Indias Forward Policy The objective of the forward policy were, first, to block potential lines of further Chinese

advance; secondly, to establish an Indian presence in Aksai Chin which would make Indian participation in the joint withdrawals proposed by Nehru more than theoretical, and thus give strength to that diplomatic lever for getting the Chinese out of the area. Beyond that, implicit at the onset, was the intention to undermine Chinese control of the disputed areas by the imposition of Indian posts and patrols between Chinese positions, thus cutting their supply lines and ultimately forcing them to withdraw, but the objectives emerged after the policy was formulated, and more a rationale; the forward policy really sprang from the conclusion that there was nothing else India could do. The policy was legalistic, assuming that India had only to go and stand on as many parts of Aksai Chin as possible to turn the tables on China, or at least attain a position of equality with her. It was reckless, ignoring the often repeated Chinese warning that assertion of Indian claims in the western sector courted retaliation across the McMohan line. And at the bottom it was irrational, because its fundamental premise was that no matter how many posts and patrols India sent into Chinese-claimed and occupied territory the Chinese would not physically interfere with them-provided only that Indians did not attack Chinese positions. In Lok Sabha in 1961, Nehru explained that the objective of the forward policy was to force the Chinese to vacate Indian territory.1 He pointed out that, if diplomatic means failed, India would have to go on a war with the aggressor.2 He stated that India would go on strengthening its position to deal with the situation until it no longer has to deal from a weak position. Maxwell argues that how it could be believed that the Chinese would stand idly and let India gradually and laboriously build positions of strength from which to attack them is difficult to understand.3 Nehru emphasized the dangers of war, not only for India and Indians but for the world as a whole. He believed that a war between India and China would be one of the major disasters of the world, for it would mean world war. He feared that both the parties would not be able to limit the war in time because it will not be possible for China to defeat India and it would be impossible for India to march up to Peaking across Tibet.

P176 176 P176

Mr. Lore J. Kavic notes, "The cautious and limited deployment of Indian troops in Ladakh proved inadequate as either a deterrent to or a bulwark against further Chinese advances."4 General Kaul writes that Mr. Nehru "had a meeting in his room somewhere in the autumn of 1961 in which Krishna Menon (Defense Minister), General Thapar (Chief of Army Staff) and I were present. He first saw on a military map all the recent incursions China had made against us. He said that whoever succeeded in establishing (even a symbolic) post, would establish a claim to that territory, as possession was nine-tenths of law. If the Chinese could set up posts, why couldn't we? "The numerical and logistical difficulties" were pointed out but were rejected. The whole basis of the "forward policy" was the assumption that "China was unlikely to wage war with India." When Mr. Nehru thought of war he thought always of total war, never of limited war. Mr. Mankekar gives more precise details about the origin of the new policy, saying that the Prime Minister gave the green light in November 1961. "Accordingly, on December 5, 1961, the Army H.Q. directed Eastern as well as Western Commands to patrol as far forward as possible towards the international border; to establish additional posts to prevent the Chinese from advancing further and also to dominate any Chinese posts already established in our territory; to be in effective occupation of the whole frontier; to cover gaps either by patrolling or by posts; and finally to make a re-appraisal of the tasks." China's reaction was to point out, in a note of 30 November, that if the policy was pursued she would "have every reason to send troops to cross the so-called 'McMahon Line.' "This was followed by a resumption of patrolling in the Western Sector in April 1962.5 In retrospect, it seems that by then China had already decided to resolve the stalemate by use of force. Dalvi maintains that "The Chinese in 1962 had prepared both for war and for talks, if India appreciated the futility of fighting for her rights. India was prepared neither for fighting nor for talking." The next event was on 10 July when an Indian post in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh was surrounded by Chinese troops. The post held out till it was overrun in October. The two sides drew different conclusions from this incident. India felt confirmed in the wisdom of its forward policy and in the assumption that China would not attack, while China realized that India was now prepared to risk armed conflict. In Dalvi's opinion, Galwan "was the perfect decoy to make their point without alerting NEFA."

India's Quest for Security: Defense Policies 1947-1965 (San Francisco: University of California Press, 1967), p. 169.
4 5

Note of 30 April 1962, White Paper, VI, p. 39.

A new IV Corps was created and Lieut.-General Kaul was appointed its Commander.6 At a Conference in Dhola on 9 October, General Kaul told the Commanders assembled there that "in spite of the stark facts and irrefutable arguments against military action, he had no option but to make some move on 10th October, as this was the last date acceptable to the Cabinet, whatever the cost." According to Dalvi, "As a direct assault on Thagla was ruled out, he decided to do a 'positional-warfare' , maneuver and occupy Yumtsola-to the west of Thagla peak, which was not, at that time, occupied by the Chinese." Accordingly, he ordered a battalion of Rajputs to move to Yumtsola, crossing the Namka Chu River, "to sit behind the Chinese, on 10th October 1962." Brigadier Dalvi persuaded General Kaul to have a patrol sent before committing the whole battalion. A platoon was sent, but it was heavily attacked by some 800 Chinese troops supported by heavy mortars. The Indian troops fired back. "The 'swift and massive retribution' for our attempt to disturb the de facto boundary shook General Kaul, who saw the first Chinese attack develop. His first reaction was one of disbelief, shock and disillusionment. 'Oh my God,' he cried, 'you are right, they mean business.' "6 On 20 October, China launched a major military offensive in both the eastern as well as the western sector. The justification claimed was not one of response to Indian provocation, but of self-defense. According to the Chinese account "On October 20, Indian forces started a massive general offensive." The forward policy was not designed to evict China altogether from territory India considered hers, but to check the continuing Chinese advance. India was not militarily strong enough to sustain this policy, but it assumed that since China would not mount a major military attack, the deteriorating condition could be arrested. In the event, India found itself confronted with an eventuality for which it had never allowed: a military clash which fell short of total war, but went far beyond the familiar local military skirmishes. When, at last, it realized the gravity of the situation, the Indian Government felt it was too late to retreat, not because this would entail capitulation to China, but because of the unacceptable domestic political consequences. A government that had been too short-sighted to negotiate when it could and should have, or to have prepared for the worst while there was yet time, found itself too weak to tell the truth to its own people.

Dalvi, p. 292.