Amir Mualem PHI300 Plato Assignment 1 Proposed definition: a fine wine is just one that wine-experts appreciate Euthyphros

s initial definition: the pious is the god-loved. 1.i Is the wine fine because the wine is being appreciated by the wine experts, or is the wine being appreciated by the wine experts because the wine is fine? 1.ii (1) the wine is being appreciated by the wine-experts [indicative verb phrase] because the wine is fine. E AGREES. (2) the wine is fine because the wine is being appreciated by the wine-experts [indicative verb phrase]. E REJECTS. (3) The wine is experts-appreciated [verbal-adjectival phrase] because the wine is being appreciated by the wine experts [indicative verb phrase]. E AGREES. (4) The wine is being appreciated by the wine experts [indicative verb phrase] because the wine is experts-appreciated [verbal-adjectival phrase]. E REJECTS 1.iii (1) is agreed to because we agree that the wine is being appreciated for this reason, that it is fine. [10e] This would imply the rejection statement (2) which contradicts the first, now that we understand the implication of because in the meaning of the sentence, and must choose between the two options Socrates posed in his question. Agreement to statement (3) follows from the explanation of because, reiterating the fact that the verbal adjectives gain their meaning from the indicative verb, not vice versa. Statements (3) and (4) follow the model of the other examples of such usage in grammar. [10b] Agreement to statement 4 would be incompatible with acceptance of statement 3 and with grammatical usage and meaning. 1.iv Statement 5: the wine is fine because the wine is experts-appreciated [verbaladjectival phrase]. This statement is presumably saying the same thing as the initial definition, this time using the verbal-adjectival phrase rather than the indicative verb phrase to define fine wine. This definition states, then, that all wine that is fine is also one that is experts-appreciated. 1.v If the experts-appreciated and the fine wine were the same, my dear Euthyphro, then if the fine wine was being appreciated because it was fine, the experts-appreciated would also be being appreciated because it was experts-appreciated; and if the expertsappreciated was experts-appreciated because it was being appreciated by the gods, then the fine wine would also be fine because it was being appreciated by the wine experts.

The reasoning behind this argument is that the statements that the wine-connoisseur agreed to are ultimately incompatible with each other, and reveal a contradiction. This response, however, implies that all these statements, and their inherent contradiction, flow from the proposed definition of fine wine. Given that the definition must explain the concept it is defining, the use of a verbal adjectival phrase to define the concept fine wine would be replaced by the indicative verb phrase which would result in a statement the wine is fine because it is appreciated by the wine-experts that is already rejected as insufficient a definition for fine wine, because it contradicts with the meaning we both attribute to the definition, that is, statement 1. 1.vi How would this show that the proposed definition of a fine wine is unsuccessful? The initial definition of fine wine is unsuccessful because it does not explain the inherence of the fine quality in the wine. The one who proposes this definition, if in Euthyphros position, also aims to show this definition explains the fact that the wine is fine (like Euthyphros action being pious). It results in statements, following Socrates question, that are inconsistent when the definition is examined according to the relational properties of formal causation, which is implied by the connector because introduced in Socrates question. Thus, Socrates demand for an explanatory definition forces Euthyphro to reflect on the assymetrical relationship between the two terms in his initial definitionthe fine wine and the experts-appreciatedin order to determine what is the direction of the causal relationship between the two terms constituting the validity of the statement. In the end, the definition, when examined under this criteria of definition, does not succeed in defining the essential quality that all fine wines can be said to have. Instead it provides us only with an accidental attribute of the fine winethat the experts appreciate it. The definition is not valid not because we do not know whether or not the wine experts agree, but because of the incompatible formal relations between terms of the statement and the type of a priori analysis that one demands of a definition aiming to explain the essential quality of the fine wine.

(2) One must ask first whether this way of arguing against a proposed definition is limited to a certain class of objects, in this case, the objects of ethical thought. Socrates shows us that even ethical concepts are subject to the demands of a priori conceptual analysis. His questions reveal the inadequacy of Euthyphros definition which isolates not an attribute of piety that exists in our conception of piety a priori, but an accidental quality such as the fact that it is god-loved. Socrates way of arguing, however, introduces a simple distinction in the sense of the definition (replacing the copula of the statement with because) that reveals the stricter demand of definition that I believe can be extended to a range of objects outside of ethical concepts, including fine wine. Although it may be possible to refute a definition of fine wine on the basis of empirical counter-examples, such a method would not be effective in this case, because the definition offered, like that of piety and the gods, allows us no empirical judgments of it in any way, because like the understanding of gods, we cannot refer to the inner mechanisms of taste in a wine-expert (or their inner disagreements). Instead, Socrates refutation refers only to the inner consistency of the statement and the consequential statements it implicates. Although the definition of fine wine is not an ethical

definitionin fact, it might be the exact opposite of a possible ethical definitionit still remains vulnerable to the same argument that Socrates posed to Euthyphro, in so far as the definition aims to the status of strict, a priori definition that aims to determine what is essential to the wine being fine. The limitations of this way of arguing may be that this standard of causal definition may not always be required of all definitions and in every case, but it is certainly required in cases where the definition aims to be an a priori analysis of a concept under philosophical discussion.