Conflict, Civil War and Underdevelopment: An Introduction Author(s): S. Mansoob Murshed Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol.

39, No. 4, Special Issue on Civil War in Developing Countries (Jul., 2002), pp. 387-393 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1555273 . Accessed: 28/08/2011 16:14
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? 2002 Journalof PeaceResearch, vol.39, no. 4, 2002, pp. 387-393 Thousand Oaks, SagePublications (London, CAand New Delhi) [0022-3433(200207)39:4;387-393; 025804]

Conflict, CivilWarand Underdevelopment: An Introduction*

S. MANSOOB MURSHED Institute of Social Studies, The Hague
Conflict has been a featureof human society since time immemorial. Disputes that arisemay be organized around social class, ethnicity, religion, region, or some combination of these factors.The struggle can be over economic opportunities,as well as political and civil rights,among other contestablefactors. In peaceful societies, conflict is channelled into nonviolent means and institutions for both its expression and resolution. Civil war is not necessarilyirrational,but a product of certainobjectives,therefore amenable to rational-choiceanalysis.In low-income countries, civil war makes poverty reduction and growth difficult to achieve. Many contemporarycivil wars have an ethnic dimension, as ethnicity is a strong uniting force. Grievances,therefore,play a major part in contemporaryconflict, but greed - the desireto control resourcesand capturerents - also enters into the calculusof conflict. Ultimately, open warfarecannot emerge inside a society with a functioning social contract, as greed and grievancesare managedand conflict is contained in countrieswith properlyoperatinginstitutions. Consequently,conflict resolution requiresthe reconstitution of the social contract.

economic opportunities, as well as political and civil rights, among other contestable Conflict has been a featureof human society factors. In peaceful societies, conflict is since time immemorial. Disputes that arise channelledinto nonviolent means and instimay be organizedaroundsocial class,ethnic- tutions for both its expression and resoluity, religion, region, or some combination of tion. Economic and human development these factors. The struggle can be over cannot occur without a large measure of * I am at social stability, which in turn requires the gratefulto TonyAddison,my projectco-director WIDER (http://www.wider.unu.edu), stimulating for aca- nurturingof institutionsfor nonviolent condemic interaction overa numberof years.Thanksarealso due to Scott Gates and Nils Petter Gleditsch for their flict resolution. Conflict in low-income The contributionsof the authorsin this countries makes the objective of poverty encouragement. of specialissueand other projectparticipants the WIDER reduction all the more difficult, since not projecton 'Why Some CountriesAvoid Conflict While Others Fail' are gratefullyacknowledged.WIDER also only is growth retarded, public money is gratefully acknowledgesthe generous support of the taken for militaryspending from basic social of governments Denmark,Finland,Norway and Sweden and the poor are themselvesdisprotowards its researchprogramme and activities during services, 2000-01. GlennMartinofJPRandJanisVehmann-Kruela portionately the victims of conflict. Econof WIDER superblyhandled the administrative side. All omists are increasinglyconcerned with how opinions expressedin this article are mine alone, and badly designed economic policy raises the should not necessarily ascribedto WIDER or the ISS. be murshed@iss.nl. Correspondence: vulnerability of low-income developing

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4 volume / number Ijuly2002 39 mentation, poverty, inequality and institutional breakdown,all play a role in contemporary civil wars. Economic analysis, particularlyfields dealing with endogenous public choice, has much to say about these matters. Also, empirical techniques associated with econometrics can shed light on many hypotheses, particularly given the emergence of qualitative data, for example on governanceindicators. This specialissue brings togethersome of the output of the UNU/WIDER (United Nations University, World Institute of Development Economics Research, in Helsinki, Finland) researchprojecton 'Why Some Countries Avoid Conflict While Others Fail'.The primaryfocus of research at WIDER is on development, and therefore the focus of the abovementioned projectwas not on conflict per se, but ratherits role in the retarding processof development.As can readily be observed from note 1, most of today'swars are civil wars, occurringin lowincome developing countries. The part played by civil wars in lowering economic growth, particularlyin sub-SaharanAfrica, where per capita growth rates have been negative in many countries for much of the last two decades,cannot be overestimated. As Rodrik (1999) emphasizes, countries with weak institutionsof conflict management,as well as high-income inequality,are less able to withstand economic shocks and experience growth failure. They are also more prone to the risk of civil strifeand war,since their weak institutions, which are further weakened by shocks and lower growth, are unable to contain the resulting social pressureand distributionalconflict. Over the last five yearsor so, economists have startedpaying much more attention to internalconflict.This is not to say that it was completely ignored before, but the new research very much arisenout of a presshas ing need to understandcontinued development failure, especially in sub-Saharan

countries to conflict, and how economic policy reinforces,or weakens,the social contract that underpins peace. Fundamentally, violent internalconflict is a symptom of the absence or breakdown of the implicit or explicit social contractthat sustainspeace. Conflict and the Collapse of the Social Contract Traditionally,war has been viewed as an irrationalact, brought about by misunderstanding and coordination failure, and primarily a breakdown in relations between nation-states. Today, most armed conflicts occur between groups within the same world.1A nation-state,and in the developing common view is that civil war is fundamentally irrational,and thereforenot amenable to the techniques of economics or rationalchoice political science. But is this so? Once the interests of belligerents are taken into account, conflict may be the product of rational decisions, even if it is only of a bounded or myopic rational-choicevariety. Even a terrible genocide, as in Rwanda for instance, is often planned well in advancein a cold, pre-meditated manner and carried out to meet a well-definedobjective.Furthermore, evidence is accumulating that socioeconomic variables, such as the desire to control natural-resourcerents, social frag1 The measurement conflict and its occurrence not of is & (see 2001). The straightforward Wallensteen Sollenberg, Carnegie Commission on PreventingDeadly Conflict (1997: 12) lists the following39 locationsas havinghad conflictswhich led to at least 1000 deathsin any one year in the 1990s: Afghanistan, Algeria,Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina,Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chechnya,Republicof Congo, DemocraticRepublicof Congo (Zaire), Colombia, Croatia,East Timor, El Salvador,Eritrea(secessionfrom Ethiopia),Georgia,Ghana, Guatemala,Haiti, Iraq, Kashmir (India vs. Pakistan), Lebanon,Liberia,Moldova, Nigeria, PersianGulf War, Sierra Peru,Rwanda, Leone,Sindh,Somalia,SouthAfrica, Southeast Sri Turkey(Kurdistan), Lanka(Tamiluprising), Sudan,Tajikistan, Uganda,Yemen.To this list, one may add Myanmar, IrianJaya(Indonesia), Kosovo,Nepal and the 1998-2000 Eritrea-Ethiopia to produceour total war of 44 conflicts.

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Africa. In this new literature,a distinction is often made between grievance,a motivation based on a sense of injustice in the way a social group is treated, often with a strong historical dimension, and greed, an acquisitive desire similarto crime, albeit often on a much larger scale. Nobody would claim of course that these motives are entirely separate in practice (and motives often change duringthe courseof war), but the distinction can be a useful analyticalstarting point. An importantquestion is whethercontemporary civil wars are more the product of grievances or more the result of greed (Collier & Hoeffler,2001). There are genuine grievancesproducing civil war, many of which are relatedto economic factors:systematiceconomic discrimination against groups based on ethnolinguistic or religious differences. Extreme poverty and poor social conditions (including refugeecamps) also facilitateconflict by providingmore readilyavailablecombatants. Competing groups are formed when collective action problems can be overcome (Olson, 1965). Many of today's civil wars have an ethnic or nationalistdimension;and ethnicity, whether based on language, religion or other distinctions, is often a superior basis for collective action in contemporaryconflicts in poorercountriesthan other social divisions such as class. In coalescing groups, therefore, present-day and historicalgrievancesplay a crucialpart.This is all the more possible when there are inequalitiesacrossa small number of clearly identifiablegroups - horizontal inequalities (see Stewart, 2000). More often than not, these take the form of high asset inequality, discriminatory public spending across groups and unequal access to the benefits of state patronage, such as government jobs. Furthermore, state failure in providing securityand a minimal level of public goods often forcesindividualsto relyon kinshipties for support and security,this ethnic capital

therebybecoming highly important to individuals (as discussedin Azam, 2001). But, as always, ethnicity must be treated carefully: there is no simple, linear relationship. Indeed, where ethnic diversityis very large, we would not expect to see much conflict, as the different groups find it difficult to organizeagainsteach other,a conjecturethat is verified by empiricalwork, including the articleby de Soysa (2002). Discussionof greedas a motive for conflict has mainly arisen in the context of naturalresource endowments, an abundance of which - at leastso faras valuablemineralsare concerned- appearsto increasethe risk of a countryfallinginto seriousconflict.Certainly thereareall too many tragicexamplesof conflict in mineral-rich countries, notably Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and SierraLeone, to name but three. The issueis addressed all the contributions by to this issue directlyor indirectly.Capturable natural-resource rents, such as alluvial diamonds (point-sourceresourcesin the article by Addison & Murshed,2002), can resultin contests over the right to control these, some of which take the form of warfare,but also criminalityand corruptionin otherinstances. Buhaug & Gates (2002) find that the presence of capturablenaturalresourcestends to draw the conflict closer to these resources, therebyenlargingthe conflict zone. A related point concerns environmental conflict, specifically the struggle over land use and water rights in situations of acute shortage of these means of livelihood. The articleby de Soysa (2002) examinesthe contribution of shortagesof renewableresources such as land or water relative to the abundance of non-renewable resources (diamonds, oil) in determining the risk of conflict. The results of his econometric investigation across a cross-section of 138 countries suggest that the former has little impact, whereas mineral-resourceendowment significantlycontributes to the risk of

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4 volume / number /july 2002 39 others and concentratingthe fruits of state power - public employment, other public spending and resourcerents - into its own hands (see Ndikumana, 2001, on Burundi and Rwanda). A final complexity in fatally weakening social contracts was the interaction of these 'domestic'factorswith external events, notably the Cold War, which provided finance and ideological succour to ruling elites and rebels (notably in Central America, Central Africa and the Horn of Africa). The net result of these processes is the accumulation of grievances within the context of a disintegrating social contract that would otherwisehave providedthe rules of the game to governthe distributionof the social pie and to achieve peaceful conflict resolution. And the collapse of the social contract, and the resulting civil war, nearly alwayshas a strongfiscaldimension:the state is increasingly perceived to exercise favouritism in public spending and to tax unjustly.Azam & Mesnard(2001) presenta model of civil war in which the social contractbetweendifferentgroupsweakenswhen the state breaksits implicit promise to make a fiscal transferto all of society'smembers. Those who are excluded rebel in an attempt to overthrowthe stateand redress theirgrievance. Addison, Le Billon & Murshed(2000) present a model in which civil war is partly motivated by a desire for natural-resource rents, but where historicallygeneratedgrievances also play a role. Addison & Murshed (2001) discuss the role of the social contract and its disintegrationas civil war develops. In summary, both greed and grievance motivatebelligerents,but they have complex social conand deep roots in a disintegrating tractthat then permitstheir free,and violent, expression.These deeper roots also provide some hope: even societies marked by prolonged civil war can in some instances reassemble a working social contract (Mozambique), or make progress towards

conflict. Also, the more exposed a nation is to trade, the greaterthe likelihood of peace; an intuitive outcome as internationaltrade cannot flourish in very poorly governedand conflictualsocieties. The greedversusgrievancedichotomy is a useful entry point into the debate. But for these forces to take the form of large-scale violence, theremust be other factorsat work, specifically a weakening of the social contract.Therefore,while rents from capturable point resources do constitute a sizeable 'prize', violent conflict is unlikely to take hold if a country has a frameworkof widely agreedrules, both formal and informal, that govern the allocation of resources,including point-resourcerents, and the peacefulsettlement of grievances.Such a viable social contract can be sufficient to restrain, if not eliminate, opportunistic behaviour,such as large-scaletheft of resource rents, and the violent expressionof grievance. Conflict-affectednations have historiesof weak social contracts(or a once strong social contractthat has degraded).This weaknessis in many instances a legacy of colonialism, which institutionalizedmechanisms favouring settlers over indigenous peoples (Guatemala,Indonesia,South Africa);divide and rule favouring one ethnic group over another, as in Rwanda; market controls to create rents for settlers to the cost of locals (Indonesia and Zimbabwe); and the expropriation of land and resourcerents (Angola, Sri Lanka and the Belgian Congo). Precolonial ethnic rivalry over territory and countries assets, the case in resource-scarce such asAfghanistan,Somaliaand Sudan,and the failure of longstanding independent states to strengthenmechanismsof political representation,notably Ethiopia, Haiti and Liberia,also lie behind weak social contracts (see Nafziger,Stewart& Vayrynen,2000). A single ethnic group (or a subset) often assumed power in the immediate postindependence era (the 1960s), subjugating

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one (Guatemala). Somalia'scivil society is creativityin trying to showing a remarkable cut acrossboth greed and grievanceto create a social contract, drawing on longstanding and traditionalmeans of dispute resolution. If greed or grievance alone drive conflict, violence would simply continue indefinitely. Other Areas Covered in this Issue Still,while thereis hope, thereis also much to fear.Conflict, once initiated,can have unpredictable dynamics. Open warfareis just one manifestation of the disintegration of the socialcontract. The otheris criminality, which also flourishesin the environment of failed In statesand poor governance. addition,criminal activity,whether involving extortion or tradein contraband goods, playsa majorpart in financingconflict.The artide by Skaperdas (2002) considerswarlordcompetition.This is a situationwhere warlords,akin to gangsters, compete with one anotherfor the lootableor capturable surplus.Although it is a model of therearesurprising similarovertones banditry, in a variety of civil wars in Africa (Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia,Angola) and elsewhere (Chechnya, competitionbetweenrival Georgia).Excessive warlordslowers the amount of the very loot that they compete over.This is becauseexcess warlord competition discourages peaceful production(which may not alwaysbe true of non-renewableresources).If that is the case, then a long-term time horizon ought to discourageexcesscompetition and violence, but it may not do so if eliminatingthe enemy now yields greaterexpected returnsin the future. Mehlum, Moene & Torvik (2002) consider the allocationof talent,especially afterthe end of war and after demobilization. Talented individualsmay choose to criminallypredate or act as protectorsof the predated. This situation can also arise in societies, as in the former Soviet Union, where the social contract was severelystressed by the transition

from communism, especially in Azerbaijan and the other newly independent states of or CentralAsia.An oversupply, the new entry of predators,increasesdemand for the complementaryservice- protection from predation - and overallcriminality increases. This is inimicalto povertyreductionand the resumption of sustainable reconstruction growth. and Other factorsalso influence the dynamics and longevity of wars, especiallywhen they affectthe abilityof belligerents organize to and themselves.Buhaug & Gates (2002) protect consider a neglected dimension: the geograof phy of conflict and the relationship topography to warfare. Using data from 1946 onwards,they find that ethnic and secessionist warstend to be locatedat a greater distance fromthe capital,whilewarsthat try to capture the stateby overthrowing existinggovernthe ment are nearerto the capital.Conflictswith a longerdurationtend to expandthe totalwar zone. Similarly,conflict zones that adjoin an international borderofferrebelarmiesa better chance of escape, providescope for resupply and trade in illicit products and serve to expand the conflict zone. Mountainous, forested and rugged terrainshould intensify the size of the conflict, but data difficulties regardingthis variablerenderit insignificant in the regressions carriedout. Aside from the belligerents themselves, other actors are caught up in conflict, most noticeably civilians and humanitarian workers. These too influence conflict's dynamics. In the model contained in Azam & Hoeffler (2002), there exists a trade-off between pure fighting and activitiesconcentrated on terrorizingthe population. While the former offers scope for looting, the role of terror is to displace civilians and lower rebel fighting efficiency, as rebel troops are less able to disguisethemselvesamongstcivilians. But less loot is available when the civiliansin rebelareas, governmentterrorizes as the populationwill havefled.Terrortactics are therefore likely to produce a refugee

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4 volume / number /july 2002 39 push potential belligerents over the brink into warfare. External triggers consist of actions and signals by outsiders, neighbouring countriesand greatpowersthat make the prospect of fighting or secession more attractive.Conflict triggerscan only be operational when the institutions of conflict and the social managementhavedegenerated contractis non-functional. Be that as it may, the restorationof peace requiresthe reconstitutionof the social contract.This requiresa broad-basedpatternof economic growthassociated with reconstruction and the peace dividend. Each society will tend to have different conceptions what constitutesa desirable regarding pattern of broad-based and taxation: public spending for some, the emphasis will be on the provision of public services that reduce the absolute poverty of the excluded groups, while others will demand a more comprehensive closure of the gap between the excluded and the favouredgroups by means of public spending and taxation, a concern for reducing group inequality as well as reducingabsolutepoverty.But, whateverthe precise pattern of broad-based spending required,the necessaryfiscal transfersmust somehow be financed.Achievingpeace from this starting point is exceedingly difficult since subsequent promises by the state to rectify the initial injustice, by fiscal transfers and other means, may be imperfectly credible(Addison& Murshed,2001). Moreover, in a prolonged conflict the tax base declines along with the economy, thereby that the reducingthe size of the fiscaltransfer state is able to offercomparedwith the initial transferit should have made to avoid war. The state can, however, share the postconflict peace dividend with the rebels, and reducingmilitaryspending aftera peace deal will release resourcesfor such broad-based spending as education and health. Conflict is now more directly integrated into researchon the causes of development

crisis. Foreign aid may discouragea looting war, as more money is available.But when the governmentis more inclined to terrorize civiliansin rebelareaswith a view to weakening rebel armies, more aid encouragesmore violence and increases the chances of a refugeecrisis.Aid deliverycan be redesigned to limit these perverseincentives, but to do so we need to understandclearlyeach conflict'sspecific dynamics. It is evident that peace agreementsto end conflict tend to fail, and it takes several attempts to bring about a lasting peace (Walter,2001, for example).In other words, one or more parties to a peace treaty often renege on their commitment to peace. The resumptionof warfarelowers the reputation of those who repudiate peace agreements, making futurepeace agreementsmore costly and difficult to achieve. In the presence of capturable point resources and overall poverty,however,the resumptionof warfare is sometimesattractive,all the more so when groups are impatient to consume (have a high discount rate). These matters are analysed in detail in Addison & Murshed (2002). The commitment to any peaceagreement can be enhanced by credible outside intervention, in the form of effective peacekeeping forces.This is part and parcelof the reform of international institutions as discussed in Nayyar (2002). Most of the internationalinstitutionsof conflict management that exist were fashioned during the Cold Warand aregearedto dealingwith inter-state conflict ratherthan civil war. To end conflict, we need to understandits causes. Unfortunately, we are only able clearlyto identify factors that contribute to the risk of open political violence and civil war. The actual outbreak of civil war, however, requires triggers that are usually both internaland external;these arenot predictable and must arisein the context of the failure of state and society to manage conflict. Internaltriggersare events that actually

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CONFLICT, CIVIL WAR AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT Conflict, 1997. PreventingDeadly Conflict. New York:CarnegieCorporation. Collier, Paul & Anke Hoeffler,2001. 'Greedand Grievance in Civil War', manuscript, World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/research/ conflict/papers/greedandgrievance.htm). de Soysa, Indra, 2002. 'Paradise Is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governancein Civil War, 1989-99', Journal of Peace Research39(4): 395-416. Mehlum, Halvor; Karl Ove Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2002. 'Plunder & Protection Inc.', Journalof PeaceResearch 39(4): 447-459. Nafziger, E. Wayne; Frances Stewart & Raimo Vayrynen, eds, 2000. War,Hunger,and Displacement: Volume 1 - Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press for UNU/WIDER and Queen Elizabeth House, International Development Centre, Universityof Oxford. Nayyar,Deepak, ed., 2002. 'GoverningGlobalization: Issues and Institutions', forthcoming. Oxford: Oxford University Press for UNU/WIDER. Ndikumana,Leonce,2001. 'FiscalPolicy,Conflict, and Reconstructionin Burundi and Rwanda', UNU/WIDER Discussion Paper No. 62. Helsinki: UNU/WIDER (http://www. wider.unu.edu/publications/publications.htm). Olson, Mancur, 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rodrik, Dani, 1999. 'Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict, and Growth Collapses', Journal of Economic Growth4(4): 385-412. Skaperdas, Stergios, 2002. 'Warlord Competition', Journal of Peace Research39(4): 435-446. Stewart,Frances,2000. 'Crisis Prevention:Tackling Horizontal Inequalities',OxfordDevelopment Studies28(3): 245-262. Wallensteen, Peter & Margareta Sollenberg, 2001. 'ArmedConflict 1989-2000', Journalof PeaceResearch 38(5): 629-644. Walter, BarbaraE, 2001. Committingto Peace: TheSuccessful Settlement Civil Wars. Princeof ton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress.

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failure than ever before. The debate has already moved on considerably from the early contributions of the 1990s, in particular unpacking and going deeper into the motives of belligerents, understanding the ways in which social norms and rules constrain aggressive behaviour and capturing more closely the dynamics of conflict, the role of non-combatants and the ways in which peace can be secured. The articles in this special issue add to this ongoing debate, but also provide a chance to take stock and to move forward in developing new theories and in undertaking more empirical investigation. References

Addison, Tony; Philippe Le Billon & S. Mansoob Murshed, 2000. 'On the Economic Motivation for Conflict in Africa',paper presented at the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Paris, 26-28 June (http://www.worldbank.org/research/abcde/ eu_2000/papers). Addison, Tony & S. Mansoob Murshed, 2001. 'From Conflict to Reconstruction: Reviving the Social Contract', UNU/WIDER Discussion Paper No. 48. Helsinki: UNU/WIDER (http://www.wider.unu.edu/ publications/publications.htm). Addison, Tony & S. Mansoob Murshed, 2002. 'Credibilityand Reputation in Peacemaking', 39(4): 487-501. Journalof PeaceResearch Azam, Jean-Paul,2001. 'The RedistributiveState and Conflicts in Africa', Journal of Peace Research 38(4): 429-444. Azam, Jean-Paul & Anke Hoeffler, 2002. 'Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars: Journal of PeaceResearch Looting or Terror?', 39(4): 461-485. Azam, Jean-Paul& Alice Mesnard, 2001. 'Civil Warand the Social Contract',paperpresented at the Royal Economic Society Annual Conference, Durham, 9-11 April. Buhaug, Halvard & Scott Gates, 2002. 'The Geography of Civil War', Journal of Peace Research 39(4): 417-433. For biographical details of the author, see the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly article by Addison & Murshedlater in this issue.