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Dierks
Request for Comments: 2246 Certicom
Category: Standards Track C. Allen
Certicom
January 1999
Copyright Notice
Abstract
Table of Contents
1. Introduction 3
2. Goals 4
3. Goals of this document 5
4. Presentation language 5
4.1. Basic block size 6
4.2. Miscellaneous 6
4.3. Vectors 6
4.4. Numbers 7
4.5. Enumerateds 7
4.6. Constructed types 8
4.6.1. Variants 9
4.7. Cryptographic attributes 10
4.8. Constants 11
5. HMAC and the pseudorandom function 11
6. The TLS Record Protocol 13
6.1. Connection states 14
D. Implementation Notes 64
D.1. Temporary RSA keys 64
D.2. Random Number Generation and Seeding 64
D.3. Certificates and authentication 65
D.4. CipherSuites 65
E. Backward Compatibility With SSL 66
E.1. Version 2 client hello 67
E.2. Avoiding man-in-the-middle version rollback 68
F. Security analysis 69
F.1. Handshake protocol 69
F.1.1. Authentication and key exchange 69
F.1.1.1. Anonymous key exchange 69
F.1.1.2. RSA key exchange and authentication 70
F.1.1.3. Diffie-Hellman key exchange with authentication 71
F.1.2. Version rollback attacks 71
F.1.3. Detecting attacks against the handshake protocol 72
F.1.4. Resuming sessions 72
F.1.5. MD5 and SHA 72
F.2. Protecting application data 72
F.3. Final notes 73
G. Patent Statement 74
Security Considerations 75
References 75
Credits 77
Comments 78
Full Copyright Statement 80
1. Introduction
The primary goal of the TLS Protocol is to provide privacy and data
integrity between two communicating applications. The protocol is
composed of two layers: the TLS Record Protocol and the TLS Handshake
Protocol. At the lowest level, layered on top of some reliable
transport protocol (e.g., TCP[TCP]), is the TLS Record Protocol. The
TLS Record Protocol provides connection security that has two basic
properties:
2. Goals
This document and the TLS protocol itself are based on the SSL 3.0
Protocol Specification as published by Netscape. The differences
between this protocol and SSL 3.0 are not dramatic, but they are
significant enough that TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 do not interoperate
(although TLS 1.0 does incorporate a mechanism by which a TLS
implementation can back down to SSL 3.0). This document is intended
primarily for readers who will be implementing the protocol and those
doing cryptographic analysis of it. The specification has been
written with this in mind, and it is intended to reflect the needs of
those two groups. For that reason, many of the algorithm-dependent
data structures and rules are included in the body of the text (as
opposed to in an appendix), providing easier access to them.
4. Presentation language
4.2. Miscellaneous
4.3. Vectors
T T'[n];
T T'<floor..ceiling>;
opaque mandatory<300..400>;
/* length field is 2 bytes, cannot be empty */
uint16 longer<0..800>;
/* zero to 400 16-bit unsigned integers */
4.4. Numbers
The basic numeric data type is an unsigned byte (uint8). All larger
numeric data types are formed from fixed length series of bytes
concatenated as described in Section 4.1 and are also unsigned. The
following numeric types are predefined.
uint8 uint16[2];
uint8 uint24[3];
uint8 uint32[4];
uint8 uint64[8];
4.5. Enumerateds
struct {
T1 f1;
T2 f2;
...
Tn fn;
} [[T]];
The fields within a structure may be qualified using the type's name
using a syntax much like that available for enumerateds. For example,
T.f2 refers to the second field of the previous declaration.
Structure definitions may be embedded.
4.6.1. Variants
struct {
T1 f1;
T2 f2;
....
Tn fn;
select (E) {
case e1: Te1;
case e2: Te2;
....
case en: Ten;
} [[fv]];
} [[Tv]];
For example:
orange VariantRecord
In RSA signing, a 36-byte structure of two hashes (one SHA and one
MD5) is signed (encrypted with the private key). It is encoded with
PKCS #1 block type 0 or type 1 as described in [PKCS1].
In DSS, the 20 bytes of the SHA hash are run directly through the
Digital Signing Algorithm with no additional hashing. This produces
two values, r and s. The DSS signature is an opaque vector, as above,
the contents of which are the DER encoding of:
stream-ciphered struct {
uint8 field1;
uint8 field2;
digitally-signed opaque hash[20];
} UserType;
The contents of hash are used as input for the signing algorithm,
then the entire structure is encrypted with a stream cipher. The
length of this structure, in bytes would be equal to 2 bytes for
field1 and field2, plus two bytes for the length of the signature,
plus the length of the output of the signing algorithm. This is known
due to the fact that the algorithm and key used for the signing are
known prior to encoding or decoding this structure.
4.8. Constants
For example,
struct {
uint8 f1;
uint8 f2;
} Example1;
TLS's PRF is created by splitting the secret into two halves and
using one half to generate data with P_MD5 and the other half to
generate data with P_SHA-1, then exclusive-or'ing the outputs of
these two expansion functions together.
S1 and S2 are the two halves of the secret and each is the same
length. S1 is taken from the first half of the secret, S2 from the
second half. Their length is created by rounding up the length of the
overall secret divided by two; thus, if the original secret is an odd
number of bytes long, the last byte of S1 will be the same as the
first byte of S2.
The PRF is then defined as the result of mixing the two pseudorandom
streams by exclusive-or'ing them together.
73 6C 69 74 68 79 20 74 6F 76 65 73
Note that because MD5 produces 16 byte outputs and SHA-1 produces 20
byte outputs, the boundaries of their internal iterations will not be
aligned; to generate a 80 byte output will involve P_MD5 being
iterated through A(5), while P_SHA-1 will only iterate through A(4).
The security parameters for a TLS Connection read and write state are
set by providing the following values:
connection end
Whether this entity is considered the "client" or the "server" in
this connection.
MAC algorithm
An algorithm to be used for message authentication. This
specification includes the size of the hash which is returned by
the MAC algorithm.
compression algorithm
An algorithm to be used for data compression. This specification
must include all information the algorithm requires to do
compression.
master secret
A 48 byte secret shared between the two peers in the connection.
client random
A 32 byte value provided by the client.
server random
A 32 byte value provided by the server.
struct {
ConnectionEnd entity;
BulkCipherAlgorithm bulk_cipher_algorithm;
CipherType cipher_type;
uint8 key_size;
uint8 key_material_length;
IsExportable is_exportable;
MACAlgorithm mac_algorithm;
uint8 hash_size;
CompressionMethod compression_algorithm;
opaque master_secret[48];
opaque client_random[32];
opaque server_random[32];
} SecurityParameters;
The record layer will use the security parameters to generate the
following six items:
The client write parameters are used by the server when receiving and
processing records and vice-versa. The algorithm used for generating
these items from the security parameters is described in section 6.3.
Once the security parameters have been set and the keys have been
generated, the connection states can be instantiated by making them
the current states. These current states must be updated for each
record processed. Each connection state includes the following
elements:
compression state
The current state of the compression algorithm.
cipher state
The current state of the encryption algorithm. This will consist
of the scheduled key for that connection. In addition, for block
ciphers running in CBC mode (the only mode specified for TLS),
this will initially contain the IV for that connection state and
be updated to contain the ciphertext of the last block encrypted
or decrypted as records are processed. For stream ciphers, this
will contain whatever the necessary state information is to allow
the stream to continue to encrypt or decrypt data.
MAC secret
The MAC secret for this connection as generated above.
sequence number
Each connection state contains a sequence number, which is
maintained separately for read and write states. The sequence
number must be set to zero whenever a connection state is made
the active state. Sequence numbers are of type uint64 and may not
exceed 2^64-1. A sequence number is incremented after each
record: specifically, the first record which is transmitted under
a particular connection state should use sequence number 0.
The TLS Record Layer receives uninterpreted data from higher layers
in non-empty blocks of arbitrary size.
6.2.1. Fragmentation
struct {
uint8 major, minor;
} ProtocolVersion;
enum {
change_cipher_spec(20), alert(21), handshake(22),
application_data(23), (255)
} ContentType;
struct {
ContentType type;
ProtocolVersion version;
uint16 length;
opaque fragment[TLSPlaintext.length];
} TLSPlaintext;
type
The higher level protocol used to process the enclosed fragment.
version
The version of the protocol being employed. This document
describes TLS Version 1.0, which uses the version { 3, 1 }. The
version value 3.1 is historical: TLS version 1.0 is a minor
modification to the SSL 3.0 protocol, which bears the version
value 3.0. (See Appendix A.1).
length
The length (in bytes) of the following TLSPlaintext.fragment.
The length should not exceed 2^14.
fragment
The application data. This data is transparent and treated as an
independent block to be dealt with by the higher level protocol
specified by the type field.
Compression must be lossless and may not increase the content length
by more than 1024 bytes. If the decompression function encounters a
TLSCompressed.fragment that would decompress to a length in excess of
2^14 bytes, it should report a fatal decompression failure error.
struct {
ContentType type; /* same as TLSPlaintext.type */
ProtocolVersion version;/* same as TLSPlaintext.version */
uint16 length;
opaque fragment[TLSCompressed.length];
} TLSCompressed;
length
The length (in bytes) of the following TLSCompressed.fragment.
The length should not exceed 2^14 + 1024.
fragment
The compressed form of TLSPlaintext.fragment.
Implementation note:
Decompression functions are responsible for ensuring that
messages cannot cause internal buffer overflows.
struct {
ContentType type;
ProtocolVersion version;
uint16 length;
select (CipherSpec.cipher_type) {
case stream: GenericStreamCipher;
case block: GenericBlockCipher;
} fragment;
} TLSCiphertext;
type
The type field is identical to TLSCompressed.type.
version
The version field is identical to TLSCompressed.version.
length
The length (in bytes) of the following TLSCiphertext.fragment.
The length may not exceed 2^14 + 2048.
fragment
The encrypted form of TLSCompressed.fragment, with the MAC.
stream-ciphered struct {
opaque content[TLSCompressed.length];
opaque MAC[CipherSpec.hash_size];
} GenericStreamCipher;
seq_num
The sequence number for this record.
hash
The hashing algorithm specified by
SecurityParameters.mac_algorithm.
Note that the MAC is computed before encryption. The stream cipher
encrypts the entire block, including the MAC. For stream ciphers that
do not use a synchronization vector (such as RC4), the stream cipher
state from the end of one record is simply used on the subsequent
packet. If the CipherSuite is TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, encryption
consists of the identity operation (i.e., the data is not encrypted
and the MAC size is zero implying that no MAC is used).
TLSCiphertext.length is TLSCompressed.length plus
CipherSpec.hash_size.
For block ciphers (such as RC2 or DES), the encryption and MAC
functions convert TLSCompressed.fragment structures to and from block
TLSCiphertext.fragment structures.
block-ciphered struct {
opaque content[TLSCompressed.length];
opaque MAC[CipherSpec.hash_size];
uint8 padding[GenericBlockCipher.padding_length];
uint8 padding_length;
} GenericBlockCipher;
padding
Padding that is added to force the length of the plaintext to be
an integral multiple of the block cipher's block length. The
padding may be any length up to 255 bytes long, as long as it
results in the TLSCiphertext.length being an integral multiple of
the block length. Lengths longer than necessary might be
desirable to frustrate attacks on a protocol based on analysis of
the lengths of exchanged messages. Each uint8 in the padding data
vector must be filled with the padding length value.
padding_length
The padding length should be such that the total size of the
GenericBlockCipher structure is a multiple of the cipher's block
length. Legal values range from zero to 255, inclusive. This
length specifies the length of the padding field exclusive of the
padding_length field itself.
Note: With block ciphers in CBC mode (Cipher Block Chaining) the
initialization vector (IV) for the first record is generated with
the other keys and secrets when the security parameters are set.
The IV for subsequent records is the last ciphertext block from
the previous record.
When generating keys and MAC secrets, the master secret is used as an
entropy source, and the random values provide unencrypted salt
material and IVs for exportable ciphers.
key_block = PRF(SecurityParameters.master_secret,
"key expansion",
SecurityParameters.server_random +
SecurityParameters.client_random);
client_write_MAC_secret[SecurityParameters.hash_size]
server_write_MAC_secret[SecurityParameters.hash_size]
client_write_key[SecurityParameters.key_material_length]
server_write_key[SecurityParameters.key_material_length]
client_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size]
server_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size]
Implementation note:
The cipher spec which is defined in this document which requires
the most material is 3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA: it requires 2 x 24 byte
keys, 2 x 20 byte MAC secrets, and 2 x 8 byte IVs, for a total of
104 bytes of key material.
final_client_write_key =
PRF(SecurityParameters.client_write_key,
"client write key",
SecurityParameters.client_random +
SecurityParameters.server_random);
final_server_write_key =
PRF(SecurityParameters.server_write_key,
"server write key",
SecurityParameters.client_random +
SecurityParameters.server_random);
client_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size]
server_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size]
Note that the PRF is used without a secret in this case: this just
means that the secret has a length of zero bytes and contributes
nothing to the hashing in the PRF.
key_block = PRF(master_secret,
"key expansion",
server_random +
client_random)[0..41]
client_write_MAC_secret = key_block[0..15]
server_write_MAC_secret = key_block[16..31]
client_write_key = key_block[32..36]
server_write_key = key_block[37..41]
final_client_write_key = PRF(client_write_key,
"client write key",
client_random +
server_random)[0..15]
final_server_write_key = PRF(server_write_key,
"server write key",
client_random +
server_random)[0..15]
session identifier
An arbitrary byte sequence chosen by the server to identify an
active or resumable session state.
peer certificate
X509v3 [X509] certificate of the peer. This element of the state
may be null.
compression method
The algorithm used to compress data prior to encryption.
cipher spec
Specifies the bulk data encryption algorithm (such as null, DES,
etc.) and a MAC algorithm (such as MD5 or SHA). It also defines
cryptographic attributes such as the hash_size. (See Appendix A.6
for formal definition)
master secret
48-byte secret shared between the client and server.
is resumable
A flag indicating whether the session can be used to initiate new
connections.
These items are then used to create security parameters for use by
the Record Layer when protecting application data. Many connections
can be instantiated using the same session through the resumption
feature of the TLS Handshake Protocol.
struct {
enum { change_cipher_spec(1), (255) } type;
} ChangeCipherSpec;
The change cipher spec message is sent by both the client and server
to notify the receiving party that subsequent records will be
protected under the newly negotiated CipherSpec and keys. Reception
of this message causes the receiver to instruct the Record Layer to
immediately copy the read pending state into the read current state.
Immediately after sending this message, the sender should instruct
the record layer to make the write pending state the write active
state. (See section 6.1.) The change cipher spec message is sent
during the handshake after the security parameters have been agreed
upon, but before the verifying finished message is sent (see section
7.4.9).
One of the content types supported by the TLS Record layer is the
alert type. Alert messages convey the severity of the message and a
description of the alert. Alert messages with a level of fatal result
in the immediate termination of the connection. In this case, other
connections corresponding to the session may continue, but the
session identifier must be invalidated, preventing the failed session
from being used to establish new connections. Like other messages,
alert messages are encrypted and compressed, as specified by the
current connection state.
enum {
close_notify(0),
unexpected_message(10),
bad_record_mac(20),
decryption_failed(21),
record_overflow(22),
decompression_failure(30),
handshake_failure(40),
bad_certificate(42),
unsupported_certificate(43),
certificate_revoked(44),
certificate_expired(45),
certificate_unknown(46),
illegal_parameter(47),
unknown_ca(48),
access_denied(49),
decode_error(50),
decrypt_error(51),
export_restriction(60),
protocol_version(70),
insufficient_security(71),
internal_error(80),
user_canceled(90),
no_renegotiation(100),
(255)
} AlertDescription;
struct {
AlertLevel level;
AlertDescription description;
} Alert;
The client and the server must share knowledge that the connection is
ending in order to avoid a truncation attack. Either party may
initiate the exchange of closing messages.
close_notify
This message notifies the recipient that the sender will not send
any more messages on this connection. The session becomes
unresumable if any connection is terminated without proper
close_notify messages with level equal to warning.
If the application protocol using TLS provides that any data may be
carried over the underlying transport after the TLS connection is
closed, the TLS implementation must receive the responding
close_notify alert before indicating to the application layer that
the TLS connection has ended. If the application protocol will not
transfer any additional data, but will only close the underlying
transport connection, then the implementation may choose to close the
transport without waiting for the responding close_notify. No part of
this standard should be taken to dictate the manner in which a usage
profile for TLS manages its data transport, including when
connections are opened or closed.
unexpected_message
An inappropriate message was received. This alert is always fatal
and should never be observed in communication between proper
implementations.
bad_record_mac
This alert is returned if a record is received with an incorrect
MAC. This message is always fatal.
decryption_failed
A TLSCiphertext decrypted in an invalid way: either it wasn`t an
even multiple of the block length or its padding values, when
checked, weren`t correct. This message is always fatal.
record_overflow
A TLSCiphertext record was received which had a length more than
2^14+2048 bytes, or a record decrypted to a TLSCompressed record
with more than 2^14+1024 bytes. This message is always fatal.
decompression_failure
The decompression function received improper input (e.g. data
that would expand to excessive length). This message is always
fatal.
handshake_failure
Reception of a handshake_failure alert message indicates that the
sender was unable to negotiate an acceptable set of security
parameters given the options available. This is a fatal error.
bad_certificate
A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that did not
verify correctly, etc.
unsupported_certificate
A certificate was of an unsupported type.
certificate_revoked
A certificate was revoked by its signer.
certificate_expired
A certificate has expired or is not currently valid.
certificate_unknown
Some other (unspecified) issue arose in processing the
certificate, rendering it unacceptable.
illegal_parameter
A field in the handshake was out of range or inconsistent with
other fields. This is always fatal.
unknown_ca
A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the
certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not
be located or couldn`t be matched with a known, trusted CA. This
message is always fatal.
access_denied
A valid certificate was received, but when access control was
applied, the sender decided not to proceed with negotiation.
This message is always fatal.
decode_error
A message could not be decoded because some field was out of the
specified range or the length of the message was incorrect. This
message is always fatal.
decrypt_error
A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including being
unable to correctly verify a signature, decrypt a key exchange,
or validate a finished message.
export_restriction
A negotiation not in compliance with export restrictions was
detected; for example, attempting to transfer a 1024 bit
ephemeral RSA key for the RSA_EXPORT handshake method. This
message is always fatal.
protocol_version
The protocol version the client has attempted to negotiate is
recognized, but not supported. (For example, old protocol
versions might be avoided for security reasons). This message is
always fatal.
insufficient_security
Returned instead of handshake_failure when a negotiation has
failed specifically because the server requires ciphers more
secure than those supported by the client. This message is always
fatal.
internal_error
An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the
protocol makes it impossible to continue (such as a memory
allocation failure). This message is always fatal.
user_canceled
This handshake is being canceled for some reason unrelated to a
protocol failure. If the user cancels an operation after the
handshake is complete, just closing the connection by sending a
close_notify is more appropriate. This alert should be followed
by a close_notify. This message is generally a warning.
no_renegotiation
Sent by the client in response to a hello request or by the
server in response to a client hello after initial handshaking.
Either of these would normally lead to renegotiation; when that
is not appropriate, the recipient should respond with this alert;
at that point, the original requester can decide whether to
proceed with the connection. One case where this would be
appropriate would be where a server has spawned a process to
satisfy a request; the process might receive security parameters
(key length, authentication, etc.) at startup and it might be
difficult to communicate changes to these parameters after that
point. This message is always a warning.
For all errors where an alert level is not explicitly specified, the
sending party may determine at its discretion whether this is a fatal
error or not; if an alert with a level of warning is received, the
- Allow the client and server to verify that their peer has
calculated the same security parameters and that the handshake
occurred without tampering by an attacker.
Note that higher layers should not be overly reliant on TLS always
negotiating the strongest possible connection between two peers:
there are a number of ways a man in the middle attacker can attempt
to make two entities drop down to the least secure method they
support. The protocol has been designed to minimize this risk, but
there are still attacks available: for example, an attacker could
block access to the port a secure service runs on, or attempt to get
the peers to negotiate an unauthenticated connection. The fundamental
rule is that higher levels must be cognizant of what their security
requirements are and never transmit information over a channel less
secure than what they require. The TLS protocol is secure, in that
any cipher suite offers its promised level of security: if you
negotiate 3DES with a 1024 bit RSA key exchange with a host whose
certificate you have verified, you can expect to be that secure.
However, you should never send data over a link encrypted with 40 bit
security unless you feel that data is worth no more than the effort
required to break that encryption.
Following the hello messages, the server will send its certificate,
if it is to be authenticated. Additionally, a server key exchange
message may be sent, if it is required (e.g. if their server has no
certificate, or if its certificate is for signing only). If the
server is authenticated, it may request a certificate from the
client, if that is appropriate to the cipher suite selected. Now the
server will send the server hello done message, indicating that the
hello-message phase of the handshake is complete. The server will
then wait for a client response. If the server has sent a certificate
request message, the client must send the certificate message. The
client key exchange message is now sent, and the content of that
message will depend on the public key algorithm selected between the
client hello and the server hello. If the client has sent a
certificate with signing ability, a digitally-signed certificate
verify message is sent to explicitly verify the certificate.
Cipher Spec. At this point, the handshake is complete and the client
and server may begin to exchange application layer data. (See flow
chart below.)
Client Server
ClientHello -------->
ServerHello
Certificate*
ServerKeyExchange*
CertificateRequest*
<-------- ServerHelloDone
Certificate*
ClientKeyExchange
CertificateVerify*
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished -------->
[ChangeCipherSpec]
<-------- Finished
Application Data <-------> Application Data
Client Server
ClientHello -------->
ServerHello
[ChangeCipherSpec]
<-------- Finished
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished -------->
Application Data <-------> Application Data
The TLS Handshake Protocol is one of the defined higher level clients
of the TLS Record Protocol. This protocol is used to negotiate the
secure attributes of a session. Handshake messages are supplied to
the TLS Record Layer, where they are encapsulated within one or more
TLSPlaintext structures, which are processed and transmitted as
specified by the current active session state.
enum {
hello_request(0), client_hello(1), server_hello(2),
certificate(11), server_key_exchange (12),
certificate_request(13), server_hello_done(14),
certificate_verify(15), client_key_exchange(16),
finished(20), (255)
} HandshakeType;
struct {
HandshakeType msg_type; /* handshake type */
uint24 length; /* bytes in message */
select (HandshakeType) {
case hello_request: HelloRequest;
case client_hello: ClientHello;
case server_hello: ServerHello;
case certificate: Certificate;
case server_key_exchange: ServerKeyExchange;
case certificate_request: CertificateRequest;
case server_hello_done: ServerHelloDone;
case certificate_verify: CertificateVerify;
case client_key_exchange: ClientKeyExchange;
case finished: Finished;
} body;
} Handshake;
The handshake protocol messages are presented below in the order they
must be sent; sending handshake messages in an unexpected order
results in a fatal error. Unneeded handshake messages can be omitted,
however. Note one exception to the ordering: the Certificate message
is used twice in the handshake (from server to client, then from
client to server), but described only in its first position. The one
message which is not bound by these ordering rules in the Hello
Request message, which can be sent at any time, but which should be
ignored by the client if it arrives in the middle of a handshake.
After sending a hello request, servers should not repeat the request
until the subsequent handshake negotiation is complete.
Note: This message should never be included in the message hashes which
are maintained throughout the handshake and used in the finished
messages and the certificate verify message.
struct {
uint32 gmt_unix_time;
opaque random_bytes[28];
} Random;
gmt_unix_time
The current time and date in standard UNIX 32-bit format (seconds
since the midnight starting Jan 1, 1970, GMT) according to the
sender's internal clock. Clocks are not required to be set
correctly by the basic TLS Protocol; higher level or application
protocols may define additional requirements.
random_bytes
28 bytes generated by a secure random number generator.
opaque SessionID<0..32>;
Warning:
Because the SessionID is transmitted without encryption or
immediate MAC protection, servers must not place confidential
information in session identifiers or let the contents of fake
session identifiers cause any breach of security. (Note that the
content of the handshake as a whole, including the SessionID, is
protected by the Finished messages exchanged at the end of the
handshake.)
The CipherSuite list, passed from the client to the server in the
client hello message, contains the combinations of cryptographic
algorithms supported by the client in order of the client's
preference (favorite choice first). Each CipherSuite defines a key
exchange algorithm, a bulk encryption algorithm (including secret key
length) and a MAC algorithm. The server will select a cipher suite
or, if no acceptable choices are presented, return a handshake
failure alert and close the connection.
struct {
ProtocolVersion client_version;
Random random;
SessionID session_id;
CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-1>;
CompressionMethod compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
} ClientHello;
client_version
The version of the TLS protocol by which the client wishes to
communicate during this session. This should be the latest
(highest valued) version supported by the client. For this
version of the specification, the version will be 3.1 (See
Appendix E for details about backward compatibility).
random
A client-generated random structure.
session_id
The ID of a session the client wishes to use for this connection.
This field should be empty if no session_id is available or the
client wishes to generate new security parameters.
cipher_suites
This is a list of the cryptographic options supported by the
client, with the client's first preference first. If the
session_id field is not empty (implying a session resumption
request) this vector must include at least the cipher_suite from
that session. Values are defined in Appendix A.5.
compression_methods
This is a list of the compression methods supported by the
client, sorted by client preference. If the session_id field is
not empty (implying a session resumption request) it must include
the compression_method from that session. This vector must
contain, and all implementations must support,
CompressionMethod.null. Thus, a client and server will always be
able to agree on a compression method.
After sending the client hello message, the client waits for a server
hello message. Any other handshake message returned by the server
except for a hello request is treated as a fatal error.
server_version
This field will contain the lower of that suggested by the client
in the client hello and the highest supported by the server. For
this version of the specification, the version is 3.1 (See
Appendix E for details about backward compatibility).
random
This structure is generated by the server and must be different
from (and independent of) ClientHello.random.
session_id
This is the identity of the session corresponding to this
connection. If the ClientHello.session_id was non-empty, the
server will look in its session cache for a match. If a match is
found and the server is willing to establish the new connection
using the specified session state, the server will respond with
the same value as was supplied by the client. This indicates a
resumed session and dictates that the parties must proceed
directly to the finished messages. Otherwise this field will
contain a different value identifying the new session. The server
may return an empty session_id to indicate that the session will
not be cached and therefore cannot be resumed. If a session is
resumed, it must be resumed using the same cipher suite it was
originally negotiated with.
cipher_suite
The single cipher suite selected by the server from the list in
ClientHello.cipher_suites. For resumed sessions this field is the
value from the state of the session being resumed.
compression_method
The single compression algorithm selected by the server from the
list in ClientHello.compression_methods. For resumed sessions
this field is the value from the resumed session state.
struct {
ASN.1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>;
} Certificate;
certificate_list
This is a sequence (chain) of X.509v3 certificates. The sender's
certificate must come first in the list. Each following
certificate must directly certify the one preceding it. Because
certificate validation requires that root keys be distributed
independently, the self-signed certificate which specifies the
root certificate authority may optionally be omitted from the
chain, under the assumption that the remote end must already
possess it in order to validate it in any case.
The same message type and structure will be used for the client's
response to a certificate request message. Note that a client may
send no certificates if it does not have an appropriate certificate
to send in response to the server's authentication request.
Note: PKCS #7 [PKCS7] is not used as the format for the certificate
vector because PKCS #6 [PKCS6] extended certificates are not
used. Also PKCS #7 defines a SET rather than a SEQUENCE, making
the task of parsing the list more difficult.
The server key exchange message is sent by the server only when
the server certificate message (if sent) does not contain enough
data to allow the client to exchange a premaster secret. This is
true for the following key exchange methods:
It is not legal to send the server key exchange message for the
following key exchange methods:
RSA
RSA_EXPORT (when the public key in the server certificate is
less than or equal to 512 bits in length)
DH_DSS
DH_RSA
As additional CipherSuites are defined for TLS which include new key
exchange algorithms, the server key exchange message will be sent if
and only if the certificate type associated with the key exchange
algorithm does not provide enough information for the client to
exchange a premaster secret.
Note: According to current US export law, RSA moduli larger than 512
bits may not be used for key exchange in software exported from
the US. With this message, the larger RSA keys encoded in
certificates may be used to sign temporary shorter RSA keys for
the RSA_EXPORT key exchange method.
struct {
opaque rsa_modulus<1..2^16-1>;
opaque rsa_exponent<1..2^16-1>;
} ServerRSAParams;
rsa_modulus
The modulus of the server's temporary RSA key.
rsa_exponent
The public exponent of the server's temporary RSA key.
struct {
opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>;
opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>;
opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>;
} ServerDHParams; /* Ephemeral DH parameters */
dh_p
The prime modulus used for the Diffie-Hellman operation.
dh_g
The generator used for the Diffie-Hellman operation.
dh_Ys
The server's Diffie-Hellman public value (g^X mod p).
struct {
select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
case diffie_hellman:
ServerDHParams params;
Signature signed_params;
case rsa:
ServerRSAParams params;
Signature signed_params;
};
} ServerKeyExchange;
params
The server's key exchange parameters.
signed_params
For non-anonymous key exchanges, a hash of the corresponding
params value, with the signature appropriate to that hash
applied.
md5_hash
MD5(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random + ServerParams);
sha_hash
SHA(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random + ServerParams);
select (SignatureAlgorithm)
{ case anonymous: struct { };
case rsa:
digitally-signed struct {
opaque md5_hash[16];
opaque sha_hash[20];
};
case dsa:
digitally-signed struct {
opaque sha_hash[20];
};
} Signature;
opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
struct {
ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<3..2^16-1>;
} CertificateRequest;
certificate_types
This field is a list of the types of certificates requested,
sorted in order of the server's preference.
certificate_authorities
A list of the distinguished names of acceptable certificate
authorities. These distinguished names may specify a desired
distinguished name for a root CA or for a subordinate CA;
thus, this message can be used both to describe known roots
and a desired authorization space.
Upon receipt of the server hello done message the client should
verify that the server provided a valid certificate if required
and check that the server hello parameters are acceptable.
struct {
select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
case rsa: EncryptedPreMasterSecret;
case diffie_hellman: ClientDiffieHellmanPublic;
} exchange_keys;
} ClientKeyExchange;
client_version
The latest (newest) version supported by the client. This is
used to detect version roll-back attacks. Upon receiving the
premaster secret, the server should check that this value
matches the value transmitted by the client in the client
hello message.
random
46 securely-generated random bytes.
struct {
public-key-encrypted PreMasterSecret pre_master_secret;
} EncryptedPreMasterSecret;
pre_master_secret
This random value is generated by the client and is used to
generate the master secret, as specified in Section 8.1.
implicit
If the client certificate already contains a suitable
Diffie-Hellman key, then Yc is implicit and does not need to
be sent again. In this case, the Client Key Exchange message
will be sent, but will be empty.
explicit
Yc needs to be sent.
struct {
select (PublicValueEncoding) {
case implicit: struct { };
case explicit: opaque dh_Yc<1..2^16-1>;
} dh_public;
} ClientDiffieHellmanPublic;
dh_Yc
The client's Diffie-Hellman public value (Yc).
CertificateVerify.signature.md5_hash
MD5(handshake_messages);
Certificate.signature.sha_hash
SHA(handshake_messages);
7.4.9. Finished
struct {
opaque verify_data[12];
} Finished;
verify_data
PRF(master_secret, finished_label, MD5(handshake_messages) +
SHA-1(handshake_messages)) [0..11];
finished_label
For Finished messages sent by the client, the string "client
finished". For Finished messages sent by the server, the
string "server finished".
handshake_messages
All of the data from all handshake messages up to but not
including this message. This is only data visible at the
handshake layer and does not include record layer headers.
Note: Change cipher spec messages, alerts and any other record types
are not handshake messages and are not included in the hash
computations. Also, Hello Request messages are omitted from
handshake hashes.
8. Cryptographic computations
For all key exchange methods, the same algorithm is used to convert
the pre_master_secret into the master_secret. The pre_master_secret
should be deleted from memory once the master_secret has been
computed.
8.1.1. RSA
When RSA is used for server authentication and key exchange, a 48-
byte pre_master_secret is generated by the client, encrypted under
the server's public key, and sent to the server. The server uses its
private key to decrypt the pre_master_secret. Both parties then
convert the pre_master_secret into the master_secret, as specified
above.
RSA digital signatures are performed using PKCS #1 [PKCS1] block type
1. RSA public key encryption is performed using PKCS #1 block type 2.
8.1.2. Diffie-Hellman
Application data messages are carried by the Record Layer and are
fragmented, compressed and encrypted based on the current connection
state. The messages are treated as transparent data to the record
layer.
struct {
uint8 major, minor;
} ProtocolVersion;
enum {
change_cipher_spec(20), alert(21), handshake(22),
application_data(23), (255)
} ContentType;
struct {
ContentType type;
ProtocolVersion version;
uint16 length;
opaque fragment[TLSPlaintext.length];
} TLSPlaintext;
struct {
ContentType type;
ProtocolVersion version;
uint16 length;
opaque fragment[TLSCompressed.length];
} TLSCompressed;
struct {
ContentType type;
ProtocolVersion version;
uint16 length;
select (CipherSpec.cipher_type) {
case stream: GenericStreamCipher;
case block: GenericBlockCipher;
} fragment;
} TLSCiphertext;
stream-ciphered struct {
opaque content[TLSCompressed.length];
opaque MAC[CipherSpec.hash_size];
} GenericStreamCipher;
block-ciphered struct {
opaque content[TLSCompressed.length];
opaque MAC[CipherSpec.hash_size];
uint8 padding[GenericBlockCipher.padding_length];
uint8 padding_length;
} GenericBlockCipher;
struct {
enum { change_cipher_spec(1), (255) } type;
} ChangeCipherSpec;
enum {
close_notify(0),
unexpected_message(10),
bad_record_mac(20),
decryption_failed(21),
record_overflow(22),
decompression_failure(30),
handshake_failure(40),
bad_certificate(42),
unsupported_certificate(43),
certificate_revoked(44),
certificate_expired(45),
certificate_unknown(46),
illegal_parameter(47),
unknown_ca(48),
access_denied(49),
decode_error(50),
decrypt_error(51),
export_restriction(60),
protocol_version(70),
insufficient_security(71),
internal_error(80),
user_canceled(90),
no_renegotiation(100),
(255)
} AlertDescription;
struct {
AlertLevel level;
AlertDescription description;
} Alert;
enum {
hello_request(0), client_hello(1), server_hello(2),
certificate(11), server_key_exchange (12),
certificate_request(13), server_hello_done(14),
certificate_verify(15), client_key_exchange(16),
finished(20), (255)
} HandshakeType;
struct {
HandshakeType msg_type;
uint24 length;
select (HandshakeType) {
case hello_request: HelloRequest;
case client_hello: ClientHello;
case server_hello: ServerHello;
case certificate: Certificate;
case server_key_exchange: ServerKeyExchange;
case certificate_request: CertificateRequest;
case server_hello_done: ServerHelloDone;
case certificate_verify: CertificateVerify;
case client_key_exchange: ClientKeyExchange;
case finished: Finished;
} body;
} Handshake;
struct { } HelloRequest;
struct {
uint32 gmt_unix_time;
opaque random_bytes[28];
} Random;
opaque SessionID<0..32>;
uint8 CipherSuite[2];
struct {
ProtocolVersion client_version;
Random random;
SessionID session_id;
CipherSuite cipher_suites<2..2^16-1>;
CompressionMethod compression_methods<1..2^8-1>;
} ClientHello;
struct {
ProtocolVersion server_version;
Random random;
SessionID session_id;
CipherSuite cipher_suite;
CompressionMethod compression_method;
} ServerHello;
opaque ASN.1Cert<2^24-1>;
struct {
ASN.1Cert certificate_list<1..2^24-1>;
} Certificate;
struct {
opaque RSA_modulus<1..2^16-1>;
opaque RSA_exponent<1..2^16-1>;
} ServerRSAParams;
struct {
opaque DH_p<1..2^16-1>;
opaque DH_g<1..2^16-1>;
opaque DH_Ys<1..2^16-1>;
} ServerDHParams;
struct {
select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
case diffie_hellman:
ServerDHParams params;
Signature signed_params;
case rsa:
ServerRSAParams params;
Signature signed_params;
};
} ServerKeyExchange;
select (SignatureAlgorithm)
{ case anonymous: struct { };
case rsa:
digitally-signed struct {
opaque md5_hash[16];
opaque sha_hash[20];
};
case dsa:
digitally-signed struct {
opaque sha_hash[20];
};
} Signature;
enum {
rsa_sign(1), dss_sign(2), rsa_fixed_dh(3), dss_fixed_dh(4),
(255)
} ClientCertificateType;
opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>;
struct {
ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<3..2^16-1>;
} CertificateRequest;
struct { } ServerHelloDone;
struct {
select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
case rsa: EncryptedPreMasterSecret;
case diffie_hellman: DiffieHellmanClientPublicValue;
} exchange_keys;
} ClientKeyExchange;
struct {
ProtocolVersion client_version;
opaque random[46];
} PreMasterSecret;
struct {
public-key-encrypted PreMasterSecret pre_master_secret;
} EncryptedPreMasterSecret;
struct {
select (PublicValueEncoding) {
case implicit: struct {};
case explicit: opaque DH_Yc<1..2^16-1>;
} dh_public;
} ClientDiffieHellmanPublic;
struct {
Signature signature;
} CertificateVerify;
struct {
opaque verify_data[12];
} Finished;
The following values define the CipherSuite codes used in the client
hello and server hello messages.
Note: All cipher suites whose first byte is 0xFF are considered
private and can be used for defining local/experimental
algorithms. Interoperability of such types is a local matter.
Note: The cipher suite values { 0x00, 0x1C } and { 0x00, 0x1D } are
reserved to avoid collision with Fortezza-based cipher suites in
SSL 3.
struct {
ConnectionEnd entity;
BulkCipherAlgorithm bulk_cipher_algorithm;
CipherType cipher_type;
uint8 key_size;
uint8 key_material_length;
IsExportable is_exportable;
MACAlgorithm mac_algorithm;
uint8 hash_size;
CompressionMethod compression_algorithm;
opaque master_secret[48];
opaque client_random[32];
opaque server_random[32];
} SecurityParameters;
B. Glossary
application protocol
An application protocol is a protocol that normally layers
directly on top of the transport layer (e.g., TCP/IP). Examples
include HTTP, TELNET, FTP, and SMTP.
asymmetric cipher
See public key cryptography.
authentication
Authentication is the ability of one entity to determine the
identity of another entity.
block cipher
A block cipher is an algorithm that operates on plaintext in
groups of bits, called blocks. 64 bits is a common block size.
bulk cipher
A symmetric encryption algorithm used to encrypt large quantities
of data.
certificate
As part of the X.509 protocol (a.k.a. ISO Authentication
framework), certificates are assigned by a trusted Certificate
Authority and provide a strong binding between a party's identity
or some other attributes and its public key.
client
The application entity that initiates a TLS connection to a
server. This may or may not imply that the client initiated the
underlying transport connection. The primary operational
difference between the server and client is that the server is
generally authenticated, while the client is only optionally
authenticated.
connection
A connection is a transport (in the OSI layering model
definition) that provides a suitable type of service. For TLS,
such connections are peer to peer relationships. The connections
are transient. Every connection is associated with one session.
digital signatures
Digital signatures utilize public key cryptography and one-way
hash functions to produce a signature of the data that can be
authenticated, and is difficult to forge or repudiate.
handshake
An initial negotiation between client and server that establishes
the parameters of their transactions.
IDEA
A 64-bit block cipher designed by Xuejia Lai and James Massey.
[IDEA]
master secret
Secure secret data used for generating encryption keys, MAC
secrets, and IVs.
MD5
MD5 is a secure hashing function that converts an arbitrarily
long data stream into a digest of fixed size (16 bytes). [MD5]
RC2
A block cipher developed by Ron Rivest at RSA Data Security, Inc.
[RSADSI] described in [RC2].
RC4
A stream cipher licensed by RSA Data Security [RSADSI]. A
compatible cipher is described in [RC4].
RSA
A very widely used public-key algorithm that can be used for
either encryption or digital signing. [RSA]
salt
Non-secret random data used to make export encryption keys resist
precomputation attacks.
server
The server is the application entity that responds to requests
for connections from clients. See also under client.
session
A TLS session is an association between a client and a server.
Sessions are created by the handshake protocol. Sessions define a
set of cryptographic security parameters, which can be shared
among multiple connections. Sessions are used to avoid the
expensive negotiation of new security parameters for each
connection.
session identifier
A session identifier is a value generated by a server that
identifies a particular session.
SHA
The Secure Hash Algorithm is defined in FIPS PUB 180-1. It
produces a 20-byte output. Note that all references to SHA
actually use the modified SHA-1 algorithm. [SHA]
SSL
Netscape's Secure Socket Layer protocol [SSL3]. TLS is based on
SSL Version 3.0
stream cipher
An encryption algorithm that converts a key into a
cryptographically-strong keystream, which is then exclusive-ORed
with the plaintext.
symmetric cipher
See bulk cipher.
C. CipherSuite definitions
Key
Exchange
Algorithm Description Key size limit
Type
Indicates whether this is a stream cipher or a block cipher
running in CBC mode.
Key Material
The number of bytes from the key_block that are used for
generating the write keys.
IV Size
How much data needs to be generated for the initialization
vector. Zero for stream ciphers; equal to the block size for
block ciphers.
Block Size
The amount of data a block cipher enciphers in one chunk; a
block cipher running in CBC mode can only encrypt an even
multiple of its block size.
D. Implementation Notes
The TLS protocol cannot prevent many common security mistakes. This
section provides several recommendations to assist implementors.
When the public key in the certificate cannot be used for encryption,
the server signs a temporary RSA key, which is then exchanged. In
exportable applications, the temporary RSA key should be the maximum
allowable length (i.e., 512 bits). Because 512-bit RSA keys are
relatively insecure, they should be changed often. For typical
electronic commerce applications, it is suggested that keys be
changed daily or every 500 transactions, and more often if possible.
Note that while it is acceptable to use the same temporary key for
multiple transactions, it must be signed each time it is used.
D.4. CipherSuites
TLS supports a range of key sizes and security levels, including some
which provide no or minimal security. A proper implementation will
probably not support many cipher suites. For example, 40-bit
encryption is easily broken, so implementations requiring strong
security should not allow 40-bit keys. Similarly, anonymous Diffie-
Hellman is strongly discouraged because it cannot prevent man-in-
the-middle attacks. Applications should also enforce minimum and
maximum key sizes. For example, certificate chains containing 512-bit
RSA keys or signatures are not appropriate for high-security
applications.
TLS version 1.0 and SSL 3.0 are very similar; thus, supporting both
is easy. TLS clients who wish to negotiate with SSL 3.0 servers
should send client hello messages using the SSL 3.0 record format and
client hello structure, sending {3, 1} for the version field to note
that they support TLS 1.0. If the server supports only SSL 3.0, it
will respond with an SSL 3.0 server hello; if it supports TLS, with a
TLS server hello. The negotiation then proceeds as appropriate for
the negotiated protocol.
TLS 1.0 clients that support SSL Version 2.0 servers must send SSL
Version 2.0 client hello messages [SSL2]. TLS servers should accept
either client hello format if they wish to support SSL 2.0 clients on
the same connection port. The only deviations from the Version 2.0
specification are the ability to specify a version with a value of
three and the support for more ciphering types in the CipherSpec.
Warning: The ability to send Version 2.0 client hello messages will be
phased out with all due haste. Implementors should make every
effort to move forward as quickly as possible. Version 3.0
provides better mechanisms for moving to newer versions.
V2CipherSpec TLS_RC2_CBC_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5
= { 0x04,0x00,0x80 };
V2CipherSpec TLS_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 = { 0x05,0x00,0x80 };
V2CipherSpec TLS_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 = { 0x06,0x00,0x40 };
V2CipherSpec TLS_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 = { 0x07,0x00,0xC0 };
The Version 2.0 client hello message is presented below using this
document's presentation model. The true definition is still assumed
to be the SSL Version 2.0 specification.
uint8 V2CipherSpec[3];
struct {
uint8 msg_type;
Version version;
uint16 cipher_spec_length;
uint16 session_id_length;
uint16 challenge_length;
V2CipherSpec cipher_specs[V2ClientHello.cipher_spec_length];
opaque session_id[V2ClientHello.session_id_length];
Random challenge;
} V2ClientHello;
msg_type
This field, in conjunction with the version field, identifies a
version 2 client hello message. The value should be one (1).
version
The highest version of the protocol supported by the client
(equals ProtocolVersion.version, see Appendix A.1).
cipher_spec_length
This field is the total length of the field cipher_specs. It
cannot be zero and must be a multiple of the V2CipherSpec length
(3).
session_id_length
This field must have a value of either zero or 16. If zero, the
client is creating a new session. If 16, the session_id field
will contain the 16 bytes of session identification.
challenge_length
The length in bytes of the client's challenge to the server to
authenticate itself. This value must be 32.
cipher_specs
This is a list of all CipherSpecs the client is willing and able
to use. There must be at least one CipherSpec acceptable to the
server.
session_id
If this field's length is not zero, it will contain the
identification for a session that the client wishes to resume.
challenge
The client challenge to the server for the server to identify
itself is a (nearly) arbitrary length random. The TLS server will
right justify the challenge data to become the ClientHello.random
data (padded with leading zeroes, if necessary), as specified in
this protocol specification. If the length of the challenge is
greater than 32 bytes, only the last 32 bytes are used. It is
legitimate (but not necessary) for a V3 server to reject a V2
ClientHello that has fewer than 16 bytes of challenge data.
Note: Requests to resume a TLS session should use a TLS client hello.
When TLS clients fall back to Version 2.0 compatibility mode, they
should use special PKCS #1 block formatting. This is done so that TLS
servers will reject Version 2.0 sessions with TLS-capable clients.
When TLS clients are in Version 2.0 compatibility mode, they set the
right-hand (least-significant) 8 random bytes of the PKCS padding
(not including the terminal null of the padding) for the RSA
encryption of the ENCRYPTED-KEY-DATA field of the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY
to 0x03 (the other padding bytes are random). After decrypting the
ENCRYPTED-KEY-DATA field, servers that support TLS should issue an
error if these eight padding bytes are 0x03. Version 2.0 servers
receiving blocks padded in this manner will proceed normally.
F. Security analysis
extracted from the server key exchange message. The result is sent in
a client key exchange message. Since eavesdroppers do not know the
server's private key, it will be infeasible for them to decode the
pre_master_secret. (Note that no anonymous RSA Cipher Suites are
defined in this document).
With RSA, key exchange and server authentication are combined. The
public key may be either contained in the server's certificate or may
be a temporary RSA key sent in a server key exchange message. When
temporary RSA keys are used, they are signed by the server's RSA or
DSS certificate. The signature includes the current
ClientHello.random, so old signatures and temporary keys cannot be
replayed. Servers may use a single temporary RSA key for multiple
negotiation sessions.
Note: The temporary RSA key option is useful if servers need large
certificates but must comply with government-imposed size limits
on keys used for key exchange.
When RSA is used for key exchange, clients are authenticated using
the certificate verify message (see Section 7.4.8). The client signs
a value derived from the master_secret and all preceding handshake
messages. These handshake messages include the server certificate,
which binds the signature to the server, and ServerHello.random,
which binds the signature to the current handshake process.
Sessions cannot be resumed unless both the client and server agree.
If either party suspects that the session may have been compromised,
or that certificates may have expired or been revoked, it should
force a full handshake. An upper limit of 24 hours is suggested for
session ID lifetimes, since an attacker who obtains a master_secret
may be able to impersonate the compromised party until the
corresponding session ID is retired. Applications that may be run in
relatively insecure environments should not write session IDs to
stable storage.
TLS uses hash functions very conservatively. Where possible, both MD5
and SHA are used in tandem to ensure that non-catastrophic flaws in
one algorithm will not break the overall protocol.
Note: MAC secrets may be larger than encryption keys, so messages can
remain tamper resistant even if encryption keys are broken.
G. Patent Statement
* If you don't have an SSL Ref license, you may have a royalty
free license to build implementations covered by the SSL
Patent Claims or the IETF TLS specification provided that you
do not to assert any patent rights against Netscape or other
companies for the implementation of SSL or the IETF TLS
recommendation.
Security Considerations
References
[IDEA] X. Lai, "On the Design and Security of Block Ciphers," ETH
Series in Information Processing, v. 1, Konstanz: Hartung-
Gorre Verlag, 1992.
[MD2] Kaliski, B., "The MD2 Message Digest Algorithm", RFC 1319,
April 1992.
[MD5] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
April 1992.
Credits
Win Treese
Open Market
EMail: treese@openmarket.com
Editors
Authors' Addresses
EMail: tdierks@certicom.com
Other contributors
Hugo Krawczyk
IBM Watson Research Center
EMail: hugo@watson.ibm.com
Comments
The discussion list for the IETF TLS working group is located at the
e-mail address <ietf-tls@lists.consensus.com>. Information on the
group and information on how to subscribe to the list is at
<http://lists.consensus.com/>.
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
Copyright Notice
1. Abstract
2. Introduction
In this document, the key words "MAY", "MUST, "MUST NOT", "optional",
"recommended", "SHOULD", and "SHOULD NOT", are to be interpreted as
described in [11].
3. Protocol overview
From this point forward, while nominally the EAP conversation occurs
between the PPP authenticator and the peer, the authenticator MAY act
as a passthrough device, with the EAP packets received from the peer
being encapsulated for transmission to a RADIUS server or backend
security server. In the discussion that follows, we will use the term
"EAP server" to denote the ultimate endpoint conversing with the
peer.
Once having received the peer's Identity, the EAP server MUST respond
with an EAP-TLS/Start packet, which is an EAP-Request packet with
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS, the Start (S) bit set, and no data. The EAP-TLS
conversation will then begin, with the peer sending an EAP-Response
packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS. The data field of that packet will
encapsulate one or more TLS records in TLS record layer format,
containing a TLS client_hello handshake message. The current cipher
spec for the TLS records will be TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL and null
compression. This current cipher spec remains the same until the
change_cipher_spec message signals that subsequent records will have
the negotiated attributes for the remainder of the handshake.
The EAP server will then respond with an EAP-Request packet with
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS. The data field of this packet will encapsulate one
or more TLS records. These will contain a TLS server_hello handshake
message, possibly followed by TLS certificate, server_key_exchange,
certificate_request, server_hello_done and/or finished handshake
messages, and/or a TLS change_cipher_spec message. The server_hello
handshake message contains a TLS version number, another random
number, a sessionId, and a ciphersuite. The version offered by the
server MUST correspond to TLS v1.0 or later.
The purpose of the sessionId within the TLS protocol is to allow for
improved efficiency in the case where a client repeatedly attempts to
authenticate to an EAP server within a short period of time. While
this model was developed for use with HTTP authentication, it may
also have application to PPP authentication (e.g. multilink).
In the case where the EAP server and authenticator reside on the same
device, then client will only be able to continue sessions when
connecting to the same NAS or tunnel server. Should these devices be
set up in a rotary or round-robin then it may not be possible for the
peer to know in advance the authenticator it will be connecting to,
and therefore which sessionId to attempt to reuse. As a result, it is
likely that the continuation attempt will fail. In the case where the
EAP authentication is remoted then continuation is much more likely
to be successful, since multiple NAS devices and tunnel servers will
remote their EAP authentications to the same RADIUS server.
To ensure that the peer receives the TLS alert message, the EAP
server MUST wait for the peer to reply with an EAP-Response packet.
The EAP-Response packet sent by the peer MAY encapsulate a TLS
client_hello handshake message, in which case the EAP server MAY
allow the EAP-TLS conversation to be restarted, or it MAY contain an
EAP-Response packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data, in which case
the EAP-Server MUST send an EAP-Failure packet, and terminate the
conversation. It is up to the EAP server whether to allow restarts,
and if so, how many times the conversation can be restarted. An EAP
Server implementing restart capability SHOULD impose a limit on the
number of restarts, so as to protect against denial of service
attacks.
To ensure that the EAP Server receives the TLS alert message, the
peer MUST wait for the EAP-Server to reply before terminating the
conversation. The EAP Server MUST reply with an EAP-Failure packet
since server authentication failure is a terminal condition.
As with other EAP protocols, the EAP server is responsible for retry
behavior. This means that if the EAP server does not receive a reply
from the peer, it MUST resend the EAP-Request for which it has not
yet received an EAP-Response. However, the peer MUST NOT resend EAP-
Response packets without first being prompted by the EAP server.
For example, if the initial EAP-TLS start packet sent by the EAP
server were to be lost, then the peer would not receive this packet,
and would not respond to it. As a result, the EAP-TLS start packet
would be resent by the EAP server. Once the peer received the EAP-TLS
start packet, it would send an EAP-Response encapsulating the
client_hello message. If the EAP-Response were to be lost, then the
EAP server would resend the initial EAP-TLS start, and the peer would
resend the EAP-Response.
3.3. Fragmentation
Note that since the peer has made a claim of identity in the EAP-
Response/Identity (MyID) packet, the EAP server SHOULD verify that
the claimed identity corresponds to the certificate presented by the
Similarly, the peer MUST verify the validity of the EAP server
certificate, and SHOULD also examine the EAP server name presented in
the certificate, in order to determine whether the EAP server can be
trusted. Please note that in the case where the EAP authentication is
remoted that the EAP server will not reside on the same machine as
the authenticator, and therefore the name in the EAP server's
certificate cannot be expected to match that of the intended
destination. In this case, a more appropriate test might be whether
the EAP server's certificate is signed by a CA controlling the
intended destination and whether the EAP server exists within a
target sub-domain.
Since the normal TLS keys are used in the handshake, and therefore
should not be used in a different context, new encryption keys must
be derived from the TLS master secret for use with PPP encryption.
For both peer and EAP server, the derivation proceeds as follows:
given the master secret negotiated by the TLS handshake, the
pseudorandom function (PRF) defined in the specification for the
version of TLS in use, and the value random defined as the
concatenation of the handshake message fields client_hello.random and
server_hello.random (in that order), the value PRF(master secret,
"client EAP encryption", random) is computed up to 128 bytes, and the
value PRF("", "client EAP encryption", random) is computed up to 64
bytes (where "" is an empty string). The peer encryption key (the
one used for encrypting data from peer to EAP server) is obtained by
truncating to the correct length the first 32 bytes of the first PRF
of these two output strings. TheEAP server encryption key (the one
used for encrypting data from EAP server to peer), if different from
the client encryption key, is obtained by truncating to the correct
length the second 32 bytes of this same PRF output string. The
client authentication key (the one used for computing MACs for
messages from peer to EAP server), if used, is obtained by truncating
to the correct length the third 32 bytes of this same PRF output
string. The EAP server authentication key (the one used for
computing MACs for messages from EAP server to peer), if used, and if
different from the peer authentication key, is obtained by truncating
to the correct length the fourth 32 bytes of this same PRF output
string. The peer initialization vector (IV), used for messages from
peer to EAP server if a block cipher has been specified, is obtained
by truncating to the cipher's block size the first 32 bytes of the
second PRF output string mentioned above. Finally, the server
initialization vector (IV), used for messages from peer to EAP server
Please note that it cannot be assumed that the PPP authenticator and
EAP server are located on the same machine or that the authenticator
understands the EAP-TLS conversation that has passed through it. Thus
if the peer offers a ciphersuite other than the one negotiated in
EAP-TLS there is no way for the authenticator to know how to respond
correctly.
3.8. Examples
ECP negotiation
CCP negotiation
PPP EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(Fragment 2)->
<- PPP EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS change_cipher_spec,
TLS finished)
PPP EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS ->
<- PPP EAP-Success
PPP Authentication
Phase complete,
NCP Phase starts
ECP negotiation
CCP negotiation
TLS certificate_verify,
TLS change_cipher_spec,
TLS finished) ->
<- PPP EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS change_cipher_spec,
TLS finished)
PPP EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS ->
<- PPP EAP-Request
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Alert message)
PPP EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS ->
<- PPP EAP-Failure
(User Disconnected)
TLS change_cipher_spec,
TLS finished) ->
<- PPP EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS change_cipher_spec,
TLS finished)
PPP EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS change_cipher_spec,
TLS finished)
<- PPP EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
PPP EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Alert message) ->
<- PPP EAP-Failure
(User Disconnected)
PPP EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS change_cipher_spec,
TLS finished) ->
<- PPP EAP-Success
PPP Authentication
Phase complete,
NCP Phase starts
ECP negotiation
CCP negotiation
PPP EAP-Response
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS ->
<- PPP EAP-Failure
(User Disconnected)
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Data...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
1 - Request
2 - Response
Identifier
Length
The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the EAP
packet including the Code, Identifier, Length, Type, and Data
fields. Octets outside the range of the Length field should be
treated as Data Link Layer padding and should be ignored on
reception.
Type
13 - EAP TLS
Data
A summary of the PPP EAP TLS Request packet format is shown below.
The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Flags | TLS Message Length
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| TLS Message Length | TLS Data...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
Identifier
Length
The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the EAP
packet including the Code, Identifier, Length, Type, and TLS
Response fields.
Type
13 - EAP TLS
Flags
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|L M S R R R R R|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
L = Length included
M = More fragments
S = EAP-TLS start
R = Reserved
The TLS Message Length field is four octets, and is present only
if the L bit is set. This field provides the total length of the
TLS message or set of messages that is being fragmented.
TLS data
The TLS data consists of the encapsulated TLS packet in TLS record
format.
A summary of the PPP EAP TLS Response packet format is shown below.
The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Flags | TLS Message Length
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| TLS Message Length | TLS Data...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
Identifier
The Identifier field is one octet and MUST match the Identifier
field from the corresponding request.
Length
The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the EAP
packet including the Code, Identifir, Length, Type, and TLS data
fields.
Type
13 - EAP TLS
Flags
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|L M S R R R R R|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
L = Length included
M = More fragments
S = EAP-TLS start
R = Reserved
The TLS Message Length field is four octets, and is present only
if the L bit is set. This field provides the total length of the
TLS message or set of messages that is being fragmented.
TLS data
The TLS data consists of the encapsulated TLS packet in TLS record
format.
5. References
[2] Sklower, K., Lloyd, B., McGregor, G., Carr, D. and T. Coradetti,
"The PPP Multilink Protocol (MP)", RFC 1990, August 1996.
[3] Simpson, W., Editor, "PPP LCP Extensions", RFC 1570, January
1994.
[6] Meyer, G., "The PPP Encryption Protocol (ECP)", RFC 1968, June
1996.
[11] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[12] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC
2246, November 1998.
[13] Rand, D., "The PPP Compression Control Protocol", RFC 1962, June
1996.
6. Security Considerations
Since the EAP server is on the Internet during the EAP conversation,
the server is capable of following a certificate chain or verifying
whether the peer's certificate has been revoked. In contrast, the
peer may or may not have Internet connectivity, and thus while it can
validate the EAP server's certificate based on a pre-configured set
of CAs, it may not be able to follow a certificate chain or verify
whether the EAP server's certificate has been revoked.
The situation may be more complex on the PPP authenticator, which may
or may not reside on the same machine as the EAP server. In the case
where the EAP server and PPP authenticator reside on different
machines, there are several implications for security. Firstly, the
mutual authentication defined in EAP-TLS will occur between the peer
and the EAP server, not between the peer and the authenticator. This
means that as a result of the EAP-TLS conversation, it is not
possible for the peer to validate the identity of the NAS or tunnel
server that it is speaking to.
The second issue is that the session key negotiated between the peer
and EAP server will need to be transmitted to the authenticator.
Therefore a mechanism needs to be provided to transmit the session
key from the EAP server to the authenticator or tunnel server that
needs to use the key. The specification of this transit mechanism is
7. Acknowledgments
8. Authors' Addresses
Bernard Aboba
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
Phone: 425-936-6605
EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com
Dan Simon
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
Phone: 425-936-6711
EMail: dansimon@microsoft.com
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
Acknowledgement
Copyright Notice
IESG Note:
Abstract
Implementation Note
Table of Contents
1. Introduction .......................................... 3
1.1 Specification of Requirements ................... 4
1.2 Terminology ..................................... 5
2. Operation ............................................. 5
2.1 Challenge/Response .............................. 7
2.2 Interoperation with PAP and CHAP ................ 8
2.3 Proxy ........................................... 8
2.4 Why UDP? ........................................ 11
2.5 Retransmission Hints ............................ 12
2.6 Keep-Alives Considered Harmful .................. 13
3. Packet Format ......................................... 13
4. Packet Types .......................................... 17
4.1 Access-Request .................................. 17
4.2 Access-Accept ................................... 18
4.3 Access-Reject ................................... 20
4.4 Access-Challenge ................................ 21
5. Attributes ............................................ 22
5.1 User-Name ....................................... 26
5.2 User-Password ................................... 27
5.3 CHAP-Password ................................... 28
5.4 NAS-IP-Address .................................. 29
5.5 NAS-Port ........................................ 30
5.6 Service-Type .................................... 31
5.7 Framed-Protocol ................................. 33
5.8 Framed-IP-Address ............................... 34
5.9 Framed-IP-Netmask ............................... 34
5.10 Framed-Routing .................................. 35
5.11 Filter-Id ....................................... 36
5.12 Framed-MTU ...................................... 37
5.13 Framed-Compression .............................. 37
5.14 Login-IP-Host ................................... 38
5.15 Login-Service ................................... 39
5.16 Login-TCP-Port .................................. 40
5.17 (unassigned) .................................... 41
5.18 Reply-Message ................................... 41
5.19 Callback-Number ................................. 42
5.20 Callback-Id ..................................... 42
5.21 (unassigned) .................................... 43
5.22 Framed-Route .................................... 43
5.23 Framed-IPX-Network .............................. 44
5.24 State ........................................... 45
5.25 Class ........................................... 46
5.26 Vendor-Specific ................................. 47
5.27 Session-Timeout ................................. 48
5.28 Idle-Timeout .................................... 49
5.29 Termination-Action .............................. 49
1. Introduction
Managing dispersed serial line and modem pools for large numbers of
users can create the need for significant administrative support.
Since modem pools are by definition a link to the outside world, they
require careful attention to security, authorization and accounting.
This can be best achieved by managing a single "database" of users,
which allows for authentication (verifying user name and password) as
well as configuration information detailing the type of service to
deliver to the user (for example, SLIP, PPP, telnet, rlogin).
Client/Server Model
Network Security
Extensible Protocol
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [2]. These key
words mean the same thing whether capitalized or not.
A NAS that does not implement a given service MUST NOT implement the
RADIUS attributes for that service. For example, a NAS that is
unable to offer ARAP service MUST NOT implement the RADIUS attributes
for ARAP. A NAS MUST treat a RADIUS access-accept authorizing an
unavailable service as an access-reject instead.
1.2. Terminology
service The NAS provides a service to the dial-in user, such as PPP
or Telnet.
silently discard
This means the implementation discards the packet without
further processing. The implementation SHOULD provide the
capability of logging the error, including the contents of
the silently discarded packet, and SHOULD record the event
in a statistics counter.
2. Operation
Once the RADIUS server receives the request, it validates the sending
client. A request from a client for which the RADIUS server does not
have a shared secret MUST be silently discarded. If the client is
valid, the RADIUS server consults a database of users to find the
user whose name matches the request. The user entry in the database
contains a list of requirements which must be met to allow access for
the user. This always includes verification of the password, but can
also specify the client(s) or port(s) to which the user is allowed
access.
If all conditions are met and the RADIUS server wishes to issue a
challenge to which the user must respond, the RADIUS server sends an
"Access-Challenge" response. It MAY include a text message to be
displayed by the client to the user prompting for a response to the
challenge, and MAY include a State attribute.
If all conditions are met, the list of configuration values for the
user are placed into an "Access-Accept" response. These values
include the type of service (for example: SLIP, PPP, Login User) and
all necessary values to deliver the desired service. For SLIP and
PPP, this may include values such as IP address, subnet mask, MTU,
desired compression, and desired packet filter identifiers. For
character mode users, this may include values such as desired
protocol and host.
2.1. Challenge/Response
The user then enters the challenge into his device (or software) and
it calculates a response, which the user enters into the client which
forwards it to the RADIUS server via a second Access-Request. If the
response matches the expected response the RADIUS server replies with
an Access-Accept, otherwise an Access-Reject.
came with the Access-Challenge. The server then sends back either an
Access-Accept or Access-Reject based on whether the response matches
the required value, or it can even send another Access-Challenge.
For PAP, the NAS takes the PAP ID and password and sends them in an
Access-Request packet as the User-Name and User-Password. The NAS MAY
include the Attributes Service-Type = Framed-User and Framed-Protocol
= PPP as a hint to the RADIUS server that PPP service is expected.
2.3. Proxy
'' The forwarding server MAY add one Proxy-State attribute to the
packet. (It MUST NOT add more than one.) If it adds a Proxy-
State, the Proxy-State MUST appear after any other Proxy-States in
the packet. The forwarding server MUST NOT modify any other
Proxy-States that were in the packet (it may choose not to forward
them, but it MUST NOT change their contents). The forwarding
server MUST NOT change the order of any attributes of the same
type, including Proxy-State.
3. The remote server (if the final destination) verifies the user
using User-Password, CHAP-Password, or such method as future
extensions may dictate, and returns an access-accept, access-
reject or access-challenge back to the forwarding server. For
this example, an access-accept is sent. The remote server MUST
copy all Proxy-State attributes (and only the Proxy-State
attributes) in order from the access-request to the response
packet, without modifying them.
Clients and servers come and go. Systems are rebooted, or are
power cycled independently. Generally this does not cause a
problem and with creative timeouts and detection of lost TCP
connections, code can be written to handle anomalous events. UDP
however completely eliminates any of this special handling. Each
client and server can open their UDP transport just once and leave
it open through all types of failure events on the network.
It's not all a panacea. As noted, using UDP requires one thing which
is built into TCP: with UDP we must artificially manage
retransmission timers to the same server, although they don't require
the same attention to timing provided by TCP. This one penalty is a
small price to pay for the advantages of UDP in this protocol.
If the RADIUS server and alternate RADIUS server share the same
shared secret, it is OK to retransmit the packet to the alternate
RADIUS server with the same ID and Request Authenticator, because the
content of the attributes haven't changed. If you want to use a new
Request Authenticator when sending to the alternate server, you may.
A NAS MAY use the same ID across all servers, or MAY keep track of
IDs separately for each server, it is up to the implementer. If a
NAS needs more than 256 IDs for outstanding requests, it MAY use
additional source ports to send requests from, and keep track of IDs
for each source port. This allows up to 16 million or so outstanding
requests at one time to a single server.
If you want to monitor your RADIUS server, use SNMP. That's what
SNMP is for.
3. Packet Format
Exactly one RADIUS packet is encapsulated in the UDP Data field [4],
where the UDP Destination Port field indicates 1812 (decimal).
A summary of the RADIUS data format is shown below. The fields are
transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Authenticator |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Attributes ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Code
The Code field is one octet, and identifies the type of RADIUS
packet. When a packet is received with an invalid Code field, it
is silently discarded.
1 Access-Request
2 Access-Accept
3 Access-Reject
4 Accounting-Request
5 Accounting-Response
11 Access-Challenge
12 Status-Server (experimental)
13 Status-Client (experimental)
255 Reserved
Identifier
Length
Authenticator
Request Authenticator
The NAS and RADIUS server share a secret. That shared secret
followed by the Request Authenticator is put through a one-way
MD5 hash to create a 16 octet digest value which is xored with
the password entered by the user, and the xored result placed
Response Authenticator
Administrative Note
The secret (password shared between the client and the RADIUS
server) SHOULD be at least as large and unguessable as a well-
chosen password. It is preferred that the secret be at least 16
octets. This is to ensure a sufficiently large range for the
secret to provide protection against exhaustive search attacks.
The secret MUST NOT be empty (length 0) since this would allow
packets to be trivially forged.
A RADIUS server MUST use the source IP address of the RADIUS UDP
packet to decide which shared secret to use, so that RADIUS
requests can be proxied.
When using a forwarding proxy, the proxy must be able to alter the
packet as it passes through in each direction - when the proxy
forwards the request, the proxy MAY add a Proxy-State Attribute,
and when the proxy forwards a response, it MUST remove its Proxy-
State Attribute if it added one. Proxy-State is always added or
removed after any other Proxy-States, but no other assumptions
regarding its location within the list of attributes can be made.
Since Access-Accept and Access-Reject replies are authenticated on
the entire packet contents, the stripping of the Proxy-State
attribute invalidates the signature in the packet - so the proxy
has to re-sign it.
4. Packet Types
The RADIUS Packet type is determined by the Code field in the first
octet of the Packet.
4.1. Access-Request
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Request Authenticator |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Attributes ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Code
1 for Access-Request.
Identifier
Request Authenticator
Attributes
4.2. Access-Accept
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Response Authenticator |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Attributes ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Code
2 for Access-Accept.
Identifier
Response Authenticator
Attributes
4.3. Access-Reject
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Response Authenticator |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Attributes ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Code
3 for Access-Reject.
Identifier
Response Authenticator
Attributes
4.4. Access-Challenge
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Response Authenticator |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Attributes ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Code
11 for Access-Challenge.
Identifier
Response Authenticator
Attributes
5. Attributes
Some Attributes MAY be included more than once. The effect of this
is Attribute specific, and is specified in each Attribute
description. A summary table is provided at the end of the
"Attributes" section.
If multiple Attributes with the same Type are present, the order of
Attributes with the same Type MUST be preserved by any proxies. The
order of Attributes of different Types is not required to be
preserved. A RADIUS server or client MUST NOT have any dependencies
on the order of attributes of different types. A RADIUS server or
client MUST NOT require attributes of the same type to be contiguous.
Likewise where packet types defined here state that only certain
Attributes are permissible in them, future memos defining new
Attributes should indicate which packet types the new Attributes may
be present in.
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | Value ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
The Type field is one octet. Up-to-date values of the RADIUS Type
field are specified in the most recent "Assigned Numbers" RFC [6].
Values 192-223 are reserved for experimental use, values 224-240
are reserved for implementation-specific use, and values 241-255
are reserved and should not be used.
1 User-Name
2 User-Password
3 CHAP-Password
4 NAS-IP-Address
5 NAS-Port
6 Service-Type
7 Framed-Protocol
8 Framed-IP-Address
9 Framed-IP-Netmask
10 Framed-Routing
11 Filter-Id
12 Framed-MTU
13 Framed-Compression
14 Login-IP-Host
15 Login-Service
16 Login-TCP-Port
17 (unassigned)
18 Reply-Message
19 Callback-Number
20 Callback-Id
21 (unassigned)
22 Framed-Route
23 Framed-IPX-Network
24 State
25 Class
26 Vendor-Specific
27 Session-Timeout
28 Idle-Timeout
29 Termination-Action
30 Called-Station-Id
31 Calling-Station-Id
32 NAS-Identifier
33 Proxy-State
34 Login-LAT-Service
35 Login-LAT-Node
36 Login-LAT-Group
37 Framed-AppleTalk-Link
38 Framed-AppleTalk-Network
39 Framed-AppleTalk-Zone
40-59 (reserved for accounting)
60 CHAP-Challenge
61 NAS-Port-Type
62 Port-Limit
63 Login-LAT-Port
Length
The Length field is one octet, and indicates the length of this
Attribute including the Type, Length and Value fields. If an
Attribute is received in an Access-Request but with an invalid
Length, an Access-Reject SHOULD be transmitted. If an Attribute
is received in an Access-Accept, Access-Reject or Access-Challenge
packet with an invalid length, the packet MUST either be treated
as an Access-Reject or else silently discarded.
Value
Note that none of the types in RADIUS terminate with a NUL (hex
00). In particular, types "text" and "string" in RADIUS do not
terminate with a NUL (hex 00). The Attribute has a length field
and does not use a terminator. Text contains UTF-8 encoded 10646
[7] characters and String contains 8-bit binary data. Servers and
servers and clients MUST be able to deal with embedded nulls.
RADIUS implementers using C are cautioned not to use strcpy() when
handling strings.
The format of the value field is one of five data types. Note
that type "text" is a subset of type "string".
5.1. User-Name
Description
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
1 for User-Name.
Length
>= 3
String
The String field is one or more octets. The NAS may limit the
maximum length of the User-Name but the ability to handle at least
63 octets is recommended.
distinguished name
A name in ASN.1 form used in Public Key authentication
systems.
5.2. User-Password
Description
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
2 for User-Password.
Length
String
5.3. CHAP-Password
Description
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | CHAP Ident | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
3 for CHAP-Password.
Length
19
CHAP Ident
This field is one octet, and contains the CHAP Identifier from the
user's CHAP Response.
String
The String field is 16 octets, and contains the CHAP Response from
the user.
5.4. NAS-IP-Address
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Address
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Address (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
4 for NAS-IP-Address.
Length
Address
5.5. NAS-Port
Description
This Attribute indicates the physical port number of the NAS which
is authenticating the user. It is only used in Access-Request
packets. Note that this is using "port" in its sense of a
physical connection on the NAS, not in the sense of a TCP or UDP
port number. Either NAS-Port or NAS-Port-Type (61) or both SHOULD
be present in an Access-Request packet, if the NAS differentiates
among its ports.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
5 for NAS-Port.
Length
Value
5.6. Service-Type
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
6 for Service-Type.
Length
Value
1 Login
2 Framed
3 Callback Login
4 Callback Framed
5 Outbound
6 Administrative
7 NAS Prompt
8 Authenticate Only
9 Callback NAS Prompt
10 Call Check
11 Callback Administrative
Callback Administrative
The user should be disconnected and called
back, then granted access to the
administrative interface to the NAS from which
privileged commands can be executed.
5.7. Framed-Protocol
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
7 for Framed-Protocol.
Length
Value
1 PPP
2 SLIP
3 AppleTalk Remote Access Protocol (ARAP)
4 Gandalf proprietary SingleLink/MultiLink protocol
5 Xylogics proprietary IPX/SLIP
6 X.75 Synchronous
5.8. Framed-IP-Address
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Address
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Address (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
8 for Framed-IP-Address.
Length
Address
5.9. Framed-IP-Netmask
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Address
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Address (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
9 for Framed-IP-Netmask.
Length
Address
5.10. Framed-Routing
Description
This Attribute indicates the routing method for the user, when the
user is a router to a network. It is only used in Access-Accept
packets.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
10 for Framed-Routing.
Length
Value
0 None
1 Send routing packets
2 Listen for routing packets
3 Send and Listen
5.11. Filter-Id
Description
This Attribute indicates the name of the filter list for this
user. Zero or more Filter-Id attributes MAY be sent in an
Access-Accept packet.
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | Text ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
11 for Filter-Id.
Length
>= 3
Text
The Text field is one or more octets, and its contents are
implementation dependent. It is intended to be human readable and
MUST NOT affect operation of the protocol. It is recommended that
the message contain UTF-8 encoded 10646 [7] characters.
5.12. Framed-MTU
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
12 for Framed-MTU.
Length
Value
The Value field is four octets. Despite the size of the field,
values range from 64 to 65535.
5.13. Framed-Compression
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
13 for Framed-Compression.
Length
Value
0 None
1 VJ TCP/IP header compression [10]
2 IPX header compression
3 Stac-LZS compression
5.14. Login-IP-Host
Description
This Attribute indicates the system with which to connect the user,
when the Login-Service Attribute is included. It MAY be used in
Access-Accept packets. It MAY be used in an Access-Request packet as
a hint to the server that the NAS would prefer to use that host, but
the server is not required to honor the hint.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Address
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Address (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
14 for Login-IP-Host.
Length
Address
5.15. Login-Service
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
15 for Login-Service.
Length
Value
0 Telnet
1 Rlogin
2 TCP Clear
3 PortMaster (proprietary)
4 LAT
5 X25-PAD
6 X25-T3POS
8 TCP Clear Quiet (suppresses any NAS-generated connect string)
5.16. Login-TCP-Port
Description
This Attribute indicates the TCP port with which the user is to be
connected, when the Login-Service Attribute is also present. It
is only used in Access-Accept packets.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
16 for Login-TCP-Port.
Length
Value
The Value field is four octets. Despite the size of the field,
values range from 0 to 65535.
5.17. (unassigned)
Description
5.18. Reply-Message
Description
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | Text ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
18 for Reply-Message.
Length
>= 3
Text
The Text field is one or more octets, and its contents are
implementation dependent. It is intended to be human readable,
and MUST NOT affect operation of the protocol. It is recommended
that the message contain UTF-8 encoded 10646 [7] characters.
5.19. Callback-Number
Description
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
19 for Callback-Number.
Length
>= 3
String
The String field is one or more octets. The actual format of the
information is site or application specific, and a robust
implementation SHOULD support the field as undistinguished octets.
5.20. Callback-Id
Description
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
20 for Callback-Id.
Length
>= 3
String
The String field is one or more octets. The actual format of the
information is site or application specific, and a robust
implementation SHOULD support the field as undistinguished octets.
5.21. (unassigned)
Description
5.22. Framed-Route
Description
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | Text ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
22 for Framed-Route.
Length
>= 3
Text
The Text field is one or more octets, and its contents are
implementation dependent. It is intended to be human readable and
MUST NOT affect operation of the protocol. It is recommended that
the message contain UTF-8 encoded 10646 [7] characters.
5.23. Framed-IPX-Network
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
23 for Framed-IPX-Network.
Length
Value
5.24. State
Description
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
24 for State.
Length
>= 3
String
The String field is one or more octets. The actual format of the
information is site or application specific, and a robust
implementation SHOULD support the field as undistinguished octets.
5.25. Class
Description
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
25 for Class.
Length
>= 3
String
The String field is one or more octets. The actual format of the
information is site or application specific, and a robust
implementation SHOULD support the field as undistinguished octets.
5.26. Vendor-Specific
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Vendor-Id
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Vendor-Id (cont) | String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
26 for Vendor-Specific.
Length
>= 7
Vendor-Id
The high-order octet is 0 and the low-order 3 octets are the SMI
Network Management Private Enterprise Code of the Vendor in
network byte order, as defined in the "Assigned Numbers" RFC [6].
String
The String field is one or more octets. The actual format of the
information is site or application specific, and a robust
implementation SHOULD support the field as undistinguished octets.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Vendor-Id
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Vendor-Id (cont) | Vendor type | Vendor length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Attribute-Specific...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
5.27. Session-Timeout
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
27 for Session-Timeout.
Length
Value
5.28. Idle-Timeout
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
28 for Idle-Timeout.
Length
Value
5.29. Termination-Action
Description
This Attribute indicates what action the NAS should take when the
specified service is completed. It is only used in Access-Accept
packets.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
29 for Termination-Action.
Length
Value
0 Default
1 RADIUS-Request
5.30. Called-Station-Id
Description
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
30 for Called-Station-Id.
Length
>= 3
String
5.31. Calling-Station-Id
Description
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
31 for Calling-Station-Id.
Length
>= 3
String
5.32. NAS-Identifier
Description
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
32 for NAS-Identifier.
Length
>= 3
String
5.33. Proxy-State
Description
The content of any Proxy-State other than the one added by the
current server should be treated as opaque octets and MUST NOT
affect operation of the protocol.
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
33 for Proxy-State.
Length
>= 3
String
The String field is one or more octets. The actual format of the
information is site or application specific, and a robust
implementation SHOULD support the field as undistinguished octets.
5.34. Login-LAT-Service
Description
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
34 for Login-LAT-Service.
Length
>= 3
String
The String field is one or more octets, and contains the identity
of the LAT service to use. The LAT Architecture allows this
string to contain $ (dollar), - (hyphen), . (period), _
(underscore), numerics, upper and lower case alphabetics, and the
ISO Latin-1 character set extension [11]. All LAT string
comparisons are case insensitive.
5.35. Login-LAT-Node
Description
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
35 for Login-LAT-Node.
Length
>= 3
String
The String field is one or more octets, and contains the identity
of the LAT Node to connect the user to. The LAT Architecture
allows this string to contain $ (dollar), - (hyphen), . (period),
_ (underscore), numerics, upper and lower case alphabetics, and
the ISO Latin-1 character set extension. All LAT string
comparisons are case insensitive.
5.36. Login-LAT-Group
Description
LAT supports 256 different group codes, which LAT uses as a form
of access rights. LAT encodes the group codes as a 256 bit
bitmap.
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
36 for Login-LAT-Group.
Length
34
String
5.37. Framed-AppleTalk-Link
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
37 for Framed-AppleTalk-Link.
Length
Value
The Value field is four octets. Despite the size of the field,
values range from 0 to 65535. The special value of 0 indicates
that this is an unnumbered serial link. A value of 1-65535 means
that the serial line between the NAS and the user should be
assigned that value as an AppleTalk network number.
5.38. Framed-AppleTalk-Network
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
38 for Framed-AppleTalk-Network.
Length
Value
The Value field is four octets. Despite the size of the field,
values range from 0 to 65535. The special value 0 indicates that
the NAS should assign a network for the user, using its default
cable range. A value between 1 and 65535 (inclusive) indicates
the AppleTalk Network the NAS should probe to find an address for
the user.
5.39. Framed-AppleTalk-Zone
Description
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
39 for Framed-AppleTalk-Zone.
Length
>= 3
String
The name of the Default AppleTalk Zone to be used for this user.
A robust implementation SHOULD support the field as
undistinguished octets.
5.40. CHAP-Challenge
Description
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
60 for CHAP-Challenge.
Length
>= 7
String
5.41. NAS-Port-Type
Description
This Attribute indicates the type of the physical port of the NAS
which is authenticating the user. It can be used instead of or in
addition to the NAS-Port (5) attribute. It is only used in
Access-Request packets. Either NAS-Port (5) or NAS-Port-Type or
both SHOULD be present in an Access-Request packet, if the NAS
differentiates among its ports.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
61 for NAS-Port-Type.
Length
Value
0 Async
1 Sync
2 ISDN Sync
3 ISDN Async V.120
4 ISDN Async V.110
5 Virtual
6 PIAFS
7 HDLC Clear Channel
8 X.25
9 X.75
10 G.3 Fax
11 SDSL - Symmetric DSL
12 ADSL-CAP - Asymmetric DSL, Carrierless Amplitude Phase
Modulation
13 ADSL-DMT - Asymmetric DSL, Discrete Multi-Tone
14 IDSL - ISDN Digital Subscriber Line
15 Ethernet
16 xDSL - Digital Subscriber Line of unknown type
17 Cable
18 Wireless - Other
19 Wireless - IEEE 802.11
5.42. Port-Limit
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
62 for Port-Limit.
Length
Value
5.43. Login-LAT-Port
Description
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
| Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Type
63 for Login-LAT-Port.
Length
>= 3
String
The String field is one or more octets, and contains the identity
of the LAT port to use. The LAT Architecture allows this string
to contain $ (dollar), - (hyphen), . (period), _ (underscore),
numerics, upper and lower case alphabetics, and the ISO Latin-1
character set extension. All LAT string comparisons are case
insensitive.
The following table defines the meaning of the above table entries.
6. IANA Considerations
The following terms are used here with the meanings defined in
BCP 26: "name space", "assigned value", "registration".
The following policies are used here with the meanings defined in
BCP 26: "Private Use", "First Come First Served", "Expert Review",
"Specification Required", "IETF Consensus", "Standards Action".
Packet Type Codes have a range from 1 to 254, of which 1-5,11-13 have
been allocated. Because a new Packet Type has considerable impact on
interoperability, a new Packet Type Code requires Standards Action,
and should be allocated starting at 14.
Attribute Types have a range from 1 to 255, and are the scarcest
resource in RADIUS, thus must be allocated with care. Attributes
1-53,55,60-88,90-91 have been allocated, with 17 and 21 available for
re-use. Attributes 17, 21, 54, 56-59, 89, 92-191 may be allocated
following Expert Review, with Specification Required. Release of
blocks of Attribute Types (more than 3 at a time for a given purpose)
should require IETF Consensus. It is recommended that attributes 17
and 21 be used only after all others are exhausted.
7. Examples
01 00 00 38 0f 40 3f 94 73 97 80 57 bd 83 d5 cb
98 f4 22 7a 01 06 6e 65 6d 6f 02 12 0d be 70 8d
93 d4 13 ce 31 96 e4 3f 78 2a 0a ee 04 06 c0 a8
01 10 05 06 00 00 00 03
Attributes:
6 User-Name = "nemo"
18 User-Password
6 NAS-IP-Address = 192.168.1.16
6 NAS-Port = 3
02 00 00 26 86 fe 22 0e 76 24 ba 2a 10 05 f6 bf
9b 55 e0 b2 06 06 00 00 00 01 0f 06 00 00 00 00
0e 06 c0 a8 01 03
Attributes:
6 Service-Type (6) = Login (1)
6 Login-Service (15) = Telnet (0)
6 Login-IP-Host (14) = 192.168.1.3
01 01 00 47 2a ee 86 f0 8d 0d 55 96 9c a5 97 8e
0d 33 67 a2 01 08 66 6c 6f 70 73 79 03 13 16 e9
75 57 c3 16 18 58 95 f2 93 ff 63 44 07 72 75 04
06 c0 a8 01 10 05 06 00 00 00 14 06 06 00 00 00
02 07 06 00 00 00 01
1 Code = 1 (Access-Request)
1 ID = 1
2 Length = 71
16 Request Authenticator
Attributes:
8 User-Name (1) = "flopsy"
19 CHAP-Password (3)
6 NAS-IP-Address (4) = 192.168.1.16
6 NAS-Port (5) = 20
6 Service-Type (6) = Framed (2)
6 Framed-Protocol (7) = PPP (1)
02 01 00 38 15 ef bc 7d ab 26 cf a3 dc 34 d9 c0
3c 86 01 a4 06 06 00 00 00 02 07 06 00 00 00 01
08 06 ff ff ff fe 0a 06 00 00 00 02 0d 06 00 00
00 01 0c 06 00 00 05 dc
Attributes:
6 Service-Type (6) = Framed (2)
6 Framed-Protocol (7) = PPP (1)
6 Framed-IP-Address (8) = 255.255.255.254
6 Framed-Routing (10) = None (0)
6 Framed-Compression (13) = VJ TCP/IP Header Compression (1)
6 Framed-MTU (12) = 1500
01 02 00 39 f3 a4 7a 1f 6a 6d 76 71 0b 94 7a b9
30 41 a0 39 01 07 6d 6f 70 73 79 02 12 33 65 75
73 77 82 89 b5 70 88 5e 15 08 48 25 c5 04 06 c0
a8 01 10 05 06 00 00 00 07
Attributes:
7 User-Name (1) = "mopsy"
18 User-Password (2)
6 NAS-IP-Address (4) = 192.168.1.16
6 NAS-Port (5) = 7
0b 02 00 4e 36 f3 c8 76 4a e8 c7 11 57 40 3c 0c
71 ff 9c 45 12 30 43 68 61 6c 6c 65 6e 67 65 20
33 32 37 36 39 34 33 30 2e 20 20 45 6e 74 65 72
20 72 65 73 70 6f 6e 73 65 20 61 74 20 70 72 6f
6d 70 74 2e 18 0a 33 32 37 36 39 34 33 30
Attributes:
48 Reply-Message (18)
10 State (24)
The user enters his response, and the NAS send a new Access-Request
with that response, and includes the State Attribute.
01 03 00 43 b1 22 55 6d 42 8a 13 d0 d6 25 38 07
c4 57 ec f0 01 07 6d 6f 70 73 79 02 12 69 2c 1f
20 5f c0 81 b9 19 b9 51 95 f5 61 a5 81 04 06 c0
a8 01 10 05 06 00 00 00 07 18 10 33 32 37 36 39
34 33 30
Attributes:
7 User-Name = "mopsy"
18 User-Password
6 NAS-IP-Address (4) = 192.168.1.16
6 NAS-Port (5) = 7
10 State (24)
The Response was incorrect (for the sake of example), so the RADIUS
server tells the NAS to reject the login attempt.
03 03 00 14 a4 2f 4f ca 45 91 6c 4e 09 c8 34 0f
9e 74 6a a0
Attributes:
(none, although a Reply-Message could be sent)
8. Security Considerations
9. Change Log
If multiple Attributes with the same Type are present, the order of
Attributes with the same Type MUST be preserved by any proxies.
Clarified Proxy-State.
10. References
[2] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March, 1997.
[4] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768, August
1980.
[9] Kaufman, C., Perlman, R., and Speciner, M., "Network Security:
Private Communications in a Public World", Prentice Hall, March
1995, ISBN 0-13-061466-1.
11. Acknowledgements
Carl Rigney
Livingston Enterprises
4464 Willow Road
Pleasanton, California 94588
Carl Rigney
Livingston Enterprises
4464 Willow Road
Pleasanton, California 94588
Allan C. Rubens
Merit Network, Inc.
4251 Plymouth Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105-2785
EMail: acr@merit.edu
EMail: wsimpson@greendragon.com
Steve Willens
Livingston Enterprises
4464 Willow Road
Pleasanton, California 94588
EMail: steve@livingston.com
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
Acknowledgement
RADIUS Accounting
Copyright Notice
Abstract
Implementation Note
Table of Contents
1. Introduction .................................... 2
1.1 Specification of Requirements ................. 3
1.2 Terminology ................................... 3
2. Operation ....................................... 4
2.1 Proxy ......................................... 4
3. Packet Format ................................... 5
4. Packet Types ................................... 7
4.1 Accounting-Request ............................ 8
4.2 Accounting-Response ........................... 9
5. Attributes ...................................... 10
5.1 Acct-Status-Type .............................. 12
5.2 Acct-Delay-Time ............................... 13
5.3 Acct-Input-Octets ............................. 14
5.4 Acct-Output-Octets ............................ 15
5.5 Acct-Session-Id ............................... 15
1. Introduction
Managing dispersed serial line and modem pools for large numbers of
users can create the need for significant administrative support.
Since modem pools are by definition a link to the outside world, they
require careful attention to security, authorization and accounting.
This can be best achieved by managing a single "database" of users,
which allows for authentication (verifying user name and password) as
well as configuration information detailing the type of service to
deliver to the user (for example, SLIP, PPP, telnet, rlogin).
Client/Server Model
Network Security
Extensible Protocol
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [3]. These
key words mean the same thing whether capitalized or not.
1.2. Terminology
service The NAS provides a service to the dial-in user, such as PPP
or Telnet.
silently discard
This means the implementation discards the packet without
further processing. The implementation SHOULD provide the
capability of logging the error, including the contents of
the silently discarded packet, and SHOULD record the event
in a statistics counter.
2. Operation
2.1. Proxy
See the "RADIUS" RFC [2] for information on Proxy RADIUS. Proxy
Accounting RADIUS works the same way, as illustrated by the following
example.
3. Packet Format
A summary of the RADIUS data format is shown below. The fields are
transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Authenticator |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Attributes ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Code
The Code field is one octet, and identifies the type of RADIUS
packet. When a packet is received with an invalid Code field, it
is silently discarded.
4 Accounting-Request
5 Accounting-Response
Identifier
Length
Authenticator
Request Authenticator
The NAS and RADIUS accounting server share a secret. The Request
Authenticator field in Accounting-Request packets contains a one-
way MD5 hash calculated over a stream of octets consisting of the
Code + Identifier + Length + 16 zero octets + request attributes +
shared secret (where + indicates concatenation). The 16 octet MD5
hash value is stored in the Authenticator field of the
Accounting-Request packet.
Response Authenticator
Attributes
4. Packet Types
The RADIUS packet type is determined by the Code field in the first
octet of the packet.
4.1. Accounting-Request
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Request Authenticator |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Attributes ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Code
4 for Accounting-Request.
Identifier
Request Authenticator
Attributes
4.2. Accounting-Response
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Response Authenticator |
| |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Attributes ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Code
5 for Accounting-Response.
Identifier
Response Authenticator
Attributes
5. Attributes
Some attributes MAY be included more than once. The effect of this
is attribute specific, and is specified in each attribute
description.
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
The Type field is one octet. Up-to-date values of the RADIUS Type
field are specified in the most recent "Assigned Numbers" RFC [6].
Values 192-223 are reserved for experimental use, values 224-240
are reserved for implementation-specific use, and values 241-255
are reserved and should not be used. This specification concerns
the following values:
Length
The Length field is one octet, and indicates the length of this
attribute including the Type, Length and Value fields. If an
attribute is received in an Accounting-Request with an invalid
Length, the entire request MUST be silently discarded.
Value
Note that none of the types in RADIUS terminate with a NUL (hex
00). In particular, types "text" and "string" in RADIUS do not
terminate with a NUL (hex 00). The Attribute has a length field
and does not use a terminator. Text contains UTF-8 encoded 10646
[7] characters and String contains 8-bit binary data. Servers and
servers and clients MUST be able to deal with embedded nulls.
RADIUS implementers using C are cautioned not to use strcpy() when
handling strings.
The format of the value field is one of five data types. Note
that type "text" is a subset of type "string."
5.1. Acct-Status-Type
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
40 for Acct-Status-Type.
Length
Value
1 Start
2 Stop
3 Interim-Update
7 Accounting-On
8 Accounting-Off
9-14 Reserved for Tunnel Accounting
15 Reserved for Failed
5.2. Acct-Delay-Time
Description
This attribute indicates how many seconds the client has been
trying to send this record for, and can be subtracted from the
time of arrival on the server to find the approximate time of the
event generating this Accounting-Request. (Network transit time
is ignored.)
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
41 for Acct-Delay-Time.
Length
Value
5.3. Acct-Input-Octets
Description
This attribute indicates how many octets have been received from
the port over the course of this service being provided, and can
only be present in Accounting-Request records where the Acct-
Status-Type is set to Stop.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
42 for Acct-Input-Octets.
Length
Value
5.4. Acct-Output-Octets
Description
This attribute indicates how many octets have been sent to the
port in the course of delivering this service, and can only be
present in Accounting-Request records where the Acct-Status-Type
is set to Stop.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
43 for Acct-Output-Octets.
Length
Value
5.5. Acct-Session-Id
Description
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Text ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
44 for Acct-Session-Id.
Length
>= 3
String
5.6. Acct-Authentic
Description
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
45 for Acct-Authentic.
Length
Value
1 RADIUS
2 Local
3 Remote
5.7. Acct-Session-Time
Description
This attribute indicates how many seconds the user has received
service for, and can only be present in Accounting-Request records
where the Acct-Status-Type is set to Stop.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
46 for Acct-Session-Time.
Length
Value
5.8. Acct-Input-Packets
Description
This attribute indicates how many packets have been received from
the port over the course of this service being provided to a
Framed User, and can only be present in Accounting-Request records
where the Acct-Status-Type is set to Stop.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
47 for Acct-Input-Packets.
Length
Value
5.9. Acct-Output-Packets
Description
This attribute indicates how many packets have been sent to the
port in the course of delivering this service to a Framed User,
and can only be present in Accounting-Request records where the
Acct-Status-Type is set to Stop.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
48 for Acct-Output-Packets.
Length
Value
5.10. Acct-Terminate-Cause
Description
This attribute indicates how the session was terminated, and can
only be present in Accounting-Request records where the Acct-
Status-Type is set to Stop.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
49 for Acct-Terminate-Cause
Length
Value
1 User Request
2 Lost Carrier
3 Lost Service
4 Idle Timeout
5 Session Timeout
6 Admin Reset
7 Admin Reboot
8 Port Error
9 NAS Error
10 NAS Request
11 NAS Reboot
12 Port Unneeded
13 Port Preempted
14 Port Suspended
15 Service Unavailable
16 Callback
17 User Error
18 Host Request
5.11. Acct-Multi-Session-Id
Description
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
50 for Acct-Multi-Session-Id.
Length
>= 3
String
The String field SHOULD contain UTF-8 encoded 10646 [7] characters.
5.12. Acct-Link-Count
Description
This attribute gives the count of links which are known to have been
in a given multilink session at the time the accounting record is
generated. The NAS MAY include the Acct-Link-Count attribute in any
Accounting-Request which might have multiple links.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
51 for Acct-Link-Count.
Length
Value
The Value field is four octets, and contains the number of links
seen so far in this Multilink Session.
# Attribute
0-1 User-Name
0 User-Password
0 CHAP-Password
0-1 NAS-Port-Type
0-1 Port-Limit
0-1 Login-LAT-Port
6. IANA Considerations
The Packet Type Codes, Attribute Types, and Attribute Values defined
in this document are registered by the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA) from the RADIUS name spaces as described in the
"IANA Considerations" section of RFC 2865 [2], in accordance with BCP
26 [8].
7. Security Considerations
8. Change Log
Updated references.
9. References
[3] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March, 1997.
[4] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768, August
1980.
10. Acknowledgements
The RADIUS working group can be contacted via the current chair:
Carl Rigney
Livingston Enterprises
4464 Willow Road
Pleasanton, California 94588
Carl Rigney
Livingston Enterprises
4464 Willow Road
Pleasanton, California 94588
EMail: cdr@telemancy.com
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
Acknowledgement
Abstract
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................2
1.1. Terminology ................................................3
1.2. Requirements Language ......................................3
2. Issues ..........................................................3
2.1. Session Definition .........................................3
2.1.1. State Attribute .....................................3
2.1.2. Request-ID Supplementation ..........................6
2.2. Overload Conditions ........................................7
2.2.1. Retransmission Behavior .............................7
2.2.2. Duplicate Detection and Orderly Delivery ...........10
2.2.3. Server Response to Overload ........................11
2.3. Accounting Issues .........................................12
2.3.1. Attributes Allowed in an Interim Update ............12
2.3.2. Acct-Session-Id and Acct-Multi-Session-Id ..........12
2.3.3. Request Authenticator ..............................13
2.3.4. Interim-Accounting-Interval ........................13
2.3.5. Counter Values in the RADIUS Management
Information Base (MIB) .............................14
2.4. Multiple Filter-ID Attributes .............................15
2.5. Mandatory and Optional Attributes .........................16
2.6. Interpretation of Access-Reject ...........................18
2.6.1. Improper Use of Access-Reject ......................18
2.6.2. Service Request Denial .............................19
2.7. Addressing ................................................20
2.7.1. Link-Local Addresses ...............................20
2.7.2. Multiple Addresses .................................20
2.8. Idle-Timeout ..............................................21
2.9. Unknown Identity ..........................................21
2.10. Responses After Retransmissions ..........................22
2.11. Framed-IPv6-Prefix .......................................23
3. Security Considerations ........................................24
4. References .....................................................25
4.1. Normative References ......................................25
4.2. Informative References ....................................25
1. Introduction
The last few years have seen an increase in the deployment of RADIUS
clients and servers. This document describes common issues seen in
RADIUS implementations and suggests some fixes. Where applicable,
ambiguities and errors in previous RADIUS specifications are
clarified.
1.1. Terminology
service
The NAS provides a service to the user, such as network access via
802.11 or Point to Point Protocol (PPP).
session
Each service provided by the NAS to a peer constitutes a session,
with the beginning of the session defined as the point where
service is first provided, and the end of the session is defined
as the point where service is ended. A peer may have multiple
sessions in parallel or series if the NAS supports that, with each
session generating a separate start and stop accounting record.
silently discard
This means the implementation discards the packet without further
processing. The implementation SHOULD provide the capability of
logging the error, including the contents of the silently
discarded packet, and SHOULD record the event in a statistics
counter.
2. Issues
The only permissible values for a State attribute are values provided
in an Access-Accept, Access-Challenge, CoA-Request or Disconnect-
Request packet. A RADIUS client MUST use only those values for the
State attribute that it has previously received from a server. An
Access-Request sent as a result of a new or restarted authentication
run MUST NOT include the State attribute, even if a State attribute
has previously been received in an Access-Challenge for the same user
and port.
In EAP, each session has its own unique Identifier space. RADIUS
server implementations MUST be able to distinguish between EAP
packets with the same Identifier existing within distinct
sessions, originating on the same NAS. For this purpose, sessions
can be distinguished based on NAS and session identification
attributes. NAS identification attributes include NAS-Identifier,
NAS-IPv6-Address and NAS-IPv4-Address. Session identification
attributes include User-Name, NAS-Port, NAS-Port-Type, NAS-Port-
Id, Called-Station-Id, Calling-Station-Id and Originating-Line-
Info.
There are issues with the suggested algorithm. Since proxies may
modify Access-Request attributes such as NAS-IP-Address, depending on
any attribute under control of the NAS to distinguish request
identifiers can result in deployment problems.
RT Retransmission timeout
RT = IRT + RAND*IRT
RT = 2*RTprev + RAND*RTprev
For Accounting-Request packets, the default values for MRC, MRD, and
MRT SHOULD be zero. These settings will enable a RADIUS client to
continue sending accounting requests to a RADIUS server until the
request is acknowledged. If any of MRC, MRD, or MRT are non-zero,
then the accounting information could potentially be discarded
without being recorded.
Each cache entry SHOULD be purged after a period of time. This time
SHOULD be no less than 5 seconds, and no more than 30 seconds. After
about 30 seconds, most RADIUS clients and end users will have given
up on the authentication request. Therefore, there is little value
in having a larger cache timeout.
When sending requests, RADIUS clients MUST NOT reuse Identifiers for
a source IP address and source UDP port until either a valid response
has been received, or the request has timed out. Clients SHOULD
allocate Identifiers via a least-recently-used (LRU) method for a
particular source IP address and source UDP port.
These methods will allow some users to gain access to the network,
reducing the load created by ongoing access attempts.
However, the text does not indicate any action to take when an
Accounting-Request packet contains an invalid Request Authenticator.
The following text should be considered to be part of the above
description:
2.3.4. Interim-Accounting-Interval
Since the original MIB module specified in [RFC2618] had been widely
implemented, the RADEXT WG chose not to change the object definitions
or to create new ones within the revised MIB module [RFC4668].
However, this section explains the issues and provides guidance for
implementors regarding the interpretation of the textual description
and comments for certain MIB objects.
Issue (1):
Issue (2):
A NAS that does not implement a given service MUST NOT implement
the RADIUS attributes for that service. For example, a NAS that
is unable to offer Apple Remote Access Protocol (ARAP) service
MUST NOT implement the RADIUS attributes for ARAP. A NAS MUST
treat a RADIUS access-accept authorizing an unavailable service as
an access-reject instead.
This text makes it clear that RADIUS does not allow the provisioning
of services within an Access-Reject. If the desire is to allow
limited access, then an Access-Accept can be sent with attributes
provisioning limited access. Attributes within an Access-Reject are
restricted to those necessary to route the message (e.g., Proxy-
State), attributes providing the user with an indication that access
has been denied (e.g., an EAP-Message attribute containing an EAP-
Failure), or attributes conveying an error message (e.g., a Reply-
Message or Error-Cause attribute).
Users may request multiple services from the NAS. Where those
services are independent, the deployment MUST treat the RADIUS
sessions as being independent.
For example, a NAS may offer multi-link services where a user may
have multiple simultaneous network connections. In that case, an
Access-Reject for a later multi-link connection request does not
necessarily mean that earlier multi-link connections are torn down.
Similarly, if a NAS offers both dialup and VOIP services, the
rejection of a VOIP attempt does not mean that the dialup session is
torn down.
2.7. Addressing
Since Link-Local addresses are unique only on the local link, if the
NAS and RADIUS server are not on the same link, then an IPv6 Link-
Local address [RFC4862] or an IPv4 Link-Local Address [RFC3927]
cannot be used to uniquely identify the NAS. A NAS SHOULD NOT
utilize a link-scope address within a NAS-IPv6-Address or NAS-IP-
Address attribute. A RADIUS server receiving a NAS-IPv6-Address or
NAS-IP-Address attribute containing a Link-Local address SHOULD NOT
count such an attribute toward satisfying the requirements of
[RFC3162] Section 2.1:
A RADIUS server MUST use the source IP address of the RADIUS UDP
packet to decide which shared secret to use, so that RADIUS
requests can be proxied.
Therefore, if a RADIUS client sends packets from more than one source
address, a shared secret will need to be configured on both the
client and server for each source address.
2.8. Idle-Timeout
In the above paragraphs "idle" may not necessarily mean "no traffic";
the NAS may support filters defining what traffic is included in the
idle time determination. As a result, an "idle connection" is
defined by local policy in the absence of other attributes.
Note that [RFC4282] does not permit a Network Access Identifier (NAI)
of zero octets, so that an EAP-Response/Identity with a Type-Data
field of zero octets MUST NOT be construed as a request for privacy
(e.g., anonymous NAI).
2.11. Framed-IPv6-Prefix
paragraph was to enable the NAS to advertise the prefix (such as via
a Router Advertisement). If the Framed-Routing attribute is used, it
is also possible that the prefix would be advertised in a routing
protocol such as Routing Information Protocol Next Generation
(RIPNG). RFC 2865 Section 5.10 describes the purpose of Framed-
Routing:
This Attribute indicates the routing method for the user, when the
user is a router to a network. It is only used in Access-Accept
packets.
This length appears too broad, because it is not clear what a NAS
should do with a prefix of greater granularity than /64. For
example, the Framed-IPv6-Prefix may contain a /128. This does not
imply that the NAS should assign an IPv6 address to the end user,
because RFC 3162 already defines a Framed-IPv6-Identifier attribute
to handle the Identifier portion.
The CPE may also require a delegated prefix for its own use, if it is
decrementing the Hop Limit field of IP headers. In that case, it
should be delegated a prefix by the NAS via the Delegated-IPv6-Prefix
attribute [RFC4818]. If the CPE is not decrementing Hop Limit, it
does not require a delegated prefix.
3. Security Considerations
The contents of the State attribute are available to both the RADIUS
client and observers of the RADIUS protocol. RADIUS server
implementations should ensure that the State attribute does not
disclose sensitive information to a RADIUS client or third parties
observing the RADIUS protocol.
4. References
[RFC3162] Aboba, B., Zorn, G., and D. Mitton, "RADIUS and IPv6",
RFC 3162, August 2001.
[RFC3315] Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins,
C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
[RFC3576] Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., and B.
Aboba, "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 3576,
July 2003.
[RFC3580] Congdon, P., Aboba, B., Smith, A., Zorn, G., and J.
Roese, "IEEE 802.1X Remote Authentication Dial In User
Service (RADIUS) Usage Guidelines", RFC 3580, September
2003.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC4282] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The
Network Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to acknowledge Glen Zorn and Bernard Aboba for
contributions to this document.
Authors' Addresses
David B. Nelson
Elbrys Networks, Inc.
75 Rochester Ave., Unit 3
Portsmouth, N.H. 03801 USA
Phone: +1.603.570.2636
EMail: dnelson@elbrysnetworks.com
Alan DeKok
The FreeRADIUS Server Project
http://freeradius.org/
EMail: aland@freeradius.org
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