Vasil Penchev

''PERESTROIKA'' – CIVILIZATION CHOICE OF RUSSIA

1. History of the Soviet Union: social, political, and cultural

changes – a philosophical vision
The history of the USSR is a history of social mobility of an enormous
part of Russian peasantry made for town and industrial enterprises in the course
of the industrialization. Urbanization and modernization passed in
exceptionally short historical time, in which a good half of the population of
the Soviet Union moved to town and abandoned the traditional rural mode of
living, but did not the patriarchal and collectivistic mentality. It is indicative of
the collapsing of the USSR that it happened when the urbanization
discontinued (at about 74% urban population).
We could characterize the Soviet Union socially and politically as
state of modernizing peasant, a state catering for its accelerated social mobility.
The very short historical time of modernization determined some typical
features of the USSR development:
– accelerated industrialization and rather rapid economic growth;
– ''cultural revolution'', forming of a ''people's intelligentsia'', results in
education, health care and other social spheres;
– terror for elimination of natural obstacles and restraints regulating
the unusual fast process of peasant social mobility (including terror for
supporting the traditional homogeneity of an urbanizing mass under conditions
causing individualization and de-traditionalizing).
– gradually coming to the end of that process, political radicalism is
replaced by political conservatism; ''Stalin's era'' was transformed into
''Brezhnev's era'' by means of ''Hrushchov's warm spell''.
Modernization is an extensive factor of growth and progress since it is
limited by natural restrictions: roughly speaking, modernization growth is
limited by proportion 3:1 of urban to peasant population, of industry to
agriculture, of people with secondary education to those without secondary
education. Modernization is a limited resource that may be consumed in very
short historical time and to be gained impetus for ''doping'' development, but
involving difficulties, secondary effects, one of which is the very crash of the
USSR. The urbanization and industrialization themselves turned out fraught
with omissions, negligence, and defects in pursuit of amount and target dates at
the expense of quality. An attendant characteristic social and psychological
feature, determining political radicalism and terror was the marginalization of
the new townsman deprived of his patriarchal peasant mainstay.
The eschatological which is typical both for Marxism and Russian
orthodoxy is an essential cultural, historical and spiritual premise for the Soviet
Union. That is achievement of the end, of "the Kingdom of God on the earth'',
the final triumph of the spiritual over the material, of the eternal bliss over the
daily pain and problems. Sobornost, which can be culturally and politically
opposed to democracy presupposes absence of the political as continuous and
statutory struggle of politically organized parts of the whole. On the contrary, it
presupposes spiritual unity of the whole. The collective body makes a decision
''from on high''. The autocracy of pre-revolutionary Russia had been
transformed into autocracy of the USSR.
Poor geographical and climatic circumstances, exceptional scattered
state of peasant population, very small surplus value determined preserving of
Russian commune also after abolition of the serfdom. The commune was
liquidated not until the collectivization, in 1930, bit its spirit continued to exist
as special mentality of Soviet citizen and sociopolitical organization.
The Soviet Union was a state that is culturally and politically a
successor of Russian orthodox sobornost, autocracy, and communal
collectivism.
2. Outlook on the eve of ''perestroika''
Two main and opposing factors produced objectively necessity of
''perestroika'': 1) exhausting the resource of accelerated modernization and
social mobility; 2) sobornost, collectivistic and autocratic tradition. The USSR
strived for finding such a direction, which had to substitute intensive for
extensive development and which had not be the west, ''capitalist'' course.
The last three secretary-generals Andropov, Chernenko and
Gorbachov typified three possibilities, which can be marked provisionally and
respectively: ''moderate'', ''conservative'', and ''radical'' alternative.
Andropov's ''moderate'' alternative. Andropov and Chernenko were
secretaries–general for a short time and for that reason both the alternatives are
hypothetic possibilities. The real fact was that Andropov took some measures
of repression for reinforcing of labour discipline by means of the repressive
authorities.A hypothetic suggestion is that he would achieve stabilization of
socialism by means of repressive measures.
Chernenko's ''conservative'' alternative. In the same hypothetic aspect
of expectations, this alternative could be described as ostentation and
bureaucratizing, a ''second edition'' of ''Breghnev's era'' and striving for
maximum preserving of socialism.
Gorbacov's ''radical'' alternative. Gorbachov took the road of radical
changes: at first, as ''acceleration'' of socialism, then as reorganization,
''perestroika'' and in the end as ''market'' or ''democratic socialism''.
The regular choice was made by history in favour of radical road. The
exhausted extensive factor of modernization precluded both the moderate and
conservative alternatives. The only opportunity was radical outcome that
happened not as a social revolution, but as transformation and still
uncompleted transition to market economy and free entrepreneurship, at that
the former elite succeeded to partially retain their position
3. History of 'perestroika'
Two processes determined the course of ''perestroika'': 1) extenuation
of the Soviet social, economic, and political system in combination with
unsoundness of the attempts to be offered a new alternative for its
transformation; 2) transformation of the power and privileges of a considerable
part of nomenclature into economic domination accompanied by involving of
outside people in the arising new elite.
There are four periods in ''perestroika": 1) from March, 1985 to
January, 1987 – ''acceleration, ''more socialism''; 2) 1987-1988 – ''perestroika'',
''more democracy''] 3) 1989–1990 is a period of demarcating and schism
against the following of ''perestroika''; 4) 1991 – sudden change in alignment of
forces in favour of radical and reformist groups and their coming to power.
7he reforms led to:
In the political sphere: The center of power transferred from the
CPSU to the Soviet of people's deputies and after that to the executive: the
presidency and the regional administration. Democratic elections were
initiated.
In the economic sphere: the party control over the economy was
reduced and structures of alternative ''Comsomol'' economy were created;
reform of the financial infrastructure and banksliquidation of State supply of
the USSR and development of commodity exchange, "experimental"
privatization.
Gorbacov played a part of a transformation initiator by means of his
subordinated machinery of the Soviet bureaucracy. His yielding, opportunistic,
and pragmatic leadership in the nature of compromise lost gradually control
over the processes and yet prevented a revolutionary explosion.
The main real result of ''perestroika'' was the dismantling of the Soviet
system and spontaneous creating of an eclectic, oligarchic, and clan system of
transition. The Soviet society and economy entered upon a new stage of deep
crisis but yet the danger of catastrophic destabilization and a civil war was
warded off. The liberated centrifugal tendencies drove to disintegration of the
Soviet Union.
''Perestroika'' history is history of a steered shipwreck accompanied by
unsuccessful and groundless attempts of being avoided.
4. Historical and philosophical meaning of 'perestroika'
 The time distance affords an opportunity for generalized,
philosophical evaluation of historical and civilization meaning of ''perestroika''.
Russia removes obstacles to farther movement to Europe. The urban
culture, education system, modern industrial economy and infrastructure
created during the Soviet time demarcated, irrespective of all the defects,
categorically Russia from the Third world The bust–up between China and
the USSR come after 20th congress of the CPSU was not only and chiefly an
ad hoc and political rivalry, but a broadening of the civilization and historical
gap. The resource of Chinese modernization is colossal potential, but as any
extensive factor will exhaust some time or other. As for Russia, it has already
exhausted. Russia has no one outcome but the way of intensive development
and forming of political and economic system based on the middle class. In
spite of difficulties and zigzags of real politics, it is the strategic line of
President Putin and it will bear fruit.
In long–term civilization and geo-strategic prospects, the road "to the
West" divides into two: Europe or USA.
The "Europe" prospect means: Euro–liberalism and social democracy,
social state, guarded and humane orientated economic development,
preponderance of bureaucracy over entrepreneurship, political principle of
groups freedom, protection of difference, of the animals, and nature,
humanitarian researches, cultural, historical, and civilization traditionalism.
The "US" prospect means: neo–liberalism and neo–conservatism, state
of "equal start'', aggressive economic development, preponderance of
entrepreneurship over bureaucracy, political principle of individual freedoms,
tolerance to the successful at expense of the underdog, space and scientific
expansion, stimulation of brain–drain, multi–culturalism and anti–
traditionalism.
"US" is also literary the prospect "Mars", "Europe" is metaphorically
the prospect "Venus" and literary "Earth"
 In the future, Russia will have to make that choice as alternative
"either "Europe" or "USA"". The considerably more probable choice is rather
"Europe", although the Soviet Union, if "perestroika" had not happened, would
be hypothetically oriented to the alternative "USA" even though as rivalry. The
reasons of such a prognosis are the following: orthodox civilization tradition,
spiritual and collectivistic value system, cultural and historical heredity of the
USSR, vast territory and natural resources still liable to exploiting
In conclusion, we would like to point out the effect of Russian
civilization choice upon Bulgarian–Russian relations in short and medium–
term prospect. Because of the cultural and civilization closeness, because of the
exceptionally close relations during the Soviet Union period, because of the
advanced Euro–integration of Bulgaria, the direction of Bulgaria is a pilot
project of Russian development
Answers of asked questions:
1. After the end of our school, our section in the Institute for
philosophical researches – it is the section 'Philosophy of history' – will have
also a conference devoted to "overtaking development". My report is "The
Russian Transition: Retribution for Overtaking Development". In that report I
will describe three roads in front of Russia: oligarchic, autocratic, and one still
hypothetical, which is directed to forming and consolidating of economic and
political system based on the middle class. These three roads are alternatives,
but simultaneously they are three stages of Russian transition: the first is the
oligarchic stage, Eltsin's government; the next is the autocratic stage, President
Putin's mandates, still the hypothetical stage lies ahead in the future: it will be
the government after Putin. Every of those roads could be reality only if had
not happened transformation in Soviet time: urbanization, modernization,
industrialization, creating of modern education system. Namely they
predetermined both the crash of the Soviet Union and future victory of the
middle class.
2. Some words speaking of Eltsin's government. A Russian researcher,
Lepehin, wrote in 1999: "In Russia, the President turned out rather not
guarantor of democracy, but guarantor of oligarchy." Eltsin's government was
marked by a consecution of sign events, which represented also natural
boundaries of different stages.
The first stage represented the struggle for much more power. The end
of that stage was the passing of the new Constitution by referendum in
December, 1993. The end of the second stage was the first regular elections in
1995. The third stage spanned the period before the crisis in august 1998. The
last stage was the very crisis, the economic and politic measures made by the
President for its getting under control up to his abdication of power. In the
whole period of Eltsin was formed oligarchic state government closely,
narrowly entangled in President's kitchen cabinet and in his administration.
3. Some words speaking of Putin's government. The career of
Vladimir Putin make an impression. He after leaving the KGB passed all the
level of state bureaucracy from a vice-mayor of Petersburg up to his
nominating for the prime-minister of Russia by keeping changing at every of
the intermediate levels average about three months. By abdication for forward
amnesty, Boris Eltsin predetermined Putin to have been elected president. In
his first mandate, Putin created prestige of the presidential institution in a
merciless political struggle with some of oligarches. He succeeded in
transforming of presidential institution into a symbol and mainstay of the
reviving state system.
In his government, Putin – in keeping with Russian and Soviet state
tradition – succeeded in relying upon central and regional bureaucracy.
In the economic sphere, the actions for stabilizing of the state
enterprises as well as the military and industrial complex made an impression.
Namely those measures predetermined the bitter political and economical
skirmish with the oligarches.
Seemingly, Putin's government makes an impression on partial
restoration of the Soviet system. In reality, Russia has no one outcome but the
way of intensive development and forming of political and economic system
based on the middle class. That's why Putin's government is not marked an
autocratic or authoritarian road but only an inevitable stage of transition toward
market economy and democracy.
4. Russian presidential system, which contains powerful control levers
for subordinating not only of the executive, even not only of the legislative and
judiciary power, but also of economic power and media, not as copies the US
system as the pre-revolutionary and Soviet autocracy. The Russian President
has to be qualified as a removable and limited to two mandates constitutional
monarch.
5. The main factor, which determined the forming and consolidation
of economic and political system based on the middle class is the stratification
development in the course of crisis overcoming. The very crisis hindered the
middle class stabilization, but its overcoming will support the middle class in
the course of enrichment of the society.
If the oligarchic stage corresponds with a gulf, gap between an
insignificant minority of super-rich people and the huge part of miserable,
destitute, poor or ''of modest means'' population, if the authoritarian stage
moderate the difference at the expense of violating democracy, then forming of
political and economic system based on the middle class presupposes a
redistribution to the high half of strata and as a result the gap will be gradually
substituted by continuous transition between the rich and the poor.
6. In Russia, forming and consolidation of middle class is hindered by
many civilization, historical, cultural and political factors as well as specific
economic factors: sobornost, spiritual and colectivistic mentality, autocracy as
state political tradition, schism as the opposite of mediation, that is the opposite
of the middle of the middle class. ''Crisis style of Russia development'',
instability, ethnic conflicts, especially that in Chechenia, terrorism both as
threat and real acts are just the opposite of what is necessary to forming and
consolidating of middle class.
Some authors propose a typology of Russian consciousness:
paternalism and collectivism (about 30%), individualism and liberalism (about
20%), intermediate types between the two types of mentality (about 50%).
There is nostalgia for Soviet time. Corrupt practices and bureaucratic
blackmails are obstacles to business activity. Economy through patronage, by
the old-boy network also don't help the forming and consolidation of the
middle class in the West meaning of the term.
Another obstacle to establishing of the middle class is the huge share
of the shady, underground economy. This way, the middle class is subordinated
to the oligarchy and mafia.
 7. The middle class is predominantly connected with the choice of
''liberal'' model of Russia development, which model can be roughly
characterized in comparison with ''social-democratic'' and ''paternalistic'' model
this way: ''liberal'' model – the state assures human rights and a legal order and
legal protection of entrepreneurship and the social relief, benefits are minimum;
''social-democratic'' model – the state regulates certain economic spheres and
protects the most needy; ''paternalistic'' model – the states regulates the better
part of economy and supports all the strata of society. The ''liberal'' model is
preferred by the rich, the ''paternalistic'' model is preferred by the poor, and the
''social-democratic'' model occupies an intermediate position. Consequently, if
and as far as the share of the rich and middle increases, so much economic and
politic system based on the middle class will form and consolidate.