ROMANIAN COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP DURING SUEZ AND HUNGARIAN CRISIS: SOME CONSIDERATIONS

Drago Ilinca Romanian Ministry of National Defence

Rise of communist regime in Romania It is well known that after the end of World War II, Romania was fully integrated into the Soviet sphere of influence. The consequence of this was to a large extent reflected in the behavior of the Romanian communist hierarchy, both in internal and external policies, which acted in a full compliance with the guidance issued by Moscow. In this respect, the transformation of the former Romanian Kingdom into a communist state was performed under the pressure of Soviet troops stationed in Romania which facilitated the infiltration of the Soviet agents into the political structures. From the legal point of view, the enforcement of the Soviet totalitarian model upon Romania was made through the adoption of the constitution of the Peoples Republic in April 1948 and, subsequently, introduction of the Soviet-based judicial model system. Under these auspices, the Romanian Workers Party moved swiftly to transform Romania, following the Soviet model and employing Stalinist patterns. In this respect I would like to mention briefly some of the major actions taken by the communists in Romania designed to impose the full control of the entire Romanian societies in all of its aspects. Thus, in June 1948, the industrial, banking, mining, insurance and transport enterprises were nationalized. Afterwards, on 2 March 1949, the ownership of land was completely removed from private hands. This allowed the liquidation of the remnants of the old landowning class. In order to impose its political program, in August 1948 the Communist regime created the repressive instrument called Securitate. From its inception the new security police was meant to defend the

democratic conquest and to ensure the security of the Romanian Peoples Republic against the plotting of internal and external enemies1. Acting as a police state, the main function of the Securitate was to maintain the communist regime in power. It is worth to mention here that the top leadership of the new structure was all agents of the Soviet security police and their activities were carefully oversight by from the Soviet Ministry of State Security. At the time of its emergence in the politics of postwar Romania, the Communist leadership was divided into the three main factions, categorized to whether they had stayed in the country or in Moscow during the war. The first group, which can be called the native one, was led by Gheorghe Ghiorghiu-Dej including at large workers and activists jailed during the strikes of 1930s. This faction included also people like Gh. Apostol, Nicolae Ceausescu, Miron Constantinescu, Alexandru Draghici and Teohari Georgescu, who will be part, afterwards, of the higher political ranks of the Communist Party. The second faction, named The Moscow Bureau comprised some members of the pre-war Communist leadership who had taken refuge in Moscow to escape arrest during the war. This group was lead by Ana Pauker, a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and head of the External Bureau of Romanian Communist Party. The third group was made up of veteran Communists who had remained in Romania and acted clandestinely. Its leading members were Stefan Foris, Lucretiu Patrascanu, Remus Koffler a.s.o. By the beginning of the fifties, Gheorghiu-Dej succeeded to remove, physically and politically, all the other rival factions, including the Moscow Bureau. Of course, this was done in full compliance with the orders issued by Stalin. The preeminence in power of Dej was sealed by his appointment, in June 1952, as the President of the Council of Ministers, a post which he combined with that of Secretary General of the Party. From this position, he intensified the attacks against the remnants of the other factions. Relying extensively on Securitate as a propaganda instrument, Dej removed, until the moment of Stalins death in 1953, almost all the potential opponents within the political hierarchy of the Communist Party. After Stalin The death of Stalin and rise in power of the new leader N.Khrushchev posed a lot of trouble for Communist leadership in Bucharest in terms of re-adapting their behavior at the newest trends in Moscow. It became clear that the separation of power was to be the order of the day when Khrushchev became the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in September 1953. Yet, this
1

The founding decree no. 221 issued in 30 August 1948.

approach gave Gheorghiu - Dej more room to manoeuvre, and he resisted Soviet pressure to separate his own powers as general Secretary and Premier by introducing collective leadership until April 1954. A clear sign that there had been no concession to Khrushchev's sanitized socialism was GheorghiuDej's reassumption of the position of First Secretary and the reelection at the Second Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party in December 1955. Two new members were added, Ceausescu and Draghici, thus confirming the overwhelming weight of Dejs faction within the higher ranks of Communist Party. Khrushchev's secret speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956 threw Gheorghiu-Dej completely off balance. Gheorghiu -Dej had led the Romanian delegation to the Congress and his first comment on the Congress was made on 23 March in a report of the Romanian delegation to an enlarged plenum of the RWP Central Committee which was only published in an abridged form in Scnteia, six days later. Gheorghiu-Dej admitted only that Stalin had soiled his reputation by indulging in the personality cult and by allowing the security police to use terror; he added that Stalin's 'departure from the Marxist-Leninist concept of the role of the personality' had a 'negative influence'. Nothing was said about Khrushchev's secret speech. Nevertheless, Gheorghiu-Dej's took a precautionary stance regarding the attitude of Moscow. At the end of March 1956 convened a secret meeting2 where read out a shortened version of Khrushchev's secret speech to the Soviet Twenty-Second Congress. He comments added to its speech highlighted that Krushchev speech had no relevance to the Romanian Party since thanks to the consistent MarxistLeninist policy of the Central Committee the excesses of the personality cult had been eliminated in 1952. In the six speeches that followed, all made by minor figures in the Party, only one showed a discordant tone, calling for an assessment of the Party leaders' actions in the light of Khrushchev's criticisms. Gheorghiu-Dej's speech fixed the Party line for the next few years; it placed the RCP amongst the most hardline of the Communist camp. The meeting itself was of major significance. It was the only one in Romania in which Khrushchevs text was presented in public; it showed the resistance of the Party leadership to the process of destalinization; and finally, it highlighted the weakness of opposition to Gheorghiu-Dej within the Party. By refusing to embark on destalinization with the backing of the Party members, Gheorghiu-Dej managed to reinforce his own control of the Party and to bind it more closely to his person3.
2 3

The report of RWP delegation regarding the XX Congress of Soviet Communist Party, Scanteia, March 29, 1956.
G. Haupt, 'La Genese du Conflit Sovito-Roumain', Revue Franaise du Science Politique, vol.18 (1968),

Hungarian Uprising and Suez Crisis In spite of these minor signs of a relative discomfort of the Romanian Communist leadership in relation with Khruschevs course of action Romania remained one of the most faithful ally of the Soviets in the next period, especially during the crisis in Hungary and Suez. This attitude was driven mainly by the fear of possible repressive Soviet actions against the Romanian communist leadership. There was no hesitation from Romanian communists side in showing an unconditioned support for the Soviets and demonstrate their fidelity to the communist block. It has to be said that the events in Hungary caused fear and confusion in the ranks of the Romanian Communist Party. Actually, the collapse of communist regime in Hungary warned the counterparts in Romania on the clear danger of spreading the revolution within the borders of neighbor countries. For Gheorghiu-Dej the events in Hungary erupted in a totally inappropriate moment putting him in a contradictory position. On the one hand, he was hostile to de-Stalinization process launched by Khruschev and he was thinking more and more at a possible independent policy regarding Moscow. On the other hand he was fully aware about the danger posed by the revolutionary events in Hungary which could put at risk the entire communist leadership in Romania. In this context, the relation with Moscow was necessary more than ever. The Romanian leader was aware of the fact that the Romanian Communist Party was not able to coupe with an internal revolt without Soviet support. Having in mind all of these, Dej decided to embark on Soviet side in all aspects, ranging from military support for intervention to external action. All of this had been oriented to prove the high fidelity of Romanian communists towards Soviet Union and the attachment to the socialist values and principles. Within this context, Romania served only as an instrument to promote Soviet policy without having any initiatives against or at least contrary to the USSR. Practically, the communist regime in Bucharest acted in a full compliance with Soviet guidelines. The first act of fidelity vis--vis USSR was the case of Yugoslavia where Dej and some other Romanian communist paid a visit in October 1956, right before of the events in Hungary. Dej acted in this occasion as a messenger of Soviet good will regarding the re-opening of relations with the communist regime in Yugoslavia. Of course, Romanian communist had its own political agenda in relation with Tito especially regarding the danger posed for neighboring country by the events in Hungary. 4

There is no doubt, as the existing documents testify, that even the Soviets feared about the spill over effect of Hugarian revolution, which could occurred within Communist block. The danger was real and present at the borders of Romania. Few days after the occurrence of revolt in Hungary, large number of students from Transylvanian cities (Cluj, Targu-Mures, Oradea, Baia Mare) were holding demonstrations in support of the Hungarian revolution. Under the threat of mass demonstrations, Romanian Communist Party took precautionary measure at the border with Hungary, sealing off all the traffic between Romania and Hungary. At the same time, additional measures were implemented in order to facilitate the transport of Soviet troops, which were increased at this moment at 2 divisions, through Romanian territory to Hungary. Within this context, the Romanian communist leadership made an offer to Soviet Big Brother to contribute with troops in the military operations which will be performed later on in Hungary. Khruschev was quite impressed by this new proof of reliability coming from the Romanian communists but he declined it. The idea behind this proposal was to secure Soviet support for the existing communist regime in Bucharest and to show, once again, the solidarity of Communist Romania with Khrushchev course of action. From this perspective, Dej felt free to act against the internal disturbances, mainly by using Securitate against the protesters. Despite these precautions, the Romanian authorities were soon confronted by renewed agitations and demonstrations of student groups and hostile elements in many parts of the country, especially Transylvania and Bucharest4. To combat the growing current, PWP Politburo set up a General Command Staff consisting of four senior Politburo members (Emil Bodnaras, Nicolae Ceausescu, Al. Draghici and Leontin Salajan) who were given extraordinary powers, including the right to shoot-tokill orders and to declare a state of emergency 5. Thanks to very harsh measures and an intensive propaganda campaign the Command Staff was successful in its tasks. Simultaneously with these measures Romanian leadership received the Declaration of the Soviet Government regarding the future relations between Communist states. The Romanian attitude towards the principles formulated by Soviets was built on a two main principles: fidelity with the socialist camp and, at the same time, a veiled dissociation from Moscow. This course of action was proposed by Dej to the Communist leadership as a platform for future actions. The above mentioned principles were structured within four points: re-confirmation of the full attachment of Romania to socialist camp;
4 5

Protocol No. 58 Politburo of RWP Meeting, October 1956, Arhivele CCPCR, Fond Biroul Politic, Do. 335&56, ff1-5. Ibidem.

highlighting the strong friendship between the Romanian people and Soviet one; fully support for the maintaining of Warsaw Treaty Organization; identify the necessary ways for initiating cautious discussions with Soviets regarding the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the Romanian territory6. Surprising or not, the last item of the political program adopted following the proposal made by Gheorghiu-Dej, showed that the Romanian communist leadership was quite determined to separate themselves from the Moscow policy in order to reach a high degree of autonomy even when the military intervention in Hungary was imminent. The existing documents on this very particular issue are backed by the testimonies of some preeminent members of Romanian Communist Party such as Silviu Brucan. According to his Memoirs, Dej had confessed to him after the Soviet intervention in Hungary about his plans regarding the autonomisation of Romania within Soviet block (My dear Tache, if we dont take a U-turn in our relations with the Soviet Union, we are lost. Therefore, we have to get the support of public opinion for this endeavor7). Whether if it is true or not, it is obviously that Dej was very impressed by the staunch resistance put up by the Hungarian people during Soviet military intervention. But that didnt affect the attitude of Romanian communists towards Soviet actions in Hungary. Although they planned to initiate an autonomisation campaign, Gheorghiu-Dej and his colleagues accepted to play a hideous role in the abduction of Imre Nagy and his followers, right upon their leaving the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, where they had taken shelter, after the outbreak of the Soviet attack. Consequently, the military intervention of the Soviets in Hungary, at the beginning of November 1956, was very welcomed by the Romanian authorities. In their view opinions, this action was meant to melt down the opposition activities in Romania and, subsequently, to give the opportunity to impose a more rigid control over the internal political life. The most interesting aspect is the Soviet attitude vis--vis the so-called autonomisation tendencies of the Bucharest regime. Although they knew about the intentions of Romanian leader which was also previously debated8 within the high ranks of the Romanian Communist Party, they decided to maintain in power the existing regime. That was derived mainly from the difficulties which affected the international stage almost simultaneously Hungarian Revolution and Suez Crisis.
6

Stephen Fischer-Galati, Dinu C. Giurescu, Ioan-Aurel Pop, O Istorie a Romanilor Studii Critice, Fundatia Culturala Romana, Cluj-Napoca, 1998, p. 325 7 Silviu Brucan, Generatia Irosita. Memorii, Bucharest, 1992, p.72-73 8 Before the Hungarian crisis Dej spoke about A Romanian Way within the Communist camp. At the same time he made a very firm stance against the Soviet plans regarding the specialization of the communist countries within CAER.

As a matter of fact, the start of fighting in the Middle East on 29-31 October 1956 caused even greater complications for Soviet leaders. Within this context, they worried that a failure to act decisively in Hungary would compound the damage to Soviet foreign policy. This fear was particularly acute after the French and British launched their military operations in the early morning hours of 31 October. Khruschev himself expressed the dominant sentiment at the Presidium of Soviet Communist Party meeting that: If we depart from Hungary, it will give a great boost to the Americans, English and French the imperialists. They will perceive it as weakness on our past and will go onto the offensive. We would then be exposing the weakness of our positions. Our party will not accept if we do this. To Egypt the imperialists will then add Hungary9.Khruschev subsequent comments about Suez in front of the Presidium, showed that he believed the decision to intervene in Hungary would help, rather than hurt, Moscow policy vis--vis Suez. The distraction posed by Hungary prevented an effective response in the Middle East. After the decision regarding the invasion of Hungary had been taken the Soviet Union would be able to take a more active part in assistance to Egypt. To a certain extent Soviet policy in Hungary was linked to the Suez Crisis. The sudden conflict diverted international focus from Hungary to the Middle East. Because the United States refused to support the combined intervention in Sinai the crisis generated a deep split among the western powers. The intra-NATO rift angered by the Suez crisis was not a critical factor10 in Moscows response to the Hungarian problem, but it provided a favorable moment for the Soviet Union to undertake large-scale military operations in Hungary. This complex picture gives some indications regarding the tolerant attitude of the Soviets regarding the autonomisation tendencies of the Romanian communists. It can be said that Khruschev was willing to accept the behavior of Dej and his fellows in order to avoid the spreading of revolution from Hungary in Romania. At the same time, the Romanian communist tried to not be more vocally on this issue and covered their real intentions under the protection of strong stance in favor of Soviet attitude within the international stage. Consequently, the Romanias position was focused on condemning the so-called jointly imperialist attack of UK, France and Israel against the people of Egypt. At the same time, the Romanian

Rabochaya zapis zasedanyia Presidiuma TSk KPPS, 31 oct. 1956, F.3, Op. 8, D.1006 reproduced in Cold War International History Project Bulletin No.5,1995. 10 Initially, the rift was not yet fully evident when the Soviet Presidium met for its fateful decision to undertake military actions against Hungary.

official worshiped the Soviet attitude in favor of Egypt and demonized the West intervention in Suez area. From this perspective, the Romanian official stance in case of Suez Crisis was announced in 1st of November, 1956. It was more a Romanian translation of USSR government position in which the Romanian Communist government firmly condemned the military actions taken by UK, France and Israel which were aimed to undermine the independence and freedom rights of the Arab people 11. At the same time for Bucharest, the West intervention in Suez was perceived as an aggression with a serious impact on Romanian economic interests. The blockade of Suez Canal was, in their opinion, a major consequence of the Imperialist aggression against Egypt which affected the economy of European countries, including Romania12. As in the Hungarian case, the communist regime in Bucharest was used by the Soviets, during Suez Crisis, as an instrument to promote their policy, within international context. Dej and his fellows accepted to play this role without any hesitation. Consequently, the propaganda machinery was made available for this endeavor. All over the country, the propagandistic agents were instructed to inform the public opinion about the Soviet attitude regarding the Suez Crisis. Following these orders, the propaganda campaign, performed also through the media, presented the Soviet policy as an official position of Romania without any another comments which could be interpreted as a national position13 on this issue. Special instructions were issued for the local authorities and propagandistic agents of the Communist regime in order to implement in all the Romanian society the official attitude of Romania and also to present the Soviet positive role within the Middle East Crisis, namely as a supporter of the fight of Arab people against Western imperialistic aggression. A special attention was paid in this framework to the propaganda activities within the Romanian Army. In this case the Political Directorate of the Army issued special instructions for its propaganda apparatus. The main purpose was to inform the military personnel about the evolutions in the Middle East for a proper understanding of the internal and external events 14. In spite of the main conclusion

11

RPR Declaration on the USSR proposals regarding disarmament and international security building measures (in Romanian Military Archives, Fond CC al PCR, D. 360/1956, c.724-729, f.54-55). 12 Speech of Iosif Chisinevschi at the Conference of Regional Party Organisation, Ploiesti, 8-9 Decembrie 1956, Romanian Military Archives, Fond CC al PCR, Rola As1, c.310-311). 13 Speech of Nicolae Ceausescu at the Conference of Regional Party Organisation, Hunedoara, 24-25 noiembrie 1956 (in Corneliu Mihai Lungu, Mihai Retegan, Explozia,Ed. Univers Enciclopedic, Bucuresti, 1996, p. 292). 14 Romanian Military Archives, Fond DSPA, R.PII-1145, c.158.

of the reports made by different informers from Army ranks, the military personnel perception on Suez Crisis was very mixed. Along with the official position regarding the events in the Middle East which was induced by the propaganda machinery, the existing documents showed various interpretation of the Suez Crisis. Thus, we can see different attitudes of different people, with different ranks within the Army. Their opinions range from condemning the Egyptian posture and legitimizing the intervention of UK and France 15 to blame USSR for their role played in the above mentioned events. Regarding the last, people were full aware of the role played by the Soviets in supporting the Nassers decision regarding the nationalization of Suez Canal as well as the USSR general policy in the Middle East aiming to create the instability climate in which their interest would had been secured. At the same time there were attitudes16 in favor of Israel position during the Suez Crisis. In this respect, the Israeli decisions were perceived by the people from the Romanian Army as meant to defend the people of Israel against the Egyptian aggression. Nevertheless, it is worth to mention here that the involvement of Romania in the public campaign condemning France, United Kingdom and Israel was used also by the communist regime in Bucharest to sharpen the international profile of Communist Romania. The origin of this approach lies in the aftermath of World War II and the particular conditions under which Romania felt under the total control of Moscow. In this respect, Romanias foreign policy was very strictly limited to a small perimeter of relations developed only with socialist states. Under these conditions Romania felt in an almost total diplomatic isolation, its international position being totally subordinated to the Soviet guidelines. Therefore, the Suez Crisis gave the opportunity for the Romanian leadership to be involved in the debates17 within the UN Assembly in support of the Soviet Union attacks against West but without having an own point of view on this matter. In order to conclude my presentation I would like also to mention briefly the main consequences of the crisis occurred at the end of 1956 in relation with the Communist regime in Bucharest.

15 16

Political Report, no.153, 18 Decembrie 1956, Romanian Military Archives, Fond DSPA, Rola PII-1147, c.233. Ibidem 17 For instance the speech of Atanasie Joja, the Permanent Representative of RPR during the Extraordinary Meeting of UN General Assembly, New York, 2 November 1956 (in Scanteia, an XXVI, nr. 3744, 4 Noiembrie 1956, p.3).

First, it was obviously for Dej and his followers that the escape from the Moscow sphere of influence, in a similar way with Titos model, wasnt possible. The repressive actions that had been taken by the Soviets in Hungary made impossible to put on practice the so-called national communist platform. Second, Dej was fully aware that in the absence of the Soviet support or much worse, in case of confrontation with Moscow, the public support is vital. But in order to achieve this goal, the main precondition was to stop the oppression policy and gather the internal public opinion alongside with a nationalistic political platform. Last but not least, the experience of Hungarian Crisis induced within the Communist ranks the idea of having a more Romanian oriented ethnical structure of the Communist Party especially at the level of upper ranks. The effective implementation of these three main conclusions was made gradually, within the next ten years, especially after the death of Gheorghiu-Dej in 1964 and the overthrow from power of Khruschev. Nevertheless, it has to be said, that in spite of the fact that the military intervention in Hungary slow down the autonomisation of Romania, the behavior of the Romanian communist during the two major crisis contributed to a large extent at favorable decision regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania. The event happened at the end of July 1958 and it was accompanied by a huge propaganda campaign that highlighted the eternal friendship between Romania and USSR.

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