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Platos Dialogical Structure and Socrates as the Physician of the Soul

Jafar Al-Mondhiry
I. INTRODUCTION Health, broadly considered, provides one with the vigor to pursue life. Our precarious hold on health is one of the central human struggles, and in many important ways the pursuit and maintenance of health is an indispensable condition for human flourishing. One view of Platos dialogues takes philosophy to be the care of the soul; that philosophy has as its goal the sustenance and guidance of the soul to a state of virtue and moral health. Through this lens, philosophical activity can be identified as the turning of souls toward the Good in a way that is gradual, cooperative, and particular to the individual engaged. Through dialogical interaction with a philosopher and philosophy in general, the soul can be examined, critiqued, and advanced by a transformative relationship to the Good. Similarly, medicine and healthcare professionals treat patients and steward the sick through a unique process of recovery that rehabilitates and reorients the body back towards a state of health.

It is the task of this paper to explore the similarities between the methods, attitudes, and goals at work in medicine and this kind philosophical care of the soul as it is variously demonstrated in the Platonic dialogues. Specific attention to the ways medicine and the task of the physician are referenced within the wider action of the dialogues will serve to explain what significance, if any, this comparison has for Platos portrayal of the philosophical life, the way it

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is taught and shared, and to what end. This paper takes as a guiding principle the sentiments expressed widely across the dialogues, but perhaps most succinctly by Socrates in Alcibiades 2, that the state or soul that is to live aright must hold fast to this knowledge [of the Good], exactly as a sick man does to a doctor.

Exploring the implications of this model first demands an interrogation of the form of the dialogues themselves, with an attempt at understanding why Plato chose to illustrate philosophy in this way. It is my contention that an analogous understanding of the health of the body and the health of the soul philosophy characterized by a concern for the latter lends itself to a sensitive understanding of the structure and movement of the dialogues and, more importantly, the characters within them. In particular, an overarching concern with philosophical health and healing may better frame the way Socrates engages his interlocutors in a process of probing criticism and exhortation. To this extent, I will try to show that what Plato depicts are scenes of moral diagnosis and treatment in dialogues such as the Gorgias and the Protagoras, amongst others. The care of the soul in these encounters requires a personal relationship between the philosopher and the interlocutor that models itself after the physician-patient relationship, as the insights of the former work to redirect and rectify the maladies of the latter. Success in this engagement is variably determined by the dimensions of just such a relationship. Finally, the unique and complex features of moral and physical health, in their related but distinct understandings, will allow the limits and value of this analogy to take shape.

At base, what this paper means to address is the bare fact that Plato did not simply espouse his beliefs as a direct and consistent set of propositions, either in his own voice or by way of Socrates. Instead, the bulk of what we are given are dramatic dialogues: scenes of

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conversation and engagement, movement and change between characters, topics, values and beliefs. What we need to interrogate, then, is the manifest and latent content of these encounters, and what kinds of patterns and themes emerge. Taken this way, we would already be justified in questioning the persistent references to medicine that occur and recur in almost every dialogue. A major Plato scholar of the early 20th Century, Werner Jaeger, was one of the first to describe the significance of such references in a way that frames and introduces this discussion:
Plato speaks of doctors and medicine in such high terms that, even if the early medical literature of Greece were entirely lost, we should need no further evidence to infer that, during the last fifth and the fourth centuries before Christ, the social and intellectual prestige of the Greek medical profession was very high indeed. Plato thinks of the doctor as the representative of a highly specialized and refined department of knowledge; and also the embodiment of a professional code which is rigorous enough to be a perfect model of the proper relation between knowledge and its purpose in practical conduct It is no exaggeration to say that Socrates doctrine of ethical knowledge, on which so many of the arguments in Platos dialogues turn, would be unthinkable without that model of medical science, to which he so often refers. Of all the branches of human knowledge then existing (including mathematics and natural science) medicine is the most closely akin to the ethical science of Socrates.

It remains an open question whether Plato actually develops just such a coherent and rigorous doctrine of ethical science through the dialogues. Indeed, any reading which distills and systematizes what the dialogues show cannot unequivocally be said to represent Platos view or the intentions of the dialogues as a whole. Such attempts necessarily move past the very content dialogues, and fail to address the work on its terms or the authors. What little writing we do have from Plato directly through the Letters does not prima facie eliminate the esoteric quality of these works or explain any ethical system or philosophical doctrines that underlie the writing. Certain attention to key passages written in the Seventh Letter, however, I believe shows that the dialogues were animated by a particular conception of the philosophy that may

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illuminate both their structure and guiding concern.

II. DIALOGICAL STRUCTURE, THE SEVENTH LETTER AND CARE OF THE SOUL The Proto-Essay View To reiterate the question posed above, it seems we are forced to ask (as a preliminary to any conscientious reading of Plato) why he chose to write in dialogues rather than simply announce his views in some other form. While debate, discussion and puzzlement remains and will remain in the scholarship, it is worth noting some prominent conceptions that bear upon this topic. In a close reading of some of the late dialogues where the significance of the dialogical form is less apparent, Kenneth Sayre summarizes what he calls the popularized proto-essay view of Platos writings. This understanding of the dialogues (which he opposes to his own), takes Platos guiding intention in writing to be the construction of rigorously tested philosophical arguments, supported by explanations of effective methods for procuring philosophical conclusions. From this perspective, the dialogical form was not itself significant for the transmission of the philosophical ideas articulated. Instead, the dialogues operated as a literary device for the convenience of its Greek audience accustomed to such dramatic forms. Or perhaps they were simply an imaginative failing on Platos part to reformulate transcriptions of the dialogues with his late teacher, the later dialogues like the Timaeus and Critias showing a progression to a more overtly essay-type form. The final conclusion following these assumptions of the proto-essay view is then that the philosophical ideas prominent within the dialogues represent Platos own beliefs, from which we can construct his philosophical system.

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Aside from the unavoidable problems of speculation in understanding the text this way, there are several concrete elements in the dialogues which point to problems with the protoessay view. First, if Plato meant to espouse a set of stable philosophical assertions, we are left to wonder why so many of the dialogues end in apparent aporia, or at least without a clean conclusion. In the Protagoras, for example, we are given an elaborate exchange between Socrates and the famous sophist of the dialogues namesake that ends with each speaker coming to contradict their earlier positions, Socrates himself calling the affair a hopeless mess (361c) and calling for more discussion before any true understanding can be reached. Likewise, examples from both the early dialogues (e.g., in the Laches where a definition of courage is pursued) and the late dialogues (e.g., the Theaetetus and the definition of knowledge) show Socrates questioning his interlocutors through a series of definitions that are proposed and corrected many times over without a satisfactory conclusion.

Second, and on a related note, Socrates seems to say different things in different dialogues about the same philosophical issues. To use the Protagoras again, much of Socrates late exchange with Protagoras involves a working definition of the Good that Socrates explicitly equates with the pleasurable.In the Gorgias (a dialogue written chronologically close to the Protagoras), however, Socrates takes a strong issue with this same definition when it comes out in his arguments with Polus and Callicles. The nuances and motivations between these definitions set aside, more explicit examples abound between other dialogues. In the Republic, for instance, Socrates claims that the soul is tripartite, while in the Phaedo he claims it has no parts, but that the soul is simple and whole. The difficulties in constructing a clear view of Platos opinions on these cannot easily be dismissed, and at the very least confounds the position that he used the dialogues as a vehicle for simply asserting his philosophical ideas as the proto-

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essay view states. The Seventh Letter If the dialogues do not give themselves over to a clear and coherent philosophical system as some might suggest, some clarification of Platos intentions might be found in the only works that bear his voice directly. In particular, the Seventh Letter provides a commentary that reaches over the whole of Platos writings in a way that radically influences our reading of them: One statement at any rate I can make in regard to all who have written or who may write with a claim to knowledge of the subjects to which I devote myselfno matter how they pretend to have acquired it Such writers can in my opinion have no real acquaintance with the subject. I certainly have composed no work in regard to it, nor shall I ever do so in future, for there is no way of putting it in words like other studies.

While some writers contest whether Plato genuinely authored this work, Kenneth Sayre (amongst others) defends the legitimacy of this writing on the grounds that even a forgery shows great familiarity with and fidelity to Platos style and works that show, in his words, whatever motives might have underlain forgery would have ruled out disclosure in the form of gross misrepresentation. At the very least, one cannot escape the fact that a very similar sentiment is expressed in the Phaedrus in Socrates recounting of the Egyptian myth of King Theuth: He would be a very simple person who should suppose that he had left his 'Art' in writings or who should accept such an inheritance in the hope that the written word would give anything intelligible or certain; or who deemed that writing could be any more than a reminder to one who already knows the subject.

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This seems to be a rather jarring statement to receive from such a prodigious author. The rejection expressed in the Seventh Letter would perhaps not be so radical if it were simply a call against writing, but instead it calls into question any linguistic formulation of philosophy, Plato stating that no intelligent person will ever risk putting what he really understands into language. Names, descriptions, mathematical formulations, scientific knowledge (episteme), and all discursive practices are thus all deemed insufficient for the genuine grasp of philosophy, which further undercuts the notion that Plato had something simple or direct to articulate through the dialogues. Rather, only a deeper sense of understanding approximates the sense of true being that is not caught up in linguistic concepts or sense experience. Plato provides a provocative explanation of the experience further in the letter: Acquaintance with it [philosophy] must come rather after frequent conversations with a master about the subject itself and living with it, when, suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it is generated in the soul and at once becomes self-sustaining.

Several important ideas contained in this passage guide the rest of this project. The first is that philosophy is not an abstract set of principles or propositions to be discovered and subordinated to, but a feeling generated in the soul of the individual akin to a mental state or visiona profound inner change within the soul of the young philosopher. Sayre expresses this change in a way that suggests a reorientation of the way philosophy is shared: Given the view that philosophic understanding is a kind of intellectual discernment that cannot be adequately expressed in language, the goal of philosophic instruction would be to bring about this state of mind in the student. This relates to the second point: that this state of the mind and soul doesnt come about on its own, but that only through frequent conversations with a master is it able to generate the spark that brings it to illumination. Thus, philosophy is not to be constructed

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immutably and silently, but brought into the world through the awakening of souls who participate in a community of dialogue. The relationship between the philosophical master and student defines how the soul can be brought up to this place of philosophical vigor.

Finally, because philosophy is not a coherent and universal system that one can simply dispassionately enter into, this state of the soul needs to be cultivated through a rigorous immersion in philosophical subjects, a living with it that demands a constant process of reconstruction and correction in order to be self-sustaining. Plato likens the austerity of such a process to a change in the whole order of ones life: As for those, however, who are not genuine converts to philosophyas soon as they see how many subjects there are to study, how much hard work they involve, and how indispensable it is for the project to adopt a well-ordered scheme of living [diata], they decide that the plan is difficult if not impossible for them, and so they really do not prove capable of practicing philosophy. The philosophical life is one which demands an intellectual regimen in order to be sustained, and the dialogues themselves might be read as just such an exercise of the mind for both the interlocutors and the reader. The Health of the Soul An integration of these insights seems to point to a particular conception of the dialogues as a whole; namely, that they show a concern for the health of the soul. I liken the experience described in the Seventh Letter to be something akin to the theory of recollection proposed in the Meno, in that it represents the potential within every soul to recover a higher state of functioning defined by its natural propensities. This sentiment is articulated well in this dialogue when Socrates claims that virtue, like health, has the same ideal for men, women, children and the elderly, and the best state of the soul is analogous to the best state of the body; i.e., there is a

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general norm for the state of the soul which we can appeal to in the pursuit of the virtuous life. Moreover, the health of the soul is something which, like the health of body, is advanced or restored by the knowledge and expertise of a healer, who is able through a sustained relationship to affect and reorient the soul of student/patient towards the Good. The dramatic figure of Socrates, as he is cast across many of the dialogues in his interactions with different interlocutors, would thus be what he refers to in the opening strokes of the Protagoras as a physician of the soul, understanding what kinds of words and logos can affect the souls health.

Finally, I take note of the well-ordered living scheme recommended in the previous passage as a nod to the idea that cultivating ones philosophical health is a matter of creating healthy life habitsthe Greek term diata more often referring to a physical as opposed to an intellectual regimen, usually in a medical context. Philosophy, in its emancipation from strict propositions and writing, would be concerned with the ideas and words which stir and invigorate the souls health. An excellent description of this appears in the Phaedrus, where Socrates and Phaedrus call for the intelligent word graven in the soul of the learner, which can defend itself, and knows with whom to speak and with whom to be silent the living word of knowledge which has a soul, and of which the written word is properly no more than an image. To be engaged with philosophy as Socrates engages his interlocutors is thus an organic, dynamic affair of the soul that responds differently in different situations and is not limited by the propositions and ideas it produces in this engagement. Similarly, the dramatic Socrates (and we might also rightfully include the Plato which stands behind him) does not rest content with the conclusions produced by his conversations, but always exhorts his listeners to continue the pursuit beyond the fragile instability of the theses continually produced and discarded.

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If the previous arguments have sufficed to give a nuanced view of the dialogues, such that their overall concern (as dictated primarily by the Seventh Letter) seems to rest on this conception of philosophy as a care and cultivation of the health of the soul, it remains to be seen what implications the metaphor to medicine has in this context. While it is readily obvious that a vocabulary of health and healing brings up medical imagery, a deeper exploration of what this parallel understanding offers will better illustrate some key concepts and bring attention to the prominence of this analogy in the dialogues.

III. THE MEDICAL ANALOGY OF THE DIALOGUES The Philosopher-Interlocutor/Physician-Patient Relationship

A substantive correlation between Socrates activities in the dialogues and the task of the physician suggests that Socrates himself is subject to or embodies some form of medical ethics, in the most basic sense that he takes as his guiding principle the care of his interlocutor as the physician takes care of the ill. Acting on this principle entails a fundamental sense of trust that Plato himself seems to recognize both for the physician and for himself:
One who advises a sick man, living in a way to injure his health, must first effect a reform in his way of living, must he not? And if the patient consents to such a reform, then he may admonish him on other points? If, however, the patient refuses, in my opinion it would be the act of a real man and a good physician to keep clear of advising such a man This being my firm conviction, whenever anyone asks my advice about any of the most important concerns of his life, such as the acquisition of wealth, or the proper regime for body or soul, then, in case I think that his daily life is fairly well regulated, or that when I give him advice on the matter about which he consults me, he will consent to follow it, under these circumstances I do counsel him with all my heart and do not stop at a mere formal compliance.

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It is the first priority of a physician to know how to engage to the sick individual so as to understand in what capacity help can be afforded. Just as the ill cannot be moved to take prescriptions unless they feel to be in trust with the doctor, so also the interlocutor cannot be successfully engaged unless there is an opening of souls between the interlocutor and the philosopher. A line from Socrates in the Charmides captures this understanding in both contexts: And therefore if the head and body are to be well, you must begin by curing the soulthat is the first and essential thing. And the cure of the soul, my dear youth, has to be effected by the use of certain charms, and these charms are fair words. Thus, the philosophers task (and the physicians, for that matter) demands the use of words and, I venture further, the open process of dialogue in order to engage the soul of the interlocutor.

Here, again, Plato makes ample use of the physician as the appropriate model for just such an engagement. Significantly, certain passages in the Laws create a vision of the medical practice which goes far beyond what Jaeger described as Platos reverence for the physician as the representative of a highly specialized and refined department of knowledge. For Plato, medicine entails a certain kind of relationship that indicates both the physician and the patient in a process of healing that promises to be transformative for both parties. Plato demonstrates this in his distinction between slave doctor and the free practitioner in Book IV of Laws:
A physician of this [slave] kind never gives a servant any account of his complaint, nor asks him for any; he gives him some empirical injunction with an air of finished knowledge, in the brusque fashion of a dictator The free practitioner, who, for the most part, attends free men, treats their diseases by going into things thoroughly from the beginning and takes the patient and his family into his confidence. Thus he learns something from the sufferers, and at the same time instructs the invalid to the best of his powers. He does not give his prescriptions until he has won the patients support, and when he has done so, he steadily aims at producing complete restoration to healthy by persuading the sufferer into compliance.

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The contrast highlighted here also bears upon the previous distinction made between a philosophy which produces a profound inner change in the soul of the interlocutor and a philosophy that establishes immutable principles that one must comport to, in the same sense as the slave doctor who makes prescriptions in the brusque fashion of a dictator. To inspire true virtue and a sense of the philosophical life, the philosopher must establish a rapport with his listener such that his words enter into the soul and inspire changes to the interlocutors life. It is only by establishing that living word spoken of in the Phaedrus that the philosopher can promote the sense of the philosophical which is self-sustaining and compelling for the individual. Socrates must convince his listeners to adopt the well-ordered scheme of living that genuine philosophical rigor demands, in the same capacity the physician exhorts his patient into a similar diata or physical regimen.

Moreover, Socrates encourages his interlocutors to the best of his powers. If we take this to mean the best of the interlocutors or patients powers, then we get a picture of the very individualized treatment process that Socrates mobilizes differently in different settings with different listeners. We are not consigned to think that Socrates contradicts himself across the dialogues or that one view of the soul or the virtues is the dominant position for him or Plato. Rather, we can see each occasion for philosophical healing as a moment that allows him to learn something from the sufferer and adapt his methods. Even while he didnt write much on the topic himself, Charles Griswold recognized this theme as well, describing the many dialogues as medicinal to the extent that they vary the treatment with the patient, and, more provocatively, that [t]he medicine is conservatively applied by Plato; philosophy [being] not beneficial for each and every person.

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While Griswold mentions these words only in passing, I think they develop an important point of caution for the medical model of philosophical care. The proper exercise of medicine means that it is employed in the care of the sick, and the entire nature of physician-patient / philosopher-interlocutor relationship depends on the dimensions of the illness itself. As Socrates points out in the Lysias: a body which is in health has no need whatever of the medical art or of any assistance, for it is sufficient in itself. And therefore no one in health is friendly with a physician on account of his health But the sick man is, I imagine, on account of his sickness. More importantly, Socrates goes on to point out that it is for the sake of health that the medical art has received the friendship. Likewise, I take it as a motivating value in the dialogues that Socrates receives the company of his interlocutors and attends to the health of their soul for the sake of the Good. Thus, the entire concept of a philosophical friendship based on the care of anothers soul relies on this orientation towards the Good in the way medicine is oriented towards health. Socrates continues: All such value as this is set not on those things which are procured for the sake of another thing, but on that for the sake of which all such things are procured.

This theme is developed in greater detail in the Gorgias, where Socrates discussion of the differences between real and apparent goods takes shape. He does this by way of comparison between medicine and pastry-baking on the one hand, and justice and rhetoric on the other, the former which always take caresome of the body, the others of the soulin accord with what is best, while the latter only guesses at the pleasant without the best. Simply giving an account of the thing which the physician or the philosopher works toward with the encountered individual (health and the Good, respectively) is insufficient. Their task must be actively

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transformed by this correspondence or accord between practices and values. On a level which speaks closer to the nature of the relationship between the physician and the patient, Book I of the Republic also sheds some light on the selflessness inherent to the healing event, that no physician, insofar as he is a physician, considers his own good in what he prescribes, but the good of the patient,. In his task, the healers concern is not the study or advancement of medical knowledge or philosophy as such (although this may come in fact as a consequence), but always to the subject which he has undertaken to direct; to that he looks, and in everything which he says and does. Socrates uses this example in the Republic to construct a view of the ideal relationship between the rulers and the polis, and despite the troubling paternalistic and eugenic overtones that come out later, I think these passages prefigure in an important way the values and attitudes employed in contemporary biomedical ethics.

The exact dimensions of this philosophical or medical friendship, however, are not defined in reference to some abstract ethical principles but with close attention to the illness or malady at hand. Another analogy to medicine from Socrates in the Laches illustrates this idea: When a person considers about applying a medicine to the eyes, would you say that he is consulting about the medicine or about the eyes? And in a word, when he considers anything for the sake of another thing, he thinks of the end and not of the means? We should be cautious here not to simply delimit philosophy to a pursuit of instrumental value in caring for the soul. The point taken is that the methods of philosophy in and of themselves do not constitute some independent, wholly abstract value, but more so with regard to how they inspire the philosophical life. The modern diagnostic imaging techniques of our times (X-Ray, MRI, CT scans) all certainly take on their own value in the way they have revolutionized and advanced knowledge in many disciplines, but their force would not have been nearly as dramatic if it were

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not for the health of the lives they have improved and the initial call for aid which motivated their discovery.

By this, I only mean to put emphasis on the fact that it is the personal relationship between the physician of the soul and the interlocutor with reference to some characterological or moral malady that determines the tools used in any particular engagement. Although we might be able to construct a kind of generalized medicine for the soul that Socrates develops with his different methods for engaging his listeners, it is for their particular care that these methods take shape at all. And this understanding of how to care for the individual comes about through an understanding of the Good or health that can dictate the specifics of the case. Socrates develops this idea in the Phaedrus when he states that the simple techniques of medicine (knowing how to induce warmth, make a patient vomit, use a particular drug) do not suffice to make one a physician. It is the ability to understand who to apply such a treatment to, why one should do it (through an account of what the treatment affects in the body), and, as Ludwig Edelstein suggests, when the right moment (kairos) has come to act. This concept of knowing when the right kairos to intervene or desist with his interlocutors is an especially important element of the dramatic form as it is displayed in the dialogues, and some suggest it plays a particularly significant role in the movements of the Protagoras, a play bookended by references to the hora or fitting time. The general point is that the physicians task, as well as the philosophers in the dialogue, is to have an understanding of the others soul such that the appropriate and timely intervention may be made. Access to the soul of the interlocutor, which defines in no small part the quality of the relationship able to be built, depends on the open process of dialogue previously mentioned, as well as the techniques that Plato has Socrates employ to generate such a healing dialogue. An exploration of the way this engagement models

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itself on the techniques employed in the physician-patient interaction will further illustrate the force of this medical analogy. The Questioning of the Patient/Interlocutors Soul As any physician would readily admit, the patient interview is one of the most fundamental and indispensable tools for diagnosis, and the ancient Hippocratic writings contemporary to Plato reflected this. For them, the way the sick received the questions and prescriptions from the physician was another crucial dimension in sealing a trust between the two that would result in the patients confidence and compliance: But it is particularly necessary, in my opinion, for one who discusses this [medicine] to discuss things familiar to ordinary folk But if you miss being understood by laymen, and fail to put your hearer in this condition, you will miss reality. For the physician of laymen, or for the philosopher with any interlocutor under her care, adapting the right form of speech allows for words to inspire the condition necessary for self-healing and personal growth. This implies that the patient/interlocutor receive her words in such a way that they can genuinely respond and be indicated as a full participant in the process.

For the care of the soul, this task takes added importance. Because the soul does not have the many brute, physical, macroscopic parts that the body has for simple examination, in order to care for the soul of his interlocutor, Socrates must get them to open and bear it for scrutiny and treatment. Mark Moes provides a helpful explanation of Socrates ability to identify the sicknesses within his interlocutors soul through his engagement with them:
An important theoretical presupposition of the practice of philosophy as Plato

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understands it seems to be that it is possible to diagnose ways in which a persons soul has departed from the norm of health by attending to that persons beliefs and desires In many of the dialogues, Socrates tests his interlocutors responses to questions, suggestions, speeches, myths, and the like, in a way similar to the way physicians test their patients responses to various pokes, prods, and other diagnostic tests.

An important conclusion to note from this understanding of Socrates diagnostic efforts is that they can only be effective when his interlocutors share their true beliefs and attitudes, and thus their true soul. Socrates commitment to getting at the true soul of his interlocutor is demonstrated perhaps most dramatically in the Protagoras when he insists that the sophist drop his elusive character and confront their conversation forthrightly and respond in a way that would make him accountable for his words: Ive got no interest in investigating in this if you like and if thats what you want kind of way; its the real you and me I want to test. The way Socrates indicates both Protagoras and himself reveals his own vulnerability and accountability as much as the sophists, and reiterates the previous passage from the Laws that points out the potential for transformation by both physician and interlocutor.

Many parts of this dialogue, in fact, are motivated by this concern for understanding the real Protagoras. The very first lines exchanged between Socrates and the famous sophist make it clear: it is you we have come to see. Later, as their discussion progresses and Socrates makes several pleas for brevity, the breakdown of the dialogue shows a breakdown in Protagoras ability to answer in his own voice rather than in speeches. Protagoras understood the conversation as a performance of words, and not as an opportunity for he and Socrates to meet and examine each others souls: I saw that he was dissatisfied with his own performance in the answers he had given, and would not of his own free will continue in the role of answerer, and it seemed to me that it was not my business to remain any longer in the discussions. Without Protagoras

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willingness to submit his soul for open critique and understanding, Socrates has nothing to offer him as a healer concerned for the health of his soul. Again, as the previous passages from the Seventh Letter and the Laws have noted, it is the physicians practical wisdom to know if she can offer any genuine help to her patients, i.e., whether they will open their soul to the process of healing.

This concern for the true soul of the interlocutor is likewise an animating element in the Gorgias. Within the first few pages of the dialogue, Socrates mentions not only an interest what Gorgias art is and what he teaches, but he tells Chaerephon to ask the obvious question: who is he? This concern comes out again later in the dialogue in the heat of his discussion with Polus about the difference between doing and suffering injustice. Socrates holds Polus to the their discussion in the hope that it will test his true beliefs and thus his true character, in a way that again reminds us of the medical backdrop that motivates Socrates care for the soul of his interlocutor: Submit nobly to the argument as you would to a doctor, and say either yes or no to my question.

It is also worth noting that prior to this passage there are many instances where Socrates attempts to redirect his engagement with these different rhetoricians back towards a true dialogue. At 448d-e, Socrates rebukes Polus for using rhetoric rather than answering the question asked of him; at 451d-e, he claims Gorgias is being unclear and giving debatable answers; and at 466a-b, he cuts Polus off from beginning a speech and asks him to stick to a single question. Perhaps most significantly, the dialogue begins with Callicles expectation that Socrates and Chaerephon had come to listen to Gorgias speech, but Socrates is quick to shift this assumption in a way that seems to frame the whole dialogue: What you say is good, Callicles.

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But then, would he [Gorgias] be willing to talk [dialegesthai] with us?

The emphasis on true and excellent political dialogue becomes one of the defining themes of this work, and Socrates interactions with the different interlocutors in this work attempt to model the excellences of dialogue as a true meeting between open souls. His efforts are thwarted (to a greater or lesser extent) in each encounter, and his ability to affect the souls of each of the three interlocutors in their turn seems to be determined to a great extent by the quality of the dialogue they share. Gorgias, the great rhetorician himself, ends up the most amicable of the three, but the final encounter between Callicles and Socrates bears a caustic bitterness that leaves the two at odds through the very end of the dialogue. The significant aspect of their encounter is Socrates failure to build the open philosophical friendship that allows for the possibility of change in either party. Despite Socrates claims to friendship early on in their discussion, his inability to get Callicles to commit to a single, coherent view leads to a nearbreakdown in the dialogue in a way very similar to that in the Protagoras:
Oh! Oh! Callicles, how all-cunning you are at one time claiming that things are this way, and at another time that the same things are otherwise, deceiving me! And yet I did not think at the beginning that I was to be deceived by you voluntarily, since you were my friend. But now I have been played false, and it looks like its necessary for me to make do with what is present and to accept from you this that is given.

Without a clear view of what beliefs are truly at stake for Callicles, Socrates is helpless to create an effective diagnosis or treatment for the deformities in his soul. Socrates enterprise rested on the assumption of friendship and forthrightness between them, and when this was manifestly destroyed by the harsh rebukes and irascible temperament Callicles demonstrated, the dialogue stopped being a potentially healing, transformative relationship. As if to salvage the matter,

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Socrates turns his arguments towards the rest of his listeners who have variously shown promise for improvement, while admitting his failure to Callicles directly: Truly, Callicles, you compelled me to engage in popular speaking, by not being willing to answer. Although Callicles is not given a chance to respond to the last speech Socrates offers, his final answer makes it clear that he is unwilling to see beyond a politics of gratification. In this final question to Callicles, however, Socrates implicitly proves his commitment to working for the sake of the Good. Explicitly aligning his view with the medical metaphor argued in this paper, he aspires to be the type of politician who would not simply gratify the polis, but [fight] with the Athenians so that they will be as good as possible, as a doctor would do.

IV. CONCLUSION In this paper, I have tried to stress the importance of Platos dialogical form, as well as certain key passages in the Seventh Letter which point to a different conception of philosophy than that provided by the proto-essay view. Plato seems to conceive of philosophy in such a way that it even defies the very form in which we carry his tradition, that is, in writing. Philosophy is to be taken as a profound personal change affected by rigorous immersion in the philosophical life and the guidance of a master. To the extent that it demands a well-ordered scheme of living, it seems to point to a certain health of the soul and the many regimens and restorative measures necessary for its maintenance. Given the esoteric quality and considerable differences between the views espoused across the many dialogues, it was my contention that Platos intentions in the dialogues be recast as a concern and care for the health of the soul.

Through this lens, the dramatic Socrates engagement with his interlocutors could be modeled after the physician-patient relationship. Such a relationship demands a basic sense of

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trust and fidelity, an openness and vulnerability to be changed by the pressures of dialogue and healing, and an orientation towards the Good which recognizes the individual in their concrete situation and problems. I have used the Protagoras and the Gorgias to demonstrate the difficulties and obstacles endemic to creating the model healing relationship advocated by the medical metaphor. The breakdowns in these dialogues occur precisely because Socrates interlocutors close themselves off from the open process of dialogue that would allow him to examine their soul and affect a treatment. In spite of this, Socrates commitment to the healing task to take in his interlocutors as a physician of the soul and struggle with them for their welfare still provides a novel and illuminating reading of the dialogues, and could serve as an invigorating reorientation for other philosophical traditions.

Bibliography On Ancient Medicine. Hippocrates, Volume 1. Translated by W. Jones. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library, 1956. Brumbaugh, Robert. Digressions and Dialogue: The Seventh Letter and Platos Literary Form Platonic Writings/Platonic Readings. Ed. Charles L. Griswold. New York: Routledge, 1988. Pg. 84-92. Print. Edelstein, Ludwig. Ancient Medicine: Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein. Ed. O. Temkin Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967. Pg. 109 Griswold, Charles. Self-Knowledge in Platos Phaedrus. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. Pg 221 Jeager, Werner. Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture.Vol. III. Translated by G. Highet. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1967. Pg. 3 King, Lester S. Platos Concepts of Medicine.(Journal of the History of Medicine. January (1954): 38-48 Long, Christopher. Lecture on Platos Protagoras. The Pennsylvania State University, Fall 2009, PHIL553: Ancient Philosophy Seminar

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Moes, Mark. Platos Dialogue Form and the Care of the Soul. New York: Peter Lang Publishing. 2000 Plato. Alcibiades 2. Plato in Twelve Volumes. Vol. 8. Translated by W.R.M. Lamb. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1955. -------. Charmides. The Collected Dialogues of Plato Including the Letters. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books. 1963. Electronic Edition. -------. Laches. The Collected Dialogues of Plato Including the Letters. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books. 1963. Electronic Edition -------. Laws. The Collected Dialogues of Plato Including the Letters. Translated by A.E. Taylor. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books. 1963. Electronic Edition -------. Letter VII. The Collected Dialogues of Plato Including the Letters. Translated by L.A. Post. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books. 1963. Electronic Edition. ------. Lysias. The Collected Dialogues of Plato Including the Letters. Translated by J. Wright. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books. 1963. Electronic Edition -------. Meno. The Collected Dialogues of Plato Including the Letters. Translated by W.K.C. Guthrie. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books. 1963. Electronic Edition -------. Phaedo. The Collected Dialogues of Plato Including the Letters. Translated by Hugh Tredennick. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books. 1963. Electronic Edition. -------. Phaedrus. The Collected Dialogues of Plato Including the Letters. Translated by R. Hackforth. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books. 1963. Electronic Edition. -------. Protagoras. The Collected Dialogues of Plato Including the Letters. Translated by W.K.C. Guthrie. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books. 1963. Electronic Edition

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-------. Republic. The Collected Dialogues of Plato Including the Letters. Translated by Paul Shorey. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books. 1963. Electronic Edition. -------. Gorgias. Translated by James H. Nichols Jr. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998 -------. Protagoras and Meno. Translated by Adam Beresfprd. New York: Penguin Books, 2005. 331c; my emphasis Sayre, Kenneth M. A Maieutic View of Five Late Dialogues. Methods of Interpreting Plato and His Dialogues. Ed. James Klagge and Nicholas Smith. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Pg. 221-243 Sayre, Kenneth M. "Plato's Writings in Light of the Seventh Letter." Platonic Writings/Platonic Readings. Ed. Charles L. Griswold. New York: Routledge, 1988. Pg. 93-109. Print.
Plato. Alcibiades 2. Plato in Twelve Volumes. Vol. 8. Translated by W.R.M. Lamb. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1955. 146e; my emphasis Jeager, Werner. Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture.Vol. III. Translated by G. Highet. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1967. Pg. 3 Sayre, Kenneth M. A Maieutic View of Five Late Dialogues. Methods of Interpreting Plato and His Dialogues. Ed. James Klagge and Nicholas Smith. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Pg. 221-243 Cf. Plato. Protagoras. Translated by W.K.C. Guthrie. 361c Cf. Ibid., 358b Cf. Plato. Gorgias. Translated by James H. Nichols Jr. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998. 475a; 492a ff Cf. Plato. Republic. Translated by Paul Shorey. 435d-444a Cf. Plato. Phaedo. Translated by Hugh Tredennick. 78b-84b Plato. Letter VII. The Collected Dialogues of Plato Including the Letters. Translated by L.A. Post. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books. 1963. Electronic Edition. 341c-d; My emphasis Note: all citations from the dialogues not listing a volume or book should be assumed to come from this source. Cf. Brumbaugh, Robert. Digressions and Dialogue: The Seventh Letter and Platos Literary Form Platonic Writings/Platonic Readings. Ed. Charles L. Griswold. New York: Routledge, 1988. Pg. 84-92. Print. Sayre, Kenneth M. "Plato's Writings in Light of the Seventh Letter." Platonic Writings/Platonic Readings. Ed. Charles L. Griswold. New York: Routledge, 1988. Pg. 93-109. Print. Plato. Phaedrus. Translated by R. Hackforth. 275c-d; my emphasis Plato. Letter VII. Translated by L.A. Post. 343a Ibid.,341d Translated by L.A. Post with minor alterations to the italicized words by Mark Moes. [Moes translation found in Platos Dialogue Form and the Care of the Soul (New York: Peter Lang Publishing. 2000. Pg. 45-46), to which I am indebted for much of the inspiration for this paper. Sayre, Kenneth M. "Plato's Writings in Light of the Seventh Letter." Pg. 103 Plato. Letter VII. Translated by L.A. Post. 340d-e; my emphasis Plato. Meno. Translated by W.K.C. Guthrie. 72d-e Plato. Protagoras. Translated by W.K.C. Guthrie. 313e Plato. Phaedrus. Translated by R. Hackforth. 276a-b; my emphasis Plato. Letter VII. Translated by L.A. Post. 330d-331d Plato. Charmides. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. 157a See Gorgias, 450a: medicine too, as it seems, is about speeches Plato. Laws. Translated by A.E. Taylor. 720b-d; my emphasis

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Griswold, Charles. Self-Knowledge in Platos Phaedrus. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. Pg 221 Plato. Lysias. Translated by J. Wright. 217a Ibid., 219a; my emphasis Ibid., 219a Plato. Gorgias. Translated by James H. Nichols Jr. 464c; my emphasis Ibid. 465a Plato. Republic. Translated by Paul Shorey. 342d Ibid. 342e-343a See Lester S. Kings article Platos Concepts of Medicine.( Journal of the History of Medicine. January (1954): 38-48) for an overview and discussion of the radical paternalism and eugenics arguments developed in the Republic Interestingly, shortly before these passages about the physicians overriding concern for the patient, he differentiates the physician from the money-maker (341c), claiming the former cannot have fee-earning as a necessary component of his art. Such selflessness that was ostensibly obvious in Platos time could provide a sharp corrective to our own. Plato. Laches. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. 185c-d Plato. Phaedrus. Translated by R. Hackforth. 268a-c Edelstein, Ludwig. Ancient Medicine: Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein. Ed. O. Temkin Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967. Pg. 109 I give full credit to Christopher Long for developing and sharing these ideas in a class-based discussion of this work (Long, Christopher. Lecture on Platos Protagoras. The Pennsylvania State University, Fall 2009, PHIL553: Ancient Philosophy Seminar) On Ancient Medicine. Hippocrates, Volume 1. Translated by W. Jones. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library, 1956. Pg. 2; my emphasis Moes, Mark. Platos Dialogue Form and the Care of the Soul. New York: Peter Lang Publishing. 2000 Plato. Protagoras and Meno. Translated by Adam Beresfprd. New York: Penguin Books, 2005. 331c; my emphasis Plato, Protagoras. Translated by W.K.C. Guthrie. 316b Ibid., 335a-b; my emphasis Plato. Gorgias. Translated by James H. Nichols Jr. 447b-d Ibid., 475d-e Ibid., 447b-c Ibid., 487c-e Ibid., 499b-c Ibid., 519d Ibid., 521a; my emphasis

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