REVOLUTION IN TELENGANA 1946-1951

( Part One )
A k h i l Gupta

Visnuru R a m a c h a n d r a Reddy, t h e much f e a r e d and h a t e d landlord of J a n g a o n t a l u k a (sub-district or county) was angry. He had been prevented from seizing the lands of a lowly washerwoman, Ailamma, by a group of peasants. D e t e r m i n e d t o p u t a n e n d to s u c h intransigence, h e h i r e d g o o n d a s (hoodlums paid to s e r v e as guards) to "eliminate" t h e g r o u p leaders. I t w a s J u l y 4, 1946. A procession led by Doddi Komarayya marched down t h e main r o a d t o w a r d s t h e landlord's house. Suddenly shots were heard. Doddi Komarayya was killed on t h e spot. His e l d e r b r o t h e r Doddi Mallayya w a s s h o t in t h e leg a n d t w o o t h e r s w e r e wounded. Normally t h e panic stricken villagers would have dispersed. But now they charged towards the landlord's house. News spread like wild-fire. Soon t w o thousand p e o p l e s h o u t i n g "blood f o r blood" a n d a r m e d w i t h a supply of d r i e d grass had surrounded t h e mansion (Sundarayya, 1972: 36-38; Reddy, 1973: 42-43). T h i s w a s t h e start of t h e T e l e n g a n a movement, o n e of t h e largest armed p e a s a n t uprisings in t h e h i s t o r y of modern India. A t i t s peak, i t spanned a n area of a b o u t 15,000 s q u a r e miles w i t h a population of 3 to 4 million. Peasant rule was e s t a b l i s h e d in 2000-3000 v i l l a g e s a n d d e f e n d e d by a g u e r i l l a a r m y of a b o u t 2000 r e g u l a r members a n d a n a d d i t i o n a l 10,000 a c t i v i s t s . When t h e Indian a r m y marched into t h e area on September 13, 1948, i t knocked t h e wind o u t of t h e movement. F i f t y thousand well trained troops were more than a match for a ragtag peasant army, sometimes brandishing nothing more fearful t h a n s t o n e s a n d slings. F o r c e d t o r e t r e a t i n t o t h e f o r e s t s , t h e g u e r i l l a s c o n t i n u e d s p o r a d i c r a i d s until t h e movement was "called o f f by the Communist Party in &tober 195 1.
SOUTH ASIA BULLETIN
Vol. IV No. 1 Spring 1984

GlON

Telengana

Considering the significance of the Telengana movement,2 we know surprisingly little about it. A p a r t from t h e w r i t i n g s of t h o s e who p a r t i c i p a t e d in i t , t h e r e is only o n e full-scale monograph ( P a v i e r , 1981). T h e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' a c c o u n t s h a v e all been published in t h e last d e c a d e - f o r t h e movement's s i l v e r jubilee. This h a s had t w o consequences: t h e long l a p s e of t i m e h a s r e s u l t e d in what may be called "thin" description; and t h e subsequent politics of the Communist P a r t y (which s p l i t i n t o "right" and "left" f a c t i o n s ) h a v e c l e a r l y a f f e c t e d t h e l e a d e r s ' own p e r c e p t i o n s a b o u t the movement.

So t h a t t h e r e a d e r may b e t t e r assess w h a t i s to come, i t might b e useful t o p l a c e s o m e of t h e primary s o u r c e s used in t h i s p a p e r o n t h e p o l i t i c a l spectrum, S u n d a r a y y a (1972) belongs t o t h e CPI(M) and his i s t h e most d e t a i l e d a c c o u n t w r i t t e n by a P a r t y member in English. R a v i N a r a y a n R e d d y (1973), R a j Bahadur Gour et, al. (1973) a n d C. R a j e s w a r R a o (1972) are all members of t h e CPI. P a v i e r , who r e l i e s heavily o n D V R a o [a CPI(ML) member] i s himself in t h e T r o t s k y i s t .. S o c i a l i s t Workers P a r t y . In a n a l y z i n g t h e e v e n t s in Telengana, I s h a l l b e less c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e p o l i t i c s 6f t h e Communist P a r t y ( h e n c e f o r t h CP) t h a n w e r e a n y of t h e s e people. But I will t a k e their analyses into account along with those of more academic commentators.
P a r t One of t h i s p a p e r i s l a r g e l y a background s k e t c h and n a r r a t i v e h i s t o r y of t h e p e a s a n t revolution. T h e f i r s t s e c t i o n i s a c o l l a t i o n of facts r e g a r d i n g physical features, population, i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , etc. t a k e n from t h e c e n s u s e s of 1931 a n d 1941. T h e n I look a t t h e p o l i t i c a l economy of H y d e r a b a d in t h e period p r e c e d i n g t h e revolution. Parallel t o t h e h i s t o r y of t h e region r u n s t h e h i s t o r y of t h e CP and t h a t i s c o n s i d e r e d in t h e t h i r d section. T h e t w o h i s t o r i e s 2

converge i n t h e Telenganamovement, permanently altering the character of both: this forms t h e substance of the last section. Part Two is also divided into four sections. First, I attempt to take stock of t h e movement's achievements. That is followed by sections i n which tentative explanations are advanced for the movement's success and failure, respectively. The concluding section asks how one is to explain the origins of themovement. Through detailed argument w i t h other studies, I conclude that no satisfactory explanation exists for the origin of revolutionary peasant movements, partly because t h e very enterprise of constructing a 'general theory of revolutions' may be mistaken.
GmmAPHY Telengana is the Telugu-speaking eastern part of the formerly princely state of Hyderabad. At an average height of 1250-1500 feet above sea-level (Quereshi, 1947: 10; Pavier, 1981: vii), Hyderabad encompasses an area of 82,700 square miles in south-central India. It was divided into three linguistic regions: Marathwada with six districts, Karnataka with two, and Telengana with nine. When the States Reorganization Commiqion's recommendations were adopted in 1956, Telengana was merged with the Telugu-speaking areas of Madras Presidency to form the present Andhra Pradesh. The most important centers of the Telengana Movement were the districts of Nalgonda and Warangal, to t h e east of the capital and main urban center Hyderabad (since then, t h e districts have been 'reorganized').
Being hilly, Telengana was covered mostly with sandy soils, good for growing jawar and bajra (different kinds of millet). Some areas had fertile black soils, used mainly for dry cultivation. The average annual rainfall was about 30 inches but it fluctuated greatly from year to year. Most of it fell during the period from roughly J u n e to September. The main food crops were jawar, bajra, rice, wheat and pulses. The major cash crops were peanut, castor, linseed, sesamum, tobacco and sugarcane. Double-cropping was commonly practiced, t h e crop being harvested i n October and late January to early February. Jawar and bajra were the main crops in Mahboobnagar; Nalgonda was the chief source of castor and an important producer of rice; Warangal, benefitting from good irrigation and heavier rainfall, produced rice as well as peanuts and tobacco.

Irrigation was provided by tanks, wells and canals. Telengana, where tanks were important, had 80% of the state's irrigation facilities. The percentage of irrigated area to total cultivated area, though, was low in the Nizam's Dominions, just six percent in 1931 compared to twenty percent for the country as a whole (Quereshi, 1947:30). Rain water filled the tanks during the monsoons; by the end of the following summer they were dry. The river Godavari, defining the eastern border of Telengana and the river Krishna demarcating the southern border are both rainfed. They too dried up during the summer. However, the torrential monsoons caused the rivers to swell. The current in the Godavari was particularly strong, making it virtually uncrossable.
All along the Godavari, between i t and the plains of Warangal and Karimnagar where agriculture is t h e main occupation, were thick forests. That was not true, though, of the entire state, only 12% of which was forested. Adilabad had even larger portions covered w i t h dense forests. Here tigers and leopards, bears, antelopes, wild boar, many species of snakes, and various small animals were to be found. There were forests along the Krishna too, in the southern parts of Nalgonda and Mahboobnagar but these were smaller and less dense.

Hyderabad had a population of just over sixteenmillion in 1941, at an average density of 198 people per square mile. Though t h i s was far lower than the all-India average of 246, it reprey sented a two-thirds increase over the last sixty years. In a predominantly agrarian economy where well over half the population dependedon agriculture for their livelihood, population per square m i l e was a less important statistic than population per cultivated square mile. In this regard, in 1931, Telengana with 476 people per cultivated square mile was nearly twice as densely populated as neighboring Marathwada which had 243 persons per cultivated square mile (Quereshi, 1947:28).
As i n t h e rest of t h e country, t h e rural population, about 89% of the total population, lived i n villages i n t h e plains and i n small hamlets i n t h e forests. The major portion of the rural

population e i t h e r c a m e from u n t o u c h a b l e castes l i k e t h e Malas a n d t h e Madigas or t r i b a l g r o u p s like t h e Hill Reddis, Chenchus, Koyas, Lambadis, Banjaras, and further north t h e Gonds (Dhanagare, 1974: 1 13; Gray, 1970: 129). T h e c a t t l e population, a t about 12.5 million, w a s almost as large as t h e human one. T h e dominant breed was called t h e Deccani. The quality of the cattle can be gauged from two facts. A good p a i r of bullocks could c o v e r j u s t t h r e e - f o u r t h s of a n acre of d r y land a n d half a n acre of land i n a day. In T e l e n g a n a , a c o w y i e l d e d j u s t over half a l i t e r a n d a b u f f a l o a r o u n d 1.25 l i t e r s of milk a day. T h i s w a s enough t o provide a m e a g e r 4.3 o u n c e s of milk p e r d a y p e r head, whereas nutritionally minimum requirements were estimated at 10 ounces per day per person. Sometimes, as in t h e homes of some deshmukhs a n d ~ a m i n d a r s t h e s e cattle s h a r e d a roof w i t h t h e ,~ families of the domestic servants of the household. In s u c h places, as e l s e w h e r e , hygiene w a s poor, medical f a c i l i t i e s n e a r l y non-existent, a n d e p i d e m i c s of c h o l e r a a n d m a l a r i a f r e q u e n t l y proved f a t a l to physiques a l r e a d y w e a k e n e d by malnutrition. Life expectancy was a mere 25.9 years and had increased little over the forty years since 1891, Tribal groups had an even lower average lower life expectancy. But if health services were poor, "infrastructural" development was worse. Warangal boasted j u s t 4 4 3 miles of m e t a l l e d road u n t i l 1950. Adilabad, sprawling o v e r 7000 s q u a r e miles, h a d 307 total miles of roadway; Nalgonda had m e r e l y 300 miles of m e t a l l e d r o a d s (Iyengar, 1951b:333). These roads probably extended from one commercial center to another; almost certainly, they led to t h e big train junctions that were t h e main vertical links through which trade was conducted. The p o s t a l s e r v i c e w a s minimal: o n e p o s t o f f i c e for e a c h 4 8 s q u a r e miles or t e n thousand people. T h e e n t i r e state h a d j u s t 6 4 t e l e g r a p h a n d t e l e p h o n e s e r v i c e s (Iyengar, 1951b3342). All t h e s e d e t a i l s may seem i n c i d e n t a l ; as w e shall see, however, t h e y w e r e to s h a p e in a c r i t i c a l way t h e c o n t e n t and nature of the armed struggle that followed.

THE FOLITICAL EOONOMY OF TELENGANA

In a predominantly rural economy, land and labor were the principal means of production. But t h e c o u n t r y s i d e w a s not a s e l f - c o n t a i n e d r u r a l utopia; i t w a s c o n n e c t e d b o t h t o t h e i n d u s t r i a l a n d merchant economy of the towns, and more importantly, to the world capitalist system, T h e dominating i n f l u e n c e on t h e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n people w a s t h e i r r e l a t i o n to land. T h e r e w e r e t h r e e main t y p e s of land tenure. In o r d e r of i m p o r t a n c e in t e r m s of area, t h e s e were: 1)Governmental land revenue system - khalsa or diwani lands - ryotwari tenure. 2) a i r d a r i s y s t e m - land given as g i f t s t o noblemen by t h e Nizam. 3) Nizam s personal estate - Sarf-e-khas system

Khalsa lands occupied a b o u t s i x t y p e r c e n t of t h e t o t a l in 1941 (Iyengar, 1951b:20).

In t h e

latter half of the nineteenth century, a series of administrative reforms were undertaken by Salar Jung I, then Prime Minister of Hyderabad State. Among them was direct revenue collection. Previously t h e r i g h t s to collect r e v e n u e w e r e a u c t i o n e d off by t h e state to r e v e n u e f a r m e r s c a l l e d deshmukhs or deshpandes ( P a v i e r , 1981:3; Dhanagare, 1 9 7 4 : l l l ) . Instead, Salar J u n g proposed d i r e c t c o n t a c t w i t h ' r e g i s t e r e d occupants', or p a t t a d a r s , who would b e " d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e to the Government for the payment of land revenue and whose name has been entered as such in Governshikmidar" ment records, whether h e b e personally in possession of the holding or through his ( P a v i e r , 1981: lo), Though p a t t a d a r s w e r e m e r e l y 'occupants' of t h e land l e g a l l y owned by t h e State, t h e y f u n c t i o n e d as proprietors. T h e i r o c c u p a n c y r i g h t w a s p e r m a n e n t , h e r i t a b l e a n d

alienable as long as they paid the revenue assessment. P a t t a d a r s c o u l d b e c u l t i v a t o r s who used e i t h e r t h e i r own labor a n d / o r h i r e d w a g e labor. Or t h e y could b e r e n t i e r s , Ieasing t h e land o u t to t e n a n t s c a l l e d shikmidars or tenants-at-will c a l l e d asami-shikmis. Shikmidars could n o t b e e v i c t e d as long as t h e y fulfilled t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s ( d e f i n e d e i t h e r by e x p l i c i t a g r e e m e n t , or more o f t e n , by custom). Such o b l i g a t i o n s w e r e o f t e n d i s c h a r g e d by payment in kind, though c a s h payment w a s q u i t e common.4 T h e usual c u s t o m for
4

payment in kind w a s to s p l i t t h e gross p r o d u c e evenly. T h e p a t t a d a r , though, was responsible for paying t h e r e v e n u e assessment while t h e t e n a n t s b o r e a l l t h e costs of production. Sometimes, a t e n a n t would h a v e t o pay a f i x e d q u a n t i t y of g r a i n to t h e landholder. T h e u s e of q u a n t i t i e s r a t h e r t h a n shares, however, was m o r e p r e v a l e n t when payment w a s made in cash. Here, besides paying t h e landholder, t h e tenant was also responsible for t h e government assessment. Quereshi observes (1947:108): "this form of tenancy is especially convenient to t h e capitalist non-resident proprietors..

."

T h e t e n u r e of tenants-at-will, asami-shikmis, r a n from o n e a g r i c u l t u r a l s e a s o n to t h e next. They formed t h e overwhelming proportion, more than three-fourths, of all tenancies. Moreover, the proportion of landless t e n a n t s to a l l t e n a n t s h a d b e e n growing steadily. A f t e r t w e l v e y e a r s on t h e s a m e plot of land, asami-shikmis w e r e e n t i t l e d to shikmidari r i g h t s b u t t h e y w e r e r a r e l y allowed t o s t a y f o r more t h a n t h r e e or f o u r y e a r s (Dhanagare, 1974: 1 1 1; Iyengar, 1951b:26-69; Pavier, 1981:3-11; Quereshi, 1947: 102-1 When direct revenue collection was introduced, deshmukhs were granted vatans (gifts of 5-10 villages) o r m a s h (annuities, computed as a p e r c e n t a g e of p a s t r e t u r n s ) (Sundarayya, 1972: 10-1 1; Dhanagare, m l l l ) . Besides, taking advantage of low literacy rates6 and their own substantial knowledge of land records, t h e y w e r e a b l e to t a k e possession of l a r g e areas of t h e most fertile land. I t seems t h a t r e g i s t r a t i o n of land-titles was usually done w i t h o u t t h e knowledge of t h e p e a s a n t who w a s c u l t i v a t i n g it (Sundarayya, 1972: 11; Pavier, 1981:3). Q u i t e o f t e n i t was e v e n m o r e f r a u d u l e n t , reducing " t h e a c t u a l c u l t i v a t o r t o t h e s t a t u s of a tenant-at-will or a landless laborer" (Dhanagare, 1974: 112). I t w a s in t h i s manner t h a t t h e landlords built up huge estates. Visnuru Ramachandra Reddy, t h e notorious deshmukh of Jangaon in Nalgonda district, owned 40,000 acres in f o r t y villages; Kalluru deshmukh owned 100,000 acres of Madhira i n Khammam district; Janareddy Pratap Reddy, perhaps the biggest of all, owned nearly 150,000 acres in Suryapet taluka in t h e district of Nalgonda. Legal c o n t r o l however by i t s e l f d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l (McMurtry, 1978:74): t h e f o r m e r is a n issue of legitimation; t h e l a t t e r of domination (Giddens, 1979: 107,188). How w e r e t h e deshmukhs a b l e to e n f o r c e t h e i r newly-won legal rights, to t r a n s l a t e t h e r i g h t o v e r p r o p e r t y t o a more t a n g i b l e form - r e n t collected e i t h e r as c a s h o r in kind?7 T h e r e w e r e s e v e r a l mechanisms, all of which were probably responsible. The deshmukhs normally employed an agent (seridar) to look after t h e i r villages. According to Sundarayya, " t h e s e s e r i d a r s used to c o l l e c t t h e p r o d u c t s from t h e p e a s a n t s by force"(Sundarayya, 1972: 1 1 , emphasis mine). Similarly, G r a y w r i t e s , "A d o r a h a s many s e r v a n t s a n d some are used as strong-arm men to e n f o r c e his wishes a n d deal with the recalcitrant" (Gray, 1970: 122). The deshmukhs often augmented their considerable economic power by functioning as the politic a l , judicial, a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h e a d of t h e village. T h e s e positions - patel, p a t w a r i , mali patel - were hereditary (Sundarayya, 1972: 11). Thus t h e deshmukh's power rested not merely on the means of force that he actually possessed; as was to become clear later, these were not sufficient to suppress t h e peasantry. Rather, t h e deshmukh's authority derived from t h e potential force that h e c o u l d summon; a power i n v e s t e d in him by his various o f f i c i a l positions including t h a t of police chief. He represented State power. As a symbol whose physical presence embodied multiple f u n c t i o n s of a u t h o r i t y t h e deshmukh was a l s o a f a v o r i t e t a r g e t of t h e w r a t h of t h e p e a s a n t s (Worsley, 1968:ix-xxi). Q But p e r h a p s more i m p o r t a n t t h a n f o r c e , e i t h e r e m p l o y e d d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y (as a t h r e a t ) , was t h e power of tradition. The most powerful means through which structures of domination are r e p r o d u c e d a r e a l s o t h e most innocent: t h e deshmukhs had always b e e n c o l l e c t i n g rent, as far as a n y o n e could remember, a n d t h e r e w a s no r e a s o n f o r i t t o be otherwise. T r a d i t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t i e s are t r a n s m i t t e d through t h e r e p e t i t i o n of simple t a s k s but t h e y are most deeply lodged in beli systems: in religion, r i t u a l , folk-tales, song, dance, etc., and v e r y importantly, in language, f6
W e h a v e s e e n how deshmukhs c a m e to c o n t r o l khalsa lands, b u t a s u b s t a n t i a l portion (roughly 30%) of t h e total land w a s c o n t r o l l e d by jagirdars. J a g i r lands w e r e estates g r a n t e d t o nobles by 5

the Nizam: some 6500 villages scattered over 25,000 square miles (Iyengar, 1951b:20; Dhanagare, 1974: 1 1 1). They o f t e n c o n t r o l l e d t h e i r own revenue, police, civil, a n d judicial s y s t e m s (Sundarayya, 1972: 10; Khusro, 1958: 10-1 1). Some paid t a x e s t o t h e state; o t h e r s did not. T h e y maintained their own armies which were given in the service of t h e Nizam when required. This was t h e i r only obligation t o t h e State; in t u r n t h e y enjoyed t h e privileges of f e u d a l lords, a c c o u n t a b l e t o no one. In t h e s e lands oppression was v e r y severe. F o r example, t a x e s for i r r i g a t e d lands w e r e t e n times a s high on j a g i r lands as on khalsa lands ( D h a n a g a r e , 1974: 11 1; Sundarayya, 1972: 10). T h e r e are t w o possible r e a s o n s for this. With t h e i r own armies, j a g i r d a r s felt free to extort revenue. Secondly, they were not constrained, as the landlords were, by being in t h e middle of a h i e r a r c h y of power. AS sub-feudatory s t a t e s , t h e s e j a g i r s w e r e t h e only p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t t o t h e Nizam's r u l e b u t their powers were limited by their extreme fragmentation. By 1949, there were 1500 jagirdars in Hyderabad (Khusro, 1958:4). As we shall see, t h e Nizam was t o be overthrown by a combination of "external" as well as "internal" forces. Besides khalsa and jagir lands was t h e sarf-e-khas, t h e Nizam's personal e s t a t e . I t s p r e a d r o u g h l y o v e r loohof t h e state's area, a b o u t 8000 s q u a r e miles s p r e a d o v e r 1961 v i l l a g e s (Iyengar, 1951b:20; Khusro, 1958:5). These areas yielded an annual income of Rs. 20 million. This sum, and an additional Rs. 7 million, w e r e used to m e e t t h e personal e x p e n d i t u r e of t h e Nizam a n d his retinue (Sundarayya, 1972:9; Dhanagare, 1974: 11 1).12
SOf a r , w e h a v e discussed r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n landowners and tenants. However, a l a r g e proportion of t h e r u r a l population c o n s i s t e d of landless a g r i c u l t u r a l laborers. If w e include poor peasants, who worked mainly as laborers but who owned a small piece of land, then according to t h e 1951 census, the two groups made up about 40% of t h e rural population. Agricultural laborers made up a b o u t 32% of t h e r u r a l population d e p e n d e n t o n a g r i c u l t u r e for a livelihood (SA, 1956: 16,186).13 Employment was uncertain, t h e seasonal high being harvest time, and total duration being a t most f i v e to six months p e r y e a r (Quereshi, 1947:71). Wages, paid in kind, w e r e pitiful. F o r example, in Huzurnagar t a l u k a in t h e d i s t r i c t of Nalgonda, w a g e s for a 9-14 hour working d a y amounted t o 1.5 kg. of paddy during t h e s l a c k season a n d 2.25 kg. during t h e busy one.14 One more fact a b o u t employment is c r u c i a l to note: t h e r o l e of t h e State. T h e P u b l i c Works Department and the Railways employed 420,000 laborers in 1931 (Pavier, 1981: 15).

Of t h e landless poor, t h e worst-off w e r e no doubt t h e bhagelas, though a l l h a d to perform f o r c e d labor c a l l e d v e t t i . T h e bhagelas w e r e t y p i c a l l y untouchables bonded t o t h e i r m a s t e r s through debt. Wages were low, interest rates high and records could b e manipulated easily; when t h e bhagelas died t h e y w e r e almost always s t i l l in debt. This d e b t was i n h e r i t e d by t h e n e x t g e n e r a t i o n a n d t h e landlord n e v e r h a d to worry a b o u t finding free l a b o r for menial jobs ( P a v i e r , 1981:8; Dhanagare, 1974: 112). F o r t h e i r v a s t landholdings, as well a s f o r household chores, landlords c o n s c r i p t e d f o r c e d labor, v e t t i , s a n c t i o n e d by t r a d i t i o n , H a r i j a n families had to s e n d o n e man from t h e family to do v e t t i which c o n s i s t e d of household work, c a r r y i n g mail o r r e p o r t s , or c o l l e c t i n g wood from t h e forests. C o b b l e r s a n d t a n n e r s w e r e e x p e c t e d t o supply m a t e r i a l to t h e deshmukh free of charge. Washermen were used as carriers for the palanquins in which landlords and their families travelled or w e r e f o r c e d to run with t h e i r bullock-carts o r h o r s e s ( t o c l e a r t h e way). Toddy-tappers15 set a p a r t f i v e to t e n trees just to s e r v e t h e landlords' needs, T h e l i s t g o e s on a n d on b u t t h e i d e a should be sufficiently clear: free labor was extracted from wherever possible, whether i t consiste d of shepherding t h e landlord's l i v e s t o c k or tilling t h e landlord's f i e l d s (Sundarayya, 1972: 1214). F u r t h e r m o r e , v e t t i w a s usually demanded w i t h o u t notice. Significantly, it w a s t h e w e a k e r s e c t i o n s of s o c i e t y t h a t w e r e c a l l e d on most often. When t h e deshmukh o v e r s t e p p e d his bounds though, t h e d u a l i t y of power b e c a m e evident: t h e v i l l a g e r s b o y c o t t e d him, r e f u s i n g to perform their services (Pavier, 1981:9; Dhanagare, 1974: 112; Gray, 1970: 122). Though t h e landlords b a s e of power l a y in t h e i r c o n t r o l o v e r land a n d t h e p r o d u c t of labor, t h e i r power e x t e n d e d to e v e r y s p h e r e of village life. T h e y c o l l e c t e d e x c i s e d u t y from toddy6

tappers, a right auctioned off by t h e State. This was a valuable source of cash which was then used for moneylending. The deshmukhs either l e n t money directly, or more commonly, allowed a Marwadi or Maratha sahukar to do so. In exchange, the banyas marketed the landlord's produce. For every t e n attadars on an average, there was one professional or agricultural moneylender. This shoul ave encouraged competition. However, the big moneylenders divided up the villages among themselves and did not encroach on their fellow sahukar's territory. Thus, though an agriculturalist did usually borrow from more than one source, t h e rates of interest were nothing short of usurious, "never less than 25 percent" (Pavier, 1981:8; Quereshi, 1947:163). Sundarayya's figures commonly indicate that they were closer to 100 percent.l7 Short term loans were especially dear, requiring a 50 percent payback i n 15-30 days, an annual nominal simple interest rate of 600-1200 percent (Sundarayya, 1972:508).18 Besides moneylending, landlords also owned forest and fisherycontracts as well ascontracts for bidi leaves (Gray, 1970:121).19 They controlled migration into the village, as well as t h e exchange of land. They even kept tribal irls as concubines in their homes, giving them away as servants in their daughters' marriages Gray, 1970:122; Sundarayya, 1972:1 ) 4.

All in all, the picture that emerges is one of extreme concentration of land concomitant with
a concentration of power. According to Sundarayya (1972:1 5), i n Nalgonda, Mahboobnagar, and

Warangal, landlords with more than 500 acres owned 60-70 percent of cultivable land. Pavier (198~4-5) claims that the trend was towards greater concentration. Studies conducted in 1928-29 show that in Warangal 25 percent of the irrigated land was sold i n t h e last quarter century, one 1) third by debt transactions (Pavier, 1981:s; Dhanagare, 1974:1 4 . Most was taken over by the big landlords or the moneylending and trading classes (Dhanagare, 1974:1 4 . 0 1)2 Production relations internal to t h e countryside are but one side of t h e story; the other is the incorporation of this rural economy into the world capitalist system. Here cash crops l i k e peanut, castor, linseed, sesamum, sugarcane and tobacco were t h e vital links, Hyderabad, w i t h more than 30 percent of sown area under non-food crops, was significantly more involved in t h e primary commodity cash economy than the rest of India (SA 1956:316). Let us look at t h e magnitude of t h e area cultivated with oilseeds (Quereshi, 1947:52-57). These numbers were to increase further, from 13 percent of sown area i n 1939-40 to nearly 19 percent in 1951-52(SA 1956:53)(SeeTableI). Oilseeds were by far themost important commodities to be exported. They accounted for over half of Hyderabad's total export earnings (Iyengar, 1951a:319). However, this was a relatively recent phenomenon. In t h e decade 1912-22, for example, oilseeds contributed less than a fifth to total export earnings, the major share coming from the sale of cotton (DR:148). Castor was already grown i n large enough quantities at t h e turn of the century to be shipped to England (Pavier, 1981:18). Peanut cultivation, however, was a new phenomenon, as can be Seen from t h e rapid increase i n peanut acreage in t h e span of just f i f t e e n years. The increase i n peanut cultivation came at the expense of jawar production, which lost nearly a million acres, and of castor where growing competition on t h e world market led to a decrease of nearly half a million acres (Quereshi, 1947:54-57). But why did peanut production increase so sharply in Telengana? There were several reasons. It (and other oilseeds) prospered on the soil in unirrigated regions, too poor to support other crops. Secondly, the markets for these products were abroad (nearly half of Hyderabad's exports went to the West) where consumers could afford to pay relative1 high prices, making it a lucrative production proposition (Iyengar, 1951a: 319; Pavier, 1981: l8K W e have already seen that money was scarce - these crops brought much needed cash into the rural economy. Furthermore, t h e State too played an important role in promoting the use of high-yield varieties (Pavier, 1981:1 ) 8. Oilseeds were not the only cash crops that benefitted from State benevolence.
New varieties of cotton and rice were developed by the A ricultural Department that substantially increased yields (Quereshi, 1947:58; Pavier, 1981:22,24).28 However, it was sugarcane that best exemplified

the growing intervention of the State. Sugarcane cultivation grew from a mere 30,000 acres in
7

1938 t o m o r e t h a n 200,000 a c r e s in 195 1-52 (SA 1956:54-55). Besides i n t r o d u c i n g high-yielding v a r i e t i e s , t h e State provided t h e o t h e r major input: irrigation. This w a s d o n e b c a n a l s from t h e newly built Nizamsagar dam j u s t n o r t h of Hyderabad c i t y ( P a v i e r , 1981:23).2 T h e r e w a s good r e a s o n for promoting s u a r c a n e : t h e 20,000 t o n s t h a t had to b e imported annually w e r e a h e a v y burden on the exchequer. $3

T h e S t a t e was not t h e only p a r t y i n t e r e s t e d in promoting a g r i c u l t u r a l e x p o r t s , P r i m a r y industries, involved e i t h e r in e x t r a c t i n g r a w m a t e r i a l s or in processing them in a n e l e m e n t a r y fashion, w e r e growing rapidly: c o a l mining in Warangal a n d Adilabad, t e x t i l e mills, t h e Nizam State Railway, cement companies, tobacco factories, and plants for processing oilseeds and milling rice. The grip of colonialism was weakening (Pavier, 198152-54) and t h e domestic bourgeoisie in India was coming of age.24 T h e biggest gains from i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e w e r e to b e m a d e by t h e merchant class, The channels through which goods could flow were limited; they were linked t o t h e development of transportation and communication. The development of these "public" goods, instit u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s , w a s c o n t r o l l e d by t h e s t a t e - a State which d r e w i t s s t r e n g t h from t h i s class and t h e rural elite. What happened in effect c a n b e simply s t a t e d in t h i s manner: t h e sale of a g r i c u l t u r a l goods on t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l m a r k e t had "opened up" t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n s a l e p r i c e a n d t h e c o s t of production. The larger profit thus occurring was being split up among the various actors. L e t us examine t h e effect of t h e s e c h a n g e s on a g r a r i a n relations. One q u e s t i o n s c r o p s up immediately: how did all t h i s c h a n g e t h e position of t h e deshmukh? If i t diminished t h e i r power, how did t h e y r e s i s t i t , and if not, why n o t ? I t seems clear t h a t t h e a b s o l u t e level of t h e deshmukh's income increased. A l o t of lowf e r t i l i t y land t h a t previously lay fallow was brought under c u l t i v a t i o n , now t h a t i t could b e used to grow oilseeds f o r e x p o r t (Pavier, 1981: 19). R e n t s w e r e i n c r e a s e d on t h e basis of t h e potent i a l l y i n c r e a s e d v a l u e of production.25 F u r t h e r m o r e , c r i s e s on t h e world m a r k e t e n a b l e d t h e deshmukhs to consolidate their landholdings even more. Productivity increasing inputs like irrig a t i o n a n d t h e new s e e d s had t o b e purchased, probably in c a s h - t h e deshmukhs had t h e liquid assets, a n d @ e influence, t o t u r n asymmetric o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n t o i n e q u i t a b l e o u t c o m e s ( P a v i e r , 1981: 19-21), T h a t t h e deshmukhs w e r e a b l e to i n c r e a s e t h e i r r e s o u r c e s is clear; i t is n o t c e r t a i n , h owever, t h a t t h e y simultaneously b e t t e r e d t h e i r r e l a t i v e position, I n c r e a s e d c o n t r o l o v e r land a nd c a s h made them r e l a t i v e l y more powerful as far as t h e landless l a b o r e r s a n d s m a l l p e a s a n t s 2 7 went. But t h o s e p e a s a n t s who d e r i v e d t h e major s h a r e of t h e i r income by s e l l i n g t h e i r p r o d u c e were not necessarily worse off.28 They probably had enough money t o buy t h e required seeds and irrigation water.29 At t h e same time they seem t o have had as good an access t o output markets as anyone else. The latter point is important. The middleman who channeled rural produce into the world market established a relationship with t h e landlord characterized by mutual dependence. On t h e o n e hand t h e m e r c h a n t needed t h e landlord's p r o d u c e t o b e a b l e t o p r o f i t from t r a d e ; on t h e other hand, the iandlr.1 needed t h e merchant t o gain t h e considerable advantages of selling on t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l :I Arket - of avoiding a c r i s i s of realization. T h e r e l a t i o n w a s not e n t i r e l y equal; i f landlords r e f u s e d L C &I, t h e m e r c h a n t s could always buy from all t h o s e p e a s a n t s who produced a surplus. I t was t h l s t h r e a t t h a t probably " c r e a t e d t h e space" t h a t r e s u l t e d in a widening of t h e power base. T h e question s t i l l remains, "Why did t h e deshmukhs allow t h e i r power to c o r r o d e away?" In t h e absence of any evidence t o the contrary, one explanation can be suggested. Our assessment so f a r has been "behind t h e actors' backs": their actions however would depend on how they perceived m a t t e r s . T h e landlord's p e r c e p t i o n of his own power was likely t o b e s y s t e m a t i c a l l y biased: his increased power over the villagers could be substantiated in day-to-day life; however, t h e loss of p o w e r involved in his d e p e n d e n c e on t h e t r a d i n g c l a s s w a s likely to b e veiled. This could b e for t w o reasons: r e l a t i o n s of exchange, being "free and equal", are seldom p e r c e i v e d otherwise,30 Secondly, t h e landlord was i n t e r e s t e d in selling his produce and could b e s c a r c e l y b e e x p e c t e d to 8

appreciate the qualitative difference between selling food crops for a local market and cash crops f o r t h e worldmarket. T h e deshmukhs w e r e losing power while thinking t h a t t h e y w e r e gaining it: that explains why they jumped into the cash-crop market so enthusiastically. The deshmukhs acted to bring about their own demise; however, the poorer peasants were pushed to a state of even greater deprivation. This happened for a number of reasons. Marginal farmers did not a p p a r e n t l y t a k e a d v a n t a g e of t h e new c a s h crops. I t seems t h a t t h e y first c u l t i v a t e d food, using up as much area and human resources as was necessary to obtain a s e c u r e outcome.31 Cash crops had a lower priority: land was s c a r c e ; irrigation and s e e d s w e r e obtained with difficulty, and a t a price, if a t all; and t h e delay in a t t e n d i n g t o t h e s e c r o p s made t h e t a s k impossible unless t h e rains had been plentiful. Landless laborers would not h a v e b e n e f i t t e d in any case: employment opportunities had increased but there was still enough surplus labor to keep wages minimally This explains why poorer peasants could not improve their condition and hence were relatively worse off, If subsistence c r i s e s for t h e landless result mainly from purchasing power deficits, as h a s been suggested by Sen, t h e n t h e s e people may h a v e been l e f t absolutely worse off as well. In t h e absence of evidence on the movement of real wages, some speculations may be permitted that lend c r e d e n c e t o t h i s view, It is c l e a r t h a t population had grown and along with it t h e a b s o l u t e number of landless agricultural workers. If w e n o t e in addition t h a t nosignificant new a l t e r n a t i v e employment opportunities w e r e c r e a t e d , w e c a n conclude t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l r e s e r v e army of labor existed, keeping wages low (DR:57,69; Quereshi, 1947:24; SA 1956: 15). During t h e G r e a t Depression, m a r k e t prices fell disastrously, both for food c r o p s and c a s h crops. R e n t s however remained t h e same. F a c e d with r e a l r e n t s t h a t had just doubled, and successive crops damaged by the weather and rodents, small landholders had just two options: they could e i t h e r t a k e loans or sell t h e i r land. Those who w e r e a l r e a d y in d e b t w e r e now f a c e d with t h e prospect of paying back s e v e r a l times t h a t amount in r e a l t e r m s -things w e r e so bad t h a t some c o u l d n o t e v e n a f f o r d to pay t h e i n t e r e s t (Pavier, 1981:27-31). Loans w e r e t a k e n for s e v e r a l purposes, o f t e n to purchase t h e only s u b s t a n t i a l c a p i t a l input required - a pair of oxen. But t h e r e w e r e o t h e r important reasons: s u b s t a n t i a l expenses w e r e incurred in marriages; homes, wells and carts needed to b e r e p a i r e d o r replaced; grain s t o r a g e facilities were poor and a bad harvest necessitated borrowing just to meet household expenses over t h e summer months (Pavier, 1981:30-31). Most loans w e r e t a k e n f o r 'productive' purposes or for the repayment of previous debts. Interest payments and debt repayment also carved out the largest chunk, nearly a q u a r t e r , from a family's savings. When d e b t s w e r e incurred by mortgaging land, t h e overwhelming proportion (nearly three-fourths) was e i t h e r in t h e form of "mortgage with possession" or "usufructuary mortgage", In two decades, the latter, relatively minor in 1929-30, had become t h e predominant form, accounting for just over half of all mortgages. "The explan tion," Iyengar (1951b3416) thinks, "lies in t h e high prices ruling f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l produce" 33 (Iyengar, 1951b3408-456; Quereshi, 1947: 149-165). Unable to pay off their debts, many peasants had no choice but to sell. For exam le, a man sold two acres of wet-land to Ravi Narayan Reddy in 1931 for just Rs. 25 (Reddy, 1973:5[34 T h e inflationary c r i s i s accompanying t h e Second World War f u r t h e r worsened t h e situation. P r i c e s of food c r o p s doubled within t h e s p a c e of t w o years; c a s h c r o p prices went up e v e n faster, Wage rates, on t h e o t h e r hand, did not i n c r e a s e as quickly, perhaps r e f l e c t i n g t h e stickiness of implicit wage contracts in the absence of collective bargaining. Thus the real income of landless l a b o r e r s fell. Seeing t h e opportunity for quick profits, t h e l a r g e landowners s w i t c h e d to c a s h crop production. However, small landholders were inclined to cereal production as we have already seen. In t h e face of a widespread food shortage, t h i s t e n d e n c y was reinforced. H e r e t h e role of the State becomes crucial. Concerned with war-time food shortages, the Hyderabad Government started actively encouraging food-production. A t the same time, like the Government of India, it imposed a levy: the State was to be the sole purchaser and distributor of foodgrains. The problem w a s t h a t t h e levy was t e n to t w e n t y p e r c e n t lower than t h e m a r k e t prices. More important is t h e mechanism for enforcing t h e levy i t was done by people from t h e village, one of whom was an

o f f i c i a l . This meant t h a t t h e deshmukh w a s t h e d e - f a c t o c o l l e c t o r a n d h e used t h i s r i g h t as a n instrument to further his domination (Pavier, 1981:33-37; Dhanagare, 1974: 115).

I n t h e s t u d y of t h e p o l i t i c a l economy of T e l e n g a n a w e h a v e so far c o n c e n t r a t e d on t h e "economy" aspect. I t is now t i m e t o t u r n t o t h e "polity", t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework of p o l i t i c s in the S t a t e and its development.
P o l i t i c a l Organization i n H y d e r a b a d Formally, t h e s u p r e m e a u t h o r i t y was t h e Nizam, presiding o v e r a "political a n d s o c i a l s t r u t u r e frommedieval Muslim r u l e ( t h a t ) had b e e n p r e s e r v e d m o r e o r less i n t a c t " (Smith, 1950:28). This was c e r t a i n l y true as far as t h e j a g i r s w e r e c o n c e r n e d b u t it w a s a l s o t r u e in a n o t h e r r e s p e c t : t h e Nizam had t h e e q u i v a l e n t of a royal r e t i n u e , c o n s i s t i n g of big i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , administrators and government officials. These were usually Muslims, S p u g h Hyderabad's population was predominantly (81Oh) Hindu (Smith, 1950:27; Quereshi, 1947:30).

55

T h e Nizams of Hyderabad had r u l e d s i n c e 1723 when Asaf J a h i had founded t h e d y n a s t y by breaking a w a y from t h e Moghul Empire. They h a d r e t a i n e d close r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e British who stationed a permanent force of 9000 troops in Secunderabad, on t h e northern outskirts of t h e city of Hyderabad. In t h e s e c o n d q u a r t e r of t h i s c e n t u r y , when British w i t h d r a w a l from India w a s imminent, t h e Nizam was p l a c e d in a t e n u o u s situation. His power b a s e within t h e state w a s e x t r e m e l y narrow, limited to a small group of noblemen in t h e urban areas, a f e w j a g i r d a r s in t h e countryside, a n d t h o s e Muslims in t h e c i t y who b e n e f i t t e d d i r e c t l y from t h e State's Islamic c h a r a c t e r . On t h e other hand, t h e British were increasingly reluctant allies. The concerted efforts of t h e communal Majlis-i-Ittehad-ul Mussulman37 to raise the slogan of Anaal Malik (literally "I am t h e King") can b e i n t e r p r e t e d in t h i s c o n t e x t (Reddy, 1973:9; P a v i e r , 1981:70). With t h e Nizam's blessings, t h e I t t e h a d (as i t w a s popularly c a l l e d ) w a s e n g a g e d in a l a s t d i t c h l e g i t i m a t i o n campaign b u t it w a s t o b e t o o l i t t l e t o o late. In t h e last f e w y e a r s of t h e Nizam's rule, t h e I t t e h a d was to p l a y a n i n c r e a s i n g l y i m p o r t a n t p o l i t i c a l role, e s p e c i a l l y in t h e armed struggle. Thus, it might b e useful to trace i t s o r i g i n and character.
I t started in 1927 with a cultural organization called t h e Anjuman-e-Tabligh-ul-Islam which e n g a e d i t s e l f in c o n v e r t i n g untouchables to Islam (Reddy, 1973:9; P a v i e r , 1981:69). T h e A r y a Samaj 8 responded by converting them back; communal clashes resulted and both organizations were banned. Bahadur Yar Jung,39 the leader of t h e Tabligh, then took over another social and cultural forum - t h e Ittehad. Under his leadership, t h e I t t e h a d b e c a m e a n a g g r e s s i v e p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a tion dedicated to the Nizam's rule. However, i t was not until t h e lawyer Qasim Razvi became t h e l e a d e r of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t i t a t t a i n e d i t s r e p u t a t i o n for fanaticism. H e c r e a t e d a n a r m e d wing called t h e Razakars which became an informal army parallel to t h e Nizam's regular army. It w a s t h e n t h a t t h e I t t e h a d o b t a i n e d t h e dubious d i s t i n c t i o n of being i d e n t i f i e d w i t h a u t o c r a c y , communalism, a n d fascism40 at t h e s a m e t i m e (Reddy, 1973:9; P a v i e r , 1981:69,112; Smith, 19%): 9,33).

Religion was j u s t o n e of t h e ways in which g r o u p l o y a l t y w a s divided t h e r e w a s class, c u l t u r e , a n d caste, a n d t h e r e w a s language.41 T h e Nizam p a t r o n i z e d Urdu, making it t h e only medium of i n s t r u c t i o n in t h e State's s c h o o l s (Pavier, 1981:65).42 Urdu a n d English w e r e t h e o f f i c i a l languages: while none of t h e o t h e r languages prospered, Telugu w a s singled o u t for derision.43 Even among elite Hindus, Telugu was not favored; resentful of t h e treatment of their n a t i v e l a n g u a g e in t h e i r own land, s o m e of t h e s e p e o p l e formed a n o r g a n i z a t i o n c a l l e d t h e Andhra J a n a Sangham ( l i t e r a l l y "Andhra Peoples' Association"). I t s o b j e c t i v e w a s to s e c u r e "a p r o p e r p l a c e f o r ( t h e ) Telugu l a n g u a g e a n d c u l t u r e in H y d e r a b a d city." In a c o u p l e of y e a r s - b y 1924 it had become a statewide organization and was given a new name - t h e Andhra Kendra Jana Sangham. 10

The Jana Sangham in turn became an umbrella organization for other similar groups; finally, i n March 1930, a new organization called the Andhra Mahasabha (literally "Andhra Convention") was formed at a conference in Jogipet. The emergence of this organization is significant: it indicated some slippage of t h e Nizam's hegemony. Previously, there was strict control of libraries; public meetings, even of a literary nature, could only be organized with prior permission from the state; newspapers were closely regulated; and civil liberties were i n general few. Composed largely of the urban petite-bourgeoisie - the prospering merchants and traders, and professionals like lawyers, government officials and teachers - the Mahasabha represented the lower strata of the ruling class, divided from t h e upper echelons by linguistic, cultural and other factors. Its class composition was reflected in its concern,44 which consisted of passing resolutions aimed at social reforms (Reddy, 1973: 1-12; Pavier, 1981:65-67; Sundarayya, 1972: 18). From its inception, the Andhra Mahasabha fused linguistic and regional concerns with cultural and later social ones. This is best seen from Ravi Narayan Reddy's description of the incident that started it: It was 1922. A Hindu social conference was held in Vivek Vardhini Theater where all t h e speeches were i n Urdu and Marathi. Only one speaker tried to speak in Telugu but h e was hooted and shouted down. The number of Maharashtrians in Hyderabad city was small, yet they exhibited their superiority in all walks of life (Reddy, 1973: 11).
In t h e fourth conference a t Sircilla, a resolution was passed requiring all speeches to be delivered i n Telugu (Reddy, 1973: 14). This orientation stayed with t h e Mahasabha well into t h e Telengana movement,

At its sixth conference, the Mahasabha elected Ravi Narayan Reddy, already a secret member of the Communist Party, as Secretary. By its eighth conference in 1941, the Mahasabha was well on its way to becoming a front organization for the communists. Before w e go on, i t would be helpful to take a brief look at t h e history of t h e Communist Party of India (CPI).

The Communist Party of India (CPI) was founded a t Tashkent inOctober 1920 by a group of Indians in exile headed b" y. Roy.45 By July 1924, it had been admitted into t h e Communist International (Ram, 1969:4; Pavier, 1981:79; Masani, 1954:24). From t h e start, t h e Communist tradition has leaned very heavily on Moscow. From a small base i n the Indian intelligentsia, t h e illegal CPI working w i t h the active participation, and under the influence of, t h e Communist Party of Great Britain (henceforth CPGB), convened an all-India conference in December 1928 of its "front" organization, t h e Workers and Peasants Party. By this time, t h e Sixth Congress of the Comintern had adopted its famous resolution entitled b e Revolution& Movement f& the Colonies and Semi-Colonies, The colonial thesis advocated an aggressive attitude towards the bourgeois national-reformist parties but did not rule out temporary agreements in the name of anti-imp6rialism One year later, specifically addressing the CPI, the Comintern's tenth plenum discredited the two-class Workers and Peasants Party (Ram, 1969:5).
On the Comintern's advice, the CPI denounced the nationalist movement. However, this only succeeded in isolating it from any mass following. In addition, 31 of the CPI's most important leaders were put into jail in t h e Meerut Conspiracy Case (Ram, 1969:s; Masani, 1954:36-40). A t t h e s e v e n t h Congress of t h e Communist International in August 1935, t h e CPI was severelycriticized for its "left, sectarian errors". The CPI was urged to work with t h e nationalist movement to create an anti-imperialist united front (Ram, 1969:6; Masani, 1954:56-58). The CPI politburo issued a statement:

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The concrete application t o t h e present stage of the anti-imperialist movement in our country of t h e line of t h e Seventh Congress is a historic affair (Masani, 1954:59).
A two-pronged strategy was decided upon: individual CPI members were to infiltrate the Congress; a t the same time t h e Party would continue to build a base of mass support. The communists' efforts to infiltrate the Congress were greatly aided by the Congress Socialist Party (henceforth CSP), the "left" group within t h e Congress. Working within t h e Congress gave the CPI access t o t h e students and trade unions while freeing t h e m from an "outward-oriented" image. When t h e communists were finally expelled from t h e CSP in 1939, they already had significant backing. In Kerala, for example, t h e entire CSP cadre reconstituted itself as the CPI (Masani, 1954:59-75; Pavier, 1981 :8 ) 0.

The communists had been active in the coastal districts of Andhra since 1934; however, it was not until 1939 that some organization was established in Hyderabad. The Nizam State Communist Committee, which brought together four small groups, registered t h e nominal s t a r t of the CPI involvement. However, i t was the AndhraMahasabha that provided t h e first substantial gain: in the eighth conference in 1941, Ravi Narayan Reddy was elected President. Resolutions were passed demanding t h e abolition of vetti, jagirdari, the tax on tapping toddy, and t h e eviction of tenants; the reduction of land taxes, rents, and compulsory survey settlements was proposed, as was the confirmation of land-titles (Sundarayya, 1972:21; Dhanagare, 1974:118; Reddy, 1973:17-30; Pavier, 1981:81-85). Before this time, theMahasabha had done little t o organize the peasantry; t h e y were content to pass resolutions or a t most make "representations" to government officials. Now t h e y tried to devise campaigns around t h e m e s like education, anti-forced labor, etc. Their most effective action however was against the levy of foodgrains mentioned earlier. Two other factors were important for the Mahasabha's increased popularity. The Congress had been banned in 1938 and was rendered virtually powerless, leaving the field to the Mahasabha. By contrast, the CPI, which had also been banned was now allowed to operate legally (Reddy, 1973:19; Dhanagare, 1974:1 16-1 17; Pavier, 1981 8 ) :3. The reason for lifting the ban on t h e CPI was a remarkable about-turn in t h e Party's policies. Sensing revolutionary opportunities a t home and seeking t o capitalize on Britain's preoccupation w i t h t h e fighting in Europe, t h e CPI s t a r t e d vigorously opposing t h e British war effort, calling it an Imperialist War. In the face of the Congress' lukewarm opposition t o the war, s u c h activism greatly helped to win support for the CPI though inviting repression from t h e British, and in Hyderabad, from their loyal ally, the Nizam (Masani, 1959:79; Overstreet and Windmiller, 1959:171-190). Then in June 1941, Nazi Germany invaded Russia, throwing the CPI into confusion. After some internal debate on the merits of the antiwar nationalist effort and considerable pressure from the international organization, t h e CPI decided to abandon i t s earlier position and support the People's War of the Soviet Union against the German aggressor. The CPI joined the war e f f o r t a t t h e same time that the Congress was launching the Quit India movement and popular opposition to 997. British rule was growing (Masani, 1954:80-86; Reddy, 1973:34-35; Pavier, 1981:83; Ram, 1 6 : ) While the Congress was banned as a result, t h e CPI was encouraged in i t s activities.
With almost all the Congress leaders in jail, t h e CPI could consolidate i t s organizational gains; however, i t had lost much of i t s credibility. Even Ravi Narayan Reddy, a f t e r giving a feeble justification for the s w i t c h , had to admit that

The Communist Party committed certain mistakes in implementing the people's war policy. It recognized the danger of fascism but underestimated the imperialist danger. Therefore it made t h e mistake of characterizing many patriots as fifth columnists (Reddy, 1973:35). Despite their mistakes t h e CPI, "grew substantially during t h e war period" (Reddy, 1973:35; Overstreet and Windmiller, 1959:207-212L46

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This was evident at the eleventh conference of the Mahasabha at Bhongir in 1944 Membership feeswhich had earlier been reduced from Rs. 1 to four annas47 were further reduced to one anna. A vigorous membership drive had been launched in the past year; 100,000 people had been recruited in the rural areas, 8000-12000 of whom had come to Bhongir. Faced with almost certain defeat, the "right" wing of t h e Mahasabha walked out. The CPI now had t h e organization to themselves and elected Ravi Narayan Reddy President and Badam Yella Reddy Secretary (Reddy, 1973:20-22; Pavier, 1981:85-89; Dhanagare, 1974: 117-1 18; Sundarayya, 1972:27-28). But t h e greatest gains of this period were to be found i n the increase of grassroots organization: district, taluka, and village committees were formed and cadres trained. Most of these initial cadres came from rich peasant backgrounds. To discourage armchair revolutionaries, they were asked first to organize against the landlords in their own villages. "Training" was most intellectual. They discussed politics and read translations from Lenin, Stalin, Palme Dutt, 48 other Marxist classics, as well as Gorky'sMother and a local novel on the oppression of untouchables, Malapalli (Pavier, 1981:88; D h a n a g a r m : 118). First the question of forced labor - v e t t i - and t h e n problems of tenancy and eviction increasingly turned into minor s k i r m i s h e s . m e Nalgonda District Commit tee, led by former student leaders not strongly influenced by Gandhi and Mahasabha-style reformism, was particularly truculent, This strate y worked very well a ainst small landlords who were quite unable tomeet cooperative resistance Pavier, 1981:87-89).5

But why did t h e State and the big landlords allow these initial organizational attempts by the CPI to succeed? What did they do about it? The evidence here is very sketchy. "The revolutionaries", according to D.V. Rao, "..,.had to face intense repression in t h e form of arrests and sentences of imprisonments" (Pavier, 1981:87). By this time in 1944, t h e CPI had not yet come out for the abolition of landlordism and the Nizam's rule. It even appealed for an Interim Government in which half t h e seats were reserved for t h e Ittehad (Pavier, 1981:84; Sundarayya, 1972:27). The end of the War also witnessed a quickening of t h e pulse of the national Independence Movement, forcing the Nizam to pay increasing attention to external events. These reasons are, however, not sufficient answers for the questions posed above. The early success of t h e CPI was thus characterized by t h e following features: articulation of t h e long-standing grievances of t h e poorer peasants; action on issues which affected the economic conditions of these peasants in a direct fashion; an aggressive district committee i n Nalgonda; the creation of a dedicated cadre; and most importantly mass participation. Reddy tells us that people joined the Party because ?...membership by payment of one anna wa3feemed by the people as a passport to their emancipation from these atrocities" (Reddy, 1973:39). It was in this context of increased agitation that the incident described at the start of t h e paper occurred the Telengana movement was on its way to a prolonged period of armed struggle.

ARMED STRUGGLE 1946-1951

Momentous changes were taking place both inside and outside Telengana Not surprisingly, the larger currents of the independence movement were to shape t h e course of events inside Telengana more than t h e other way round. Changes were taking place i n the communist movement too, both within India and on the international front. Here, the Telengana movement was of greater importance - it shaped the character of Indian communism as much as i t was shaped by it. The armed struggle i n Telengana w e n t through two distinct phases. The first one, from July 1946 to September 1948, was a period of growth and expansion; however, after the Indian army invaded the region i n September 1948, t h e movement was forced to retreat u n t i l it was called off in October
1951.

The Doddi Komarayya incident sparked off a wave of protest that spread to 300-400 villages in the same month. A spontaneous movement seems to have emerged groups of villagers seem to have
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marched from one village t o the next, and congregated to discuss problems of vetti, land eviction, and grain levies and t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o zamindari. Then t h e y would conduct processions t h a t stopped at the landlord's house. At each village, some people would drop out of the group, having a l r e a d y come q u i t e a d i s t a n c e from home. But new ones would t a k e t h e i r p l a c e - in t h i s way t h e enthusiasm and strength of the group remained undiminished. In a village adjacent to Kadavendi, t h e p l a c e w h e r e Komarayya was killed, t h e CPI s e i z e d 200 acres from a landlord and p r o c e e d e d to distribute it (Pavier, 1981:96; Sundarayya, 1972:38; Dhanagare, 1974: 120-12 1). Once land s e i z u r e s t a r t e d , i t was d i f f i c u l t to stop. But land t h a t had been r e d i s t r i b u t e d also needed to be defended; otherwise the landlords would seize i t back and probably become even more repressive. Defense corps had been organized since 1942. Now they were formed into units wielding lathis.52 One male from each family was recruited for the task. T h e s e dalams (para-military units) w e r e responsible for d e f e n s e while administration was handled by committees c a l l e d ram-ra ams (village republics or village 'soviets'). T h e y supervised redistribution of land, and a n l e complaints, disputes, and personal and family problems. In short, t h e y took o v e r t h e deshmukh's job. T h e committees w e r e e l e c t e d at meetings; however, t h e c a n d i d a t e s w e r e f i r s t s e l e c t e d by t h e CPI. A t this s t a g e , t h e committees w e r e dominated by r i c h p e a s a n t s (Pavier, 1981:98-99; Dhanagare, 1974: 123-124). They e f f e c t i v e l y c a r r i e d o u t a campaign t o abolish f o r c e d labor, "illegal" payments ( r e n t s , levies, etc.) and "illegally" s e i z e d land (disenfranchisement for non-payment of debt, etc.). T h e landlords w e r e not standing by idly. F i r s t t h e y l e t t h e i r goondas loose on t h e peasants. When t h e s e forces proved t o be too f e w in number and t o o poorly armed t o d e a l with mass unrest, t h e y summoned t h e police and t h e Nizam's army. Finally, when t h e s i t u a t i o n could not b e controlled, t h e y l e f t t h e village. Meanwhile, skirmishes b e t w e e n t h e villagers and t h e police o r oondas had become routine. When a local leader, Matta Reddy, was shot by a policeman in N o v e m b e r h o u s a n d s attended the cremation. The villagers became more organized in the face of increased repression. A big drum put in t h e center of t h e village was sounded i n c a s e of danger - this a l e r t e d a l l t h o s e working in t h e f i e l d s nearby. Stones, t o b e used with slings, w e r e c o l l e c t e d a n d put on housetops. Women would arm themselves with chili-powder (to be hurled at the enemy), stones, and even boiling water t o protect their homes and their children (Sundarayya, 1972:42-44; Reddy, 1973:43-44). The police by now had set up camps throughout the Jangaon area. Infuriated by a police raid, one thousand people converged on the Mundrai camp with the intent to attack. They had their usual "arms" and had c o v e r e d t h e i r bodies with gunny sacks, believing t h a t police b u l l e t s harmlessly deflected off them (Sundarayya, 1972:43). This action was carried out over the objections of the local CPI leaders.

Warfare was also c o n d u c t e d on t h e c u l t u r a l and psychological planes. A t night, p o s t e r s and leaflets were posted on the doors of "anti-social elements"; domestic servants sympathetic to the movement often l e f t such "messages" in unlikely p l a c e s i n t h e home; and physical a t t a c k s on landlords also i n c r e a s e d (Sundarayya, 1972: 52). T h e local d r a m a t i c form Burra Katha, Golla Suddulu (shepherd's tales), songs, poems and newspapers were all employed actively. An observer describes one performance of the Burra Katha:
After the monotone recital of the prologue came a single lengthy act, cleverly recounting a t a l e of a n c i e n t India, t h e s t o r y of a t y r a n t monarch who lived a frivolous l i f e of luxury at t h e expense of his poor subjects. A b r a v e and pious guru d a r e d to r e p r o a c h t h e slothful king i n public for his p e r v e r s e misrule and of c o u r s e was s e n t e n c e d t o death. A t t h e l a s t moment t h e people rose in rebellion, r e s c u e d t h e guru, and imprisoned t h e inpos tor. T h e g r e a t e r p a r t of t h e play consisted of long s p e e c h e s by t h e guru a n d t h e prolet a r i a n rebels, p a r t l y in t h e usual Marxist jargon, and p a r t l y couched in t h e philosophy
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of Mahatma Gandhi to plant t h e message more deeply in t h e hearts and minds of t h e audience (Pavier, 1981: 101).
The Andhra Praja Natya Mandali (Andhra Peoples' Theater Association) produced a play Na Bhoomi (My Land) on t h e Telengana struggle. I t proved t o be a big success and helped raise money for t h e movement. The newspaper of the movement was Meezan, published in Hyderabad city in Telugu, Urdu and English. In November 1946, t h e CPI was officially banned. A t t h e same time, in t h e face of an army equipped with modern w e a p 0 n s , ~ 3 h e peasant movement came t o a temporary standstill. On t h e t surface everything appeared calm. The Nizam withdrew the armed camps from the villages. But the surface calm was misleading; feverish activity was being conducted and t h e leadership of t h e Andhra CPI had decided t o escalate the armed struggle (Sundarayya, 1972:46-47; Pavier, 1981: 100).
I t was now 1947. Independence was imminent, first announced to take effect i n eighteen months and then with the Mountbatten Award, on Augwt 15, 1947. Like the other princely states, Hyderabad had the option of joining India, Pakistan, or remaining autonomous. .The Nizam and the ruling Muslim minority wanted to remain independent. The Congress, on the other hand, was putting pressure on t h e Nizam t o accede. Both sides wanted more than t h e other was willing to give; finally an agreement was reached t o leave m a t t e r s as they were with theBritish. Thestandstill Agreement, as it was called, was good for a year (Smith, 1950:36-37; Ram, 1969:8).

Within the State, the Congress launched 'a satyagraha to seek the merger of Hyderabad with the Indian union. The ostensible purpose of this move was t o enable t h e reorganization of t h e states on a linguistic basis. The Andhra CPI had a long-standing plan to integrate he Telugu-speaking areas of Hyderabad with those of the Madras Presidency to form Vi~halandhra.~j They now started holding meetings and demonstrations jointly with t h e Congress. In some ways, such a s t r a t e g y proved to b e successful. Sundarayya recounts how one such meeting in Vijayawada yielded Rs. 20,000 for buying arms t o fight t h e Nizam. On t h e other hand, when t h e CPI joined t h e Congress campaign to c u t toddy-trees, i t found itself alienating t h e toddy-trappers, a large fraction of t h e landless rural poor who constituted its main base.55 In Nalgonda, CPI cadres went on a walking tour around t h e district, raising t h e Indian flag and burning t h e records of village officials and moneylenders. At the border, they burnt the checkposts wed to collect duty. They seized grain hoarded by merchants and distributed it (Sundarayya, 1972:56-57; Pavier, 1981:lll112; Reddy, 1973:49). The communists broke with the Congress by January 1948. The Telengana movement was now in full force. Thearampanchayats, consisting of five to seven members, had become the de-facto governing bodies in the villages. The cadres were divided into two groups: village squads and guerilla squads. The former, numbering around t e n thousand, continued to lead normal lives but conducted small activities on t h e side. Guerilla squads had about two thousand members and had been formed on t h r e e levels: district, taluka, and village. But armed struggles did not follow administrative boundaries - mobility was limited, communications poor, and weapons scarce. Under these conditions, geography and s t r a t e g y dictated organizational choice. Accordingly, the guerilla squads were reorganized along operational lines: t h e r e were to be five area committees; many zones withineach area, each with an organizer; and several military and political squads within each zone (Pavier, 1981:115-116; Sundarayya, 1972:5966). Each regular squad was to consist of t e n guerillas. Organizational skill was necessary but could b e developed with experience; weapons on t h e other hand had to be e i t h e r manufactured, bought or seized. Some were bought but a t g r e a t expense; no one knew how to manufacture them; and so they had to be taken by force or cunning from those who possessed them. Many raids were made on deshmukhs' houses and police stations but the yields were low. Theshortage of weapons wasso acute t h a t when avolunteer agreed to become a full t i m e guerilla, h e had t o t a k e an oath before t h e Red Flag which said i n part, "weapons a r e more precious than life" (Sundarayya, 1972:67).56 Hard to obtain, weapons were nonetheless easy to lose, left behind because they hampered quick movement in retreat.

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Transportation and communication gave the government forces a crucial advantage. Though we have seen that hard-bed roads were few, jeeps and trucks could be used to transport large numbers of troops in a relatively s h o r t time. By c o n t r a s t t h e guerillas seem to have t r a v e l l e d e n t i r e l y on foot. Motor vehicles could be c a p t u r e d but w e r e of limited utility: t h e y w e r e highly visible in t h e countryside and needed a s t e a d y supply of fuel. T h e only o t h e r possibility was t o p r e v e n t t h e government from using t h e m e a n s a t i t s disposal. With this in view, on t h e nights of F e b r u a r y 26-27, 1948, t w e n t y coordinated a t t a c k s w e r e made on railway tracks, t e l e g r a p h and telephone poles, and new bridges (built to support armored cars). Trenches w e r e dug around villages to prevent vehicular traffic and roads were either blocked or destroyed. When this was not possible, planks studded with six-inch nails were placed on the road (Pavier, 1981:133; Sundarayya, 1972:9498; Reddy, 1973:54). The price was high even for such mildly subversive activity:

In Jagireddygudem (Suryapet taluka) area, t h e military forcibly brought people to f i l l up t h e breaches in t h e road and while (they) w e r e doing so under t h e t h r e a t s of bayonets, t h e y ( t h e m i l i t a r y )s h o t d e a d six and t h r e w t h e bodies i n t o those same d i t c h e s and filled them with e a r t h afterwards....a t o t a l of 60 persons w e r e s h o t d e a d a n d buried in the breaches on the road (Sundarayya, 1972:97).
Injuries sustained e i t h e r in b a t t l e o r a s a r e s u l t of t o r t u r e w e r e only t o o f r e q u e n t while medical facilities, if t h e y e x i s t e d at all, w e r e poor. Doctors a t Vijayawada s y m p a t h e t i c to t h e movement arranged a separate ward a t the Vijayawada General Hospital to treat injured fighters. In addition, squads were supplied with first aid kits complete with antivenom for snakebites. Two d o c t o r s even joined t h e guerillas, training c a d r e s in f i r s t aid. When a cholera epidemic broke out in Bhongir taluka, t h e s e 'paramedics' w e r e instrumental i n controlling it. P r e v e n t i v e medic i n e was emphasized, such as disinfecting drinking w a t e r using local m a t e r i a l s like coal and lime (Paranjpe, 1973: 154-156; Reddy, 1973:57). By mid-1948, t h e movement had spread northward to Karimnagar and Adilabad d i s t r i c t s and eastwards to the areas bordering the Krishna and West Godavari districts of Andhra There were now six area squads of 20 people each, and 50-60 village squads (Sundarayya, 1972:89; Dhanagare, 1974: 123). Geographical expansion was accompanied by a corresponding "expansion" of the participants' consciousness. Some of this was intentionally affected by the Party. A literacy training program was instituted57 According to Sundarayya (1972: 126), the Party 'propagandized' for equal rights for m e n and women.58 The village councils prevented forced marriage, allowed divorces, and encouraged widowed women t o remarry.59 Many times, however, change occurred as the unintended consequence - the by-product - of some other action. For example, fighting and working together helped break down c a s t e distinctions among t h e members of t h e squad. Similarly, Sundarayya (1972:127) points o u t t h a t "belief in gods, demons, etc. had d e c r e a s e d t o a g r e a t e x t e n t . Especially among t h e youth, i t had disappeared noticeably." But t h e only description of t h e process itself is o f f e r e d by P a r a n j p e (1973: 161): It was very moving t o see i l l i t e r a t e young boys b a t t l i n g with t h e i n t r i c a c i e s of rhyme and m e t e r and ultimately coming up with a song or a poem, occasionally full of exquisite p o e t i c imagery; o r a c h a p quickly grasping t h e important points in a complex argument o r y e t o t h e r youths showing t h e i r g i f t of intelligence in matters of t a c t i c s t o be followed in offense and defense.

A big change took p l a c e in t h e r e l a t i o n s between thesexes. Women a t first filled an auxiliary role in t h e armed struggle, a c t i n g a s c o u r i e r s o r looking a f t e r t h e old and very young. As t h e war progressed, t h e y became drawn into a c t u a l combat. But t h e Communist P a r t y was no equal opportunity employer. Sundarayya, one of its leaders, himself says as much (1972:344): "the Party admitted only a very f e w women i n t o t h e f o r e s t areas, even f e w e r in t h e guerilla squads." Those who were admitted to the squads were not treated equally (Sundarayya, 1972:328,347-348):

16

W e women a r e s t i l l looked upon with t h e old outlook t h a t we are inferior. Any slip or mistake we commit, our l e a d e r s come down very heavily on us. It becomes a subject of open gossip and scandal. W e must b e guided and improved, not derided. If we move a little freely, we are watched with suspicion. In t h e squads, " t h e r e w e r e strict rules.,.of behavior anddeportment" (Paranjpe, 1973: 159). Not only did t h e P a r t y "frown on licentious behavior" (Sundarayya, 1972:351), i t discouraged too r a d i c a l a break in cross-gender relations: One woman, after o u r squad's exhortation, went to t h e e x t e n t of declaring t h a t s h e would make her husband cook the food. The leadership pointed out how this approach would only lead to domestic trouble, i n s t e a d of t h e women being drawn i n t o fight against t h e present social and political system (Sundarayya, 1972:5 13). The land distribution scheme was running into problems. One of the programs being carried out consistedof returning land t h a t had been "illegally" c o n f i s c a t e d from t h e peasants over t h e l a s t t w e n t y years. This land was e i t h e r sold, or more commonly, leased to a n o t h e r peasant who was supporting t h e movement. T h e sanghams w e r e in a dilemma. "In t h i s sort of case t h e y used to offer t h e aggrieved p a r t y lands of equal s i z e and f e r t i l i t y , b u t o f t e n came up against t h e peasants' desire for their hereditary lands? Sundarayya, 1972:115) goes on to say that such cases w e r e usually solved by "the need for unity, t h e pressure of public o p i n i ~ n . . . ~When t h e land in question had been confiscated by richer peasants who supported the CPI, the sangham would not act against them (Pavier, 1981:99). T h e p a t t e r n of land s e i z u r e seems to have been t h e following: first, wastelands andmarginal forest lands were captured from the government; then the lands of the big deshmukhs and jagirdars w e r e seized; next came all surplus lands over 500 acres; when t h i s move proved inadequate, t h e ceiling was reduced to 200 acres; finally, f a c e d with s t i l l more pressure from t h e peasantry, i t was fixed a t 100 dry and 10 w e t acres. Only t h e lands of those supporting t h e P a r t y w e r e spared. All told, o n e million acres of land was redistributed, a t e n t h of which was government land (Sundarayya, 1972: 115-1 18; Dhanagare, 1974: 117). The immediate effect of these changes went entirely counter to expectations: according to D.V. R a o production expanded as never b e f o r e (Pavier, 1981:136).6 Fighting did not disturb cultivation: the grain produced was hidden scattered all over the fields. Agricultural workers, a 'great' percentage of whom were women,61 now received a higher wage that was fixed by t h e CPI. T h e i n t e r e s t rates on loans w e r e also r e g u l a t e d by t h e village committees. A f t e r initially abolishing debts, t h e committees found t h a t r i c h p e a s a n t s w e r e no longer willing to give credit: t h e funds dried up and w e r e restored only when t h e g r a m ralyams g u a r a n t e e d repayment.62 T h e village committees w e r e beginning to c o n t r o l prices too but w e r e s t i l l dependent on old trading arrangements to r e a l i z e t h e value of production. Middlemen o f t e n had to b e bribed to market t h e produce of rebel villages; on the other hand they supplied the raw materials to make gunpowder and bombs (Pavier, 1981: 136; Sundarayya, 1972: 127-129). While t h e Andhra branch of t h e CPI was going from s t r e n g t h to s t r e n g t h , t h e r e was g r e a t confusion in t h e national ranks. Independence presented t h e CPI with a dilemma: should i t c o n t i n u e in a n "anti-imperialist" f r o n t with t h e domestic bourgeoisie or should i t s t r u g g l e against them as a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e working c l a s s ? A f t e r prolonged deliberation, t h e CPI politburo passed a resolution granting unqualified support to Nehru. In Moscow, the reaction was not so favorable. E.M. Zhukov c a l l e d t h e new government r e a c t i o n a r y and imperialist because i t favored formal independence but continued to depend on Britain for economic and military considerations. In February 1948, t h e Second Congress of t h e CPI e l e c t e d B.T. Ranadive as General Secretary. H e c a l l e d for an a l l i a n c e of workers, peasants, and revolutionary intelligentsia to r i s e in a one-stage revolution from below, a t t a i n e d through violent means. In t h i s c o n t e x t , t h e armed struggle in Telengana achieved a new significance. "Telengana today means Communists and Communists mean Telengana", thundered Ranadive. While this provided ideological justification for them, t h e leadership of t h e Andhra CPI had its d i f f e r e n c e s with Ranadive. T h e s e w e r e s t a t e d in 17

the famous Andhra letter which said: Our revolution in many r e s p e c t s d i f f e r s from t h e classical Russian revolution; and i s to a g r e a t e x t e n t similar to t h a t of t h e Chinese revolution. T h e p e r s p e c t i v e i s likely not t h a t of g e n e r a l s t r i k e s and g e n e r a l rising leading t o t h e liberation of t h e r u r a l sides; but t h e dogged r e s i s t a n c e and prolonged civil w a r in t h e form of an a g r a r i a n revolution culminating in the capture of political power by the democratic front (Ram, 1969:25). T h e Andhra t h e s i s identified feudalism and imperialism as t h e main enemies i n t h e first, "new democratic" stage of t h e r e v ~ l u t i o n . ~ ~four-class strategy was to be adopted, uniting workers, A peasants, i n t e l l e c t u a l s and t h e national bourgeoisie. Specifically, t h e s t r u g g l e in t h e r u r a l areas was t o combine all peasant classes against the three "leeches" -landlords, moneylenders and profiteers. This "united front", consisting of t h e rural p r o l e t a r i a t , and small, medium, and r i c h peasants was also to include the few big landlords who were fighting the Nizam. Ranadive attacked t h e "two-stage" theory, arguing t h a t t h e reasons rich and middle p e a s a n t s w e r e being wrongly included as a l l i e s was due t o t h e i r i n f l u e n c e within t h e Andhra C P (Ram, 1969:8-30; Pavier, 1981:97-121; Dhanagare, 1974: 124). Whether i t was t h e r e s u l t of ideological confusion or "low political consciousness" (Pavier, 1981:124),63 the Hyderabad City Committee of the Party issued a statement in May 1948 denouncing t h e i n t e g r a t i o n of Hyderabad i n t o India. T h e Indian Government was labelled 'pro-landlord and pro-bourgeoisie' and the call for an Azad Hyderabad (Free Hyderabad) was raised. This pleased the Nizam and h e l i f t e d t h e ban on t h e CPI; on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e Indian Government publicized t h e s t a t e m e n t widely on radio and in t h e print media, saying t h a t t h e communists had joined t h e Razakars, The Hyderabad City Committee was still against the Nizam, but neither this fact nor the Andhra CP's denunciation of the statement could undo the damage (Sundarayya, 1972: 179; Pavier, 1981: 124; Dhanagare, 1974: 124-125). Once lifted, t h e b a n o n t h e CPI was f o r some reason never reinposed. The City Committee's statement must be viewed against the backdrop of the collapse of negotiations between t h e Nizam and the Indian Government. Since the signing of the Standstill Agreement on November 29, 1947, relations had deteriorated steadily. There were two major reasons for this. Subsequent t o t h e fighting in Kashmir, and after communal disturbances, labor unrest, and o t h e r 'instabilities' had been controlled, t h e Indian Government was in a s t r o n g enough position t o force t h e cards, but Hyderabad refused to acknowledge t h i s fact. T h e Indian Government responded by im osing an economic blockade on Iand-locked Hyderabad, Secondly, the Nizam gave a Rs. 200 million65 'loan' to P a k i s t a n in J a n u a r y 1948, a t a time when h o s t i l i t y b e t w e e n P a k i s t a n and India was a t i t s peak, A t t h e same time, t h e I t t e h a d encouraged Muslims from neighboring states t o migrate t o Hyderabad t o alter the religious composition of the population. By mid-1948, t h e war with P a k i s t a n was over. I t s troops free, and using t h e 'internal s e c u r i t y t h r e a t ' as a justification, the Indian Army, moving in on five fronts, marched into Hyderabad on September 13, 1948 (Pras& 1972; Menon, 1956:369-389; Smith, 1950: 37-43; Pavier, 1981: 130,139-141; Dhanagare, 1974: 125). P e r h a p s t h e t h r e a t t o i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y had been less s e v e r e t h a n imagined. In four days, t h e military had disarmed and a r r e s t e d t h e Nizam's army, and suppressed t h e R a z a k a r s , t h e only ~ e r e a l s o u r c e of r e ~ i s t a n c e .T h~ Nizam publicly surrendered; meanwhile, with no p o l i c f p d t h e Indian Army looking the other way, fanatic Hindus launched a massive massacre of Muslims. If t h e r e was a t h r e a t to t h e national government of any consequence, i t was s u r e l y t h e peasant movement - a communist takeover right in the heart of India!69 It has even been suggested that Delhi waited so long to overcome the Nizam because it was afraid that a radical change in the status quo might be to the communists' advantage (Smith, 1950:40). Once t h e Nizam had been safely disposed off, t h e Army t u r n e d to i t s real task. General J.N. Chaudhuri, who headed t h e Army's operations, confidently announced t h a t h e would liquidate t h e communists in all of Hyderabad in six weeks (Sundarayya, 1972: 178).

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T h e task turned o u t not to b e so simple. Within a week, t h e military set up armed camps in t h e r u r a l areas. They t h e n methodically proceeded to arrest or kill P a r t y a c t i v i s t s and t o r t u r e and rape suspected sympathizers. The t ical mode of operation consisted of encircling anywhere from f i v e t o f i f t e e n villages a t a time,% gathering all t h e inhabitants a t o n e place, and t h e n conducting house t o house searches. S i n c e t h e guerillas usually hid in t h e fields, t h e c i r c l e wouldslowly b e closed until t h e y w e r e discovered. Sometimes informers would t i p t h e police off if a squad was in the area. Here superior communication and transportation proved to be a crucial advantage: t h e military would quickly surround such a n a r e a and almost always s u c c e e d in t h e i r mission. Over a period of time, such raids decimated t h e squads: o v e r t w o thousand peasants and Party members were killed and ten thousand arrested (Dhanagare, 1974: 125-126; Pavier, 1981: 144145; Sundarayya, 1972: 189-196). Some squad members not killed in combat w e r e perhaps t h e worse off for being caught alive. Ramulu was t i e d to a truck and "dragged on t h e road until his body was t o r n to bits." One squad member "was t i e d to t h e wheels of a bullock cart and t h e bullocks w e r e whipped." Several guerillas were burnt alive, some were buried alive. Ganji Satyanarayana and Harijan Muthayya from Malkapuram "had t h e i r e y e s gouged out, t e s t i c l e s c u t and t h r u s t i n t o t h e i r mouths, and l a t e r hacked to pieces." Yellaswamy from Nomula got this treatment: pieces of flesh were cut from his body, nails were hammered into him, he was branded with a red-hot iron" - a common technique (Sundarayya, 1972: 198-199).

"...

Informants o f t e n received t h e same treatment. They w e r e not to f o r g e t t h e i r loyalties easily, "beaten with lathis and bayonets and t o r t u r e d to t h e e x t r e m e = l i k e peeling t h e skin in the design o hammer and sickle" (Reddy, 1973:60). f In Loyapalli and surrounding villages, people w e r e thrown i n t o thorny bushes and w e r e trampled upon by t h e military with t h e i r boots on. A t 12 noon, in ( t h e ) hot sun, people were made to crawl on those thorny bushes on their knees and elbows. The whole place was splattered with blood. Three hundred men became unconscious (Sundarayya, 1972: 199). There were other factors at work that contributed to the 'success' of the A m y besides tactical and numerical superiority. For many people, the Army invasion marked a victory over the Nizam and the landlords supported by him, The Army was met with demonstrations of support; certainly when Nehru visited the state shortly afterwards, he "was welcomed with enthusiasm as a delivering hero by immense cheering crowds" (Smith, 1950:48; Pavier, 1981: 143; Reddy, 1973:59). Though many of t h e CPI squads took a d v a n t a g e of t h e confusion in t h e ranks of t h e R a z a k a r s to s e i z e valuable weapons, o t h e r s surrendered t h e i r arms to t h e Army, having "develo e d illusions about t h e character of the intervention by the Indian Union" (Sundarayya, 1972: 181). 5 1 T o c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e f a i t h placed in t h e Indian invasion as a n 'illusion' was not e n t i r e l y misleading, as t h e villagers soon found out. When t h e Army t u r n e d to t h e countryside, it brought in tow t h e deshmukhs and t h e t a x collectors. I t ensured t h a t all t h e c o n f i s c a t e d lands w e r e r e t u r n e d t o t h e i r 'legitimate' owners. Almost a l l t h e 'excess' land r e d i s t r i b u t e d by t h e village committees seems to h a v e been t a k e n back in t h i s way; however, n e i t h e r 'traditional lands' nor waste lands were uniformly reconfiscated. I t is not surprising then, as a police o f f i c i a l revealed, to find t h a t "the people are not helping t h e government in t h e villages; on t h e contrary, t h e y are helping t h e communists" (Sundarayya, 1972:203-205).72 T h e policemen w e r e all from o t h e r states (mostly Malabar and Mysore) because it was felt that native policemen would either balk at doing violence to their own people or worse, b e secret sympathizers. Even so, t h e Military Governor had to warn t h e police about "going under communist influence" (Sundarayya, 1972: 203-205). Despite help from the peasantry, the squads were forced either to give up or run away. There w a s a simple reason for this: in t h e plains t h e r e was no p l a c e to hide. T h e size of t h e squads was c u t from about t e n to about f i v e or less, and c a d r e s w e r e i n s t r u c t e d to d r e s s like villagers and not c a r r y a n y weapons (Sundarayya, 1972: 196). Nothing helped; guerilla w a r f a r e against a
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superior f o e can only s u c c e e d if t h e s mpathy of local people and intimacy with t h e t e r r i t o r y c a n b e t u r n e d i n t o a decisive advantage.73 T h e former was not s u f f i c i e n t ; t h e l a t t e r could only b e useful if t h e b a t t l e g r o u n d could b e s h i f t e d t o t h e forests.

We have seen that there were forests both to the south along t h e Krishna and more dense ones to t h e east along t h e Godavari. I t is to t h e s e a r e a s t h a t t h e guerillas now turned. But t h e y had not made any plans to prepare for such an eventuality: they found themselves among forest-people who fled at the sight of them (Sundarayya, 1972:249).
T h e t r i b a l people who lived i n t h e forests w e r e p a t h e t i c a l l y poor and a c u t e l y exploited. T h e y lived in l i t t l e hamlets, p r a c t i c e d s h i f t i n g cultivation, raised c a t t l e , wore w h a t f e w c l o t h e s t h e y could obtain, and survived on a d i e t of g r a s s seeds, f o r e s t f r u i t s and nuts, wild roots, ippapuvvu (flower used to make liquor), forest fowl, boar, buffalo, and coarse millets made i n t o r o t i or gruel (Sundarayya, 1972:247,253). T h e wood t h e y required for cooking food and building thelr huts was traditionally obtained from t h e forest. Now under government protection, forestwood could not b e c u t without t h e forest official's consent. This was given only in e x c h a n g e for unlimited free labor, bribes, and women ( k e p t asconcubines). Often t r i b a l l e a d e r s w e r e p a r t y t o t h e i r own peoples' exploitation: t h e y took bribes from forest contractors and used t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y t o provide c o n t r a c t o r s with c h e a p labor (Sundarayya, 1972:248; Pavier,
1981: 158-159)
0

I t took t h e c a d r e s from four to six months t o win over t h e tribals, a p r o c e s s helped considerably by t h e CPI's reputation. Some forest o f f i c i a l s f l e d on h e a r i n g of t h e guerillas' arrival; some were killed; and those who remained at once agreed to pay higher wages and allow the redistribution of land and cattle. About 40-50 squads were formed among t h e Koya people consisting of a total of a thousand fighters; 200 of t h e s e w e r e r e c r u i t e d i n t o t h e P a r t y (Sundarayya, 1972:89,243; Pavier, 198 1: 159).

But fighting in t h e f o r e s t s had i t s price: t h e c a d r e s w e r e ill-fed, often f o r c e d to make r a i d s j u s t t o eat; t h e y s u f f e r e d from bad h e a l t h and disease; and morale was low, a l l c o n t a c t with t h e State P a r t y C e n t e r having been lost f o r almost t w o y e a r s (Sundarayya, 1972:246). Worst of all, t h e y w e r e on t h e run constantly: t h e military was not l e t t i n g up. The Government had adopted the Briggs Plan - tribal people were evacuated t o 'camps' outside t h e forest areas and t h e i r hamlets r a z e d to t h e ground. Living conditions in t h e s e camps w e r e terrible: a n e s t i m a t e d t e n thousand people died of epidemic diseases. Meanwhile, in t h e forests, t h e squads w e r e l i t e r a l l y l e f t without shelter. Troops t h e n camped a t water-holes, p a t i e n t l y waiting for t h e squads to refill t h e i r w a t e r s t o c k s in t h e hot weather. S t r i c t r e s t r i c t i o n s on t r a v e l w e r e imposed throughout t h e area: a pass specifying t h e r o u t e of t r a v e l and l e n g t h of s t a y was required. Even in t h e s e r e s t r i c t i v e conditions, some t r i b a l people managed to bring food and supplies to t h e guerillas. Earlier, t h e y had helped t h e c a d r e s in extending t h e i r operations. P e o p l e from a s y m p a t h e t i c hamlet would contact neighboring ones, asking a l l of them t o b e at home on a n assigned day b e c a u s e t h e y w e r e bringing t h e i r 'relatives' o v e r to m e e t them (Sundarayya, 1972:252). One more example will suffice. A squad leader was once surrounded by the police. He w a s promptly dressed up as a girl who had just r e a c h e d puberty and k e p t in a dark corner of a hut. R e s p e c t i n g custom, t h e police did not c h e c k 'her' face and his l i f e was spared. Once t h e t r o o p s s u s p e c t e d a village of harboring activists, t h e y s p a r e d no niceties. Sundarayya (1972:245) describes what happened in Nereda: Once 70 women were beaten with tamarind birches. They were forced t o wear pyjamas and chameleons were put into these pyjamas and at the bottom the pyjamas were tucked up. The r e p t i l e s s t a r t e d biting and t h e agonyof t h e women was indescribable. R e d c h i l i powder was also sprinkled on the wounds.

20

The movement nevertheless spread, down among t h e Chenchu people in the Nallamalia forests of the Krishna River Forest Area and up among the Gonds in Adilabad74 In t h e face of i n c r e a s e d repression, loss of c o n t a c t s with groups in t h e plains, and diminishing squad sizes, t h e guerillas increasingly a d o p t e d hit-and-run terrorist tactics. T h e n a t u r e of t h e fighting was changed to a 'secret war'. But i f t h e squads w e r e not well p r e p a r e d t o m e e t t h e Indian army or to retreat i n t o t h e forests, t h e y w e r e e v e n less p r e p a r e d to carry on a well-coordinated battle requiring high secrecy. By the time t h e movement was 'called off' on October 21, 1951, t h e armed s t r u g g l e had d e g e n e r a t e d i n t o sporadic acts of violence against individuals. T h e Army invasion and subsequent e v e n t s caused a split within t h e ranks of t h e Andhra communists, a split which was to find its way i n t o t h e national ranks of t h e CPI. W e h a v e a l r e a d y s e e n Ranadive's i m p a t i e n c e to bring about a one-stage revolution and t h e Andhra leadership's disagreement, expressed in t h e Andhra Letter. What happened next was predfctable: Ranadive's policies collapsed when planned s t r i k e s f a i l e d t o materialize. T h e worst f a i l u r e was when a n all-India railway s t r i k e c a l l e d by t h e CPI did not g e t t h e support of t h e All-India Railwaymen's Federation, t h e p a r e n t union controlled by t h e Socialists. T h e CPI w a s largely discredited among urban labor groups as a r e s u l t of its a c t i v i t i e s in t h i s period (Ram, 1969:20; Pavier, 1981: 149-151). When the Central Committee met in May-June 1950, Rajeswara Rao replaced Ranadive as General Secretary. Four out of the new Politburo of nine came from the Andhra region. They a d o p t e d t h e Chinese model of armed s t r u g g l e f o r India as a whole, barring a f e w areas. Telengana was to be India's Yenan (Ram, 1969:39-4 1; Pavier, 1981: 152-1 54). But f o r most a r e a s i n India, urban as well as rural, armed s t r u g g l e was a n impossible dream. Soon, t h e leadership was b e i n g s n i p e d a t from both ' l e f t ' and 'right' factions, espec i a l l y t h e l a t t e r . T o s e t t l e t h e i r differences, a four member delegation s e c r e t l y visited Moscow and met a committee headed by Stalin. Two documents resulted: the 1951 Draft Program and the Statement of Policy.75 The Draft program recommended a four-class alliance (working class, peasants, i n z l l i g e n t s i a , and middle-class and bourgeoisie) in a two-stage revolution. I t i d e n t i f i e d t h e Congress leadership with British imperialism. T h e S t a t e m e n t of Policy pursued t a c t i c a l questions. I t r e j e c t e d both t h e Russian p a t h of g e n e r a l s t r i k e s among t h e industrial p r o l e t a r i a t and t h e Chinese p a t h of p a r t i s a n w a r f a r e as t h e on1 p a t h for India. R a t h e r , it suggested a working class-peasant a l l i a n c e under t h e l e a d e r s ip of t h e former (Ram, 1969:42-55; Sundarayya, 1972:398-404).

-8

T h e immediate implication of t h e new tactical line was clear: t h e armed s t r u g g l e in Telengana was to b e c a l l e d off. T h e C e n t r a l Committee issued a s t a t e m e n t t h a t only t h e "people of Telengana" could d e c i d e whether o r not t o c o n t i n u e t h e struggle. However, t h e C e n t r a l Committee would b e willing to n e g o t i a t e with t h e Indian government to p r o t e c t t h e gains made by t h e p e a s a n t r y i f t h e y should d e c i d e to c a l l it off (Ram, 1969:56; Pavier, 1981:166). A three-member t e a m was s e n t to Hyderabad to n e g o t i a t e with t h e Indian Government s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r . It had t h r e e main conditions: land-evictions w e r e to b e stopped, t h e military was to b e withdrawn, and all communist prisoners w e r e t o b e released. T h e P a r t y w a n t e d to b e in full s t r e n g t h for t h e upcoming g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n in F e b r u a r y 1952. T h e government refused t o negotiate; l e f t w i t h no o t h e r option, t h e CPI 'called off' t h e insurrection anyway (Ram, 1969:57-58; Sundarayya, 1972:421-422; Pavier, 1981: 167-168). While t h e communist-led guerilla movement was on t h e wane, a wave of a g r i c u l t u r a l s t r i k e s was sweeping t h e plains. From J u n e to December 1949, in Warangal d i s t r i c t , 20,000 a g r i c u l t u r a l workers i n 150 villages went on s t r i k e ; as a consequence t h e i r wages doubledor e v e n tripled. A t t h e same time, in t h e Pindiprolu and Ilendu areas, t h e r e w e r e a g r i c u l t u r a l labor s t r i k e s in 90 villages; in 20 villages, women workers w e n t on s t r i k e independently 21

(Sundarayya, 1972243,259). Neither in these movements nor in the urban areas was the CPI very effective. Students and workers went on strikes and demonstrations often during 1948-49 but urban unrest remained l a r g e l y u n a f f i l i a t e d w i t h t h e i n s u r r e c t i o n i n the r u r a l areas (Sundarayya, 1972:307-312; Pavier, 1981: 161).

NOTES
I am indebted m o s t of a l l to Purnima M a n k e k a r for having suggested the topic and for her encouragement and h e l s Special thanks are due t o Ethiraj Venkatamthy for coming to my aid a t a c r i t i c a l stage i n the writing of t h i s paper. Fernando Salas, Vasant Kaiwar and Michael Soldatenko offered many detailed mmments and suggestions for w h i c h I am grate& I would also like to thank Irwin Scheiner, Anjum A l t a f , Pradeep Dhillan and o many other readers who offered criticism, encouragement and advice. Finally, I would like t acknowledge the generow aid of L i s a Fbfel who read the l a s t draft in the m o s t minute detail and made numerow '-8 not a l l of which I have had the good judgement t o incorprate.

Sundarayya (1972) p s the figures a t 16,000 square miles, 3 m i l l i o n peasants and 3000 Villages; AlaVi t (1965) and Gough j1974) a t 15,000 square m i l e s an3 4 million people in 2000 villages and an army of SOOO; the a ' s figure of 4000 n l l a g e s comes from Dhanagare (1974) who is in turn quoting Rajeswara Rao; R m (1973) numbers 000 are 16,000 square miles, 3000 villages, 4OOO militants killed and an additional 1 , 0 jailed or detained.
S m i t h (1950:33) has &led it the "largest and for a brief moment perhaps the most effective peasant uprising i n Asia outside of china".

Large landowners. ~ e ~ h m ~ kuh s d l l ylived i n the s~ landlords residing i n bigger t m a d cities. o

ma

areas; zamindars#by contrast, were often absentee

Which form of payment dominated varied over the years. Cash payments were more prevalent i n 1929-30, ra covering 55%of rented a e . But by 1949-50, t h i s figure w a s down below 40% ( I y e n ~ a r , 1951b:58).

' The
*

Iyengar (195lb:6O) reports that 82.7% of all tenants had been cultivating their land for five years or less.
This i n itself

literacy rate in the whole state was only 3.3% i n 1921, several decades later. represented "considerable improvement as compand w i t h the statistics of 1911" ( X 1930:62*). I,

This i s a guestion that none of the authors who has worked on t h i s subject addresses,
Dora or durra means "sir", "master", or "lord of the village". Gray (1970:122) says, "Doras are occasionally murdered."

lo It is impossible to give examples of how these operated. Close scrutiny of the literature r d s nothing.

m e was a complex differentiation amvarious types o jagirs as is evident by their names: f ilaqas, samsthans, jagirdars, ijardars, banjardars, maktedars, inamdars8 a (% w

... 11

%%t
-

T h e magnitude of t h i s figure can a i l y be gauged by comparing it w i t h the annual wage of a farm servant

-00

or of agricultural laborers

- Rs50-400

(Iyengar, 1951b:212).

l3pavier c l a i m s that 60% of the rural population ooplsisted of poor peasants and a g r i d t u r d 8 1 but nthe figure cannot be definitely verified from official statistics" (1981:14). While it seems doubt that official statistics cannot be trusted, they can a t least be used to establish broad claims. lb substitute these numbers by a r b i t r a r i l y chcwen ones, as pavier seems t o do, is t o t a l l y unjustified. "b give a c~unteracample, Iyengar (195lb:218) c l a i m s , an the basis of field research, that the peroentage of landless laborers had gone down significantly since 1929-30.

l4 Wages in peanut farming were even m o r e dismal, on an average Rs. 07 per 33 k s of peanuts dug up and .5 g.

shelled (Sundarayya, 1972:507).

l5

is an inexpensive -try

liquor abtained from the palmyra e. m

sometimes ~ w n e r s the process of primitive a c c w a ~ t i m througfi mercantile profit s e e m s to have beem w i d e s p r e a d

l6sah~karsor banyas are merchants, traders,

l7For example, he points out (1972:508) that loans were paid back a t the rate of 3 seers jawar per rupee when the market price was d y 2 seers jawar per rupee, since most loans w e r e taken i n the tlry 88ilson Apail to June t h i s would put the simple interest rate a t 100%. However, interest w a s usually compouded.

l8 seems t have been a o premium for paying ba~kloans in kind, ~nterest rates for o a ~ h e r e 2-3 w percent per month. The 1937 Inquiry oarraborates this: cash rates varied f r o m 6-3- ( Q u ~ 1947t149-165). ,

him

22

l9 B i d i s are country cigarettes

- tobacoo rolled in a leaf

20 s 1 (195lb:112-126) figures s h o w that only 7% of the land area wa8 transferred in the last fifteen notes that only 15% of a l l l a d years, m o r e of it transferred to cultivating classes than f r o m them, transferred was due to accumulated debt, most of it being passed on through t e "usual legal sale paocess". h me 1937 Inquiry, though, s h o w s that f r o m 19228 10% of a l l land area passed into the hards of -lenders ad village officers. The evidence for increased ooncentration is therefore not d u s i m

21 & On aottiOn W a s leubsidized by the AZam Jahi M i l l s , - W i n g the Close aoMsctiOn b&W= the n S W y i n Marathwada industries that pocessed agricultural goods and the state. However, cutton w a s grown d d w a s never very i m p a r t a n t i n Telengana's 8oocylmy.
22 N i z a m s a g a r w a s built b e t w e e n 1924 a &

1931,

23 Hyderabad had its own cwrency, w h o s e etchanannually.

rate with the british W n rupee w a s adjusted s e m i a

Strazg backing tO

tO find these, the Tatas, B k l a S and &abhaiS# 24 It is nOt led Nationalist Iwvement see Kosambl ( 9 6 . 14)

the

CangreSS-

25 It is not clear w h e t h e r rents incseased in relative terms. m z in t higher than m x u p r a b l e figures i other states (Iyengar, 195a62-64). n

it sho~ldbe notad, w a r e

27 he t e r m "small peasants" is

u s ~ dloosely in this amtext: it indicates anyone who &so

as a wage

labcarer.

28 Thare s e e m s to be =me omtrwersy about this point pavier thinks that 'the d e s h m u k h s aert;aialp dep-essed the -me of rich peas an^ ( 9 1 2 ; emphasis mine). ~ g a r (1974:114)# o 18:1 e n i hand, 8888 gradual develogment of the rich peasant s e . 1 am inclined to agree with h i m for the r~a8oc18 stated i the n text.
29 Pavier himself points out (1981:~) that f e r t i l i z e r farm-machinsry w e r e not yet im-t miderati seeds and ixri tim ar8 classic examples of ncn-lumpy, 'differentiable' inputs - they a n be plr cha~eda t any scale, his argument =x=mirq aocess to capital tbes not seem very plausible,

&,

3o m s w a s ~anr's great disa0very, as he himself c l a i m d be exploitative a t amther level (1977r51L

- how free

eq~al exd-mnge 00uld s i m ~ t a n e o u s l y

m 31 Soott's subsistence hypothsis seems plausible here ( 9 6 l - 6 . Pavier (1981t20) quotes a visitar i 17:S2) that area " t e fields in the valley are exclusively reserved far food crop^ w h i c h have to be attended to -h immediately after the f i r s t rain sets in. It is only after the farmer has finished woI=)c cmnectd w i t h food crop6 that he can devote attentim to the cilstor seed which is grown QI t b slop&"

32 atcept a t hamest time, when wages typically w e n t

often by 50 paroent (y a -y ,

17:0) 9257.

33 Both the high percen-ge of debt imTested i n productive uses and the predominame of usufmctuary m a r t g a g e s farmdl of labor to CapitdL ( m i 19=)0 j, points to the

wmm

34 he amoclIlt is equal to a farm servant's monthly w a g e 100-400 per acre (pavis# 1 8 : ) 91S. 35

he prim of w e t l

a at that time rar~gedfrom ~k

3 6 37
38

39
40

41

23

44 Though it need not have. Dhanagare (1974:118) seems to make the elementary error of equating people% class backgrounds w i t h their interests.
45 mere is apparently some aispxte about the orgmizatim's faunding d t . ae he CPI(M) locates it in 1920

while the CPI thinks the correct date is 1925 (Lieten, 1977:1610).

46 This was probably truer i n rural areas; the CPI a m a "nrrstrike* wartime policy t h a t did not endear it d o to the trade unions.
47 There were 16 annas to the rupee

48 Palme Ixrtt w a s a m e m b e r of the BGB who w a s very influential in the politics o the CPL f
49 Reddy (1973:40-41) identifies three types of problems cuncerning land: distribution of fallow l a d s ; poeventian of evicticxq ard stopping disenfrandsemenL

Pavier's reliance on D.V. overemphasis.

Rao who w a s e e t a r y of the Nalgada D i s t r i c t C o m m i t t e e makes it suspect of

51 The atrocities he refers t o w e r e the usual exacticms of landlords,

5 2 ~ g w ~ s t i c 3~ h e ~ n d h r a ~ a h a & c a m e t o b ) a x > w n a s ~ u t a an t were previously b w n as chitty sangfiam - petitions group (paia+e&;

- the lathi group- whereas they

-m,
1972:39)o

53 Relative to the peasants who w e r e armed with slings, sticks, and very occasionally country-guns,
54 vishal' l i t e r d l y m e a n s

%we, vast,

or expansive'.
But while the Congress could

55 The campaign% purpose w a s t o deprive the N i z a m of excise-tax revenua legitimize it in moralistic terms, the CPI had no such excuse.

56 The only time the peasants could obtain modern weapans was when the Nizam's forces were i n retreat but then they had to face the Indian army (Sundarayya, 1972:135).
57 It is hard t o estimate how widespread or effective t h i s was. Some of the cadres, including squad leaders, w e r e illiterate, Reddy (1973:57) claims that "illiteracy w a s wiped out during those glorious days," but a f e w

sentences later suggests that the change w a s not so sweeping: " M a n y became l i t e r a t e through night schools" (em-is mine), sundarayya (1972:127-128) says that adult literacy waa e n m g e d but not systematically n carried o . 58 There is no reference anywhere about how it was b e ,
59 The latter is i m p r t a n t because of the large p p x t i o n of widowed women in iyderabad, 20% of the female poplation i n 1921 (DR62). These 'evils' have always been the main targets of the reformist tradition i n Ida n i . This betrays the petite-bourgeois orientation of the Aradhra -I; they were, however, separated from reformism i n one crucial respect: they could make Qoals e f f d v e

60 If this abserVation i s aorrect (no figures are given t o support it), it certainly could not be explained on the basis of land distribution and the "inverse relation", for the simple reason that zpobably not enough time had elapsed to see the results.
61 Statistics from 1921 show that women formed a larger proportion of the field laborers than m e n (wZ:70).
~ k 62 ~n effect, they w e r e functioning as insurance agents. ~ a of capital is often cited as an impediment t o n productivity increases i n agriculture, Here i s an example where an alteration i the balance of power made a simple i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangement possible,

63 T e domestic bourgeoisie were to be fought next h

came from M u s l i m backgrounds.

- in the "proletarian

stage".

64 H even suggests that this m y be due to c u l t u r a l conditioning since the leading Par t y m e m b e r s i Hyderabad e a n 65 bout $20 m i l l i o n ,

66 Pavier suggests that Jinnah's death on September 12 was a big psychological b l o w to Hyderabad and may have h e n a factor. 67 The code n a m e for the invasion was "operation polo", perhap a reflection of its expected a i f f i c ~ l t y . The military invasion and subsequent repression is euphemistically referred t o as the %lice Action". It is a measure of the state's hegemony of the ideological domain that it has since always been referred to by that r t h e t , even by the c o m m u n i s t leaders. Until today, the murder of 'extremists' by government forces is ways referred to as an 'enmunter', a word that neuters the act by trivializing its deliberateness. 68 S m i t h (1950:46) p t s the number of Muslims killed a t anywhere b e t w e e n 50,000-200,000, mostly in Marathwada The M u s l i m community f e l l before a massive and brutal blow, the devastation of which l e f t those who survived reeling i bewildered fear-somewhere between m e i n t e n and one i five adult ( M u s l i m ) males may have lost n n

24

their lives i n those few days. eqmpriation. "

In addition to killing,

there w a s widespread rape,

a m looting r ,

and

69 In February 1947, K.M. M u n s h i , India's Agent-General in Hyderabad, was afraid that (1957:133) ". .i n the end the Communists would obtain a complete hold over Andhra". Dhanagare (1974:125) cites a Government of India report w h i c h says: 'The immediate intention of India's forces i n Hyderabad w a s (a) to round up the communists i n the south-eastern districts; (b) to go round, taluka by taluka, tracing out the Razakars and d i s a r m i r r g the popilation so that the Nizam could be r e m a s h m the S t a b " See also M e n a ~
(1956:384).

7 Pavier (1981:144) quoting D . Rao puts the figure a t 10-15 villages; Fteddy (1973:60) pits it a t 5-6. 0 V . s e e m s that as the cadre population thinned out over t i m e , the dragnet g r e w larger.

It

71 I w i l l suggest later that such 'illusions' were of a systematic character and not merely subjective deviations.
72 he name or rank of the police official is not revealed nor is the date of the interview. sundarayya~s sources are seldom clear: it is presumed that his book is remnstructed from f i r s t and d - h a d accounts.

73

the

of Vietnam clearly shows.

74 The Gonds apparently had revolted before but had been brutally suppressed.
75 This w a s the ' p n version of a document called the 'Tactical Line'' (Ram, 1 9 5 ) oe' %:3.

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-y m

of the peasant. New Haven: Y a l e University Press.

S t a t i s t i c a l Abstract,

Andhra Pradesh, 1956.

(1972).

Hyderabad: Government of Andhra PradeSh.

Calcutta: Communist Party of

slmdarayya, puchalpdlli

India (MI.

Wengana People's Struggle and Its -saw.

TABLE I
Areas of O i l s e e d Cultivation ( i n thousand acres).
1925
CROP
peanuts

1931-35

1939-40

3.0 1ooaO*
IlriL

986.0

1959.5 670.9 526.2

Castor

nu
318.0

Linseeds

m: n. . a

signifies data not available.

T h e figures for 1931-35 are averaged f o r the whole period.

*Figure for 1921-22 (actually larger or equdl t) o.

26