THAMES WATER UTILITIES LIMITED Capital Delivery Rose Kiln Court, Rose Kiln Lane Reading Berkshire RG2

0HP

DOCUMENT REF: ISSUE DATE:

TWUL/E04 ISSUE 4.0 MAY 2009

STANDARD PRACTICE DOCUMENT E04 ZONING OF HAZARDOUS AREAS ISSUE 4.0

Date Issued Manual No.

May 2009 Uncontrolled Copy

Page 1 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 0.0 ISSUE 4.0 0.1 CONFIDENTIALITY Title to and copyright in this document vest in Thames Water Utilities Limited (TWUL). This document is CONFIDENTIAL to the recipient and members of this organisation with a need to see it. All issued paper copies must be returned when the recipient has no further use for it, and if he/she is an employee, all copies (electronic or otherwise) shall be surrendered on leaving the Company. Reproduction of the whole or part thereof shall not be made without the express permission of the Head of Capital Delivery.

Page 2 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 0.0 ISSUE 4.0 0.2 CONTENTS LIST SECTION 0.1 0.2 0.2.1 DESCRIPTION CONFIDENTIALITY CONTENTS LIST List of Tables 10 List of Figures 13 NOTES REGISTERED HOLDERS REVIEW AND AMENDMENT PROCEDURE INTRODUCTION ENQUIRIES AND AUTHORS GENERAL SPECIFIC MEANINGS GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS Definition of Area Classification Terms 18 Abbreviations (used within this SPD) 22 2.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 6.0 6.1 6.1.1 SCOPE REFERENCED MATERIAL LEGISLATION STANDARDS OTHER DOCUMENTS DSEAR COMPLIANCE DESIGN OF PLANT AND EQUIPMENT STORAGE OF DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES CONTROL AND MITIGATION MEASURES MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR PROCEDURES MARKING OF HAZARDOUS AREAS PRINCIPLES OF AREA CLASSIFICATION INTRODUCTION KEY TERMS FOR AREA CLASSIFICATION HAZARDOUS AREA ZONING EXTENT OF ZONE NON- HAZARDOUS AREA GRADE OF RELEASE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GRADE OF RELEASE AND CLASS OF ZONE PROCEDURE FOR AREA CLASSIFICATION ASSESSING THE RISK Risk Assessment Process 38 Flammable Liquids in Drainage Systems (FLIDS) 39 DETERMINING HAZARDOUS AREAS 41 24 25 25 25 25 27 27 28 29 30 31 35 35 35 35 36 36 36 36 38 38 15 15 15 17 17 17 18 18 2 3

0.2.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4.1

1.4.2

6.1.2 6.2

Page 3 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 0.0 ISSUE 4.0 6.2.1 Personnel 42 Timing 42 Information Required 43 Equipment Details 43 Recording Area Classifications 43 CLASSIFICATION OF AREAS WHERE FLAMMABLE GASES OR VAPOURS MAY BE PRESENT 45 CLASSIFICATION OF AREAS WHERE COMBUSTIBLE DUSTS MAY BE PRESENT 45 Classification Procedure for Explosive Dust Clouds 46 Dust Layer Hazard 46 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.3.1 MODEL SOLUTIONS FOR SEWERAGE AND SEWAGE TREATMENT FACILITIES INTRODUCTION VENTILATION AND ODOUR CONTROL SYSTEMS SEWERS Domestic Foul Sewer 49 Combined Sewer 50 SEWAGE PUMPING STATIONS Domestic Effluent Wet Well 52 Combined Effluent Wet Well 52 Combined Effluent Dry Well 52 Equipment in Wet Wells 53 Example Zoning for Sewage Pumping Stations 54 STORAGE CHAMBERS AND CSOS PRELIMINARY AND PRIMARY TREATMENT (INCLUDING STORM WATER STORAGE) 66 66 51 48 48 48 49

6.2.2

6.2.3

6.2.4

6.2.5 6.3 6.4 6.4.1

6.4.2

7.3.2 7.4 7.4.1

7.4.2

7.4.3

7.4.4

7.4.5 7.5 7.6

Page 4 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 0.0 ISSUE 4.0 7.6.1 General 66 Classification of Inlet Channels and Chambers Open to Atmosphere 67 Classification of Enclosed or Sheltered Inlet Channels and Chambers in Open Air 68 Enclosed, Open and Ventilated Channels in Buildings 69 Primary Settlement (including Storm Water Storage) 71 INTERSTAGE PUMPING STATIONS SLUDGE STORAGE, THICKENING/DEWATERING DIGESTERS DIGESTED SLUDGE VESSELS, SUMPS AND LAGOONS PIPEWORK CONTAINING DIGESTED SLUDGE DIGESTED SLUDGE CENTRIFUGES DIGESTED SLUDGE PRESSES AND PRESS HOUSES Press Liquors 81 GAS MAINS Definitions 82 Gas Pipework and Fittings 82 Condensate Drains 84 Low Pressure Gas Mains Installed in the Open Air 84 Medium Pressure Gas Mains Installed in the Open Air 85 Medium and Low Pressure Gas Mains Installed in Covered Ducts 86 Gas Mains Installed in Plant Rooms 86 Gas Receivers 87 GASHOLDERS GAS COMPRESSORS AND BLOWERS Gas Compressors and Blowers Installed in the Open Air 90 Enclosed Gas Compressors and Blowers 92 FLARES / WASTE GAS BURNERS 94 87 90 72 72 73 77 80 80 81

7.6.2

7.6.3

7.6.4

7.6.5 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.10 7.11 7.12 7.13 7.13.1 7.14 7.14.1

82

7.14.2

7.14.3

7.14.4

7.14.5

7.14.6

7.14.7

7.14.8 7.15 7.16 7.16.1

7.16.2 7.17

Page 5 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 0.0 ISSUE 4.0 7.18 7.18.1 PLANT ROOMS Plant Rooms for Engines, Boilers or Other Fired Equipment 98 Plant Rooms for Pumps 99 Other Enclosed Spaces 99 LPG FACILITIES DISTILLATE FUEL ROADWAYS AND VEHICLES FOR USE IN ZONED AREAS ODOUR CONTROL PLANT CLASSIFICATION OF FACILITIES (WATER TREATMENT) INTRODUCTION ELECTROCHLORINATION PLANT AMMONIATION FACILITIES UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES AND TUNNELS PUMPING STATIONS PLANT ROOMS FOR ENGINES, BOILERS AND OTHER FIRED EQUIPMENT LPG FACILITIES OTHER PLANT CLASSIFICATION OF FACILITIES (WORKSHOPS AND LABORATORIES) INTRODUCTION WORKSHOPS LABORATORIES Fire Control Measures 110 Fume Cupboards 111 Releases into enclosed spaces 111 10.0 10.1 SELECTION OF EQUIPMENT FOR USE IN POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE ATMOSPHERES 113 SOURCES OF IGNITION 113 99 102 102 102 103 103 103 105 106 106 106 106 106 108 108 108 109 98

7.18.2

7.18.3 7.19 7.20 7.21 7.22 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.3.1

9.3.2

9.3.3

Page 6 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 0.0 ISSUE 4.0 10.1.1 Unprotected Flames 113 Mechanically Generated Sparks 113 Static Electricity 113 Lightning 114 Electrical Equipment 114 Hot Surfaces (non-electrical equipment) 114 Other Ignition Sources 114 GAS DETECTORS Introduction 115 Use of Gas Detectors 115 Use of Gas Detectors in a Safety Instrumented System 116 Methods of Flammable Gas Detection 118 Response characteristics 118 Location of Sensors 119 References 120 SELECTION OF MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT CATEGORY SELECTION OF TYPES OF PROTECTION ACCORDING TO HAZARD ZONE SELECTION ACCORDING TO TEMPERATURE CLASS SELECTION ACCORDING TO APPARATUS SUBGROUP SELECTION ACCORDING TO ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS COMPLETION OF RECORDS MARKING OF APPARATUS INSTALLATION ELECTRIC LIGHTING LIGHTNING PROTECTION INSPECTION, TESTING AND COMMISSIONING COMPETENCY AND TRAINING BASIS AND FREQUENCY OF INSPECTION FORMS OF INSPECTION 121 121 122 125 125 126 126 126 127 127 127 129 129 129 129 115

10.1.2

10.1.3

10.1.4

10.1.5

10.1.6

10.1.7 10.2 10.2.1

10.2.2

10.2.3

10.2.4

10.2.5

10.2.6

10.2.7 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9 10.10 10.11 10.12 10.13 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.3

Page 7 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 0.0 ISSUE 4.0 11.4 11.5 11.6 11.7 11.8 11.9 11.10 11.11 11.12 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 A1.0 A1.1 A1.2 A1.2.1 INSPECTION FINDINGS AND FAULT CATEGORIES ISOLATION MAINTENANCE OF INTRINSICALLY SAFE SYSTEMS ALTERATIONS AND REPAIRS TO APPARATUS AND SYSTEMS INSULATION TESTING FASTENINGS AND TOOLS PORTABLE APPARATUS PERMITS TO WORK AND GAS FREE CERTIFICATES EQUIPMENT REPAIR REFERENCES THAMES WATER PUBLICATIONS HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE (HSE) PUBLICATIONS BRITISH STANDARDS MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS SOURCES OF RELEASE SOURCES OF FLAMMABLE MATERIALS PROPERTIES OF FLAMMABLE MATERIALS Flammable Gases 139 Properties of Biogas 139 Properties of Fuels, Lubricating Oils and Treatment Chemicals 140 Effects of Oxygen Enrichment, Temperature, and Pressure 141 SOURCES OF BIOGAS IN WASTEWATER AND SLUDGES Sewer Gas 141 Raw Sludge 142 Digested Sludge 142 Hydrogen Sulphide and Ammonia 142 OTHER SOURCES OF GAS Landfill Gas 142 Geological Methane 142 SOURCES OF FLAMMABLE LIQUID FROM ACCIDENTS Accident Spillages (WRc Data) 143 Flammable Liquids In Drainage Systems 143 Vapourisation Rates (Petrol) 144 143 142 141 130 132 132 132 133 133 133 133 133 134 134 134 134 135 138 138 138

A1.2.2

A1.2.3

A1.2.4 A1.3 A1.3.1

A1.3.2

A1.3.3

A1.3.4 A1.4 A1.4.1

A1.4.2 A1.5 A1.5.1

A1.5.2

A1.5.3

Page 8 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 0.0 ISSUE 4.0 A2.0 A2.1 A2.2 A2.2.1 VENTILATION AND AREA CLASSIFICATION GENERAL TYPES OF VENTILATION Main Types 145 Natural Ventilation 145 Artificial Ventilation 146 Specific Categories for Area Classification 147 CLASSIFICATION OF ENCLOSED AND SHELTERED AREAS Requirement and Definition 147 Classification Details 147 ARTIFICIAL VENTILATION - SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS Supply and Discharge Locations 149 Loss of Artificial Ventilation 149 Gas Detection 150 VENTILATION REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN FACILITIES Wet Wells 150 Gas Compressors and Blowers 150 Plant Rooms 151 SAFETY INSTRUMENTED SYSTEMS 153 150 149 147 145 145 145

A2.2.2

A2.2.3

A2.2.4 A2.3 A2.3.1

A2.3.2 A2.4 A2.4.1

A2.4.2

A2.4.3 A2.5 A2.5.1

A2.5.2

A2.5.3 A2.6

Page 9 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 0.0 ISSUE 4.0 A2.6.1 Introduction 153 IEC 61508 requirements 153 Risk Reduction requirements 156 Technical Options 157 Summary of Reliability Calculations. 158 Conclusions. 161 A3.0 A3.1 A3.1.1 HAZARDOUS AREA CALCULATIONS DISPERSION CALCULATIONS Dispersion from Release at High Velocity (more than 10m/s) 162 Dispersion from Release at Low Velocity 162 DISPERSION GRAPH FOR ZONE EXTENTS FROM COVERED WET WELLS 163 EXAMPLES OF HAZARDOUS AREA CALCULATIONS 163 Example1: Sewage Pumping Station - Submersible Pump and Motor Set (NOT domestic foul only) - see Figure 7.2(b) 163 Example 2: Floating Roof Digester - Hazardous Area Extents for PRV 165 FLARE MINIMUM SEPARATION DISTANCE 167 162 162

A2.6.2

A2.6.3

A2.6.4

A2.6.5

A2.6.6

A3.1.2 A3.2 A3.3 A3.3.1

A3.3.2 A3.4

0.2.1

List of Tables

Table 4.1 4.2 4.3 6.1 7.1

Title Guidance for Positioning of Ex Warning Signs on Waste Water installations Guidance for Positioning of Ex warning signs on Digester/Sludge Installations. Guidance for Positioning of Ex warning signs on Electrochlorination Plants Typical Sources of Dangerous Substances Zone Extents for High Risk Combined Sewer Vents

Page 28 28 28 33 46

Page 10 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 0.0 ISSUE 4.0 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.10 7.11 7.12 7.13 7.14 7.15 7.16 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 11.1 11.2 A1.1 A1.2 Zone Classification of Sewage Pumping Stations Hazard Distances from Openings in High Risk Wet Wells Zone Classification of Inlet Works, Channels and Chambers Zoning Distance for Water Seal Leakage Floating Roof Digesters Hazard Distances for Inadequately Ventilated Storage Vessels Containing Digested Sludge Hazard Distances for Open Sumps Containing Digested Sludge Zone 1 Distances for Gas Leakage from Condensate Drains Zone 2 Distances for Medium Pressure Gas Mains in Open Air Zone 2 Distances for Centrifugal/Reciprocating Compressors in Open Air Discharge radius from Compressor Vents Minimum Ventilation Rates (m3/s) for Enclosed Centrifugal Centrifugal/Reciprocating Compressors Zone 2 Distances for Enclosed Centrifugal/Reciprocating Compressors Flare Safety Distances (Minimum Separation Distances) Zoning Distances for LPG Storage Tanks in Open Air Zoning Distances for LPG Facilities in Open Air Safety Integrity Levels SIL Test Intervals Variation in Detector Response to Different Gases Categorisation of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment Types of Protection Available for the Achievement of Safety when using Electrical Apparatus in Explosive Atmospheres Types of Protection Available for the Achievement of Safety when using Mechanical Apparatus in Explosive Atmospheres Relationship between Temperature Class and Maximum surface Temperature of the Apparatus Minimum Thickness of Metal Sheet or Metal Pipes Inspection Schedule for Ex d, Ex e and Ex n Installations Inspection Schedule for Ex i Installations Properties of Flammable Materials - Gases Composition of Biogas 46 48 61 71 73 74 77 79 84 86 87 88 90 95 96 111 112 113 116 117 118 119 122 125 126 132 132

Page 11 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 0.0 ISSUE 4.0 A1.3 A2.1 A2.2 Properties of Flammable Materials - Fuels Enclosed Area with an Internal Source of Release Effect of Ventilation Type on Zone of Hazardous Area Enclosed Area with no Internal Sources of Release but Connected to an Outside Hazard Zone Effect of Ventilation Type on Zone of Hazardous Area Precautions Applicable on Loss of Artificial Ventilation for Enclosed Areas Degree of Natural Ventilation (Digester Boiler House) Safety Integrity Levels Safe Failure Fractions Gas Detector Failure Rates Solenoid Valve Failure Rates System Test Intervals Hazard Distances for Sewage Pumping Stations Recommended Design Total Radiation 133 141 142

A2.3 A2.4 A2.5 A2.6 A2.7 A2.8 A2.9 A3.1 A3.2

142 144 147 147 152 153 154 156 160

Page 12 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 0.0 ISSUE 4.0 0.2.2 List of Figures

Figure

Title

Page

4.1 6.1 6.2 7.1a to b 7.2 a to l 7.3 7.4 7.5a 7.5b 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.10 7.11 7.12 7.13 7.14 7.15 7.16 7.17 7.18 7.19

Type of Warning Sign FLIDS Assessment Process (New Build and Modified Installation) Shading convention for Hazardous Area Zones (BS60079-10 & BS61241) Zoning for Sewers Zoning for Sewage Pumping Stations Zoning of Medium Risk Inlet Channels or Chambers Open to Atmosphere Zoning of High Risk Enclosed or Sheltered Inlet Channels or Chambers Zoning of High Risk Enclosed Screen Channels in Buildings Zoning of Medium Risk Enclosed Screen Channels in Buildings Zoning for Fixed Roof Digesters Zoning for Floating Roof Digesters Zoning for Open Storage Vessels or Sumps Containing Digested Sludge Zoning for Covered Storage Vessels Containing Digested Sludge Zoning for Open Sumps Containing Digested Sludge Where Natural Ventilation is Restricted Zoning for Condensate Drains on Gas Pipework in Chambers Zoning for Condensate Drains on Gas Pipework in Freely Ventilated Areas above Ground Zoning for Water Sealed Gasholder Zoning for Double Skin Inflatable (Balloon) Type Gasholders Zoning for Compressors and Blowers Beneath a Canopy in the Open Air Zoning for Compressors and Blowers in the Open Air Zoning of Enclosed Compressors and Blowers with Inadequate Ventilation or No Flow Monitoring Open Flare Minimum Separation Distance Ground Flare Minimum Separation Distance

27 36 39 45 49 to 60 63 64 65 66 70 71 72 73 74 77 78 83 84 86 87 88 91 92

Page 13 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 0.0 ISSUE 4.0 7.20 7.21 8.1 8.2 8.3 A1.1 A3.1 Zoning for LPG Storage Tanks in the Open Air Zoning for LPG Storage Facilities in the Open Air Zoning for Open and Partially Enclosed Sodium Hypochlorite Storage Tanks Associated with Electrochlorination Plant. Zoning for Closed Top Sodium Hypochlorite Storage Tanks Associated with Electrochlorination Plant Oxygen Safety Distances in Metres Graph of Petrol (Heptane) Vaporisation Rates for Given Areas of Spill Hazard Distances from Sewage Pumping Stations 95 96 99 100 102 137 156

Page 14 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 0.0 ISSUE 4.0 0.3 NOTES This document* is issued** by Capital Delivery on behalf of TWUL. Within Capital Delivery it forms part of the overall Records as required by BS EN ISO 9001. It demonstrates the Quality level of corporate expertise in the above field and represents the Department practices which are to be exercised on all projects. Additions and amendments will be controlled, by the Standards Co-ordinator as coordinating editor, to this document as required to reflect current practices and standards. Amendments will be made by replacement of the applicable section(s), each being identified by amendment letters, which are alphabetical, and the date of the amendment. The current changes will be identified by highlighting the changed text. In every case the document will be re-issued and shall be identified by issue, consecutively numbered. Each issue shall replace all previous issues and amendments.
*Document means both the electronically held version and the paper copy where this is formally issued.

**Issued means available on the Twexnet database or provided as a paper copy containing the same information. 0.4 REGISTERED HOLDERS NB The latest version of this document is always that held in the Twexnet database The register of those holding controlled paper copies of this manual is maintained by the Standards Co-ordinator, Rose Kiln Court. Only controlled copy holders will be advised of changes. All applications for either controlled or uncontrolled copies are to be directed through the Engineering Senior Managers to the Standards Co-ordinator at Rose Kiln Court. A full, controlled hard copy of the management system documents is held in the Thames Water library. 0.5 REVIEW AND AMENDMENT PROCEDURE This document will be reviewed by the owner periodically to ensure its continued effectiveness with regard to any changes in best engineering practice, standards policy and practical application problems. After changes are made, approved and issued, users will be notified via an intranet announcement. All controlled paper document holders will be issued with the amendment under cover of the amendment issue and record sheet, which will show the current status, for each section of the document. Registered paper copy holders shall acknowledge receipt of the amendments by signing and returning a copy of the amendment issue and record sheet to the Standards Co-ordinator. Amendments are identified by an ascending whole number and each issue of amendments cancels and replaces all previous issues. The registered holders list of the paper copies of this manual shall be updated, as changes occur.

Page 15 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 0.0 ISSUE 4.0 To: Standards Section, Rose Kiln Court

Document Change Request

_____________________________________________________________________ _ PRIORITY Document Title ________________________________ Current Issue_____________ Change Requested by __________________________ Dept ________________

Location _____________________ Tel No __________________ Email Id__________ Reason for Change: Date ___________________

Details of Change:

____________________________________________________________________ Accept/Reject: Reason for Rejection:

Signed:

Date:

____________________________________________________________________ Date Incorporated* ______________________________ Updated document issue No.* _____________________ *To be inserted by <Issuing Authority>

Page 16 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 1.0 ISSUE 4.0 1.0 INTRODUCTION In industry, many processes either use or produce substances that have the potential to create a risk from energetic (energy-releasing) events such as fires, explosions and exothermic reaction. Such substances are known as dangerous substances in the Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 2002 (DSEAR). DSEAR sets minimum requirements for the protection of workers from fire and explosion risks arising from dangerous substances and potentially explosive atmospheres. The Regulations require Thames Water Utilities Limited (TWUL) to carry out a risk assessment on all of its assets. This risk assessment needs to identify what dangerous substances are present in the workplace, what work activities involve these substances and how they might give rise to a fire or explosion with potential harm to employees and the public. Derogation of the content or intent of this asset standard requires written consent from the Thames Water Progect Manager in accordance with the Contract Standard Practice Document (SPD) E04 provides information on the background to the Regulations and the requirements for compliance. This document also provides a standardised approach using model solutions for the classification of areas where explosive atmospheres may occur. The purpose being to ensure that a consistent approach is used in the classification of hazardous areas and for the correct selection, installation and maintenance of electrical equipment and other sources of ignition. Where the standardised approach is inappropriate or creates difficulties, a classification from first principles approach can be followed, subject to approval by the Project Manager based on the information on hazardous area classification in the Technical Appendix section of this SPD. 1.1 1.1.1 1.1.2 ENQUIRIES AND AUTHORS All queries and clarifications should initially be raised through the Project Manager. This SPD was prepared by: Entec UK Ltd 17 Angel Gate City Road London EC1V 2SH

Tel: 0207 8431400 Fax: 0207 8431410 1.2 GENERAL Many gases, vapours, mists and dusts encountered in industry are flammable and some of these occur in the water and sewage industry. When ignited, they may burn readily and with considerable explosive force if mixed with air in appropriate proportions. It is often necessary to use mechanical and electrical apparatus in locations where such flammable materials may be present, and appropriate precautions must therefore be taken to ensure that all such apparatus is adequately protected in order to reduce the likelihood of ignition of any explosive atmosphere. When using electrical apparatus, potential ignition sources include electrical arcs and sparks, hot

Page 17 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 1.0 ISSUE 4.0 surfaces and, in certain circumstances with mechanical equipment sparks caused by friction. In general, protection against mechanical and electrical ignition sources is achieved by implementing one of two procedures. Whenever practicable, the apparatus should be located outside hazardous areas; alternatively the apparatus must be designed, installed and maintained in accordance with measures recommended for the area in which the apparatus is to be located. It is, therefore, necessary to identify areas within which such precautions are required. This is known as area classification, hazardous area classification or the zoning of hazardous areas. General guidance as to the main principles, definitions and explanations of terms relating to area classification has been set out internationally and is followed in the UK by the British Standards Institution. The guidance states that recommendations for specific industries should be provided by codes relating to those industries. This Standard Practice Document (SPD) has been developed as a standard for use in the water treatment, sewerage and sewage treatment activities of Thames Water Plc. 1.3 SPECIFIC MEANINGS In this Standard Practice Document (SPD) may, should, shall and must have the following specific meanings: 1.4 may should shall and must where alternatives are equally acceptable where a provision is preferred where a provision is mandatory

GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS 1.4.1 Definition of Area Classification Terms

Adequate Ventilation This is ventilation (natural, artificial or a combination of both) sufficient to avoid persistence of explosive atmospheres within sheltered or enclosed areas, but insufficient to avoid their initial formation and spread throughout the area. (see Section A2.2). Apparatus Group (or subgroup) Certain electrical apparatus for use in hazardous areas is allocated to a group or subgroup depending on its suitability for use with specific gases. Area Classification Area classification is the notional division of a facility into hazardous and non-hazardous areas, and the sub-division of hazardous areas into zones. (see Section 5.0). Auto-ignition Temperature (AIT) See ignition temperature. Buoyancy of Release A gas or vapour should be considered as a buoyant and lighter than air if its density on release to atmosphere would be less than 0.75 relative to the ambient air. Certified A term applied as in certified apparatus, but can be applied to a component, or to a system, and is defined in BS 5345 Code of Practice for Selection, Installation and Maintenance of Electrical Apparatus for Use in Potentially Explosive Atmospheres

Page 18 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 1.0 ISSUE 4.0 (other than Mining Applications or Explosives Processing and Manufacture) Part 1 as a formal attestation by a recognised testing station that a prototype or sample of apparatus (or component or system), constructed to the certification documents, complies with a standard. Continuous Grade Release A release that is continuous, or nearly so, or one of relatively short duration which occurs frequently. (see Section 5.6). Dilution Ventilation Artificial ventilation sufficient to maintain, generally, as non-hazardous an enclosed area containing a source of release, or an aperture into a hazardous area. (see Section A2.2.3). Explosive Atmosphere A mixture with air, under atmospheric conditions, of flammable substances in the form of gas, vapour, mist or dust, in which after ignition, combustion spreads throughout the unconsumed mixture. Explosion Protected A general term for electrical apparatus suitably constructed and protected for use in a hazardous area. Flammable Synonymous with inflammable. Refers to any substance, solid, liquid, gas or vapour, that is easily ignited. The addition of the prefix non indicates that the substances are not readily ignited, but does not necessarily indicate that they are non-combustible. Flammable Limits (or range) The limits of combustibility of flammable gases or vapours when mixed with air. Synonymous with explosive limits (or range). See upper explosive limit and lower explosive limit. Flash Point The lowest temperature at which a liquid gives off sufficient vapour to form a mixture with air that can be ignited momentarily in prescribed laboratory apparatus. Forced Draught Ventilation The provision of artificial ventilation by delivering air to the area to be ventilated. Grade of Release See source and grade of release. Hazardous Used only in this SPD for hazards due to the presence of an explosive atmosphere which might be ignited. It does not include those from other causes such as toxicity, asphyxiation, etc. Hazardous Area and Zone A hazardous area or zone is defined as a three dimensional space in which an explosive atmosphere is, or may be expected to be, present in such frequencies as to require special precautions for the construction and use of mechanical and electrical apparatus. All other areas are refereed to as non-hazardous in this context. In a hazardous area three types of zone are recognised: Zone 0, Zone 1 and Zone 2. (see Section 5.3).

Page 19 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 1.0 ISSUE 4.0 Hot Work This includes welding, or the use of any flame or electric arc, or the use of any equipment likely to cause heat, flame or spark. It also includes caulking, chipping, drilling, riveting and any other heat producing operation, unless it is carried out in such a way as to keep the temperature below the level at which ignition of an explosive atmosphere could occur. Ignition Temperature The temperature at which a substance will begin to burn without application of any source of ignition. Synonymous with auto and self ignition temperatures. Inadequate Ventilation Ventilation, natural or artificial, which is insufficient to avoid persistence of an explosive atmosphere within sheltered or enclosed areas. (see Section A2.2). Induced Draught Ventilation The provision of artificial ventilation by the removal of air from the area to be ventilated. Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) Synonymous with lower flammable limit. The lowest concentration of a flammable gas or vapour in air at atmospheric pressure capable of being ignited. It is usually expressed as a percentage by volume. (see Section A1.2). Non-hazardous Area An area in which explosive atmospheres are not expected to be present such that special precautions for the construction and use of mechanical and electrical apparatus, or for the control of non-electrical sources of ignition are not required. Note: such an area may be part of a greater restricted area. (see Section 5.5). Open Area An area in an open air situation where vapours are readily dispersed by wind. Typically air velocities should rarely be less than 0.5 ms-1 and should frequently be above 2 ms-1. Over-pressure Ventilation Artificial ventilation of an enclosed area to maintain the area at a controlled pressure above ambient pressure. (see Section A2.2.4). Permit to Work A document issued by an authorised person to permit work to be carried out safely in a defined area under specified conditions. Point Source Method A method of determining the size of a hazardous area or zone by regarding all releases from a plant item as emanating from a single point, and providing dimensions of the surrounding hazardous area referred to the single point. Primary Grade Release A release that is likely to occur in normal operation. (see Sections 5.6). Protection See types of protection. Release An emission of flammable gas, vapour or liquid.

Page 20 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 1.0 ISSUE 4.0 Secondary Grade Release A release that is unlikely to occur in normal operation and, in any event, will be of short duration. (see Section 5.6). Sheltered Area An area within an open area where ventilation may be less than in a true open area but has adequate ventilation as defined in Section A2.3.1. Source and Grade of Release For the purpose of area classification, a source of release is defined as a point from which flammable gas, vapour or liquid may be released to the atmosphere. These releases are graded in terms of their likely frequency and duration. See primary grade release and secondary grade release. (see Section 5.6). Self-ignition See ignition temperature. Source of Ignition Any phenomenon that may give rise to the ignition of an explosive atmosphere Static Electricity The build-up of an electrical difference of potential between or charge through friction or dissimilar materials or substances. Temperature Class (T class) One of six values of temperature allocated to electrical apparatus derived from a system of classification according to the maximum surface temperature of the apparatus. (see Section 10.6). Types of Protection Measures applied in the construction of electrical and mechanical apparatus to prevent the ignition of a surrounding flammable release. Electrical apparatus: Type of protection d - flameproof enclosure (refer to BS EN 60079-1). Type of protection e - increased safety (refer to BS EN 60079-7). Type of protection i, ia, ib - intrinsically safe apparatus or system (refer to BS EN 60079-11 and 25). Type of protection m encapsulation (refer to BS EN 60079-18). Type of protection N, n - type of protection N (refer to BS EN 60079-15). Type of protection o - oil immersion (refer to BS EN 60079-6). Type of protection p - pressurisation, continuous dilution and pressurised rooms (refer to BS EN 60079-2). Type of protection q - powder / sand filling (refer to BS EN 60079-5). Type of protection s special (refer to BS EN 60079-14).

Mechanical / Non-electrical Apparatus: Type of protection fr - for use in potentially explosive atmospheres by use of a flow restricting enclosure (refer to BS EN 13463).

Page 21 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 1.0 ISSUE 4.0 Type of protection c by application of constructional safety measures (refer to BS EN 13463). Type of protection k by liquid immersion techniques (refer to BS EN 13463). Type of protection b by controlling the ignition source (refer to BS EN 13463). Type of protection d by using flameproof enclosures (refer to BS EN 13463). Upper Explosive Limit (UEL) Synonymous with upper flammable limit. The concentration of a flammable gas or vapour in air at atmospheric pressure above which combustion will not occur. It is usually expressed as a percentage by volume. (see Section A1.2). Ventilation Ventilation is a general term to indicate air movement and replacement by fresh air. Natural ventilation refers to ventilation caused by wind or convection effects. Artificial ventilation refers to ventilation caused by air purges or mechanical means such as fans. See adequate ventilation, dilution ventilation, forced draught ventilation, inadequate ventilation, induced draught ventilation and over-pressure ventilation. (see Section A2.0). Zoning of Hazardous Areas Alternative title for area classification. Zone 0 That part of a hazardous area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is continuously present or present for long periods. (see Section 5.3). Zone 1 That part of a hazardous area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is likely to occur in normal operation. (see Section 5.3). Zone 2 That part of a hazardous area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is not likely to occur in operation and, if it occurs, will exist only for a short period. (see Section 5.3). 1.4.2 ACH BS DSEAR FLIDS HSE IChemE IGE IP LEL SPD TWUL Abbreviations (used within this SPD) Air Changes per Hour British Standard Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations Flammable Liquids In Drainage Systems Health and Safety Executive Institution of Chemical Engineers Institution of Gas Engineers Institute of Petroleum Lower Explosive Limit Standard Practice Document Thames Water Utilities Limited

Page 22 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 1.0 ISSUE 4.0 UEL Upper Explosive Limit

Page 23 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 2.0 ISSUE 4.0 2.0 SCOPE This SPD applies to all of Thames Waters facilities (except for sludge incineration plant), new, modified and existing, where dangerous substances are present or may be produced that could give rise to a potentially explosive atmosphere. TWUL need to assess incinerator risks with respect to suitably appropriate legislation. The SPD also applies to the assessment of existing facilities, as the regulations stipulate that all equipment and protective systems installed in places where explosive atmospheres may occur, including existing installations, must meet the requirements of the Equipment and Protective Systems Intended for Use in Potentially Explosive Atmosphere Regulations 1996. This SPD is intended to ensure compliance with DSEAR and therefore deals with fire and explosion hazards due to the presence of flammable or combustible substances including dusts; it does not provide guidance on the extra precautions to be taken where such substances involve a toxic or asphyxiation hazard, or any other type of hazard. The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations deal with the health risks from substances that are toxic or present an asphyxiation hazard. General guidance as to the main principles, definitions and explanations of terms relating to area classification has been set out internationally and is followed in the UK by the British Standards Institution. The guidance states that recommendations for specific industries should be provided by codes relating to those industries. This SPD has been developed as a standardised approach to the assessment of fire and explosion risk and the classification of hazardous areas in all of Thames Waters facilities.

Page 24 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 3.0 ISSUE 4.0 3.0 REFERENCED MATERIAL This Standard Practice Document (SPD) has drawn on information available in current legislation, British Standards, international standards, other industry guides, codes of practice, other SPDs, etc. Quotations from such references have been limited to that necessary to inform and guide. 3.1 LEGISLATION A number of pieces of legislation exist that have relevance to potentially explosive atmospheres in the water industry: Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999. Equipment and Protective Systems Intended for Use in Potentially Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 1996. Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 1988. Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 2002 (DSEAR) Implementing Explosive Atmospheres Directive 99/92/EC (ATEX137) and the Chemical Agents Directive 98/24/EC (CAD).

3.2

STANDARDS References from key British Standards which deal with explosive atmospheres and hazardous area classification are: BS EN 1127-1:1998 - Explosive atmospheres. Explosion prevention and protection. Basic concepts and methodology. BS EN 60079-10:2003 - Electrical apparatus for explosive gas atmospheres. Classification of hazardous areas. BS EN 60079-14:2003 - Electrical apparatus for explosive gas atmospheres. Electrical installations in hazardous areas. BS EN 60079-17:2003 - Electrical apparatus for explosive gas atmospheres. Inspection and maintenance of electrical installations in hazardous areas. BS EN 61241-10:2004 - Electrical apparatus for use in the presence of combustible dust. Classification of areas where combustible dusts are or may be present. BS EN 12255-10:2001 Wastewater Treatment Plants. Safety Principles also provides information on general safety requirements for wastewater treatment plant construction. BS EN 13463 Non-electrical Equipment for Use in Potentially Explosive Atmospheres.

3.3

OTHER DOCUMENTS Institution of Gas Engineers and Managers IGE/SR/25:2000. Hazardous Area Classification of Natural Gas Installations Institute of Petroleum - Model Code of Safe Practice, Part 15 (third edition, 2005). Area Classification Code for Petroleum Installations. WRC Report UM1208 - Guidelines for the Identification of Flammable Atmospheres Arising in the Water Industry.

Page 25 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 3.0 ISSUE 4.0

NOTE: The above report has been updated by WRc Report UC6549 - Explosive Atmosphere Risk in the Water Industry, but UM1208 is still valid as a general reference document for hazardous areas the water industry.

The American NFPA 820, Standard for Fire Protection in Waste Water Treatment and Collection Facilities (2003 Edition), may also provide useful information after allowing for the differences in UK and American zoning designation.

Page 26 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 4.0 ISSUE 4.0 4.0 DSEAR COMPLIANCE The Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 2002 (DSEAR) were made under the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and their main provisions came into force on 9 December 2002. The regulations implement the European Directives the Explosive Atmospheres Directive 99/92/EC (ATEX137) and the Chemical Agents Directive 98/24/EC (CAD). For new plant or equipment brought into use for the first time after 30 June 2003, the regulations require a risk assessment and classification of all areas where a dangerous substance is present. In workplaces where equipment is already in use, a transitional period applies before the 1st of July 2006. Equipment can continue to be used indefinitely after this period provided a risk assessment shows it is safe to do so. A dangerous substance is defined in the regulations as any substance or preparation (mixture of substances) with the potential to create a risk to persons from energetic (energy-releasing) events such as fires, explosion, thermal runaway from exothermic reactions, etc. In the water industry such substances include, but are not limited to; methane (biogas, digester gas, natural gas), petrol (accidental spillages), liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), hydrogen (electro chlorination), ammonia (disinfection plant) and combustible dusts (dried sewage sludge). Note that suppliers or manufacturers of powdered substances, such as polyelectrolyte powders should confirm whether or not their product must be regarded as a combustible dust. It should also be noted that handling of powders can contribute to ignition sources in hazardous situation by creating electro-static charges. Oxidising agents such as chlorine, ozone and oxygen although not flammable in their own right can also act as an accelerant with organic substances and may therefore create a fire risk. The main requirements of DSEAR are that employers shall: Carry out a risk assessment on all assets to identify where dangerous substances may be present; To record the significant findings of the assessment including: The measures to eliminate and/or reduce the identified risks as far as is reasonably practicable; Details of hazardous zones and entry points marked; Information to show that equipment and protective systems within these zoned areas are designed, operated and maintained with due regard to safety; Arrangements to deal with accidents, incidents and emergencies; Measures taken to inform, instruct and train employees.

This SPD deals specifically with the approach to the assessment of risk from dangerous substances, guidance on technical measures for eliminating or reducing the identified risks and the methodology for classification of risk areas into hazardous zones. Procedures to deal with accidents and emergencies and the provision of information and training to employees are discussed below, but it is expected that such procedures will already be in place as part of Thames Waters general duty to manage risks under the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999. The HSE have produced a DSEAR Approved Code of Practice (L138) with supporting guidance on the implementation of the regulations, extracts from which are reproduced in the following sections. 4.1 DESIGN OF PLANT AND EQUIPMENT

Page 27 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 4.0 ISSUE 4.0 Wherever practicable, plant and equipment must be designed to eliminate the risk from dangerous substances. Designers need to consider the hazards arising from the design of new or modified plant and equipment and the purpose of the risk assessment is to determine measures that will: Avoid or minimise the risk of spillage or release of a dangerous substance; Avoid the occurrence of explosive atmospheres; Prevent ignition of dangerous substances or explosive atmospheres; Prevent uncontrolled chemical reactions that can give rise to explosive atmospheres; Avoid the spread of fires or explosions through interconnecting plant and equipment; Mitigate the effect of a fire or explosion so as not to endanger people.

DSEAR recognises a hierarchy of measures to reduce risk in which elimination is regarded as the best solution and involves replacing a dangerous substance with a substance or process that eliminates the risk totally. In practice this is often difficult to achieve but replacement with a substance that is less hazardous or to design the process so that is less dangerous is more likely to be achievable. 4.2 STORAGE OF DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES As part of the risk assessment, places where flammable or dangerous substances are stored must be assessed and reviewed whenever the storage conditions or type of dangerous substance is changed. The assessment must identify the hazards arising from storage of the dangerous substance to; Avoid or minimise the risk of a spillage or release of a dangerous substance; Minimise the risk of a fire or explosion occurring at the storage location; Protect the storage area from fires occurring elsewhere. When assessing a storage installation the relevant factors to be taken into account must include: The properties of the substances being stored and any adverse reactions that could occur through accidental spillage and mixing of the substances (e.g. generation of heat, hydrogen, etc); The quantity of the substances being stored and the method of storage (i.e. bulk tanks or containers, bunding arrangements, temperature and pressure of the stored substances); Location of the storage area in relation to other plant and equipment or buildings (e.g. proximity to heat or ignition sources, vehicle thoroughfares, etc); Design standards for the installation and potential for corrosion; Frequency of deliveries, loading and unloading operations; Training of operators and maintenance personnel, so they can deal with incidents and emergencies.

Gases, liquids or liquefied gases (LPG) must be stored in closed containers (e.g. tank, cylinder, hopper or silo) constructed to an appropriate national or international standard. Flammable liquids stored above ground must have a means of containing leaks and

Page 28 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 4.0 ISSUE 4.0 preventing their spread (e.g. bunded area around tank). Underground tanks for flammable liquids must have secondary containment or a leak detection system. Fuels with a flash point above 40C (e.g. diesel) can generally be regarded as combustible rather than flammable and are therefore less hazardous, provided storage conditions are at ambient conditions. Solids that can give rise to combustible dust must be stored in closed vessels design to contain any dust release during filling and where this is not appropriate, good controls over dust release must be exercised during material transfer. Storage areas for dangerous substances must be adequately separated from other plant and equipment which may increase the hazard risk and not impede escape routes in the event of a fire. Where flammable liquids or gases are stored inside buildings this must be a separate room, adequately separated from other work areas and any potential hazards or be a fire resisting structure. Substances that are incompatible must be segregated to minimise the risk of interacting. Incompatible substances can include those that release a flammable gas product when mixed or accelerate burning. Good ventilation must be provided in areas where flammable liquids or gases are stored to disperse any spills or leaks. Wherever possible these materials must be stored in the open air. Tanks, vessels and containers used for storing dangerous substances must be clearly labelled to identify the contents. Loading and unloading arrangements at storage facilities must be designed to avoid or minimise the risk of fire or explosion by incorporating measures to minimise the risks of leaks, spills and overfilling of tanks, vessels and containers. The quantity of any dangerous substances being stored must be as small as is reasonably practicable. The DSEAR ACOP advises that the quantity of flammable liquids with a flashpoint above the maximum ambient temperature (taken as 38C, plus 2C safety margin) that can be stored in a workroom must be no more than 250 litres in total. For flammable liquids with a flashpoint below 40C the ACOP advises that the maximum that should be stored in a workroom is 50 litres in total. Storage facilities must be maintained in safe condition and be subject to regular inspection to ensure they remain fit for purpose. Prior to disposal, waste materials must be stored safely where there is a risk of fire or explosion. Containers for storing the waste must be labelled to identify the type of waste. 4.3 CONTROL AND MITIGATION MEASURES Control measures can be applied to reduce the risk and shall be applied in the following priority order: Reduce the quantity of dangerous substances to a minimum (e.g. trade effluent control); Avoid or minimise releases (e.g. reduce retention time for sludge storage); Control releases at source (e.g. gas tight ducts and conduits); Prevent formation of an explosive atmosphere (e.g. use of gas detection to initiate emergency procedure); Collect, contain and remove any releases to a safe place (e.g. ventilation);

Page 29 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 4.0 ISSUE 4.0 Avoid ignition sources (e.g. segregation of mechanical and electrical equipment, MCC panels) (see Section 10.1 for further information on ignition sources); Avoid adverse operating conditions that could lead to danger; Keep incompatible substances apart.

Mitigation measures should be applied depending on the risk involved and the nature of the operation including: Reduce the number of workers exposed to risk; Provide plant that is explosion resistant (i.e. plant constructed so as to withstand the overpressure likely in the event of an explosion); Provide explosion suppression or relief equipment (e.g. inert gas fire protection system (e.g. CO2), pressure/vacuum relief on gas holders); Take measures to control or minimise the spread of fire or explosions (e.g. separation of storage areas or fire resisting structures); Provide suitable Personal Protective Equipment (anti-static footwear and clothing)

In general, the workplace must be designed, constructed and maintained so as to reduce risk, and organisational measures such as written instructions and permit to work employed, for work carried out in hazardous areas. Methods to reduce gas release rates may include any or all of the following: Use of special flange joint gaskets which on failure reduce gas release rates significantly compared to normal gaskets, e.g. metal clad gaskets, spirally wound supported gasket with backing ring joint and trapped gasket or ring; Increased level of inspection and maintenance in areas where the hazard results from decomposition of sewage or sludge rather than a direct release of flammable material. Double mechanical seals on boosters and compressors Automatic gas shut off valves triggered from flammable gas detectors Use of continuously welded gas pipework such that releases from flanges, etc., is minimised.

Flammable gas detectors can be installed at any location where there may be a risk of a release of flammable gas, e.g. sewers, pumping stations, head works, digester processes and fuel storage areas. The use of flammable gas detectors to monitor these applications will provide warning of a release before the concentration of gas reaches a value at which it is likely to explode. Gas monitors must be certified for the explosive atmosphere in which they may be required to operate. 4.4 MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR PROCEDURES Maintenance work shall only be carried out by competent personnel. A risk assessment must be carried out before any maintenance, repair or modification is undertaken within a hazardous area. The risk assessment needs to identify the hazards arising from the proposed work, what control and mitigation measures are necessary and the system of work that will be employed to ensure the safety measures are understood and implemented. Factors to include in the assessment should include:

Page 30 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 4.0 ISSUE 4.0 The nature of the materials that are present or were present in the area or plant, where the activity will be carried out; The potential for heat or ignition sources to be present during the proposed activity and how an explosive atmosphere could arise; The consequences of a fire or explosion and what additional protective and emergency equipment is required; The training and level of competence of personnel; What systems of work will be needed to implement necessary control measures (e.g. permit to work, temporary ventilation).

For low risk activities, adequate supervision or the use of written procedures may be sufficient to ensure that control measures are implemented. Examples of low risk activities may include; Routine cleaning operations; Dealing with small leaks and spills; Routine adjustments to operating equipment

For medium risk activities, the use of method statements must be employed, where the work may involve the release of small but not significant quantities of a flammable liquid, gas or combustible dust. Medium risk activities do not introduce ignition sources into the hazardous area and may include; Routine activities such as loading and unloading of storage vessels, sampling from designated sample points; Opening or breaking into plant and equipment that do not normally contain flammable or combustible materials and is not in a confined space.

High risk activities are those where the foreseeable consequences of an error or omission could result in immediate and serious injuries, from an explosion or fire. Strict controls should be put in place so that the work is carried out against agreed safety procedures by implementing a permit to work system. Activities considered high risk include: Hot work on or in any plant and equipment that contains or may have contained a flammable or combustible material; Hot work in the vicinity of a hazardous area where an outbreak of fire caused by the work could spread and result in a significantly increased hazard; Entry into, and work in, a confined space where a flammable or combustible material may be present or may be introduced by the work activity; Opening or breaking into plant and equipment that contains or has contained a flammable or combustible material.

The permit to work must detail the precautions that need to be taken to prevent fire and explosion and must only be issued by a responsible person. 4.5 MARKING OF HAZARDOUS AREAS The regulations require that, where necessary signs are to be displayed at the point of entry to an area where an explosive atmosphere may exist, usually referred to as Zoned or Hazardous areas. Regulation 7: Places Where Explosive Atmospheres May Occur

Page 31 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 4.0 ISSUE 4.0 (3) Where necessary, places classified as hazardous pursuant to paragraph (1) (classification of hazardous or non hazardous) shall be marked by the employer with signs at their points of entry in accordance with Schedule 4 (to the Regulations). Figure 4.1 Type of Warning Sign

The sign is triangular in shape with black letters on a yellow background with black edging.

The purpose of the sign is to warn of entry into zoned or hazardous areas where an explosive atmosphere may be present, so that they can take the necessary precautions in relation to the risk. The Ex signs are used to: identify places where special workplace or site rules apply e.g. no smoking, antistatic footwear to be worn, or access restricted to authorised people; identify where portable or mobile equipment must be of an explosion protected design e.g. hand torches, vehicles or cleaning machines; identify for the purposes of audit or later plant modifications, where fixed equipment must be of an explosion-protected design.

The Ex warning sign, if necessary should be positioned at the points of entry to a hazardous area. Where this is within a clearly defined area, the appropriate point or points of entry will be easy to determine. However, in other cases the hazardous area may be located in places that do not have obvious entry points, for example in an open area around multiple zoned installations. Providing warning signs at multiple entry points may, therefore, not always be appropriate, but the risk area must be identified and its presence communicated by some other means (e.g. marked up site drawing). The size of any signs provided should be sufficient to fulfil their warning function, and they must be maintained so that they are clearly visible. The arrangements made by employers under Regulation 9 should ensure that employees receive sufficient information, instruction and training on the meaning of the sign and the measures to be taken in connection with it. In general, it is expected that Thames Water employees and contractors should not be reliant on signage to advise them of a potential Hazardous Area. Hazardous Area Plans are readily available to all staff and contractors, and DSEAR risks should be highlighted when TWOSA/TOCOPs are issued. Examples of situations where it may be considered that signage is required include; locations where there are frequent visits by third parties who may be difficult to control via the TWOSA process, locations where hazardous areas would not generally be expected, cleanwater sites where DSEAR awareness is not widespread.

Page 32 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 4.0 ISSUE 4.0 Where it is considered that Hazardous Area signage is required, the following tables provide guidance with regards positioning;

Table 4.1

Guidance for Positioning of Ex Warning Signs on Waste Water Installations

Waste Water Systems Or Installations

Inlets or similar Areas

Positioning of Signs
Sign to be displayed at or near each point of entry, including any ladder access, or, if there is no distinct entrance, in a prominent position which would be reasonably seen by any person who would need to access the area. Sign to be displayed at or near points of entry Sign to be displayed at or near points of entry Sign to be displayed at or near points of entry Sign to be displayed at or near points of entry Sign to be displayed at or near points of entry These should not be signed but details entered in the Site Register

Enclosed Wet wells Enclosed Dry wells (If zoned) Plant rooms not effectively segregated from a zoned area WwPS/Enclosed Combined Sewer Overflows Enclosed tanks or channels with distinct access or entry points Open tanks or channels with no distinct access or entry which can be approached from any angle

Table 4.2

Guidance for Positioning of Ex Warning Signs on Digester/Sludge Installations

Digester/Sludge Installations
Boiler Room/Area Compressor Room/Area Digesters Waste Gas Burners Gas Holders Enclosed Digested Sludge Tanks/ Secondary Digesters

Positioning of Signs
Sign to be displayed at all access points on the door, or gate if provided or nearest wall or fixed point Sign to be displayed at all access points on the door, or gate if provided or nearest wall or fixed point On the access way and on stairs where they enter the zoned area. Adjacent to the Flare Control Unit and any access way to the stack On all access way and at the base of any ladders leading to the hazardous areas On all access way and at the base of any ladders leading to the hazardous areas

Table 4.3

Guidance for Positioning of Ex Warning Signs on Electrochlorination Plants

Electrochlorination Plants
Electrolyser Room or areas with distinct points of entry (doorway or gateways)

Positioning of Signs
Sign to be displayed at all access points on the door, or gate if provided or nearest wall or fixed point

Page 33 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 4.0 ISSUE 4.0

Associated Hypochlorite Tanks On the access way

Page 34 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 5.0 ISSUE 4.0 5.0 5.1 PRINCIPLES OF AREA CLASSIFICATION INTRODUCTION Hazardous area classification is a means of describing the risk posed by a hazardous area with regards to explosion or fire. The approach is to reduce to an acceptable minimum level the probability of coincidence of an explosive atmosphere and an ignition source (electrical or non-electrical equipment). This objective is achieved by dividing or classifying a plant into zones, which take into account the likelihood of the existence of an explosive atmosphere. This classification provides a basis for the selection of mechanical and electrical apparatus that is protected to a degree appropriate to the risk involved and the nature of the flammable material. When the hazardous areas of a plant have been classified, the remainder will be defined as a non-hazardous area. Users of this SPD shall, wherever practicable, make use of the model solutions, as laid out in Section 7.0 of this document, to classify hazardous areas around plant and process locations. Where users of this SPD deviate from the model solutions, they will be required to demonstrate how they arrived at their conclusions, using the guidance contained within the Technical Appendix at the end of this document. For the majority of situations encountered however, the model solutions will provide sufficient guidance to allow the zoning of hazardous areas around items of plant and equipment encountered on Thames Water sites. Electrical equipment, such as isolators, junction and control boxes, should be located in non-hazardous areas wherever practicable, however, it is recognised that excluding equipment from hazardous areas may not always be practical. It should also be noted that, sources of ignition other than electrical may be present and precautions will be necessary to prevent such sources compromising hazardous areas. Refer to Section 10.1 of this document for a list of potential ignition sources that may be encountered on Thames Water sites. In applying area classification to a plant, it is a prerequisite that the facilities to which it is applied are designed, constructed, maintained and operated in accordance with good practice, so that releases of flammable materials are minimised. 5.2 KEY TERMS FOR AREA CLASSIFICATION In the following, the key terms of area classification are defined, these include both zone and grade of release. It is the assessment of the grades of release which, together with external factors and fluid properties, lead to the definition of the types and extent of the zones. This is known as the point source method of classification and is described in considerable detail in BS EN 60079-10 - Electrical Apparatus for Explosive Gas Atmospheres - Part 10. Classification of Hazardous Areas (reference 22). This SPD principally uses the standardised type diagram method of classification which presents the zoning application to typical items of plant. In these standardised type diagrams, the respective grades of release and, therefore, zone classification have already been taken into account. The principles of grade of release are included, so that the user of this SPD will have a better appreciation of the fundamentals of area classification and so will be better able to apply them to less typical, or more stringent, situations than are described herein. They are needed in the application of area classification where ventilation is reduced. There are other references to these releases as specifically defined in this SPD. 5.3 HAZARDOUS AREA ZONING A hazardous area is an area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is present, or may be expected to be present, in quantities such as to require special precautions for the construction, installation and use of electrical apparatus. Traditionally when dealing

Page 35 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 5.0 ISSUE 4.0 with area classification a three dimensional volume in space has been described as an area. That concept is continued in this SPD. Hazardous areas are subdivided into zones, based on the likelihood and persistence of a flammable gas/air mixture being present: Zone 0 that part of a hazardous area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is continuously present or present for long periods. (Zone 20 for combustible dusts) Zone 1 that part of a hazardous area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is likely to occur in normal operation. (Zone 21 for combustible dusts) Zone 2 that part of a hazardous area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is not likely to occur in normal operation and, if it occurs it will only exist for a short period. (Zone 22 for combustible dusts)

See model solutions in Section 7.0 for the zoning of hazardous areas for plant used in wastewater and clean water treatment. 5.4 EXTENT OF ZONE The distance in any direction (vertically and horizontally) from the source of release to the point where the explosive atmosphere has been diluted by air to a value below the lower explosive limit. 5.5 NON- HAZARDOUS AREA In the context of this SPD, an area which is not classified as a hazardous area. Note, that it may, in part or whole, form part of a wider restricted area within a plant in which all work is carried out under control. There may, also, be other hazards present such as those of a toxic nature. 5.6 GRADE OF RELEASE In addition to the definition of zones, area classification, also, defines grades of release of flammable material according to their expected frequency and duration: Continuous Grade - a release that is continuous, or nearly so, or one of relatively short duration that occurs frequently. Primary Grade Release - a release that is likely to occur periodically or occasionally in normal operation. Secondary Grade Release - a release that is unlikely to occur in normal operation and, in any event, will do so only infrequently and for short periods.

5.7

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GRADE OF RELEASE AND CLASS OF ZONE Grade of release is dependent solely on the frequency and duration of the release. It is completely independent of the rate and quantity of the release, the degree of ventilation or the characteristics of the fluid. However, it is these factors that determine the extent of vapour travel and hence the dimensional limits of the hazardous area. Assessment of the grade of release is not always obvious and requires experience and operational judgement. This is especially so for intermittent and irregular operations, such as venting, draining, sampling and opening up of equipment (e.g. changing of spades, filter cleaning, etc.). It has been recommended for continuously operated plant that releases should be regarded as:

Page 36 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 5.0 ISSUE 4.0 Continuous - if it is likely to be present for more than 1000 hours per year. Primary - if it is likely to be present for 10 hours or more per year, but less than 1000 hours. Secondary - if it is likely to be present for less than 10 hours per year and for short periods only.

Under unrestricted open air conditions (i.e. a high standard of ventilation exists), there is a direct relationship between grade of release and resultant zone type, namely: Continuous grade leads to Zone 0 (or Zone 20). Primary grade leads to Zone 1 (or Zone 21). Secondary grade leads to Zone 2 (or Zone 22).

It must be noted that grade of release and zone are not synonymous. Poor ventilation may require the application of a more stringent zone due to persistence of the flammable material. Some sources may have a dual grade of release with a small continuous or primary grade and a larger secondary grade. It should be noted that whilst a Zone 1 (or Zone 21) area may often be surrounded by a larger Zone 2 (or Zone 22) area, there is no specific requirement for this. The potential for any large, but infrequent release (e.g. a PRV relieving under abnormal operation), must be considered carefully to identify the requirement for a larger Zone 2 (or Zone 22) area.

Page 37 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 6.0 ISSUE 4.0 6.0 6.1 PROCEDURE FOR AREA CLASSIFICATION ASSESSING THE RISK DSEAR will apply wherever a dangerous substance is, or is liable to be, present at the work place. The risk assessment process should identify the dangerous substances present in the workplace, the nature of work activities involving those substances and how they might fail dangerously so as to give rise to fire, explosion and similar events with the potential to harm people.

Table 6.1

Typical Sources of Dangerous Substances

Source
Sewers and Sewage Pumping Stations

Dangerous Substances
Flammable liquids petroleum products, chemical spillages. Flammable gases decomposition of sewage organic matter, methane from geological sources, untreated landfill leachate and infiltration of gas from pipelines. Flammable liquids petroleum products, volatile chemicals in sewage. Flammable gases methane from decomposition of sewage organic matter. Oxidising agents oxygen in secondary treatment, ozone in tertiary treatment. Flammable gases methane from decomposition of septic sludges, digestion of sludge and utilisation of digester gas. Combustible dusts sludge drying plant, active carbon. Flammable gases hydrogen from electrochlorination, ammonia from disinfection. Combustible dusts active carbon. Oxidising agents chlorine, ozone Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG), acetylene (welding), propane (calor gas)

Sewage Treatment Works

Sludge Treatment

Water Treatment

Other

The purpose of the risk assessment is to help in deciding how to eliminate or reduce to as far as is reasonably practicable, the safety risk from dangerous substances. It must be carried out before bringing into use any plant, equipment or area which handles or processes dangerous substances, before making any modifications to that plant, equipment or area and before changing the operating conditions or the type of dangerous substance handled. 6.1.1 Risk Assessment Process

The risk assessment process should begin by identifying the hazards and the circumstances of the work that give rise to a level of risk. The scope of this assessment should therefore include consideration of: The flammable materials that may be present; The hazardous properties of the dangerous substances involved; The source of the potential releases; The amount of dangerous substance involved; The work processes, and their interactions, including any cleaning, repair or maintenance activities that will be carried out;

Page 38 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 6.0 ISSUE 4.0 The temperatures and pressures at which the dangerous substances will be handled; The containment system and controls provided to prevent liquids, gases, vapours or dusts escaping into the general atmosphere of the workplace; Any explosive atmosphere formed within an enclosed plant or storage vessel, and, any measures provided to ensure that any explosive atmosphere does not persist for an extended time, for example, ventilation.

These factors are the starting point for hazardous area classification, and where measures can be taken to mitigate risk, thereby avoiding an area being classified as hazardous, these must be recorded. Where the conclusion of the risk assessment is that a hazardous area still exists then the factors above should allow for the identification of any zoned areas. The assessment must also identify areas within a workplace that are connected to places where an explosive atmosphere may occur. This will provide information on any areas away from the source of the hazard to which an explosive atmosphere may spread. This may happen, for example, through ducts. These areas need to be included in the area classification system. 6.1.2 Flammable Liquids in Drainage Systems (FLIDS)

A particular type of risk assessment considers the release of flammable liquids into sewer systems. Small quantities of flammable liquids, such as petrol, solvents or diesel are not an uncommon type of accidental or deliberate release into sewers. In practice though, because the amounts released are so small, generally less than 5 litres, the explosion risk to sewerage installations is quite low. Accidental spillages of larger quantities of flammable liquids (more than 50 litres) are thankfully much rarer, but the consequences of a fire or explosion are considerably greater with the potential for multiple fatalities. The Major Hazard Incident Database System provides national records of serious accidents involving these hazardous materials. These records enable a statistical evaluation to be made of the risk from a major flammable liquid spillage, for example from petrol tanker road accidents. This statistical evaluation has been applied in a risk assessment process called FLIDS (Flammable Liquids In Drainage Systems) to determine the risk of accidental spillage into sewerage installations due to fuel stores (petrol stations or large industrial sites) located in a particular catchment. The number of fuel stores within a catchment area can be determined by contacting the local licensing authority in the area responsible for licensing petrol filling stations and commercial fuel storage facilities (e.g. Trading Standards, Health and Safety, Fire and Rescue service). Information on petrol filling stations can also be obtained by a search of the following internet websites. Websites - General: www.yell.com; www.upmystreet.com.

Websites Supermarkets: www.asda.co.uk; www.morrisons.co.uk; www.sainsburys.co.uk; www.tesco.com.

Websites Petroleum Companies: www.bp.com; www.exxonmobil.com; www.murco.co.uk; www.shell.com; www.texaco.co.uk

Local Petroleum Licensing Authorities or PLAs (e.g. County, Borough, City or District Councils, or the local Fire Service) are responsible for licensing of premises that store and dispense petroleum products and must maintain a register of these premises. In London the licensing authority is the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority.

Page 39 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 6.0 ISSUE 4.0 The register can be obtained by contacting the local authority or may be available online in the local council website. Once the addresses of premises storing and dispensing petrol have been obtained these can be plotted on a catchment area map to determine the number of fuel stores present in the catchment. This information should then be recorded on the Explosion Protection Document and the Hazardous Area Plan subsequently produced for the sewerage installation. Using a simple, easy to follow flow sheet approach (see Figure 6.1) the classification of sewerage installations can then be obtained. The assessment process starts with a catchment classification into domestic foul only or combined foul and surface water. Combined sewers present a potential risk of a major flammable liquid spillages from either trade effluent discharges (large industrial sites storing flammable liquids) or accidental spillage into road surface drainage from main roads (transport and storage of petroleum products). This risk is only significant where 3 or more fuel stores are located in the catchment area and where the sewerage installation is enclosed. The risk is increased further where more than 20 fuel stores are present in the catchment1. The zonal classification of the sewerage installation is then based on the three risk categories of Low, Medium or High. The FLIDS assessment process is carried out on both new build and for modifications to existing sewerage installations.

Thames Report: Application of FLIDS to Existing Facilities, March 2007 Page 40 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 6.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 6.1 FLIDS Assessment Process (New Build and Modified Installation)
FLIDS Assessment Process (New Build and Modified Installation)

Sewage Pumping Stations, Storage Facilities, CSO's

Sewer System

Inlet Works and Preliminary Treatment

Is the Catchment, Domestic Foul only or Combined Foul and Surface 1 Water ?* Combined Foul and Surface Water
1

Domestic Foul only

2 Are there more than 20 fuel stores No in the catchment area?** Yes

No

Is the installation open topped (>60% of area)?** Yes Low Risk Installation

Is the installation open topped, >60% of area open?** No

Yes

Is the enclosed area adequately Yes 5 ventilated, >3 air changes/hr ? ** No Medium Risk Installation

Is the enclosed area adequately Yes 5 ventilated, >3 air changes/hr ? ** No High Risk Installation

Can Design Changes be Made to the Installation to Eliminate or Reduce Risks Further?** No Sewage Installation Classified as 'Zone 1' **

Yes

Sewage Installation Classified as 'Zone 2' **

Sewage Installation Classified as 'Non-Hazardous' **

Record Findings in Explosion Protection Document **

Specify category of equipment within hazardous areas suitable for zonal classification **

Approve Assessment and Verify Installation is Safe for Use ***

Notes Domestic Foul only: receiving effluent from toilets, washing or laundry facilities, kitchens for meal preparations (not food processing), 1) or combined sewer receiving non-flammable trade effluent and having less than 3 fuel stores in the catchment. Combined Foul and Surface Water: receiving domestic foul sewage and trade effluent or connected to surface water drainage on main roads and having 3 or more fuel stores in the catchment. 2) Fuel Stores include petrol stations, railway marshalling yards and industrial installations carrying more than 25 tonnes of flammable liquids. 3) Catchment assessments should be undertaken every 5 years or when there is a: - significant change within the catchment (e.g. new housing estate, petrol station) - site modifications (e.g. installing new EMI or covering of installations) 4) Tasks Performed by: * = TWUL / ** = Designer or Assessor / *** = DSEAR Engineer 5) Zone classification requires a design value or measured ventilation rate for enclosed installations.

Domestic foul only sewerage installations (including combined foul and surface water installations with less than 3 fuel stores in the catchment) will generally result in a Low Risk category, unless they are enclosed and inadequately ventilated, in which case the installation will be Medium Risk. For combined foul and surface water installations, where the number of fuel stores within the catchment area is more than twenty, the installation will be High Risk if the degree of ventilation is inadequate. For combined foul and surface water installations where the number of fuel stores is between 3 and 20 and all other circumstances, the installation will be Medium Risk. 6.2 DETERMINING HAZARDOUS AREAS Where dangerous substances are present that could give rise to significant release of flammable gas, vapour or dust, it will be necessary to determine the type and extent of each hazardous area. The sources of release that are typically present in water treatment, sewerage and wastewater treatment works are described in this SPD. It is important, however, that the actual classification process should include consideration of all hazards involved and not merely those described in this SPD. In particular, consideration must be given as to whether or not the works under consideration has

Page 41 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 6.0 ISSUE 4.0 any features not normally present or missing from what may be considered a typical installation. In performing the detailed area classification, it is important to identify and assess all continuous and primary sources of release (which result in Zone 0 and Zone 1 hazardous areas) and wherever possible eliminate or reduce them by design. Similar consideration must be given to those items from which release might occur during abnormal operation to minimise the frequency and rate of release. This is important not only for the safety of the plant, but also for its economic design and to reduce operational and maintenance problems. Area classification is not intended to apply to catastrophic failures of plant items, but is applied to abnormal single mode events which are predictable, e.g. accidental spillage of petrol into sewerage systems may regarded as predictable based on statistical data. Vents or drain valves (e.g. on gas holders or gas mains) which could give rise to a large release volume, but which are plugged or blanked off during normal operation, are not usually considered as significant release sources in area classification. Instead a smaller release volume is normally taken into account for area classification, for example from flange leakage etc. These items must then only be operated under a permit to work. Where the area classification makes such allowance it must be clearly stated in the operating and maintenance manuals that such permits will be required in these cases. Operating and maintenance procedures must be taken into account when considering area classification. Intermittent operations, such as the routine opening of parts of closed process systems (e.g. for filter changing) should be recognised. The extent of operator manning and the consequential likely speed of response to upset conditions needs to be considered. The interior of buildings or closed spaces that are in or abut external hazardous areas and have doors, windows or other means of access that allows the ingress of an explosive atmosphere shall adopt the same classification as the external zone. Once a plant has been classified, it is important that any modification to process materials, equipment or operating procedures is re-assessed to ensure that suitable electrical and other equipment is selected. It is essential that process equipment maintained on or off the plant is carefully examined before bringing it back into service, such that it does not prejudice the integrity of the original design. Factors outside the normal operation of the installation may also be relevant such as changes to a catchment area, for example a new industrial estate or construction/upgrading of trunk roads, which may result in an increased risk from an accidental spillage of flammable liquids. 6.2.1 Personnel

Area classification must be carried out by competent personnel who have a good knowledge of the properties of flammable materials and fully understand the concept of area classification. It requires an interdisciplinary approach and should involve personnel with a full knowledge of the process systems and equipment, in consultation with safety, mechanical and electrical engineering personnel as appropriate. In practice, the process of area classification may be achieved either by one or two competent personnel performing the classification initially, in consultation with others, followed by a peer review by an appropriately composed multi-disciplinary team or by undertaking the whole process as a combined classification and peer review. The results of the area classification must then be reviewed and approved by the Project Manager where the area classification does not comply with section 7 of this document. 6.2.2 Timing

Area classification is an ongoing task intended to describe the installation from initial design, through construction and commissioning to its eventual closure including all the changes and modifications along the way.

Page 42 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 6.0 ISSUE 4.0 For a new plant, or a modification to an existing plant, an initial risk assessment must be carried out followed by area classification where appropriate, before the design and layout are finalised. At this stage, it may be possible to make considerable improvements at little cost. The area classification must be reviewed and modified, if necessary, during the evolution of the design up to completion of the design. Before any change is made to an existing plant, a revised risk assessment and area classification must be completed. 6.2.3 Information Required

To perform a hazardous area classification from first principles, some basic design information must first be assembled, and this may include: A flow diagram showing flows, temperatures and pressures as appropriate; Relevant physical properties of the fluids handled, or of anticipated flammable releases (details of typical flammable materials are given in Appendix A1.2 of this SPD). A piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID); A layout or general arrangement drawing with plan and elevation views showing the position of all equipment including operational vents, drains and sample points to atmosphere; A preliminary control philosophy identifying equipment features and mode(s) of operation; and, Consideration of the state of ventilation, whether open area, restricted (sheltered) or enclosed. For sheltered or enclosed buildings, the position of openings, such as doors, windows and inlets/outlets for ventilation air, will be needed.

Model solutions of typical hazardous area classifications are provided in Section 7.0 6.2.4 Equipment Details

To permit the selection of electrical equipment appropriate to the area classification, the apparatus subgroup and temperature class must be determined, during the process of area classification, based on the flammable substances that can be released. These aspects of electrical equipment are described in Section 10.3. To comply with DSEAR Regulations the equipment (mechanical or electrical) shall be supplied, used and marked in accordance with the ATEX Directives. All such documentation associated with selection of equipment (including Declarations of Conformity and Risk Assessment details for equipment selection) shall be retained and filed along with the area classification documentation. Again, the effect of abnormal operations, such as start-up and shut-down, must be considered since they may affect the likely substances to be released. 6.2.5 Recording Area Classifications

DSEAR requires a document to be drawn up recording the results of area classification and for it to be kept updated. This document, referred to as the Explosion Protection Document under the ATEX Directive, must demonstrate that explosion risk has been determined and assessed, adequate measures have been taken to control or mitigate risk and that places where an explosion risk may be present have been classified into zones. A suitable document should therefore include: the DSEAR Risk Assessment, hazardous area classification data sheets, details of properties, gas group and temperature class for flammable materials, area classification drawings and, where appropriate for clarity, equipment data sheets. Equipment (including electrical / mechanical components and instruments) records must include details as to the type of protection selected to meet the zone requirements

Page 43 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 6.0 ISSUE 4.0 and the applicable apparatus subgroup and temperature class. Documentation to support equipment compliance with the ATEX Directive is also required to be retained and filed. Area classification drawings must be in sufficient scale to show all the main items of equipment and all the buildings, in both plan and elevation, including the positions of all openings, such as doors, windows, ventilation inlets and outlets and services/utilities entries if not sealed vapour tight. The drawings must be marked up to show the boundaries of all hazardous areas and zones present using the shading convention shown in Figure 6.2 below. It is acceptable to indicate any requirement for small local zones/areas, e.g. around control valves, by a note on the drawing. The drawings and/or notes must indicate where the classification depends on the correct operation of a special ventilation arrangement. It should consider and indicate the effect of such an arrangement. The preparation of the area classification drawing provides an opportunity to check that the coverage of all sources of release has been comprehensive. It also provides an opportunity for smoothing zone boundaries to remove unrealistic detail. It may be desirable, both from a geographic and administrative aspect, to adopt physical plant features (e.g. roads or access ways) for a readily defined zone boundary line, provided the zone boundary from any source is within these limits. Due to the number of assumptions inherent in area classification, it is not good practice, even on an open area, to denote small pockets of non-hazardous areas within a general hazardous area, unless there are special features of the design such as vapour tight physical barriers and special ventilation arrangements to avoid the ingress of explosive atmospheres. Likewise, it is normally not necessary to determine the hazardous area that would arise from each individual source of release, when this would not influence the overall zone boundary. Where zones of different severity overlap, the more severe applies. Figure 6.2 Shading Convention for Hazardous Area Zones (BS 60079-10 & BS 61241) Zone 0 Zone 1 Zone 2

Flammable Gas or Vapour

Zone 20

Zone 21

Zone 22

Combustible Dust
Note: Due to the limited availability of fill in in some of Thames Waters drawing packages, existing (or older) zoning drawings are likely to show a Zone 0 with the shading convention of a Zone 21 (as indicated above in Figure 6.2 for combustible dusts).

Page 44 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 6.0 ISSUE 4.0 6.3 CLASSIFICATION OF AREAS WHERE FLAMMABLE GASES OR VAPOURS MAY BE PRESENT There are a number of potential sources for the release of flammable gases or vapours in wastewater treatment. Typically those that should be considered in the classification of sewers, sewage treatment and sludge treatment facilities include: Accidental spillages of flammable hydrocarbons (petrol, diesel and solvents) into sewers; Industrial effluents and landfill leachate discharged into sewers; Methane gas migration from geological or landfill sources into sewers; Decomposition of organic matter in septic sewage and sludges; Biogas (digester gas) produced by anaerobic digestion of sludge; LPG and other fuel installations on site.

For a flammable material to become a hazard, contact has to be made with an ignition source. This is most likely to be through the vapour or gas phase of the material. In general, only flammable liquids with flash points below 40C (maximum ambient temperature of 38C + safety margin of 2C) will present a risk of creating an explosive atmosphere due to evaporation under ambient conditions. Flammable liquids with higher flash points may present a risk if they are subject to heating or vaporisation. Anaerobic degradation of the organic material in sewage, sludges and sediments can generate biogas under normal ambient conditions. Biogas contains methane and hydrogen sulphide both of which are flammable, however, it is unlikely that the quantity of hydrogen sulphide generated under normal conditions will be sufficient to create an explosive atmosphere. Methane can be produced by the degradation of organic material at sufficient rate to form an explosive atmosphere under the following conditions; Increasing temperature will increase the biogas generation rate; Long retention time under anaerobic conditions; Optimum pH for production of biogas from organic material is around pH7.

Digestion of sludge is a process where the production of biogas (digester gas) is optimised with the temperature of the sludge maintained at around 35C and the pH kept around pH7. All anaerobic digestion processes present a risk from potentially explosive gases and the storage of digested sludge in tanks, sumps and chambers will normally require classification as a hazardous area. Equally handling and use of biogas is a hazardous process and equipment should be classified accordingly. 6.4 CLASSIFICATION OF AREAS WHERE COMBUSTIBLE DUSTS MAY BE PRESENT The general principles for the classification into zones of locations where combustible dusts may be present are similar to those applied to gases and vapours. Sources of release must be identified and then graded as continuous, primary or secondary. Classification of hazardous areas where combustible dusts are or may be present is undertaken in accordance with BS EN 61241-10 (31). The hazards presented by combustible dusts are as follows: The formation of a dust cloud from a source of release including a dust layer that forms an explosive atmosphere The formation of dust layers which do not form a dust cloud but may ignite due to self heating or contact with a hot surface and cause a fire hazard

Page 45 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 6.0 ISSUE 4.0 Where explosive dust clouds and combustible layers may exist, sources of ignition should be avoided. Examples of combustible dusts that may be encountered in the water industry include; dried sewage sludge; and activated carbon. Note that suppliers or manufacturers of polyelectrolyte powders must confirm whether or not their product could be regarded as a combustible dust, although it should also be noted that the powders could contribute to a hazardous situation by creating static. 6.4.1 Classification Procedure for Explosive Dust Clouds

The decision to classify an area depends on whether the dust is combustible or not. An understanding of the material characteristics is therefore necessary for the correct selection of electrical and other equipment. The material characteristics can be confirmed by tests in a recognised laboratory (Examples of a recognised laboratory include Chilworth and BRE). Typical dried sewage sludge properties are given in Appendix A of HSE OC847/9 (13). Properties of dusts can vary considerably depending on particle size and moisture content. It is important that dust particle sizes used for any tests are less than 75m and that the moisture content represents that than can be achieved in the process. Once the material characteristics are known, it will be necessary to identify where sources of dust release can occur within the plant installation. This should be undertaken with reference to the Process & Instrumentation Drawings and General Arrangement drawings of the plant and any building structure drawings. The study should take into account releases that may occur due to all plant operating conditions as well foreseen plant maintenance activities such as removing cartridges from dust filters, screws from conveyors etc. After identification of potential sources of release, the likelihood that dust will be released from those sources needs to be identified and thus, the likelihood and frequency of explosive dust / air mixtures in various parts of the plant installation. The extent of explosive dust air mixture may take into account the minimum explosible concentrations and limiting oxygen concentrations in the atmosphere as well as any ventilation. Examples of dilution by ventilation are given in Section 6.2.3.3 of BS EN1127-1 (22). Examples of zones for explosive dust concentrations are given in Section 6 of BS EN 61241-10 (31). Once these assessments have been made, the hazardous zones can be identified and extents defined. The methodology, assessment and reasoning for the zoning must be recorded as well as clear plans and sections showing the zone extent. 6.4.2 Dust Layer Hazard

The presence of a dust deposit does not in itself directly lead to a zoned area. The dust deposit is simply a potential source of release. If the dust deposit is disturbed, then a dust cloud could result. The zones for dust refer to dust clouds not dust layers. Locations where dust layers may exist need to be considered in terms of the likelihood of the layer being disturbed to form a cloud. Once a layer has formed, ventilation may be a cause of layer disturbance and thus has the potential to make the position worse rather than improving it. In general, apart from within system containment (for example within process ducts, etc) dust layers should be avoided by design and/or good housekeeping. In addition to the possibility of dust layers being disturbed to form a cloud, the dust layer itself can be ignited and can thus present a fire risk. The ignition of dust layers from hot surfaces needs careful consideration and it should be remembered that normal surface temperatures (for example in free air) may become hotter under a dust layer. For this

Page 46 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 6.0 ISSUE 4.0 reason the temperature classes applied to electrical apparatus must be subjected to a factor of safety if the apparatus may be covered by a dust layer. Examples of avoiding dust layer accumulation in buildings are given in Section 6.2.3.4 of BS EN 1127-1 (22) and Appendix C of BS EN 61241-10 (31).

Page 47 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 7.0 7.1 MODEL SOLUTIONS FOR SEWERAGE AND SEWAGE TREATMENT FACILITIES INTRODUCTION This section presents information for the area classification of facilities and equipment items encountered in the handling and treatment of sewage. The information is presented as a written description to prescribe a set of rules for classification and/or as a standardised type diagram which defines the extent of classified areas specific to the type of equipment. All such areas are three dimensional. When applying the zoning information, the item under consideration should not differ significantly from the given example in layout, type of equipment, fluid content, or in the conditions of temperature, pressure or ventilation. The examples provided are expected to be located in a typical open area in which there is good ventilation to ensure the natural dispersion of any releases to the atmosphere. This applies at most sewage treatment plant. Details for enclosed facilities, such as plant rooms and sewage pumping stations, are also given. When the circumstances of an item are considered to deviate significantly from the information given in this SPD then, it is likely that a more severe zonal classification, or increase in the size of a zoned area will apply. Judgement will have to be applied in such circumstances. Helpful information may be found in published literature - see Section 12.0. For the effect of ventilation, Appendix A2.0 should be consulted in the first instance. Appendix A2.3 provides specific details for the classification of enclosed spaces. When the item being considered is not covered by the examples and details given in this section, then a preliminary classification must be made by utilising and interpreting information from this SPD supplemented with that available in the published literature. The preliminary classification must then be agreed in writing with the Project Manager to ensure a consistent corporate approach. Where there are groups of plant items, such as digesters, it is appropriate to apply the zonal classification to the entire location occupied by the items, with the distance to the boundary of the zone from the outer most items being taken from the zoning information for those items. In this way, pockets of non-hazardous areas within the layout of the items can be avoided. If the total quantity of flammable material available for release is very small, it may not be necessary to classify the area, however, account should be taken of the particular risks involved when selecting mechanical and electrical equipment. On some existing installations local circumstances may permit a less restrictive classification to be used. In these circumstances a written variation from the Project Manager may be given defining the revised classification and any other restrictions or requirements which are necessary. 7.2 VENTILATION AND ODOUR CONTROL SYSTEMS Where structures are substantially covered with little or no ventilation then it is highly likely that in the event of an explosive atmosphere being present, it may persist for long periods. Hence, where a risk of a significant flammable gas or vapour release within an inadequately ventilated structure is considered likely, the structure will require zoning. Section A2.0 provides further information on ventilation and area classification. Ventilation may however be available within the design either as forced or natural ventilation. Where ventilation is used for odour control purposes typical design rates applied are between 3 and 6 ACH. Where natural ventilation is designed by the use of louvres and building vents then similar air changes per hour can be achieved. It should be noted that although 12 ACH is the figure used in IP Part15 (41) as the criteria for determining adequate ventilation, in practice a much lower ventilation rate can often be regarded as adequate, depending on the nature and quantity of material involved in the

Page 48 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 flammable release. Refer to Section A2.3 for definitions of adequate and inadequate ventilation. Ventilation provided for odour extraction which is not adequate to prevent an explosive atmosphere from being created, may however, reduce persistence and hence zone type and extent in the event of a release. Odour control systems and their associated ductwork could therefore contain flammable gas mixtures drawn off various treatment processes, chambers, tanks, etc. Where ventilation is deemed inadequate to prevent an explosive atmosphere from forming or persisting, then alternative control options may need to be considered. For example flammable gas or hydrocarbon detectors could be incorporated that would monitor the presence of a flammable release to provide an automatic response, e.g. isolation of gas or electrical supply, increase in ventilation rate, or initiate emergency procedures. 7.3 SEWERS Any covered chambers receiving sewage prior to the inlet works of a sewage treatment plant, or on the works are included in this section. Pumping facilities, including wet wells, are covered in Section 7.4. In a well designed gravity sewer, where a minimum scour velocity is maintained (at design conditions), the concentration of methane in sewer gas is normally outside the flammable range (see Appendix A1.3.1). In sewer systems where sewage solids may be retained for a prolonged period, so that septicity takes place, there may be a possibility that the concentration of methane builds up locally and exceeds the lower explosive limit. The danger of fire or explosion in sewers can also arise from the spillage of flammable liquids such as petroleum products either deliberately or accidentally into the sewer. Generally the quantity of material involved is small (typically less than 5 litres) and as most sewers have some passive ventilation through them, flammable vapours will disperse quickly. It is important to note that explosive limits are normally quoted for gas or vapour / air mixtures. Mixtures in oxidizing gases, e.g. from leaking oxygen pipes or chemical breakdown of oxidizing agents such as hydrogen peroxide, will normally expand the explosive range. As the oxygen concentration rises in a confined space, fires (and explosions) are easier to start -- a spark from a tool, static electricity or any other source of ignition that would not start a fire in normal air can do so in an oxygen enriched environment. Fires will be able to start at both a lower LEL and a higher UEL. Those fires will also burn and spread faster. Refer to Appendix A1.2.4 for further information on the effects of oxygen enrichment. As far as is practicable, all ignition sources such as electrical installations should be excluded from sewers. 7.3.1 Domestic Foul Sewer

For domestic foul sewers (as described in Figure 6.1), the risk from biologically generated methane will be low and any spillage of flammable liquid into the sewer will involve only small quantities. Sewers handling only domestic foul sewage are normally enclosed and therefore inadequately ventilated, so are categorised as Medium Risk.

Page 49 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.1a Zoning for Domestic Foul Only Sewer

A sewer handling domestic foul sewage only is classified as Zone 2 internally with no external hazardous area. 7.3.2 Combined Sewer

Combined sewers, i.e. those handling discharges of domestic foul sewage, industrial trade effluent and/or that have connections to surface water drainage on roads, may have an increased risk of fire and explosion. The potential for a larger quantity of flammable liquid to be released into a combined sewer, is greater due to accidental spillages from the transport and storage of highly flammable liquids (e.g. industrial sources and petrol retailing activities). Where the risk assessment (described in Section 6.1) identifies a combined sewer as Medium Risk, then it shall be classified the same as for a domestic foul sewer, i.e. Zone 2 internally with no external hazardous area. Where the risk assessment identifies the sewer as being High Risk, then it shall be classified as Zone 1 internally with a Zone 2 externally around manholes, vents and air valves. Air valves located within a chamber are classified as Zone 2 inside the chamber, those located in open air are classified as non-hazardous. Figure 7.1b Zoning for Combined (High Risk) Sewers

Around manholes the extent of the Zone 2 area will normally be of negligible extent whilst the cover is in place. If the cover is removed for inspection then a zone extent equivalent to 2 metres must be assumed unless it is known that no flammable material is present in the sewer.

Page 50 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Vents (including vented manhole covers) to atmosphere on High Risk combined sewer systems will have a Zone 2 area of x metres radius around the tip of the vent depending on the diameter of the vent pipe (refer to zone extent values below) and their height above ground level. Dispersion from a high level vent, where the tip of the vent is more than 5m above ground level, will be greater due to higher wind velocity (min. 1m/s), than for a low level vent (less than 5m above ground level min. 0.5m/s). Whilst control of this hazard distance may be difficult outside of company installations, it must be taken into account when siting such a vent to minimise problems. As such vents frequently are elevated, it may not be a problem.

Table 7.1
Vent Diameter

Zone Extents for High Risk Combined Sewer Vents

50mm 80mm 100mm Hazard Radius x 250mm

High Level (more than 5m above ground) Low Level (less than 5m above ground)

0.2m 0.3m

0.4m 0.5m

0.5m 0.7m

1.5m 1.7m

Note: Hazard distances have been calculated based on passive ventilation rates within sewer (less than 0.05 ACH), using formulae detailed in Appendix A3.3.

7.4

SEWAGE PUMPING STATIONS This section applies to sewage pumping stations in the sewerage system and includes the terminal pumping station, whether located on or off the sewage treatment works site. Wet wells of sewage pumping stations can be considered in two categories; those that receive domestic foul effluent only, and combined sewers that receive other wastes such as trade effluents and surface water drainage from roads.

Table 7.2

Zone Classification of Sewage Pumping Stations

Risk Category/ Zone

Low Risk/Non-Hazardous

Installation Conditions
Connected to a domestic foul only sewer system and open topped or enclosed and adequately ventilated (min. 3ACH) Connected to a combined sewer system and less than 3 fuel stores in the catchment and open topped or enclosed and adequately ventilated (min 3ACH) Connected to a domestic foul only sewer system and enclosed or sheltered and inadequately ventilated (i.e. less than 3ACH) Connected to a combined sewer system and either - more than 20 fuel stores in the catchment and open topped or enclosed and adequately ventilated (min. 3ACH), or; - less than 20 fuel stores (min 3 fuel stores) in the catchment and enclosed or sheltered and inadequately ventilated (less than 3ACH).;

Medium Risk/Zone 2

High Risk/Zone 1

Connected to combined sewer system and more than 20 fuel stores in the catchment, enclosed or sheltered and inadequately ventilated (less than 3ACH);

Note: Refer to Section 6.1.2 for determination of number of fuel stores in catchments.

Page 51 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 7.4.1 Domestic Effluent Wet Well

Open topped wet wells receiving domestic foul effluent only are Low Risk and classified as non-hazardous. Covered sewage pumping station receiving domestic foul effluent only, where the wet well is not adequately ventilated, are considered Medium Risk and shall be classified as Zone 2. 7.4.2 Combined Effluent Wet Well

Open topped or covered but adequately ventilated (min. 3 ACH) wet wells, receiving effluent from a combined sewer that has no flammable trade effluent and less than 3 fuel stores in the catchment, are Low Risk and classified as non-hazardous. Covered wet wells receiving effluent from a combined sewer with between 3 and 20 fuel stores in the catchment, are Medium Risk and classified as Zone 2 internally. Covered wet wells receiving effluent from a combined sewer with less than 3 fuel stores in the catchment are Medium Risk if inadequately ventilated (less than 3 ACH) and classified as above. Covered sewage pumping stations connected to High Risk combined sewer systems, (more than 20 fuel stores in catchment area) where the wet well is not adequately ventilated (i.e. less than 3 ACH), must be classified as Zone 1. Where measures to increase ventilation are taken, e.g. wet well covered by mesh flooring (more than 60% of the surface area is open), or by addition of mechanical ventilation (e.g. odour control), then the classification may be reduced to Zone 2. High Risk covered or sheltered wet wells classified as Zone 1 internally have a Zone 2 area of x metres radius (refer to Table 7.3 for values of x) around any openings (e.g. manhole covers, open grills, etc.). The Zone 2 distance is dependant on the ventilation rate within the wet well and only applies where the opening discharges to unobstructed open air outside the structure. If openings from covered wet wells do not discharge to unobstructed open air outside the structure, the principle described for dry wells below, must be applied to the area to which the vents discharge. Openings from Medium Risk covered or sheltered wet wells classified as Zone 2 do not have an associated zone around them if they discharge to unobstructed open air outside the structure. 7.4.3 Combined Effluent Dry Well

Dry wells with a gas migration path from a wet well (e.g. a connecting duct, vent or opening), must be classified the same as the wet well, if the ventilation of the dry well structure is inadequate (i.e. less than 3 ACH). If the dry well is adequately ventilated (min. 3 ACH) then the structure can be classified the same as for unobstructed open air.

Page 52 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0

Table 7.3

Hazard Distances from Openings in High Risk Wet Wells

Covered Surface Area Wet Well Ventilation (less than 3ACH min. 1ACH) x = x = x = x = x = x = x = x = x = x = x = x = x = 0.3m 0.4m 0.4m 0.4m 0.5m 0.6m 0.6m 0.7m 0.8m 1.0m 1.0m 1.0m 1.0m Wet Well Ventilation (less than 1ACH) 0.5m 0.6m 0.7m 0.7m 0.8m 0.9m 1.0m 1.1m 1.2m 2.5m 3.2m 3.6m 4.2m

2.5m 3.5m 4.5m 5.7m 7.1m

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

10.5m 12.6m 15m 20m 80m

2 2 2

120m 150m 200m Notes:

2 2 2

1. The term covered surface area relates to the enclosed liquid surface area within the wet well and not to the 2 surface area of any associated structures such as a manhole cover or wet well roof. Surface areas under 15m are for standard precast concrete rings. 2. For surface areas between those shown, the value of x can be selected from the graph in Appendix A3.2. Dispersion formulae used to determine zone extents are detailed in Appendix A3.3. Passive ventilation (less than 0.05ACH) is assumed in dispersion calculations where ventilation is less than 1ACH in covered wet well. 3. Where openings are normally covered (e.g. a manhole cover) but not gas tight, the rate of release of any flammable gas or vapour can be assumed to be negligible, no zone extent need therefore be considered for normal operation, however, when the cover is removed (e.g. during maintenance/inspection), then the zone extents above shall apply. 4. Wet well ventilation of at least 3ACH will result in no Zone 2 area above any opening.

7.4.4

Equipment in Wet Wells

It is considered that Zone 2 power and signal connectors (e.g. ICORE) are suitable for all wet well applications, not withstanding the fact that they are only certified for Zone 2 applications, subject to the following constraints: The connector is located at the top of any wet well in an immediately accessible position when the cover, manhole, etc., is opened. It should be ensured that the connector remains in this position when covers, manholes, etc., are closed. The connector is not made or broken except when the cover is open, the cable and connector is lifted out above the cover and the power has been isolated. A statement to this effect must be included in the Operating and Maintenance Manual and a prohibition sign posted adjacent to the connector stating:

NOT TO BE MADE OR BROKEN UNLESS COVERS, MANHOLES, ETC., ARE OPEN, POWER/SIGNAL CONNECTORS AND CABLE LIFTED OUT AND THE POWER SUPPLY HAS BEEN ISOLATED ELSEWHERE

Page 53 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Since flammable material can be ignited by contact with a hot surface, it is necessary to specify an appropriate Temperature (T) Class for all apparatus to be used in hazardous areas. When mixtures of substances can be released, the most restrictive temperature class must be specified, i.e. the one with the highest T class number. For example, if it is possible that propane (class T1), butane (class T2) or kerosene (class T3) explosive atmospheres could exist in the same area then class T3 equipment must be selected. It is recommended that class T3 equipment is used in sewers and sewage pumping stations within the sewerage system (including terminal pumping stations) to allow for petrol spillages etc., unless it is known that a more restrictive class is appropriate. 7.4.5 Example Zoning for Sewage Pumping Stations

Some examples of covered sewage pumping station classifications are shown in Figures 7.2(a) to (l). The zone extents x from any openings in the wet well or dry well (if gas-tight seal not present) can be derived from the covered surface areas in the table below. Figure 7.2 (a) Zoning for Sewage Pumping Stations

Submersible pump and motor set (Medium Risk)

Page 54 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.2 (b) Zoning for Sewage Pumping Stations

Submersible pump and motor set (High Risk)

Page 55 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.2 (c) Zoning for Sewage Pumping Stations

Submersible pump with motor at ground level (Medium Risk)

Page 56 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.2 (d) Zoning for Sewage Pumping Stations

Submersible pump with motor at ground level (Medium Risk)

Page 57 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.2 (e) Zoning for Sewage Pumping Stations

Separate pump and motor mounted together in dry well (High Risk)

Page 58 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.2 (f) Zoning for Sewage Pumping Stations

Separate pump and motor mounted together in dry well (High Risk)

Page 59 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.2 (g) Zoning for Sewage Pumping Stations

Separate pump and motor mounted together in dry well (High Risk)

Page 60 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.2 (h) Zoning for Sewage Pumping Stations

Pump in dry well and motor at high level (Medium Risk)

Page 61 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.2 (i) Zoning for Sewage Pumping Stations

Pump in dry well and motor at high level (High Risk)

Page 62 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.2 (j) Zoning for Sewage Pumping Stations

Pump in dry well and motor at high level (High Risk)

Page 63 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.2 (k) Zoning for Sewage Pumping Stations

Pump in dry well and motor at high level (High Risk) (Zone 2 from wet well vent impinges on doorway to building)

Page 64 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.2 (l) Zoning for Sewage Pumping Stations

Screw Pumping Station (High Risk)

Page 65 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 7.5 STORAGE CHAMBERS AND CSOS Sewer storage tanks are used to store sewage during periods of high flow, which is then emptied when the flow in the main sewer drops back to average conditions. Refer to Table 7.2 - Zone Classification of Sewerage Installation. High Risk sewer storage tanks that are inadequately ventilated (less than 3ACH) are classified as Zone 1. Otherwise they are categorised as Medium Risk and classified as Zone 2. Combined Sewer Overflows can often contain mechanical raked screens, motorised valves and may be open to the air or in an enclosed structure or chamber. CSOs shall be classified as the connecting sewer, i.e. Zone 2 if Medium Risk, Zone 1 if High Risk. Mitigation measures such as adequate ventilation of an enclosed CSO structure or chamber can be considered in order to reduce the classification. The zone extent from any openings in sewage storage tanks and CSOs shall be the same as that specified for sewage pumping stations in Table 7.3 and based on the covered surface area. The zone extents for vents openings in sewage storage tanks and CSOs shall be the same as that specified for sewage pumping stations in Table 7.1 7.6 PRELIMINARY AND STORAGE) PRIMARY TREATMENT (INCLUDING STORM WATER

Table 7.4

Zone Classification of Inlet Works, Channels and Chambers

Risk Category/ Zone

Low Risk/Non-Hazardous

Installation Conditions
Receiving sewage from domestic foul only sewer and; open topped or enclosed and adequately ventilated (min. 3ACH)

Receiving sewage from a combined sewer system with less than 3 fuel stores in the catchment and; Medium Risk/Zone 2 open topped or enclosed and adequately ventilated (min 3ACH)

Receiving sewage from a domestic foul only sewer and; enclosed or sheltered and inadequately ventilated (i.e. less than 3ACH)

Receiving sewage from a combined sewer system with more than 20 fuel stores in the catchment and, open topped or enclosed and adequately ventilated (min. 3ACH),

Receiving sewage from a combined sewer system with less than 20 fuel stores in the catchment and, High Risk/Zone 1 enclosed or sheltered and inadequately ventilated (less than 3ACH)

Receiving sewage from a combined sewer system with more than 20 fuel stores in the catchment and, enclosed or sheltered and inadequately ventilated (less than 3ACH);

Note: Refer to Section 6.1.2 for determination of number of fuel stores in catchments.

7.6.1

General

Sewage is received at a treatment works at the inlet works, which if it is open to the atmosphere will allow any flammable gas or vapour present to be diluted and dispersed by natural ventilation. Methane produced from decomposition of sewage organic matter is unlikely to present a risk of an explosive atmosphere, because sewage is normally

Page 66 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 processed within a day, it contains very little organic matter and the temperature is often below 20C. However, where solids are retained for long periods and ventilation is restricted, there is an increased risk of methane building up to a hazardous level. Highly flammable liquids such as petrol arising from a spillage into the sewer present a greater risk of creating an explosive atmosphere as they are generally heavier than air and may not disperse quickly where ventilation is restricted. Flammable vapours will persist in sheltered open structures where natural ventilation is restricted. Sheltered structures are either sheltered from the wind by other surrounding structures (separated from another structure e.g. a building or tank, by less than twice the height of the structure) or where the depth of the open structure is greater than twice the width. Low risk inlet works are open or enclosed and adequately ventilated (min. 3ACH) works that receive domestic foul only sewage (i.e no trade effluent or surface water drainage). These works are unlikely to receive sufficient quantity of flammable liquid to form an explosive atmosphere. Inlet works receiving flows from combined sewers that contain trade effluent and/or are connected to surface water drainage are categorised as Medium or High risk. Inlet works connected to sewers with more than 20 fuel stores in the catchment are considered as being at greatest risk of receiving a large amount of flammable liquid in the sewage inflows. Open inlet or enclosed and adequately ventilated inlet works, reduce the risk of any explosive atmosphere being formed or persisting, whereas sheltered or inadequately ventilated inlet works, increase the risk. Whilst flammable vapours may persist in an inadequately ventilated inlet works, the normal flow of sewage through the works will carry highly flammable liquids quickly forward, which may limit the quantity of vapour released. Highly flammable liquids may accumulate in screens and degritting channels where the flow velocity will be reduced. In these areas, it is expected that the bulk of the flammable liquid will evaporate quickly leaving a much smaller quantity of flammable material to be passed forward to the first stage of treatment (typically primary sedimentation or storm water settlement). The residual flammable liquid, on arrival at these stages in the treatment process, will then disperse on the large surface area present and quickly evaporate to atmosphere. Generally the zoning associated with the inlet works will only extend to the distribution chamber/channel for the primary settlement tanks/storm tanks. However a risk assessment should be conducted to ascertain whether or not hazardous zoning should apply after preliminary treatment. In subsequent treatment steps, petroleum products in the effluent flow are not deemed to constitute a hazard. On some existing installations, local circumstances may permit a less restrictive classification to be used, subject to a risk assessment being completed. In these circumstances a written variation from the Project Manager must be obtained defining the revised classification and any other restrictions or requirements that are necessary. Where a works is not split into conventional primary and secondary stages, such as membrane or SBR plant, then similar principles will apply. That is, the petroleum product would be carried forward to the first open tank with a large free surface area and thereafter would not be deemed a hazard. 7.6.2 Classification of Inlet Channels and Chambers Open to Atmosphere

Equipment for screening, grit removal and commutation located at the receiving works are included in this section. Flammable liquids present in sewage will flow into open inlet channels and chambers, where the through surface flow conditions that normally prevail, will prevent large quantities of flammable vapour being produced. Refer to Table 7.4 Zoning of Inlet Works, Channels and Chambers. Open inlet channels with unrestricted natural ventilation, receiving sewage flows from Medium risk

Page 67 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 category combined sewers are classified as Zone 2 internally up to coping level. Externally above the coping wall, the area should be classified as non-hazardous. Screening equipment below the coping wall shall therefore be suitable for a Zone 2 area and non-hazardous above the coping wall. Open inlet channels receiving flows from domestic foul only sewers are classified as Non-hazardous. Figure 7.3 Zoning of Medium Risk Inlet Channel or Chambers Open to Atmosphere

7.6.3

Classification of Enclosed or Sheltered Inlet Channels and Chambers in Open Air

Inlet channels or chambers located in the open air, may be enclosed or sheltered, thereby limiting any natural ventilation available. If artificial ventilation is not provided within enclosed channels or chambers, then the ventilation must be considered as inadequate to disperse a release of flammable gas or vapours. An open channel or chamber in a sheltered location (e.g. a deep channel/chamber or one sheltered from the wind by surrounding structures) should be considered the same as an enclosed channel or chamber with inadequate ventilation. Where artificial ventilation is provided within an enclosed channel or chamber but is less than 3 ACH or ventilation is at least 3ACH but discontinuities could occur for more than 10 hours (e.g. no standby ventilation fan or manual duty/standby changeover on unmanned site), then the ventilation within the channel or chamber must be considered inadequate. Refer to Table 7.4 Zoning of Inlet Works, Channels and Chambers. High Risk enclosed or sheltered inlet channels or chambers, where ventilation is inadequate (less than 3ACH) are classified as Zone 1 internally. A Zone 2 area will be taken to extend for a distance of x metres radius from any large opening or above the coping wall of a sheltered open channel (refer to Table 7.3 for values of x). Enclosed screenings equipment shall be classified internally the same as the covered channel up to the inlet of the launder channel and non-hazardous thereafter. Medium Risk enclosed or sheltered inlet channels or chambers are classified as Zone 2 internally or up to coping level. Enclosed screenings equipment shall be classified internally the same as the covered channel up to the inlet of the launder channel and non-hazardous thereafter. Low Risk enclosed but adequately ventilated (min. 3ACH) inlet channels or chambers are classified as non-hazardous.

Page 68 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.4 Zoning of High Risk Enclosed or Sheltered Inlet Channels or Chambers

7.6.4

Enclosed, Open and Ventilated Channels in Buildings

Some inlet channels may be located within a building along with screening plant to control odours. Where channels are covered they may be provided with extract type artificial ventilation for odour control. Ventilation rates for odour extraction are typically in the range of 3-6 ACH. In the event of a large hydrocarbon spillage, this level of ventilation in a covered channel may not be adequate to prevent an explosive atmosphere from being formed by hydrocarbon vapours, but could reduce persistence time and hence the zone type and extent. Open channels within a building may be covered with mesh flooring and hence ventilation within the channel will be provided by the natural or artificial ventilation available within the building. Local extractive ventilation, in the range of 3-6 ACH within covered inlet channels or chambers inside a building will maintain a negative pressure beneath the covers, so that a release of flammable vapour or gas to the surrounding building is unlikely provided large hatches and openings in the covered channels are kept closed. Hatches and openings in the covers shall be clearly marked to show that their presence forms part of the zoning classification for the channel or chamber and should be replaced as soon as is practicable when removed for maintenance purposes. Refer to Table 7.4 Zoning of Inlet Works Channels and Chambers. High Risk enclosed inlet channels or chambers within a building are classified as Zone 1 beneath the covers. Where the ventilation in the building is at least 1ACH, a local Zone 2 area of x m radius (refer to Table 7.3 for values of x) will extend from any large opening in the covers (Note; this zoning only applies when the cover is removed). The Zone 2 distance is dependant on the ventilation rate within the enclosed channel (refer to Table 7.3). For High Risk enclosed channels where the ventilation rate in the building is less than 1ACH or ventilation in the building is not continuous, then the whole building shall be classified as Zone 2.

Page 69 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Open inlet channels or chambers shall be considered as being similar to enclosed channels or chambers with the surrounding structure providing the cover or enclosure. Where the building ventilation is less than 3 ACH, High Risk open channels or chambers shall be classified as Zone 1 up to the coping or mesh floor level and the whole of the surrounding building shall be classified as a Zone 2 area. Where building ventilation is a minimum of 3ACH, then open inlet channels or chambers are categorised as Medium Risk. Enclosed screens in open inlet channels shall be classified the same as the channel up to the screens launder channel and non-hazardous thereafter. Figure 7.5a Zoning of High Risk Enclosed Screen Channel in Building

Medium Risk enclosed or open inlet channels or chambers within a building are classified as Zone 2, internally. For enclosed Medium Risk channels and chambers, the rest of the building shall be classified as Non-hazardous provided there is a minimum continuous ventilation rate of 1 ACH in the building. If the minimum ventilation rate in the building is less than 1 ACH or ventilation is not continuous, a local Zone 2 area of x metres radius (refer to Table 7.3) will extend around large openings in the covers. Enclosed screens in inlet channels shall be classified as Zone 2 internally up to the screens launder channel and nonhazardous thereafter. For open Medium Risk channels or chambers, the rest of the building shall be classified as Non-hazardous provided there is a minimum continuous ventilation rate of 3 ACH in the building. If the minimum ventilation rate in the building is less than 3 ACH or ventilation is not continuous, a local Zone 2 area of x metres radius (refer to Table 7.3) will extend above the top of the coping wall or mesh covers.

Page 70 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Low Risk enclosed inlet channels or chambers are classified as non-hazardous. Figure 7.5b Zoning of Medium Risk Enclosed Screen Channel in Building

Where the use of continuous building ventilation to reduce or eliminate zonal classification is not feasible due to local odour restrictions, a permitted alternative measure would be to use flammable gas/vapour detection to initiate the building ventilation. Any gas detection system used to initiate ventilation as a means of eliminating a zonal classification is deemed to be a Safety Instrumented System and therefore must comply with the requirements set out in Section 10.2.3. The use of a Safety Instrumented System must be approved by the Project Manager. The gas detector must be located upstream in the inlet channel and interlocked with building ventilation. On flammable gas/vapour detection an alarm should be initiated at 10% of Lower Explosive Limit (LEL). The building ventilation should be initiated at 25% LEL to provide ventilation of at least 3 ACH within the building. A failsafe for the gas detection system shall be that building ventilation is energised on loss of gas detection (detector failure). 7.6.5 Primary Settlement (including Storm Water Storage)

In the event of an accidental spillage into a combined sewer, screened and degritted sewage from a Medium or High Risk inlet works could pass forward residual flammable liquid to the first stage of treatment (typically primary settlement or storm water storage). These tanks have a large surface area, which are generally open to the atmosphere and would allow any residual flammable liquid still present in the sewage inflow to quickly evaporate. In addition, conventional primary settlement and storm storage tanks are normally equipped with scum boards which would retain any floating liquid on the surface.

Page 71 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 For membrane or SBR plant, similar principles would still apply in that they have large surface areas where the flammable liquid can evaporate. Gas generation from sludge solids settled in the bottom of the tanks will occur where sludge is not removed frequently and is most noticeable in warm weather. The composition of this sludge gas is unlikely to be flammable (see Technical Appendix A1.3.2) and with the large free surface area and natural ventilation of open tanks, mean that there is no risk with regard to biogas generation. Open topped primary settlement tanks (including storm tanks) are therefore classified as Non-hazardous. Covered primary settlement tanks receiving effluent from Medium or High Risk inlet works, may be at risk from flammable vapours in the event of a flammable liquid spill, if they are inadequately ventilated. Primary settlement tanks which are covered or enclosed inside a building to control odours and have adequate ventilation (min. 3 ACH) shall be classified the same as open primary tanks above (this includes settlement tanks enclosed within buildings). If the ventilation rate is less than 3 ACH then this may be inadequate to prevent an explosive atmosphere from forming under the covers of the tank. A covered primary tank with inadequate ventilation shall therefore be classified as Zone 2 under the covers and non-hazardous above the covers. Primary settlement tanks (including storm tanks) that are covered and receive flows from a Low Risk inlet works are classified as non-hazardous. 7.7 INTERSTAGE PUMPING STATIONS Interstage pumping stations on sewage treatment works are located between treatment processes and can operate on a range of fluids produced in the treatment of sewage and sludge, including primary effluent, raw, secondary and digested sludges, mixed and return liquors and final effluent. Open or covered wet wells, channels or chambers associated with interstage pumping stations containing settled sewage, mixed liquor from activated sludge plants, filter effluent, final effluent and tertiary treated effluent are considered non-hazardous. Pumping stations containing raw or activated sludges, whether open or covered, shall be classified non-hazardous. Raw sludge can emit gases but these are composed primarily of carbon dioxide, accompanied by small amounts of methane and traces of other gases, such as hydrogen sulphide. This gas mixture is not flammable, see Technical Appendix A1.3.2. Return liquors from the thickening or dewatering of primary, activated and humus sludges will not generate a flammable gas mixture so open or covered wet wells containing return liquors from these sources are considered non-hazardous. Liquors obtained from digested sludges however, may still contain a considerable amount of dissolved methane and the classification of wet wells is dealt with in Section 7.13.1. 7.8 SLUDGE STORAGE, THICKENING/DEWATERING The factors affecting the quantity and composition of gas produced from the decomposition of sludges include: Retention for long periods of time; High ambient temperature; Less acidic sludges.

These conditions are optimised in the case of sludge digestion to actively generate biogas containing the highest concentrations of methane and to maximise its

Page 72 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 production. Storage of digested sludge must therefore be considered a high risk as digesting sludges on leaving a digester will continue to produce biogas for a considerable period. Digesters and digested sludge is considered separately in Section 7.9. In a well operated works, raw, activated and humus sludges will not normally produce a flammable gas as a result of decomposition at ambient temperature (up to 20C), and therefore in these circumstances it is considered that no hazard is deemed to exist from these sludges. Sludge storage, thickening and dewatering equipment handling raw, activated or humus sludges are also classified as non-hazardous. 7.9 DIGESTERS Digesters are sometimes termed primary and secondary digesters. Generally primary digesters are for the digestion of raw sludge at elevated temperatures, typically 35oC, with utilisation of the fuel value of the methane content of the gas produced. Secondary digesters perform a similar function for sludge received from primary digestion, but without any means for maintaining temperatures or, usually, recovering the gas. Consequently, the gas evolution rate is lower than in a primary digester and decreases with time as the temperature of the sludge decreases slowly. This section is concerned only with primary digestion. Secondary digestion is dealt with in Section 7.10 - Digested Sludge Vessels and Sumps. There are various designs of digesters. They may be constructed of concrete or metal and have either fixed or floating roofs; in this latter case arranged as a dome to function as combined digester and gas holder. All new digesters should be fixed roof with separate gas holders. The roof of the digester will contain a number of fittings, which may include pressure/vacuum relief valve, rupture discs, sight glasses, lamp glasses, and instrumentation items for pressure, level and temperature. All these connections must be considered as potential leak sources. Mixing is provided either by compressed sludge gas being sparged at the bottom of the digester, or by internal mechanical mixers. The digester may be operated in a fill and draw regime or a displacement regime. In the former, some of the digested sludge is removed before introducing a fresh feed of raw sludge. In the latter, the raw sludge is introduced and displaces digested sludge.
The fill and draw method is no longer recommended due to the potential for introducing atmospheric oxygen into the digester, thus, possibly creating an internal explosive mixture.

Digester structures should not be utilised to create a plant room for pumping of digested sludge. Where this does occur, a preliminary hazardous area classification must be made by utilising and interpreting information from this SPD supplemented with that available in the published literature. The preliminary classification must then be agreed in writing with the Project Manager to ensure a consistent corporate approach. Digesters should be classified as shown in Figure 7.6 for fixed roof digesters and Figure 7.7 for floating roof digesters. The following points must be noted with regard to zone classification: Fixed concrete roofs suffer occasionally from cracks and steel tanks suffer occasionally from corrosion pitting holes, with consequential gas leakage (or more particularly from around purpose-made insertion points in the roof or wall where equipment has been fitted). Operating practice must be to repair such leaks before they become a significant problem. On the basis that this is done speedily and effectively, the roof is shown as a Zone 2 area for distance of 2.0m, with the zone extending to a minimum of 2.0m below water seal level. Where this boundary would be below ground then the zone extent shall terminate at ground level.

Page 73 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Minor gas leakage may be expected from around the water seal of a floating digester during normal operation, so a Zone 1 area will extend from the surface of the water seal up to the top of the containment wall. Under abnormal conditions it is possible for the water seal around a floating roof digester to release gas to the atmosphere, for instance because of overinflation. A release from the water seal is therefore regarded as a secondary release leading to a Zone 2 hazardous area extending from the water seal around the rim of the gas holder. The Zone 2 distance for a release from the water seal is given in Table 7.4. Under abnormal conditions the pressure/vacuum relief valve may operate under negative pressure, allowing air to be drawn into an atmosphere, which would otherwise be at a concentration above the UEL, and thus giving rise to an explosive gas/air mixture. The interior of the digester is therefore classified as Zone 1. If the relief valve is of the dead weight type (e.g. Whessoe Valve), small leakages of flammable gas will be released between the weight pallet and seating of the valve during normal operation. A Zone 1 is therefore deemed to extend for a radius of 0.5m from the valve. The pressure/vacuum relief valve is shown sufficiently elevated to clarify the zoning around its discharge location. Generally, the valve is lower and the lower part of the zone will merge with that above the roof. Under abnormal conditions the relief valve may operate under high pressure and release flammable gas. The outlet of the relief valve is therefore regarded as a secondary grade of release. For digesters with gas production rates up to 200m3/h, a Zone 2 area will extend for a radius of 5m from this release source. Usually pressure fluctuations in the digester can be accommodated by the gas holder without the relief valve operating. The zoning is based on a mechanical pressure/vacuum relief device operating at a typical relief pressure of 25mbar. This zoning is equally applicable to those devices relying on a head of water if measures have been taken to ensure that the liquid level is appropriately maintained at all times. For digesters operating at higher gas production rates or at a higher relief pressure, the extent of the Zone 2 area around the relief valve must be calculated using the formulae given in Example 2 of Appendix A1.1.2. The classification around the relief valve is based on the assumption that the primary route for disposal of excess gas is via the waste gas burner. If the waste gas burner is not operational for an extended period of time a risk assessment must be carried out to consider reclassifying around the relief valve to reflect its use as the primary route for excess gas disposal.

For other ancillary items (such as gas mixing pipework) and variations to the design shown (e.g. overflow arrangements, agitator drives, etc.) then the information given elsewhere in this SPD should be used to arrive at a preliminary classification.

Page 74 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.6 Zoning for Fixed Roof Digester

Page 75 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.7 Zoning for Floating Roof Digester

Page 76 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0

Table 7.5
D (m)

Zoning Distance for Water Seal Leakage - Floating Roof Digesters

Digester Height to Diameter Ratio (H/D) 0.5 0.75 1 Dispersion Distance x (m) 1.25 1.5

10 20 30 40 50

2 2 2 2 3

2 2 2 3 5

2 2 2 3 5

2 2 2 3 5

2 2 3 3 5

Note: The table is based on IGE/SR/25; Table 10, but has been modified to suit dispersion distances for biogas released from a water seal leakage.

7.10

DIGESTED SLUDGE VESSELS, SUMPS AND LAGOONS Vessels for storing primary digested sludge received from digesters are sometimes called secondary digesters. Secondary digesters are used to provide additional pathogen reduction prior to dewatering and/or disposal. Digested sludge is stored in the secondary digester for a minimum retention period of 9 days to ensure compliance with HACCP procedures and an air mixing system is often fitted to minimise short circuiting of primary sludge through the vessel. Compared to primary digesters, very little solids reduction and gas production takes place in a secondary digester, nevertheless, digested sludge will continue to release gas for some time within the vessel as it cools down. Ventilation is required in secondary digesters in accordance with SPD C09 - Sludge Treatment (reference 4). Provision must be made for explosion relief on inadequately ventilated enclosed vessels due to the significant possibility of an explosive atmosphere being present virtually continuously in the vessel. The sizing of such explosion relief must be supported by appropriate calculations provided by competent specialists. Covered storage vessels (secondary digesters) that have ventilation provided for odour control, shall be classified as Zone 1 internally and non-hazardous externally, provided they have a ventilation rate of at least one air change per hour. Covered secondary digesters with ventilation of less than 1 ACH are considered to be inadequately ventilated and shall be classified as shown in Figure 7.9. Open storage vessels or sumps containing digested sludge from digesters e.g. discharge overflow limpet boxes on the fill and discharge type of digester, should be classified as in Figure 7.8, where the sump is in an open freely ventilated area. The sump can be considered to be in an open freely ventilated area when the sump is separated from other significant sized buildings or structures (e.g. a large building or tank) by more than twice the height of the building or structure. Where this criteria is not met then the storage vessel or sump is in a sheltered location and ventilation is considered to be inadequate, so the zoning in Figure 7.10 should be applied. Although lagoons may receive some primary digested sludge, the amount entering a lagoon is usually too small to create a significant release of flammable gas. However, if the feed into a lagoon is large enough there is a potential to generate a localised explosive atmosphere around the inlet feed pipe. If this is likely then a Zone 2 area of 1.0m radius should be assumed above the surface of the lagoon centred on the feed pipe. As digested sludge from the secondary digester will have largely ceased anaerobic biological activity the risk of significant gas release from the sludge will be minimal. Return liquors obtained from the dewatering of digested sludge, may however still contain some dissolved methane.

Page 77 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.8. Zoning for Open Storage Vessels or Sumps Containing Primary Digested Sludge

Page 78 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.9. Zoning for Covered and Inadequately Ventilated Storage Vessels Containing Primary Digested Sludge

The distance x for the Zone 0 and Zone 1 bubbles in the figure above will be dependant on the stored volume of digested sludge. The distance x is defined below for a range of vessel storage volumes, for values in between those given select the nearest upper value of x, up to a maximum of 1.0m.

Table 7.6

Hazard Distances for Covered and Inadequately Ventilated Storage Vessels Containing Primary Digested Sludge
Volume of Covered Storage Vessel Up to 500m 750m
3 3 3 3 3

x = x = x = x = x =

0.5m 0.6m 0.6m 0.7m 1.0m

1000m 1500m

Greater than 1500m

Note: Dispersion formulae used to determine zone extents are detailed in Appendix A3.3.

Page 79 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0

Figure 7.10 Zoning for Open Sumps Containing Primary Digested Sludge Where Natural Ventilation is Restricted.

The zone extent x for the Zone 2 area in the figure above is dependant on the volume of the sump. The distance x is defined below for a range of sump volume, for values in between those given select the nearest upper value of x, up to a maximum of 0.5m.

Table 7.7

Hazard Distances for Open Sumps Containing Primary Digested Sludge

Volume of Open Sump Up to 500m 750m
3 3 3 3 3

x = x = x = x = x =

0.2m 0.25m 0.3m 0.3m 0.5m

1000m 1500m

Greater than 1500m

Note: Dispersion formulae used to determine zone extents are detailed in Appendix A3.3.

7.11

PIPEWORK CONTAINING DIGESTED SLUDGE Pipework and fittings containing digested sludge should be classified non-hazardous. If such pipework containing digester sludge (feeds, heating streams, discharges, etc.) is to be installed in plant rooms, then the provision of valves, flanges and fittings should be minimised. Any drain connections should be valved and the open ends provided with a blank flange or plug. Reference should also be made to Section 7.18.2 with regard to digested sludge pumps located within plant rooms. Covered drains and manholes handling primary digested sludge shall be classified as Zone 1 internally where the ventilation is inadequate (less than 1 air change per hour), with a Zone 2 extending around any vent or opening for a distance of x as defined in Table 7.6. Where ventilation is available at min. 1 air change per hour (e.g. open manholes) then the classification shall be Zone 2 internally with a Zone 2 extending above the coping level for a distance of x as defined in Table 7.7. Covered drains and manholes handling secondary digested sludge shall be classified as Zone 2 internally where the ventilation is inadequate (less than 1 air change per hour) with no external Zone 2. Where ventilation is available at min. 1 air change per hour (e.g. open manholes) then the classification shall be non-hazardous.

7.12

DIGESTED SLUDGE CENTRIFUGES Centrifuges employed on secondary digested sludge dewatering should be classified as non-hazardous when they are installed in a freely ventilated open air environment.

Page 80 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Centrifuges may be installed indoors and should be classified as non-hazardous, provided adequate ventilation is available to control the concentration of hydrogen sulphide and methane in the atmosphere. If centrifuges are installed indoors, then the enclosed space containing the centrifuge should be provided with a ventilation system achieving a minimum of 1 air change per hour. Forced air ventilation systems must be fitted with air flow monitoring, that alarms and shuts down the centrifuge in the event of loss of sufficient air flow. 7.13 DIGESTED SLUDGE PRESSES AND PRESS HOUSES Filter presses handling secondary digested sludge that are located within a press house shall be classified as non-hazardous inside the press unit, provided a ventilation system achieving a minimum of 1 air change per hour exists within the press house. The press house itself shall be classified as non-hazardous. Where mechanical ventilation is employed, extract systems must be fitted with air flow monitoring, that alarms and shuts down the presses in the event of loss of sufficient air flow. An alternative to ventilating the whole press building to a minimum of 1ACH is to enclose the press in a smaller curtained off area complete with a roof and provide local ventilation within the curtained off area of at least 1ACH. The extraction system must discharge to the outside of the building at a safe point. Filter presses handling primary digested sludge are required to have a minimum ventilation rate of 3ACH either in the press building as a whole or within a curtained off area around the press In the latter case, the rest of the press house must have a minimum ventilation rate of 1ACH at all times. Mechanical ventilation must be interlocked with press operation that alarms and shuts down the presses in the event of loss of sufficient air flow. Digested sludge filter presses situated in the open air or the equivalent of open air are classified as non-hazardous internally and externally around the unit. Where ventilation of the sludge presses and/or press house above is inadequate (less than 1ACH for secondary digested sludge or less than 3 ACH for primary digested sludge), then the filter press and/or press house shall be classified as Zone 2. An alternative mitigation measure where ventilation is inadequate, to remove zonal classification, could be to provide a flammable gas detection system linked to emergency ventilation and press shutdown. Any gas detection system used to initiate emergency ventilation and press shutdown as a means of eliminating a zonal classification is deemed to be a Safety Instrumented System and therefore must comply with the requirements set out in Section 10.2.3. The use of a Safety Instrumented System must be approved by the Project Manager. The gas detection system must be installed in a suitable location above each press. On detection of flammable gas at 10%LEL, an alarm will be initiated and emergency local or building ventilation started to provide the minimum required ventilation rate. The press must be automatically shutdown and a washdown initiated if the flammable gas level reaches 25%LEL. Any press or press house that does not match the arrangements described above should be classified on an individual basis. A preliminary classification must be made by utilising and interpreting information from this SPD supplemented with that available in the published literature. The preliminary classification must then be agreed in writing with the Project Manager to ensure a consistent corporate approach. 7.13.1 Press Liquors Liquors from pressing of digested sludge will have a high organic load and may still contain dissolved methane. The concentration of dissolved methane in liquors from secondary digested sludge is considered to be less than 10mg/l due to degassing in the secondary digester. At this concentration any residual methane release is unlikely to result in the formation of an explosive atmosphere, except in enclosed vessels such as covered sumps and wet wells that are inadequately ventilated. Where the enclosed

Page 81 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 space is adequately ventilated (a minimum of 1 ACH), then the internal volume shall be classified as non-hazardous. If the ventilation rate in the enclosed space is less than 1 ACH, then the internal volume of the enclosed vessel shall be classified as a Zone 2 with no external zone extent. Liquors obtained from primary digested sludge will contain a higher concentration of dissolved methane, which is likely to be in excess of 10mg/l. At this concentration, methane is more likely to be released from solution and this could lead to an explosive atmosphere being formed.. Where the enclosed space (e.g. sumps or wet wells) is adequately ventilated (a minimum of 3 ACH), then the internal volume shall be classified as non-hazardous. If the ventilation rate in the enclosed space is less than 3 ACH, then the internal volume of the enclosed vessel shall be classified as Zone 2 with no external zone extent. 7.14 GAS MAINS 7.14.1 Definitions Gas mains include pipework, flanges, valves and associated fittings (including instrumentation). In sewage treatment plant utilising the digestion process, the gas mains present are primarily for the handling of the sludge gas (biogas) evolved by the process. Natural gas and vaporised LPG are sometimes used for fuel in sewage treatment plant. They are handled in similar gas mains (refer to Section 7.19 for LPG) and shall also be classified according to the following sections. The gases above are handled at different pressures, at low pressures, typically up to 20 mbarg for sludge gas and up to 40 mbarg for the other gases, and at medium pressures, typically above 2 barg for compressed sludge gas and possibly for LPG in its vaporised state. High pressure gases (above 5 barg) are not normally used on Thames Water sites and advice should be sought when considering area classification involving high pressure gases. For the purposes of area classification low and medium pressure conditions are defined as follows: low pressure medium pressure up to 500 mbarg. between 500mbarg and 5 barg.

Where doubt exists in relation to whether the pressurised gas should be considered medium or low pressure, the guidance for medium pressure gas mains should be used in preference to that for low pressure gas mains. 7.14.2 Gas Pipework and Fittings The design, selection of material and installation of pipework, fittings, etc., for sludge gas must comply with the current editions of the Institution of Gas Engineers Publication IGE/UP/2 - Gas Installation Pipework, Boosters and Compressors on Industrial and Commercial Premises (reference 28), for pressures up to 5 bar. Adequate consideration of the temperature of operation, particularly of compressed sludge gas must be considered, together with the relevant mechanical protection when selecting pipework. These requirements are, also, applicable to natural gas. The requirements cater for pipework to be installed above ground, below ground and in covered ducts. Pipework pressure testing is described in both the above publications. Gas pipework installed in plant rooms to supply engines, boilers or fired equipment must satisfy a leakage test as described in BS 5978 - Safety and Performance of Gas Fired Hot Water Boilers (60kW to 2MW Input) - Part 1 (18). Pipework should make use of welded construction with the minimum of flanges.

Page 82 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Detailed advice on piping for use with LPG can be found in UKLPG Code of Practice No. 22 - LPG Piping, System Design and Installation (42). Since small bore pipework is more prone to accidental damage and possible release to atmosphere, pipes smaller than 12 mm should be avoided. When this is not possible, e.g. with instrument systems, then additional upstream isolating valves must be provided. Condensate removal facilities provided on sludge gas pipework should be by means of automatic drains, siphon chamber pumps or self-closing manually operated valves, as appropriate. All low points in the pipe runs should be given special attention with regard to condensate removal. If the drain is not kept capped off it is possible under abnormal conditions for gas to leak past the seal of the closed valve, and in the case of automatic drains for the water seal to be lost. Figure 7.11. Zoning for Condensate Drains on Gas Pipework in Chambers

It is considered that gas leakage from a condensate drain into a chamber is expected if the drain operates frequently and leads to a primary grade of release, therefore a Zone 1 area is assumed within the chamber. A Zone 2 will then extend above the top of the chamber for a distance of x metres due to gas leakage through the condensate valve (a 1% leak area has been used for a typical condensate valve size). The distance x can be extrapolated from the table below for different gas pressures.

Table 7.8

Zone 1 Distances for Gas Leakage from Condensate Drains

x x x = = = 0.4 metres 0.8 metres 0.9 metres

Low Pressure Gas (100 mbar) Medium Pressure (1 bar) Medium Pressure (2 bar)

Note: Dispersion formulae used to determine zone extents are detailed in Appendix A3.3.

Page 83 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.12. Zoning for Condensate Drains on Gas Pipework in Freely Ventilated Areas Above Ground.

Gas leakage from a condensate drain in the open air is expected if the drain is operated frequently and leads to a primary grade of release, therefore a Zone 1 will exist, extending around the drain valve a radius of x metres. The distance x can be extrapolated from Table 7.6 above. Wherever practicable drains should not be installed in plant rooms, covered ducts, etc. If drains are installed in a plant room, the drain piping must be led to an easily visible point outside the building. The end of the pipe should be zoned as described above. None of the resulting zones should impinge on any opening back into the plant room. 7.14.3 Condensate Drains Condensate drains should be led outside covered ducts as described above for plant rooms. Where gas mains and associated equipment are buried no zones exist externally. However where fittings, etc., are located in chambers or above ground then the classifications appropriate to the gas pressures and degree of ventilation in those locations should be used. Site drains must be water sealed, e.g. using a U bend, to ensure that any gas releases are not transmitted to other parts of the site via them acting as open ducts, thereby requiring the classification of facilities some distance from the potential source of release. 7.14.4 Low Pressure Gas Mains Installed in the Open Air These are gas mains operating up to 500 mbarg on any of the gases mentioned identified in Section 7.14.1. Internally, the gas main should be classified as Zone 1. Devices inserted into the gas flow must be rated for Zone 1 if integral electrical parts are in wetted contact with the gas. If integral electrical parts could only abnormally come into wetted contact with the gas (e.g. failure of: diaphragm, seal, protective tube, etc.) the devices must be rated

Page 84 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Zone 2. This zoning of devices is not considered to extend beyond the external perimeter of those devices, unless a clear transmission route exists. CFD modelling studies2 have shown that gas cloud volumes resulting from low pressure leaks are of negligible extent (as defined in BS EN 60079-10) in open areas where they are freely ventilated. Consequently for flanges, valves and fittings in a normal environment, installed in the open air or in an adequately ventilated plant room (see section 7.14.7), which are inspected at least twice per year, shall be classified as non-hazardous around the periphery of the item. A normal environment is non-vibratory equipment that is well maintained and either rarely broken (flanges and fittings) or infrequently used (valves). Flanges, valves and fittings in an adverse environment, shall be classified as Zone 2 with a zone extent of 0.4m for pressures up to 100mbar and 0.6m for pressures up to 500mbar (equivalent to a 2.5mm2 leak area) around the periphery of the item. An adverse environment is equipment that is either installed on vibratory pipework, regularly broken (flanges) or more frequently used (valves used during operation or as a result of frequent maintenance), Valves should be installed close to flanges, which are regularly broken to minimise the implications of any releases. 7.14.5 Medium Pressure Gas Mains Installed in the Open Air These are gas mains operating between 500mbarg and 5 barg on any of the gases identified in Section 7.14.1. Open air installations means above ground or in open ducts having width greater than twice their depth. Any mesh covers should have an open area of at least 60 percent. Any installation not meeting these requirements must be treated as described in Section 7.14.6, unless the gas mains are buried (see Section 7.14.3). Gas mains pipework, not including valves, flanges, etc., complying with the requirements of Section 7.14.2 should be classified as non-hazardous externally and Zone 1 internally. Flanges, valves, etc., installed on non-vibratory pipework, which are well maintained, but are rarely broken (flanges) or infrequently used (valves), should have a local Zone 2 area with a radius 0.3m (for a 0.25mm2 leak area) around the periphery of the item. Flanges, valves, etc., installed on vibratory pipework (e.g. connected to blowers/compressors) or items broken or used more regularly, should have a local Zone 2 area with a radius based on the gas main pressure as below (for a 2.5mm2 leak area). Valves should be installed close to flanges, which are regularly broken to minimise the implications of any releases.

Table 7.9

Zone 2 Distances for Medium pressure Gas Mains in Open Air

0.8 metres 0.9 metres 1.2 metres

Medium Pressure Gas Mains (1 bar) Medium Pressure Gas Mains (2 bar) Medium Pressure Gas Mains (5 bar)

Note: Dispersion formulae used to determine zone extents are detailed in Appendix A3.3.

Instruments and their fittings, including gas meters, should be zoned using the above information on flanges, valves and pipework.

CFD Modelling of Low Pressure Jets for Area Classification HSL/2005/11 Page 85 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 7.14.6 Medium and Low Pressure Gas Mains Installed in Covered Ducts Covered ducts carrying gas mains that have a combination of flanges, valve glands, screwed fittings, joints and regulators should be ventilated to prevent accumulation of gases. If adequate ventilation is provided to disperse any release of gas from leaks and prevent accumulation then the covered duct shall be classified as Zone 2 internally and non-hazardous externally. Ventilation can be considered adequate if: N L/(3W) (N = number of ventilators equally spaced along length of duct, L = length of duct, W = width of duct) and, the minimum area of each ventilator opening in the duct is not less than 50% of the cross sectional area of the duct.

Ventilator openings shall terminate to the open air, in a non-hazardous area, with a minimum of one at each end of the duct, or at each end of each isolated section of duct. For horizontal ducts, the openings should be at the top of high points and the bottom of low points. If ventilation is considered inadequate then the duct shall be classified as Zone 1 internally with a Zone 2 of 0.1m radius around any opening or ventilator for low pressure gas mains and 0.3m radius for medium pressure gas mains Should it be necessary for a gas main to pass through an unventilated duct or void, either: the pipe should be continuously sleeved through the unventilated duct or void with the sleeve ventilated at both ends into a ventilated area; or, the unventilated duct or void should be filled with a crushed inert infill to reduce to a minimum the volume of any gas which may accumulate. The infill material should be of a dry, chemically neutral and fire resistant nature e.g. crushed slate chippings or dry washed sand.

7.14.7 Gas Mains Installed in Plant Rooms Wherever practicable the running of gas mains within buildings should be avoided. For all areas of buildings, other than plant rooms, a justification for the routing of the gas mains and a preliminary hazardous area classification must be made by utilising and interpreting information from this SPD supplemented with that available in the published literature. The preliminary classification must then be agreed in writing with the Project Manager to ensure a consistent corporate approach. Gas mains should only be run in plant rooms if providing a fuel supply to equipment in the room. The plant room shall be classified as non-hazardous where ventilation of at least 1 air change per hour is provided within the room. Low pressure gas mains serving engines or fired equipment in ventilated plant rooms shall be classified in accordance with Section 7.14.4. Medium pressure gas mains shall be classified in accordance with Section 7.14.5, depending on the gas mains pressure. The pipework must be tested leak tight as described in Section 7.14.2. Where a gas main is run in a plant room that has limited ventilation rate of less than 1 air change per hour, the entire plant room shall be classified as Zone 2. As far as is practicable, valves, flanges, etc., should be minimised on gas mains in plant rooms and welded construction maximised. Where possible, pressure reduction to that required by the equipment should occur prior to entering the plant room. The maximum possible pressure, taking account of possible failure of any pressure reducing device, must be used as the basis for hazardous area classification. Any condensate drains from gas pipework should have the drain piping led to an easily visible point outside the building. The end of the pipe should be zoned as described for

Page 86 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 such drains in Section 7.14.2. None of the zones should impinge on any opening into the plant room. Care must be taken in the design, installation and commissioning of instruments and their fittings to ensure that the likelihood of leakage is minimised and that the design basis applied is not, therefore, compromised. 7.14.8 Gas Receivers Gas receivers or accumulators, whether on low or medium pressure systems, should be installed in the open air or in a ventilated area having a ventilation rate of at least 1 air change per hour. Where gas receivers are to be installed in areas that have limited ventilation of less than 1 air change per hour, they must be enclosed in a ventilated cabinet that discharges to an open or well ventilated area. Manways or similar flanges are not regarded as giving rise to a hazardous area. Other than any fittings, such as drains, vents, and instruments, which should be classified by reference to Section 7.14.2 for drains and Section 7.16.1 for vents, classification of the receiver area should be non-hazardous externally and Zone 1 internally. 7.15 GASHOLDERS Gasholders may be of the water sealed or waterless variety operating at low pressure. Details of gasholders can be found in SPD C09 - Sludge Treatment (4). Standard specifications, also, exist for gasholders of both steel and plastic types. Lightning protection will be required for gas bag type gas holders (see SPD C09). For details of safety recommendations for design, maintenance and inspection of gasholders, reference may be made to IGE publication IGE/SR/4 - Low Pressure Gas Holders Storing Lighter than Air Gases (36). The following points must be noted with regard to zone classification: Flammable gas is continuously present within the roof space, its concentration being above the upper explosive limit (UEL). Under normal conditions an explosive atmosphere will not be present. Under abnormal conditions the pressure/vacuum relief valve may operate under negative pressure, allowing air to be drawn into an atmosphere which would otherwise be at a concentration above the UEL, and thus giving rise to an explosive gas/air mixture. The interior of the floating roof is therefore classified as Zone 1. If the pressure/vacuum relief valve is of the dead weight type (e.g. Whessoe valve), small leakages of flammable gas will be released between the weight pallet and seating of the valve during normal operation. A Zone 1 will therefore extend for a radius of 0.5m radius around the valve. Under abnormal conditions the relief valve may operate under high pressure and release flammable gas. The outlet of the relief valve is therefore regarded as a secondary grade of release and results in a Zone 2 hazardous area that extends for a radius of 5m around the valve. Minor gas leakage may be expected from around the water seal of a floating roof gasholder during normal operation, so a Zone 1 area will extend from the surface of the water seal up to the top of the containment wall. Under abnormal conditions it is possible for the water seal around the floating roof to fail, resulting in a release of flammable gas to the atmosphere. The water seal is regarded as a secondary release leading to a Zone 2 extending from the water seal around the rim of the gas holder. Refer to Table 7.5 for dispersion distances for a leak from the water seal.

Page 87 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Because of the need to consider leakages from the roof, due to pinholes, etc, and any boundary effects from secondary releases, a Zone 2 is deemed to exist around the floating roof for distance of 2.0m, with the zone extending to a minimum of 2.0m below water seal level. Where this boundary would be below ground then the zone extent shall terminate at ground level. The classification around the relief valve is based on the assumption that the primary route for disposal of excess gas is via the waste gas burner. If the waste gas burner is not operational for an extended period of time a risk assessment must be carried out to consider reclassifying around the relief valve to reflect its use as the primary route for excess gas disposal.

For any other ancillary items and variations in design, the information given in the SPD should be used to arrive at the appropriate size and zoning of the classified area. IGE/SR/25 Hazardous Area Classification of Natural Gas Installations (37) provides some guidance on zoning distances for pressure relief valve vents. Water sealed gasholders, for sludge gas storage, should be classified as shown in Figure 7.13. Double skin inflatable (balloon) gasholders should be classified as shown in Figure 7.14. The pressure relief valve is shown sufficiently elevated to clarify the zoning around the discharge location; generally the valve is lower.

Page 88 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.13. Zoning for Water Sealed Gas Holder.

Page 89 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.14. Zoning for Double Skin Inflatable (Balloon) Type Gas Holders.

7.16

GAS COMPRESSORS AND BLOWERS Gas compressors and blowers should, wherever practicable, be installed in the open air or in an open sided structure beneath a roof canopy. Where gas compressors or blowers are installed in enclosed spaces (e.g. acoustic enclosures), ventilation requirements should be confirmed by the compressor supplier. These may need to be increased if considered necessary for area classification requirements as described below. Minimum requirements recommended by the Institution of Gas Engineers Publication IGE/UP/2 - Gas Installation Pipework, Boosters and Compressors on Industrial and Commercial Premises (38), comprise the following for natural ventilation of enclosed spaces: ventilation openings to the atmosphere should be provided at high and low levels; all high level, ventilation should be located at roof level, or as near to the roof as practicable; the total ventilation area should be equally disposed about the enclosed area with all openings at least 3 metres from any external source of ignition hazard; the total effective ventilation area should be not less than 2 percent of the floor area of the enclosed area; mechanical ventilation systems shall be fully interlocked with machine operation; and, when noise levels necessitate attenuation of the ventilators, such attenuation shall not reduce the effectiveness of the ventilators. The acoustic attenuation of all ventilation items must, also, be effective.

Gas compressor rooms or enclosures located within a larger building, should be fire resistant, with at least 30 minutes fire resistance or in accordance with Building Regulations. 7.16.1 Gas Compressors and Blowers Installed in the Open Air This section applies to compressors and blowers in service on sludge gas (digester gas). For compressors on vaporised LPG see Section 7.19.

Page 90 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Compressors and blowers should be installed in the open air or in an open sided structure with only overhead weather protection provided by a roof with which is ventilated at its high point. (Note: the roof is not required for health and safety purposes and could be omitted if other factors allow). Guidance on compressors installed within acoustic enclosures is given in the next section. Gas compressors and blowers are classified as Zone 1 internally. Secondary releases may occur due to leaks in compressor glands, seals and joints. A leak on the shaft seal on the compressor/blower would represent the worst case secondary release. Therefore for both rotary and reciprocating compressors the installation should be classified externally as shown in Figures 7.15 and 7.16. The Zone 2 distance x around the periphery of the centrifugal/reciprocating compressor is dependant on shaft diameter and discharge pressure of the compressor (see Table 7.10 for Zone 2 distances on open air).

Table 7.10

Zone 2 Distances for Centrifugal/Reciprocating Compressors in Open Air

Shaft Diameter SD (mm)

Leak Area (mm ) = Radius (m) at 100mbarg Radius (m) at 200mbarg Radius (m) at 500mbarg Radius (m) at 1barg Radius (m) at 2barg Radius (m) at 4barg Radius (m) at 5barg Leak area calculation 2

10
16.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.3
2

15
24.3 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.6
2

25
40.1 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.9 2.1

40
63.6 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.4 2.6

50
79.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.7 2.1 2.7 2.9

80
126.4 1.6 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.6 3.3 3.7

100
157.9 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.9 3.7 4.1

([SD + d ] / 2) (SD / 2)

(from Area Classification for Landfill Gas Extraction,

Utilisation and Combustion; ESA ICoP 2, edition 1:Nov. 2005). d = leak diameter (assumed to be 1mm) Zone 2 distances in open air are based on dispersion of a pressurised jet of gas in air to below the LEL.

Diaphragm compressors shall be classified as Zone 2 above with distance x 3.0m around the periphery of the compressor. Note: Figures 7.15 and 7.16 do not include the zones associated with the gas pipework - reference should be made to Section 7.14.2 Blower installations should, also, be classified as shown in Figures 7.15 and 7.16. Any relief valves or drain vents on gas duty, including vents from any crankcase seals and lubricating oil system must discharge to atmosphere at a safe location. Such vents will have a zoned area at their discharge point to atmosphere. The classification will depend on the continuity of discharge as given in the zone definitions in Section 5.3. The zone will be a sphere centred on the discharge point having a radius as follows:

Table 7.11

Discharge Radius from Compressor Vents

Radius (m) 1.5 5.2

Vent Rate at Ambient Conditions 3 (m /hour) Up to 10 10-100

Page 91 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Drains should be classified by reference to Section 7.14.2. Figure 7.15. Zoning for Compressors and Blowers Beneath a Canopy in the Open Air.

Figure 7.16.

Zoning for Compressors and Blowers in the Open Air.

7.16.2 Enclosed Gas Compressors and Blowers Although it is preferred that compressors or blowers are installed in the open it is often necessary to enclose a compressor or blower installation, for instance to provide noise attenuation. When it is necessary to install a gas compressor or blower in an enclosed space, such as an acoustic enclosure or inside a room or building, secure proven ventilation and gas detection must be provided. Secure ventilation must be powered by an electrical source independent of a CHP engine, whilst proven ventilation requires a device to directly monitor the air flow. Where explosion relief is also provided, the sizing of such explosion relief must be supported by appropriate calculations provided by competent specialists. Where the minimum ventilation rates specified in Table 7.12 are provided within the enclosure for the removal of flammable gases, the enclosure shall be classified as Zone

Page 92 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 2 inside. Ventilation rates may be greater than this if required for other duties such as cooling.

Table 7.12

Minimum Ventilation Rates (m3/s) for Enclosed Centrifugal/Reciprocating Compressors

Shaft Diameter SD (mm)

Leak Area (mm ) = MVR (m /s) at 100mbarg MVR (m /s) at 200mbarg MVR (m /s) at 500mbarg MVR (m /s) at 1barg MVR (m /s) at 2barg MVR (m /s) at 4barg MVR (m /s) at 5barg
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2

10
16.5 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.26 0.49 0.61

15
24.3 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.23 0.38 0.72 0.90

25
40.1 0.13 0.18 0.28 0.38 0.63 1.19 1.49

40
63.6 0.20 0.28 0.45 0.6 1.00 1.89 2.36

50
79.3 0.25 0.35 0.56 0.74 1.25 2.36 2.94

80
126.4 0.40 0.56 0.89 1.18 2.00 3.76 4.68

100
157.9 0.50 0.70 1.11 1.48 2.49 4.68 5.85

If the minimum ventilation rate is provided by mechanical means, then the ventilation system should operate whenever the gas compressor is operating. Air flow monitoring shall be provided that alarms on ventilation failure. Where the minimum ventilation rate is not achieved within the enclosure or for mechanical ventilation where air flow monitoring is not provided, the enclosure shall be classified as in Figure 7.17. Figure 7.17 Zoning of Enclosed Compressors and Blowers with Inadequate Ventilation or No Air Flow Monitoring

Page 93 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 The Zone 2 distance x around any source of continuous vent from the enclosure is dependant on shaft diameter and discharge pressure of the compressor (see Table 7.13 for Zone 2 distances).

Table 7.13

Zone 2 Distances for Enclosed Centrifugal/Reciprocating Compressors

Shaft Diameter SD (mm)

Leak Area (mm ) = Radius (m) at 100mbarg Radius (m) at 200mbarg Radius (m) at 500mbarg Radius (m) at 1barg Radius (m) at 2barg Radius (m) at 4barg Radius (m) at 5barg Leak area calculation 2

10
16.5 1.2 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.7 3.8 4.0
2

15
24.3 1.4 1.7 2.2 2.7 3.3 4.7 5.0
2

25
40.1 1.9 2.3 2.9 3.6 4.3 6.2 6.5

40
63.6 2.4 3.0 3.8 4.6 5.6 8.0 8.4

50
79.3 2.8 3.3 4.3 5.2 6.3 9.0 9.5

80
126.4 3.6 4.3 5.5 6.7 8.1 11.7 12.3

100
157.9 4.0 4.9 6.3 7.6 9.2 13.2 13.9

([SD + d ] / 2) (SD / 2)

(from Area Classification for Landfill Gas Extraction,

Utilisation and Combustion; ESA ICoP 2 (47)). d = leak diameter (assumed to be 1mm) Zone 2 distances based on low velocity release from enclosure opening with dispersion occurring at minimum wind speed of 0.5m/s.

A higher ventilation rate may be employed in the enclosure to achieve dilution ventilation (refer to Section A2.5.2), for the purpose of reducing the enclosure classification to Non-hazardous. Where dilution ventilation is employed in the enclosure, the adequacy of the ventilation must be confirmed by air flow monitoring, that automatically isolates the suction and discharge valves on the gas supply in the event that inadequate air flow is detected. Gas detection should be fitted within the enclosure to detect gas leaks and isolate the gas supply as above. Any gas detection system being used to initiate a gas supply shut-off as a means of eliminating a zonal classification inside the enclosure is deemed to be a Safety Instrumented System and therefore must comply with the requirements set out in Section 10.2.3. The use of a Safety Instrumented System must be approved by the Project Manager. Gas detector settings should be as low as practicable without causing spurious alarms. Alarm settings should be no higher than 10% of the lower explosive limit (LEL) and trip settings no higher than 25% of LEL. For small enclosures (no access except by removing panels), located in the open or in a building where dilution ventilation is being provided in the enclosure to achieve a Nonhazardous classification, then explosion relief panels shall be fitted to the enclosure. The sizing of such explosion relief must be supported by appropriate calculations provided by competent specialists. For large enclosures, such as a room within a building, where dilution ventilation is provided to achieve a Non-hazardous classification, then explosion relief is not required but local gas detection providing alarm and interlocked with isolation of the gas supply must be installed. 7.17 FLARES / WASTE GAS BURNERS Surplus or waste sludge gas may be burnt using a waste gas burner, which may be of the open flare type or enclosed ground flare variety. Waste gas burners includes burners fitted to boilers and sludge heaters as well as open or ground flares. Since

Page 94 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 waste gas burners are a source of ignition, they must be located as far as is reasonably practicable from hazardous areas. The gas burner gas train on waste gas burners shall incorporate flame failure detection, safety shut-off valves and flame arrestors. For the purposes of this SPD, open flares are considered to be those units where the flare tip is mounted on top of a stack so the flame is external to the unit. Enclosed ground flares are considered to be those units where the flare tip or burner is enclosed within a refractory lined carbon steel shell or a radiation fence, depending on the size of the system. Heat radiation from a ground flare will be less than for an open flare because the flame is enclosed and will reduce the minimum separation distance to an object exposed to thermal radiation. Minimum separation distances around flares are dependent on the type of unit and its design rating. Table 7.14 provides details of flare safety distances based on design sludge gas throughputs for open and enclosed ground flares. A fenced off exclusion zone shall be located at a minimum 2m distance around ground flares. Open flares also require a fenced off exclusion zone where the height of the flare tip is less than the minimum separation distance above ground level. Where the height of the flare tip above ground is at least 2m above the minimum flare safety distance, then a fenced off exclusion zone may not be necessary. For example, if flare has design gas rating of 250m3/hr, the separation distance is 5m, if the flare tip is 2m above this minimum, i.e. 7m above ground level then a fenced off area is unnecessary. If the flare tip height is less than 2m above the minimum separation distance but still above the minimum separation distance, then the fenced area shall be the same as for ground flare, i.e. 2metres . In the above circumstances and for ground flares, the Local Control Panel (LCP) can be located inside the fenced area provided the LCP is installed with a suitable heat protective canopy. In general, the tip height of open flares used for burning waste gas are often less than the minimum separation distance and therefore a 5m fenced off exclusion zone will be required to protect personnel and heat sensitive equipment. In this case, the LCP should be installed outside the 5m fenced area. The actuated solenoid valves for the burner/pilot train are usually installed at low level close to the flare, an isolation valve is also normally fitted in the gas train upstream for manual isolation in an emergency or for maintenance. This manual isolation valve can be within the fenced area, but located close to the fence periphery and need not be lockable, a lockable isolation valve will be required if installed outside of the fenced area. Ideally equipment requiring regular access for maintenance should be outside the fenced off area. Access to fenced off areas must be controlled under a permit to work system, that ensures the gas line to the unit is isolated prior to any maintenance being carried out.

Table 7.14.

Flare Safety Distances (Minimum Separation Distances)

Design sludge gas rating (m3/hr)

Open flare minimum separation distance (m) D1

5 7.5 10

Ground flare minimum separation distance (m) D2

4 5.5 7

less than 250 greater than or equal to 250, but less than 500 greater than or equal to 500, but less than 750

Page 95 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0

greater than or equal to 750, but less than 1000 greater than or equal to 1000 12 refer to Project Manager 8 refer to Project Manager

Note: Minimum separation distances are derived from formulae specified in API RP 521 Guide for Pressure Relieving and Depressurising Systems (46), refer to Appendix A3.4 for further details.

Figure 7.18

Open Flare Minimum Separation Distance

Page 96 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.19 Ground Flare Minimum Separation Distance

Reliability of pilots and their ignition system is necessary to avoid a flare becoming a source of flammable gas release. Flame detection with an alarm shall be provided for flare pilots. Alarms shall also be provided for the loss of the fuel supply. Standard specifications exist for both ground and open flares. Ground flares are normally used for the larger sewage treatment works, e.g. Maple Lodge STW, but open flares, or flare stacks, are used for smaller works, since they are less expensive. Open flares usually have a flame front generator at ground level for pilot ignition, where this is installed within a hazardous area it shall incorporate flameproof enclosures for the ignition control panel. Ground flares shall be operated with permanent pilots that are continuously alight - note this does not necessarily apply to gas burners where the flame is contained within the unit and an electronic ignition system exists. All pipework prior to the waste gas burners protective upstream flame arrester must be classified in accordance with Section 7.14. Downstream of the flame arrester the system must comply with current British Gas and Institution of Gas Engineers and Managers (IGEM) standards for equipment installed in such facilities (38).

Page 97 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 For open flares or enclosed ground flares where gas venting is carried using a purge override facility, prior to ignition on start-up, the base of the flare stack shall be subject to 2m high by 2m radius Zone 2 area. 7.18 PLANT ROOMS 7.18.1 Plant Rooms for Engines, Boilers or Other Fired Equipment CHP engines and boilers are typically installed in plant rooms, which may be integral with a larger building or separate. Plant rooms that are normally occupied should be avoided, as should basement locations, if reasonably practicable. The fuel used for fired equipment can include sludge gas (digester gas), natural gas, vaporised LPG, and (as liquids) gas-oil or diesel fuel. There is currently a prohibition on the installation of liquid petroleum gas fuelled appliances with automatic ignition in basement locations. If the plant room is well ventilated, i.e. has adequate natural ventilation or secure proven forced ventilation of at least 1ACH, then it may be regarded as safe and unclassified (note: zones associated with gas pipework may exist, reference should be made to Section 7.14). Secure ventilation should be powered by an electrical source independent of a CHP engine, whilst proven ventilation requires a device to directly monitor the air flow. In the case of forced ventilation, the air flow should be monitored and interlocked with a fuel isolation valve outside the room. Section A2.5.3 provides further information on ventilation requirements in plant rooms. For CHP plant rooms located within a larger building, gas detection should also be installed in the room which is interlocked with the fuel isolation valve. On gas detection an alarm only should be initiated at 10% LEL. The fuel supply should be shutdown at 25 % LEL with initiation of an appropriate shutdown alarm. The fuel shutdown valves shall be located outside the plant room. Section 10.2 provides further information on the use of gas detectors. For boilers or other fired equipment the following protection must be provided: flame arresters are installed on the gas-line upstream of the burners as soon as practical, but definitely within flame arrester manufacturers recommendations (typically 40-50 diameters); flame failure detection linked to automatic plant shutdown; fusible links within the plant area automatically shutdown fuel isolation valves (via gravity) located immediately outside the structure (alternatives included thermal (point or line-type) detectors, light obscuration (optical beam) detectors, radiant (emission point) detectors ; for gaseous fuels, pipework is tested as leak tight (see Section 7.14.2); pipework construction makes maximum use of welded construction with the minimum of flanges; and, Manual shutdown valves are installed on all fuels outside the plant room.

Where the ventilation provided is inadequate (less than 1ACH), or discontinuities of ventilation could occur for more than 10 hours (e.g. no standby ventilation fan or manual duty/standby changeover on unmanned site), the plant room shall be classified as Zone 2. Pipework carrying gases or liquid fuel not associated with the installed equipment should be excluded from plant rooms. Pipework carrying sludges, will not affect the classification. New plant rooms containing these items of equipment must be located as far as is reasonably practicable from hazardous areas. Exhausts, chimneys and flues must be similarly located.

Page 98 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 When using natural ventilation to ventilate the Plant Room consideration shall be given to any cooling effects on the plant and pipework within the building. 7.18.2 Plant Rooms for Pumps Plant rooms containing pumps handling effluent, liquors or sludge (except for digested sludge and digested sludge liquors) should normally be classified as non-hazardous, unless influenced by their proximity to hazardous areas. In such circumstances, the ventilation aspects need careful consideration, especially where parts of the plant room are below ground level. Hazardous areas can, however, arise in the event of a major leakage of digested sludge or digested sludge liquors. For this reason, the electrical supply to plant rooms containing pumps for digested sludge and digested sludge liquors should be capable of being isolated externally and all emergency light fittings shall be self-contained and explosion protected to a Zone 1 standard. In addition, emergency lights fitted below ground level, or within 1m of floor level, or in any area which may be submerged in sludge in the event of a major leakage should be protected to an Ingress Protection (IP) standard of IP67, as defined in BS EN 60529 Specification for Degrees of Protection Provided by Enclosures (reference 23), appropriate to the possible depth of immersion as a minimum. Plant rooms containing pumps handling digested sludge or digested sludge liquors must have natural or mechanical ventilation that can provide at least 3 ACH. If such ventilation is provided, the plant room shall be classified as non-hazardous. Where the rate of ventilation in the plant room is less than 3 ACH, but is greater than 1 air change per hour then the plant room shall be classified as Zone 2. When using natural ventilation to ventilate the Plant Room consideration shall be given to any cooling effects on the plant and pipework within the building. Digester structures should not be utilised to create a plant room for pumping of digested sludge. Where this does occur, a preliminary hazardous area classification must be made by utilising and interpreting information from this SPD supplemented with that available in the published literature. The preliminary classification must then be agreed in writing with the Project Manager to ensure a consistent corporate approach. 7.18.3 Other Enclosed Spaces Pipework carrying gas or sludge inside digester galleries should be classified the same as for Plant Rooms in Section 7.18.1. When using natural ventilation to ventilate the Enclosed Space, consideration shall be given to any cooling effects on the plant and pipework within the enclosure. 7.19 LPG FACILITIES LPG storage in fixed installations, located in the open air, including pumps, vaporisers (other than direct fired) and compressors, should be classified as shown in Figures 7.20 and 7.21. LPG storage vessels must be located in the open air.

Page 99 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.20 Zoning for LPG Storage Tanks in the Open Air.

Table 7.15

Zoning Distances for LPG Storage Tanks in Open Air

a in metres 2.5 3.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 b in metres 2.5 3.0 7.5 15.0 22.5 30.0

Vessel Water Capacity in litres Up to 500 500 2,500 2,500 9,000 9,000 135,000 135,000 337,500 Above 337,500

Note: Zoning distances derived from HSG 34 The Storage of LPG at Fixed Installations.

Page 100 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 7.21 Zoning for LPG Facilities in the Open Air.

Table 7.16

Zoning Distances for LPG Facilities in Open Air

x in metres 2.5 3.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5

Vessel Water Capacity in litres Up to 500 500 2,500 2,500 9,000 9,000 135,000 135,000 337,500 Above 337,500

Note: Zoning distances derived from HSG 34 The Storage of LPG at Fixed Installations.

Pumps and compressors may be covered by a canopy. This will not affect the zone sizes if the canopy is above the zoned areas. Where pumps, compressors and vaporisers (other than direct fired) are installed at an indoors location with adequate ventilation, then the entire room and any adjacent rooms, not separated by a vapour tight partition, should be classified Zone 1. Such rooms must be provided with explosion relief. The sizing of such explosion relief must be supported by appropriate calculations provided by competent specialists. LPG fuelled appliances with automatic ignition must not be installed in basement locations. HSE booklet HS(G) 34 - Storage of LPG at Fixed Installations (9) should be consulted for further information, including spacing distances from other items. The zoning requirements for LPG storage tanks takes into the account industry standards such as the Institute of Petroleums Model Code of Safe Practice (Area Classification Code for Installations Handling Flammable Fluids) Part 15 (41).

Page 101 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 7.0 ISSUE 4.0 7.20 DISTILLATE FUEL Distillate fuels, typically diesel fuel oils and gas oils (refer to BS2869 - Fuel Oils for Non Marine Use Part 2 - Specification for Fuel Oil for Agricultural and Industrial Engines and Burners (Classes A2, C1, C2, D, E, F, G and H)) (14), are normally stored and handled below their minimum flash points. As such, they are not classified as flammable and can normally be considered as non-hazardous. Where there is a risk that the fuel may be atomised into a fine mist, an explosion risk exists, and the tank shall be classified as a hazardous area. With regards to spacing distances from other equipment, a fire risk assessment is required to demonstrate any impact that heat or flames may have on igniting the diesel fuel within the storage tank. The risk from such an event should be as low as that required under the Fire Precautions (Workplace) Regulations. 7.21 ROADWAYS AND VEHICLES FOR USE IN ZONED AREAS Designated zoned areas identified as a result of hazardous area classification should not impinge onto roadways that are available for use without any special precautions being undertaken. Examples of roadways that may be within zoned areas will be those used purely for specific maintenance activities, such as hard-standings for cranes. Access to these roadways must be prevented by suitable (locked) barriers which may only be removed under strict control, e.g. when it is known the hazard cannot exist due to manhole covers in place over wet wells (except where covers are vented), plant being isolated, or when a comprehensive gas monitoring program will identify the potential occurrence of an explosive atmosphere with time to initiate appropriate ignition avoidance measures (e.g. isolation and shutdown of potential ignition sources), or when vehicles are provided with diesel engines suitably protected for the zone in question. Guidance on the use of diesel engines in hazardous areas is given in the following two documents: HSE(G)113 Lift Trucks in Potentially Explosive Atmospheres (11). EEMUA Publication No. 107 - Recommendations for the Protection of Diesel Engines for Use in Zone 2 Hazardous Areas (48). 7.22 ODOUR CONTROL PLANT Wherever possible, non-flanged gas tight joints should be provided for gas carrying ductwork on the positive pressure side of the fan. Where drawing from both zoned and non-hazardous areas into the same odour control plant, ductwork should be arranged so that gases from the zoned area are not introduced into the non-hazardous zone in the event of the fan failing or during routine maintenance. For odour plant, the interior of, ductwork and vessels shall be classified the same as the vessel from which the plant is drawing. Fans, drives and motors used in any mechanically ventilated system shall also be classified as the vessel from which the plant is drawing. Where more than one vessel is connected to the plant then the vessel with the most onerous classification shall be applied. The outlet of odour plant classified as hazardous must terminate in an area open to atmosphere and will have a Zone 2 volume of 2m in the form of a hemisphere above the horizontal axis centred on the discharge point from the plant.

Page 102 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 8.0 ISSUE 4.0 8.0 8.1 CLASSIFICATION OF FACILITIES (WATER TREATMENT) INTRODUCTION This section presents information for the area classification of facilities and equipment items encountered in the handling and treatment of potable water. When an item is not covered by the examples and details given in this section, then it should be classified by utilising and interpreting information from this SPD supplemented with that available in published literature, e.g. BS, HSE, IP, IGE. On some existing installations local circumstances may permit a less restrictive classification to be used. In these circumstances a written variation from the Project Manager may be given defining the revised classification and any other restrictions or requirements which are necessary. 8.2 ELECTROCHLORINATION PLANT A by-product of electrochlorination is hydrogen. The hydrogen produced in the generator is released into the hypochlorite storage tank and/or degasser unit and a forced air venting system removes the hydrogen by venting it to atmosphere. Best engineering design can minimise the potential for hydrogen leaks, but the following areas need to be considered as potential hydrogen escape routes; the generator cells, in particular the flanged end caps and screwed process and instrumentation fittings. the sodium hypochlorite storage tanks.

Classification of hazardous areas associated with such plant is described in HSE OC498/11 - Fire and Explosion Hazards at Electrochlorination Plant (12). HSE OC498/11 provides hazardous area classification information for open (and partially enclosed) tanks, as well as closed top tanks. Within Thames Water closed top tanks are generally used. The sodium hypochlorite storage tanks associated with electrochlorination plant should be classified as shown in Figures 8.1 and 8.2. If installed outside, the area above the electrolytic cells and associated pipework, and extending 1.5 metres horizontally and below should be classified as Zone 2. Where the electrolytic cell or storage tanks are located indoors (this being the usual case in Thames Water), the whole of the room and any directly or indirectly connected rooms (i.e. not gas sealed from the plant room) should be classified as Zone 2 throughout. Forced ventilation is required into the tank to maintain a concentration of less than 1% Hydrogen within the tank. The tank ullage space shall be maintained at a higher pressure than atmospheric.

Page 103 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 8.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 8.1. Zoning for Open and Partially Enclosed Sodium Hypochlorite Storage Tanks Associated with Electrochlorination Plant.

Any relaxation from the hazardous area classification for electrochlorination plant detailed in this section must be in accordance with the requirements of HSE OC498/11 - Fire and Explosion Hazards at Electrochlorination Plant (12) and approved in writing as a variation to this standard by the Project Manager. It should be noted that any zonal classification due to the electrochlorination equipment may effect existing and future equipment installed within the zoned areas - this is particularly true when plant is installed in existing buildings.

Page 104 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 8.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 8.2. Zoning for Closed Top Sodium Hypochlorite Storage Tanks Associated with Electrochlorination Plant.

8.3

AMMONIATION FACILITIES Ammonia has the potential for creating an explosive atmosphere, however, even within its flammable limits, ammonia is difficult to ignite and any flame generated is not stable. Ammonia is stored in either drums or cylinders and the main source of a potential leak is in the storage room which should be classified as Zone 2 throughout. The above classification assumes that drum systems are provide with automatic drum shutdown valves (that operate at the high level gas alarm) and the following levels of ventilation are provided: Normal condition - natural ventilation resulting in one air change per hour minimum. Low level gas leak (not exceeding 25ppm ammonia) - mechanical ventilation running giving six air changes per hour minimum. High level gas leak (not exceeding 4 percent ammonia) - mechanical ventilation maintained giving six air changes per hour minimum.

Page 105 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 8.0 ISSUE 4.0 The ventilation equipment in the storage room must be suitable for a Zone 2 environment. Ammonia instrument rooms are classified as non-hazardous, if the pipeline carrying the ammonia gas through the room is under vacuum (as is usually the case for ammonia drums). Where the gas pipeline is under pressure (as for ammonia cylinders) then the room shall be classified as Zone 2. 8.4 UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES AND TUNNELS Normally underground structures and tunnels would be classified as non-hazardous, but consideration should be given to the possible ingress of geological methane or landfill gases (essentially methane). Examples where this may be a problem are raw water tunnels, potable water tunnels and service reservoirs. If it is thought that such gases are likely to be present, advice should be sought from the Project Manager on the precautionary measures to be taken. 8.5 PUMPING STATIONS Pumping stations are classified as non-hazardous but they can be influenced by their proximity to hazardous areas. 8.6 PLANT ROOMS FOR ENGINES, BOILERS AND OTHER FIRED EQUIPMENT Reference should be made to Section 7.18 with regard to the zoning of plant rooms containing engines, boilers or other fired equipment. 8.7 LPG FACILITIES Reference should be made to Section 7.19 with regard to the zoning of LPG facilities. 8.8 OTHER PLANT Any other plant that may contain flammable gas/air or dust/air mixtures should be zoned in consultation with equipment manufacturers and the Project Manager. Oxidizing gases, e.g. leaks from oxygen storage tanks or from chemical breakdown of oxidizing agents such as ozone or hydrogen peroxide, will normally expand the explosive range. As the oxygen concentration rises in a confined space, fires (and explosions) are easier to start -- a spark from a tool, static electricity or any other source of ignition that would not start a fire in normal air can do so in an oxygen enriched environment. Fires will be able to start at both a lower LEL and a higher UEL. Those fires will also burn and spread faster. Refer to Section A1.2.4 for further information on the effects of oxygen enrichment. Oxygen enrichment of a confined space can cause materials to spontaneously ignite. Prevent oxygen enrichment by ensuring equipment is leak tight and in good working order and check ventilation of confined spaces is adequate to prevent oxygen enrichment. Never store combustible materials next to equipment containing oxygen or oxidizing agents. Oil and grease are particularly hazardous in the presence of oxygen as they ignite spontaneously and burn with explosive violence. They should NEVER be used to lubricate oxygen or enriched air equipment. Special lubricants with which oxygen can be used under certain conditions are available. The British Compressed Gas Association Code of Practice CP19 (49), provides information on bulk liquid oxygen storage and the minimum separation distances between storage tanks and typical hazards.

Page 106 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 8.0 ISSUE 4.0 Figure 8.3 Oxygen Safety Distances in Metres

Refer to Code of Practice CP19 for Table references above.

Reprinted from BCGA CP19 Rev 3 2002 Page 107 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 9.0 ISSUE 4.0 9.0 9.1 CLASSIFICATION OF FACILITIES (WORKSHOPS AND LABORATORIES) INTRODUCTION This section provides guidance on the acceptable practices relating to the requirements for compliance with DSEAR in workshop facilities and laboratories. 9.2 WORKSHOPS Workshop facilities are not normally classified as hazardous areas except where the quantities of material involved require its consideration as a means of controlling the risk from fire and explosion. The Institute of Petroleum provides guidance on the minimum quantities of flammable materials above which hazardous area classification may be appropriate: Flammable gas (volume corrected to 1 bar) Inside 50 litres; outside 1000 litres. Liquified flammable gas inside 5 litres; outside 100 litres. Flammable liquid inside 25 litres; outside 200litres, Typical examples of dangerous substances that may be found in workshops Ammonia storage/handling of drums/cylinders Petrol - storage/handling in drums/cans eg from draining fuel tanks/lines, and when working on vehicles Other flammable liquids - storage/use of paints, solvents, cleaning materials, Flammable gases - welding/cutting equipment, LPG heaters, battery charging, LPG-fuelled vehicles, some aerosols.

Where flammable materials are present in the workshop, measures must be taken to control the risk of fire and explosion. In order of priority, the following control measures should be adopted where reasonably practicable Reduce the quantity of dangerous substance to a minimum: DO keep stored quantities of petrol, and flammable solvents, including wastes, as low as possible. DO keep numbers of gas cylinders to a minimum. Avoid or minimise releases DO use fuel retrievers for draining petrol tanks/lines. DO use safety containers for flammable substances. Keep tops/lids on all containers and dispose contaminated cloths/rags safely Control releases at source Prevent the formation of an explosive atmosphere DO use tools with built in extraction or local exhaust equipment DO potentially dangerous work in safe and well ventilated areas eg in the open air. DONT drain petrol tanks/lines over or close to an inspection pit, drain or other opening in the ground. DONT carry out welding or other hot work on flammable substance containers unless they have been adequately cleaned and purged.

Page 108 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 9.0 ISSUE 4.0 Avoid ignition sources DONT smoke or carry out any hot work while draining petrol or where flammable vapours could be present. DONT store oxygen and flammable gas cylinders together.

Keep incompatible substances apart

Flammable solvents, petrol and gas cylinders should be stored in the open air if possible, or in storerooms which are in safe positions or are fire-resisting structures. Where flammable gases are stored inside, e.g. ammonia, ventilation should be provided, either natural or artificial to prevent a build up of flammable gas. Generally rooms used for storing ammonia will be Zone 2. Gas cylinders should be stored in suitable racks with securing chains. Acetylene and oxygen cylinders used for welding are normally transported in a trolley, cylinders should be secured with fixed clamps or chains. Any spare cylinders should be stored outside in cages with clear marked areas for full and empty cylinders. Acetylene, propane and oxygen should be stored separately with a minimum 3m distance between the cages or half hour firewall segregating each storage area. Petrol in quantities greater than 25litres should be stored in a flame vault. 9.3 LABORATORIES For most laboratory operations there is no tradition of hazardous area classification or using ignition-protected equipment, and the risks are usually controlled in other ways. The risk assessment required under DSEAR must consider the potential sources of a release (e.g. handling of flammable liquids, liquified flammable gases, flammable gases), the scale of operations involved and the procedures established within the laboratory to control fire risk. At the very smallest scale of operations, the consequences of a spill may well be trivial. Quantities up to about 50mls can be mopped up or sometimes flushed away, and if they ignite, so long as the fire does not quickly spread, they may well burn out before anyone is at risk, or before a laboratory worker could take any action to extinguish a fire. If these are the conclusions of a risk assessment, formal zoning is clearly inappropriate, though it may well be appropriate to avoid the use of naked flames and other powerful or constant ignition sources in the immediate vicinity. Where the evaporation of a solvent is deliberately intended, e.g. from a coated surface, the operation may need to be carried out in a fume cupboard. In these cases, if the health risks under COSHH are properly controlled, there may well be no need for additional precautions to control the fire and explosion risk. Where quantities are larger but still manipulated on the open bench, for example up to 2.5 litres, in a Winchester bottle, the risks are more significant. The actual extent of a flammable atmosphere following a spill may well be a radius of up to a metre, but only a very small height above the liquid level. Any ignition of a spreading pool will produce a fire that quickly extends to the whole area of the spill, and could cause a risk to laboratory staff. Particular dangers arise if the spill enters the drains, as an explosive atmosphere could then form in an enclosed space. Direct heating by bunsen burners and other obvious continuous ignition sources should be avoided, but the greatest risk probably comes from electrical equipment in use as part of the operation. Much of this cannot be avoided, and may well not be available in ignition-protected form, e.g. hot plates, heating mantles, stirrer controllers. Therefore reliance is placed upon safe working practices within laboratories to control the risk of fire. Laboratory work involving equipment above a 2 litre scale, and pilot scale plants need more careful consideration. Pilot scale is taken to mean equipment with a capacity of 50-100 litres or more. In these cases formal hazardous area classification may be the most appropriate method of reducing the risk from ignition sources.

Page 109 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 9.0 ISSUE 4.0 9.3.1 Fire Control Measures

Fire depends on the presence of a fuel, an oxidant (usually air) and normally a source of ignition. Therefore, the prevention of fires relies on eliminating one or more of these. This can best be achieved by a combination of good design and safe working practice. The design and construction of chemical laboratories is covered in detail in the Building Regulations 2000, various British Standards and other publications. If a fire occurs it is important for the structure of the building to provide containment in order to limit its spread to adjoining areas. Difficulties arise in laboratory buildings because of potential chimney effects created by fume cupboard exhausts and service ducts. Firebreaks are desirable in such ducts and fusible-links dampers may be necessary. With these the damper is held open by a lightweight metal link which melts at high temperatures and causes the damper to close. Ideally at least two protected escape routes should be provided. Emergency exits must be clearly identified by suitable signs and wherever practicable emergency lighting should be provided. Fire escape routes and exits should be kept clear and unobstructed at all times. An appropriate fire detection and fire alarm system should be provided. The location of all fire alarm call points should be clearly marked. Smoke and/or rate of rise heat detectors should be considered, especially in laboratories where equipment is left running unattended. Automatic fire extinguishing systems may also be considered (especially in fume cupboards). Portable fire fighting equipment should also be provided. The design of safe working procedures is as important in fire prevention as the provision of adequate facilities. Reference to safe working procedures is included in various sections below. Storage and Handling of Flammable Substances Wherever practical highly flammable (or hazardous) substances should be substituted with less flammable substances. Where this is not possible, quantities should be minimised and the following precautions taken. Flammable substances must be stored in correctly designed fire-resisting stores. Ideally such stores should be separate buildings in order to minimise the impact of a fire on the main laboratory building. All stores should be clearly marked to indicate their contents and to warn of flammability. Stocks should be controlled, and where possible kept to a minimum, by the careful management of purchase, stock rotation, use and disposal. Access to stores must be restricted to authorised persons who have been instructed in the nature of the hazards and in the safe handling precautions, including procedures in the event of a spillage. All containers must be labelled in accordance with the Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packing for Supply) [CHIP] Regulations (as amended from time to time). The arrangement of materials in stores should be simple and logical (eg alphabetical) and any special requirements for segregation of incompatible materials (e.g. oxidizing agents) should be followed. The fire and explosion hazards involved with the storage of flammable liquids can be minimised by storing these in properly designed containers inside fire resisting store rooms and cupboards and by taking care to prevent or contain spillages during storage and dispensing. Ideally dispensing of liquids should not be carried out in dedicated flammable store rooms. Sources of ignition should be removed from stores and no other combustible materials should be kept in them. Adequate provision of absorbent materials, such as vermiculite, must be available to deal with spillages. An appropriate method for disposing of the used absorbent should be arranged. On no account should flammable material be washed down drains if it is spilled. Flammable liquid stores should be ventilated both at high and low level to prevent the build up of vapours. A sill should be provided at the doorway of the store in order to

Page 110 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 9.0 ISSUE 4.0 retain any spillages inside the store. Any electrical equipment such as lights, heaters etc should be of special flameproof construction to prevent vapours being ignited. The storage of flammable liquids in laboratories must be minimised and as guidance no more than 50 litres of highly flammable liquid (250L of flammable liquid) should be stored in each room of a laboratory and it should be kept in a fire-resisting cupboard or bin. All such storage cupboards should be clearly marked with their content and its flammability. Shelves in cupboards should be provided with a lip to contain any spillage. The maximum size of any container kept on the bench should be 500ml. Containers kept on the bench should, wherever possible, be stored on a tray to contain any spillage or leakage. When flammable liquids are transported within the laboratory appropriate carriers should be used for anything other than small glass bottles. Dispensing of flammable liquids from bulk containers should be carried out by trained staff in a safe well ventilated area. Wherever possible the need for dispensing should be avoided by the purchase of the correct sized containers. As indicated above all containers should be properly labelled. Where flammable liquids are used steps should be taken to contain or minimise vapours and any spillages or loss of containment arising, for example, from fractured glassware, overboiling, loss of cooling to a condenser or inappropriate methods of transferring liquids. The use of fume cupboards and secondary containment (benches with lips or trays) may be appropriate in addition to written safe working instructions. The storage of volatile, flammable liquids in ordinary refrigerators has led to serious explosions and, consequently only specially designed or modified (spark-free) refrigerators should be used for this purpose. Cylinders of flammable gases should ideally be stored outside the laboratory in a secure well ventilated compound or storeroom. Gas cylinders should be stored vertical and secured to prevent them falling. Acetylene cylinders must always be kept upright. Full and empty cylinders should be segregated and individual gases kept in separate bays where Flammable gases should be segregated from oxygen and other oxidising gases. Where a gas distribution system is used, manifolds and pipes should be of possible. appropriate material, colour coded and labelled at appropriate points. Pipework and fittings for acetylene should not include any copper, otherwise copper acetylide can form on internal surfaces and could give rise to an explosion risk. 9.3.2 Fume Cupboards

Some work at this scale may be done in a fume cupboard, and this will allow the sash to be closed to give some protection if a fire should start. The work should be arranged so that any foreseeable release of gas or vapour will be rapidly diluted below the explosive limit, by the airflow through the cupboard. Precautions may still be needed to reduce the fire risk, such as retaining sills at the front edge, and extraction ductwork kept free from flammable residues. In particular fume cupboards should not be used as storage facilities for toxic or flammable chemicals while they are also being used for experimental work. Rapid failure of stored bottles in a small fire could produce sufficient vapour to prevent the extract fan diluting vapours sufficiently. 9.3.3 Releases into enclosed spaces

Where vapours or gases may escape into an enclosed space like an oven, or refrigerator, the consequence of an ignition is more likely to be an explosion than a fire. Refrigerators have exploded in laboratories, where the light switch or thermostat contact sparked when opening or closing. This risk can be avoided by buying a unit designed for this purpose, with any spark-producing electrical equipment sealed from contact with the internal atmosphere, rather than a designation of the inside of unit as zone 1 or 2. In the case of an oven, it may be possible to keep heating elements below

Page 111 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 9.0 ISSUE 4.0 the ignition temperature of any vapour likely to be used, or to provide adequate ventilation to prevent the build up of vapours, but some risks will remain unless close control is maintained over products and quantities that can be placed inside.

Page 112 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 10.0 ISSUE 4.0 10.0 SELECTION OF ATMOSPHERES EQUIPMENT FOR USE IN POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE

10.1

SOURCES OF IGNITION For an explosion to occur in a hazardous area, a source of ignition must be present. It is therefore a sensible precaution to ensure that wherever possible and practicable sources of ignition are removed from the hazardous area. Where removal of a source or potential source of ignition is not possible, adequate precautions must be taken to ensure that the source of ignition does not come into contact with the explosive atmosphere. Care must be taken to ensure that all potential sources of ignition receive proper consideration. A list of possible sources of ignition, which can commonly occur in the water industry is detailed below. For a more comprehensive list of ignition sources requiring consideration, refer to BS EN 1127-1 (22). 10.1.1 Unprotected Flames Unprotected flame is possibly the most obvious source of ignition and could arise from a range of objects and activities. These include matches, smoking, welding, oxyacetylene cutting etc. 10.1.2 Mechanically Generated Sparks Mechanical generated sparks may result from friction, impact or abrasion. The particles which become separated from solid materials during these processes become hot owing to the energy used in the separation process. If these particles consist of oxidizable substances, for example iron or steel, they can undergo an oxidation process, thus reaching even higher temperatures. Sources include such things as sparks from tools, grinding operations, metal studs on boots, etc. Impacts involving rust and light metals such as aluminium, magnesium or their alloys can initiate a thermite reaction which can cause ignition of explosive atmospheres. These metals could exist as housings for equipment, conduit, walkways, covers etc, Under BS EN 13463 1 2009 (22) there is no restriction in the use of Aluminium (and other light metals) in hazardous areas provided it can be demonstrated that there is no risk of ignition from incendive friction, impact or abrasion sparks through contact with rusty metal can be avoided or if the metal is sufficiently protected (e.g. with a suitable coating) so as not to present a source of ignition. The light metals titanium and zirconium can also form incendive sparks under impact or friction against any sufficiently hard material, even in the absence of rust, so there use in hazardous areas should be avoided. NOTE: Aluminium tools, ladders, etc. should not be taken into hazardous areas. 10.1.3 Static Electricity Static electricity primarily occurs when two dissimilar materials are brought into contact and then separated, resulting in each carrying an equal but opposite charge. For conducting materials this charge is quickly recombined and no residual charge remains, however if one or more of the materials is a non-conductor then the insulating properties of this material may prevent the charge from being immediately dissipated. Solids and liquids are capable of retaining an electrostatic charge, which if the charge potential is great enough, can create an electrostatic discharge or spark to earth. Possible sources of static electricity include non-conducting solids such as plastics, man made fibres (e.g. nylon), but also liquids such as vapour droplets, jets of liquids/gases, nozzles, drive belts, fan blades etc. Whether or not an electrostatic discharge will ignite a flammable mixture will depend on the minimum ignition energy to ignite the mixture and the incendivity of the spark discharge. BS 5958 (17) provides

Page 113 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 10.0 ISSUE 4.0 more detailed information and should be consulted for general considerations on control of static electricity and for recommendations applicable to particular industrial situations. BS EN 60079-0 (24) provides requirements for preventing electrostatic charges on external non-metallic materials of electrical apparatus and provides guidance on the maximum size of chargeable surfaces depending on the ignitability of the gases and vapours and the classification of the hazardous area. GRP materials used in as covers on odour control plant, tanks and digesters will not readily accumulate electrostatic charge in normal use and will readily dissipate any charge due to the high humidity inside the covered vessel. Note: there are available GRP materials which have antistatic properties. Some types of plastic (e.g. polyethylene) have high resistivity values, (resulting in a resistance to earth path in excess of 1 G), that present a greater risk of becoming charged and creating an ignition hazard. Where a charging mechanism exists for building up static on these materials, such as friction, or flow through a hose and valve and by splash filling of containers, then the following precautions must be considered. In Zone 0 areas (Zone 20) the use of sheeting made from high resistivity materials should be avoided. In Zone 1 and Zone 2 (Zone 21 and 22) such sheeting is acceptable provided that the charge generated is small and gives rise to a low ignition risk, equivalent to that from Zone 2 electrical equipment. Continuity and earth bonding of all conductive and dissipative parts connected to non-conductors will also reduce charging potential. Note: the resistance to earth only has to be sufficiently low to provide a dissipative path and could be as high as 1M, with 10 - 100 specified for convenience in monitoring. These values are considerably higher than that used for personnel protection. 10.1.4 Lightning This form of ignition is dealt with in BS EN 62305 (34) and information on lightning protection is given in Section 10.13. 10.1.5 Electrical Equipment Only suitably protected electrical equipment should be used within hazardous areas. NOTE: Personal portable electrical equipment (mobile telephones, pagers, other communication and test equipment, etc) shall not be taken into a hazardous area, unless such equipment is specifically designed and approved for use in such an area and is of proper condition and maintained in accordance with the manufacturers instructions. Such excluded equipment may only be used under the control of a permit to work. Simple electronic based watches are acceptable providing the case and glass is in good condition and not removed within the area. Multifunction watches (i.e. watches with calculators etc. and stop watches), torches (unless suitably certified for hazardous area use), car alarm key fobs, etc. are not to be taken into such areas. 10.1.6 Hot Surfaces (non-electrical equipment) Hot surfaces may result from equipment malfunction or process operations. Magnification of sunlight through glass can also result in the production of hot surfaces. 10.1.7 Other Ignition Sources BS EN 1127-1 (22) describes several other possible ignition sources including; Radio frequency electromagnetic waves, further information is available in BS 6656 (20). High frequency electromagnetic waves Ionizing radiation Ultrasonics Adiabatic compression and shock waves

Page 114 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 10.0 ISSUE 4.0 Generally these igntion sources require significantly higher levels of power to be a risk than are normally encountered in the water industry 10.2 GAS DETECTORS 10.2.1 Introduction Flammable gas detectors can be installed at any location where there is a risk of a build up of flammable gas e.g. sewers, pumping stations, head works, digester processes, landfill sites, and fuel storage areas such as digester gasholders and fuel tanks for emergency generators and heating systems. The use of flammable gas detectors to monitor these applications will provide warning of a build up of flammable gas before the concentration of gas reaches a value at which it is likely to explode. Such devices may be installed as the result of a risk assessment. It should be noted that equipment used to monitor potential build up of explosive atmospheres and carry out some form of control function as a means of avoiding development of a hazard (for example, alarm function, preventing equipment operation, initiating ventilation) would be classified as safety related equipment, which should meet the requirements of BS EN 61508 (32) and the related standard for the process industry of BS EN 61511 (33). It is possible that these requirements would be more onerous than installation of Ex equipment. Flammable gas detectors are available in versions for permanent installation at a site and as compact portable devices that can be easily carried by personnel working in areas where a build up of flammable gas could occur. 10.2.2 Use of Gas Detectors This section applies to the use of fixed gas detectors for flammable gas. Portable gas detectors tend to be used only for short periods in various locations, e.g. to confirm safe conditions prior to and during such activities as maintenance. Fixed gas detection systems range from simple single detector devices, which are installed in the location to be monitored, up to multi-sensor instruments that are used to monitor large areas of plant from a central location. In this situation, the instrument is located in the control room and connected to a number of remotely located sensors. A fixed gas detection system would be used where it is necessary to give an early warning of the presence and location of an accidental accumulation of flammable gas. The system would initiate one or more of the following actions, either manually or automatically: safe evacuation; appropriate fire fighting procedures; shutdown of processes or plant; and, ventilation control.

According to circumstances, one or both of the following approaches may be used for fixed detectors: source detection, in which the detectors are located adjacent to the likely sources of flammable release; and/or, perimeter detection, in which the detectors are located to surround the whole area or plant from which the hazard may arise.

An example of source detection is that described in Sections A2.4.2 and A2.4.3 as a precautionary measure for ventilated enclosures. This method is applicable for relatively small enclosed situations, e.g. small boiler rooms.

Page 115 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 10.0 ISSUE 4.0 Perimeter detection may provide an early warning of flammable release provided the provision of detectors is sufficiently extensive and wind direction is not adverse, e.g. digester / gasholder areas. The location of gas detectors in a wet well or at the receiving works to warn of, say, an accidental spillage of petrol or solvent, could be regarded as a combination of both source (the sewer) and perimeter detection (of the treatment plant). The basic principles are that gas detectors should be used in areas which are normally safe but which may become hazardous due to abnormal operation of plant, failure or breakdown of facilities (such as ventilation), or other less likely occurrences. The gas detectors should be sited near to where the gas leaks could occur, but far enough away from known sources of release to avoid false alarms. If, under normal conditions, gas may be present, gas detectors will be unnecessary. Gas detectors should not be regarded as substitutes for proper ventilation. They should not be sited close to ignition sources. 10.2.3 Use of Gas Detectors in a Safety Instrumented System Gas detectors can be used to initiate a safety function that eliminates or reduces a hazardous area, e.g. isolate gas supply in the event of flammable gas detection. As such this instrumented safety function may then in effect provide mitigation for the need to install EX certified equipment. Safety related equipment like this are regarded as Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) and guidance in the application of safety instrumented systems for the process industry is given in BS EN 61511 (33). BS EN 61508 (32) and BS EN 61511 (33) are international standards and as such summarise best practice. These standards provide technical assessments tools (e.g. Risk Graph or Layer of Protection Analysis), technical specifications (e.g. SIL definitions) and a framework for a reliability management system. As best practice they are not a formal legislative requirement. However, to comply with general Health and Safety Law (e.g. Health and Safety at Work Act) it is necessary to undertake risk assessments and to reduce risk as low as is practicable. This principle is also enshrined in DSEAR, which uses area classification and hazardous zoning to identify the protective measures required to reduce the risk to as low as practicable. DSEAR also requires control and mitigation measures to be considered in order to reduce or eliminate hazardous areas. So any mitigation system employed to reduce or eliminate a hazardous area should aim achieve the same level of risk reduction as would be achieved by the installation of equipment suitable for the zone classification. Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is a measurement of performance required for a safety function and is defined as a relative level of risk-reduction provided by the safety function, or to specify a target level of risk reduction. Four SIL levels are defined, with SIL4 being the most dependable and SIL1 being the least.

Table 10.1

Safety Integrity Levels

Safety Integrity Level 4 3 2 S 1

High demand rate (Dangerous failures/hr) 10-9 to less than 10-8 10-8 to less than 10-7 10-7 to less than 10-6 10-6 to less than 10-5

Low demand rate (Probability of failure on demand) 10-5 to less than 10-4 10-4 to less than 10-3 10-3 to less than 10-2 10-2 to less than 10-1

Page 116 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 10.0 ISSUE 4.0 aSafety systems operating with high demand rate are in continuous mode of operation, low demand rate is for safety systems operating intermittently on demand. Generally gas detectors operating a safety instrumented system will have a low demand rate as they are only required to operate on detection of a flammable gas atmosphere. Where a safety instrumented system is being employed to mitigate a hazardous area, it should achieve the same level of risk reduction provided by EX certified equipment. Therefore for any safety instrumented system used in intermittent mode to eliminate a hazardous area a risk reduction level of at least 100 should be applied (see Section A2.6 for explanation). This level of risk reduction corresponds to a SIL 2 (i.e. a reliability for the system of less than 1 in 100 failures on demand), Where any safety instrumented system is being used only to reduce a zone classification to a lower type, e.g. Zone 1 to Zone 2, the risk reduction level can be between 10 and 100, which corresponds to a SIL 1. Gas detectors can be used in various mitigation configurations, but each system used to eliminate a hazardous area must be a SIL 2 category system. The minimum system components required in the most typical applications are described below; Ventilation Systems - The system will comprise a gas detector (or detectors if the area is large), a control panel (relay and contactor) and two duplicate fans each able to provide 100% of the ventilation requirements. Power Shut-off Systems - The system will comprise a gas detector (or detectors if the area is large), a control panel (relay and contactor) within which power would be removed from the building. Gas Supply Isolation - The system will comprise a gas detector (or detectors if the area is large), a solenoid valve on the air supply (either compressor supply or air cylinder) to a large actuator which operates a slam-shut isolation valve on the gas supply. For gas detectors used to reduce a hazardous area classification, a SIL 1 category system may comprise the same components as above but inspection/test frequencies may be longer. The table below gives PFD values (with SIL in brackets) for the three systems at various test frequencies.

Table 10.2

SIL Test Intervals

SIL Test Intervals System Ventilation fail to start Ventilation fail during operation Power shut-off Gas feed isolation. 1 week 0.0049 (2) 0.0011 (2) 0.0008 (3) 0.0006 (3) 1 month 0.0072 (2) 0.0045 (2) 0.0032 (2) 0.0024 (2) 3 months 0.014 (1) 0.014 (1) 0.0095 (2) 0.0073 (2) 6 months 0.023 (1) 0.028 (1) 0.019 (1) 0.015 (1)

Page 117 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 10.0 ISSUE 4.0 10.2.4 Methods of Flammable Gas Detection There are three commonly used techniques for the detection of flammable gases, these are catalytic sensors (often referred to as pellistors) infra-red (IR) and flame ionisation detectors (FID). The pellistor sensors are the most commonly applied sensor for general monitoring purposes despite their lack of specificity. This is largely due to their reliability, efficiency and cost effectiveness. Pellistor sensors The pellistors detector consists of two beads of ceramic material, in each of which is embedded a platinum wire. One bead, the sensor, is doped with a catalytic material that promotes oxidation of a flammable gas at concentrations below its LEL. The second bead is not doped with catalyst and acts as a reference. The two beads, which are mounted in protective cases and located in close physical proximity to each other within the detector, are connected to a bridge circuit to enable the resistance of the embedded platinum wires to be compared. The beads are heated to temperature in the region of 400C to 600C by passing an accurately controlled current through the embedded platinum wire. In the presence of a flammable gas, the catalyst present in the sensor bead enables combustion of the gas at the surface of the bead. This gives rise to an increase in temperature within the sensor bead, which is then detected by the bridge circuit as a increase in the resistance of the platinum wire within the sensor bead when compared with the reference bead. Infra-red sensors The carbon/hydrogen bond present in most hydrocarbon compounds absorbs strongly in the infrared region of the electromagnetic spectrum. Infrared sensors for flammable gases detect the presence of the target gas by measuring the absorption of infrared energy by the gas as it passes through a sampling device. There are two distinct types of infrared gas detectors; these are non-dispersive sensors that use a broadband infrared source, and dispersive sensors that use a prism or grating to select the specific wavelength that is absorbed by the target gas. The infrared energy from the source is directed through a sample chamber to a detector. If the target gas is present in the sample, it will absorb the infrared energy in proportion to its concentration, resulting in a reduction in energy reaching the detector. The specificity of the sensor can be tailored to a specific application by the correct choice of infrared wavelength. Flame ionisation detectors (FID) The flame ionisation detector (FID) employs a hydrogen flame burning in air, surrounded by an electrostatic field. In the absence of organic substances in the flame, the electrical conductivity of the flame is low due to the low concentration of electrons and ions produced by the burning hydrogen. This results in a very low current flow in the surrounding electrostatic field. If a sample containing an organic substance is introduced into the flame, there is a corresponding increase in the concentration of electrons and ionised carbon compounds in the flame. This results in an increase in the electrical conductivity of the flame and therefore an increased current flow in the electrostatic field, which is proportional to the concentration of organic material in the sample. Flame ionisation detectors are useful broadband detectors and are available in a compact hand held form for use in survey work and for process investigations. However, these instruments do not provide a response to hydrogen, carbon monoxide or carbon dioxide. 10.2.5 Response characteristics The response of pellistor flammable gas detectors, non-dispersive broadband infrared sensors and flame ionisation detectors vary depending on the gas being detected, i.e. the sensitivity of the detector is not the same for all gases. This is an important point to

Page 118 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 10.0 ISSUE 4.0 keep in mind if a flammable gas detector is used in situations where there may be a number of different gases present. The variation in the sensitivity of a pellistor sensor to a variety of gases is represented in Table 10. after the sensor had been calibrated on methane.

Table 10.3

Variation in detector response to different gases

Type of Gas

Gas Concentration % LEL

Instrument Reading % LEL

Methane Pentane Hydrogen MEK Butane Propane Heptane Carbon Monoxide Propylene Ethylene Hexane

50 50 50 50 51 50 50 49 46 50 45

50 23 50 12 27 30 17 42 31 39 17

The results shown in Table 10.3 clearly demonstrate that an instrument calibrated on methane gave a correct response to hydrogen but reported the concentration of pentane as less that half the true concentration and reported the concentration of MEK at less than of the true value. These results demonstrate the importance of identifying the flammable gases that may be present in the area being monitored. The detector can then be calibrated for these gases and alarm levels set to ensure gas concentrations are kept well below their respective LEL limits. It is essential that personnel using portable flammable gas detectors understand the implications of the variations in sensor response to different gases. If the gas being detected is different to the gas used to calibrate the instrument then the indicated concentration may be very considerably lower that the true concentration. 10.2.6 Location of Sensors The installation of flammable gas detectors must be in accordance with recognised standards, codes of practice and any local regulations. A number of publications are available covering the installation, use and maintenance of flammable gas detectors including BS EN 50073 (23). Some key points to consider with the installation of flammable gas detectors. The detector should be mounted at a location where the gas is most likely to be present. Detectors for gases that are lighter that air should be mounted at a high level. Detectors for gases that are heavier than air should generally be mounted at a low level.

Page 119 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 10.0 ISSUE 4.0 The location of the detector should take into account how potential gas leaks may occur and the effects that local air movement, either natural or forced, may influence the movement of the escaping gas. Process conditions can influence the behaviour of escaping gas, a gas which is heavier than air may rise rapidly if it is released at an elevated pressure or temperature. Detectors should be mounted in a position where they will be protected from rain, flooding and contamination with process chemicals etc. Consideration should be give to the ease of access for maintenance and calibration.

Gas detectors must be certified for the explosive atmosphere in which they may be required to operate and must be tested periodically in accordance with manufacturers recommendations. Consideration should be given to the reliability of gas detectors and whether a multiple installation with voting is required to avoid spurious signals. The need for the detectors to initiate shutdown or isolation actions should be considered also, together with any pre-alarm or warning signals. Procedures must be prepared to advise site personnel of the actions to be taken following an alarm or actuation signal from any gas detector. 10.2.7 References Fixed site flammable gas detectors are available from a number of manufacturers and a detailed review of all the available products is beyond the scope of this document. The following information is included only as a brief guide to the type of equipment that is available. Draeger Safety A range of portable and stationary flammable gas detection systems are available from Draeger Safety UK Limited, Ullswater Close, Kitty Brewster Industrial Estate, Blyth, Northumberland, NE24 4RG, (website: www.draeger.com). Draeger's product range covers a wide variety of types: catalytic bead or infra-red IR sensor technology point or open path detection increased safety, intrinsically safe or explosion proof. GMI A range of gas detection systems, including both portable units and fixed site units are available from Gas Measurement Instruments Ltd. Inchinnan Business Park, Renfrew, PA4 9RG (www.gmiuk.com). Products include the Multi-Gas system which is capable of monitoring up to 128 locations using infrared, electrochemical or semiconductor sensors; 4500 rack mounted unit with capacity for 40 sensors per rack; Active 8 which has the capability to monitor up to eight sensors for flammable gas, fire or ambient pressure and temperature; Open Path Gas Detectors measure combustible hydrocarbons along a line of sight, between an optical transmitter and a receiver. Drgers IR gas detectors provide state of the art technology, performing reliable measurements even in harshest environments. Catalytical Transmitters for the detection of flammable gases and vapors utilise Pellistors.

Page 120 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 10.0 ISSUE 4.0 Gasurveyor 400 series which is a portable unit with the capability to monitor up to six gas ranges in one instrument; FI 2000 hand held flame ionisation detector for general survey work and leak location.

Crowcon Crowcon Detection Instruments Ltd., at 2 Blacklands Way Abingdon Oxfordshire OX14 1DY, manufacture a range of fixed site and portable gas detectors. (www.crowcon.com). The Crowcon product range includes: single and multi-gas personal monitors; infrared, thermal and electrochemical fixed site sensors; multi-channel control systems to interface large numbers of remotely located sensors; single and multi point gas sampling systems.

Internet Links The Council of Gas Detection and Environmental Monitoring (CoGDEM) represents over 40 companies, see internet page for details and links to companies. www.cogdem.org.uk 10.3 SELECTION OF MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Since it is not practical to locate equipment in non-hazardous areas only, it is necessary to classify the plant into appropriate hazard zones and to select and specify the appropriate type of equipment compatible with these zones. The selection and specification of appropriate equipment will be performed by an specialist, who, (under the Equipment and Protective Systems Intended for Use in potentially Explosive Atmospheres), is responsible for providing the following information to the supplier: The classification of the hazardous area or the equipment category required The required temperature class of the equipment or ignition class of the gas or vapour Where applicable the gas or vapour classification in relation to the group or sub group, and External influences that could affect explosion protection (chemical, mechanical vibrational thermal, electrical or humidity) and ambient temperature

These aspects are described in more detail in the following sections, which are followed by sections on records, apparatus marking and installation, including electric lighting. The aspects of the selection of equipment covered in this section of the SPD are limited. Reference should be made to the appropriate standards for detail e.g. BS EN 60079 (Parts 0, 1, 2, 6, 7, 11, 14 & 15) and BS EN 13463-1 (22). 10.4 EQUIPMENT CATEGORY Table 10.4 shows the relationship between equipment category and hazardous area categorisation

Page 121 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 10.0 ISSUE 4.0

Table 10.4 Categorisation of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment

Classified Hazardous Zone

Equipment Group

Categor y

Temperature Class

Maximum Equipment Surface Temperature exposed to the gas or dust (See Section 6.4.2 of EN1127-1)
80% of MIT 80% of MIT In normal operation, 100% of MIT 66% of MIT, this may be reduced further if layers of dust are allowed to accumulate 66% of MIT, this may be reduced further if layers of dust are allowed to accumulate 66% of MIT, this may be reduced further if layers of dust are allowed to accumulate

0 1 2 20

IIG IIG IIG IID

1 2 3 1

T1-T6 T1-T6 T1-T6 T1-T6

21

IID

T1-T6

22

IID

T1-T6

10.5

SELECTION OF TYPES OF PROTECTION ACCORDING TO HAZARD ZONE Once the zone classification of the hazardous area has been established it will be possible to select the apparatus having the type of protection appropriate to the zone. There are ten internationally recognised categories of type of protection for electrical equipment, and these are listed in Table 10.5. Table 10.5 quotes the international standards applicable to the relevant categories. In the UK, the categories are described in BS EN 60079 14 (26). For further details of the apparatus, the appropriate parts of BS EN 60079, which specifies the equipment, should be consulted. Similarly Table 10.6 lists the types of protection for mechanical equipment.

Table 10.5

Types of Protection Available for the Achievement of Safety when using Electrical Apparatus in Explosive Atmospheres

Zone in which protection may be used

0

Type of protection (see notes below)

BS 60079 Part No.

IEC 79 equivalent

CENELEC equivalent

Marking in accordance with BS 60079

ia

11

79-11

EN 50020

Ex ia II A, B or C T1-T6 Ex s II A, B or C T1-T6

14 (refer to Section 5.2.4)

79-0

any type of protection suitable for Zone 0 d 1 79-1 EN 50018 Ex d II A, B or C T1-T6

Page 122 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 10.0 ISSUE 4.0

Zone in which protection may be used

1

Type of protection (see notes below)

BS 60079 Part No.

IEC 79 equivalent

CENELEC equivalent

Marking in accordance with BS 60079

79-2

EN 50016

Ex p II A, B or C T1-T6 Ex q II A, B or C T1-T6 Ex o II A, B or C T1-T6 Ex e II A, B or C T1-T6 Ex ib II A, B or C T1-T6 Ex m II A, B or C T1-T6

79-5

EN 50017

79-6

EN 50015

79-7

EN 50019

ib

11

79-11

EN 50020

79-18

EN 50028

any type of protection suitable for Zone 0 or 1 n 15 79-15 (n) Ex n II A, B or C T1-T6

Notes: d e ia ib m n o p q s flameproof enclosure increased safety Intrinsically safe apparatus and systems, category ia intrinsically safe apparatus and systems, category ib encapsulation type of protection n oil immersion pressurisation and continuous dilution powder / sand filled special protection, certain types specifically certified for use in Zone 0 or Zone 1

Page 123 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 10.0 ISSUE 4.0

Table 10.6 Types of Protection Available for the Achievement of Safety when using Mechanical Apparatus in Explosive Atmospheres

Zone in which protection may be used

0

Equipment Category

Ignition Hazard Assessment

Type of protection (see notes below)

Marking in accordance with BS 13463-1

No effective ignition source even under rare malfunction Effective ignition source only during rare malfunction Effective ignition source during rare and expected malfunction

N/A

Single type of protection (fr is not suitable for category 1 equipment) Combination of two independent types of protection (fr is not suitable for category 1 equipment)

II 1G or D dcbpkg T1-T6 II 1G or D d /c /b /p /k /g T1-T6 (Note / showing independent types of protection)

No effective ignition source under expected malfunction Effective ignition source only during expected malfunction Effective ignition source only during normal operation

N/A

Single type of protection (fr is not suitable for category 2 equipment) Single type of protection

II 1G or D dcbpkg T1-T6 II 1G or D fr d c b p k g T1-T6

Notes: Expected malfunction disturbances or equipment faults which normally occur in practice.

Rare malfunction type of malfunction, which is known to happen but only in rare instances. Two independent foreseeable malfunctions, which, separately, would not create an ignition hazard but which, in combination, do create an ignition hazard, are regarded as a single rare malfunction. fr d c b p k g flow-restricting enclosure flameproof enclosure constructional safety for control of ignition source pressurised equipment liquid immersion inherent safety

Page 124 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 10.0 ISSUE 4.0 10.6 SELECTION ACCORDING TO TEMPERATURE CLASS Since flammable material can be ignited by contact with a hot surface, it is necessary to specify an appropriate Temperature (T) Class for all apparatus to be used in hazardous areas. The temperature class, which is specified in BS EN 60079-0 (24), indicates that the apparatus will not present an ignition risk when used in, or likely to come into contact with, gases having an auto-ignition temperature exceeding the temperature limit of the class. There are six internationally recognised temperature classes, as shown in the following table.

Table 10.7

Relationship Between Temperature Class and Maximum Surface Temperature of the Apparatus

T Class
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6

Maximum Surface Temperature

450 C 300 C 200 C 135 C 100 C 86 C
o o o o o o

Ignition temperatures, determined according to international standards for a large number of gases and vapours, may be found in BS EN 60079-20 (29). Specific values for flammable materials likely to be present in water industry are quoted in Table A1.1 and A1.3, which, also, gives the T class for suitable apparatus. When mixtures of substances can be released, the most restrictive temperature class must be specified, i.e. the one with the highest T class number. For example, if it is possible that propane (class T1), butane (class T2) or kerosene (class T3) explosive atmospheres could exist in the same area then class T3 equipment must be selected. It is recommended that class T3 equipment is used in sewers and sewage pumping stations within the sewerage system (including terminal pumping stations) to allow for petrol spillages etc., unless it is known that a more restrictive class is appropriate. 10.7 SELECTION ACCORDING TO APPARATUS SUBGROUP Apparatus having types of protection, which depend upon flameproof enclosures (type of protection d), intrinsic safety (type of protection i), some types of specific protection (type of protection s) and pressurised apparatus (type of protection p) are allocated apparatus subgroups IIA, IIB and IIC. These subgroups indicate with which gas or vapour the apparatus may be used. For types of protection other than d, i, p and s, the protective technique applies equally to all gases and vapours, subject only to temperature classification as described above. Apparatus subgroups, determined according to international standards, for a large number of gases and vapours may be found in BS EN 60079-20 (29). Specific values for flammable materials likely to be present in water industry are quoted in Table A1.1 and A1.3. Note: the most likely flammable materials present in the water industry are petrol, biogas (methane) and ammonia all of which are apparatus group IIA. When mixtures of substances can be released, the most restrictive apparatus subgroup must be specified. As the sub grouping becomes more severe in going from IIA to IIB to IIC, subgroup B apparatus may be used in place of subgroup A apparatus and

Page 125 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 10.0 ISSUE 4.0 subgroup C can be used in place of apparatus for both subgroups, but the converse is not true. Note, Group I is applicable to mining applications only and the methane (firedamp) encountered therein. Industrial methane, as encountered in sewage treatment plant is a Group IIA gas. 10.8 SELECTION ACCORDING TO ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS The apparatus must be selected so that it is suitable for the intended conditions of its installation location. Particular attention must be given to the need for protection against the weather, ingress of liquids and particulate matter, corrosion, the effect of solvents, the effects of heat from adjacent plant and the exclusion of contact between persons and parts within the enclosure. This classification, sometimes referred to as Ingress Protection or Degree of Protection of Enclosures, has been agreed internationally. 10.9 COMPLETION OF RECORDS The supplier of the equipment is responsible for provision of Declarations of Conformity, and instructions as well as correctly marking the equipment. As mentioned previously, all the factors relating to apparatus selection must be entered on the records to complete the area classification process. For each site, a responsible person should maintain plans and/or records of the following items, as recommended by BS EN 60079-10 (25): the classification and extent of hazardous areas together with other information (such as the documented risk assessments and equipment Declarations of Conformity) as recommended in Section 6.0; and, records sufficient to enable the explosion protected equipment to be maintained in accordance with its type of protection. This should include a comprehensive record of non-certified or non-marked devices used in intrinsically safe systems.

10.10

MARKING OF APPARATUS Apparatus for use in explosive atmospheres carries a marking to indicate that it is so protected, and to identify the particular explosion risk for which the apparatus is certified. Marking requirements have changed over the years and individual standards may need to be consulted for specific guidance. International agreement has been reached on the markings and the symbol Ex denotes explosion protection. The general requirements for electrical equipment are described in BS EN 60079-0 (24), which, also, gives many examples of apparatus marking. The marking should provide the following information: 1st line: CE mark, Notified Body Identification Mark if involved in production control stage, hexagon symbol (special marking of explosion protection) and symbols of Group and Category and type of hazard, gas (G) or dust (D). 2nd line: Marking according to standards to which the equipment conforms, as in BS EN 50014 such as EEx, symbol for each type of protection; explosion groups I, IIA, IIB or IIC for protection types d, I or q; the symbol indicating the temperature class or the maximum surface temperature. 3rd line: marking according to certification (where appropriate): code of Notified Body, year of issue, issue of certificate and number of certificate. Note X at the end indicates special conditions apply to the equipment use and U indicates the item is a component.

Page 126 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 10.0 ISSUE 4.0 Marking of non-electrical equipment are described in BS EN 13463-1:2009 (22). Marking should include the following: Name and address of manufacturer, manufacturers type identification and year of manufacture; Symbol of equipment group and category and type of ignition protection used, where appropriate, also symbol of explosion group (e.g. II or IIA, etc); temperature class or maximum surface temperature; serial number, name or mark of certificate issuer and number of certificate the symbol X if special conditions apply and any additional marking as prescribed in BS 13463-1:2009 (22)

During installation a check should be made to ensure the marking on the equipment is the same as that recorded in the declaration of conformity and instructions. 10.11 INSTALLATION All electrical installations, whether in hazardous areas or not, must comply with all relevant statutory requirements. In the UK this includes the Electricity at Work Regulations 1989. Within Thames Water the companys Electrical Safety Rules must, also, be followed. There are particular requirements for all electrical installations covering such topics as insulation, earthing, isolation, wiring, etc., together with inspection, maintenance, testing and repair. Electrical installations in hazardous areas have additional requirements specific to providing facilities compatible with the zones. Amplification of these aspects is contained in BS EN 60079-14 (26) and maintenance in BS EN 60079-17 (27), which should be consulted as appropriate. 10.12 ELECTRIC LIGHTING Electric lighting to be installed in a hazardous area is to be treated as any other type of electrical equipment for installation in such an area, and must comply with the zoning requirements. Sufficient lighting must be provided to minimise the need to use portable lighting equipment. 10.13 LIGHTNING PROTECTION Lightning protection provided for plant with any associated zoned areas must be designed to protect the equipment and any associated hazardous areas (refer to BS EN 62305-3:2006 (34) Protection against lightning Part 3: Physical damage to structures and life hazard). Section D.5 of BS EN 62305-3 (34), provides guidance for structures containing hazardous areas. Air terminations and down conductors for lightning protection should be at least 1m away from a hazardous zone, where possible. Where this is not possible, conductors passing within 0.5m of a hazardous zone should be continuous or connections should be made with compression fittings or by welding. Structures containing Zones 2 and 22 areas may not need supplemental protection measures where the construction is of metal that meets the thickness requirements of Table 10.6. Where the above applies, air termination devices and down-conductors are not required but the structure must be earthed, preferably by a Type B arrangement (either a ring conductor external to the structure or a foundation earth electrode). Structures made of metal that are then clad with insulating material may not be considered as natural air-termination components, unless there are exposed metal

Page 127 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 10.0 ISSUE 4.0 parts or pipes with the required cross-sections specified in Table 6 of BS EN 62305-3 (34).

Table 10.8

Minimum Thickness of Metal Sheets or Metal Pipes

For structures utilizing steel reinforced concrete, the electrical continuity of the reinforcing bars shall be determined. Where the overall electrical resistance is greater than 0.2, the reinforcing steel shall not be used as a natural down conductor and an external down conductor shall be installed. Structures containing Zones 1 and 21 shall meet the requirements for zones 2 and 22 and in addition where there are insulation pieces (e.g. non-metallic gaskets) in pipelines, then protective measures should be employed to avoid a disruptive discharge, such as isolating spark gaps (component with discharge distance for isolating electrically-conductive installation sections). Isolating spark gaps and insulation pieces should be inserted outside the hazardous area. For structures containing Zones 0 and 20, the requirements for zones 1 and 21 shall apply and closed steel containers shall have a wall thickness of at least 5mm at the possible lightning striking points In the case of thinner walls, air termination devices should be installed. In the case of floating roof tanks (e.g. gas holders), the floating roof should be effectively bonded to the main tank shell. The design of the seals and shunts and their relative locations needs to be carefully considered so that the risk of any ignition of a possible explosive mixture by incendiary sparking is reduced to the lowest level practicable. When a rolling ladder is fitted, a flexible bonding conductor of 35 mm width should be applied across the ladder hinges, between the ladder and the top of the tank and between the ladder and the floating roof. When a rolling ladder is not fitted to the floating-roof tank, one or more, (depending on the size of the tank), flexible bonding conductors of 35 mm width, or equivalent, shall be applied between the tank shell and the floating roof. The bonding conductors should either follow the roof drain or be arranged so that they cannot form re-entrant loops. On floating roof tanks, multiple shunt connections should be provided between the floating-roof and the tank shell at about 1,5 m intervals around the roof periphery. Material selection is given by product and/or environmental requirements. Alternative means of providing an adequate conductive connection between the floating roof and tank shell for impulse currents associated with lightning discharges are only allowed if proved by tests and if procedures are utilized to ensure the reliability of the connection.

Page 128 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 11.0 ISSUE 4.0 11.0 INSPECTION, TESTING AND COMMISSIONING BS EN 60079-17 (27) together with BS EN 60079-14 (26) and BS IEC 60079-19 (28) should be consulted in conjunction with this section. It is essential that all equipment installed in hazardous areas is inspected and maintained at regular intervals so as to ensure the continued integrity of the protection concepts used in the equipment design. Such inspection and maintenance should be carried out in accordance with BS EN 60079-17 (27) and, where applicable, the manufacturers instructions. Specific records must be kept centrally of all maintenance carried out on such equipment and must include part nos./certificates of conformity for replaced items. These shall allow the unique identification of each item of equipment or system. 11.1 COMPETENCY AND TRAINING The inspection, maintenance, removal for repair and replacement of apparatus, systems and installations must be carried out only by personnel whose training has included instruction on the various types of protection and installation practices and where appropriate the principles of area classification. Refresher training should be carried out each time the regulations are revised or at intervals not exceeding 2 years if the person responsible for ensuring compliance is not using / applying the regulations on a regular basis. Records should be retained for those undertaking the inspection and maintenance of hazardous area equipment to verify their training. 11.2 BASIS AND FREQUENCY OF INSPECTION A planned system of regular routine inspection is the basis of effective maintenance, and especially important where the safety of personnel depends upon the continued protection in hazardous areas. A main requirement of any planned system is the keeping of records which should include details of the following: 11.3 Up to date Area Classification All Apparatus, Systems and Installations Inspections carried out and Faults revealed. Corrective Action taken to Remedy Faults.

FORMS OF INSPECTION Two forms of inspection shall be adopted as follows: A. Initial Inspection Initial Inspection of all apparatus, systems and installation shall be carried out on first installation and after modification or replacement of apparatus. An initial inspection shall also be carried out after apparatus repair. In all cases, the details of the initial inspection shall be recorded. When adjustment is carried out on any apparatus, system or installation, it shall be checked in accordance with the relevant items in the D (Detailed) column of Table 11.1 or 11.2. B. Periodic Inspection

Page 129 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 11.0 ISSUE 4.0 Periodic Inspection of all apparatus, systems and installations shall be carried out according to the programme of planned inspections and details recorded. The time intervals for periodic inspection will depend on the environment and operating conditions under which the apparatus, systems and installation have to function. The frequency of periodic inspections shall be determined by a competent person responsible for the site. Factors influencing the determination of inspection frequency will include historical information from previous inspections, likely corrosion and environmental conditions etc. It should be noted that inspection frequencies will need to be increased with the age of the installation concerned. Even for new sites with favourable conditions, it is unlikely that an interval between inspections in excess of two years can be justified. Additional guidance on the types of inspection (Detailed, Close and Visual) may be obtained from BS EN 60079-17 (27). NOTE: Visual and close inspections can be performed with the apparatus energised. Detailed inspections will, generally, require apparatus to be isolated. 11.4 INSPECTION FINDINGS AND FAULT CATEGORIES Faults noted during inspections should be categorised as Critical, Major or Minor in accordance with the following criteria. Critical Fault A critical fault impairs the required level of safety of the type of protection involved to the point where there is an immediate absence of protection afforded against ignition of a flammable gas. An example of a Critical Fault would be Ex d (Flameproof) switchgear which had a damaged enclosure and thus afforded no protection against ignition of a flammable atmosphere from unprotected electrical sparking sources. Major Fault A major fault impairs the required level of safety for the type of protection involved, but does not lead to an immediate unprotected source of ignition. An example of a Major Fault would be an Ex d (Flameproof) enclosure with a damaged enclosure but which only contains terminals (Non-ignition capable parts). The situation is not immediately ignition capable unless the terminals are loose or water can provide a conductive path. Minor Fault A Minor Fault does not directly impair the integrity of the type(s) of protection involved but does, nevertheless, represent a non compliance with the requirements of applicable standards. An example of a Minor Fault would be a missing or illegible certification label on apparatus or missing plant identification label. NOTE: 1 The ability to recognise and place faults in the applicable category depends on the skill and training of the personnel involved in the inspection operation. 2 Faults in a lesser category may become more severe if not promptly addressed. 3 The categorisation of faults is the primary aid to risk assessment which enables the management of fault rectification.

Page 130 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 11.0 ISSUE 4.0

Table 11.1 Inspection Schedule for Ex d, Ex e and Ex n Installations

(D = Detailed, C = Close, V = Visual)

Page 131 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 11.0 ISSUE 4.0

Table 11.2 Inspection Schedule for Ex i Installations

11.5

ISOLATION Apart from certain activities which are permitted on intrinsically safe circuits, certain specific situations in Zone 2, and Permit to Work operations as detailed below, apparatus containing live parts and located in Hazardous Areas must not be opened without isolating all incoming connections including the Neutral Conductor. NOTE: If the continuing absence of an explosive atmosphere can be guaranteed under a Permit to Work System essential work for which exposure of live parts is necessary may be carried out in accordance with Thames Water Electrical Safety Rules.

11.6

MAINTENANCE OF INTRINSICALLY SAFE SYSTEMS The requirements as set down in BS EN 60079-17 (27) shall apply.

11.7

ALTERATIONS AND REPAIRS TO APPARATUS AND SYSTEMS Any alteration which it is necessary to make to apparatus or systems shall maintain the integrity of the method of protection. In the case of certified apparatus or systems no alterations or repairs which might invalidate the certificate or other document relating to the safety of the apparatus or system shall be made.

Page 132 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 11.0 ISSUE 4.0 11.8 INSULATION TESTING During normal maintenance or fault diagnosis it may be necessary from time to time to carry out insulation testing. If the test is to be carried out using conventional insulation or pressure test equipment the locations where the test is to be applied and/or where incendive sparking may occur must be declared free from an explosive atmosphere by the responsible authority and guaranteed as remaining so for the duration of the test. A certificate to this effect shall be issued. Insulation testing in hazardous areas should if practicable, always be carried out in the continued absence of an explosive atmosphere, but where this is not possible any instrument used for testing must be intrinsically safe. It should however, be appreciated, as explained in the following note, that with the majority of such intrinsically safe insulation testers danger can arise if the limitations of the certification are not fully observed. NOTE: The instruments referred to above are intrinsically safe only in the sense that no danger can result from sparks produced by current generated within the instrument. The effect of external loads, however, cannot be predicted and an intrinsically safe charging current applied to an energy storage circuit such as a length of cable can give rise to incendive discharges. This difficulty has been recognised and the instrument is provided with a discharge circuit which, if the instrument is used correctly, ensures that the circuit under test is left in a safe condition. This provision, however, gives no protection against a possible discharge within the circuit during the application of a test. It should also be noted that the certification of most intrinsically safe insulation testers is to old UK National standards which utilised a different hazardous area nomenclature. The reference on the label of these testers to 2a and 2c is only equivalent to Group IIA and the tester must not be used on circuits which enter or traverse Group IIB or IIC locations. 11.9 FASTENINGS AND TOOLS Where special bolts and other fastenings, or special tools are required the responsible person(s) shall ensure that the appropriate items are available and are used. 11.10 PORTABLE APPARATUS Any portable electrical apparatus for use in hazardous areas shall be regularly checked to ensure compliance with the type(s) of protection utilised by the apparatus. 11.11 PERMITS TO WORK AND GAS FREE CERTIFICATES The issuing of Permit to Work and Certification of gas free spaces must be carried out by a competent person who by their experience, knowledge and training can undertake such duties to ensure the safety of personnel is maintained at all times during the execution of the work. 11.12 EQUIPMENT REPAIR Because of the danger of invalidating safety aspects inherent in the design of hazardous area electrical equipment, repair should only be carried out by the original equipment manufacturer or his authorised agent or a repairer (for example certain motor repair workshops) which have the necessary skills and training to ensure that the types of protection employed on the equipment still retain their certification conditions and comply with the applicable design and construction standards after the repair. BS EN 60079-19 (28) should be consulted for additional details. It is the responsibility of the person sending the equipment for repair to ensure that the repairer is aware of his responsibility to comply with the above.

Page 133 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 12.0 ISSUE 4.0 12.0 12.1 REFERENCES THAMES WATER PUBLICATIONS

1. C60B

Thames Water Health and Safety Manual

2. PU1735 Thames Water Electrical Safety Rules 3. SPD A17 Testing, Commissioning and Handover of New Works 4. SPD C09 Sludge Treatment TWUL / C09 Issue 2.0 October 2001 5. Not Used 6. SPD F26 General Specification
12.2 HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE (HSE) PUBLICATIONS

7. SI 1989/635 The Electricity at Work Regulations 1989 No. 635

8 9 10 11 12 13 12.3 L138 DSEAR Approved Code of Practice and Guidance HS(G)34 HS(G)50 Capacity Storage of LPG at Fixed Installations Storage of Flammable Liquids in Fixed Tanks up to 10000 m3 Total

HS(G)113 Lift trucks in potentially explosive atmospheres HSE OC498/11 HSE OC847/9 Fire and Explosion Hazards at Electrochlorination Plant Sewage Sludge Drying Plant

BRITISH STANDARDS 14 BS 2869 Fuel Oils for Non Marine Use Part 2 - Specification for Fuel Oil for Agricultural and Industrial Engines and Burners (Classes A2, C1, C2, D, E, F, G and H) BS 5345 Selection, installation and maintenance of electrical apparatus for use in potentially explosive atmospheres. (withdrawn, but provides some useful references) BS 5925 Code of Practice for Ventilation Principles and Designing for Natural Ventilation BS 5958:1991 - Code of practice for control of undesirable static electricity BS 5978 Safety and Performance of Gas Fired Hot Water Boilers (60 kW to 2 MW Input) - Part 1 BS 6644 Specification for Installation of gas-fired hot water boilers of rated inputs between 70 kW (net) and 1.8 MW (net) (2nd and 3rd family gases) BS 6656:2002 Assessment of inadvertent ignition of flammable atmospheres by radio-frequency radiation. Guide BS 6941 Specification for Electrical Apparatus for Explosive Atmospheres with Type of Protection N BS EN 1127-1:1998 Explosive atmospheres. Explosion prevention and protection. Basic concepts and methodology. BS EN 50073:1999 Guide for selection, installation, use and maintenance of apparatus for the detection and measurement of combustible gases or oxygen

15

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Page 134 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 12.0 ISSUE 4.0 24 25 26 27 28 BS EN 60079-0:2004 Electrical apparatus for explosive atmospheres. General requirements BS EN 60079-10 Electrical Apparatus for Explosive Gas Atmospheres Part 10: Classification of Hazardous Areas. BS EN 60079-14:2003, Electrical apparatus for explosive atmospheres Part 14: Electrical installations in hazardous areas (other than mines). BS EN 60079-17:2007 Explosive atmospheres. Electrical installations inspection and maintenance. BS IEC 60079-19:1993, Electrical apparatus for explosive gas atmospheres. Repair and overhaul for apparatus used in explosive atmospheres (other than mines or explosives). BS EN 60079-20:2000. Electrical apparatus for explosive atmospheres Part 20: Data for flammable gases and vapours, relating to the use of electrical apparatus. BS EN 60529 (IP code) Specification for Degrees of Protection Provided by Enclosures

29 30 31 32 33

BS EN 61241-10 Electrical apparatus for use in the presence of combustible dust. Classification of areas where combustible dusts are or may be present. BS EN 61508-1:2002 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems. General requirements BS EN 61511-1:2004 Functional safety. Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector. Framework, definitions, system, hardware and software requirements. BS EN 62305:2006 Protection against lightning, Parts 1, 2 3 & 4 BS EN 13463-1:2009 Non-electrical equipment for use in potentially explosive atmospheres. Basic method and requirements.

34 35

12.4

MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 IGE/SR/4 Low Pressure Gas Holders Storing Lighter than Air Gases - Institution of Gas Engineers IGE/SR/25 Hazardous Area Classification of Natural Gas Installations IGE/UP/2 Gas Installation Pipework, Boosters and Compressors on Industrial and Commercial Premises - Institution of Gas Engineers IM/24 Guidance Notes on the Installation of Industrial Gas Turbines, Associated Gas Compressors and Supplementary Firing Burners - British Gas Plc. NFPA 820 Standard for Fire Protection in Wastewater Treatment and Collection Facilities (2003 Edition) Area Classification Code for Petroleum Installations - Institute of Petroleum, Model Code of Safe Practice Part 15, July 2005 3rd Edition. LPG Piping System - Design and Installation - The LP Gas Association, Code of Practice 22 Manual of British Practice in Water Pollution Control , Sewage Sludge 1 Institution of Water Pollution Control (IWPC) Recommendations for the Protection of Diesel Engines for use in Zone 2 Hazardous Areas - The Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association (EEMUA), Publication No. 107 (1992)

Page 135 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 SECTION 12.0 ISSUE 4.0 45 46 47 48 49 CEI 31-35 Electrical Apparatus for Explosive Gas Atmospheres, Guide for Classification of Hazardous Areas Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressurising Systems API Recommended Practice 521 Area Classification for Landfill Gas Extraction, Utilisation and Combustion, Industry Code of Practice, ESA ICoP 2, edition 2, July 2006. EEMUA Publication No. 107 - Recommendations for the Protection of Diesel Engines for Use in Zone 2 Hazardous Areas. British Compressed Gases Association Code of Practice CP19, Bulk Liquid Oxygen Storage at Users' Premises. Revision 2: 1996.

Page 136 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A1 ISSUE 4.0

TECHNICAL APPENDICES
General Note: The information contained in the following sections within the Appendices is intended for use by personnel with expertise in hazardous area classification and the requirements of DSEA Regulations. Furthermore, note that the hazardous zones given above in Section 7 of this document have been derived from a computer model and, therefore, could differ from outputs that follow the calculation methods described below within these Appendices.

Page 137 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A1 ISSUE 4.0

A1.0

SOURCES OF RELEASE SOURCES OF FLAMMABLE MATERIALS Flammable materials may be present in many sewerage, sewage and sludge treatment facilities for several reasons, namely: Decomposition of organic matter in sewage producing methane, accompanied by smaller amounts of other flammable gases. These gases are produced in the digestion process and by incidental decomposition elsewhere; Fuels, lubricating oils and treatment chemicals imported to the plant. The fuels include distillate fuels (gasoil, kerosene, etc.), natural gas and LPG; Spillages from accidents (e.g. from road tankers or industrial premises) which arrive via the sewerage system; Methane gas seepage (e.g. geological methane, disused mine workings) into underground assets; Landfill gas seepage or infiltration from adjacent landfills into underground assets; Gas from gas pipelines. (although unlikely);

A1.1

In water treatment plant, fuels, lubricating oils and treatment chemicals are often present together with other flammable materials and their presence will depend on the type of treatment process used. For example in disinfection plant (e.g. chloramination plant) ammonia will be handled. Although not specifically affecting hazardous area classification the potential for oxidising agents to accelerate burning should be considered. Typical substances used in the water industry include chlorine and ozone for disinfection plant at water treatment works, oxygen used for welding with acetylene and in specialised treatment processes (e.g. Vitox) in effluent treatment. These substances must be segregated and stored separately, a minimum of 5 metres, from flammable substances or incompatible substances like oil and grease where they may react vigorously to create potentially explosive atmospheres. Suppliers of the plant should be consulted for toxic and flammability risk precautions that need to be taken where storing and handling such materials. Other premises, such as stores and laboratories, may contain flammable materials that would require the need to apply hazardous area classification principles. Generally where heavy fuels such as kerosene or diesel or gas oil are used then they would be classified as non-hazardous because of their high flash points. Lubricating oils also have high flash points and so would not present a flammable risk and would also be treated as non-hazardous. Exceptions to this rule would be where the materials are used under pressure and could be atomised into a fine spray if they were to leak, or if they could be heated above their flash point for example by leaking onto hot surfaces. Properties relevant to area classification for some flammable gases and liquids, taken from BS 5345 - Part 1 and the Institute of Petroleum Model Code of Safe Practice - Part 15 (IP15 2nd Ed), are given in Tables A1.1 and A1.2.

A1.2

PROPERTIES OF FLAMMABLE MATERIALS In determining the behaviour of flammable materials it is necessary to understand some of their physical and chemical properties some of which are summarised in the following sections.

Page 138 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A1 ISSUE 4.0 A1.2.1 Flammable Gases Some properties of common gases some of which may be associated with water and wastewater treatment facilities are included below.

Table A1.1

Properties of Flammable Materials - Gases

Flammable material

Relative density (to air @ same temp. and pressure)

0.55 1.19 0.59 0.07 1.56 2.05

Flash point (C)

Lower explosive limit (vol.% in air)

Upper explosive limit (vol.% in air)

Ignition temp. (C)

T class of suitable apparatus

Apparatus group BS EN 60079

Methane Hydrogen Sulphide Ammonia Hydrogen Propane Butane

Gas Gas Gas Gas Gas -60

5 4.3 15 4.0 2.0 1.5

15 45.5 28 75.6 9.5 8.5

595 270 630 560 470 365

T1 T3 T1 T1 T1 T2

IIA IIB IIA IIC IIA IIA

The properties of biogas is discussed separately in the next section. Ammonia for injection into sewage effluent and for disinfection purposes is stored under pressure in gas cylinders. The gas also presents a toxic hazard if released. Other flammable gas risks may arise from the use of compressed gases in cylinders, but are not specifically addressed in this SPD. A1.2.2 Properties of Biogas There are many sources of biogas within water and wastewater treatment facilities as discussed briefly in Section A1.3. The composition of biogas evolved from the mesophillic anaerobic digestion process as quoted in the Manual of British Practice in Water Pollution Control, Sewage Sludge I (IWPC) is typically in the range:

Table A1.2

Composition of Biogas

% by volume
Methane Hydrogen Carbon Dioxide Nitrogen Hydrogen Sulphide 60 - 70 Trace 30 40 Trace Up to 2000 ppm v/v

The range of concentrations is due to changes in the quality of the feed sludge and operational conditions. The gas is usually saturated with water vapour. Mixtures of digester gas (sludge gas) in air are flammable. The lower explosive limit (LEL) of the gas mixture is close to that of methane although it is affected by the quantity of inert gas in the methane.

Page 139 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A1 ISSUE 4.0 Digester gases have a specific gravity not less than about 80 percent of that of air. Digester gas is, therefore, regarded as non-buoyant for area classification purposes. The potential presence of small concentrations of hydrogen or hydrogen sulphide does not alter the equipment subgroup (see Table A1.1) from that of IIA. A1.2.3 Properties of Fuels, Lubricating Oils and Treatment Chemicals Fuels will be used on all sites and in some cases stored on sites and so it is necessary to understand the properties of typical fuels in the event that there may be a spillage either on the treatment works or in catchments supplying them. The table below summarises some of the properties of common fuels.

Table A1.3

Properties of Flammable Materials - Fuels

Flammable material

Relative density (to air @ 15C and 1 atm)

1.5

Flash point (oC)

Lower explosive limit (vol.% in air)

2.1

Upper explosive limit (vol.% in air)

10.0

Ignition temp. (oC)

T class of suitable apparatus

Apparatus group BS EN 60079 / 5501

LPG (commercial propane) LPG (commercial butane) Petrol (motor spirit) Kerosene (BS 2869, pt2 class C) Gasoil / Derv fuel (BS 2869, pt2 class D)

Gas

470

T2

IIA or IIB

2.0

Gas

1.8

9.0

365

T2

IIA or IIB

2.8 -

less than -20 38 (min)

1.4 0.7

7.6 5

560 210

T3 T3

IIA IIA

55 (min)

1.3

177-329

T2

IIA

Natural gas supplied by pipeline is essentially methane. It is lighter than air and so if it escapes from low pressure distribution mains then dispersion is aided by its buoyancy. LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) comprises propane and butane and is supplied in two forms as commercial propane, commercial butane or mixtures of the two. For delivery and bulk storage, they are kept under pressure to maintain their liquid state; for use as fuels they are normally vaporised and handled as gases. The vapours if released are significantly heavier than air and so can easily accumulate in unventilated low points such as sumps or drains. On sites which are not connected to a mains natural gas supply LPG is frequently used as a support fuel. Within Appendix A of IP-Part15, 2nd edition, some further clarification is given regarding zoning for high flash point materials such as gasoil / diesel / derv. As a typical example within the UK mainland a maximum ambient temperature of 38C has been recorded (Faversham, Kent, July 2003). Consequently aviation fuels of the kerosene type (flash point 38C minimum) should be regarded as flammable and an explosive hazard. Gasoil/diesel/derv are higher flash point fuels and can be classed as non-hazardous when stored or used away from processing areas or hot lines and vessels. However, where they may be raised to higher temperatures by contact with hot surfaces then they can still present an explosive hazard. Similarly, if they are used under pressure a leak could result in a fine atomised spray which can also be flammable even though the

Page 140 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A1 ISSUE 4.0 liquid is below its flash point. As liquid spills are likely to result in temperatures well below the ambient temperature there is a further degree of safeguard in this above classification. There is also reference to a generally accepted rule of thumb which is if a material can not be heated to within 5C of its flash point then it can be treated as nonhazardous if it is only under a few meters head or stored in a storage tank. Lubricating oils are also handled and used in machinery below their flash points and are, therefore, normally regarded as non-hazardous for classification purposes. A1.2.4 Effects of Oxygen Enrichment, Temperature, and Pressure Oxygen enrichment increases the heat release within the combustion zone of the developing wave-front and therefore decreases the required initial energy contribution from the ignition source. The most easily ignited concentration of oxygen and vapours or gases ignites at about one hundredth the minimum ignition energy of the most easily ignited concentration of the same vapour or gas in air. Because the flame speeds are considerably higher, the pressure rise in an explosion-proof enclosure may also be much higher. No means of explosion protection considered safe for atmospheric mixtures should be considered safe in oxygen enriched mixtures without careful examination. The qualitative effect of increasing temperature is relatively easy to estimate. Every material has a spontaneous ignition temperature, SIT (or AIT, autogenous ignition temperature) at which it will ignite spontaneously. Obviously, if the temperature of a mixture is raised, the amount of electrical energy required will decrease, reaching zero at the AIT. The effect of pressure is understandable if one considers that when pressure increases the number of molecules per unit volume increases. The heat release per unit volume will consequently increase, and the ignition energy required to cause the incipient flame sphere to grow to its critical diameter decreases. Similarly, decreasing pressure decreases the amount of energy released in the combustion zone and increases the required electrical ignition energy. This relationship has been verified experimentally over many atmospheres of pressure change. Doubling the pressure of a gas cuts the ignition energy to approximately 25% of its former value.

A1.3

SOURCES OF BIOGAS IN WASTEWATER AND SLUDGES The generation of biogas from anaerobic digestion is dependent on a number of parameters including: Availability and concentration of materials capable of degradation: Concentration of methane generating bacteria Aeration of material in the location Temperature Acidity and alkalinity Quantity of material present Degree of mixing

As there are a large number of variables a review of a number of sources for determining biogas production rates was conducted. A1.3.1 Sewer Gas A typical composition quoted for sewer gas (percent by volume air free basis) in the Recommended Practice for Fire Protection in Waste Water Treatment Plants (NFPA 820) (reference 27) is Methane 5%, Carbon Dioxide 70%, Other Gases 25%.

Page 141 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A1 ISSUE 4.0 Such gas mixtures with air are not flammable provided that the other gases do not contain significant amounts of flammable materials. A1.3.2 Raw Sludge Some decomposition can occur in raw sludge that is handled and stored at ambient temperature typically up to 20C. The gas evolved from this decomposition has been determined from laboratory tests conducted by Thames Water (see Cremer & Warner report D/91068, 1991) and shown to contain a large proportion of carbon dioxide (up to 40%). Digestion of raw sludges at ambient temperature for periods between 7 and 18 days has shown that methane is present in this gas but only in very small amounts (up to 3%). Traces of other gases, such as hydrogen sulphide, may also be present, but the overall gas composition is not flammable. The evolution rate of this gas observed at 0.1m3 gas/m3 sludge per day is, also, much lower than biogas from digested sludge. A1.3.3 Digested Sludge Where sewage sludge is being digested at a temperature of 35C the gas production rates are typically in the range from 0.8 to 1.3m3/m3/d. Digested sludge will continue to evolve biogas (refer to composition in Table A1.2) as it cools to ambient temperature at a diminishing rate for some time after it leaves the digester. Sludge liquors from digested sludge will also be saturated with dissolved methane (solubility of methane in water is 22 mg/l at 20C) and may release this methane to the atmosphere for a similar period of time. Where the dissolved methane concentration in the liquor is below 10 mg/l at ambient temperature, the release rate of methane to the atmosphere is considered low enough to be unlikely to generate a flammable atmosphere. A1.3.4 Hydrogen Sulphide and Ammonia Both these gases can be evolved in the decomposition processes. Apart from the digestion process, the concentrations are usually very low, but their odour levels may give the impression that large concentrations exist. The presence of such gases may require control from an odour as well as an occupational health aspect.

A1.4

OTHER SOURCES OF GAS There are other potential sources of gas either in the form of methane or biogas that need to be considered and a couple of examples are provided below.

A1.4.1 Landfill Gas Where treatment plants are located adjacent to landfill sites, which is sometimes the case, then there is the potential for landfill gas to permeate to underground facilities. Landfill gas consists of 50-60% methane and 35-40% carbon dioxide and so it has a composition similar to biogas. It also contains trace levels of other gases such as hydrogen sulphide and organic substances that give it its characteristic sweet, sickly smell. Where there is the potential for gas to permeate into underground facilities such as drains or pumping wells then appropriate zoning will be required. In certain circumstances such as leachate wells methane may be present for long periods and in flammable concentrations. Non-electrical driven pumps such as pneumatic powered pumps may therefore be more appropriate for such facilities. A1.4.2 Geological Methane Methane which is of geological origin can percolate into underground sewerage systems or water pipes. Frequently the sources and origins are not well understood but certain locations are more susceptible than others. The most infamous case of the escape of geological methane was the contributory factor behind the Abbeystead disaster4 where a water main was out of service for 17 days before pumping was
4

The Abbeystead Explosion HSE 1985. Page 142 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A1 ISSUE 4.0 recommenced. Geological methane infiltrated the void and was subsequently expelled into the valve house where the flammable mixture was ignited, killing 16 people and injuring 28. Methane is also soluble in water although sparingly and the solubility increases at higher pressures. When the pressure is reduced then the methane will come out of solution as a gas and therefore present a potential explosive hazard. The solubility of methane5 in water at atmospheric pressure at 20C is 22mg/l. Flammable gas from disused mine workings will also be a possible source and infiltration into underground facilities is possible and the risks of this need to be considered.

A1.5

SOURCES OF FLAMMABLE LIQUID FROM ACCIDENTS

A1.5.1 Accident Spillages (WRc Data) All varieties of flammable liquids have the potential to be spilled into the sewerage system, such as those which are transported by road or are utilised on industrial premises. The more volatile materials which are not miscible with water and are sufficiently low in density to float on the surface are the most hazardous from the flammability aspect. Petrol is a specific example and its properties are included in Table A1.3. As petrol is the fuel most commonly used any accidents involving liquid spills are more likely to be with petrol than other materials. This was investigated in the WRc report, where a study of flammable liquid spills was undertaken between 1970 and 1992 and has recently been updated and extended in a new WRc report (UC6549). Of 205 spills, 107 involved petrol (52%) whilst other spills involved other flammable liquid materials. Of the 107 petrol spills 38 (36%) were associated with road tankers, 10 (9%) with rail-tankers, and 40 (37%) with petrol stations (mainly storage), 11 (10%) with static storage and 8 (8%) with pipework, pipelines or other. The report identifies that 92% of the flammable liquid spills were not contained, checked or consumed by fire and therefore could potentially reach the drainage systems. The report uses an accident frequency of 5.4 x 10-8 per tanker-km from motor spirit tanker reported spills6. To derive a yearly accident frequency this figure needs to be multiplied by the ATM (Annual Transport Mileage) for the catchment handling flammable materials. This is determined by the number of filling stations in the catchment, an estimate of the number of deliveries made and the distance of the delivery. This information is incorporated in the FLIDS methodology where medium and high risk catchments are identified. A1.5.2 Flammable Liquids In Drainage Systems Where there is the potential for flammable liquids to be discharged into a sewer or catchment, either by accident or illegally, then there is the possibility that an explosive atmosphere could be produced, which if ignited could cause considerable harm to personnel and damage to equipment. The risks posed by such an event may be very low, particularly for small rural catchment areas where there may be limited potential for flammable liquids to enter the sewer network in significant quantities. An initial FLIDS Assessment provides a qualitative assessment of the risk from a flammable liquid spillage (petrol) into the catchment area. The assessment procedure uses the following inputs for the catchment and receptor risk assessment: The number of petrol stations in the catchment

5 6

SRC Physical Property Database ACDS HSE Advisory Committee on Dangerous Substances. Major Hazard Aspects of the transport of dangerous substances, HMSO, 1991. Page 143 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A1 ISSUE 4.0 The presence of industrial installations where uncontained spillage of flammable liquids is possible. The type and nature of the catchment and sewerage system. The quality of ventilation provided in the installation and whether there are ignition sources present.

A1.5.3 Vapourisation Rates (Petrol) In the event that petrol spills into a catchment then it is likely to run into the sewerage system to pumping stations or inlet works. Assuming that the petrol is floating on a pool of water with the surface area of the wet well or storage tank, an estimate of petrol vaporisation rate has been made using PHAST7. This assumes that the petrol has similar properties to heptane and that release conditions are equivalent to 1.5F (1.5m/s wind speed at 10m, stability type F) at 15C. The results are summarised in Figure A1.1 below. These may be used to determine acceptable ventilation rates for avoiding flammable atmospheres. Figure A1.1 Graph of Petrol (Heptane) Vaporisation Rates for Given Areas of Spill

Petrol Spill Vaporisation Rate 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 0 20 40 60 Area m2 80 100

Vaporisation Rate kg/h
7

PHAST Version 6.42 DNV Consequence modelling software. Page 144 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A2 ISSUE 4.0

A2.0

VENTILATION AND AREA CLASSIFICATION GENERAL Ventilation is an important aspect of the area classification information given in sections 7 and 8. Those items located outdoors in an open area are anticipated to enjoy good natural ventilation which should ensure the natural dispersion of any releases to the atmosphere. When such good ventilation is not available, dispersion of releases is reduced and they can persist for longer periods. An increase in either zone severity or in size of zone may then be necessary. The treatment of hazardous areas within buildings or similar enclosed areas requires special care due to the ventilation being less than in open air. Some additional ventilation provided by fans etc. may be necessary. This section provides some information on ventilation aspects relevant to the application of area classification and the finalisation of zone type and extent. Good practices are described for circumstances when ventilation is reduced. Additional information is given on the ventilation requirements for some specific facilities in Section A2.5. Note that there may be other requirements for ventilation such as personnel comfort, removal of heat from equipment, etc.. Such aspects are not included in the scope of this section. Ventilation is a complex subject and expert advice on design matters should be obtained. Additional guidance on the influence of ventilation on area classification is to be found in BS EN 60079-10 - Electrical Apparatus for Explosive Gas Atmospheres Part 10. Classification of Hazardous Areas (reference 22) and Institute of Petroleum (IP) Model Code of Safe Practice - Part 15 - Area Classification Code for Petroleum Installations (reference 28).

A2.1

A2.2

TYPES OF VENTILATION

A2.2.1 Main Types The following main types of ventilation are recognised:
Natural Ventilation is that which occurs in open air situations typical of those in a sewage treatment plant where the facilities occupy a large open tract of land, which is generally flat. In all such cases there are no stagnant areas and the dispersion of vapours occurs readily assisted by wind. It may prevail in buildings which have sufficient openings in their walls and/or roofs, however the degree of ventilation, if a control measure, must be established in accordance with BS 5925 - Code of Practice for Ventilation Principles and Designing for Natural Ventilation (reference 16). Artificial Ventilation is that promoted by fans pressurising air into (forced draught) or out

of (induced draught) an area or enclosure. These two types can be combined to give a balanced draught ventilation system. It is important to note that the integrity of the mechanical ventilation system must be good where it is utilised in the application of improving safety by controlling the duration of the release of a flammable gas or vapour. The ventilation system condition must be operated and maintained to satisfy the design criteria. A2.2.2 Natural Ventilation Design Criteria Natural ventilation is that accomplished by the movement of air through wind or temperature gradients. In open air situations, natural ventilation is often sufficient to disperse a flammable release (depending on release rate) and prevent formation of an explosive atmosphere. A minimum wind speed of 0.5m/s is assumed for open areas, which is present continuously. In practice the wind speed will often be above 2 m/s.

Page 145 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A2 ISSUE 4.0 The classification of enclosed and sheltered areas is necessary when such an area contains a source of flammable release, or abuts or lies within a zoned area with which it has a connection which is not vapour tight. A sheltered area is an open building, shallow chamber (width more than two times the depth) or open space within an area where ventilation may be less than in a true open area, due to an obstruction such as a wall or adjacent structure. Ventilation is usually sufficient to avoid persistence of a flammable release, open buildings shall have high level outlets provided on a minimum three sides to prevent accumulation of gas within roof space. Under these conditions ventilation inside the sheltered area can be regarded as equivalent to an open-air situation but availability of ventilation may be reduced locally due to obstructions. An enclosed area is any building, deep chamber (width less than two times the depth), or enclosed space within which, in the absence or failure of artificial ventilation, the ventilation may be limited and any flammable gases or vapours will not be dispersed naturally. Wherever practicable buildings should have permanent openings with sufficient low level (on three sides) and high level (on two sides) vents to facilitate free air movement. Where an enclosed area is deemed to have insufficient natural ventilation then artificial ventilation should be considered. To propagate natural airflow within a building the floor level should be above ground level. Any ducting that utilises natural ventilation should be limited to vertical sections that are assisted by improving the stack effect. A2.2.3 Artificial Ventilation Design Criteria The provision of artificial (mechanical) ventilation can assist with the reduction of type and/or extent of zones in hazardous areas. When considering the type of ventilation system to be installed, the following design criteria shall be applied: Ventilation specific to a particular source (i.e. local ventilation) shall be used where practicable as it is generally far more effective than general area ventilation. Ventilation of an entire room for example, at say 3 ACH, that is regarded as adequate to prevent an explosive atmosphere forming, may in practice only result in one or two air changes per hour at particular locations within the room. Failure of mechanical ventilation shall be considered and duty/standby extract fans may be prudent to improve the overall availability. This is particularly important when mechanical ventilation is being used as a means of controlling continuous and primary grades of release. Ventilation system monitoring in enclosures shall include fan failure and detection of low flow rates of airflow. Ventilation equipment shall be zoned appropriately, generally the same zone type as the hazardous area connected to the equipment. Zone classification may be reduced where additional dilution with fresh air from other sources (e.g. buildings) is achieved at all times. Ventilation discontinuity must be taken into account when reducing zone classification, whereby accumulation prior to resumption may compromise the dilution. Locate duty and standby systems as far as possible from each other to prevent short circuit. Providing two ducts compared to a single duct system not only improves the ventilation effectiveness, but reduces the resistance to 25% of one duct conveying the same airflow. Outlet velocity is proportional to the power required Circular ducts are preferred to minimise resistance, noise and pressure drops to the ventilation system.

Page 146 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A2 ISSUE 4.0 System must be designed to ventilate both high and low levels where applicable to prevent accumulation of both lighter than air and heavier than air explosive atmospheres. A2.2.4 Specific Categories for Area Classification Area classification defines additional categories or qualities of ventilation which refer to the degree or specific nature of the ventilation provided, namely: Adequate Ventilation for area classification purposes within enclosed areas is a specially defined concept. It is the achievement of a uniform ventilation rate with no stagnant areas sufficient to dilute and disperse an explosive atmosphere to an average concentration not exceeding 50% of the lower explosive limit (LEL) for a secondary release and not exceeding 25% of the LEL for a primary release. Adequate ventilation may be insufficient to prevent the formation of a local explosive atmosphere close to the point of release. Inadequate ventilation, in area classification terms, is therefore that which is less than adequate ventilation and is not sufficient to dilute and disperse an explosive atmosphere below the LEL. Dilution Ventilation is ventilation of an enclosed area at such a rate that the probability of an explosive atmosphere being formed, even immediately following a release, is so low that the area may be considered non-hazardous. The ventilation must be sufficient to dilute immediately any release or production of flammable vapour and normally only applies to artificial ventilation of small spaces (e.g. acoustic enclosures) or where the release is particularly small. Dilution is usually to less than 10 percent of the lower explosive limit (LEL) for a secondary release or 10 times the level required to achieve adequate ventilation for a primary release. Overpressure Ventilation (or pressurisation) is artificial ventilation of an enclosed area to maintain it at a pressure sufficiently above that of the surrounding area to prevent ingress of an explosive atmosphere from an outside source.

A2.3

CLASSIFICATION OF ENCLOSED AND SHELTERED AREAS

A2.3.1 Requirement and Definition The classification of enclosed and sheltered areas is necessary when such an area contains a source of flammable release, or abuts or lies within a zoned area with which it has a connection which is not vapour tight. A sheltered area is an area within an open area where ventilation may be less than in a true open area, due to an obstruction such as a wall, adjacent structure or open side roofing. Ventilation is usually sufficient to avoid persistence of a flammable release and so meets the definition of adequate ventilation. An enclosed area is any building, deep sump (width less than two times the depth), or enclosed space within which, in the absence or failure of artificial ventilation, the ventilation will be limited and any flammable will not be dispersed naturally. A2.3.2 Classification Details The classification of enclosed areas containing a flammable release according to quality of ventilation for the three grades of release is given in Table A2.1.

Page 147 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A2 ISSUE 4.0

Table A2.1 Enclosed Area with an Internal Source of Release

Effect of Ventilation Type on Zone of Hazardous Area

Grade of release Inadequate
(1) (2)

Adequate
(1)

(3)

Dilution

Overpressure

Continuous Primary Secondary

Zone 0 Zone 1

Zone 0 Zone 1 Zone 2

Non-hazardous Non-hazardous Non-hazardous

(1)

(1)

Zone 1

Not applicable where there is an internal primary or continuous grade of release, may be applicable to maintain a zone 2 when surrounded by zone 0 or 1

When ventilation quality is adequate or inadequate, the presence of continuous grade releases within an enclosed area is not accepted practice and should be avoided wherever practicable. It may be possible to achieve this by relocation of the source, or by ducting or piping the release from a source so that it is discharged at a safe location in the open air. For small releases, the ventilation rate may be suitably increased to reduce the problem. With inadequate ventilation, for a source within an enclosed area, the external zone classification will be: continuous release - Zone 0; primary release - Zone 1; secondary release - Zone 2. With adequate ventilation, for a source within an enclosed area, the external zone classification will be the same as that of the enclosed area itself. Not applicable where there is an internal primary or continuous grade of release, but may be applicable in conjunction with adequate ventilation to maintain an enclosed area containing only secondary grade releases as Zone 2 when surrounded by a Zone 0 or 1 area. An area within a larger enclosure subject to local artificial ventilation should be classified according to the local ventilation rate applicable in that local area, i.e. either dilution or adequate, depending on which is met. With a source of small hazard radius, e.g. a sample point, the ventilation locally can sometimes be high enough to prevent the source influencing the classification of the whole enclosure. There would still be a local Zone 1 or 2 around the source and the extent of this zone will be greater than in open air, typically by a factor of two. Dilution ventilation is the fresh air required to dilute immediately any release of flammable vapour to create a non-hazardous atmosphere. Any openings in the enclosed area will result in a classified area extending outside the enclosed area. The extent of these should be as if the source of flammable release were situated at the opening. The classification of enclosed areas not containing an internal source of flammable release, but which are connected to an outside hazard zone is given in Table A2.2, which follows the same principles as Table A2.1.

Page 148 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A2 ISSUE 4.0

Table A2.2 Enclosed Area with no Internal Source of Release but Connected to an Outside Hazard Zone

Effect of Ventilation Type on Zone of Hazardous Area

Inadequate Continuous i.e. Zone 0 Primary Zone 1 Secondary Zone 2 Notes: (1) Location of an enclosed area without overpressure ventilation in a Zone 0 or 1 is not acceptable practice and should be avoided. (2) An inadequately ventilated enclosed area within an external Zone 2 and not containing a source of release may sometimes be classified as Zone2 when the only aperture is a self-closing vapour tight door. The frequency of door opening and the ventilation level must be considered to assess the risk. i.e. i.e Zone 0 Zone 1 Zone 1
(1)

Adequate Zone 0 Zone 1

(1)

Dilution Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

Overpressure

(1)

Non-hazardous with source outside enclosed area (see Section A2.4.2)

(1)

(1)

(2)

Zone 2

A2.4

ARTIFICIAL VENTILATION - SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

A2.4.1 Supply and Discharge Locations Air for artificial ventilation should be taken from a non-hazardous area. The discharge of ventilation air from a classified enclosed area is also a source of flammable release and there will be a zoned area around the vent. The size and class of zone should be as if the source were situated at the vent. A2.4.2 Loss of Artificial Ventilation Precautions are necessary to cater for the loss of artificial ventilation to prevent a hazard arising. Appropriate precautions for the various types of artificial ventilation are summarised in Table A2.3. Use of a pre-alarm before automatic shutdown should be considered. In the design phase, sufficient consideration should be given to the reliability of the ventilation system.

Table A2.3

Precautions Applicable on Loss of Artificial Ventilation for Enclosed Areas

Type of Ventilation
Conditions Classification of ventilated enclosed area Build-up of explosive atmosphere on failure of ventilation Ventilation failure alarm Gas detection

Adequate

Dilution

Overpressure

Zone 2 slow yes yes near release

non-hazardous quick yes no

non-hazardous

yes yes in incoming ventilation air

Page 149 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A2 ISSUE 4.0

Type of Ventilation
Precautions Isolation of electrical apparatus on failure of ventilation

Adequate

Dilution

Overpressure

no

yes if not having protection for the explosive atmosphere or no if operation giving rise to release is stopped no

no

Isolation of electrical apparatus on detection of gas

yes if not suitable for Zone 1

yes if not suitable for Zone 1

Ventilation failure should be determined by provision of fan failure alarms associated with the motor etc., and by air flow monitoring within the ventilation system.

A2.4.3 Gas Detection Gas detectors should be employed to monitor the presence of flammable material in the enclosed area, or in the ventilation air inlet as shown in Table A2.3. The gas detectors must be certified for the explosive atmosphere in which they may be required to operate. See Section 10.2 for further details of gas detectors.

A2.5

VENTILATION REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN FACILITIES

A2.5.1 Wet Wells An enclosed trade effluent only wet well, which is classified Zone 1, will need ventilation rates and the likelihood of flammable releases from industrial premises into the sewerage system to be considered when attempting to reduce the type and/or extent of the zone. The effect of increased ventilation rates on type of zone is described in Section A2.3. For flammable vapour releases (e.g. petrol spills) the quantity of vapour released is proportional to the surface area over which the liquid is evaporating. As a general rule of thumb, adequate ventilation will be provided when the airflow (m3/h) within the building or enclosure is 18 x CSA (m2) of the evaporating pool. In practice 3ACH within a building is generally sufficient to provide adequate ventilation in the event of a flammable vapour release. A2.5.2 Gas Compressors and Blowers If gas compressors are to be completely enclosed, any ventilation requirement for the enclosure will be as described in Section 7.16.2. A gas compressor in a sheltered area having a ventilated roof with partial side walling down to within about 2.5 metres above ground, which gives weather protection to compressors or pumps located out of doors, should be classified as per Section 7.16.1. For enclosed gas compressors, the minimum required ventilation rate of 1ACH may not be adequate to prevent an explosive atmosphere from forming, where the leak source is from the shaft seal on the compressor. Dilution ventilation of the enclosed area will prevent an explosive atmosphere being formed, so that the area may be considered non-hazardous. The ventilation rate achieved by dilution ventilation should be to less than 10 percent of the lower explosive limit (LEL) for a secondary release or 10 times the level required to achieve adequate ventilation for a primary release.

Page 150 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A2 ISSUE 4.0 A2.5.3 Plant Rooms Guidance on the requirements for ventilation, combustion and temperature control of plant rooms containing gas fired boilers of up to 2MW is given in BS 6644 Specification for Installation of Gas Fired Hot Water Boilers of Rated Inputs between 60kW and 2MW (2nd and 3rd Family Gases) (reference 19). For other fuels, provided the boiler efficiency is similar, then the same factors may be used. As a first approximation, the information may be used pro-rata for larger capacity fired equipment. Advice should also be obtained from the equipment supplier. Note that induced draught ventilation should not be used for such plant rooms. The calculation of natural ventilation rates in plant rooms and other buildings/enclosures is detailed in the British Standard BS 5925:1991 and CIBSE Applications Manual AM10. BS5925:1991 gives recommendation on the principles which should be observed when designing for the natural ventilation of buildings for human occupation. It also gives recommendations on calculating natural ventilation rates for simple buildings. Simple buildings refers to the shape of the building and it does not consider the building purpose. CIBSE Applications Manual AM10 (2005) provides detailed information on how to implement a decision to adopt natural ventilation and provide calculations on different cases of natural ventilation studies. When calculating ventilation rates within plant rooms and buildings for area classification purposes, the following guidelines shall apply: The minimum wind speed used in calculating natural ventilation rates within buildings/enclosures is defined in BS EN 60079-10 as 0.5m/s. In the absence of any mechanical ventilation in the building/enclosure, which would normally be active in the event of a release of flammable gas, this minimum wind speed should be applied to all ventilation calculations. Where mechanically assisted ventilation is provided that would be normally active in the event of a release of flammable gas, e.g. roof fans or enclosure ventilation, a reference wind speed Ur (based on 80% of the mean wind speed) should be used to calculate the natural ventilation rate. This reference wind speed is applied instead of the minimum wind speed because the probability of simultaneous failure of mechanical ventilation when minimum wind speed conditions exist is considered to be unlikely. In the calculation of natural ventilation in a building, a wind angle of 45 should be applied to each external face of the building. The lowest ventilation rate calculated from this is then taken as the minimum ventilation rate within the plant room or building. The free ventilation area through slatted louvre/grill ventilators is assumed to be 50%. Louvred ventilators with mesh fly screens, less than 2mm2, reduce this free area by about 50% (i.e. 25% free area), coarse mesh screens ,more than 2mm2, reduce this free area by 20% (i.e. 40% free area). For partially open windows (less than 45 angle), the free ventilation area is taken as 30%. For partially windows open more than 45 and ridge vents in roofs, the free ventilation area is taken as 60%. For fully open doors and windows, the free ventilation area is taken to be 100%. The ventilation rates in buildings/enclosures should be calculated as being due to wind only and no stack effect (temperature) is included to give worst case scenario.

The minimum required ventilation rates for plant rooms/buildings/enclosures is defined in Section 7.18 as:

Page 151 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A2 ISSUE 4.0 In boiler, power house and plant rooms, a minimum of 1ACH (air change per hour), where only source of gas release is from flanges, valves and fittings in normal environment (i.e. not adverse, subject to vibration or regular dismantling and re-assembly). For flammable gas releases (e.g. small leaks from flanges or valves on a digester gas mains) the quantity of the release is proportional to the leak area and the release pressure. For flanges or valves the leak area is normally taken to be 0.25mm2 and 2.5mm2 for an adverse environment (i.e. subject to vibration or regularly broken and remade),. The airflow (m3/h) within a building or enclosure is adequate when it is 30 x Gv (Gv = Volumetric gas release rate m3/h). In practice, 1ACH within a building is generally sufficient within buildings containing fired equipment.

The minimum required ventilation rates for Klampress buildings is defined in Section 7.13 For Klampresses inside buildings handling digested sludge, a minimum of 3ACH inside curtained area around Klampress, minimum of 1ACH in rest of building.

Example Ventilation Calculation - Digester Boiler House Ventilation is provided by two louvred panels on the south face and a single louvred panel on the west face of the building. Two roof ventilators are located at one end of the building. A steel roller shutter door is located in the east end of the building; this is normally closed during operation of the boiler. The open ventilation areas in the Boiler House are shown in the table below and natural ventilation air flow rates calculated using standard airflow formulae. The airflow formula used for this structure is based on multiple sided vents. As there is no mechanical ventilation provided in the boiler house, the minimum wind speed of 0.5m/s has been used to calculate the applicable ventilation rate.

Table A2.4

Degree of Natural Ventilation (Digester Boiler House)

Ventilation Openings

Opening Sizes h x w x no.

Open Ventilation Area m

South Wall 2no large louvres North Wall No openings West Wall 1no small louvres East Wall No openings Roof 1no large louvre 1no large louvre Housing Size (w x l x h) 0.4 x 4 x 1 0.4 x 2.8 x 1 8.9 x 2.68 x 4.3 1.6 x 50% = 0.8m
2 2

0.83 x 0.85 x 2

1.411 x 50% = 0.7055m

0.2 x 0.2 x 1

0.04 x 50% = 0.02m

1.12 x 50% = 0.56m 102.6 m

3

Page 152 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A2 ISSUE 4.0

Standard formulae for estimating 1 airflow rates

1 1 1 = + 2 A 2 (A +A ) ( A +A )2 w 1 2 3 4
Aw = 0.99

Qw = CdAwUrCp Qw=0.07m /s 2.45 ACH

3

0.5

Wind from North West or North East (wind speed 0.5m/s)

1

Standard formulae for estimating air flow rates can be found in BS 5925,Code of Practice for Ventilation Principles and Designing for Natural Ventilation (16)

The calculated ventilation rate is 2.45ACH for an equivalent opening area of 0.99 m2, therefore the minimum requirement of 1ACH within the boiler house from existing louvred ventilation area is achieved.

A2.6

SAFETY INSTRUMENTED SYSTEMS

A2.6.1 Introduction Hazardous areas are divided into zone types as follows: Zone 0 where a continuous (or nearly continuous) flammable atmosphere exist Zone 1 where a flammable atmosphere exists typically between 10 to 1000 hours per year. Zone 2 where a flammable atmosphere exists typically less than 10 hours per year.

In practice Zone 0 is normally only encountered in secondary digesters in WwTW applications and electrochlorination tanks in WTW. In most other cases, hazardous areas tend to be classified as Zone 2 or Zone 1 with flammable atmospheres occurring as single (or few) events per year. The persistence of a flammable atmosphere rather than its frequency is therefore often the key distinction between Zone 2 and Zone 1. Typically even for a Zone 1 area, the flammable atmosphere is more likely to exist for up to 30 hours rather than a figure closer to the upper end of the potential range (1000 hours). DSEAR prioritises the measures that can be taken to reduce the risk from fire or explosion. Controlling the release of a dangerous substance or preventing the formation of an explosive atmosphere comes higher up this order of priority, than control of ignition sources. Therefore installing a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) that initiates automatic isolation or triggers ventilation in the event of a release, may be considered preferable where this allows the zoning to be reduced or even eliminated. Any mitigation system used as an alternative to EX certified equipment to modify or eliminate the zone classification however, should be designed achieve the same level of risk reduction, i.e. it must provide a similar level of protection. For safety instrumented system used in this way, the requirements of IEC 61508 will apply and the reliability of the SIS classified by Safety Integrity Level (SIL). A2.6.2 IEC 61508 requirements IEC 61508 (or the Process Industry specific standard IEC 61511) is an international standard and as such summarises best practice. This standard provides technical assessment tools (e.g. Risk Graph or Layer of Protection Analysis), technical specifications (e.g. SIL definitions) and a framework for a reliability management system. As best practise it is not a formal legislative requirement. However, to comply with general Health and Safety Law (e.g. Health and Safety at Work Act) it is necessary to undertake risk assessments and to reduce risk as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). To ignore any applicable standard leaves an organisation open to the charge that they have need negligent: why have you not used a publicly available international standard which is the benchmark for best practice?

Page 153 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A2 ISSUE 4.0 Full compliance with either of these standards may not be achievable immediately but a significant improvement in reliability can be achieved and demonstrated through adapting current procedures to include most of the requirements from these standards. Key requirements reliability performance The standard sets specific reliability requirements into 4 Safety Integrity Levels: SIL 1 to 4. The reliability requirements are defined in the table below:

Table A2.5

Safety Integrity Levels

Safety Integrity Level

4 3 2 1

High demand rate (Dangerous failures/hr)

10 to less than 10 10 to less than 10 10 to less than 10 10 to less than 10
-6 -7 -8 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5

Low demand rate (Probability of failure on demand)

10 to less than 10 10 to less than 10 10 to less than 10 10 to less than 10
-2 -3 -4 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1

An example of a high demand system is car brakes. These are active systems in that they are used either constantly or very frequently. An example of a low demand system is a car air bag system. It is a passive system in that it is designed only to respond to very rare events. Most emergency shut-down systems are low demand. In addition to the basic reliability requirements there are also system requirements. All devices are spilt into 1 of 2 groups. Type A components (failure modes, well defined plus behaviour under fault conditions well defined plus failure data available) eg. valves/simple instruments. Type B components (likely to be more complex and whereby any of the above are not available) eg. PLC SMART Instruments

There is a basic understanding that the more complex a system is the less reliable it is likely to be. This criteria attempts to categorise this and ensure that complex systems are designed in such away as to reveal faults, i.e. to cover the added complexity of a system it is designed with a degree of self-diagnostics. A Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) is a measure of diagnostic cover. It measures the number of failure mechanisms that are revealed by some form of diagnostic cover against the total number of failure mechanisms. This is not linked mathematically to actual failure rates.

Table A2.6

Safe Failure Fractions

SILs for Safe Failure Fractions

TYPE A
SFF less than 60% 60%-90% 90%-99% 1 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 4

Simplex

(m+1) Duplex

(m +2)

Page 154 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A2 ISSUE 4.0

more than 99% 3 4 4

TYPE B
less than 60% 60%-90% 90%-99% more than 99%

Simplex
NO 1 2 3

(m+1)
1 2 3 4

(m+2)
2 3 4 4

A simplex system has one loop, a duplex system has two parallel loops covering each other and so on. Key requirements Management systems: Life Cycle To obtain a reliable safety system an appropriate management system must be employed. The system must be specified, design, installed, operated, maintained and modified using appropriate procedures and competent personnel. Specification Any safety system needs to be well specified. Some form of Risk Assessment (such as a Layer of Protection Analysis) must be undertaken to assess how reliable the system needs to be, e.g. the probability of failure on demand. In addition a technical description is required: specifying the inputs, outputs and required function of the system. Design. The specification form above will be turned into a design for one or more hardware components. This includes calculation of a system probability of failure on demand (PFD) and assessment of the system requirements (i.e. the Safe Fail Fraction, SFF, requirements). There are several critical steps in this activity. The designer MUST understand the process and hence the specification. For example, if two instrumented valves have been included in a process design to relieve pressure do they both have to operate to achieve the functionality required or are they redundant. The designer must agree a testing frequency and methodology with the operating and maintenance staff. The test frequency is a major parameter when calculating the PFD (SIL). If the designer assumes a high level of testing (e.g. weekly tests) but this cannot be achieved then the system will not be as reliable as required in the specification. If testing can only be undertaken at long intervals (e.g. every 5 years) it may be possible to design a system where key elements can be tested on-line and give the PFD desired. Installation and validation. Any high integrity system should be installed in a competent and controlled manner. The functionality of the system should be confirmed to ensure that the design intention is achieved. Operation and Maintenance. During the operational life of the system the functionality should be tested at regular intervals to ensure that the system still provides safe protection. A strong system must be put in place in ensure that the tests are done in a timely fashion, that full records are kept and that faults are identified, investigated and corrected for the long term. The management system in particular should monitor progress and resolution of faults. Modification Any proposed changes to the process (hence potential changes to the specification) or to the SIS should be captured by a modification. The implication of the proposed changed should be fully evaluated to ensure that safety is not diluted.

Page 155 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A2 ISSUE 4.0 People For all of the above a series of procedures and documents need to be produced. Staff must be trained to a suitable level of competence. As the SIL increases the management system requirements increase. For example, an increased level of independence of the SIL calculation checker is required as SIL increases. Requirements in practice. In practise most applications are for SIL 1 or 2 systems. These give the level of protection normally required without introducing excessively onerous requirements either on the hardware design of system requirements. The difference in management system requirements between SIL 1 and 2 is not significant. For most companies the SIL 2 management system requirements can be introduced by developing their existing design and maintenance procedures. Testing of the systems is the biggest on-going commitment and which can generate conflict with other operational requirements. The management system in general should comply with features of the Deming Cycle: Plan, Do, Check and Review. A2.6.3 Risk Reduction requirements To install a mitigation system it should achieve the same level of risk reduction as achieved by the zoning. The longest duration for Zone 1 is 1000 hours and for Zone 2 is 10 hours. On this basis a risk reduction factor of 100 (1000 divided by 10) would achieve a level of risk reduction at least as good as going from Zone 2 to Zone 1. The longest duration for Zone 0 is 8760 hours per year (i.e. continuous) and on this basis a risk reduction factor of 10 (8760 divided by 1000) would be sufficient to achieve a level of risk reduction at least as good as going from Zone 1 to Zone 0. There is not an equivalent duration criteria for unclassified areas. A typical WwTW asset life may be 40 years. The event frequency leading to the flammable atmosphere may occur in the order or 1 or 2 times per year. Thus in the life of the asset the number of events could range from 40 to 80. However, even if the event occurred this would suggest that in an unclassified area the probability of ignition of 0.18 would reduce the number of actual explosions. This would suggest that the reliability of one failure on demand in 100 events is the maximum that could be tolerated and that at lower figure should be the norm. A risk reduction of 10 is inadequate and 100 or better is required. (One failure on demand in 100 events is equivalent to a risk reduction factor of 100.) Within IEC 61508 / 61511 the boundary of SIL 1 and 2 is 100, with a SIL 1 ranging from 1 in 10 to 1 in effect 99.9. Therefore where elimination of zonal classification is required using a SIS, the level of risk reduction to be achieved requires that a SIL 2 system (i.e. the reliability of the system of less than 1 in 100 failures on demand) should be used. Where a reduction in zonal classification is being sought (e.g. Zone 1 to Zone 2), since the area will still require some control over ignition sources the level of risk reduction to be achieved will be less and a SIL1 system i.e. the reliability of the system of less than 1 in 10 failures on demand) can be used. In practice there is no significant difference between the criteria required for SIL 1 or 2 systems under the standard.
8

Cox, Lees and Ang (1990) Classification of Hazardous locations (IChemE, ISBN 0 85295 258 9) gives information of Ignition Probabilities on page 58. Assuming a liquid spill of petroleum liquid into a drain (flash point less than 43C) the probability of ignition is 0.01 for a zoned area or (multiplied by a factor of 10) 0.1 for an area with arcing electrical equipment. These figures are order of magnitude and do not suggest that zoned equipment only give a protection factor of 10.

Page 156 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A2 ISSUE 4.0 Consider a potential hazardous area where a flammable atmosphere may occur either as a primary or secondary release (i.e. less than 1000 hours per year). If a ventilation is being used to mitigate the zonal classification and achieve a non-hazardous classification, it would have to operate continuously. If instead a safety instrumented system is employed to operate the ventilation system, then in Zone 2 the key question is will the ventilation start on demand if it does start the fans are likely to continue to run for the maximum expected duration of 10 hours. A SIL 2 system would easily achieve the level of risk reduction that would justify a non-hazardous classification. If the ventilation operates in Zone 1 the key questions are will it start and continue to operate if it does start the fans, will the ventilation system continue to run for the maximum expected duration of the release. In practise the maximum duration of release is probably around 30 hours. This is summarised as: Zone 1 PFDstart-up less than 1 in 100 PFDoperating less than 1 in 100 Zone 2 PFDstart-up less than 1 in 100 As a result it is necessary to calculate both a start-up PFD and an operating PFD for the system. It is key to note that these are risk reduction requirements for a SYSTEM. The complete mitigation system must have a Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) which achieves the reliability required. A2.6.4 Technical Options There are various scenarios where mitigation systems could be installed. These are described individually below. Ventilation systems. Ventilation can be used in various operational modes. Fans can be run continuously to prevent the build up of flammable material in a poorly vented space. Alternatively there may be a requirement to operate fans in an emergency. Should a large amount of fuel spill (e.g. 25te from a road tanker) into a drainage system, the system could be designed to ventilate the pump station building on activation for a gas detection system. The scope of IEC 61508 applies only to SIS but the operator should be concerned about the reliability of both the SIS and of any mechanical system (e.g. the fans running continuously) although in practice this may have significantly different implications. Historically hazardous area classification documents have required that duplicate fans are used for ventilation purposes where change of zoning is based on ventilation. This reflects the need to have reliable mitigation measures. The system comprises of a gas detector (or detectors to give adequate coverage), a control panel (relay and contactor) and two duplicate fans each able to provide 100% of the ventilation requirements. Power shut-off systems As an alternative to the emergency operations of the fans above, an alternative approach would be to take power off of the pump station building, including pumps, lighting, control panels etc. This may generate other safety issues. This option removes the source of ignition associated with the electrical power supply. The system comprises of a gas detector (or detectors to give adequate coverage), a control panel (relay and contactor) within which power would be removed from the building or equipment within the hazardous area. Gas feed isolation.

Page 157 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A2 ISSUE 4.0 If the flammable gas is produced to generate power or heat, there is an option to isolate the gas supply that feeds the CHP or boiler plant. The most reliable means of doing this would be to close a slam shut valve on the pipeline supplying the equipment. The system comprises of a gas detector (or detectors to give adequate coverage), a solenoid valve on the air supply (either compressor supply or air cylinder) or relay on the actuator which operates the isolation valve on the gas supply of the gas compression system. A2.6.5 Summary of Reliability Calculations. Reliability Block Diagrams For each of the systems a simple Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) is used to show the structure of the system in a schematic manner. System 1: Ventilation systems. The system comprises of a gas detector, a control panel (two duplicate relays and contactors) and two duplicate fans each able to provide 100% of the ventilation requirements.
Relay Contactor Fan

Gas Detector Relay Contactor Fan

System 2: Power shut-off systems The system comprises of a gas detector, a control panel (relay and contactor) within which power would be removed from the building.

Gas Detector

Relay

Contactor

System 3: Gas feed isolation. The system comprises of a gas detector, a solenoid valve on the air supply (either compressor supply or air cylinder) to a large actuator which operates an isolation valve on the gas supply of the gas compression system.

Gas Detector

Solenoid valve

Valve Actuator

Isolation valve

Reliability Data The individual systems above can be broken down into component parts some of which are common across one or more system. For each component, reliability data has been obtained as detailed below.

Page 158 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A2 ISSUE 4.0 Gas detectors Draeger quote the following data for a Polytron 2 IR Typ 334 gas detector based on an annual function test.

Table A2.7

Gas Detector Failure Rates

Crowcon quote the following data for a Xguard types 5&6 Flammable Gas Detector based on a 6 month proof test.

Considering the Infra Red detectors both achieve a SIL2 based on hierarchy criteria. The failure rates are 0.03 x 10-6 hours and 0.7 x 10-6 hours. Comparison with OREDA9 page 393 gives a mean failure rate for IR detectors of 1.2 x 10-6 hours with a range of 0.22 3.9 x 10-6 hours. For an IR detector Faradip10 gives a typical figure of 7 x 10-6 hours with a range of 2.0 40 x 10-6 hours. It is assumed that the higher supplier figure is most representative of equipment purchased currently while still giving a conservative estimate. This assumes that the detectors are installed and maintained properly and that they are located in positions suitable to identify and leaks. Relays A generic failure rate for a Safety Relay is given by Technis as 2.0 x 10-6 hours. From a brief review of technical sales literature for Safety Relays it is believed that a SIL 3 component can be easily obtained which ensures that any architectural criteria can be achieved. Contactor A generic failure rate range for a Relay (Contactor) is given by Technis as 1.0 6.0 x 10-6 hours. The more conservative figure will be used. Fans A review of existing literature has not identified any specific Failure to start rates for ventilation fans. However, it has been assumed that an equivalent figure can be achieved by comparison against another rotating mechanical device.

10

OREDA. Offshore Reliability Data, 1992. ISBN 82 515 0188 1 Technis FARADIP Database Version 6.1 Page 159 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A2 ISSUE 4.0 OREDA page 210 for a single stage oil pump (10-1220 kw) gives a mean probability of 0.013 failure to start on demand (range 6.6 to 23 failures per 1000). OREDA page 509 gives a mean failure rate of 12.0 x 10-6 hours (range 2.9 - 21 x 10-6 hours) for ventilation or heating fan failure during operation. The mean value has been used. As discussed above the fans MUST operate in parallel. In this case common cause factors must also be considered. Both fans are likely to have been manufactured by the same company at the same time and be maintained using the same equipment, at the same time by the same technician following the same procedures. This commonality could be the cause of failure and hence reduce the reliability benefit of having two fans. The system reliability has been calculated using the Beta method, assuming a 0.3 factor which is conservative. Soleniod valve / Valve Actuator / Process Valve Data on Emergency Shut-Down (ESD) valves was obtained from Neles as tabulated below.

Table A2.8

Solenoid Valve Failure Rates

It is assumed that a soft seated valve together with an actuator and valvguard controller are in the loop. This gives a failure rate per million hours of F = { (1/30) + (1/420) + (1/55.3) } * (106 / 8760) = 6.1 x 10-6 hours OREDA page 89 gives a failure rate of 3.81 x 10-6 hours for failure to close with an Emergency Shut-down Valve. The higher figure from Neles has been used. Results. The following general assumptions have been made: equipment is adequately installed and maintained. gas detectors are located in positions where they will be effective in quickly identify the presence of flammable gas. written record of tests, especially failures, are kept.

Operators could also reasonably check the system either once per week or once per month rather than current 6 or 12 monthly. If a system is designed with a gas test bottle connected to the detector than an operator can fully check the system operates within a 15 or 30 minute period of time. It is assumed that the full system could be checked using a test gas arrangement on the detector and that a suitable time could be chosen where no nuisance (e.g. odour) impacts would occur. It is assumed that on site calibration of the gas detector by the supplier would occur every 6 or 12 months.

Page 160 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A2 ISSUE 4.0 The reliability data above are suitable for new systems. However, for old systems the reliability is likely to be lower by perhaps one or two orders of magnitude. Older systems are less likely to be designed with IEC61508 in mind and could be more complex with poorer reliability values for individual components (see range of results for IR detectors). The table below gives PFD values (with SIL in brackets) for the three systems at various test frequencies.

Table A2.9

System Test Intervals System Test Intervals

System
Ventilation fail to start Ventilation fail during operation Power shut-off Gas feed isolation.

1 week
0.0049 (2) 0.0011 (2) 0.0008 (3) 0.0006 (3)

1 month
0.0072 (2) 0.0045 (2) 0.0032 (2) 0.0024 (2)

3 months
0.014 (1) 0.014 (1) 0.0095 (2) 0.0073 (2)

6 months
0.023 (1) 0.028 (1) 0.019 (1) 0.015 (1)

A2.6.6 Conclusions. Based on the above results the following conclusions can be drawn. For a new SIL 2 rated system designed to comply with IEC 61508, a non-hazardous classification can be assigned to a hazardous area where the test interval of 1 month for ventilation systems or 3 months for Power Shut-off or Gas Isolation is applied. For a new SIL 1 rated system where only a reduction in zonal classification is to be achieved, a test interval of 3 months for ventilation systems or 6 months for Power Shut-off or Gas Isolation should be applied. For existing systems where the integrity of equipment is uncertain, only a SIL 1 rating can be applied and therefore the system can only achieve a reduction in zonal classification.

Page 161 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A3 ISSUE 4.0

A3.0

HAZARDOUS AREA CALCULATIONS DISPERSION CALCULATIONS Note that the formulae identified in A3.1.1 should be applied to those gases which are identified as being lighter than air, such as methane / biogas.

A3.1

A3.1.1 Dispersion from Release at High Velocity (more than 10m/s) The extent of dispersion from a release of gas (methane) under pressure to the LEL e.g. a pipework flange, valve gland or vent, can be defined by the following (from WRc UM1208); X=

0.07 A P1

0.55

for gas leak at pressures up to 500mbar(g)

X = 0.365 A((P1 / 1000 ) + 1) Where:

]0.55 for gas leak at pressures above 1bar(g)

A = leak area (mm2) (a nominal hole size of 0.25mm2 is assumed for a leak from a flange unless adverse conditions indicate otherwise, e.g. pipework subject to vibration, when 2.5mm2 should be applied). P1 = gauge pressure in mbar. X = dispersion distance (m). A3.1.2 Dispersion from Release at Low Velocity The dispersion from a point source at low pressure with negligible velocity can be determined for either a low or high level point source as follows: Gas Dispersion Distance a gas or vapour ((from Guide Line Standard, CEI 31-35 Guide for Classification of Hazardous Areas)

42300 Q g f X= M Ew
Where:

0.55

1.2

X = Dispersion Distance (m) Qg = Gas Flow Rate (kg/s) E = Lower Explosive Limit of Flammable Gas (%vol) f = Air exchange effectiveness factor (normally assumed to be 1 in open areas) M = Molecular weight of gas or vapour w = Wind speed (0.5m/s for a low level point source, 1.0m/s for high level point source) Notes: 1. where resulting dispersion distance does not touch the ground or other substantial boundary, then high level point source condition is met. 2. calculation of the dispersion distance from ventilation openings is unnecessary for a high degree of ventilation.

Page 162 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A3 ISSUE 4.0 The above calculations above relate to dispersion in open air conditions where natural turbulent mixing will occur, where the release occurs into sheltered or restricted ventilation areas, specialist advise should sought to determine the actual zone extent applicable.

A3.2

DISPERSION GRAPH FOR ZONE EXTENTS FROM COVERED WET WELLS A description of the classification of sewage pumping stations is given in Model Solutions section 7.4. Table 7.2 in section 7.4 provides hazard distances x for openings in the wet well of sewage pumping stations based on covered surface area. The following graph of zone extents allows hazard distances to be selected for covered surface areas in between those values in Table 7.2. Figure A3.1 Hazard Distances for Sewage Pumping Stations

Sewage Pumping Stations 160 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 Zone Extent m
Covered Wet Well

A3.3

EXAMPLES OF HAZARDOUS AREA CALCULATIONS

A3.3.1 Example1: Sewage Pumping Station - Submersible Pump and Motor Set (NOT domestic foul only) - see Figure 7.2(b) If it is assumed that a gravity sewer on a combined sewer feeds a sewage pumping station. The dangerous substance considered to be highest risk is petrol spillage into sewer. The sewage pumping station comprises a covered wet well with a submersible pump and a valve chamber not sealed from wet well. Wet Well dimensions: Ventilation: Total surface area: 3m dia x 3m deep No ventilation provided (passive ventilation only through openings) 7.1m2 of liquid surface*

Covered Surface Area m2

Page 163 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A3 ISSUE 4.0 Characteristics of Release Source of release: Flammable material: Grade of release: Safety Factor (k): Initial Concentration (Co) Ambient temperature (Ta): LEL (E): Molecular Weight Mass Release rate (Qg) Petrol spillage into sewer Petrol vapour Secondary 2 100% 15C 1.4%v/v 100.2 Based on total surface area and the vaporisation rate of 0.53kg/m2 (0.53 x 7.1) = 3.7kg/h (0.001kg/s). (0.001 x 0.0821 x (15+273)/100.2) = 2.4 x 10-4 m3/s

Volume Release rate (Qv): Minimum Ventilation Required Wet Well volume: Minimum ventilation required:

21.2m3

Qv k

Co Ta = Vmin E Tref
1 .4 288 273
= 0.036 m3/s

2.4 10 4 2 100
Min No of Air changes (Cmin):

Vmin = C min Vo
0.036/21.2 = 0.0017 s-1 Based on passive ventilation only (say 0.1 ACH) and air exchange effectiveness (f) of 5 = 0.02 ACH = 0.42m3/h = 1.18 x 10-4 m3/s

Actual ventilation rate:

Actual No of Air Changes (C): Degree of Ventilation dV = (C/Cmin)

1.18 10 4 = 5.6 x 10-6 s-1 21.2

5.6 10 6 = 0.0033 1.7 10 3

(dV is less than 1 so degree of ventilation is

inadequate) Availability of Ventilation Ventilation availability is assumed good (wet well is outside in open air)

Page 164 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A3 ISSUE 4.0 Persistence Time Persistence time:

tp =

1 E ln C Co.k 1 1.4 /3600 = 246 hrs ln 6 5.6 10 100 2

Zone Type The number of air changes per hour is well below minimum required air changes and the degree of ventilation is consequently inadequate, indicating a Zone 1. Availability of ventilation is good and persistence time is more than 10hrs, so Zone 1 classification inside wet well is confirmed (if persistence time had been less than 10hrs then Zone 2 may apply).

Effect of Ventilation Type on Zone of Hazardous Area (from Table A2.1)

Grade of release Inadequate
(1) (2)

Adequate
(1)

(3)

Dilution

Overpressure

Continuous Primary Secondary

Zone 0 Zone 1

Zone 0 Zone 1 Zone 2

Non-hazardous Non-hazardous Non-hazardous

Note 4 -(refer to Table A2.1) Note 4 -(refer to Table A2.1) Note 4 -(refer to Table A2.1)

(1)

(1)

Zone 1

Zone Extent The wet well is classified as a Zone 1 internally. The zone extent is calculated for a release from any opening (such as an open manhole cover).

Zone Extent x

42300 Q g f M Ew

0.55

1.2

w = wind speed of 0.5m/s used for dispersion at ground level (1.0m/s for release at high level).

42300 0.001 1 100.2 1.4 0.5

0.55

x1.2 = 0.76 (0.8m)

A3.3.2 Example 2: Floating Roof Digester - Hazardous Area Extents for PRV The determination of hazardous area extents for primary and secondary releases from the PRV on a Floating Roof Digester are given below for a pressure/vacuum relief valve. There are two hazard distances as follows: 1. Primary release of flammable gas from seal of PRV, R1 2. Secondary release of flammable gas under digester abnormal high pressure operating conditions, R2. If we assume the following data;

Page 165 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A3 ISSUE 4.0 PRV size = 150mm PRV set pressure = 25mbar PRV overpressure = 2mbar Release temperature = 35C Molecular weight of Biogas = 25.8 Wind speed = 1m/s (high level release) Also assume turbulent ideal mixing of gas release. For a primary release from seal of PRV at low pressure (due to small amount passing due to seal leakage), R1 and assuming only 0.1% of the total flow released under high pressure relieving conditions will leak: Volume released data) Qv = 0.001 x 9.09x10-1 m3/s (flow taken from manufacturers Qv = Mass released Qg = 9.09 x 10-4 m3/s

(0.0821 (35 + 273)) 9.09 10 4 25.8

8.9 x 10-4 kg/s

42300 8.9 104 1 Therefore Radius R1 = X = 25.8 6.7 1.0 R1 = 0.5m

0.55

1.2

For secondary release under abnormal high pressure operating conditions, assuming the following conditions: Digester gas production = 150 m3/hr Number of PRVs = 1 Ventilation factor (F) = 1 Using the above data Qv is obtained. Volume released Qv =

150 3600

Qv = 4.2 x 10-2 m3/s Mass released Qg =

0.0821 (35 + 273) 4.2 10 2 25.8

4.1 x 10-2 kg/s

Therefore radius

42300 4.1 10 2 1 R2 = X = 25.8 6.7 1.0

R2 = 4.4m rounded up to 5m

0.55

x 1.2

IGE/SR/25 Hazardous Area Classification of Natural Gas Installations provides further useful guidance on zoning distances for pressure relief valve vents with tables of dispersion distance based on relief vent diameter and release flowrate.

Page 166 of 167

DOCUMENT REF: TWUL/E04 APPENDIX A3 ISSUE 4.0

A3.4

FLARE MINIMUM SEPARATION DISTANCE Thermal radiation levels are measured in kilowatts per square metre and permissible radiation levels (K) for different conditions are shown in the table below.

Table A3.2

Recommended Design Total Radiation

Permitted Design Level (K) kW m

15.77

Conditions
Heat intensity on structures in areas where operators are not likely to be performing duties and where shelter from radiant heat is available (e.g. behind equipment) Value of K at design flare release at any location to which people have access (e.g. at grade below the flare or a service platform of nearby tower); exposure should be limited to a few seconds, sufficient for escape only Heat intensity In areas where emergency actions lasting up to 1 minute may be required by personnel without shielding but with appropriate clothing Heat intensity in areas where emergency actions lasting several minutes may be required by personnel without shielding but with appropriate clothing Value of K at any location where personnel with appropriate clothing may be continuously exposed

9.46

6.31

4.73

1.58

In most cases, equipment can safely tolerate higher degrees of heat intensity than those defined for personnel. However, items vulnerable to overheating, flammable vapours or electrical equipment may be susceptible to heat radiation due to resulting high surface temperatures. Minimum separation distance is calculated using the formula:

D=

FQ 4K

Where: D = minimum distance from the midpoint of the flame to object being considered (m)

= fraction of heat intensity transmitted (taken as being 1.0)

F = fraction of heat radiated (0.2 for methane) Q = heat release (kW) K = allowable radiation (kW m2) A K value of 6.31 has been assumed for calculating the fenced off exclusion zone, a K value of 1.58 is assumed for calculating the minimum separation distance between the flare and any flammable material, hazardous area, or site boundary. D1 = minimum separation distance for open flares and incorporates an allowance for flame length as distance is taken from mid point of flame for open flares (i.e. flame length is added to calculated distance D1). Flame lengths for open flares are derived from API RP 520 Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring Systems. D2 = minimum separation distance for enclosed ground flares uses value for D only as flame is shielded.

Page 167 of 167