GR L-61260 | February 17, 1992 | SERGIO BAUTISTA, v. HON. JOSE P.

CASTRO F: Both the petitioner Sergio Bautista and private respondent Roberto Miguel were candidates for the office above mentioned. After canvass, petitioner Bautista was proclaimed the winner by the Barangay Board of Canvassers on May 17, 1982 with a plurality of two (2) votes. On May 25, 1982, Roberto Miguel filed a protest before the City Court of Quezon City, (docketed as Election Case No. 82-408) on the ground of fraud and illegal acts or practices allegedly committed by Bautista. The latter filed an answer but filed no counter protest. It appears that the results of the election in all the four (4) voting centers in Bgy. Teachers Village East, Quezon City were contested. A revision and recounting of the ballots was conducted which resulted in a tie. The trial court rendered a decision declaring Roberto Miguel to have received the same number of votes as the protestee Sergio Bautista for the position of Bgy. Captain of Bgy. Teachers Village East, Quezon City. From this decision of the city court, protestant Roberto Miguel filed an appeal to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. * On July 29, 1982, judgment was rendered on the appeal which, as stated in the first portion of this decision, declared protestant Roberto Miguel the duly elected Barangay Captain of Bgy. Teachers Village East, Quezon City and setting aside as null and void the proclamation of protestee Sergio Bautista. Petitioner Sergio Bautista filed the instant petition for review by certiorari I: 1) Whether or not the supposed opinion of a person, who was brought by private respondent but who was never presented as a witness, is competent and admissible evidence to support the appellate court's (CFI) conclusion that no less than eighteen (18) votes cast in favor of your petitioner were written by one and the same person. 2) Whether or not a ballot which does not contain the signature of the poll chairman be considered a valid ballot. 3) Whether or not respondent Judge acted correctly in its appreciation of the contested ballots H: Anent the first question, petitioner Bautista questions the reliance by respondent court on the opinion of one Desiderio A. Pagui, who was never presented and qualified as an expert witness. The report of Pagui allegedly appeared only in the records of the case on file with the CFI which was attached in the Memorandum for Protestant Miguel. The contention of petitioner that respondent court relied on the report of an alleged handwriting expert is misplaced. It should be noted that while respondent court considered the report of Atty. Pagui, it did not rely solely on the said report. In the words of respondent court, "(I)t has taken pains and meticulous effort to examine with its naked eye the questioned ballots and handwritings and compare the same with each other . . ." In fact, in its effort to determine the true value of the contested ballots and in order not to disenfranchise bona fide voters, it counted certain ballots in favor of petitioner which the alleged handwriting expert found as written by only one person. It contradicted said report as regards Exhibits "I", "J", "V" and "V-1". The respondent court was circumspect in relying on its own findings on whether or not these contested ballots were prepared by one person. The ballots are the

best evidence of the objections raised. Resort to handwriting experts is not mandatory. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting, this can be done by the COMELEC (in this case, the court taking cognizance of the appeal in this election protest) itself (Bocobo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 94173, November 21, 1990, 191 SCRA 576). Petitioner also argues that respondent court misinterpreted and misapplied Section 36(f) of Comelec Resolution No. 1539. It allegedly failed to take into consideration the other provisions of said Section 36 of the Resolution. We do not agree. The law (Sec. 14 of B.P. 222) and the rules implementing it (Sec. 36 of Comelec Res. No. 1539) leave no room for interpretation. The absence of the signature of the Chairman of the Board of Election Tellers in the ballot given to a voter as required by law and the rules as proof of the authenticity of said ballot is fatal. This requirement is mandatory for the validity of the said ballot. As regards exhibit "Z" and "Z-l", respondent court reversed the decision of the trial court which ruled that these were not marked ballots and hence, were valid votes for petitioner BAUTISTA. In reversing the trial court, respondent court ruled that the presence of an arrow with the words "and party," was meant for no other purpose than to Identify the voter. We agree. It cannot be said that these writings were accidental. As a general rule, a voter must write on the ballot only the names of candidates voted for the offices appearing thereon. Certain exceptions, however, are provided in Section 149 of the Revised Election Code. For example, prefixes such as "Sr.," "Mr.", and the like and suffixes such as "hijo", "Jr.", etc. will not invalidate the ballot (par. 5). Initials (paragraph 15), nicknames or appellation of affection and friendship will not invalidate the ballot, if accompanied by the name or surname of the candidate, and above all, if they were not used as a means to identify the voter. Even under a liberal view, the words written on the ballots under consideration cannot be considered as falling within the exception to the rule. Consequently, they are irrelevant expressions that nullified the ballots. (Lloren v. CA, et al., No. L-25907, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 110). Hence, respondent court excluded Exhibits "Z" and "Z-l". Petitioner objects to respondent court's ruling rejecting Exh. "5". The word "BLBIOY" was written in the spare for Barangay Captain. "BIBOY", petitioner's nickname was duly registered in his certificate of candidacy. While the name written was "BLBIOY", there was no doubt that the voter intended to vote for "BIBOY", the nickname of which petitioner was popularly known and which nickname was duly registered in his certificate of candidacy. Hence, the respondent court's decision as regards Exhibit "5" is reversed and the vote is counted for petitioner. Exhibit "6" was invalidated by both respondent court and the city court as stray vote on the ground that petitioner's name, written as "Bo. Barangay Bautista" was placed on the first line intended for councilmen. We believe however that the voter's intention to vote for BAUTISTA as Barangay Captain was present and said vote should be counted in favor of petitioner. Respondent court correctly invalidated Exhibit "7". This ballot cannot be considered as a vote for petitioner whose name was written seven (7) times in the ballot. The writing of a name more than twice on the ballot is considered to be intentional and serves no other purpose than to identify the ballot (Katigbak v. Mendoza, L-24477, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 543).

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of respondent court is MODIFIED as regards Exhibits "5" and "6". Private respondent Roberto Miguel in declared the duly elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Teachers Village East, Quezon City, with a plurality of twenty-two (22) votes. The temporary restraining order issued Court on December 2, 1982 is hereby LIFTED. G. R. No. 144197 | December 13, 2000 | WILLIAM P. ONG v. COMELEC F: Petitioner William P. Ong and respondent Isagani B. Rizon were candidates for the position of mayor of the municipality of Baroy, Lanao del Norte during the May 11, 1998 local elections. On May 13, 1998, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed William P. Ong as the winner. On May 22, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, Lanao del Norte an election protest contesting petitioners votes in five (5) clustered precincts. Only the ballot boxes for two (2) precincts, namely: Precincts 8A and 28A/28A1 were opened since respondent waived the revision of the ballots in the other precincts. On March 25, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision annulling forty-five (45) votes for petitioner while invalidating two (2) votes for respondent. Petitioners lead was reduced to eight (8) votes over that of respondent. In time, respondent appealed the trial courts decision to the Comelec. On February 1, 2000, the Comelec, Second Division, promulgated a resolution declaring that the trial court committed serious reversible errors in its appreciation of the contested ballots and invalidated sixty-three (63) votes for petitioner and eight (8) votes for respondent. The final result of its examination of the ballots showed that respondent led by a margin of four (4) votes. On February 7, 2000, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the above resolution. On August 15, 2000, the Comelec en banc promulgated a resolution affirming the Second Divisions resolution but reduced by one (1) vote the lead of respondent over petitioner. Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the Comelec en banc resolution, aside from being patently illegal, was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On the whole, the petition disputed the sixty one (61) invalidated ballots of petitioner and seven (7) ballots of respondent. I: WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its resolution H: Comelec invalidated all the contested ballots for being marked and written by two persons. We find that Comelec grievously erred ousting itself of jurisdiction for grave abuse of discretion in invalidating the ballots, including the votes for Ong. The law is clear: Unless it should clearly appear that they have been deliberately put by the voter to serve as identification marks, comma, dots, lines, or hyphens between the first name and surname of a candidate, or in other parts of the ballot, traces of the letter T, J, and other similar ones, the first letters or syllables of names which the voter does not continue, the use of two or more kinds of writing and unintentional or accidental flourishes, strokes or strains, shall not invalidate the ballot.

The rule is in favor of the validity of the ballot, not otherwise. The term unless imports an exception rather than the general rule. The printed name NIKKI does not show any intention on the part of the voters to identify or distinguish themselves. Therefore, the ballots are not considered marked. The name NIKKI only showed that it was the voters intention to emphasize and stress their adulation for a senator with the name NIKKI, rather than to identify themselves. The votes are stray for the senatorial candidates but will not invalidate the entire ballot. In the same manner, the appearance of print and script writings in a single ballot does not necessarily imply that two persons wrote the ballot. The strokes of print and script handwriting would naturally differ but would not automatically mean that two persons prepared the same. A visual examination of the ballots belies the claim that these ballots were prepared by two persons. In the absence of any deliberate intention to put an identification mark, the ballots must not be rejected. We held that: The ballots must be appreciated in favor of Ong. There is no showing that the words/letters/names written therein have been intentionally placed to identify the voters. Notice that these markings are appellations or nicknames of famous showbiz personalities who might have been mistaken as candidates. At most, these may be considered as stray votes for the position where they were written, as provided in Sec. 211 (19), Omnibus Election Code. The primordial principle in the appreciation of the ballots is to respect, not to frustrate the will of the electorate. Comelec also correctly ruled that Exhibits Q, GGG, OO, PP and WW of Precinct 28A, 28A1 are valid votes for Ong. LIM, APEC and DAYO are names of candidates which were written on spaces where they should not be written as they were not candidates for said position. For instance, APEC is a party list candidate but was written on the space intended for senatorial candidates. As such, the same shall be considered as stray vote but shall not invalidate the whole ballot. Thus, the finding of the Comelec that these ballots are valid for Ong is affirmed. However, the Court is constrained to reverse the Comelec finding that Exhibits Y and XX of Precinct 28A, 28A1 were valid for Ong. Considering that there was no candidate for senator with the name PACETE or PACITE, such writings served to identify the ballots. The ballots are, therefore, invalid for Ong. Incorrect spelling of a candidates name does not invalidate the ballot. The Comelec was not correct when it ruled that Exhibit ZZZ of Precinct 28A, 28A1 was invalid considering that the voter "appeared to be literate." Even the most literate person is bound to commit a mistake in spelling. Hereunder is a summary of the findings. From a total of 4,411 votes of Ong per Comelec findings, a total of another twenty (20) shall be added as per above findings which gives him a total of 4,431 votes. From a total of 4,414 votes of Rizon per Comelec findings, a total of five (5) votes shall be added as per above findings which gives him a total of 4,419. Consequently, candidate William P. Ong won by a margin of twelve (12) votes.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Resolution dated August 15, 2000 of the Commission on Elections en banc declaring respondent Isagani B. Rizon as the winner in the May 11, 1998 elections. De Guzman v. Sison F: Hilario De Guzman was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Jacinto, Pangasinan with 4,248 votes as against 4,104 votes obtained by Columbres. Columbres filed an election protest which was raffled to RTC Judge Deodoro Sison who then rendered a decision finding that the revision and physical counting of votes/ballots in the precincts contested showed that Columbres won the mayoralty elections with 4,037 votes as against complainant's 3,302 votes. In a letter addressed to Chief Justice Davide, Jr., de Guzman charged Judge Sison with manifest partiality and gross ignorance of the law in the appreciation of the ballots in the Election Case contending (among others) that Judge Sison: (1) nullified all the votes in his favor for failure of the Election Chairman to countersign the ballots, citing Batas Pambansa No. 222 and Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539, as well as the case of Bautista vs. Castro (which applies only to barangay elections); (2) nullified the ballots with undetached stubs despite the provision in Section 211 (27) of the Omnibus Election that failure to remove the detachable coupon from a ballot does not annul such ballot; (3) Respondent nullified ballots with "X" marks, lines and similar marks despite the provision in Section 211 (21) of the Omnibus Election Code that circles, crosses or lines placed on spaces on which the voter has not voted shall be considered as signs of desistance from voting and shall not invalidate the ballot. This was followed by the filing of a verified complaint. In response, Sison claimed that any error in his decision is correctable by appeal and not through an administrative complaint, absent any showing of malice or bad faith on his part. Investigating Justice found respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and manifest partiality and recommended his dismissal from the service. Issue: Whether Judge Sison erred in applying Batas Pambansa No. 222 and Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539, as well as the case of Bautista vs. Castro in nullifying votes for failure of the Election Chairman to countersign Held: Yes. The subject case involved an election protest relative to the Mayoralty Elections of 1998. At that time up to the present, such elections were governed by the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, and the Synchronized Elections Law of 1992. Clearly, B.P. Blg. 222 and Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539 xxx were inapplicable because they applied to the election of barangay officials in 1982 and they have already been repealed and rendered obsolete. It is, thus, perplexing why respondent judge insisted in applying B.P. Blg. 222 which pertained only to the election of barangay officials in 1982 instead of B.P. Blg. 882, enacted on December 3, 1985, which expressly governs mayoralty elections including those held in 1998. Issue: Whether the contention of Judge Sison, that ballots contain obvious markings visible on their face, gives rise to the presumption that said markings on the ballots were placed thereat by the voters themselves, thus nullifying the said ballots, is correct

Held: No. The Court has consistently held that laws and statutes governing elections contests especially the appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. The court cited the January 25, 2000 resolution of the COMELEC en banc in EAC A-20-98: The distinction should always be between marks that were apparently carelessly or innocently made, which do not invalidate the ballot, and marks purposely placed thereon by the voter with a view to possible future identification, which invalidates it. In other words, a mark placed on the ballot by a person other than the voter himself does not invalidate the ballot as marked. There is no legal presumption that the alleged markings were deliberately made by the voter himself and for the purpose of identifying it thereafter. In the absence of any circumstance showing that the intention of the voter to mark the ballot is unmistakable, or any evidence aliunde to show that the words or marks were deliberately written or put therein to identify the ballots, the ballot should not be rejected. Moreover, as a rule, slight variations in writing are not sufficient to show that the ballot was prepared by two hands and where there is doubt as to whether the names were written by two persons, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the validity of the ballot where the ballot shows distinct and marked dissimilarities in writing of the names of some candidates from the rest, the ballot was written by two hands and hence void. Issue: Whether the Investigating Justice erred in recommended dismissal Held: No. We agree with the Investigating Justice that given the foregoing circumstances, this is not a case of not knowing or failing to understand legal principles and relevant doctrines but a deliberate disregard of them. Such an omission by respondent of the pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Election Code and his application of B.P. Blg. 222 and Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539, which are applicable exclusively to the election of barangay officials and which are already obsolete, can not simply be brushed away as an honest mistake of judgment or an innocent error in the exercise of discretion. It can only be seen as a deliberate attempt, through the misuse of judicial processes, to give a semblance of merit to a clearly unmeritorious cause and to accord undeserved benefits to the party espousing and promoting the same. There is evidence aliunde which have been adduced to show respondent's bias or partiality in Columbres' favor, referring to two (2) incidents which occurred after the promulgation of respondent's assailed decision. In the first incident, complainant's witness Omictin testified that she saw respondent together with Columbres waving to the public from the balcony of the San Jacinto Municipal Hall on the latter's assumption of office as Mayor. The second incident allegedly occurred on December 18, 1998 at the Northern Paradise Resort in San Jacinto, Pangasinan, where respondent judge was again seen with Columbres. Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. It is improper for a judge to meet privately with the accused without the presence of the complainant. The Court notes that aside from this case, respondent has been charged seven (7) other times. It need not be overemphasized such an unflattering record only erodes further the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary. G.R. No. 97105 | October 15, 1991 | Lerias v. HRET

F: Petitioner Rosette Y. Lerias filed her certificate of candidacy as the official candidate of the UPP-KBL for the position of Representative for the lone district of Southern Leyte in the May 11, 1987 elections. In her certificate of candidacy she gave her full name as "Rosette Ynigues Lerias". Her maiden name is Rosette Ynigues. Respondent Roger G. Mercado was the administration candidate for the same position. During the canvass of votes for the congressional candidates by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Southern Leyte, it appeared that, excluding the certificate of canvass from the Municipality of Libagon which had been questioned by Mercado on the ground that allegedly it had been tampered with, the candidates who received the two (2) highest number of votes were Roger G. Mercado with 34,442 votes and Rosette Y. Lerias with 34,128 votes, respectively. In the provincial board's copy of the certificate of canvass for the municipality of Libagon, Lerias received 1,811 votes while Mercado received 1,351. Thus, if said copy would be the one to be included in the canvass, Lerias would have received 35,939 votes as against Mercado's 35,793 votes, giving Lerias a winning margin of 146 votes. But, the provincial board of canvassers ruled that their copy of the certificate of canvass contained erasures, alterations and superimpositions and therefore, cannot be used as basis of the canvass. The provincial board of canvassers rejected the explanation of the members of the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon that said corrections were made to correct honest clerical mistakes which did not affect the integrity of the certificate and said corrections were made in the presence of the watchers of all the nine (9) candidates for the position, including those of Mercado who offered no objection. Lerias appealed the ruling of the provincial board of canvassers to the Comelec praying that the Commission order the provincial board of canvassers to use their copy of the certificate of canvass for Libagon. At the scheduled hearing on June 5, 1987, Atty. Valeriano Tumol, then counsel for Lerias, agreed to use the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass provided that it be found to be authentic and genuine. A similar reservation was made by counsel for Mercado. The Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass was produced and when opened it showed that Lerias received only 1,411 votes in Libagon because in Precincts 6, 10, 18 and 19 she received in each of the said precincts 100 votes less than what she received as shown in the provincial board of canvasser's copy of the certificate of canvass. Nevertheless, the Comelec, (Second Division) in its Resolution dated June 6, 1987, directed the provincial board of canvassers to complete the canvass by crediting Mercado 1,351 votes and Lerias 1,411 votes, the votes received by them, respectively, as shown in the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvas. So, on June 7, 1987, the provincial board of canvassers reconvened, resumed the canvass and proclaimed Mercado, as the winning candidate, having received the highest number of votes 35,793. Lerias, his closest rival, received 35,539 votes or a difference of 254 votes. On June 7, 1987, Lerias filed an urgent ex-parte motion for the reconsideration of the June 6, 1987 resolution. She prayed that the members of the municipal board of canvassers be summoned to testify on the authenticity and veracity of the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass and statement of votes submitted to

the Comelec and that the election returns for precincts 6, 10, 18 & 19 be produced. On June 15, 1987 Lerias filed with the Comelec a petition (SPC No. 87-488) for the annulment of the canvass and proclamation of Mercado, praying that the ballot boxes of precints 6, 10, 18 & 19 of Libagon be ordered opened and the votes therein recounted. On June 21, 1987, she filed a motion to suspend the effects of the proclamation of Mercado. There being no action taken by the Comelec on the said motion and since the term of office of the members of the House of Representatives would commence on June 30, 1987, Lerias filed on June 30, 1987 before this Court a petition (G.R. No. 78833) for the annulment of the Comelec resolution of June 6, 1987 and the proclamation of Mercado. Meanwhile, in SPC-87-488, the Comelec en banc required Mercado to file an answer. Instead of filing an answer, however, Mercado filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (a) the resolution dated June 6, 1987 had already become final because the motion for reconsideration filed by Lerias was ex-parte and did not stop the running of the period to appeal therefrom and (b) since Lerias filed with the Supreme Court a petition for the annulment of the Comelec's June 6, 1987 resolution and the subsequent proclamation of Mercado, she had abandoned her previous petition with the Comelec. At the scheduled hearing on June 16, 1987 of SPC-87-488, the members of the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon and the school teachers who served as inspectors of Precincts 6, 10, 18 and 19 were present and manifested that they were ready to testify and affirm that the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass was not authentic for it did not correctly state the number of votes received by the parties since Lerias actually obtained 1,811 votes in Libagon, not 1,411 votes. The Comelec did not want to hear the case on the merits opting instead to merely hear Mercado's motion to dismiss. The said witnesses were not given the chance to testify. On June 17, 1987, the Comelec resolved to dismiss SPC-87-488 because the petitioner had filed a case with the Supreme Court and had, therefore, abandoned her case with the Comelec. On July 22, 1987 Lerias filed with this Court a second petition to set aside not only the Comelec's resolution of July 6, 1987 but also the resolution of July 17, 1987. This Court dismissed the petition because (a) the Comelec resolution of June 6, 1987 and the proclamation of Mercado had already become executory inasmuch as five days had elapsed from receipt of a copy of said resolution by petitioner and no restraining order had been issued by the Court citing Sec. 246 of the Omnibus Election Code, and (b) Lerias thru counsel had agreed before the Comelec (Second Division) during the hearing therein on June 5, 1987 to use the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass. Lerias filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, on October 1, 1987, she filed an election protest with respondent HRET. In her protest, Lerias contested the results of the election in Precinct Nos. 6, 10, 18 & 19 of Libagon asserting that the total votes credited to her in the said four precincts (1,411 votes) were less than or short by 400 votes from that actually obtained by her (1,811 votes) and if the provincial board of canvassers' copy of the certificate of canvass for Libagon were to be used as basis of the canvass

instead of the Comelec copy, she would have garnered 35,930 votes as against Mercado's 35,793 votes or a winning margin of 146 votes. Mercado filed his Answer with Counter-Protest, denying the material allegations of the protest and counter-protesting the results of the elections in 377 precincts. The initial hearing was scheduled for August 22, 1988, but on March 7, 1988 unidentified uniformed armed men raided the municipal building of Libagon and stole the ballot boxes for the 20 precincts of Libagon stored in the office of the municipal treasurer. Fortunately, these armed mem overlooked the ballot box which was kept in the office of the election registrar at the second floor of said municipal building. Said ballot box contained all the copies of the election returns of Libagon which were used in the municipal canvass. It is in the said office that said ballot box remained until a representative of the HRET went to Libagon on March 23 and 24, 1988 to take possession of the contents of the same particularly the election returns kept in said ballot box. The Protest (with HRET): Lerias contended that in the four (4) protested precincts of Libagon where her votes were determined to be 1,411 only, the same were allegedly reduced by 100 votes in each precinct, thus totalling 400. Should her claimed votes as aforestated be sustained Lerias' total votes from the municipality of Libagon shall be 1,811 votes. In such an eventuality, Lerias shall have been able to recover 400 votes, more than sufficient to overcome the winning margin of Mercado, thereby prevailing by a plurality of 146 votes. To prove her contention, Lerias submitted original copies of the certificate of canvass of the municipal board of canvassers and the provincial board of canvassers. She also invoked the original copy of the election returns for the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon. These documents, particularly the election returns showed that Lerias received 162 votes in Prec. No. 6, 123 votes in Prec. No. 10, 132 votes in Prec. No. 18 and 156 votes in Prec. No. 19 to give her a total of 1,811 votes in the entire municipality of Libagon. Upon the other hand, Mercado relied mainly on the xerox copy of the certificate of canvass for the Comelec. This certificate showed that Lerias received 62 votes in Prec. No. 6, 23 votes in Prec. No. 10, 32 votes in Prec. No. 18 and 56 votes in Prec. No. 19. The HRET majority opinion rejected the election returns and sustained the certificate of canvass because (1) the Comelec found that the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass is "regular, genuine and authentic on its face" and said finding of the Comelec had been sustained by the Supreme Court; (2) the protestant (meaning Lerias) had agreed during the pre-proclamation proceedings to the use of the Comelec copy of the certificate of canvass; and (3) the authenticity of the election returns from the four (4) disputed precincts had not been established. I: WON the findings and pronouncements of the HRET (majorirty opinion) are totally bereft of any support in law and settled jurisprudence H: In an election contest where what is involved is the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves. But where the ballots cannot be produced or are not available, the election returns would be the best evidence. Where it has been duly determined that actual voting and election by the registered voter had taken place in the questioned precincts or voting centers, the election returns

cannot be disregarded and excluded with the resulting disenfranchisement of the voters, but must be accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the results of the voting. Canvassing boards, the Comelec and the HRET must exercise extreme caution in rejecting returns and may do so only upon the most convincing proof that the returns are obviously manufactured or fake. And, conformably to established rules, it is the party alleging that the election returns had been tampered with, who should submit proof of this allegation. At this juncture, it is well to stress that the evidence before the HRET is the original copy of the election returns while the Comelec's copy of the certificate of canvass, is merely a xerox copy, the original thereof had not been produced. Under the best evidence rule, "there can be no evidence of a writing, the contents of which are the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself" except only in the cases enumerated in Rule 130, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court. The exceptions are not present here. Moreover, the xerox copy of the certificate of canvass is inadmissible as secondary evidence because the requirements of Sec. 4 of the same Rule have not been met. (Dissent of J. Cruz, p. 254) Besides this certificate of canvass had been disowned by the chairman and members of the municipal board of canvassers, claiming that the same was falsified since their signatures and thumbmarks appearing thereon are not theirs and the number of votes credited to Lerias in the municipality of Libagon had been reduced from 1,811 to 1,411. The finding of the Comelec in the pre-proclamation proceedings that its copy of the certificate of canvass is "genuine and authentic" and which finding was sustained by this Court (G.R. No. 78833; 79882-83) is not binding and conclusive. Anent the pronouncement of the HRET (majority opinion) that having agreed to the use of the Comelec's copy of the certificate of canvass, Lerias is now estopped from assailing it, suffice it to state that Lerias agreed to the use of said copy because she was not aware then that the figures therein had been altered. It is a matter of record that she immediately objected after she discovered the discrepancy. At any rate, she cannot be estopped from protesting a falsification of the voters' will because such estoppel would contravene public policy. (Dissent of J. Cruz, p. 5) Moreover, as indicated in the discussion hereinabove, under the circumstances relating to pre-proclamation, estoppel certainly cannot apply. As to the delay in presenting the election returns because these were not presented during the whole pre-proclamation proceedings, it must be noted that at that time, the four ballot boxes of Libagon with their correspondidng ballots were still intact and as these would have provided the best evidence, resorting to the election returns was uncalled for. It is for this reason that Lerias had asked for a recount of the ballots and this would have obviated the need for the election returns. Under these circumstances the failure of Lerias to ask for the production of the election returns during those times that the ballots were still available cannot be considered as ground for considering said election returns as of dubious character. The "suspicion" of the HRET (majority opinion) regarding the possible tampering of the election returns are at best merely speculative and dispelled by the

incontrovertible evidence in the case. On its face, these election returns have no traces of tampering. Even the majority decision admits that said election returns "appear to be originals and on their faces, authentic." When the chairmen of each of said precincts testified before the Hearing Officer designated by the Tribunal, they all Identified their respective signatures and thumbmarks appearing on the envelopes for said four precincts. Ruego, the chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers and acting election registrar during the election, also Identified his signature on the envelopes acknowledging the receipt of said envelopes containing the election returns for said precincts. The four chairmen of said precincts also positively Identified that the election returns shown to them for their respective precincts taken from the custodian of the Tribunal and placed inside Envelopes A and B were the very same election returns prepared by them. They Identified their own signatures and thumbmarks and those of the other members of the board of election inspectors in their respective precincts. The number of votes received by protestant and protestee in the four disputed precincts of Libagon as shown in the election returns for said precincts is substantiated by documentary evidence. According to NAMFREL Operation Quick Count Report No. 075576 for Precinct 6, both the national headquarters' copy and the copy of the NAMFREL municipal coordinator, Bencouer Gado (Exhs. H and CC), protestant got 162 votes while protestee got only 45 votes. In the entire congressional district Lerias obtained 35,937 votes while Mercado obtained 35,795 votes. These are reports coming from Lakas ng Bansa and PDPLaban, political parties who had their own candidates. They would not have filed said reports admitting that Lerias obtained more votes than their own candidates unless the same were actually the votes obtained by her as verified by their own representatives. The Municipal Board of Canvassers' copy of the Certificate of Canvass and supporting statement of votes as well as the Provincial Board of Canvassers' copy of said reports showed that Lerias obtained 1,811 votes in Libagon. True, that the Provincial Board of Canvassers rejected their copy of said Certificate of Canvass because of certain erasures and alterations therein. But the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers explained to the Provincial Board of Canvassers that the corrections made by them were merely to correct certain clerical errors. It should be pointed out here that the corrections and erasures made did not refer to the votes of the congressional candidates. The votes of Lerias and Mercado in Precincts 6, 10, 18 and 19 of Libagon bear no corrections or erasures. And in the canvass for the senatorial candidates, the Provincial Board of Canvassers' copy which the board rejected in the congressional canvass, was used as basis of the canvass. The board would have rejected the same were it not authentic.The fact that said copy of the Certificate of Canvass was used in the senatorial canvass conducted after the congressional canvass would indicate that the board considered the same authentic. Conclusion: Considering the indubitable evidence on record the 400 votes fraudulently taken away from Lerias should be returned to her. So that in the entire municipality of Libagon, she received 1,811 votes. From the

original 35,539 votes, Lerias should be credited with 35,939 votes as against the 35,793 votes of Mercado giving her a margin of 146 votes. Whatever the results of the review of the ballots in the counter-protested precincts would be, (wherein Mercado won by 67 votes according to the majority, or as found by the dissenting members, Lerias won by 12 votes (dissent of J. Herrera) or by 20 votes (dissent of Rep. Cerilles) Lerias would still be the winner. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Honorable Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 16 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. G.R. No. 166639 | April 24, 2007 | ROGELIO P. JUAN vs. COMELEC F: Petitioner Rogelio P. Juan and respondent Salvador C. Del Mundo were both candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon City, in the July 15, 2002 synchronized barangayand sangguniang kabataan elections. Petitioner was proclaimed the winner by a margin of 1,083 votes. Claiming massive electoral fraud and dissatisfied with the results, respondent filed an election protest before the trial court. Respondent sought the recount of ballots in all of the seventy-two (72) precincts of Barangay Talipapa. In his Answer, petitioner denied respondent's claim, contending that the election was clean and credible and that the respondent did not object to the tabulation made by the Board of Election Tellers (BET). Correlatively, petitioner filed a counter-protest. The trial court scheduled the recounting of ballots. In the course thereof, on October 16, 2002, petitioner moved to stop the recount because before they were opened, some ballots boxes had broken and/or unlocked plastic seals. Petitioner claimed that the integrity of the ballots contained therein had been compromised and the recount would not faithfully reflect the true will of the people. After requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda, the trial court denied the said motion since it was premature to conclude that fraudulent acts were indeed committed. The trial court proceeded with the recount. RTC: Dismissed the election protest filed by respondent and proclaimed petitioner the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon City. The trial court held that petitioner won the election by garnering 3,102 votes over respondent's 2,576 votes, or a winning margin of 526 votes. The trial court noted that both parties made claims and objections as to the ballots. However, they failed to formally offer the said contested ballots in evidence. Respondent appealed to the COMELEC. COMELEC: In its Resolution dated January 30, 2004, the Second Division granted respondent's appeal, reversed the trial court's Decision, declared respondent as the duly elected Punong Barangay of Barangay, Talipapa, and ordered petitioner to peacefully vacate the contested office. The Second Division found respondent to have won the election by 1,241 votes. Petitioner moved to reconsider. However, in a Resolution dated January 25, 2005, the COMELEC En Banc, denied the petitioner's motion, annulled his proclamation and affirmed the Second Division's ruling with modification as to the number of votes obtained, holding that respondent won over the petitioner by fifty-six (56) votes.

I: WON (1) the instant petition has no basis since the appreciation of contested ballots involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC ; (2) the petitioner's allegation of post-election operations is not supported by evidence and partake of a factual determination; and , (3) the best evidence in determining the results are the ballots, in the absence of any evidence that the ballots were indeed tampered or substituted. On February 1, 2005, this Court issued a Resolution requiring the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the COMELEC's assailed resolutions. H: The petition is bereft of merit. A ballot indicates the voter's will. There is no requirement that the entries in the ballot be written nicely or that the name of the candidate be spelled accurately. In the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot is presumed valid unless there is a clear reason to justify its rejection. The object in the appreciation of ballots is to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, if it can be determined with reasonable certainty. When placed in issue, as in this case, the appreciation of contested ballots and election documents which involves a question of fact,is best left to the determination of the COMELEC. As to the allegations that the "markings" on the ballots cast for the petitioner were the result of post-election operations in the 37 reversal precincts, this Court abides by the COMELEC findings that the said allegations were not supported by evidence. The petitioner argues that the testimonies of the 107 public school teachers of the BET attest that they observed no markings in the contested ballots or that the same were prepared by one or two persons, and that there were no irregularities in the appreciation thereof in the precinct level. However, this Court observed that the representative sample of the said testimonies would show that the same is an affidavit in prepared form, with the affiant only writing her name, precinct number, and affixing her signature thereon. This only implies that the testimonies of the said 107 teachers of the BET consisted only of the very same prepared Sinumpaang Salaysay with only the affiants affixing their own signatures. Further, as correctly observed by the COMELEC En Banc, the markings on the ballots were so subtly made that they would have escaped the scrutiny of the teachers serving as BET, and that only upon close comparison with the other ballots did the flaws became discernible. This Court is not a trier of facts. The Court's jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of the COMELEC on this matter operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. Verily, only where grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the COMELEC's judgment. Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as would amount to lack of jurisdiction; it contemplates a situation where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law. The office of a petition for certiorari is not to correct

simple errors of judgment; any resort to the said petition under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues. Thus, it is imperative for the petitioner to show caprice and arbitrariness on the part of the COMELEC whose exercise of discretion is being assailed. Proof of such grave abuse of discretion is found wanting in this case. The COMELEC'S conclusion on a matter decided within its competence is entitled to utmost respect. It is not sufficient to allege that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion. Such allegation should also be justified. In this case, petitioner failed to justify his assertion of grave abuse of discretion against the COMELEC. In the same token, petitioner failed to support his allegation with evidence that post-election operations were devised in order to invalidate his votes. Moreover, the COMELEC's proceedings were conducted in accordance with the prevailing laws and regulations. Findings of facts of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings are made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed. The COMELEC, as an administrative agency and a specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has more than enough expertise in its field that its findings or conclusions are generally respected and even given finality. We do not find the instant case an exception to this avowed rule. Petition dismissed. AM RTJ-98-1403 | August 14, 2000| MAMERTO T. PACRIS vs. JUDGE ADRIAN N. PAGALILAUAN F: During the pendency of Election Case No. 1807-S, entitled Federico Q. Galapia, protestant, versus Mamerto T. Pacris, protestee, which was tried and submitted for decision before respondent judge, and during the campaign of (sic) the 1995 elections, wherein the protestant and the protestee were again among the candidates for mayor in Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, the protestant in his campaign speeches told the public that he will sit as the Mayor-elect of Sanchez Mira on April 14, 1995. So the protestee approached the respondent judge in his chambers to inquire from him if he has (sic) already rendered his decision in the election protest involving the protestant and the protestee and stated to him what the protestant had been publicly telling the people, but respondent judge told protestee not to believe the protestant and to convince protestee, he showed his unsigned decision dismissing Election Case No. 1807-S. In the early morning of April 20, 1995, the undersigned before going to Tuguegarao, Cagayan, to see the Governor on official matters, he decided to see first the respondent judge in his chambers, which he was using it (sic) at that time as his sleeping quarters without the permission of the Supreme Court because he left his boarding house after he was caught peeping at the daughter of his landlady while taking a bath, to ascertain from him if it is (sic) true what protestant had been telling the public that he will (sic) sit that day, April 20, 1995, as the mayor-elect of Sanchez Mira and he admitted that he had changed his unsigned decision dismissing the election protest and invalidated the ballots with undetached coupons.

When protestee arrived home from Tuguegarao in the afternoon, he was informed that the respondent judge had promulgated his decision (Annex A) in the election protest and the Comelec Officer of Sanchez Mira had already received his copy of the decision from whom protestee got an immediate xerox copy as the basis of his perfection of an appeal with the COMELEC on April 22, 1995. That respondent judge, as part of his plan, design or scheme to make protestant win the election protest, intentionally violated the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in his desire to favor the protestant, by not setting a date for the promulgation of the decision wherein due notice must be given to the parties, but instead he immediately promulgated the same on the very day it was rendered, in violation of Rule 35, Sec. 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and the case of Alejo vs. Tanada, 238 SCRA 60 (1994). That respondent judge, intentionally and persistent-disregarded (sic) well-known law, legal rules and jurisprudence or stare decisis to the prejudice of the protestee and knowing it as the only possible means to make protestant win his election protest, declared invalid one hundred twenty one (121) ballots with undetached upper coupons cast in favor of protestee in violation of Sec. 211 of the Omnibus Election Code Circular No. 13, dated July 1, 1987, of the Supreme Court, providing general guidelines for all members of the judiciary, that judges should keep abreast of the rulings and doctrines laid down by the Supreme Court and apply them to appropriate cases regardless of their personal opinion. That respondent judge, to buttress his decision making protestant win in the election protest, which exposes his complete ignorance of the law, not only invalidated the 121 ballots with undetached upper coupons but also considered said ballots as marked contrary to the settled doctrines in elections (sic) contest that the mark which shall invalidate the ballot are those which the voter himself deliberately placed on his ballot for the purpose of identifying it thereafter. In other words, a markplaced (sic) on the ballot by a person other than the voter himself does not invalidate [the ballot] as marked (Tajanlangit vs. Cazenas, G.R. No. L-18894, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 567). Hence, the ballots which (sic) upper coupons were not detached by the Chairman of the Board of Inspectors are not marked ballots. That respondent judge, either as a part of his plan, design or scheme to make protestee lose in the election protest or in evident bad faith and/or partiality, also declared invalid six (6) ballots cast in favor of the protestee which were not signed by the Chairman of the Board of Inspectors. However, he did not declare invalid the twenty five (25) ballots cast in favor of the respondent. Orlino P. Acdal died on December 12, 1992 (Annexes B-B1, while Pacito Cabulisan died on June 2, 1992 (Annex C) after the elections on May 11, 1992. The annotations deceased at the back of their voters affidavit were entered by the Comelec Officer when he requested the court during the trial of the election protest for the return to his Office the Book of Voters of the aforesaid precincts preparatory to the May 8, 1995 elections. Nancita Alegado is a classroom teacher in Barangay Tokitoc, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan and is a registered voter of Precinct 35 therein (Annex D). She was assigned and served as a member of the Board of Inspectors of Precinct 22-B of Barangay

Masisit and she voted in said precinct pursuant to Sec. 169 of the Omnibus Election Code allowing members of the board of election inspectors to vote in the polling place where they are assigned on election day. That respondent judge, to further fortify his plan, design or scheme to make protestee lose the election protest and with deliberate intent to cause injustice on the part of the protestee and a clear violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution, dismissed for lack of merit protestees counter-protest without taking into account the facts and evidence alleged in his counter-protest and without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which the dismissal was based. Considering the facts that protestant had been publicly telling the people that he has plenty of money; that he will do everything within his resources to win his election protest; that he will sit as the mayor-elect of Sanchez Mira on April 20, 1995, the date of the questioned decision of respondent judge; that respondent judge had prepared an unsigned decision dismissing the election protest; that he was enticed to prepare another decision dated April 20, 1995, which he promulgated on the same day, declaring protestant as the winner in the May 11, 1992 elections for mayor of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, in complete disregard to (sic) the decisions and rules and regulation of the Supreme Court, the principle of res ipsa liquitor (sic) be applied to him. That respondent judge, since appointment to the judiciary, as presiding judge of the RTC has not been reporting for duty and hearing cases every Mondays, Thursday afternoons and Fridays of the week. He arrives in his station from Tuguegarao, Cagayan, where he resides, in the morning of Tuesday and leaves his station after lunch of Thursday, thereby affecting his integrity and efficiency. That respondent judge, despite the fact that he does not report for duty and hold session on Mondays, Thursday afternoons and Fridays, he certified in his Monthly Certificate of Service that he rendered complete service for the month, which is a clear case of falsification of monthly certificate of service since he became a judge up to the present. I: WON respondent Judge Adrian N. Pagalilauan is GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law H: The charge of gross misconduct against respondent judge for allegedly showing to complainant a copy of his unpromulgated decision in Election Case No. 1807-S, lacks sufficient evidentiary support. There is nothing on record to prove that the respondent showed a copy of his subject decision to the complainant. That respondent prepared two drafts of his subject decision is of no moment. It may be that he changed his mind after preparing one draft or intentionally prepared two drafts for his evaluation and consideration. Besides, the decision became effective only upon its promulgation. Respondent erred in making distinctions where the law is clear and no distinction is necessary. He erred in not adhering to the precedents set by this Court no matter what his opinion on the matter may be. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. Indeed, respondent appears unmindful of his duty as a member of the judiciary. A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to

particular instance, that ours is a government of laws and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He should administer his office with a due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law. Then too, he invalidated six (6) ballots for complainant for being unsigned by the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers but did not invalidate the ballots cast in favor of protestant which were also unsigned by the Chairman. Respondent admitted having done the same fact but explained that it was through mistake or omission. His defense is unsustainable. He is liable for violating the rule that failure of the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors to comply with his mandated administrative responsibility, i.e., signing, authenticating and thumbmarking of ballots, should not penalize the voter with disenfranchisement: Similarly, Section 211 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines provides that in the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be valid unless there is a clear and good reason to justify its rejection. Certainly, the inefficiency of an election officer in failing to affix his signature at the back of the ballot does not constitute as a good and clear reason to justify the rejection of a ballot. So also, he invalidated the vote of Nancita Alegado, a member of the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 22 of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, on the ground that her name did not appear in the Book of Voters. Respondent likewise violated Section 169 of the Omnibus Election Code, which reads: Sec. 169. Voting privilege of members of the board of election inspectors. - Members of the board of election inspectors and their substitutes may vote in the polling place where they are assigned on election day; Provided, That they are registered voters within the province, city or municipality where they are assigned: and Provided, finally, That their voting in the polling places where they are not registered voters be noted in the minutes of the board of election inspectors. Ms. Alegado is a registered voter of Precinct 35 of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, but she was serving as an election inspector in Precinct 22-B so that she was entitled to vote in the latter precinct. Despite the categorical declaration in the law that she had voting rights, respondent improperly excluded her vote just because Ms. Alegados name did not appear in the Book of Voters. Respondent dismissed complainants counter-protest without stating the facts and law on which such dismissal was based. Therefrom, it can be gleaned unerringly that respondent never discussed in the body of his decision the basis for the dismissal of the counter-protest. In so doing, he violated a basic legal principle, a constitutional one at that, that in making a decision, the facts and the law upon which the decision is based must be expressed clearly and distinctly.

All the foregoing studiedly considered the Court is of the irresistible conclusion that respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. The laws that respondent violated or failed to apply are not complicated, and do not involve difficult questions of law. His failure to apply basic legal principles constitutes utter disregard of well-settled doctrines. Respondent also failed to observe office hours as required by Circular No. 13. Respondent admitted not holding trials on Mondays and Fridays, contrary to the instruction of the Court. Respondent has to be reminded that proper and efficient utilization of office hours for hearings and trials is to ensure a speedy administration of justice. The charge that respondent has been partial in favor of the counsel for the protestant in Election Case No. 1807-S is dismissed for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, has certified that since the respondent became the Presiding Judge, there was only one criminal case which was reconsidered, from conviction to acquittal, and that it was counsel for protestant, Atty. Victoriano Pascua, who appeared as the private prosecutor in the said case. Furthermore, Atty. Pascua has a lot of cases pending in the sala of the respondent that somehow explains the long hours he spends in the courtroom. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Adrian N. Pagalilauan is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS. The charges of serious misconduct, falsification of certificates of service and inefficiency are DISMISSED for lack of merit.