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Does the presence and growth of the WTO enhance or diminish the position of developing countries with regard to global trade and international trade agreements?

Introduction
The post-Cold War era witnessed the increasingly significant role of international institutions such as the WTO that helped increase the level of economic interdependence between states to a degree never seen before. It was believed then, as it is now, that greater inter-reliance between states would help prevent the kinds of economic meltdowns that occurred in the early 20th century, as well as the violent conflicts that followed them. Originally instituted at the Bretton Woods Conference as the GATT, the WTO today is the institution tasked with the responsibility of establishing rules and protocols for the international trading system. These rules are incredibly important, as they can and do affect employment rates, commodity prices, import-export balances, and the general welfare of people around the world.1 However, the WTO is certainly not without its critics. The institution has been characterized as being a tool of the elite that is used to perpetuate economic inequalities between the rich and developing states. True enough, there are certainly disadvantages associated with being a developing nation in the WTO; but in the long run, the benefits to membership outweigh the costs. The institution seeks to raise the standard of living for everybody. But due, in large part, to initial economic and power disparities, trade policies lead to an uneven distribution of benefits, to the detriment of developing nations. In order to understand how the WTO affects trade and welfare among and between nations and why it matters, it is first necessary to understand its stated objectives. The WTOs goals are to raise the standards of living all over the world, increase employment, expand the volume of production and services, and support developing countries, especially the leastdeveloped countries (LDCs), with their economic growth and development. Although many people outside of the WTO are generally ignorant of its trade rules, the WTO plays an increasingly important role in affecting human welfare. With the completion of the Uruguay Round in 1994, these rules extended into a number of areas that had been outside the GATT system notably agriculture, textiles, trade in services and intellectual property rights (essentially patents and copyrights).2 This greatly increased the impact that the WTO made on the everyday lives of people, especially for those in developing countries, not only by extending the scope of the effects of employment, incomes and prices, but also by introducing measures affecting trade in services that affect the provision and regulation of public services such as health amenities, education, water and sanitation.3 There can be no doubt that since the inception of the WTO, developing countries have made enormous progress in integrating into the international trading system. Growth in their international trade has exceeded growth in output, the product composition of their exports has shifted dramatically in favour manufactures and away from primary commodities, and since the early 1990s trade in some developing countries has grown exceptionally quickly and far more than trade in developed countries.4 Furthermore, the multilateral trading regime of the WTO is based on a number of core principles that aim to democratize the process and distribute the benefits more evenly. Among these principles are rules that declare that states should not discriminate between a countrys
1 2

Jawara 3 ibid 3 ibid 4 Michalopolous 1

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trading partners, but grant all equally most favored nation (MFN) status; should not discriminate between the countrys own products and imports but accord foreign suppliers national treatment; should become progressively freer, lowering trade barriers over time through negotiations, etc.5 The main issue of contention, however, is that what member states should do and what they actually are often perceived to be misaligned, especially in the eyes of developing nations. The biggest criticisms hurled against the WTO highlight the hypocritical deeds of developed nations, who are accused of purporting to defend and promote the cooperative spirit of the WTOs rules while bullying weaker nations into accepting trade concessions and maintaining high levels of protection for their own domestic industries. In addition, member states charge the organization as being fundamentally undemocratic in nature, from the negotiation phase all the way to the dispute settlement phase. In order to weigh the costs and benefits of the WTO, therefore, the next logical step would be to look at what kinds of costs are imposed on developing countries through the WTO. What does the presence and growth of the WTO mean for the trading positions of developing states?

A League of Hypocrites
According to one developing country delegate, the policies emerging from the organization are loaded against developing countries. He believed that if you let globalization do its work it will benefit the poor.6 Similar sentiments are often echoed throughout the world in both developed and developing nations, some more vocally or angrily than others. This is due to the fact that the biggest problems that exist with the WTO (one might also add institutions like the World Bank and IMF as well) are the hypocritical actions taken by developed nations in their dealings with developing nations. Despite the spirit of the GATT/WTO, which espouses a cooperative and egalitarian partnership among member states, the trade practices of many of the large industrialized countries are protectionist and restrictive yet legal because GATT/WTO rules are loosely worded.7 Developed nations maximize their benefits by protecting the domestic industries that would be hurt most from trade liberalization with developing nations, because developing nations often have a comparative advantage in such industries, like agriculture. Although the WTO should, in theory, create a fair and equal system, critics of the WTO believe that many aspects of the WTO merely provided the developed countries with new instruments to put pressure on developing countries in pursuit of their own commercial agenda.8 Developed nations exploited these pressure points not so much on customs duties as on nontariff restrictions involving quotas, voluntary export restraints, minimum import prices, licensing and monitoring of imports, technical requirements and standards, antidumping procedures, and so on.9 By using non-tariff barriers to protect domestic industries, developed nations not only skirt the edges of the WTO rules (others would say they are in outright violation of them)10, but they reveal how loosely worded, and therefore loosely interpreted, the rules are. International markets are, therefore, liberalized only in name; in practice, developing nations face huge barriers in the form of non-tariff barriers such as the ones mentioned above, especially in industries where they hold the comparative advantage due to factors like lower labor costs.11
5 6

Jawara 7-8 ibid 269 7 Pietras 359 8 Jawara 302 9 Pietras 359 10 Madichie, Pietras, Jawara to name a few 11 Madichie 12

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And even though developing countries expect their larger trading partners to hold to their ends of the bargain, developed countries often walk away with special privileges or immunities inked into their deals that enable them to get out of their agreements. Developed countries knew exactly where the cracks wereand systematically, through webs of coercion, shattered their opponents. They got away with these tactics in part because the often fragmented and disunited front presented by developing countries provided an all too easy target.12 According to one scholar, The Americans went to Doha focusing on opening markets for agriculture industrial goods and services, and succeeded in doing so. They managed to obtain a get out clause on the environment. The EU, similarly, also obtained a get-out clause on the phasing out of subsidies in agriculture.13 Developing nations, on the other hand, do not possess the leverage necessary to write in their own get-out clauses.

Wheres the Democracy?

Another criticism that is especially valid against the WTO concerns its lack of democracy. That is not to say that it is an undemocratic organization; after all, each member state, no matter the size, gets only one vote, although actual votes are never taken. However, since decision making is done by consensus, relative market size of nations plays a stronger role than voting power in the WTO. The disadvantages of this system are not immediately obvious, but they are very hurtful to developing nations. One of the highest-profile issues in global trade today concerns TRIPs agreements, which deals with trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights. Many developed nations argue that the TRIPs agreements favor developed countries since it is the wealthier countries who hold approximately 90% of the worlds patents. TRIPs agreements require members to enforce the same patent laws, which helps drive in about $40 billion a year for the wealthy owners of the intellectual property. Instead of benefiting developing nations by providing access to better technologies and resources, the TRIPs agreements actually inhibit the flow of technology to developing countries, since they have no choice but to pay more in order to access new patented technologies. Ironically enough, the developed nations of today did not have to face such strict restrictions to new technologies when they themselves were industrializing. For instance, when the US was a developing nation vis a vis European nations, the US aggressively transferred technology from Europe. Japan did the same regarding the US and Europe as it developed.14 Another distressing problem with the nature of the WTOs structure is the fact that crucial meetings are held behind closed doors, excluding participants with critical interests at stake, with no formal record of the discussion.15 At the 1999 Seattle Ministerial, for example, major negotiations were held in invitation-only Green Rooms where members from only a handful of developed nations hammered out provisions with a select group of countries, while the overwhelming majority of the delegations were left in the dark over the terms of the negotiations.16 These meetings are a serious threat to the credibility of a democratic WTO, as they are completely non-transparent, attended by only those invited, and undocumented.17 At the end of the ministerial, developing nations felt that they were merely presented with what was produced in the Green Room on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the same scenario they had faced at the end of the Uruguay Round.18 As one longtime GATT analyst wrote, the
12 13

Jawara 182 ibid 120 14 Wallach & Woodall 160 15 Jawara 276 16 Wallach & Woodall 159 17 Jawara 18 18 Wallach & Woodall 159

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main negotiations were a trilateral affair involving the US, the European Economic Community (ECC)19 and Japan.20 Developing nations went home feeling that they had no say in the process. This practice of informal negotiating not only marginalizes developing nations during ministerials, but it continues even after official meetings have concluded. Most of the real deals at the WTO, especially the all-important bilateral trade deals, are discussed at still more informal meetings (sometimes within the WTO) and cocktail parties (outside the WTO).21 Japan, for example, who has one of the largest mission staffs to the WTO in Geneva, frequently invites selected delegates to discuss important trade negotiations over sushi.22

Throwing Ones Weight Around

Accusing developed nations of merely bending the rules in their favor do not go far enough in some cases. For some critics, developed nations are no less than powerful bullies who use divide-and-conquer strategies in order to keep developing nations divided and to ensure their own influence in the regime. When developing countries attempt to take positions counter to the interests of developed nations, the developed nations resort to an arsenal of bullying tactics, many of which are not explicitly prohibited by WTO regulations. These tactics can include any combination of inducements in the form of a few more crumbs to negotiators and their governments; putting the country on a blacklist of unfriendly countries who deserve to have their preferential trade agreements suspended; putting pressure on capitals, often backed by disinformation and/or threats, to relieve negotiators (including ambassadors) of their jobs, making their positions untenable; and, in classic divide-and-rule style, the deployment of middle-income countries to convince low-income countries to change their positions.23 Also due to their relatively large market size, developed nations possess the power to provide or withhold technical assistance, financial aid, bilateral and multilateral debt relief and preferential trade agreements, all important factors that contribute to the growth of developing nations.24 This gives them an effective arm-twisting tool, since threats issued by developed nations are often viewed as credible. Refusing to behave appropriately in negotiations can prevent developing nations from accessing the very materials and resources necessary for growth. Developed countries point out that the system is equitable because it reflects the share of market size that each country commands. Since developing countries command a relatively small share of global trade, it would be preposterous to allow them to control the system totally. Yet, the bullying tactics employed by developed nations prevent developing countries from fighting for a more equitable system that might actually improve their economies. They thus find themselves locked in a vicious cycle of political impotence, unfair trading rules and weakening trade performance.25

Playing with the Cards Stacked Against Them

19 20

The ECC was the predecessor to the EU. Wallach & Woodall 175 21 Jawara 6 22 ibid 23 ibid 150 24 ibid 149 25 ibid 182

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In addition to the negative and hypocritical actions of developed nations putting developing nations at a disadvantage, the nature of the WTO is such that it is fundamentally not a system built to the advantage of developing nations. This is highlighted by the developing nations small mission sizes, their lack of resources (or access to these resources), and their lack of (credible) leverage. The lack of mission size for many developing nations puts them at a huge disadvantage for several reasons. Meetings are numerous and often occur simultaneously, making effective participation in them highly contingent on the number of people working on a countrys missions staff. The WTO has a thousand meetings a year in total, many of them running parallel to each other.26 Staffing levels are critical because of the need to participate in many of these meetings. While developed nations are well-represented by a substantial number of delegates, (US has 14, EC 18, Japan 23, Canada 12, and South Korea has 32!) only a handful of developing nations can afford to send so many delegates. Most have between two or five; and the great majority have to represent their countries in more than twenty other international agencies based in Geneva as well as the WTO.27 The smallest twenty nations in the WTO, in fact, dont even have permanent missions in Geneva.28 The lack of resources put developing countries at a huge negotiating disadvantage, since they need technical knowledge and financial and human resources in order to promote economic growth in their countries. It is little wonder, then, that the negotiators from developing countries reacted to proposals during negotiations with a view to minimizing the negative effects and containing the damage, rather than negotiating to maximize their economic benefits.29 According to one Asian delegate, Bilateral deals are what most developing countries look out for. At the end of the day, it is your own economic interest you have to watch. It is, of course, always preferable to get multilateral agreements but if this is not possible in the final stage of a ministerial meeting, people resort to bilateral deals to jettison the sinking ship. This is normal and is part of the game.30 But the effect this has for developing nations is to whittle the negotiation process down to a matter of leverage. Since only the developed nations have any real leverage, because their threats are both credible and potentially disastrous for smaller nations, there is little choice left but to agree to go along with the Green Room agreements. The irony is that, by skewing the international trade rules still further towards the interests of the developed countries, this process, and the agreements that emerge from it, will make their need still more desperate, and their ability to resist still weaker, in future negotiations.31 In the absence of any strong coalitions between developing countries, the major powers have free reign to pressure individual states into acquiescence on important issues. Another systemic disadvantage for developing countries comes in the form of, ironically enough, the WTOs Dispute Settlement Mechanism, which had been intended to protect smaller nations from larger nations in trade disputes with reference to WTO rules. Lauded by its proponents as a both a safeguard for developing countries as well as an example of greater democracy and equality within the WTO, the DSM was meant to level the playing field for these countries, passing judgments as neutrally as possible and with disregard for the influence of member states involved.32 Again, the theory outperformed its implementation, as it turned out to be less beneficial to most developing countries in practice. The major problem
26 27

ibid 22 ibid 21 28 ibid 21-22 29 Wallach & Woodall 175 30 Jawara 181 31 ibid 32 ibid 6

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with the dispute settlement mechanism is that enforcement of its decisions is through the sanctioning of retaliatory trade restrictions.33 In other words, the mechanism would work well for large countries, because their sanctioning would have large, harmful consequences for the offending country; but the effects of sanctioning by small, developing nations would be small too small, in most cases, to have any effects at all. Therefore, there is really no incentive to go through the costly process of the DSM for developing countries, even if they have solid evidence, because there is no way they can enforce the punishments.

The Early Bird Gets the Worm

Perhaps more than anything else, the most significant and relevant reason for uneven benefit distribution and economic growth is due to the initial power and economic asymmetries that existed between nations before the Bretton Woods institutions were even established. The late entry of developing countries onto a pre-existing international system makes them rule takers rather than agenda setters.34 They were, in the words of one scholar, intruders who sought to partake in the rich benefits promised by membership in these international institutions in a system of states that was not built to suit their advantage.35 After all, the WTOs predecessor, the GATT, was established as an international economic system through which the (mostly developed) founding nations, led by the US, could protect their interests. Sovereign states do not participate in cooperative institutions for altruistic reasons [as more] often than not, when they participate in such arrangements, it is because, ceteris paribus, they expect tangible benefits, which may be political, economical, or social.36 One WTO scholar puts the situation into its appropriate historical context by pointing out the following: In the hierarchic arrangement of states, or what we call global power structure, during a particular time interval in history, one state or a combination of states, becomes the leader who chalks out the rules of the game for participation of other states in the IEO.37 By implication, a particular state becomes a leader at a particular historical juncture, while the other states maintain the position of followers, the activities of the leader being rationalized by exercise of her own state power and accepted as mandate by the followers.38 As the founders of these international institutions, not only do they have the right to set the rules and the agenda, but it is only common sense to set the terms in their favor. Therefore, criticisms hurled against the WTO for being elite-dominated and unfair to less developed nations not only have an element of truth to them, but they are also, in a sense, nave. Although the WTO has liberalized significantly since its inception as the GATT half a century ago, the institution was originally created as a club for developed nations with the promotion of their interests as a priority. In the case of developing nations, this means that being late to the game gives them no choice but to play by someone elses rules, in a system that had not been designed particularly for their advantage. Therefore, it was understood, by countries in the third world, that they [were] not in a position, separately or unitedly, to alter the dynamics internal to the DMEs (Developed Market Economies) nor [could] they delink themselves from the IEO (International Economic Order) shaped by them.39 The disparities that exist today, therefore, largely reflect the inequities that existed during the years prior to Bretton Woods. It is known that the share of the Big Five (US,
33 34

ibid Narlikar 12 35 ibid 12-13 36 Madichie 11 37 IEO = International Economic Order 38 Warhda 87 39 ibid 85

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UK, Germany, France and Japan) in world industrial output during the peak of industrial revolution (1870-1938) was more than 60 percent...During the pre-Depression period (19261929), it was more than 70 percent excluding Japan. Thus, it was the G-7 (that includes Italy and Canada) that commanded the lions share of the world industrial output.40 Although more than 80% of the WTO is made up of developing countries, with that share continually increasing, these nations, as a whole, contribute very little to the overall world output, whereas the few powerful developed nations account for more than 75%.41 Because the developed nations held the lions share of the worlds output, they would also derive the lions share of the benefits from integrating their economies because they held the greatest stakes in the system. As the largest contributors to the world output, therefore, it is the developed nations that have the most to lose by liberalizing trade and changing the rules to redistribute the benefits of trade. They have the largest stakes in the preservation of the current international economic order and it is therefore not in their interests to reform the system. The system, therefore, works to their benefit largely due to power and economic asymmetries that had already existed when these institutions were being established. It was unequal to start with, and this is the fundamental root cause of the inequities today, with the forces of globalization exacerbating many of these pre-existing inequities.

Weighing the Benefits

As former special advisor to the WTO Constantine Michalopolous wrote, There is no way of making the rules of the international system benefit a countrys interests unless the country is a member of andeffectively represented in the WTO.42 This denotes the fact that the international economic order is, at the core, part of an anarchic system without rules. Supporters of the WTO, therefore, argue that the WTO is necessary and beneficial for developing countries because the institutional framework provided by a rules-based international institution at least puts the developing countries in a stronger position to challenge the developed countries with the anarchy of a ruleless system.43 Critics, on the other hand, illustrate the scenario for developing nations as coming down to a Faustian choice between agreeing to rules that are harmful to their interests, or remaining on the outside of the international trading regime altogether, absent even the most minimal degree of protection.44 Although there are certainly elements of truth in both, the benefits are certainly greater in the long run since nations are more likely to affect change from within rather than from the outside. There are many potential benefits to membership beyond the obvious benefit of participating in a system that has set rules and regulations. The first of these benefits is the way WTO membership, or the process of acceding to the WTO, promotes greater reforms of domestic policies and institutions dealing with international trade. As a matter of fact, international economic institutions like the WTO (with the support of the World Bank and the IMF, as well) were integral in facilitating the transition of former Soviet bloc nations away from centrally-planned economies and towards a free-market orientation.45 While the central governments had been in charge, institutions governing rules of international trade, like intellectual property rights or agricultural issues, were non-existent, barely functioning, or
40 41

ibid 92 ibid 99-100 42 Michalopolous 176 43 Jawara 302 44 Wallach & Woodall 159 45 Pietras 353

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qualitatively different from the economies of the West.46 The challenges of integration were great, as making the transition to a market economy entailed challenge enough, including the need to privatize existing state enterprises, to establish a viable commercial code, to enable prices to reflect relative costs and scarcities, to remove the monetary overhang, and to find new sources of government revenue.47 In this way, each of the economies in transition needed the WTO and the international economy48 in order to implement the deep structural changes necessary to join the international economic order and begin to reap the benefits. Absent an international institution like the WTO, it would have, without a doubt, taken much longer and been much more difficult integrating these economies into the international economy. The GDP per capita of these nations would have taken longer to rise, if at all, and its progress would have been severely stunted by problems such as corruption and protectionism. Without the WTO, or an international trading regime like it, the standards of living around the world would have taken considerably longer to rise or fail to rise at all because, particularly for developing nations, their economies would have been vulnerable not only to exploitation by developed nations, but impediments to growth due to domestic institutional problems as well. Even the promises of the benefits of WTO membership themselves would often provide incentive enough for these nations to reform their institutions in order to adhere to WTO rules and provisions; and these changes gradually accrued greater benefits to the welfare of their citizens. Equally important to a countrys economy, Michalopolous points out, is the greater stability in commercial policy that comes from adherence to WTO rulesStability is important both to domestic producers and to exporters from other countries wishing to access that countrys markets.49 There is no question that these countries clearly benefited from the presence of the WTO.

A Source of Stability in a System of Anarchy

The WTO offered transitioning countries an already-existing stable economic order into which they could integrate. Were the international markets stagnant, the difficulties associated with transition and integration with the world economy would be considerably more difficult.50 Because the existence of internationally agreed-upon rules had already been established, the integration of these developing countries were greatly facilitated and enhanced. Being part of an organization that has preset rules and regulations also contributes to the member states perceptions of security and certainty. One of the largest issues within the WTO involves antidumping cases, where countries, usually large nations, dump their products in another country to sell at much lower costs than they would in their own countries. So by remaining on the outside of the WTO, states would be vulnerable to dumping by larger nations, without the kind of protection that the WTO could afford them. And since the introduction of antidumping regulations in the GATT/WTO, it has been increasing incited numerous times by developing countries. As of 1996, 58 developing and transition-economy countries had notified antidumping laws or regulations to the WTO, and sixteen had notified antidumping actions to the WTO.51 This leads to another point of contention: the expected reciprocity between nations when it comes to trade agreements. Although states are not required to make reciprocal commitments to open their markets, it is generally expected that the lowering of protectionism
46 47

Michalopolous 177 Pietras 354 48 ibid 355 49 Michalopolous 177 50 Pietras 355 51 Finger & Winters 377

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on one side of the negotiating table would be reciprocated with the same from the other. Rather than being an enforceable rule, it is, as Madichie says, an article of faith in negotiations.52 However, developing nations are not required either to make reciprocal agreements if this would be inconsistent with their individual development, financial, and trade needs.53 As George Washington once noted, there can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation.54 The fact that large countries are held to the rules of the WTO provides considerable protection for smaller nations. As a multilateral forum, the WTO gives the member states of developing countries considerably more ability to raise issues and disputes with trading partners and, in doing so, operate in a environment where they would have the best chance of perhaps influencing policies that would otherwise be unavailable or non-negotiable. This dispute settlement mechanism allows countries to seek recourse in circumstances where they believe a trading partner has failed to respect its obligations.55 Access to an impartial and binding dispute settlement mechanism whose decisions have a significant chance of being enforced is a very important potential benefit.56 Although there are problems facing the mechanism, membership provides opportunities that, with proper assistance, can be beneficial to new Members, especially in their relationship with large trading partners.57 Even though the hypocritical actions of developed nations unfairly benefit them more, this does not mean that developing nations do not benefit at all from the WTO. Small countries have won cases against rich countries, after all. They would not have been able to do so from outside the WTO. Of course, the most straightforward potential benefit of the WTO is the cooperative framework that nations can establish with one another that help reduce transaction costs and tariffs between trading partners. The WTO sponsors multilateral negotiations through which countries agree to reduce and to bind their restrictions, particularly tariffs, against unilateral increases.58 Countries negotiate tariff reductions and the removal of other such barriers in a push towards a more liberal trading regime. So from the perspective of the developing country, the WTO negotiations offer several different opportunities. Among these include the potential to bargain for lower tariffs in markets of interest; to use the multilateral negotiations as leverage against domestic interests that resist tariff reductions; and to negotiate bindings that will provide defenses against future domestic pressures to increase rates or to provide protection by other means.59 The negotiating process offers developing nations an array of opportunities through which they can remove prohibitive barriers to trade, thus leaving the potential for increasing the welfare for both sides.

Conclusion
None of this is meant to detract from the reality that there are certainly disadvantages and costs to being in the WTO; much of these costs are based on not only the initial power and economic asymmetries between nations but also on the hypocrisy of and bullying by rich developed nations. However, these costs are outweighed by the long-term benefits accrued by developing states through the aid of not only the WTO but also the World Bank, the IMF, and UNCTAD. Trade liberalization may hurt domestic agricultural producers from third world
52 53

Madichie 8 ibid 54 Jawara 148 55 Madichie 9 56 Michalopolous 178 57 ibid 58 Finger & Winters 366 59 ibid 367

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countries by lowering barriers and increasing competition, for example, but in the long run, their economy will only become more efficient as, over time, people move into industries that hold comparative advantages which helps to create new jobs in different sectors. Even if a countrys national economic welfare were to decline because of a deterioration in its terms of trade resulting from the next multilateral trade negotiations, that does not mean it would be better off not participating in the round. On the contrary, that countrys welfare would fall even more if it did not participate, because it would forego the economic efficiency gains from reforming its own policies.60 In the short run, and for the foreseeable future, there are many costs and disadvantages associated with the WTO. In the long run, however, developing countries can only stand to improve their positions as they become more fully integrated into the international economic order where they can use their voices, however small, to influence change.

60

Anderson 42

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Sources Cited
Anderson, Kym. "Developing-country interests in WTO-induced agricultural trade reform." Developing Countries in the World Trading System The Uruguay Round and Beyond. 40-65. Developing Countries in the World Trading System The Uruguay Round and Beyond. Ed. Ramesh Adhikari and Prema-Chandra Athukoralge. Grand Rapids: Edward Elgar, 2002. Finger, J. Michael, and L. Alan Winters. "What Can the WTO Do for Developing Countries?" WTO as an international organization. Chicago: University of Chicago P, 1998. Jawara, Fatoumata, and Aileen Kwa. Behind the Scenes at the WTO The Real World of International Trade Negotiations. New York: Zed Books, 2003. Madichie, Nnamdi. "Better off out? The Benefits or Costs of the World Trade Organization to Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of African Business, Vol. 8 (1), pp. 5 -30, 2007 Michalopoulos, Constantine. Developing countries in the WTO. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001. Narlikar, Amrita. International Trade and Developing Countries Bargaining Coalitions in GATT and WTO. New York: Routledge, 2005. Pietras, Jaroslaw, ed. "The Role of the WTO for Economies in Transition." WTO as an international organization. Chicago: University of Chicago P, 1998. Wallach, Lori, and Patrick Woodall. Whose trade organization? a comprehensive guide to the WTO. New York: New P, 2004. Wardha, Harin. WTO and third world trade challenges. Commonwealth, 2002. WTO as an international organization. Ed. Anne O. Krueger. Chicago: University of Chicago P, 1998.