I Want You to Bring Me a Slab: Remarks on the Opening Sections of the "Philosophical Investigations" Author(s): Warren D.

Goldfarb Source: Synthese, Vol. 56, No. 3, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Proceedings of a Conference Sponsored by the Austrian Institute, New York, Part II (Sep., 1983), pp. 265-282 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20115907 . Accessed: 03/01/2011 16:16
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WARREN

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IWANT REMARKS

YOU TO BRING ME A SLAB: SECTIONS OF THE INVESTIGATIONS1

ON THE OPENING

PHILOSOPHICAL
The first few pages

are often seen as of the Philosophical Investigations To many this portion of the text has appeared relatively unproblematic. and, in the end, easily digestible. reasonably clear in intent and operation, is not hard to find. Many of Witt The source of such complacency

remarks throughout his treatment of language and meaning genstein's a view to the effect that seem to be directed against a naive mentalism, in or constituted and allied notions are grounded meaning by occurrent con even mental mental perhaps images. Wittgenstein phenomena, us to look and see whether there are phenomena of the stantly urges sorts "going on inside" when we assert a sentence, issue a appropriate to a property, to a thing, attend and so on. Witt command, point the genstein's presumed point is that when we find no such phenomena,
case is won.

but to take Wittgenstein's So far this is easily digestible; primary to be naive mentalism is to take him to be attacking a straw man. It object is difficult to find any significant philosopher whose doctrines could be so is most Indeed, such naive mentalism easily defeated. foreign to just with whose views on language Wittgenstein ismost those philosophers and the author of the Tractatus. After all, the concerned, viz., Frege is "always to separate the logical keynote of early analytic philosophy are insistent from the psychological";1 and the early Wittgenstein Frege on the irrelevance of the passing mental show to any questions of Their order of priority is clear: only given the structures they meaning. can sense be made see as underlying communication of objective notions. psychological it could be claimed Of course, their protestations, the that, despite were in some straightforward mentalists way early analytic philosophers in disguise. Various led on, I believe, by their complacent commentators, construal of the Investigations' back early sections, have read mentalism into Frege and the early Wittgenstein. These readings are, to my mind, to by the texts. Moreover, simply unsupported they render it impossible understand what the aims of early analytic philosophy could have effected the dramatic change it did.2 Synthese 56 (1983) 265-282.
Copyright ? 1983 byD. Reidel

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and how

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then, is how Wittgenstein's seemingly naive remarks, and My question, to cut more in which they are embedded, could be meant the passages an attack on some rather unsophisticated i.e., to go beyond deeply, This question has a specifically theories of meaning. form, for exegetical of the nature of Wittgenstein's interlocutor in the it is the question stance does he represent, and why does sections. What opening set up the particular that he does? The oppositions Wittgenstein of an answer can come only from a close scrutiny of how these beginnings attention has to be paid to the interactions unfold. In this, moreover, to engage ways Wittgenstein's rejoinders and proposals may be meant to elicit acquiescence. and provoke the reader, not merely a curious To is to recognize and take these questions seriously feature of Wittgenstein's method. does not Wittgenstein pervasive one who expresses anything recogniz set up as his opponent ordinarily able as a philosophical mind, or what have theory of naming, meaning, you. The interlocutor does not voice developed philosophical positions; who puts forward some he is not a sophisticated Fregean or Tractarian, counters "not p". This tenet p of his system to which Wittgenstein as Wittgenstein's characterized interest in "un feature is sometimes Talk of temptations has its good points. It temptations". masking seeks not so much to propose an alternative indicates that Wittgenstein to such and such a philosophical theory, but to pull the rug out from it hints that to be successful Wittgenstein's under the theory. Moreover, that what he has pointed out is remarks must exact an acknowledgement such an acknowledgement what might have led one on. Obtaining may the sources of a philosophical rather than position require portraying itmay well be more a matter of depiction than of refuting the position:
argument.

is a slogan. Like all Witt if it is not supported by a detailed gensteinian metaphilosophical slogans, account of what is going on in the sections where the work is being it can mean anything. in suggest the slogan can mislead done, Indeed, pre ing that there are specific theses which play the role of unnoticed are beguiling, which but which mises (in, e.g., Frege's arguments), "Unmasking temptations", however, can be recognized as incorrect or misguided as soon as they are made explicit. to bring to light operates at a more wishes Rather, what Wittgenstein For in these sections Wittgenstein is examining what it is to basic level. for a philosophical account of language and meaning. The begin looking

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in the conjuring trick" (as he puts it in another context, "decisive moves ?308) do not amount to specific theses held by this or that philosopher; far they are made without notice at a point in the course of philosophizing of a particular position. Thus I see the earlier than the development as crucially concerned with exhibiting such opening of the Investigations an early stage and with evoking its character. All this is still not far beyond the level of slogans. There is no way of it out but to scrutinize Wittgenstein's it is to the words. Hence fleshing text that I now turn.

1. Wittgenstein Confessions, begins, as is well known, with a passage from Augustine's a particular and tells us that the passage expresses essence of language. The conception of the he elaborates conception of a has three features: every word names something; the meaning no difference word is what it names; there is between kinds of words.

to this as a starting point (just as with naive Surely we ought object see that anyone of importance has ever held this it is hard to mentalism); seems most inaccurate if attributed position. And again, the conception to the early analytic philosophers I have mentioned. To say of Frege that in kinds of words is to ignore the cen he does not recognize differences to his thought of his distinction between saturated and unsaturated trality (in the ordinary sense) expressions. To say that Frege takes the meaning of a word to be what it names is to misread him blindly. For Frege gives a special usage, and emphasizes the role in what we "Bedeutung" of a word of both Bedeutung call the meaning and Sinn. unreflectively to attribute this conception to the early Wittgenstein is tomiss Moreover, what he himself calls his Grundgedanke, that the logical constants do not stand for anything (Tractatus L?gico-Philosophicus, 4.0312). Now it might be said that although this so-called Augustinian true to these or other modern is not particularly thinkers, conception that their differences with these thinkers share enough of the conception it are mere matters of detail. That is to say that their actual theories of is language are not what is at issue. I think, in fact, that Wittgenstein this. But it surely does not do to use the label "Augustinian suggesting at will, and then take any considerations conception" as directly or undermining features the refuting its crude so philosophers against

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labelled.3 The task is to figure out on what level Wittgenstein might be that would make details unimportant, and what there is about a operating like this that carries over to sophisticated crude conception theorizing. I believe, that in ?1 Wittgenstein is also raising a deeper however, is expressing a conception problem. It is not at all obvious that Augustine of the essence of language. My primary reaction to the citation from the is obvious - it read by itself, is to think that what it expresses Confessions, seems trivial, prosaic, well-nigh It is just a harmless unobjectionable. of the observations that early in life children elaboration learn what are called, and learn to express their wants and needs verbally. It things no capital can the level of the commonplace; hardly goes beyond surely be made of it. to first sentence after the quotation, Thus, Iwould take Wittgenstein's the effect that Augustine's remarks contain a definite picture of the of language, to be intended to shock. Many commentators would us meekly to this sentence,4 I suggest whereas that acquiesce means to call up amazement. This is giving the essence of Wittgenstein of meaning? language? This is a philosophical conception to the unclarity of In short, Wittgenstein in ?1, pointing is, already it is to have a conception of language; we know neither what what a conception constitutes (a "picture of the essence") nor when it happens that our words express one. He is suggesting that despite its common a way of looking at can be taken as expressing air the quotation place that is in its very core philosophical. language of Augustine's The transformation remarks from trivial to metaphysi to treat certain sorts cal occurs when we read the passage as attempting as being entered of problems in certain sorts of debates. The notions invokes, like "naming some object", "wishing to point a thing Augustine after all, we and "state of mind", can be entirely unexceptionable; out", use them all the time. However, seeks to show that when Wittgenstein these notions are used in certain contexts, they come to have a weight of them does not support. that our ordinary understanding have I take Wittgenstein like these function to want in philosophy goes on. That to claim that, roughly put, innocent notions to set up the frameworks in continually are everyday notions fuels our they essence

which debate of their availability for philosophical conviction But when exploitation. a structure in general explanatory is imposed on they figure settings, them; so construed, they will shape how we view the task of any account what is to be accounted for. and how we characterize

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To expose these ordinarily hidden moves, Wittgenstein will adopt what we might call an intentional naivete. The chief expression of this stance is the constant hectoring to substantiate of the interlocutor his a hectoring remarks and even his terminology, that seems often to be the obvious. Wittgenstein's aim here is to keep us to a low challenging for we cannot see what our words come to the level of description; level, until we have a perspicuous and unbiased view of what the data are. To be sure, it is never clear beforehand what "description" is, and when we are in danger of going beyond it. In the list of "uses of language" in ?23, is not a single or homogeneous indicates that description Wittgenstein to amount to take description (and, of course, we cannot category out the facts", where like "picking the notion of fact is something to have some independent the point here content). However, supposed a sentence counts as description will depend on goes further. Whether the work to which it is to be put. The forced naivete to is thus meant how things we say, things that in ordinary contexts are the most can become else. ordinary sorts of descriptions, something to flesh out these ideas at once. In ?2, he gives a Wittgenstein begins simple example where all is open to view: the language of the builders. He says it is a language for which the description is given by Augustine correct; it is a language, I take it, where there can be no question of what it "amounts to" to make the ascriptions In ?5, does. Augustine unearth the fog to study the phenomena of notes, "It disperses Wittgenstein in primitive kinds of application in which one can command a language clear view of the aim and functioning of the words". This remark ought not to be taken flatly. To be sure, Wittgenstein adduces the example of ?2 because he hopes it to be illuminating. Yet I cannot that he intends us to accept the example without imagine For surely it raises serious questions, which are perhaps best hesitation. two ways in which the example may be brought out by considering
taken.5

like you or me, but (1) We can imagine the builders as people much four special sounds that they use in a specific way, i.e., the way having in this. We can then easily given in ?2. There seems to me little problem think of an apprentice's this "language" learning by watching, grasping the intentions in the utterances, seeing what builder A wants, etc. And there can be no hesitation in saying of A that he wants a slab and therefore calls out "Slab!". So here we see that Augustine is correct, literally and word for word.

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(2) On the other hand, we can imagine the builders as people whose in ?2. Now is given by the description the entire linguistic behavior It seems terrain has changed, as perhaps is evidenced by our imaginings. most natural then (to all I have asked) to think of these builders as as plodding, as having blank expressions, and so on. cavemen, Here a worry arises: perhaps the terrain has changed too much. Surely to it can be objected that under reading (2) the example has no relevance of language", it is then hardly a because "the study of the phenomena can we take them language at all. If this is the whole of their "language", to be human? to be speaking, to be using words with understanding, to be asking for this reaction. This is evi In fact, I take Wittgenstein denced by his use of "calls" for the words of this language, by the inter in ?65 that Wittgenstein the real problem evades locutory accusation of what counts as a language, and by by not giving a characterization see. Moreover, as we shall presently outside the Investigations ??19-20, on theFoundations to the builders several times, e.g., Remarks he alludes All this shows a fascination with V ?50 and Zettel ?99. ofMathematics to be spun out. that it is an example meant the builders, and suggests is described is not a The challenge is that under reading (2) what i.e., for denying language. Now what are the grounds for this challenge, here that there can be understanding this, so to speak, at the denying very start, so as to deny the relevance of anything further that might be said about ?2? What, after all, is wrong with taking the assistant who a slab upon hearing as starts getting it right (bringing "Slab!") understanding? There are, of course, stories that seem to support the challenge. These Yet this hardly and animal-like. imagined builders do seem mechanical to us, seems more than to say that these builders are not fully intelligible or that we cannot their lives. Wittgenstein ourselves leading imagine would then ask why one should dig in one's heels on such ground. That is, reasons for vesting would anything insistently demand in one or another particular part of any story that could be told important the challenger might well want to here. In the face of this insistence, with this: "These 'builders' don't think! They can't think; what explode has described leaves no room for thinking". Wittgenstein in Zettel the is suggested such a reaction ?99, where Indeed, "You are just tacitly assuming that these people interlocutor think; says, if that they are like people as we know them in that respect...". Now, Wittgenstein what pulls together and underlies the force of the challenge does lie in the

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idea of thought, then it should be clear that the challenge cannot operate invokes an unexamined for it implicitly at the level of description, of great intricacy and power. To mount such a challenge is, in conception the end, to imagine an independent process of thinking that is behind and It is to imagine language as stuck on to people who animates language. thoughts are what make noises into language. already have thoughts; in a full-tilt assault on philosophi does not engage Now Wittgenstein For now, it of "thinking" until later in the Investigations. cal conceptions the wealth of assumptions made when is enough to emphasize in the present context. In Zettel ?99 Wittgenstein is exploited say of the builders:
But that the important there is such and their thing is that their language, a thing as "primitive thinking" which

"thinking" goes on to

too, may be rudimetary, thinking is to be described via primitive

behaviour.

to have of taking the builders the possibility In simply presenting to their lives, the sort of thought appropriate thought", "rudimentary means to undermine "either they the sharp dichotomy Wittgenstein are just like people as we know them or else they are automata". More important, though, he is posing two general questions: From what stance to come? Upon are standards for what counts as "thinking" supposed to thought supposed to be we are ascribing what features is the power based? These questions have particular force, I think, against those who hold handle we can get on the notion of thought comes only via that whatever that they is suggesting about language. For Wittgenstein considerations in implicitly (or even subliminally) using may well have stacked the deck a conception of what is to be of thought to frame the characterization for. in thereby coloring the data that have to be accounted analyzed, and There are, of course, ways to respond to Wittgenstein's questions.6 is that one cannot buy the whole kit and caboodle at The moral, however, in the small, what aspects of our operations the start. We must examine, we are taking as crucial to "animate" language, and why. This is, in some measure, of ?19. the from the worries about conclusive Hence, emerges nothing I take this to be intentional. absence of a definite builders. Again, (The answer is also hinted at in ?360:"We say only of a human being, and of is like one, that it thinks." The hint comes from the obviously what the subject intentional vagueness of "like".) We are then meant to retain a certain

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a sense of oddity, about reading (2) of the builders' uneasiness, language. In denying the builders anything else but these calls, we have denied that we are reluctant to call the calls names. To say that them so much here "Slab!" names slabs is just to say that A calls out "Slab!" and B brings a slab; all is open to view. Because of this simplicity, we want to say that this is perhaps like a name but really is not one, or not one in the real sense - the sense inwhich we have names in our language. Stripped of the that leads to the blunt assertion "this is not language", the ideology reluctance itself is a datum. This reluctance reflects back on what I've said about ?1. As we've about the word-for-word seen, under reading (1) there is no question remarks. Under accuracy of Augustine's reading (2), however, we are to apply the notion of "naming some object" - as uneasy, and hesitate to point a thing out", "state of well as, presumably, those of "wishing the difference between mind", and the like. What creates the reluctance, the two readings, is the abrogation of the rest of language. This suggests that our everyday of these notions presuppose the sur applications that the surroundings roundings provided by the rest of language. Given are in place, we can use these notions without to mark out reservation are removed, various distinctions. When the surroundings the notions no longer operate quite rightly. Thus the relation of ?2 to Augustine's remarks is far from straightfor note that the builders provide a case for which the ward; Wittgenstein's is correct has a double edge. Augustine's description given by Augustine remarks can be trivial, if we take the notions that figure in it to be The trouble comes when we segment the description, operating locally. to point", and so on, as if they i.e., when we take "naming", "wishing out isolatable phenomena, can be given whose character in picked of any surrounding structure. dependently to why the double aspect of is connected This idea of surroundings contexts. To take the notions remarks arises in philosophical Augustine's invokes as figuring in a general account of language is to take Augustine them as picking out particular phenomena that are crucially, perhaps at stake in the operation of language. These phenomena foundationally, in and of themselves for then become the focus of theorizing. Thus, in ?6, Wittgenstein talks of the connection between word and example, of thing. His remarks there are intended not to deny that attributions to words make sense, but rather to expose a slide that results in reference a special place underlying connection the use of giving the word-thing

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of understanding. as the essential item in the explanation language, the notions are construed as operating When this sort of thing happens, on their own, independently of the rest of the structure. For it is they that about ?2 thus suggest that what ground the structure. Our considerations is already a large move. such general accounts is involved in undertaking can play a role here, of the notions that In his investigations too broad characterization intends to give this altogether Wittgenstein content by teasing out the ways in which these notions are illicitly taken as separable when exploited for certain ends. Now, one lesson we are to is that there is no accurate learn from Wittgenstein general charac - we can terization of how one can go wrong expect no systematic in isolation from the surroundings account of what it is to treat notions that ordinarily insight can be gained only by give them life. Further that of cases. I shall consider one such examination, detailed examination in ??19-20, which poses the question of how words are meant.

2. examines what I have called the notion of In ??19 and 20, Wittgenstein the animation of language by thought by looking at the relations among our command call "Slab!", the builders' "Slab!", and our sentence the he is using our hesitations regarding "Bring me a slab". Here about our language, and in particular language of ?2 to raise questions our words consists in. It disperses the fog to about what our meaning not because settle such primitive the builders, consider languages force certain questions back on us. but because they anything directly, have a very The says in these sections things the interlocutor air: our order "Slab!" is elliptical for "Bring me a slab"; commonplace when I say "Slab!" Imean "Bring me a slab"; when I say "Slab!" I want does not deny that you should bring me a slab; and so on. Wittgenstein in taking these commonplaces, but seeks to show that the interlocutor, them to evidence is putting on them a something deep about language, burden they cannot bear. starts by claiming that the builders' call is not our The interlocutor our command for "Bring me a slab". He is is elliptical since command, to locate our uneasiness with the builders in something specific trying to our sentences, as opposed in something finer than about their calls i.e., lives are, after all, different from fact that the builders' the overarching

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ours. Wittgenstein command is elliptical (as it agrees that our one-word how does this humdrum observation show a difference surely is). But call? The it and the builders' interlocutor that the between responds follows conclusion because builders' the does not simply language contain the longer sentence. The interlocutor must, then, be construing of our command "Slab!" for "Bring me a slab" to imply the ellipticality of the former is parasitic on that of the latter. He that the functioning of our one-word command as a conventionally conceives shortened form me a slab". Something sentence is left out in the of the real "Bring former, and we are in some way more accurate when we put it back in by filling in the ellipsis. He is claiming that any account of what we do with the shortened sentence must go by way of the longer one: our command it is at bottom the longer "Slab!" can function as it does only because
sentence.

here is headed towards a philosophical theory of of the relation between with his characterization language. Agreement the shorter and longer sentences will rapidly drive towards the idea of as some have there being a full sense of our sentences (or a proposition, put it), viz., what is obtained when all of the "ellipses" have been filled in. to the will call our attention To block this drive at the start Wittgenstein in this way, is in which the notion of ellipticality, when construed ways The interlocutor groundless. Thus he asks, with an innocent air, why we don't take the one-word to be "convention command as the basic form, and the longer sentence we do this, there is no bar to identifying the builders' (If ally lengthened". to be taken as the is the longer sentence call with our command.) Why standard? answers that it is because you really mean the longer in one tone of voice utter the shorter sentence. Again, you a triviality. The interlocutor, is in effect emphasizing this is however, that the conviction the deep-seated and is thereby voicing "really", some sort of priority. He sentence is construing has "really longer as a relation to something. The something here is the longer meaning" sentence as opposed to the shorter. In the philosophical run, not-so-long turns out to be the full sense, or the thought in its entirety, the something as uttered. the sentence which may well go beyond some support for taking such talk of "really To point out the need for as showing that one form of the sentence ismore basic than the meaning" The interlocutor when sentence other, Wittgenstein dismissively asks, "Do you say the unshortened

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to yourself?" The answer, of course, sentence is no. All that can be is that the two sentences mean the same, and that the shorter concluded even asks, "Why should I not say one is, well, shorter. Wittgenstein 'When he says "Slab!" he means "Slab!"'?" then we should Now, we normally do not say such things. Perhaps at this question. For it suggests that the interlocutor could pause he does not) point out the following: we say "When he says (although 'Slab!' he means 'Bring me a slab'", but not "When he says 'Slab!' he means 'Slab!' ". Nor do we say "When he says 'Bring me a 'slab' he means 'Slab!'". Surely this shows that the longer sentence is a more accurate locus of meaning. But how does this show that? We say "When he says X he means Y" in to a question, when something is unclear. about the utterance response It is hard to imagine a case in which we would be unclear about "Bring me a slab" yet would have understood had "Slab!" been said. Hence the shorter sentence the longer. This is not, in general, useful for explaining is an innocent observation, but the interlocutor that the concludes shorter sentence depends on the longer one. Of course there is a jump here that amounts to an implicit adoption of an inchoate conception of "full sense". For the full sense represents the complete of explanation the one that handles any unclarity that could possibly arise. The meaning, assumption of such a final resting point provides a notion of a "direction of analysis". It is this notion that funds the interlocutor's claim that me a slab" is more basic than "Slab!". Now Wittgenstein "Bring in many ways. He challenges criticizes this conception the idea of and all possible and denies that unclarities, complete explanation and doubts elicit something in the questions already there, somehow, sentence. These need not be rehearsed criticisms, however, original we make task is to show that the observations here.7 For the present about meaning when we stick to the descriptive level do not by themselves substantiate the interlocutor's claims. If these claims are a conception when we of full sense or substantiated only import tantamount to it - a philosophical of the essence of something picture is ever there were one then that is enough. language attack of the sort I am discussing (Clearly, no one Wittgensteinian could be conclusive. A defender of the conception under attack can, at - not else fact under each juncture, claim that something the putative consideration furnishes its true support. But enough cases like this will these disavowals surely make ring hollow.)

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In any case, the interlocutor of ?19 does not invoke features of how we explain what we mean. He takes a different tack. To show that something can be gotten at only via the four-word about the one-word command one, the interlocutor says, "When I call 'Slab!', then what Iwant is, that he should bring me a slab?" Again Wittgenstein agrees to the common is speaking as if the its efficacy. The interlocutor place, but challenges to the longer sentence. He had isolatable parts corresponding wanting of the speaker's desires to something passes from a certain description But what is the justification for this move? about the "real sentence". Note, by the way, that we can equally well say, "When I say 'Slab!', Iwant a slab", or, "When I say 'Slab!', I want him to obey the command the description 'Slab!'". The various ways we can transform here no evidence for taking one sentence constitute rather than the other as
basic.

In trying to base his claim on what the utterer of "Slab!" wants, the interlocutor is taking there to be an object of the wanting, viz., a state of and that has a specific character affairs that is wanted given by a canonical verbal description. Wittgenstein asks for the grounds for such a construal of the wanting. with which Wittgenstein The question concludes is grounded only if the utterer ?19 suggests that the construal of "Slab!" in some sense thinks the longer sentence. Clearly, however, no such conscious thought is, in general, present. Hence the construal either or else relies upon some notion of unconscious or implicit is groundless in the latter case, the interlocutor is simply presupposing thought. And to substantiate. what he needs the idea that the He must support one-word command depends on the four-word command. But to assert or implicit thought of the longer sentence that unconscious always occurs is already to assume that "Bring me a slab" is a more accurate of the "elliptical" command "Slab!": it is to assume that our expression with "Slab!" are mediated by some more basic relation to operations
"Bring me a slab".

cannot rely on a basic level of language to anchor what we what is it to mean "Bring me a slab" itself, i.e., to mean the longer mean, form? In ?20 the interlocutor suggests a plausible answer: it is to use the sentence contrast with other sentences in that share some of these words, a slab", "Bring me a pillar", etc. I shall call these other like "Bring him Yet if we
sentences "variants".

The give

interlocutor's suggestion may rise to yet another philosophical

seem

obviously

conception:

right, but it can the idea that the

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out of something of the sentence is constructed meaning specific located in each word that can be gleaned from contrasts with those something variants in which that word alone is replaced, and that tells what is done to the alternatives. It is not far to the in using just this word as opposed we understand and the sentence by grasping its constituents idea that are combined. seeing how they in contrast to its variants" is taken when "using a sentence However, to ground the notion of how we mean a sentence, it appears that to use a an act that explains sentence in contrast is to perform the speaker's as before, Wittgenstein notes sentence. Here, that that no uttering a localization of "using of mental life support such features introspectible act. The absence of such introspectibilia it in contrast" in a particular the jump that has been made in ascribing a certain character to highlights notion of using in contrast, for it indicates the otherwise unobjectionable that this ascription rests on no facts whatever. Wittgenstein adduces the to undermine further considerations the ascription: the usual following talk surrounding particular acts is inapplicable; questions like "Do all the seem enter into the act?" and "When does it happen?" variants completely inappropriate. then points out that we say we use the sentence in Wittgenstein contrast because our language contains the variants. It is, of course, a truism that we could not use a sentence in contrast to others if the others were not available. Wittgenstein means more, however: to say one uses in contrast to the variants the sentence is to say no more than that the language contains these variants, and when one utters the given sentence one is not uttering the variants. The whole content of our talk of using a sentence in contrast lies in the availability of alternatives in our language. There is no particular act which is the "using in contrast", except for the utterance of the sentence itself. Itmight be objected that we do have a richer notion of using a sentence in contrast to others, e.g., when I have thought about whether to write rather than "very talented" in a letter of recom talented" "quite mendation. so, but in specific settings like these we have the Exactly facts that anchor the "using in contrast". The act of choosing particular is visible, there are specific alternatives, and questions like "When does it are answerable. The interlocutor's notion is not like this. He is happen?" - as in contrast" as a general phenomenon talking of "using the sentence with the contrast class including all the possible always occurring variants. And then there are no facts that could ground a notion of a

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sort of act. Nothing is being particular meant them". these words and

added

to the description

"I said

Thus the interlocutor may be charged with illicitly importing features into an overly general notion. However, in special contexts that emerge claims that in general the diagnosis may be taken further. Wittgenstein no more is going on than that I said this sentence and meant it, though I but didn't. One wants to could have said any of those other sentences, more must be going on. For the fact that I could have said object that but didn't, bespeaks The notion of those other sentences, something. "using in contrast" gives what lies behind my saying this sentence and not to explain those others. There must be something behind my utterances are available to me. Imust in them rather than others that why Imake some way be constantly weighing, checking, and selecting my words, just as I do consciously when Iwrite letters of recommendation. Either acts of like picking, but not exactly picking) go on all the picking (or something - I am time, or else I am not speaking only mooing. The Wittgensteinian response to all this would be to scrutinize both the the picture of picture of rational language use at work here (including it embodies) for explanations and the felt need of our rationality utterances. Why, what I say explanation after all, isn't my meaning is to be secured by demanding further? Is there something enough? What like that, in the end, would satisfy these demands? Questions anything sees the in the Investigations, for Wittgenstein these surface frequently as operating for explanation and desire powerfully, pervasively, in philosophy. With regard to ?20, however, we need only misleadingly To rely on unexplored is operating say that that desire prematurely. about the nature of rational language use is to assume far presuppositions too much about the subject that we are supposed to be investigating from the ground up. has tried to show that what we all agree Once again, then, Wittgenstein to concerning meaning does not by itself support the idea that "what I - a sentence whose internal sentence mean" picks out a privileged how my utterance does its job. When we recognize features will explain to speak of a sentence's this, it is no longer dangerous being elliptical. that the sentence leaves talk does not commit us to thinking out that I supply by "meaning it". "Slab!" for is elliptical something "Bring me a slab" because they mean the same and the former is shorter. out arises from the fact The feeling that the former leaves something like the latter can that, given the whole of our language, certain forms Such

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for example, that can forestall be taken as paradigmatic. (Forms, or forms that simply a wide enough range of circumstances, in unclarities are familiar enough and used frequently enough. As the occurrences of indicate, there are no absolutely paradigmatic forms.) Ellip "enough" ticality does not point to any notion of the complete content of our words that which may go beyond the words as uttered and which those words in some ultimate way express. In short, that two sentences have the same sense does not imply that that sense. Indeed, in the last there is a privileged way of expressing of ?20, Wittgenstein off a request for just such a puts paragraph verbal expression with the observation that what it comes to privileged to have the same sense is that they have the same use. for two expressions It might be objected that this is false, and that, indeed, no two sentences have (exactly) the same use, since there will inevitably be some occasions where one would be employed but not the other. The reply to means "more or less the same use". this is not simply that Wittgenstein To ascribe sameness of sense to two sentences is to say that they have in common. What features might be essential features of their application to the ascription for that depends on our aims in is not given beforehand, on the reasons we are talking - in the particular context the classification, of sense at all. Indeed, Iwould argue that there is no general notion of use, and would claim thatWittgenstein agrees. For such reasons, I do not as use in ?43 as a definition, or read his notorious "definition" of meaning as explanatory, or as suggesting a "use-based (This theory of meaning". not to be a is closely connected with reading taking Wittgenstein It should be clear that if he is not, then little can be made of behaviorist. talk of "use" simpliciter.) Given that invoking use by itself carries little I take his remark in ?43 to be, by and large, a denial of the information, of theorizing about meaning. and appropriateness possibility In sum, Wittgenstein in which is concerned in ??19-20 with ways can arise. His point may perhaps about meaning philosophical questions be summarized by a remark from the Zettel ?16:
The mistake is to say that there is anything that meaning something consists in.

in Yet, of course, he is hardly denying that we can and do mean sentences various ways. Rather, he is trying to get us to resist the impulse to localize in a specific act or event. Admittedly, it is no easy meaning something to pin down precisely what the denial of this status to meaning matter something amounts to.8 Partly, Wittgenstein is urging that the

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answer to a question of how a sentence ismeant depends on no one thing, or few things, in particular, but rather on a variety of features of the utterance and the utterer, and on the circumstances inwhich the question is denying that the notion of is asked. More important, Wittgenstein of language, certain conceptions and, in supports meaning something that it supports the idea that there is the thing that ismeant particular, (which would be the content or relatum of the act). In taking meaning amiss, Wittgenstein charges, we illicitly use the life in talking of ways we have of talking about the surface level of mental to the and understanding. His pointing notions like meaning, wanting, sorts is a way to of the appropriate lack of introspectible phenomena rather than show that an unwarranted step has been taken. It is this step mentalistic that he wishes to undercut. To use his any specifically theory term of art, it is a question of the grammar of crucial notions like a naive of that grammar, Given certain misunderstandings meaning. a mentalistic to account. But reactions attempt might philosopher mentalism seek only to replace one explanans with another, and hence about the explanandum. rely on the same presuppositions is not tied discerns, here as elsewhere, Indeed, the move Wittgenstein to any one developed it ismade on the way view. Rather, philosophical it is made, that Once there will be questions into philosophizing. will begin to debate, notions that philosophers will begin to philosophers wishes to snap such debates off before they begin by refine. Wittgenstein that at the start we have misread the facts. He is indicating the showing in common of our insistence that these facts, expressed groundlessness places we all agree to, point inevitably to the notions that are the subject of philosphical debate. the ways we As we've seen, he does this by constantly challenging might want to exploit the commonplaces. the common By themselves, can claim are perfectly unobjectionable (that iswhy Wittgenstein places in ?305 that he is not denying anything). Yet every time we try to make of them, it turns out that a jump has been made: we have something a special of the commonplaces. This assumed interpretation already raises the question of where the insistence that the facts must be so read
comes from.

to uncover in turn, can serve unexamined pre question, of thought as animating language, of what protopictures conceptions of meaning must rest on, of the nature of rational language explanations affect what we take use, etc. His point then is that these preconceptions That

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philosophically tinted

as data. We
spectacles.

read

the commonplaces

through

are powerful, Of course, such protopictures and cannot be simply In a sense, the opening dismissed. sections of the Investigations set an the charge that philosophers agenda. To substantiate groundlessly misconstrue the commonplace, must go on to investigate Wittgenstein further aspects of what he sees as the fuel for such misconstruals. It is the subtle and interwoven nature of these factors that makes the In in every direction". "criss-cross appear to proceed vestigations The opening sections of the Investigations, though, have the crucial to light that there is something to be examined role of bringing at this even to begin level. What makes it possible for philosophizing is a decisive move that is ordinarily unrecognized, very natural, and hard to of avoiding. Wittgenstein conceive is trying to expose the distance we take matters when we first start philosophizing between how and what we really have to go on. It is not easy to recognize this, and itmay be far more difficult to accept the "pictureless" view of things that such a recognition entails.

NOTES at theWittgenstein This paper, delivered on April Florida State University, Conference, on the Investigations. is a fragment of a work in progress I am profoundly indebted 1,1982, to Burton over with whom discussions the last fourteen Dreben, years have greatly influenced my views on the later Wittgenstein. I am most grateful too to Thomas Ricketts for many comments instructive and much advice. helpful 1 Gottlob The Foundations Illinois: Northwestern Frege, (Evanston, of Arithmetic Press, 1980), p. XL University 2 of disguised mentalism often arise from the view that the logicolinguistic Allegations some sort of "epistemological" theories of Frege and of the early Wittgenstein presuppose it is alleged, foundation. these philosophers have Thus, which, faute de mieux, must be psychologistic. epistemology resides. of this line of thought is in P. (The best example (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), Chapter II.) Such on a lack of appreciation of the ways inwhich the theories of received views Wittgenstein's Blackwell, to subscribe That is where to some implicit the mentalism and to me Illusion to rest *

Hacker, Insight seem allegations these philosophers

undermine

in philosophy. See H. Mounce, (then and now) of the place of epistemology Tractatus of Chicago and Oxford: Basil Press, (Chicago: University 1 and 2, and T. Ricketts, and 1981), especially Chapters 'Objectivity

of judgement' objecthood: Frege's metaphysics Synthese). (forthcoming, 3 Cf. G. Baker and P. Hacker, and Meaning Wittgenstein: Understanding (Chicago: of Chicago Basil Blackwell, 1. Press, and Oxford: 1980), Chapter University 4 Massachusetts: Harvard E.g., A. Kenny, Press, Wittgenstein (Cambridge, University

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1973),

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(Oxford: was Oxford

Press, 5 That

(London: of Wittgenstein and Kegan Paul, 1970). Routledge 7 and perhaps relevant. ??87-89 ?209 are most directly 8 I take, e.g., ??140-160 to be attempting to pin down the related idea that understanding is not a specific, state or process. isolatable mental Dept. of Philosophy Harvard University MA 02138 Cambridge, U.S.A.

A Memoir p. 154; N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: and P. Hacker, loc. cit. 1958), p. 71; and G. Baker of the builders may be read in two ways the example Stanley Cavell. 6 See R. Rhees, in Discussions builders', 'Wittgenstein's

University to me by

first suggested