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Max A.

Freund

A Complete and Consistent Formal System for Sortals

Abstract. A formal logical system for sortal quanti ers, sortal identity and (second

order) quanti cation over sortal concepts is formulated. The absolute consistency of the system is proved. A completeness proof for the system is also constructed. This proof is relative to a concept of logical validity provided by a semantics, which assumes as its philosophical background an approach to sortals from a modern form of conceptualism.
Keywords : sortal logic, conceptualism, semantics for sortals.

Introduction
Within the framework of standard rst order predicate logic with identity, adjectives, common nouns and intransitive verbs are all represented as monadic predicates. Several authors has raised several objections to this approach and argued that sortal terms should be distinguished from other predicate terms. (See, for example, Geach (1980) and Strawson (1959)). The main characteristic which sets those two kinds of terms apart is that the former is constituted by linguistic expressions supplying criteria enabling us to distinguish and count objects that have not been previously individuated, while the criteria supplied by expressions belonging to the latter presuppose that the distinguished objects had been already individuated. Accordingly, common nouns (such as `man', `horse') would, in general, constitute sortals terms, but not adjectives and verbs (such as `white' and `run'). Based on the above distinction, further distinctions have been drawn between sortal and standard predication (e.g., between `is a man' and `is red'), sortal and absolute identity (e.g. between `x is the same man as y' and `x is identical to y') and, nally, sortal and absolute (classical) quanti cation (e.g., between `every man', `some man', and `every individual' and `some individual'). As a response to the above discussion and from a modern conceptualist philosophical framework, Nino Cocchiarella has introduced the notion of a sortal concept , by which he means an intersubjectively realizable cognitive capacity whose use in thought and communication is associated with certain identity criteria, i.e., criteria by which we are able to distinguish, count and classify objects. (See, for example Cocchiarella(1977), (1995) and (1998).)
Presented by Melvin Fitting Received February 5, 2000
Studia Logica 65 c Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
: 367{381, 2000. 2000

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The above distinction between sortal and other predicate terms is explained by him in terms of that notion: sortal terms are the only expressions standing for sortal concepts other kinds of predicate expressions stand for predicable concepts. Sortal as well as predicable concepts are formed, according to Cocchiarella's conceptualist framework, in a process of di erent stages in which conceptual structures at a later stage are in general not explicitly de nable or reducible to those at the earlier they presuppose (as conceptually prior bases for their construction). Moreover, at any given stage of conceptual development, the earlier stages are not thrown out but rather retained as still important and useful parts of the overall conceptual framework. Now, sortal concepts and predicable concepts are not the only ones which are formed in the above mentioned process. Logical notions are also developed in this process and at di erent stages. Among the rst notions to be formed there is the concept of relative identity or identity relative to a sortal such as `a is the same horse as b': once sortal concepts are formed, then (where S is a sortal term such as `man') the notion that an object a is S the same S as b (in symbols, a = b) is constructed. In other words, given the formation of sortal concepts, the notion of identity relative to identity criteria provided by a sortal concept is developed. Relative identity is considered to be formed earlier (in the process of conceptual development) than the notion of absolute or unrestricted identity, i.e., the notion of an object a being simpliciter the same as b (in symbols, a = b). In other words, the notion of relative identity is considered to be conceptually prior to the notion of absolute identity. Moreover, the construction of absolute identity pressuposes a prior construction of another two notions: sortal quanti cation and (second order) quanti cation over sortal concepts. Cocchiarella has analysed sortal quanti cation in terms of what he calls referential concepts , i.e., intersubjectively realizable cognitive structures that enable us to refer to objects distinguished and classi ed by sortal concepts. Accordingly, linguistic expressions such as `every man', `every horse', `some horse' and `any horse', where sortal quanti cation is found, stand for such referential concepts. Now, an important point in the present philosophical framework is that the notion of sortal quanti cation is supposed to be formed earlier than the notion of absolute quanti cation, i.e., the notion linguistically expressed, e.g., in the words `everything', `every individual' and `every object'. In this way, sortal quanti cation is considered to be conceptually more basic than absolute quanti cation. As in the case of absolute identity, absolute quanti cation also presupposes construction of the notion of second order quanti cation over sortal concepts.

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In the process of conceptual development, after the notion of sortal quanti cation has been formed, a stage is reached in which reference to sortal concepts is given. According to this view, one rst learns to refer to things of the di erent sorts and then to refer to the sorts themselves. I should note that the notion of second order reference to sortal concepts is understood to be implicitly counter-factual, i.e., reference is not only to the sortal concepts already constructed, but also to those which we can in principle construct. Once the stages at which the notions of sortal quanti cation, sortal identity and second order quanti cation over sortal concepts have been developed, stages of conceptual development arise in which the concepts of absolute identity and quanti cation can be formed. A kind of absolute identity is constructed in these stages as the notion of identity with respect to some sortal or other, i.e., with respect to a cognitive capacity which can in principle be constructed and can provide identity criteria. Accordingly, this notion can be de nitionally introduced as follows
S (x = y) =df ( S )(x = y)
9

where the symbol S stands for (second order) existential quanti cation over sortal concepts which might in principle be constructed. Concerning absolute quanti cation, on the other hand, a kind of this notion is formed in the above stages as reference to all objects of any sort (i.e., reference to all objects that might fall under sortals which could in principle be formed). This can de nitionally be expressed as
9

( x)' =df ( S )( xS )' where the symbols xS stands for sortal quanti cation with respect to the sortal S (and should be read as \for every S ") and the symbol S stands for universal (second order) quanti cation over sortal concepts which might in principle be constructed (and so should be read as \for every sortal concept ", where reference in this latter expression should be understood implicitly counter-factual). Now, in the present philosophical framework, it is left open whether there is a level of concept formation in which the notion of absolute quanti cation as reference to all objects in general (i.e., reference to all objects irrespective of whether or not the objects fall or might fall under a sortal concept) has been constructed. In other words, the possibility that there is a more mature stage of conceptual development at which we come to refer in an absolute way that is independent of sortals (i.e., to refer to things that might never be of any sort at all) is not precluded, even though the notion presupposes the philosophically problematic view that things might exist for which there
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will never be identity criteria . The same applies to the concept of absolute identity between objects in general.(For a detailed discussion of the ideas in this and previous paragraphs see Cocchiarella (1997),(1995) and (1998).) Therefore, in the above philosophical framework, the notions of sortal identity, sortal quanti cation and second order quanti cation over sortal concepts appear as primitive (and basic) logical notions constructed in a process of di erentstages of conceptual development. These notions are considered to be conceptually prior to (and more basic than) absolute quanti cation and absolute identity and, moreover, they constitute the basis for the construction of a certain kind of these two latter concepts. In general, formation of the notions of absolute identity and absolute quanti cation is viewed as not having a development independent from the three above mentioned logical notions. A set-theoretic semantics for sortal identity, sortal quanti cation and (second order) quanti cation over sortal concepts has been formulated in Cocchiarella (1977) and constitutes a semantic system for a language containing (in its logical syntax) the past and future tense propositional temporal operators as well as the now operator. Several semantic systems are clearly derivable from Cocchiarella's system by restricting it to languages with fewer propositional operators in their logical syntax and, in particular, to a fully extensional language, i.e., a language having the classical propositional operators and no intensional operators in their logical syntax. It is important to note that absolute quanti ers and absolute identity are not included in the aforementioned semantic systems and, in particular, in the restriction to a fully extensional language. However, in this latter restriction the system allows that an object (in the sense of a value of a free individual variable) may not be identi able by any sortal concept at all, i.e., S in symbo ls, S (x = x) is consistent in the restricted semantic system. This is to be in accord with the above mentioned position of not precluding the possibility that at a stage of concept formation we might come to refer in an absolute way independent of sortals. It should also be noted that Leibniz's law is preserved under relative (sortal) identity in the semantic systems and so it agrees in this regard with the view, e.g., of Cocchiarella (1977) and Wiggins (1980) and is opposed to that one of Geach and Routley. Finally, I should add that a semantic clause for sortal predication is not included in the di erent systems because in Cocchiarella (1977, p. 446) it has been de ned in terms of sortal predication and sortal identity. Now, consistent formal systems together with completeness proofs with respect to concepts of logical validity (provided by Cocchiarella's own system as well as by the particular semantic systems derivable from it) have not been
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constructed. In this article, I shall focus on the above mentioned restriction of Cocchiarella's original semantic system to a fully extensional language. I shall formulate an axiomatic formal system, prove its consistency as well as its soundness and completeness with respect to this restriction.

1. Syntax and semantics


The set of primitive logical symbols will consist of the symbols , , =, (, ), . The classical propositional operators of conjunction, disjunction and material equivalence will be represented by the symbols `&', ` ' and ` ', respectively, and de ned in the usual way. I shall assume denumerably many individual variables, sortal term variables and, for each positive integern, nplace predicate variables. I shall use `x', `y' and `z ' with or without numerical subscripts to refer (in the metalanguage) to individual variables and upper case letters in italics (such as `S ' and `H ') to refer to sortal term variables. S Atomic w s are expressions either of the form of a relative identity (a = b), where a and b are individual variables and S is a sortal term variable or of the form x1 :::xn , where is an n-place predicate variable and x1 , : : : , xn are individual variables. As stated in the introduction, the atomic w S (a = b) should be read as \a is the same S as b". The set of w s is the smallest set containing the atomic w s and such that ', (' ), xS' and S' are in the set whenever ', are in the set and where x and S are, respectively, an individual variable and a sortal term variable. As stated in the introduction, for any given sortal term variable S , the expressions xS and S formally represents, respectively, sortal quanti cation with respect to S and universal quanti cation over sortal concepts. Accordingly, where S is a sortal term variable, the expression xS should be read as \for every S " and S as \for every sortal concept ". In a given context, I shall usually drop the use of parentheses whenever there is no danger of ambiguity. Hereafter, I shall make use of lower case greek letters ', , , and to refer to w s, to refer to predicate variables and upper case greek letters ; and to refer to sets of w s. The concepts of a bound and free occurrence of a variable are understood in the usual way. If and are variables of the same type, then by ' is meant the w that results by replacing each free occurrence of by a free occurrence of , if such a w exists, and otherwise ' is ' itself. I shall say that is free for in ', if ' is not ' unless is . Having speci ed the syntax, I now proceed to describe the semantic system for sortals. As noted above, this system has as its philosophical background the assumptions already outlined in the introduction.
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I shall rst de ne a restricted Cocchiarellan sortal frame (C-frame, for short), as a structure D S such that (1) D is a domain of discourse, empty or otherwise and (2) S P(D ) (where `P(D )' stands for the power set of D ). By an assignment (of values to variables) in a C-frame D S I shall understand a function A with the set of variables (of all types) as domain and such that (1) A (x) D , for each individual variable x, (2) A (H ) S , for each sortal term variable H , and (3) for each positive integer n and n-place predicate variable , A ( ) P(D n ). By a Cocchiarellan sortal model (C -model , for short) I shall mean an ordered pair A = D S A , where A is an assignment in the C-frame D S . By A(d=a) I shall understand the ordered pair D S A (d=a) , where A (d=a) is like A except for assigning d to a, where a is either an individual or a sortal term variable. Let A be a C-model D S A . I shall de ne the truth-value of ' in A (in symbols, Val(' A)) as follows: S 1. Val(x = y A) = 1 i A (x) = A (y) and A (y) A (S ) 2. Val( x1 :::xn A) = 1 i A (x1 ) : : : A (xn ) A ( ) 3. Val( ' A) = 1 i Val(' A) = 0 4. Val(' A) = 1 i either Val( ' A) = 1 or Val( A) = 1 5. Val( H' A) = 1 i for every d S , Val(' A(d=H ) = 1 6. Val( xH' A) = 1 i for every d A (H ), Val(' A(d=x)) = 1. Finally, a w ' is said to be C-valid if and only if Val(' A) = 1 for any C-model A, and a set ; is C-satis able if and only if there is a C-model B such that Val(' B) = 1, for every ' ; . As the reader might have noticed, in any C-model the set S set-theoretically represents the set of sortal concepts which have been and might in principle be constructed with respect to the domain D (in a certain process of conceptual development). In this way, in a given assignment sortal terms variables would stand for (set-theoretically representations of) sortal concepts. Then, relative to one of such assignments, clause 6 would express universal quanti cation over all the objects falling under the sortal concept a given sortal term variable stands for. Clause 5 above would set-theoretically capture the concept of (second order) quanti cation over sortal concepts. Clause 2 set-theoretically represents predication with respect to predicable concepts. As already remarked in the introduction, there is no need for a semantic clause corresponding to predication with respect to sortals because it can be de ned in terms of sortal quanti cation and sortal identity. Obviously, clause 1 set-theoretically expresses the notion of sortal identity.
h i 2 2 2 hh i i h i hh i i hh i i 2 h i 2 : ! : 8 8 2 2 2

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2. System SQ
I shall now formulate an axiomatic system (which I shall call SQ) and prove its absolute consistenty. In the next section, I will show that SQ is complete with respect to C-validity.
Axioms

A0 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 LL

All tautologies S xS yS (y = x) ' yS', provided y does not occur free in ' ' S', provided S does not occur free in ' S S x=x yS (y = x), where y is a variable other than x ( S' ' H ), provided H is free for S in ' S S S x=y x=x xS (' ) xS' xS ) S (' ) ( S' S ) S x = y (' ' ), where ' is obtained from ' by replacing one or more free occurrences of x by free occurrences of y.
8 9 ! 8 ! 8 ! 9 8 ! ! 8 8 ! ! 8 8 ! 8 ! ! ! 8 ! $ 8 8

Rules:

UG from ' infer yS' UG(s) from ' infer S' MP from ' and ' infer . The existential quanti ers are de ned as usual.
!

Definitions 9yS' =df :8y :' 9S' =df :8S :'

The notion of a theorem (relative to SQ) will be de ned in the customary way as follows: a w ' is a theorem of SQ (in symbols, SQ ') if and only if there is nite sequence of w s 1 , : : : , n such that every member of the sequence is either an axiom of SQ or follows from previous members of the sequence by one the rules of SQ and ' is n .
`

Convention. From now on, a proof requiring reasoning in accordance with

classical propositional logic will be denoted by PL. I will now show that several principles instrumental in the completeness proof for SQ (with respect to C-validity) are theorems of the system.

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Theorems S y T0 9xS (x = y) ! (8xS' ! ' x ), provided y is a variable other than x free for x in ' (By LL, PL, UG) z , provided z is free for y in ' and does not occur T1 8yS' $ 8zS' y free in ' (by UG, T0, A1, A2) H , provided H is free for S in ' and does not occur T2 8S' $ 8H' S free in ' (by UG(s), A5, A3) S S T3 x = y ! y = x (by LL, A6, PL) S S T4 x = y ! 9zS (z = x) (by A6, A4, PL) S S S T5 (9S (x = y )& 9S (y = z )) ! 9S (x = z ) (by LL, UG(s), A3, A8, T2) S S T6 9zS (y = z ) ! 9S (9zS (y = z )) (by A5, PL) S S T7 9S (x = y) ! 9S 9zS (z = y) (by T4, UG(s), A8, PL) S H S T8 x = y ! (9H (x = y) & 9zS (z = y)) (by T4, A5, PL, de nition) S S T9 9yS (x = y) ! x = x (by A6, PL, UG, A7, A2, de nition) S S T10 :9S (x = x) ! 8S (:9yS (y = x)) (by T9, A5, PL, UG(s), A3) S H S T11 9zS (y = z ) ! (9H (x = y) ! (x = y)) (by LL, UG(s), PL, T9, A8, A3)

It can be easily shown (by induction on theorems) that SQ is sound with respect to C-validity. Metatheorem I. (Soundness Theorem) For every w ', if ' is a theorem of SQ, then ' is C-valid. Now, as the proof to the following metatheorem shows, SQ is relatively consistent to standard second order logic. Metatheorem II. SQ is relatively consistent to standard second order logic. Proof. Recursively de ne the function t as that function whose domain is the set of w s such that: S t(x = y) = (x = y) t( x1 :::xn ) = x1 :::xn t( xS') = x(t(')) t( S') = S (t(')) t( ') = t(') t (' ) = t(') t( ) where S is the rst monadic predicate variable new to '.
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Clearly, for every w ', t(') is a well formed formula of standard second order logic. The reader can easily verify that t(') is a theorem of standard second order logic (as described for example, in Cocchiarella (1986, p. 182)), whenever ' is an axiom of SQ. Also, if t(') and t(' ! ) are theorems of second order logic, then t( ), t(8xS') and t(8S') are theorems of standard second order logic as well. That is, the MP, UG(s) and UG rules preserve theoremhood under the translation function t. Therefore, if ' is a theorem of SQ, t(') is a theorem of standard second order logic. Consequently, SQ is consistent if standard second order logic is consistent. As shown in Church (1958), standard second order logic is absolutely consistent. Consequently, given Metatheorem II, SQ is absolutely consistent.
Corollary. SQ is absolutely consistent.

3. Completeness theorem for SQ


I shall now construct the completeness proof for SQ. However, before doing so, I must rst state the following de nitions:
Definition 1. Let ; be a set a w s. The set ; is !-complete if and only if for every w ', both (i) if 9xS' 2 ; , then for some variable y other that S y x free for x in ', (9xS (x = y) & ' x ) 2 ; and (ii) if 9S' 2 ; , then there is a sortal term T free for S in ' such that ' T 2 ; . S Definition 2. ; is a SQ-maximally consistent set of w s of SQ if and only if ; is SQ consistent and for every w ', either ' 2 ; or :' 2 ; . Definition 3. Let ' be a w and

an individual or sortal term variable. By recursion, I shall de ne the expression ` '( ) ]', which intuitively should be understood as the result of rewritting all bound occurrences of by variables new to ' of the same type as . If ' is an atomic w , then '( ) ] = '. If ' is of the form , then '( ) ] = ( ) ]. ( ) If ' is of the form , then '( ) ] = ( ) ] ]. If ' is of the form zS , then
: : ! !

'(

8 < ]=:

zS 8kS
8

( ) ( )

] if z it not ] k if z is and k is the rst individual variable new to

( )

] and '.

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If ' is of the form S , then 8 () < S ] if S it not if S is and H is the rst '( ) ] = : H ( ) ] H sortal variable new to ( ) ] and '. Definition 4. ' is a SQ-theorem of ; (in symbols, ; SQ ') if and only if there are w s 1 , : : : , n ; such that ( 1 & & n ) ' is a theorem of SQ. I shall now state several lemmas indispensable in the completeness proof on pp. 377{380. By induction on the complexity of , Lemma 1 can be proved using T1 and Lemma 2 using T2. Lemma 1. For any individual variable x, SQ (x) ] . Lemma 2. For any sortal term variable S , SQ (S ) ] . Note 1. If x is free for y in , then x (x) ] is (x) ] x and so by Lemma 1, y y x. (x) x ]y SQ y
8 8 ` 2 ! ` $ ` $ ` $

Note 2. If S is free for H in , then


`SQ

( )

some w will be shown. So suppose ' is zS , for some w . Then, by de nition, Val( zS A(A (y)=x)) = 1 if and only if for any d A (S ), Val( A(A (y)=xd=z )) = 1. Clearly, since y is free for x in ', then y is free for x in . On the other hand, for any d A (S ), A(d=z ) is a C-model and is of complexity less than n. Then, by the inductive hypothesis, for any d A (S ), Val( y A(A (y)=x)d=z ) = 1 if and only if for any d A (S ), Val( x A(d=z )) = 1. y Therefore, Val( zS A(A (y)=x)) = 1 if and only if Val( zS x A) = 1.
8 8 2 2 2 2 8 8

Proof. Let C = fn 2 ! j for any w ' and C-model A = hD L A i if ' is of complexity n and y is an individual variable free for x in ', then y Val(' A(A (y)=x)) = 1 if and only if Val(' x A) = 1g. By strong induction it will be shown that ! C . So let n 2 !, x and y individual variables and suppose that ' is a w of complexity n in which y is free for x in ', A = hD L A i is a C-model and assume that for every t < n, t 2 C . Since cases where ' is either an atomic w or of the form : or ! (for w s , ) are fairly simple, only the cases where ' is either 8zS or 8S , for

Lemma 3. For any w ', if A = hD L A i is a C-model and y is an individual variable free for x in ', then Val(' A(A (y)=x)) = 1 if and only y if Val(' x A) = 1.

S ]S H

S H.

S (S ) H ]

is

( )

S ]S H

and so by Lemma 2,

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Suppose now ' is S , for some w . Then, by de nition, Val( S A(A (y)=x)) = 1 if and only if for every d L , Val( A(A (y)=xd=S )) = 1. Now, since y is free for x in ', then y is free for x in . Also, A(d=S ) is a Cmodel, for every d L , and is of complexity less than n. Then, by the inductive hypothesis, for every d L , Val( A(A (y)=x)d=S ) = 1 if and only y if for every d L , Val( x A(d=S )) = 1. Therefore, Val( S A(A (y)=x)) = y A) = 1. 1 if and only if Val( S x
2 2 2 8 8

The proof for the following Lemma proceeds in a way analogous to the proof for the previous one. Lemma 4. For any w ', if A = D L A is a C-model and H is a sortal term variable free for S in ', then Val(' A(A (H )=S )) = 1 if and only if Val(' H A) = 1. S Given the above lemmas and de nitions, the completeness of SQ can now be shown. Metatheorem III. (Completeness Theorem for SQ) If ; is SQ-consistent, then ; is C-satis able. Proof. Assume the hypothesis of the theorem. Without loss of generality, suppose there are denumerably many individual variables y0 , : : : , yn , : : : and denumerably many sortal term variables H0 , : : : , Hn, : : : which do not occur in ; . (Otherwise for each k ! replace the k-th individual variable and the k-th sortal term variable in all the w s in ; by the 2k-th individual and sortal term variable, respectively. It can then be easily shown that ; is satis able if and only if the replacement set for ; is and that the replacement set for ; is consistent if ; is consistent.) Let 0 , : : : , n , : : : be an enumeration of the w s of the form yS' or S'. De ne a chain of sets ;0 , : : : , ;n, : : : as follows. ;0 = ; If n is of the form yS', S ;n+1 = ;n yS' ( yS (y = x) & ' x ) y where x is the rst individual variable new to ; n ). If n is of the form S', ;n+1 = ;n S' ' H S where H is the rst sortal term variable new to ;n n ). By weak induction, it can be shown that for every n !, ;n is consistent: by assumption, ;0 is consistent. Assume that ;n is consistent and also
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that ;n+1 is not consistent. First suppose that ;n+1 = ;n yS' S S x) x ) . Then, ; yS (y = x) & ' y and ( yS (y = x) & ' y n ( yS' S ;n ( yS' ( yS (y = x) & ' x )) , for some w . Consequently, y S by PL, ;n yS' and ;n ( yS (y = x) ' x ). Given that x does not y S x ) (by U.G., A7, A2, PL, A1, T1 occur in ;n , from ;n ( yS (y = x) 'y and de nition) it follows that ;n yS', which is impossible because ;n is consistent by assumption. Suppose now that that ;n+1 = ;n S' ' H . S Then by PL, ;n S' and ;n 'H=S . From ;n 'H=S (by UG(s), A8, A3 T2 and de nition) it follows that ;n S', which is impossible by assumption. S Set ; = n2! ;n . Clearly, by above ; is consistent. By Lindenbaum's method, extend ; to a maximally consistent set . Note that by construction is !-complete. De ne a relation among the set of individual variables as follows:
! ` 9 ! 9 ! : ` 9 ` 9 ! : ` 9 ! : ` :9 f9 ! g ` 9 ` : ` : ` :9

x=z i

S either S (x = z ) or S S S ( yS (y = x) & yS (y = z ))
9 2 8 :9 :9

Lemma 5. = is an equivalence relation in the set of individual variables. Proof. 1. = is re exive, i.e., x = x for every individual variable x: Since S S is maximally consistent, by PL 9S (x = x) 2 or :9x(x = x) 2 . S S If 9S (x = x) 2 , then by de nition x = x. If :9S (x = x) 2 , then S by T10 and PL, 8S (:9yS (y = x)) 2 . But then by PL, UG(s), A8, S S 8S (:9yS (y = x) & :9yS (y = x)) 2 , and so x = x. 2. = is symmetric, i.e., if x = z , then z = x, for every individS ual variable x and z : Assume x = z . Then, either 9S (x = z ) 2 or S S S 8S (:9yS (y = x) & :9yS (y = z )) 2 . If 9S (x = z ) 2 , then (by S T3, PL, UG(s), de nitions and A8) 9S (z = x) 2 and so z = x. If S S 8S (:9yS (y = x) & :9yS (y = z )) 2 , then by PL, UG(s) and A8, S S 8S (:9yS (y = z ) & :9yS (y = x)) 2 and so z = x. 3. = is transitive, i.e., if x = z and z = w, then x = w, for every individual variable x, w and z : Assume x = z and z = w. Then, both either S S S S 9S (x = z ) 2 or 8S (:9yS (y = x) & :9yS (y = z )) 2 and either 9S (z = S S w) 2 or 8S (:9yS (y = z ) & :9yS (y = w)) 2 . Accordingly, four possiS S bilities should be considered. If 9S (x = z ) 2 and 9S (z = w) 2 , then S S S by T5, 9S (x = w) 2 . Assume now 9S (x = z ) 2 and 8S (:9yS (y = z )

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S S & yS (y = w)) . Now, from S (x = z ) (by T7 and PL) it folS S lows that S yS (y = z ) . On the other hand, from S ( yS (y = z ) S & yS (y = w)) (by PL, UG(s), A8 and de nition) it follows that S S yS (y = z ) , which is impossible because is consistent. SimiS S lar reasoning applies when both S ( yS (y = x) & yS (y = z )) and S S (z = w ) . Therefore, the second and third possibilities are impossible. S S S S If S ( yS (y = x) & yS (y = z )) and S ( yS (y = z ) & yS (y = S S w)) , then by PL, UG(s) and A8, S ( yS (y = x) & yS (y = w)) . Therefore, x = w. 2 Let x] be the equivalence class of x determined by = in the set of individual variables. Set D = x] x is an individual variable for every H sortal term variable H , CH = x] D yH (y = x) , for some individual variable y other than x , D = x1 ] : : : xn ] (x1 :::xn ) and L = CH H is a sortal term variable . Let A be the function whose domain is the set of variables such that A (x) = x], A ( ) = D and A (H ) = CH . Let A = D L A . Clearly, A is a C-model. Before continuing with the completeness proof, rst note that the following statements concerning A follow from Lemmas 1{4 and the Soundness Metatheorem for SQ:
9 9 2 :9 9 2 :9 2 8 :9 :9 2 9 2 8 :9 :9 2 8 :9 :9 2 8 :9 :9 2 f j g f 2 j 9 2 g fh i j 2 g f j g h i

Statement 1. For any w ' and for any individual variables y and x, Val(' A( x]=y)) = 1 if and only if Val( '(x) ] x A) = 1. (Where A is the y

above de ned C-model.)

Statement 2. For any sortal term variable H , Val(' A(CH =S )) = 1 if and only if V al( '(H ) ] H A) = 1. (Where A is the above de ned C-model.) S

Let I = { ! for every w ', if ' is of complexity {, then Val(' A) = 1 i ' . I will show by strong induction that ! I . So suppose k !, ' is a w of complexity k and for every i < k, i I . There are six cases to consider. S 1. ' is of the form x = y: Val(' A) = 1 if and only if (by de nition) A (x) = A (y) and A (y) A (S ) if and only if (by de nition) x] = y] and S S y] CS if and only if (by de nition) zS (z = y) and either S (x = y) S S S or S ( zS (z = x) & zS (z = y)) . Now, if zS (z = y) , then S S by A5, PL and the consistency of , S ( zS (z = x) & zS (z = y)) . S S S So if zS (z = y) and either S (x = y) or S ( zS (z = x) S S S & zS (z = y)) , then zS (z = y) and S (x = y) and
f 2 j 2 g 2 2 2 2 9 2 9 2 8 :9 :9 2 9 2 8 :9 :9 8 62 9 2 9 2 :9 :9 2 9 2 9 2

380
2 2 9 2 9 2

M. A. Freund

S S therefore by T11 x = y . On the other hand, if x = y , then by T8, S S zS (z = y) and S (x = y) . 2. ' is of the form x1 :::xn : Val(' A) = 1 if and only if (by de nition) A (x1) : : : A (xn) A ( ) if and only if (by de nition) x1 ] : : : xn ] D if and only if (by de nition) x1 :::xn . 3. ' is of the form : Val(' A) = 1 if and only if Val( A) = 0 if and only if (by the inductive hypothesis) if and only if (by maximality and consistency of ) . 4. ' is of the form : Val(' A) = 1 if and only if (by de nition) either Val( A) = 0 or Val( A) = 1 if and only if (by the inductive hypothesis) or if and only if (by maximality and consistency of ) or if and only if (by PL, maximality and consistency of ) . 5. ' is of the form yS : Val(' A) = 1 if and only if (by de nition) for every d A (S ), Val( A(d=y)) = 1 if and only if (by de nitions) for every individual variable x, if x] A (S ), then Val( A( x]=y)) = 1 if and only if (by Statement1) for every individual variable x, if x] A (S ), then Val( (x) ] x A) = 1 if and only if (by de nition) for every individual y S variable x, if zS (z = x) (for some variable z other that x), then (x) x Val( ] y A) = 1 if and only if (by the inductive hypothesis) for every S individual variable x, if zS (z = x) (for some variable z other that x), then (x) ] x if and only if (by T0, Lemma 1, UG, !-completeness, y Note 1 inmediately following Lemmas 1{2 and T1) yS . 6. ' is of the form S : Val(' A) = 1 if and only if(by de nition) for every CH L , Val( A(CH =S )) = 1 if and only if (by Statement 2) if for every sortal term variable H , Val( (H ) ] H A) = 1 if and only (by the S inductive hypothesis) for every sortal term variable H , (H ) ] H if and S only if and only if (by Lemma 2, !-completeness, UG, Note 2 inmediately following Lemmas 1{2, A5 and T2) S . Therefore, by above, for every w ', Val(' A) = 1 if and only if ' . Since by construction, ; , then Val(' A) = 1, for every ; , which proves the metatheorem.
h i 2 h i 2 2 : 62 : 2 ! 62 2 : 2 2 ! 2 8 2 2 2 9 2 9 2 2 8 2 8 2 2 8 2 2 2

Acknowledgments. I am grateful to the referees for their comments and


suggestions.

A Complete and Consistent : : :

381

References
Church, A., 1958, Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Princeton University Press, PrinceCocchiarella, N. B., 1977, `Sortals, natural kinds and re-identi cation', Logique et Analton, N. J.
yse 80, 439{474. Cocchiarella, N. B., 1986, Logical Investigations of Predication Theory and the Problems of Universals , Bibliopolis Press, Naples. Cocchiarella, N. B., 1995, `Knowledge representation in conceptual realism', Int. J. Human-Computer Sciences 43, 697{721. Cocchiarella, N. B., 1998, `Reference in Conceptual Realism', Synthese 114, 169{202. Geach, P., 1980, Reference and Generality, Cornell U. Press, Ithaca. Strawson, P. F., 1965, Individuals, Metheuen, London. Wiggins, D., 1980, Sameness and Substance, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

Max A. Freund

Departamento de Filoso a APDO 86-3000 Heredia, Costa Rica mfreund@cariari.ucr.ac.cr