4.

6 Empirical Relation Between Mean, Median And Mode A distribution in which the values of mean, median and mode coincide (i.e. mean = median = mode) is known as a symmetrical distribution. Conversely, when values of mean, median and mode are not equal the distribution is known as asymmetrical or skewed distribution. In moderately skewed or asymmetrical distribution a very important relationship exists among these three measures of central tendency. In such distributions the distance between the mean and median is about one-third of the distance between the mean and mode, as will be clear from the diagrams 1 and 2. Karl Pearson expressed this relationship as: Mode = mean - 3 [mean - median] Mode = 3 median - 2 mean and Median = mode + Knowing any two values, the third can be computed. Example Given median = 20.6, mode = 26 Find mean. Solution:

Q.3 Concept of conditional probability. (pata ni sahi k ni)

There is also a concept of the conditional probability of an event given a discrete random variable. Such a conditional probability is a random variable in its own right. Suppose X is a random variable that can be equal either to 0 or to 1. As above, one may speak of the conditional probability of any event A given the event X = 0, and also of the conditional probability of A given the event X = 1. The former is denoted P(A|X = 0) and the latter P(A|X = 1). Now define a new random variable Y, whose value is P(A|X = 0) if X = 0 and P(A|X = 1) if X = 1. That is

This new random variable Y is said to be the conditional probability of the event A given the discrete random variable X:

According to the "law of total probability", the expected value of Y is just the marginal (or "unconditional") probability of A. More generally still, it is possible to speak of the conditional probability of an event given a sigma-algebra. Bayes' Theorem is a simple mathematical formula used for calculating conditional probabilities. It figures prominently in subjectivist or Bayesian approaches to epistemology, statistics, and inductive logic. Subjectivists, who maintain that rational belief is governed by the laws of probability, lean heavily on conditional probabilities in their theories of evidence and their models of empirical learning. Bayes' Theorem is central to these enterprises both because it simplifies the calculation of conditional probabilities and because it clarifies significant features of subjectivist position. Indeed, the Theorem's central insight that a hypothesis is confirmed by any body of data that its truth renders probable is the cornerstone of all subjectivist methodology.

1. Conditional Probabilities and Bayes' Theorem

The probability of a hypothesis H conditional on a given body of data E is the ratio of the unconditional probability of the conjunction of the hypothesis with the data to the unconditional probability of the data alone. (1.1) Definition. The probability of H conditional on E is defined as PE(H) = P(H & E)/P(E), provided that

both terms of this ratio exist and P(E) > 0.[1] To illustrate, suppose J. Doe is a randomly chosen American who was alive on January 1, 2000. According to the United States Center for Disease Control, roughly 2.4 million of the 275 million Americans alive on that date died during the 2000 calendar year. Among the approximately 16.6 million senior citizens (age 75 or greater) about 1.36 million died. The unconditional probability of the hypothesis that our J. Doe died during 2000, H, is just the population-wide mortality rate P(H) = 2.4M/275M = 0.00873. To find the probability of J. Doe's death conditional on the information, E, that he or she was a senior citizen, we divide the probability that he or she was a senior who died, P(H & E) = 1.36M/275M = 0.00495, by the probability that he or she was a senior citizen, P(E) = 16.6M/275M = 0.06036. Thus, the probability of J. Doe's death given that he or she was a senior is PE(H) = P(H & E)/P(E) = 0.00495/0.06036 = 0.082. Notice how the size of the total population factors out of this equation, so that PE(H) is just the proportion of seniors who died. One should contrast this quantity, which gives the mortality rate among senior citizens, with the "inverse" probability of E conditional on H, PH(E) = P(H & E)/P(H) = 0.00495/0.00873 = 0.57, which is the proportion of deaths in the total population that occurred among seniors. Here are some straightforward consequences of (1.1):
y y y y

Probability. PE is a probability function.[2] Logical Consequence. If E entails H, then PE(H) = 1. Preservation of Certainties. If P(H) = 1, then PE(H) = 1. Mixing. P(H) = P(E)PE(H) + P(~E)P~E(H).[3]

The most important fact about conditional probabilities is undoubtedly Bayes' Theorem, whose significance was first appreciated by the British cleric Thomas Bayes in his posthumously published masterwork, "An Essay Toward Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances" (Bayes 1764). Bayes' Theorem relates the "direct" probability of a hypothesis conditional on a given body of data, PE(H), to the "inverse" probability of the data conditional on the hypothesis, PH(E). (1.2) Bayes' Theorem. PE(H) = [P(H)/P(E)] PH(E) In an unfortunate, but now unavoidable, choice of terminology, statisticians refer to the inverse probability PH(E) as the "likelihood" of H on E. It expresses the degree to which the hypothesis predicts the data given the background information codified in the probability P. In the example discussed above, the condition that J. Doe died during 2000 is a fairly strong predictor of senior citizenship. Indeed, the equation PH(E) = 0.57 tells us that 57% of the total deaths occurred among seniors that year. Bayes' theorem lets us use this information to compute the "direct" probability of J. Doe dying given that he or she was a senior citizen. We do this by multiplying the "prediction term" PH(E) by the ratio of the total number of deaths in the population to the number of senior citizens in the population, P(H)/P(E) = 2.4M/16.6M = 0.144. The result is PE(H) = 0.57 0.144 = 0.082, just as expected.

Though a mathematical triviality, Bayes' Theorem is of great value in calculating conditional probabilities because inverse probabilities are typically both easier to ascertain and less subjective than direct probabilities. People with different views about the unconditional probabilities of E and H often disagree about E's value as an indicator of H. Even so, they can agree about the degree to which the hypothesis predicts the data if they know any of the following intersubjectively available facts: (a) E's objective probability given H, (b) the frequency with which events like E will occur if H is true, or (c) the fact that H logically entails E. Scientists often design experiments so that likelihoods can be known in one of these "objective" ways. Bayes' Theorem then ensures that any dispute about the significance of the experimental results can be traced to "subjective" disagreements about the unconditional probabilities of H and E. When both PH(E) and P~H(E) are known an experimenter need not even know E's probability to determine a value for PE(H) using Bayes' Theorem. (1.3) Bayes' Theorem (2nd form).[4] PE(H) = P(H)PH(E) / [P(H)PH(E) + P(~H)P~H(E)] In this guise Bayes' theorem is particularly useful for inferring causes from their effects since it is often fairly easy to discern the probability of an effect given the presence or absence of a putative cause. For instance, physicians often screen for diseases of known prevalence using diagnostic tests of recognized sensitivity and specificity. The sensitivity of a test, its "true positive" rate, is the fraction of times that patients with the disease test positive for it. The test's specificity, its "true negative" rate, is the proportion of healthy patients who test negative. If we let H be the event of a given patient having the disease, and E be the event of her testing positive for it, then the test's specificity and sensitivity are given by the likelihoods PH(E) and P~H(~E), respectively, and the "baseline" prevalence of the disease in the population is P(H). Given these inputs about the effects of the disease on the outcome of the test, one can use (1.3) to determine the probability of disease given a positive test. For a more detailed illustration of this process, see Example 1 in the Supplementary Document "Examples, Tables, and Proof Sketches".