Name: Michael Utama Class: 1T06 Date: 15 March 2011 Assignment: H1 China Studies in English J1 March Holiday Assignment

t Question: To what extent do you agree with the view that the Chinese government has little control over the concept of Chinese identity ? Answer: The notion of Chinese identity is so ambiguous and multifarious that it is explicitly difficult to establish a veracious, absolute definition for it. To some, this concept is defined and compounded based on the traditional mindset of ethnicity, cultural roots, and race of individuals; to others, quite the contrary, this concept is solely perceived to only apply to people living within Chinas geographical boundary and structure, irrespective of their respective distinct ethnic, cultural and racial differences. As such, it is very conspicuous that there is some kind of an identity crisis plaguing China today. This is probably because the concept of Chinese identity cannot be caught, for it is must be fought; it must be earned by the people of China themselves. However, the execution of this task faces many adversities, for there is a multitude of factors that can either amalgamates and unify China, or segregate and divide the country. Hence, the question of the efficacy of the Chinese government in fabricating a common identity for China comes into light, for they play an indispensable and instrumental role in establishing this identity to unify and lead China to a brighter and glorious future. In response to the aforementioned question, in my judgment and to a large extent, I strongly agree with the notion that the Chinese government has minimal, insignificant control over the idea and concept of Chinese identity. This is because their actions in dealing with the various factors that shape Chinese identity, such as the effectiveness of government policies, minority groups identity, geographical locations and historical legacies, are not only ineffective and chaotic, but has also been exacerbating the tensed situation in China instead of ameliorating it. Firstly, it is an undeniable fact that government policies, specifically the integrationist policies, that the Chinese government has fabricated, show that the government has controls over these policies and the political momentum of China. The question is whether the government has control over the effectiveness of these policies, because this effectiveness would have direct impacts, and will determine, on whether a common Chinese identity can truly be formed. In my opinion however, the effectiveness of these government policies in trying to forge a common Chinese identity is infinitesimal and merely nugatory. In fact, some of these policies have backfired and brought about the opposite, negative effects. This is a bad situation because this insinuates that the act of forming a common Chinese identity through government policies might have failed, because the effects the policies bring about are undesirable. Theoretically speaking, these policies are implemented so as to encourage civic consciousness and respect for one anothers diversity, therefore forging and developing cohesive state-society relations as well boosting nation-state building
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WDS information and information regarding inadequate protection of cultural identity in China are extracted from the China: Minority Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tension 2007 report by Human Rights in China (HRiC) Commissioned by Minority Rights Group International, http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/MRG-HRIC.China.ES.pdf, extracted on 15 March 2011

process, hence forging common bonds and a uniform Chinese identity which might takes certain time, dedication and effort. These policies also serve to embrace modernization, meaning going through a one-sided adaptation to absorb a new layer of identity for the assimilation and integration of the ethnic minorities, at the expense of abandoning and forgoing minorities distinctive linguistic, cultural or social characteristics and become indistinguishable from the majority population. But of course, the purpose and effectiveness of these policies are only theoretical. In practice, it is much more complicated than what it looks. For example, the integrationist policy (policy #9) of having more developed cities in China be paired off with ethnic autonomous (EA) areas to provide aid, whereby the Chinese government encourages the buddying of more prosperous Chinese cities such as Shandong, with the EA regions such as Xinjiang, is implemented so as to attain common prosperity and uniformity. However, whilst the government can enforce and has control over policy #9, its effectiveness solely depends on the willingness and readiness of both the EA regions as well as the more prosperous cities of China to interact with and assist one another. This policy, in fact, is viewed as marginalizing and ostracizing the minorities in the EA regions, as it is perceived as a deliberate act of mockery and travesty against the minorities of being underdeveloped, poor, and burdens of China. With the EA regions being allegedly and hypothetically viewed as the disabled and handicapped ones, the minorities such as the Uighurs in Xinjiang would obviously be furious and enraged because being perceived as the weak link seems to undermine the dignities and prides of these minorities. Furthermore, these minorities are not receptive towards receiving aid or help from cities that are predominantly Hans, due to the inerasable prolonged souring historical relations/legacies and unpleasant violent pasts that have occurred between the Hans and these minorities such as the Uighurs and Tibetans (e.g. The Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 has increased the scale of intentional political attack on Tibetan Buddhism and culture). Indeed, it is very ironic that the very policies crafted by the Chinese government to integrate the minorities have ricocheted and reciprocated back negatively, as they further widened the disparities and resentment between the Hans and these minorities due to historical enmity and misinterpretation of the policies purposes. As such, the effectiveness of these integrationist policies, like policy #9, has been breached and compromised, as there was an inadvertent infusion of problems of bitter historical legacies and ethnic diversities into the policy, therefore hindering the process of assimilating the minorities into the society, hence indirectly preventing an establishment of a common Chinese identity to occur. Furthermore, with reference to the integrationist policy (policy # 6) of Giving greater assistance to alleviate poverty in ethnic autonomous areas, while although there have been attempts to alleviate the growing economic disparities within its borders and having every region of China to be one a similar basil level of economic development, thus establishing some sort of uniformity and identical economic identity, Chinas rapid economic transformation actually has not improved the lives of ethnic minorities at all, but in fact bringing about the opposite effect. For example, the Western Development Strategy (WDS)[1] is an economic strategy targeting at the western provinces and EA regions, with the intention to modernize
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WDS information and information regarding inadequate protection of cultural identity in China are extracted from the China: Minority Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tension 2007 report by Human Rights in China (HRiC) Commissioned by Minority Rights Group International, http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/MRG-HRIC.China.ES.pdf, extracted on 15 March 2011

these areas and narrow development gap between the interior and the wealthier coastal provinces. However, given the potential for discontent in such inequitable situations, the WDS is universally seen as a political device for strengthening national unity through common prosperity, with its official development goals being undermined by 3 unspoken but overreaching objectives resource extraction from the borderlands to benefit the coast, assimilation of local ethnic minority groups through Han Chinese population transfers to the autonomous areas, and the alternate purpose of infrastructure development for military use. As such, it is evidently illustrated that these policies, together with the failure of the Chinese government to address the resulting inequalities and discrimination, contribute to the violations of human rights of ethnic minorities, making it almost impossible to have these minorities to willingly succumb to assimilation for it is occurring in tandem with systematic violations of fundamental civil, political and human rights. To further aggravate the situation, it is also not uncommon to see many well-paid and high status occupations to be given to the more educated Hans as opposed to the less-educated minorities who are also less competent in the Han-Chinese language, thus collectively stigmatizing the minorities economically and widens income gap between the Hans and the minorities. Hence, through the thorough analysis of the above 2 integrationist policies, I deduce that while it is true to say that the government has controls over political experiences/efforts in introducing policies to integrate everyone in the Chinese society together, it is however fallacious to say that they have control over the consequences, outcomes and effectiveness of these policies. Since these effectiveness/outcomes determine whether a common Chinese identity is established or not, I therefore also deduce that indirectly, the government has limited or no control over the concept of Chinese identity. Secondly, it also impartial to say that the identity of minority groups also has a significant influence in establishing the concept of Chinese identity. The question, once again, is whether the Chinese government has the control in defining the identity of the minority groups. In my judgment, while the government has the limitless power to force the minority groups to succumb to the ideal Chinese identity that the government envisions and portrays, the government however does not acquire the power and control over the willingness and desire of the minorities to sincerely and wholeheartedly, in an exaggerated sense, transform their identities voluntarily to what the government envisions. The effort of fabricating the concept of Chinese identity and holding on to it is deemed as works of politics. Hence, the pivotal reason for the forced inclusion of ethnic minorities into such works without asking their permission, together with the fact that certain ethnic culture and traditions of these minorities must be forsaken, is its potential for abuse of authoritarian power by inflammatory demagogues. This is because in order to boost the popularity of the Han Chinese identity, the government would inevitably propagate bigoted mindsets, blaming the nations socioeconomic problems on the impoverished, impecunious autonomous regions of ethnic minorities such as Xinjiang, Tibet etc. The government falsifies the notion that if these minorities are not properly assimilated, it serves as a convenient scapegoat for policy failure and continued downward spiral of Chinas development, therefore incurring the wrath of a perplexed and frustrated majority that is directed against it. In such situations, tensions and conflicts would arise (e.g. Uighurs calls for separatism
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WDS information and information regarding inadequate protection of cultural identity in China are extracted from the China: Minority Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tension 2007 report by Human Rights in China (HRiC) Commissioned by Minority Rights Group International, http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/MRG-HRIC.China.ES.pdf, extracted on 15 March 2011

has been reciprocated with violent subdues and retaliations by authorities and policemen such as during the 1997 Yining Uprising; 2008 Tibetan riots etc.) and if fuelled further, the eruption of acute xenophobia and genocide might be ubiquitous and unstoppable. As such, the government enforces the need to assimilate these ethnic minorities into the Han-Chinese norm, therefore transforming them to possess a Han-Chinese identity. For example, the HRiC[2] report in 2007 explained that there has been an inadequate protection on cultural identity of the minorities, because Han Chinese settlers continue to over-flowingly dominate the urban public sphere in the autonomous regions, (e.g. the construction of the Qinghai-Tibet railway as part of the Go West Policy has encouraged more Han Chinese to flock into Tibet, resulting in the higher-paying jobs to be given to the Hans as they are more educated, resulting in economic disparity) making it difficult for minorities to maintain their distinct cultural identities (e.g. the declining availability of ethnic language or cultural education is compounded by an aggressive campaign of Chinese nationalist patriotic education, instituted in primary and secondary schools). However, In my opinion, by forcing these minorities to succumb to the presumably falsified notion of Han-Chinese identity (which is what the government is insinuating), the plan will only backfire because certain minority groups (NOT ALL) are not receptive, unwavering, and sometimes restive/hostile towards the radical notions of being forced to let go their distinctive cultures and traditions for an assimilation process they dislike by the government. This is because changing the identity of the minorities inadvertently involves sensitive political foreplays (e.g. integrationist policies) which are bleakly and negatively perceived by the ethnic minorities, as well as resulting in an inadvertent negative consequence of economic disparities. As a result, it will only fuel further animosity and tensions between the minorities and the Hans, hence further segregating the society and causes a wider social divide within China. Hence, the mission of establishing a common Chinese identity has failed because the government has limited control over the concept, because how could a country and the government have a strong concept of a national identity if the perpetuation of some (NOT ALL) ethnic and social cleavages continues to prevail ? In short, I deduce that in order for the government to grasp the concept of Chinese identity, everyone in China, including the minorities, must be willing to come to a common consensus of a Chinese identity. By forcing minorities to change their identities to the liking of the government is like having monks force lions to become vegetarians. This results in the situation to be exacerbated further, because the minorities will only resent the government more deeply, hence they are less receptive towards the notion of possessing a Chinese identity, and rather retain their tradition and cultural identity (e.g. The Tibetans retaining a Bhutan/Nepal identity as opposed to Chinese identity). As a result, the government has little control over the Chinese identity because they fail to address the issue of the identity of minorities.

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WDS information and information regarding inadequate protection of cultural identity in China are extracted from the China: Minority Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tension 2007 report by Human Rights in China (HRiC) Commissioned by Minority Rights Group International, http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/MRG-HRIC.China.ES.pdf, extracted on 15 March 2011

Thirdly, the diverse geographical locations and structure of China has made it difficult for the Chinese government to assimilate the minorities into the entire society together and unify China, therefore making it a challenge for the government to establish a common Chinese identity and has limited control in grasping the concept tightly. Chinas geographical diversity terrains and climate largely shape the lifestyle and culture of communities. As such, different regions of China have different lifestyle and culture, making China a land of great internal contrasts due to different climate, culture, and topography. Furthermore, Chinas geographical proximity to other countries (e.g. Tibet bordering Nepal and Bhutan) also influences the cultural identity of these autonomous regions. As such, with the geographical nature of certain regions like Xinjiang and Tibet having profound and impactful influences in shaping the cultural identities of these minorities, it is very difficult for the Chinese government to establish a common Chinese identity within these regions because the strong cultural identity of these minority groups overshadows and overpowers the national Chinese identity perpetuated by the government. In addition, it is very challenging to regulate the influx of migrants of other countries (e.g. Nepal, Thailand, Vietnam etc.) from immigrating into these autonomous regions since they border various countries. It is extremely difficult for these migrants in these autonomous regions to discard the cultural identity that they already possess for a Chinese identity, therefore making the task of the government even harder in establishing a common Chinese identity within these autonomous regions. For example, Tibets geographical isolation has always been a decisive factor in the development of its distinctive culture, making it difficult for Tibetans to discard the strong, profound cultural identity they already have for Chinese identity. Tibets isolation and seclusion from the rest of China preserves its culture from being tainted by the rapidity of globalization, inadvertently also being the root cause of political and economic problems. With such problem surfacing due to geographical isolations, it is a challenge for the government to control the concept of Chinese identity. Hence, in short, because geographical locations and isolations also involves the interplay of a mix of other factors such as identity of ethnic minorities as well as integrationist policies, all these combined just made the challenge thrice as hard for the government to spread the notion of a common Chinese identity across the entire China, for the cultural identity that mushroomed due to geographical locations and the other factors is so much stronger that it overshadows the proposed Chinese identity, causing government to have limited control over the concept of Chinese identity. Fourthly, the souring, bitter and negative historical experiences and legacies between the Han-Chinese government and certain minorities have constantly reminded the latter as to why they should never be part of China and integrate with the rest of society, thus deterring them from being cohesively bonded and integrated. Hence, in the eyes of certain minorities such as Tibetans and Uighurs, to them history is being granted legitimacy to national claims, because the cultural identity that is erected and moulded from historical experiences has now come to dominate the meaning of national identity. In addition, with the presence of pervasive efforts by the Chinese government in implementing integration policies so as to force minorities to integrate into the main society, which have along the way resulted in certain repercussions, the animosity and enmity between certain minorities and the Han-Chinese have escalated
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WDS information and information regarding inadequate protection of cultural identity in China are extracted from the China: Minority Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tension 2007 report by Human Rights in China (HRiC) Commissioned by Minority Rights Group International, http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/MRG-HRIC.China.ES.pdf, extracted on 15 March 2011

over the years. For example, ever since the invasion of Tibet and destruction of Buddhist temples and monasteries in Tibet since the 1950s, tension and violence have constantly erupted all the way to 2008 where the recent Tibetan riots occurred. This shows that negative historical consciousness and animosity experienced in the past can emanate into the present, whereby they are compounded by very contemporary resentments and economic disparities which only further deepens the existing line of division, hence further deterring the assimilation of such minorities into the society. As a result, the existence of such ethnic and social cleavages, together with the cultural identity fabricated from historical experiences/legacies, prevent the success of governments effort in establishing a common Chinese identity across China due to such social segregations. In short, historical experiences itself is seldom a factor that affects the concept of national or Chinese identity. However, the fact that such historical legacies are being compounded with sensitive political agenda as well as cultural identities of certain minority groups, just make the establishment of a common Chinese identity to be almost impossible. Hence, the Chinese government has little/limited control over the concept of Chinese identity. Fifthly, quite the contrary, out of many factors I believe the Chinese government has a certain amount of control over the factor of religions as well as ideologies, which essentially do influence the concept of national identity in China, although the extent of how much the government has control over is however debatable. Throughout history, China has always shown a comparative indifference towards religion. Unlike other countries and regions whereby religions have distinctive role in shaping the history, politics and culture of the society, Chinese culture was perhaps the first to develop an intellectual skepticism concerning gods. That being said, religion still somewhat has an impact in shaping the common identity of China. This is because the lessons and beliefs learnt in religion are usually linked with the question of the ownership of the land (i.e. geographical locations), which fundamentally shapes and forms certain cultural identities in China. Because there is more than one religion, such religious diversity may result in the formation of a myriad of cultural identities, which could essentially overpower the concept of national identity, enabling the diverse culture in China to be defined as the common Chinese identity. As such, the government does undertake precautionary measures to ensure that whilst religious freedom can still be practiced, it must not overpower and dominate the political supreme of the Chinese government. This is because in many proven situations, religious activities are sometimes threatening to political stability and that the government sometimes view religion as tools that national separatists use to destroy the unity of China and barriers to governments efforts in fabricating a common Chinese identity. For example, in Tibet, religious activities were very closely monitored by the state and there were reports of houses being raided and the seizures of religious objects and photographs of the Dalai Lame in their possession were fined. This was because the Dalai Lama was viewed as a political threat to China, hence such measures were deployed to clamp down the power of religion in the political field in China.

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WDS information and information regarding inadequate protection of cultural identity in China are extracted from the China: Minority Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tension 2007 report by Human Rights in China (HRiC) Commissioned by Minority Rights Group International, http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/MRG-HRIC.China.ES.pdf, extracted on 15 March 2011

Furthermore, in terms of ideologies like Confucianism, President Hu Jin Tao has taken efforts to revive Confucianism as a moral compass in guiding the forging of a harmonious and cohesive society, which has been well perceived by many because not only is Confucianism able to tap a share of this buoyant religious market, but it can also successfully position itself on the broader market of values in a postMaoist and partially secularized society. As such, with the positive effects of Confucianism being so conspicuous, the government has been promoting Confucianism as part of moral codes and ethics that every Chinese should follow, thereby forging some sort of Chinese identity. Hence, it is very evident that out of all the factors that affects national identity, religions and ideologies is one that the government does have a tight and unfaltering control over. However, that being said, it must be reminded that the Chinese government must not deploy too tight of a control over these areas, for it might be viewed by the people in China, especially the minorities, as oppression of religious freedom. Should this happen, the resentment and enmity towards the Chinese government might escalate to epic proportions, so much so that these negative ricochets and repercussions that might occur would cause a further social and ethnic cleavage that threatens the establishment of a common Chinese identity. Overall, to conclude, I strongly believe in the notion that the Chinese government has little control over the concept of Chinese identity. This is because more often than not, the myriad of actions and policies executed and implemented by the Chinese government to tackle the omnifarious factors that affect the idea of Chinese identity, often lead to negative repercussions that might exacerbate the tensed situation further, causing the deepening of social and ethnic cleavage within the society of China. With the cons outweighing the pros, it is very obvious that within the past century, the Chinese government has find it explicitly formidable and mind-boggling to pertinaciously establish a common national identity that can be widely accepted and embraced by every single person in China; because with a sturdy national identity, only then will China be able to rise to any occasion and stay strong in the face of all adversities. (3595 words)

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WDS information and information regarding inadequate protection of cultural identity in China are extracted from the China: Minority Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tension 2007 report by Human Rights in China (HRiC) Commissioned by Minority Rights Group International, http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/MRG-HRIC.China.ES.pdf, extracted on 15 March 2011

List of References

1. Catholic Junior College Humanities Department: China Studies in English (CSE) H1 Theme 1 Course Pack (2011), pp. 15, 16, 37, 38, 39, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50 , 51, 52, 57, 58, 59, extracted on 15 March 2011 2. Catholic Junior College H1 China Studies in English (CSE) 2011 Theme 1 Lecture Notes Miss Mook, extracted on 15 March 2011 3. China: Minority Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tension 2007 report by Human Rights in China (HRiC) Commissioned by Minority Rights Group International, http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/MRGHRIC.China.ES.pdf, extracted on 15 March 2011 4. A Revival of Confucianism in China Today? by Sebastian Billiond, Associate Professor in Chinese civilization, University Paris Diderot, part of CJC JC 1 Week 10 Reading given by Miss Mook, extracted on 15 March 2011

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WDS information and information regarding inadequate protection of cultural identity in China are extracted from the China: Minority Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tension 2007 report by Human Rights in China (HRiC) Commissioned by Minority Rights Group International, http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/MRG-HRIC.China.ES.pdf, extracted on 15 March 2011