PRIMICIAS v. FUGOSO FACTS: The petitioner Cipriano Primicias is a campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties.

Respondent Valeriano Fugoso is the Mayor of the City of Manila. Petitioner filed an action for mandamus to compel respondent to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on November 16, 1947. Said meeting is for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of grievance. Petitioner instituted a mandamus action because respondent refused to grant such permit pursuant to Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila.
Section 1119. Free for use of public.The streets and public places of the city shall be kept free and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and the same shall be used or occupied for other purposes as provided by the ordinance or regulation. xxx xxx xxx And provided, further, That the holding of any parade or procession in any streets or public places is prohibited unless a permit therefor is first secured from the Mayor, who shall, on every such occasion, determine or specify the streets or public places for the formation, route, and dismissal of such parade or procession xxx xxx

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent mayor can validly refuse to issue permits for the holding of public meetings? HELD: NO. The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a well settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed as the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations; to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This government power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose. The Supreme Court held that Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila should be construed so as to mean that said provision does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held. The ordinance cannot be construed as conferring upon the Mayor the power to grant or refuse to grant the permit, which would be tantamount to authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for holding of meetings, parades or processions, because such a construction would make the ordinance invalid and void or violative of the constitutional limitations. As the Municipal Board is empowered only to regulate the use of streets, parks, and other public places, and the word regulate as used in section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code, means and includes the power to control, to govern and to restrain, but cannot be construed as synonymous with suppress or prohibit the Municipal Board cannot grant the Mayor a power which it does not have. There appearing no reasonable objection to the use of the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo for the meeting applied for, the SC granted the petition for mandamus and ordered the respondent to issue the corresponding permit.

Bayan et.al. v. Ermita Facts: Rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 is at issue. BAYANs rally was violently dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. KMU asserts that the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU cosponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005, a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along EspaaAvenue in front of the UST and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 The Public Assembly Act of 1985, some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the no permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy announced on Sept. 21, 2005. Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is sought. Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions. Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication. KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right toassembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble. Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing. BP 880 entails traffic re-routing to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free flow of commerce and trade. It is content-neutral regulation of the time, place and manner of holding public assemblies. According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the Mayor power to deny a permit independently of B.P. No.

880. and that the permit is for the use of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based regulationbecause it covers all rallies. Issue: Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional. Held: No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance1 is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to theregulation. The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, this was declared null and void. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designationof at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law.

MTRCB v. ABS-CBN Facts: It was on October 1991 where the documentary television program of ABS-CBN, specifically The Inside Story with the plot of Prosti-tuition was aired. The program shown that some female students of PWU were moonlighting as prostitutes, and as customer of the said place. The event uproared the PWU community. The Chancellor and the Parents and Teachers Association filed a letter complaint to the MTRCB regarding the matter. The petitioner then initiated an Investigating Committee of the respondents program, alleging that the latter did not submit the program to the review board violating Sec. 74 of PD 19865 and Chapter III and Section 7, 7, Chapter IV of the MTRCB Rules and Regulation. The Respondent, on the other hand, contends that The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial, which is protected by constitutional provision of freedom of expression and of the press and that the petitioner has no power and authority to impose such restraint upon the respondents. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent and affirmed by the CA. Issue: WON PD 1986 violated the constitutional freedom of expression and of the press. Held: No, the court ruled that PD 1986 does not violate the constitutional freedom of expression and of the press because Sec 3 of PD 1986 provides the power and function of MTRCB: B) to screen, review and examine all motion pictured as herein defined, television programs, including publicity materials This clearly states that the law gives the Board the power to screen, review, and examine all television programs Ergo, The Inside Story is within the jurisdiction of MTRCB. Although the respondents argue that their program is classified themselves under the exceptions of the power of MTRCB which is: Sec. 7. Unauthorized showing of or exhibition except motion pictures, television programs or publicity material imprint or exhibit by the Phil. Govt and/or its departments and agencies, and newsreels. They categorized themselves under the newsreels, though it wasnt defined in PD 1986. According to Webster Dictionary, newsreels is a short motion picture films portraying or dealing with current events, these are straight presentation of events and depiction of actualities. This was distinguished from news analyses, commentaries and opinions. The Inside Story is more of a public affairs program which is described as a variety of news treatment; a cross between pure television news and news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions. The Court merely penalized the respondent for their failure to submit the program to the Board.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RENE LAMSING Y JABON, Accused-Appellant. MENDOZA, J.: Facts: This is an appeal from the decision rendered on March 30, 1992 by the RTC of QC finding accused-appellant guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him accordingly. The case arose from the killing in the early hours of November 1, 1989 of Winnie Cabunilas, a security guard, while on duty at the construction site of a Synergy building on Aurora Boulevard, Cubao, Quezon City. Four days after the killing, accused-appellant was arrested by policemen, while in a drinking spree with friends at a basketball court near the scene of the crime. He was detained and in a police lineup, was identified by witnesses as one of those responsible for the death of Winnie Cabunilas. The prosecution evidence is as follows: Across the street was a canteen where Elizabeth de los Santos, an 18-year old student working as a dishwasher, was staying. This witness said that at dawn of November 1, 1989, she was roused from her sleep by the cries of a distressed person calling for his "mama". She got up, partly opened the door and saw, at a distance of about one meter, two male persons, one of them holding Winnie Cabunilas and the other one stabbing him. She immediately closed the door and peeped through a hole on it. She noticed a window partly open and watched from it. She identified the person who stabbed Cabunilas as the accused-appellant. From where she was, De los Santos saw accusedappellant stab the security guard with along pointed weapon ("ice-pick") several times, as another person held the guard's mouth. De los Santos saw accused-appellant holding the gun of the security guard which accused-appellant pointed at two persons who came to the rescue. De los Santos knew Winnie Cabunilas because he had been assigned to the construction site for four days already before the incident. According to the witness, after stabbing Cabunilas, the accused-appellant and his companion fled, bringing Cabunilas' gun with them. Appellant denied involvement in the crime. He claimed that on October 1, 1989, he and his common-law wife stayed at his uncle's house at Butocan St., Area V, project 2, Quezon City, as he and his uncle had prepared foodstuffs to be sold at the La Loma Cemetery the following day, which was All Saints' Day. Accused-appellant complains that he was made to join a police lineup where he was identified by three persons, including Elizabeth De los Santos, without the assistance of counsel. Issue: WON the accused was deprived of his Right to Counsel as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights Held: It was settled in Gamboa v. Cruz, 31however, that the right to counsel guaranteed in Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution does not extend to police lineups because they are not part of custodial investigations. The reason for this is that at that point, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory. The accused's right to counsel attaches only from the time that adversary judicial proceedings are taken against him.cha Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED by sentencing accused-appellant to an indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, with the corresponding penalties for the crime of homicide and to an indeterminate penalty of 3 months and 11 days of arresto mayor to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of prision correctional and to indemnify the Allen Security & Investigation Agency, Inc. in the amount of P500.00 for the crime of theft. In all other respects, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

People v Peralta FACTS: Version of Prosecution: Pedro Labita of Central Bank of the Philippines filed a complaint for qualified theft against accused. He submitted to SPO4 Coronel, the investigating officer at Western Police District Command, punctured currency notes in P100.00 and P500.00 bills with a face value of Php 194,190.00. These currency bills were punctured because they were no longer intended for circulation and are to be shredded; such notes were stolen from BSP by the accused. Ulysses Garcia was apprehended while he was waiting for a passenger bus. Garcia gave 3 separate statements admitting his guilt and participation of the crime charged and identified other co-accused. Version of the Defense: Garcia, served as a driver of BSP, was arrested by a man who had identified himself as a police officer while waiting for a passenger bus. He was arrested without warrant and dragged and forced him to ride a car. While inside, he was blindfolded, his hands were hand cuffed and was made to bend his chest touching his knees. (In essence, he was tortured). He was brought at the office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw. Upon interrogation by APO4 Coronel, Mr. Pedro Labita instructed SPO4 to get and examine the wallet of accused Garcia. There, they found 3 pieces of P100 perforated bill. It was actually Mr. Labita, and not accused-appellant Garcia, who gave the answers appearing in accused-appellants 3 sworn statements; Garcia was not present when Atty. Sanchez, accuseds counsel, signed the alleged 3 sworn statements. During the hearing, Atty. Sanchez manifested in open court that he did not assist Garcia when the police investigated him and signed the 3 sworn statements only as a witness thereto. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been sufficiency of evidence. HELD: [Art. III, Sec. 12 (1) and (2)- Right to counsel]. It is clear from a plain reading of the 3 extrajudicial confession that Garcia was not assisted by Atty. Sanchez. Moreover, he only appeared in court and categorically testified that he had not assisted Garcia when the latter was investigated by the police, and that the former had signed the Sworn Statement only as a witness. Lawyers role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused. A waiver in writing, like that which the trial court relied upon in the present case is not enough. Without the assistance of a counsel, the waiver has no evidentiary relevance. Also, the police arrested Garcia without a warrant, while he had been MERELY waiting for a passenger bus; hence, he not lawfully arrested. Nonetheless, not having raised the matter before entering his plea of not guilty, he is deemed to have waived the illegality of his arrest. Note, however, that this waiver is limited to arrest and not to search made as an incident thereto or to the subsequent seizure of evidence allegedly found during the search. In the present case, the perforated P100 currency notes were obtained as a result of a search made without a warrant subsequent to an unlawful arrest; hence, they are inadmissible in evidence. Without the extrajudicial confession and the perforated currency notes, the remaining evidence would be utterly inadequate to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence. Appellants ACQUITTED.

People vs. Pablito Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997 Re.: Extrajudicial Confessions to Mayor and Media Admissible Facts: Pablito Andan alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with homicide. The offense was committed on February 19, 1994 in Baliuag, Bulacan; the victim being Marianne Guevarra, 22 and a 2nd year student at the Fatima School of Nursing. On said day, victim left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela. While on her way, appellant invited her to his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to do so as the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. By night time, Marianne, who was still unconscious, was dragged by appellant to their backyard that was adjacent to a vacant lot. Appellant was to transfer Marianne to the vacant lot when she moved, prompting appellant to hit her head with a piece of concrete block. No longer moving, he dragged her to the lot and abandoned her. At 11am her body was discovered. The autopsy revealed that she died of "traumatic injuries." Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form an investigation team. The investigation pointed to the appellant. Appellant's nearby house was searched but he was not there. On February 24, a police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him and brought him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, he denied any knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police confronted him with evidence, appellant relented but implicated two of his neighbours, and that he was merely a lookout. Larin and Dizon were likewise brought there by the police. The following day a physical examination conducted on the suspects revealed that appellant has multiple scratches on the neck, chest and back. By that time, people and media representatives were already at the police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and whispered that they talk privately. The mayor led him to the office of the Chief of Police and there, he broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. Since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. After his confession, appellant hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help him. His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide. On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that on said date he was at his parent's house for the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and son went home after 5pm, slept at 8pm, and woke up at 6am the next day. Appellant claimed that after he was picked up by the police on February 24, he was coerced to confess that he raped and killed Marianne. Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told. The trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death. He was found guilty of the crime charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized accordingly. Hence, the automatic review. Issue: W/N the appellants confession not being assisted by a counsel is in violation of the constitution, and is therefore inadmissible as evidence against him. Held: Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounseled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court. Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. The Court therefore held accused-appellant Pablito Andan guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.

People v. Pacito Ordoo y Negranza and Apolonio Medina y Nosuelo GR No. 132154, June 29, 2000 FACTS: After three days of being reported as missing, the body of Shirley Victore, 15 years old, was found among the bushes near a bridge in Brgy. Poblacion, Santol , La Union. It was reported that she was raped and strangled to death. Unidentified sources pointed the 2 accused as suspects of the said crime, but due to lack of evidence they were sent home. The 2 accused later on confessed of committing the crime where the police immediately conducted an investigation and put their confession in writing; however, there were no practicing lawyer in the said municipality being a remote town of the Province of La Union to be able to assist the two accused. Before taking the said statements both accused were appraised in their own dialect of their constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by a competent counsel of their choice, the 2 accused understood their rights and did not require the services of counsel. After giving their personal statements, they were detained at the Santol Police station where a leading announcer of radio station DZNL visited and interviewed them which was played on air the following morning. A PAO lawyer, Oscar B. Corpuz was brought by the police to assist and be the counsel of the 2 accused where in a closed-door session apprised each of their constitutional rights, asked to write their confessions, explained to them each of the questions and answered their own questions. On arraignment the 2 accused pleaded not guilty. According to them they were detained and forced through violence to admit the said crime. The trial court found the 2 guilty of the crime rape with homicide attended with conspiracy. ISSUE: Whether or not the 2 accused should be convicted on the ground that constitutional infirmities attended the execution of their confessions. HELD: The Court ruled that according to the Constitution there are 4 fundamental requirements: 1. The confession must be voluntary 2. The confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel 3. The confession must be express 4. Confession must be in writing In the present case the extrajudicial confession was inadmissible due to the absence of counsel due to the fact that to be informed of the rights to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. It is not enough for the investigator to enumerate the person under investigation of his rights but it must also explain the effect of such provision in practical terms. Further the RA 7438 has two conditions to be met: (1) counsel o the accused must be absent and (2) a valid waiver must be executed. However, meeting the said conditions does not eliminate the necessity of counsel, but provides for the importance of the substituting a counsel should be made with caution. Thus, in the present case the absence of valid waiver would not make the Parish Priest of Santol, The Municipal Mayor, the relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police and other police officers of the municipality a substitute for a counsel. Having the custodial investigation inadmissible, the interview with the DZNL radio announcer would be left as evidence. Although the defense questioned the authenticity of the tape they were not able to submit evidence that would prove otherwise. The said tape also proved that the 2 accused were free from any intimidation and willingly done by such, making the said interview admissible as evidence. Further, the nature of the investigation was not in of an investigation but as an interview which would not violate any constitutional rights. The BOR does not concern itself with the relation between private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State.

PEOPLE v. AMESTUZO FACTS Accused-appellant Albino Bagas, Valeriano Amestuzo, Federico Ampatin, Dioscoro Vias and four other accused were charged with the complex crime of robbery in band with double rape for robbing the house of complainant Perlita Lacsamana and raping her niece and one of her employees. After the trial found merit on the prosecution, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. However, accused-appellant Albino Bagas was the only one who filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. He contends that his right to be represented by a counsel was violated. Bagas narrated that four days after the incident, a group of police together with accused Federico Ampatin went to the handicrafts factory in Pasay City where Bagas was working as a stay-in shell cutter. They were looking for a certain Mario. Failing to find the person, the police hit Ampatin and uttered to him to point any person present therein. It was then that Bagas pointed Ampatin as he was the first person the latter chanced to look upon. Thereafter, Bagas was arrested and they were brought to the Urduja Police Station in Kalookan City and placed under detention together with the other two accused, Amestuzo and Vias. When the complainants arrived, accused-appellant was brought out, Complainant Lacsamana asked him if he knew accused Amestuzo and Vias. Accused-appellant answered in the negative. The policemen told the complainants that accused-appellant was one of the suspects. This incited complainants to an emotional frenzy, and were only stopped when one of the policemen intervened Now, Bagas alleges that his right to be represented by a counsel was violated when he was entitled to it from the moment he was arrested, detained and singularly presented to the complainants for identification. He maintains that the identification was a critical stage of prosecution at which he was as much entitled to the aid of counsel as during the trial proper. ISSUE Whether or not the right to counsel of Bagas was violated. RULING No. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Hence, the right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process. This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory. It is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up. Hence, herein accused-appellant could not yet invoke his right to counsel when he was presented for identification by the complainants because the same was not yet part of the investigation process. Moreover, there was no showing that during his identification by the complainants, the police investigators sought to elicit any admission or confession from accused-appellant. In fact, the police did not at all talk to accused-appellant when he was presented before the complainants. The alleged infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused while under custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extra-judicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of his conviction. In the present case, there is no such confession or extra-judicial admission.

People vs Escordial This case avers that when there is an out-of-court identification under custodial investigation, the accused must be assisted by counsel Facts: On the evening December 27, 1996, Michelle, Erma and Teresa were asleep in their boarding house at Baranggay 40, Bacolod City. They were awaked by a man with his face covered by a shirt and armed with a knife. He demanded money which was given to him. Not satisfied, he wanted to rape Michelle and order all the ladies to cover their eyes with shirts (so that they could not identify the assailant). The offender succeeded in raping Michelle twice. The assailant left and the victims reported the matters to the authorities. On January 4, 1997, the police and Michelle went to Pontevedra, Negros Occidental as they received a tip that the suspect was there. The accused was arrested without a warrant of arrest. The accused was then brought to the police station so that he could be identified in a police line-up. Michelle was quite hesitant in the identification of the accused. During the police line-up, the accused was not assisted by counsel. However, the other witnesses identified the accused as the perpetrator. The defense presented two witnesses that the accused was actually in a cockpit game and he stayed at his friends house on the evening of December 27, 1996. They further presented that the accused was subjected to torture by the police. The RTC found the accused guilty of Robbery with Rape. The defense appealed with one contention concerning the lack of assistance of counsel of the accused during the police line-up. Issue: Was the accused entitled to assistance of counsel during police line-up? Held: Yes. A police line-up is one of the methods for out-of-court identification in which the complainants and his witnesses will identify the accused from a group of persons. Generally, police line-ups are considered out of custodial investigation as there is no investigation conducted to the accused. However, in the case at bar, the accused was arrested without a warrant and was already focused as the main assailant by the police due to an informants tip. Thus, he is already investigated before a police line-up could be conducted which entitles him to the assistance of counsel. The out-of-court identification of Michelle and the other witnesses are considered inadmissible as evidence. However, since the defense counsel failed to question the inadmissibility of the out-of-court identification of the accused during the police line-up, it is deemed that the accused waived his right to such. Moreover, even if the out-of-court identification was inadmissible, the in-court identifications admissibility will be sufficient to identify the accused as the perpetrator. However, the court believes that the complainant and witnesses have not properly and convincingly established the identity of the accused. Accused is acquitted

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ERIC GUILLERMO y GARCIA, appellant. FACTS: For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 73, dated March 7, 2001, in Criminal Case No. 98-14724, finding appellant Eric Guillermo y Garcia guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. Apellant is accused of murdering his employer, Victor Francisco Keyser. Appellant contends that his conviction was based on inadmissible evidence. He points out that there is no clear showing that he was informed of his constitutional rights nor was he made to understand the same by the police investigators. ISSUE: If RULING: it is a Sunday and no lawyer is available, can this be waived?

No. While the investigating officer was aware of the appellants right to be represented by counsel, the officer exerted no effort to provide him with one on the flimsy excuse that it was a Sunday. Despite the absence of counsel, the officer proceeded with said investigation. Moreover, the record is bare of any showing that appellant had waived his constitutional rights in writing and in the presence of counsel. As well said in People v. Dano, even if the admission or confession of an accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. Under Article III of the Constitution, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requisites: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be express; and (d) the confession must be in writing.

People v. Lucero This case was a result of information for robbery with homicide filed against Petitioner Alejandro Lucero, Bienvinido and Blabino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and John. Only the petitioner and the Echavez brothers were apprehended. Facts: On May 7 1988, at around 7 in the morning, complainant Dr. Demetrio Z. Madrid, on his way to his main residence in Project 6, Quezon City, was robbed by three malefactors and the assailants shot both Dr. Madrid and his driver Lorenzo Bernalesonly the former survived the incident. Dr. Madrid reported the incident to the Quezon City Police, however, no steps were taken and this prompted him to file his complaint with the Special Operations Group of the Central Intelligence Service (CIS). Two months later, after surveillance of the suspects, the Special Operations Group interrogated Bienvinido Echavez and thereafter apprehended Balbino and petitionerthey were turned over to the Investigation Department of the CIS. After being informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, petitioner informed Pfc. Alberto Perusal that he has no lawyerto which Atty. Diosdado Peralta was requested to assist him. Atty. Peralta appeared at the investigators office and explained to petitioner his constitutional rights to remain silent but he did not observe any reaction from petitioner and inferred that petitioner understood his advice. When the investigating team started to ask questions, Atty. Peralta left petitioner to attend a wake of his friend. Thereafter, petitioner was accompanied by two CIS officer to Atty. Peraltas house to make the latter sign a signed extrajudicial statement of petitioner. The former asked the latter if it was given voluntarily, to which the petitioner answered in the affirmative so Atty. Peralta signed it. The Echaves brothers were acquitted of the crime charged and only petitioner was convicted. Issue: 1.) WON the positive identification of complainant is sufficient to convict the accused? 2.) WON petitioners extrajudicial confession is admissible in court?
Held: In the first issue, the Court ruled in the negative. Dr. Madrid only was able to identify Lucero after the latter participated in a 4th police line-up, despite the fact that the robbery took place in the morning and the culprits wore no masks. His testimony also during the trial was inconsistent as he initially said that he could identify only one of the robbers and in another time he could now identify twoeventually he said that he could identify all three. Likewise, the Court ruled in the negative anent the second issue. The record shows that Atty. Peralta did not give importance to his role as counsel of petitioner. It was during his absence that Lucero gave an uncounselled decision. When the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. Atty. Peralta left his client to attend the wake of a friend during the crucial stage of interrogation and petitioner signed the extrajudicial confession in the absence of counselthis infirmity was not cured when the statement was later signed by Atty. Peralta. Despite alibi being a weak defense, it is the prosecution that must prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubtwhich in this they failed to do so.