THOMAS BIOLSI University of California, Berkeley

Imagined geographies:
Sovereignty, indigenous space, and American Indian struggle

A B S T R A C T
In this article, I seek to complicate scholars understanding of the modular form of the nationstate by examining four kinds of indigenous political space that figure in contemporary American Indian struggle in the United States: (1) tribal or indigenous-nation sovereignty on reservation homelands; (2) comanagement of off-reservation resources and sites shared between tribal, federal, and state governments; (3) national indigenous space in which Indian people exercise portable rights beyond reservations; and (4) hybrid political space in which Indian people exercise dual citizenship and assert rights as tribal citizens under treaty and other federal Indian law, as U.S. citizens under the Constitution, and as social or cultural citizens within a multicultural U.S. society. [indigenous, law, nation-state, Native, race, sovereignty, space]

n 1992, the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation in Oregon issued a Declaration of Sovereignty, enacted by the Tribal Council:

Our people have exercised inherent sovereignty, as nations, on the Columbia Plateau for thousands of years, since time immemorial. . . . We . . . hereby declare our national sovereignty. We declare the existence of this inherent sovereign authoritythe absolute right to govern, to determine our destiny, and to control all persons, land, water, resources and activities, free of all outside interference throughout our homeland. This is familiar language to anyone who has listened to American Indian tribal governments speak of their right to self-determination within the United States. It is also remarkably similar to language invoked by indigenous peoples in their claims to self-determination the world over, and it certainly seems to be the same political language as that spoken by the historic anticolonial, nationalist movements of the 20th century (one thinks of Vietnam declaring its independence from France in 1945 by quoting from the U.S. Declaration of Independence) as well as by a wide range of ethnonational independence movements in the present, from the Basque region to Northern Ireland and Chechnya to Palestine and Tibet. The significance of sovereignty and nationalism for formerlyor stillcolonized people seems obvious: At the end of a century dominated by anti-colonial nationalist struggles for sovereignty and independence, we can hardly help but see national independence as almost synonymous with dignity, freedom, and empowerment (Ferguson 1997:123). Nations and nationalities seem very much to be obligatory categories of modern space and modern political subjectivity, respectively. In this article, I aim to complicate this prevailing picture of national sovereignty and national citizenshipboth at the level of the established
AMERICAN ETHNOLOGIST, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 239 259, ISSN 0094-0496, electronic ISSN 1548-1425. A 2005 by the American Anthropological Association. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Presss Rights and Permissions website, www.ucpress.edu/journals/ rights.htm.

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nation-state (in this case, the United States) and at the level of resistances against it. I examine four kinds of indigenous space imagined, fought for, and, to a remarkable extent, achieved and lived by American Indian people in the United States in the present. The first is tribal sovereignty within a Native homeland (a modern tribal government with its tribal citizenry on its reservation) as exemplified so well in the Warm Springs declaration quoted above. The second is territorially based rights to off-reservation resources that imply comanagement of (or perhaps even shared sovereignty over) overlapping territory by tribes, on the one hand, and the federal and state governments, on the other hand. Off-reservation fishing rights in the Pacific Northwest are a good example. The third is generic (supratribal) indigenous rights within an inclusive space that ultimately spans all of the territory of the contiguous United States, what I will call national indigenous space (I leave Alaska and Hawaii out of the picture in the interest of making the argument as directly as possible).1 The final one is hybrid indigenous space in which Indian people claim and exercise citizenship simultaneously in Native nations and in the United States. The nation-state, it turns out, is only one among several (perhaps many) political geographies imagined, lived, and even institutionalized under modernity by American Indians. As is well known, the modern nation-state form was a historical emergence. The prevailing genealogical narrative runs something like this: In the premodern context of medieval Europe, political space was heteronomous and essentially unstatelike (Ruggie 1998:146). Sovereignty, to the extent that such a thing existed, was parcelized (Anderson 1974:15), an intricate puzzle of partial and overlapping sovereignties (Mattingly 1988:23). Modern political space, represented in the present by the nationstate, is fundamentally different. The modern state claims totalized territorial sovereignty, not jurisdictional rule (Sahlins 1989:63), in which the geography of states takes the form of discrete, mutually exclusive, internally continuous domains, with clear insides and outsides and linear borders (see also Brubaker 1992; Poggi 1978). The modern state claims, as Benedict Anderson puts it, sovereignty [that] is fully, flatly, and evenly operative over each square centimeter of a legally demarcated territory (1991:19). Such panoptical sovereigntyalong with the idea of the nation as an imagined communityalso implies the more or less equal treatment of citizens, who become, from the imputed standpoint of the state, interchangeable as objects of the states gaze. The emergence of the nation-state is even more recent: Anderson (1991:113) argues that only in 1922, with the formation of the League of Nations, did the nationstate, with its deep horizontal comradeship and historical continuity through empty homogenous time, finally

become the universal political form on the planet (1991: 7, 24). From that point, a mosaic understanding of the globe has organized thinking about political space, amounting to a states-metageography (Taylor 2004:219). The consolidation of this geography, Anderson asserts, was premised on a fundamental change . . . taking place in modes of apprehending the world, which, more than anything else, made it possible to think the nation (1991: 22). The hegemonic effect of the modern episteme of nation-state sovereignty in shaping our imaginations is that it becomes increasingly difficult to think in terms of a geographical order that is not state-based (Murphy 1996:103). This is true to such an extent, Anderson argues, that the nation-state became a modular form available for pirating by all sorts of imaginable communities (1991:156)the nation-state, in other words, is in circulation not only as an obligatory but also as a liberatory category in the global public sphere: It structures both political realities and subversive political imaginaries. As soon as one acknowledges the historicity of the nation-state form, however, one is immediately struck by the formidable number of counterexamples to this presumptively modularized and universalized political episteme. For example, Aihwa Ong has described the condition of graduated sovereignty, whereby citizens in different zones that are differently articulated to global production and financial circuits are subjected to different sets of civil, political, and economic rights (1999: 215 216). Ong has in mind free-trade zones and other spatial arrangements by which developing states such as Malaysia outsource some state functions to other states or transnational corporations. What results is a system of variegated citizenship in which populations subjected to different regimes of value enjoy different kinds of rights, discipline, caring, and security (Ong 1999:217). The states gaze, in other words, may be studiously nonpanoptical, its sovereignty purposely not flat, full, or even across its territory but carefully zoned. Reflecting on Ongs remarkably provocative description of graduated sovereignty, one is immediately aware that modern states have always been graduated, even the most powerful, most liberally democratic, Western states. Consider the case of the United States and African Americans. Black people were first denied the status of legal personhood under the U.S. Constitution left out of the reach of the states pastoral power because they were deemed property, not legal personsthen abandoned by the central state to white-controlled local governments and unlicensed violence during the Jim Crow era. Is this not precisely an example of graduated sovereignty, in which the state outsources the governance of some would-be citizens to state subcontractors, public and private? This is a case in which the

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nation-state purposely declined to exercise full, flat, and even jurisdiction over space, at least as far as some of its citizens were concerned. Consider, as well, the case of color-blind enforcement of civil rights law in the United States in the present, a trend that seems to be increasingly institutionalized by both state and federal courts and legislatures. Does this not guarantee the security of white privilege against black and antiracist demands for substantive equality or social justice for all U.S. citizensa demand that would require some kind of affirmative action to remedy both historical and ongoing racial inequality? And is this not precisely a form of graduated sovereignty, but one that takes the remarkably powerful ideological form of apparent race neutrality on the part of the state (see, in particular, Brown et al. 2003:ch. 1; Omi and Winant 1994:ch. 7)? Consider, also, the situation of undocumented immigrant labor. Commerce, indeed, daily life as Americans know it, would quickly grind to a halt in places like California without the labor of undocumented workers who regularly cross the border despite border security.2 U.S. immigration law sees to it that these workers have no citizenship or other rights that the nation is bound to respect. These workers unentitled and always subject to deportationthus inevitably eschew unions (in fact, do not assert any kind of rights as workers other than the agreed-on pay in the daily verbal contract) and do not claim workers compensation, medical or dental coverage, unemployment benefits, social security benefits, or even drivers licenses or other items in the standard wage package or the social wage for documented workers in California (see, e.g., Kearney 1998). Finally, very real places exist where the state seems incapable or unwilling to use the force at its disposal to provide equal protection to all of its citizensbecause of which certain well-known categories of citizens are regularly, even systematically, assaulted, raped, and killed in private or otherwise unlicensed acts of violence: women in their own homes and on the streets, especially at night, people of color in high-crime areas, and, of course, inmates in prisons supposedly the most disciplinary of total institutions (all such places and times are, of course, very much socially produced).3 The list of ways the state variegates its gazegraduates or zones its sovereigntyso as to benefit some citizens systematically and, just as systematically, to disempower or otherwise harm other citizens, of course, goes on. This article is a preliminary attempt to reimagine the political space of the nation-stateand to do so from the standpoint of those made marginal to it. None of the four kinds of indigenous space to be examined here are consistent with the received wisdomscholarly or popular regarding the supposedly homogenous political space of

the nation-state. Either in terms of imaginary geography or in terms of lived political space, the American Indian cases to be discussed all problematize the modular, epistemic, and universal space of the modern nation-state that seems so oftenagain, in both scholarly and popular contextsto be spoken of as if it were either historically inevitable or an obligatory worldview. My point, however, is not to critique current thinking on the nation-state formobviously this thinking is a necessary part of any critical analysis of modernityso much as to productively complicate understanding of it.

Tribal sovereignty
As noted above, the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation certainly seem to have borrowed a modular form of the nation-state (although they would, no doubt, see it as more a matter of indigenous continuity, not one of pirating a modern commodity form). Their political imaginary, which is probably representative of the dominant thinking among tribal leaders and Indian intellectuals throughout the United States, seems to be fully consistent with the common sense of political modernity in which all territorial space on the planet is partitioned into nations: Each nation, with its own culture, its own language, its own history and place on the map is entitled to its own state with clear and secure borders and general autonomy within those borders and to a seat at the table of the community of nations. This mosaic political imaginary is visually represented by the multicolored map of nations described as the national geographic by Liisa Malkki (1997), and has, in fact, been institutionalized in the United States regarding American Indian peoples. Figure 1, published by the U.S. Census Bureau, depicts the reservations which are understood by many Americans, both Indian and non-Indian, as indigenous nationsof the United States. Although the different reservations are not multicolored on this or any other map that I know of, the national geographic logic of distinct sovereignties rooted in discrete territories is clear enough. This is the case even in cyberspace, in which federally recognized tribes may use the nsn.us or nsn.gov (native sovereign nation) domain designations. The Rosebud Sioux Tribe has even enacted legislation regarding its airspace, and the question of tribal currencies has recently been aired nationally. Perhaps a bit surprisingly, the United States, in a clear strategy of graduated sovereignty, has not fundamentally opposed the model of sovereignty articulated by the Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs and other Native peoples.4 Federal Indian law as made by Congress, executed by the executive branch, and interpreted by the federal courts, is largely in agreement with the essentials

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Figure 1. American Indian Reservations. Source: Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce 2000.

of the Warm Springs Declaration of Sovereignty, and unquestionably the declaration is in part shaped by Native readings of federal Indian law. Indeed, many of the ideas that Indian people have about tribal sovereignty clearly come from their reading and interpretation of federal law (see Biolsi 2001). Here is Chief Justice John Marshall in one of the key Supreme Court cases dealing with the sovereignty of Indian Tribes: [The majority of the justices are convinced as to] the character of the Cherokees as a state, as a distinct political community, separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself. . . . They have been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of our country. The numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war . . . [with] the United States. . . . The acts of our

government plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a state. [Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, at 106 (1831)] Marshall went even further toward recognizing the sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation in an 1832 opinion: The Indian nations have always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial. . . . The very term nation, so generally applied to them, means a people distinct from others (Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. [6 Pet.] 515, at 559 [1832]). Neither Great Britain nor the United States had ever attempted to interfere with the internal affairs of the Indians, Marshall wrote (Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. [6 Pet.] 515, at 547 [1832]). What is more, the states of the Union had no authority to interfere in any way with

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Indian tribes, even tribes within their exterior geographic boundaries: The laws of Georgia can have no force, Marshall made clear, within the Cherokee Nation (Worcesster v. Georgia, 31 U.S. [6 Pet.] 515, at 561 [1832]). The freedom of tribes from state law within their reservation homelands remains a basic principle of federal Indian law and the legal status of Indian tribes and is what allows tribes, for example, to operate casinos. But tribes are not only free from state jurisdiction in general. Because they are preconstitutionaltheir existence as sovereign polities predates the existence of the United Statesthey are also extraconstitutional: They exercise their sovereignty without constraint by the federal Constitution or federal law in generalwith some critical exceptions explored below. Thus, the Supreme Court as early as 1896 held that the Bill of Rights was not a constraint on what tribal governments do to their own tribal citizens (Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. [1896]; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 [1978]). Note that the formal federal recognition of indigenous sovereignties in the United States has gone further than it has in other Western nation-states. In Canada, for example, although the 1982 constitution declares that existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed, Aboriginal self-government can be exercised only within the framework of the Canadian Constitution, and the particulars of self-government must be negotiated with the federal and provincial or territorial governments (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development 1995; see also Asch 1993; Harris 2002; Macklem 2001; McKee 2000). Indigenous sovereignty is even less developed in Australia, where the recognition of Native Title subsequent to the groundbreaking Mabo decision in 1992 does not involve recognition of sovereignty or Aboriginal selfgovernment (see Mercer 1997; Povinelli 2002; Reynolds 1996; Webber 2000). The apparent exceptionalism of the United States regarding the indigenous notwithstanding, however, American Indian tribes generally have much more in mind in the way of sovereignty than the U.S. government is prepared to countenance. In fact, the Warm Springs Declaration of Sovereignty was meant as a declaration of independence from U.S. federal definitions of tribal sovereignty. That the federal courts recognize a kind of tribal sovereignty and that Congresss clear policy since the 1970s has been one of respecting tribal sovereignty and supporting tribal self-determination are certainly true. Even President George W. Bush went so far in 2002 as to assure that my Administration will continue to honor tribal sovereignty by working on a governmentto-government basis with American Indians and Alaska Natives. But the kind of sovereignty being honored here is a profoundly limited onelimited, in fact, to the

point that it does not make logical sense to many Indian people, is not really sovereignty at all from their point of view, and can only be understood as bespeaking a profoundly racist view of Indians on the part of Congress, the courts, and white people in general. Although the 1830s Marshall opinions on inherent tribal sovereignty still have effect in federal Indian law, a century-old doctrine undercuts the Marshall holdings: This is the rule that gives Congress what the Court calls plenary power over the status of Indian tribes. In the 1904 case of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock (187 U.S. 553 [1903]), the Supreme Court held that Congress has essentially absolute power over tribes and can abrogate treaties or otherwise legislate regarding Indian tribes without their consent because Indians are wards of the United States (for the origin of the concept of Indian wardship, see United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, at 383 [U.S. Sup. Ct., 1886]). Lone Wolf has never been overturned and is considered good law in the present. Congress, can reduce tribal powers at will and has done so. It did so as early as 1885 in enacting the Major Crimes Act (23 Stat 385), which imposed federal jurisdiction over serious crimes committed by or against Indians on reservations (see Harring 1994). And it did so most recently in the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA; 102 Stat 2467). The IGRA was a congressional reaction to the growing success of tribes in the gaming industryand the increasing jealousy of revenue-hungry states (and, perhaps, the gaming industry)in the 1980s. Tribal gaming was, prior to the IGRA, available for reservation economic development (free from state regulation or interference) on the basis of inherent tribal sovereignty, as announced by the Supreme Court in 1832. The IGRA, however, limits tribal gaming to those forms of gambling legal under state law, and it requires tribes to enter into compacts with states before they can open gaming operations; essentially this means that states have veto power over tribal gaming. Although Congress presented this act as an attempt to balance the interests of states and tribes, from the point of view of tribal advocates it was simply a blatant violation of inherent tribal sovereignty exercised through the plenary power the Court arbitrarily gave to Congress over Indian tribes.5 In addition to congressional plenary power over Indian tribes, the federal courts, the Supreme Court in particular, have invented the notion of implied repeals of inherent tribal sovereignty (see Wilkins and Lomawaima 2001:ch. 5). This refers to court-ordered reductions of tribal sovereignty in instances in which Congress has not explicitly enacted legislation to reduce tribal sovereignty but in which the federal courts think up abrogations of sovereignty as logical implications of Congresss intent regarding Indians or their dependent status. For example, in 1978 the Supreme Court considered the

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question of whether the Suquamish Indian Tribe in Washington State might exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians within reservation boundaries. Before summarizing the Courts holding, I stress the importance of understanding that the question in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe (435 U.S. 191 [1978]) was not just a matter of abstract principles of sovereignty because tens of thousands of non-Indians live, work, recreate, and do business on Indian reservations in the United States. On many reservations, non-Indian residents constitute the majority of the population and have organized counties and municipalities under state law within the borders of the reservations. This situation is not a historical accident. On the contrary, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the federal government encouraged non-Indian settlers to homestead what was deemed surplus tribal land and to buy land from Indians within reservation borders. The assumption was that white settlers were good role models in the game of civilizing Indians and that white farmers and their communities would raise the property values of the surrounding reservation land, materially benefiting their Indian neighbors. The government also assumed that the reservations would disappear as legal enclaves as Indians became civilized and, thus, U.S. citizens.6 Because of a radical reversal of Indian policy in the 1930s, however, the reservations never disappeared, and most reservations today have a checkerboard pattern in which Indian land under federal trust status and non-Indian deeded land are interspersed (see Figure 2; see Biolsi 2001). Checkerboarding was the prevailing situation on reservations nationally when the Supreme Court answered the question in Oliphant. Writing for the majority, Justice William Rehnquist held that a careful analysis of treaties and acts of Congress made clear that even though Congress had never expressly forbidden the Suquamish or other tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, that intent was clearly implied. But more than mere congressional intent was involved; ultimately the matter was one of logic: Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising both those powers of autonomous states that are expressly terminated by Congress [through its plenary power] and those powers inconsistent with their status (435 U.S. 191 [1978], at 208, quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F. 2d, at 1009 [U.S. Ct. Appls., 9th Cir.; 1974]). Regarding the latter, Rehnquist insisted that upon incorporation into the territory of the United States, the Indian tribes thereby come under the territorial sovereignty of the United States and their exercise of separate power is constrained so as not to conflict with the interests of this overriding sovereignty. Thus, there are inherent limitations on tribal powers that stem from their incorporation into the United States

Figure 2. Checkerboarding on Rosebud Reservation, South Dakota. Shaded areas are federal Indian land in trust status. Blank areas are fee-patented land, owned mostly by non-Indians. Map courtesy of Office of Water Resources, Rosebud Sioux Tribe, Rosebud, South Dakota.

(435 U.S. 191, at 209 [1978]). One of these limitations stems from the overriding sovereigns great solicitude that its citizens be protected by the United States from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty. . . . By submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States (435 U.S. 191, at 210 [1978]). As of 2005, in terms of criminal jurisdiction, tribes may not so much as issue traffic tickets to non-Indians. In 1981, the Supreme Court applied the basic logic of its Oliphant decision on tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians to the question of tribal civil and regulatory jurisdiction, holding that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe (Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, at 565 [1981]). The Court has, of late, been particularly ambitious to outlaw what it apparently sees as tribal attempts to find loopholes by which tribal governments might exercise civil and regulatory jurisdiction over nonIndians. In the 2001 case of Atkinson v. Shirley (532 U.S.

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902[2001]), the Court held that the Navajo Nation has no authority to impose a business tax on a trading post owned by a non-Indian in the middle of the Navajo Reservation. Even though the business relies on tribal services and exists because of the tourist industry based on the presence of Indians, the Court insisted that the tribe has no authority to regulate the business operations of nonIndians on private property. Advocates of tribal sovereignty recognize clearly that the kind of sovereignty they are allowed under federal Indian law is a specific kindinternal selfdetermination or dependent sovereignty in the federal courts terms. One of my consultants on Rosebud Reservation describes it as amounting to making Indian tribes into Boy Scout troops or private clubsvoluntary associations, not governments. Indian people on Rosebud Reservation commonly point out that when an Indian leaves the reservation, he or she immediately comes under the criminal and civil regulatory jurisdiction of the state of South Dakota (or Nebraska) and its subdivisions, even though that person does not live in the jurisdiction in question, vote or run for office there, or expect a jury of peers were he or she to wind up in court there. Indians ask, why, then, is a non-Indian not subject to tribal jurisdiction when he or she enters the reservation? The argument that an Indian could theoretically take up legal residence and become a voter, officeholder, or jury member in the off-reservation jurisdictionwhereas a non-Indian could not do the same with respect to tribal governmentseems strained logic to most Indians as an explanation for the general territorial jurisdiction that obtains in the case of white governments but not in the case of tribal governments. Indeed, it seems to many, if not most, Indian people like a racist differentiation in which white people simply refuse to trust Indian people to exercise governance responsibly or democratically. In any event, the sovereignty exercised by Indian tribes is anything but consistent with the modular model of nation-state sovereigntyalthough the modular model is very much the vision and goal of tribal advocates. One legal scholar calls such arrangements for tribal governments mere semblances of sovereignty (Aleinikoff 2002). A critical anthropology of modern political subjectivity must necessarily pay attention not just to the pirating of a modular nation-state model as a political tactic but also to the lived reality of graduated, quasi (Jackson 1990), or permeated sovereignty (Biersteker and Weber 1996:9). Tribal homelands are relegated, under federal law, to a condition of heteronomous political space in which different citizens are subject to different sovereigns in coterminous physical space. As John Ruggie explains, this kind of arrangement has a precedent in premodern, medieval European political organization, before it was thoroughly reorganized into

the distinct, disjoint, and mutually exclusive territorial forms of the modern state (1998:172).

Comanagement
In addition to declaring sovereignty over the reservation, the Warm Springs declaration looks beyond the reservation boundaries: Our homeland also encompasses, and our sovereignty extends to, tribal off-reservation rights in our historic ancestral domain, a vast region that includes the Columbia Plateau and far beyond. These offreservation rights include rights attaching to our usual and accustomed fishing grounds and stations; to inlieu fishing sites; to burial sites and other sacred sites; to lands on which tribal members can hunt, gather roots and berries, and pasture stock. [Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon 1992; emphasis added] The claim here is based, in part, on terminology in the 1855 treaty signed by the people of what is now the Warm Springs Reservation with the United States at the Dalles, Oregon Territory: The exclusive right of taking fish in the streams running through and bordering said reservation is hereby secured to said Indians; and at all other usual and accustomed stations, in common with citizens, of the United States, and of erecting suitable houses for curing the same; also the privilege of hunting, gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their stock on unclaimed lands, in common with citizens, is secured to them. [12 Stat 37, at 38; emphasis added] The ceded lands remain a critical part of the Warm Springs tribal homeland as well as that of the people of the Yakima, Umatilla, and Nez Perce reservations, who also signed versions of the 1855 treatyeven though the ceded lands are no longer reservation land and are composed of federal, state, and private lands (see Figure 3). In the wake of a series of fish-ins beginning in 1964, which were meant to assert off-reservation, treaty-based fishing rights, and after prevailing in federal court against the attempts by Oregon and Washington to deny treatybased fishing rights (see Cohen 1986), Northwest tribal members now regularly fish at usual and accustomed places free from state jurisdiction. In the federal litigation, the tribes were assigned the responsibility by the courts to regulate their own tribal citizens off-reservation fishing and have delegated that responsibility to the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission (see http:// www.critfc.org). But in the tribal view, what is at stake is much more than simply freedom from state fish and game

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Figure 3. Ceded Lands of the 1855 Treaty Tribes in the Columbia Basin. Source: Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission 1992:1.

laws or the right to have tribal fish and game wardens. In simplest terms, tribal advocates believe that, on the basis of the treaties and their reserved off-reservation rights, Indians have what amounts to the right of shared sovereignty (see Silvern 1999, 2002), or at least comanagement, with the federal, state, municipal, and county governments in the ceded areas over the health and future of both the particular food sources mentioned in the treaties and the environment more generally (other specific sites are included within tribal jurisdiction via other federal laws and policies; see below). One should understand that this vision of shared sovereignty entails an assumption of coequal sovereignty, not nested, hierarchical sovereignty or a relationship of scaled sovereignty, in which the highest sovereign encompasses the lower sovereignsas in the relationship between the states and the federal government (on the construction of such vertical scales and spatial political encompassment in Third World contexts, see Ferguson and Gupta 2002). Thus, the ` vision here is of tribes as entities fully sovereign vis-a-vis ` -vis the states. the U.S. government and certainly vis-a Not surprisingly, the state and federal governments, exhibiting their own concerns for territorial sovereignty, do not agree to shared sovereignty with tribes outside of reservation boundaries (see Silvern 1999, 2002). What has evolved in its place in the last ten years is a framework for allowing tribal governments to have some official role as stakeholders in policy making by state and federal agencies. Commonly called a policy of government-togovernment relations, this framework first appeared in the 1990s. In 1996, for example, Governor John Kitzhaber of Oregon signed an executive order mandating dialogue of his department heads with tribal governments on matters of policy in which tribes and the state have mutual interests. In 1998, President Bill Clinton signed

an executive order requiring federal agencies to establish procedures for tribal governments to provide meaningful and timely input in the development of . . . policies on matters that significantly or uniquely affect their communities (see also Clinton 1999).7 Although the phrase government-to-government is, in fact, an exaggeration of the actual recognition granted to tribal governments under this policy (because neither the federal nor the state governments agree to share sovereignty with tribal governments over nonreservation lands), tribes clearly see this procedure as a means for exercising some degree of what they deem sovereignty over off-reservation lands. This model has some remarkable parallels with the process of recognizing Native Title in Australia, in which Aboriginal groups may be granted rights to public lands that might include visiting to protect important places, making decisions about the future use of the land or waters, hunting, gathering and collecting bush medicines (National Native Title Tribunal 2003). In the case of national parks, Aboriginal groups have a recognized right to co-management (see New South Wales National Parks and Wildlife Service n.d.). The struggle over shared sovereignty is well illustrated by the Kennewick Man case in the Northwest. The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA) assigned ownership of Native American human remains and associated funerary objects discovered on federal or tribal lands to the tribe with the closest cultural affiliation with such remains or objects when lineal descendants cannot be ascertained (U.S. Code, Vol. 25, Ch. 32, Sec. 3002). In 1996, human remains dated as old as 9200 B.P. were discovered on the Columbia River near Kennewick, Washington, and were turned over by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineersthe owner of the landto an anthropologist for study. The Yamaka Nation, Nez Perce Tribe, Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Reservation, and Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation demanded return of what they call the Ancient One to them for reburial under the terms of NAGPRA. After convoluted litigation between a group of plaintiff anthropologists, on the one side, and the tribes, Corps of Engineers, and Department of the Interior, on the other side, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in 2004 that NAGPRA did not apply to the Ancient One because the remains are so old and physically distinct from contemporary American Indians. The court reasoned that because NAGPRA defines Native American in the present tense (of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to the United States [U.S. Code, Vol. 25, Ch. 32, Sec. 3001, Para. 9]), the act unambiguously requires that human remains bear some relationship to a presently existing tribe, people, or culture to be considered Native American and thus eligible for repatriation (Bonnichsen v. United States, 357 F. 3d 962, at

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972 [U.S. Ct. of Appls., 10th Cir., 2004]). Thus, the court denied the tribes claim to shared sovereignty over ancient, off-reservation remains because the Ancient One did not meet a narrow definition of a biologically ancestral relationship to the tribes (Bonnichsen v. United States, 357 F. 3d 962, at 969 [U.S. Ct. of Appls., 10th Cir., 2004]). The remains bear no relationship, the court said, to the Yakama, Nez Perce, Umatilla, or Colvilles, and are not Native American under the terms of NAGPRA (Bonnichsen v. United States, 357 F. 3d 962, at 977 [U.S. Ct. of Appls., 10th Cir., 2004]). In doing so, the court denied to tribes the opportunity to exercise shared sovereignty over the off-reservation landscape by denying the continuity of Native presence on the landscape.8 What the tribes generally seek regarding off-reservation rights is heteronomous political space in which more than one sovereign may exercise jurisdiction in coterminous space and in which political space itself is discontinuous. In this case, however, and distinct from the situation examined in the previous section, in which heteronomy is forced on tribal governments by the federal and state governments as a means of limiting tribal sovereignty, heteronomy has the effect of extending tribal self-determination while limiting the absolute sovereignty of the federal and state governments. Indeed, much of the literature celebrating the liberatory effects of postsovereign or postnational political space cites precisely the kind of shared sovereignty sought by Indian tribes beyond their reservation borders (see, e.g., Ford 2001; Frug 1991; Leitner 2004; Ruggie 1998; Stacy 2003; Young 2000).

A Great Indian Training School. . . . . . .an American Indian Museum. [Josephy et al. 1999: 40 43]
The island was occupied until June 1971 (see Johnson 1996; Johnson et al. 1997). The occupation of Alcatraz stands in contrast to the geography of tribal sovereignty on the reservation homeland and off-reservation shared sovereignty within traditional tribal homelands. Alcatraz was occupied not by members of a single tribe within their tribal homeland, but by a group claiming to represent all American Indian people, a form of identity commonly called panIndianism in the scholarly literature (see, e.g., Hertzberg 1971; Thomas 1968). And just as pan-Indianism represented the invention of a new ethnic group, the American Indian (Thomas 1968:129), so the space claimed by pan-Indians represents the social production of new political space: not a tribal homeland or even a mosaic of different homelands, but a generic Native space of U.S. national dimensions. Alcatraz was seen as just a piece of a national Indian Territory held by American Indian people as a whole, and the cultural institutions that would be built there would speak to all Indian people in the United Statesand perhaps beyond. To the mosaicor actually the archipelagoof tribal homelands would be added continuous, national indigenous space. This geography is notor, not necessarilyinconsistent with tribal sovereignty, but it operates at a different spatial scale in terms of imagined Native community. Historian Frederick Hoxie (2005), in adapting a reading of Paul Gilroys The Black Atlantic (1993) to the case of American Indians, has illuminated this kind of national indigenous geography in his concept of a Red Continent. A brief example illustrates: When I once took a group of Portland State University students to visit Warm Springs Reservation, our host from the tribal administration pointed out that we visitors had entered a different nation, and that all of us, even the Indian students who were not Warm Springs citizens, were aliens. One of my students, an urban Dine (Navajo), took offense at this: Apparently he thought that native space is native space and that he should, as Native, feel at home (in a way nonIndians might not) in the Warm Springs Nation. What my Dine student had in mind was akin to the national indigenous space imagined at Alcatraz, whereas our Warm Springs host was speaking in the language of nation proper (in this case, and at least one other described below, some inconsistency exists between continental indigenous space and tribal sovereignty).9 Although things did not work out quite the way the occupiers at Alcatraz, or anyone else, expected, much of what they planned in 1969 has come to pass in different ways. Native American Studies programs, which were

National indigenous space

In November 1969, a group of 89 American Indians landed on Alcatraz Island with the intention of occupying it. Calling themselves Indians of All Tribes, they claimed the island on the basis of what they called the right of discoveryparodying the so-called doctrine of discovery by which the United States claims its legal title to much of North America: To the Great White Father and All His People: We, the native Americans, re-claim the land known as Alcatraz Island in the name of all American Indians. ... We plan to develop on this island several Indian institutes:

A center for Native American Studies. . . . An American Indian Spiritual Center. . . . An Indian Center of Ecology. . . .

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just starting at the University of California, Berkeley, San Francisco State, the University of California, Los Angeles, and the University of California, Davis, in 1969, now are common as freestanding programs or components in ethnic studies or American studies programs around the United States (see Champagne and Stauss 2002). The National Museum of the American Indian is now open on the Mall in Washington, D.C. These and other developments reflect a consciousness of the common experience of the indigenous in the United States. That my student could take offense at the perceived violation of this indigenous geography is testament to its cultural weight. The geography of national indigenous space has been institutionalized in other ways, too. In 1984, Klamath tribal member Al Smith was fired from his job as a drug counselor with a private drug rehabilitation program in Oregon for ingesting peyote in Native American Church meetings. When Smith applied for unemployment insurance benefits with the state Employment Division, his application was denied on the grounds of his having been fired for misconduct. Under Oregon law at the time, peyote was a controlled substance, an illegal drug, so partaking of peyote, especially by a drug counselor, amounted to employee misconduct. Although most states at the time and the federal government exempted the use of peyote by Indian members of the Native American Church from criminal prohibition, Oregon did not, and the legal question was whether this arrangement was a violation of Smiths first-amendment right to free exercise of religion. The Supreme Court, in its Employment Division v. Smith opinion, answered no, that Oregons drug law had not been specifically directed at persecuting Smiths religion, that it was a neutral law of general applicability that just happened to prohibit what the Native American Church considers a central sacrament (494 U.S. 872, at 879 [1990]). The Oregon law was constitutionally valid, and Indian people had no right to expect to practice their religion wherever they wanted. Although the Court did not specifically say so, the tacit reasoning was that Indian people might presume to practice their religions and other customs on reservations where, generally, state laws do not apply to Indians minding their own business, but outside of reservations, Indians have no special rights simply because they are Indian. After a remarkably organized public information and lobbying effort by the National Congress of American Indians, the Native American Religious Freedom Act Project, and other organizations and individuals (including production and circulation of a video documentary, The Peyote Road [1992]), Congress responded to the Employment Division v. Smith holding with the American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, providing that the use, possession, or transportation of

peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be prohibited by the United States or any State (U.S. Code, Title 42, Ch. 21, Subch. I, Sec. 1996a).10 What this means is that any American Indian, anywhere in the United States, whether on or off any reservation, in any city, in any state, is free to have and use peyote for Native religious purposes. As did the Indians of All Tribes in their occupation of Alcatraz, this law produces a Native space in which Indian people have indigenous rights across the national landscape, not just within reservation enclaves. Similar national indigenous rights for Indians codified in federal law include access to eagle feathers in an exemption from the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (U.S. Code, Title 16, Ch. 5a, Subch. II, Sec. 668a) and the right to a protected status for use of the phrase Indian made in the sale of artwork and crafts (Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, U.S. Code, Title 18, Pt. 1, Ch. 53, Sec. 1159). A critical characteristic of contemporary Native American life is that more Indian people live off reservation than on, mostly in metropolitan areas, partly as a result of the economic pull of such areas, which offer more jobs and higher wages than most reservation economies have any chance of doing. But a historical push was also a factor. Relocationthe goal of moving Indians from reservation to citywas the official policy of the United States from the early 1950s into the 1960s (see Fixico 1986), and one of the underlying goals of relocation, consistent with the larger goal of terminating tribes, was to solve the Indian problem by detribalizing Indians and eradicating both Indians and tribes as legal categories. Thus, not surprisingly, the commonsense understanding of even many Indian people is that urban Indians are somehow less authentically Indian than reservation Indians, perhaps even a kind of second-class tribal citizen (see, e.g., Jackson 2002). At the same time, urban Indians may appear as somehow less authentically urban citizens than other urban residents, merely denizens, akin, perhaps, to immigrants (see Buff 2001). Although the term diaspora is not usually associated with urban Indians, the concept is consistent with much of the prevailing common sense about urban Indians in the United States (see, e.g., Clifford 1997). But this is not the kind of spatial organization of nativeness imagined and claimed at Alcatraz (nor is it the kind of nativeness claimed by some First Nations women in Canada, who see the cities as new territories of rights [Peters 1998:678]). The forms of portable Indian status just examined are meant, among other things, to allow Indians to live in cities, or, indeed, wherever they choose, without giving up their identity or legal status as Indians or their ability or right to practice indigenous cultures. At work is a form of place making that is meant to make Indians at home everywhere

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within the United States. These laws are critical for most urban Indian people not for the specific rights they recognizemost Indian people do not use eagle feathers or peyote or produce Indian-made artwork for salebut for the general principle they reflect: that Indian people do not lose their right to be Indian or their claim to Indianness when they live among non-Indians. This national indigenous geography also opens up possibilities for people who identify themselves as Indians but who are not members of federally recognized tribes (i.e., not card-carrying Indians). If not only a tribal reservation but all of the United States is Native homeland, people who claim descent from Native ancestors but who do not live on a reservation and never have can more easily assert and exercise their Indianness. A serious Native intellectual vision has emerged out of this situation, led by Ward Churchill and M. Annette Jaimes, among others, who ask both why the federal government was and is intent on terminating Indians and tribes via blood quantum requirements and why so many Indian people and tribal governments continue to engage in autogenocide by definitional and statistical extermination (Churchill 1999:56). More important for present purposes, these thinkers imagine a U.S. national Indian population of much more substantial numbers (upward of 15-fold) than those reported by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (Churchill 1999:57; see also Forbes 1990; Jaimes 1992; Stiffarm and Lane 1992). Put differently, what would the United States look like if the indigenous presence was more akin to that in, say, Guatemala (see Warren 1998), Mexico, or Peru? Perhaps not surprisingly, however, this much more populous and geographically national understanding of Native or Indian is not consistent politically with the tribally based sovereignty movementthe Indian national geographic of federally recognized tribesand has been criticized by other Indian thinkers, sometimes harshly, as amounting to an exercise in ethnic fraud.11 To make the transcontinental United States, rather than the reservation, the homeland of Indian people also opens up the meaning of sovereignty in fundamental ways. For example, some Native scholars and tribal intellectuals who are advocates of tribal sovereignty on reservation homelands insist on the importance of essentially going back to indigenous fundamentals or looking inside for keys to tribal survival and the indigenous future (see Porter 1999 for an extended argument). But Robert Warrior (Osage), a faculty member in English at the University of Oklahoma, understands sovereignty as a more open-ended process. Recovering critical insights from Vine Deloria Jr. (Sioux), for example, Warrior writes, Through [a] process-centered definition of sovereignty, Deloria is able to avoid making a declaration as to what contemporary American Indian communities are or are

not. Instead, Deloria recognizes that American Indians have to go through a process of building community and that that process will define the future (1995:91). Warrior quotes from an interview in which Deloria asserts, Everyone doesnt have to do everything that the old Indians did in order to have a modern Indian identity. We dont have to have every male in the tribe do the Sun Dance. We need a larger variety of cultural expression today. I dont see why Indians cant be poets, engineers, songwriters or whatever. I dont see why we cant depart from traditional art forms and do new things. [1995:93] Such indigenous cosmopolitanism necessarily implies that Indians are at least as at home in cities, universities, the entertainment industry and mass media, and so on, as they are on reservations. With national Native space in mind, one should not be surprised to find Indians in unexpected places (Deloria 2004)excelling at the arts, sciences, and letters in and of the dominant society while still being Indian. Thinking expansively about Native space has also, as might be expected, opened up a transnational, continental, or hemispheric perspective among many Indian people. Indian Country Today, the major national American Indian newspaper (available online at http://www. indiancountry.com), regularly covers, not unexpectedly, Canadian First Nations stories, but more interestingly, news from Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, and other southern countries. The International Indian Treaty Council, which was founded in 1974 and describes itself on its World Wide Web homepage as an organization of Indigenous Peoples from North, Central, South America and the Pacific working for the Sovereignty and Self-Determination of Indigenous Peoples and the recognition and protection of Indigenous Rights, Traditional Cultures and Sacred Lands, has as its logo a red silhouette of both New World continents, crossed by a pipe (International Indian Treaty Council n.d.a). The Indian Law Resource Center also works on indigenous rights hemispherically and recently won a case it filed on behalf of two Shoshone women with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (Indian Law Resource Center n.d.a). Both organizations as well as other American Indian organizations and individuals are active with the world indigenous movement, centered at this moment on the adoption of the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (on the draft declaration, see Biolsi 2004; Indian Law Resource Center n.d.b; International Indian Treaty Council n.d.b). But the kind of globalism practiced by both organizations as well as by the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/index.html),

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does not imagine or produce indigenous space beyond individual indigenous nations, and the world indigenous movement is very much akin to an indigenous united nations in which the common colonial situations of each individual and autonomous indigenous nation is recognized but the mosaic of separate and autonomous Native sovereignties is never questioned. And, tellingly, the logo on the front page of every paper issue of Indian Country Today is a silhouette of the United States (actually, only the 48 contiguous states; both Alaska and Hawaii, to say nothing of the Pacific possessions, are excluded) showing reservations in red. Even for this globally aware newspaper, Indian Country apparently stops abruptly at both the northern and southern borders of the contiguous states.12

Hybrid political space

All of the cases of Indian and tribal rights examined so far are, legally speaking, fundamentally different from affirmative action, even though they may seem like a related form of special or race-based rights to some nonIndians. The legal distinction between Indian rights under federal law and the pursuit of civil rights by racial minorities is made plain by a 1974 Supreme Court case, Morton v. Mancari. This was a class-action challenge by white Bureau of Indian Affairs employees to the agencys Indian-preference policy in hiring and promotion, in which the plaintiffs argued that Indian preference violated the prohibitions against racial discrimination in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. In Morton v. Mancari, the Court explained that the preference and other special laws for Indians and tribes are not granted to Indians . . . as a discrete racial group, but, rather as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities (471 U.S. 535, at 554 [1974]). But one would be mistaken in assuming that Indian people or Indian tribes have a stake in federal Indian law but not in state and federal constitutional and other civil rights law, including affirmative action, that would serve to protect individual Indian people and their communities from racial discrimination. American Indians have been U.S. citizens since 1924, and they have invoked civil rights protections repeatedly from even before that time, both on and off the reservation, against tribal governments (see, e.g., Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F. 2d 131 [U.S. Ct. Appls. for the Tenth Cir., 1959]; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 [U.S. Sup. Ct., 1978]; see also Harris 1990; MacKinnon 1987), state governments, and the federal governmentinvolving everything from the rights of the accused to a fair trial to voting rights and affirmative action programs to the rights of a racial minority to a public sphere or civil society that does not constitute a ra-

cially hostile environment (the Smith case described in the previous section is, of course, also an example of civil rights law of critical importance to Indian people). Two examples will indicate the importance of traditional U.S. civil rights law (broadly defined) for Indian people. In 1992, seven individual American Indians filed a petition with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to cancel the trademark registrations of the Washington Redskins football team. Their argument was that the trademarks and images are racially disparaging to American Indians and, therefore, prohibited by the Trademark Act. The Patent Offices Trademark Trial and Appeal Board found in favor of the petitioners in 1998 (Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., Cancellation No. 21,069, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, U.S. Department of Commerce [1998]). Pro-Football, Inc., the owner of the Redskins, appealed to federal district court, and in September 2003, the court held that the petitioners had failed to prove that the trademarks were disparaging to a substantial composite of Native Americans (Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, at 144 [U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia, 2003]). The loss of this case only highlights for Indian people and their allies the greater political vision of racial public respect. Many Indian people and their allies describe this as a fundamental matter of racial justice in U.S. societyof treating everyone equally and not allowing Indian people to be racially insulted when other groups would never be treated with such prejudice. A well-known political cartoon by Thom Little Moon has circulated in Indian newspapers that confrontationally poses the question of what would happen, or how would Americans feel, if Jews or African Americans or Chinese Americans had sports teams named after them (see Figure 4). The point is clear: Indian people intend to

Figure 4. Mascots; by Thom Little Moon. Source: Indian Country Today, January 25 February 1, 1999.

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defend their individual rights to racial equal treatment in both courts of law and the court of mass-mediated public opinion.13 Two critical points about the fight against racist sports mascotsand the issue extends beyond the Redskins to include the Cleveland Indians, the Atlanta Braves, the Fighting Illini of the University of Illinois, and the University of North Dakota Fighting Sioux, among othersare important to note. First, the political space at issue here is not tribal or Native: Rather, this is a matter of U.S. citizens in U.S. territory who happen to be Indian. The political geography is squarely centered in the map of the United States as a (multiracial) nation-state of equal citizens. At work is not just a fight against racist hate speech but also a larger struggle for inclusion in U.S. society, or for cultural citizenshipthe right to be Indian and American at the same time in a truly multicultural society (see Ramirez 2004). Second, although this geography is very different from that of the others examined here in that it is more inclusionary (in a context of multiculturalism or cultural citizenship) than it is indigenous, the anti-defamation movement, as it is called by the National Congress of American Indians (n.d.a), is a celebrated cause among members of that organization itself, tribal governments, individual Indian people both on and off the reservations, and urban Indian organizations such as the American Indian Movement. In other words, tribal citizenship and indigenous identity, on the one hand, and U.S. citizenship and belonging, on the other hand, are not seen as mutually exclusive when the matter is fighting racism against Indian people. Indeed, the ability of Indian people to articulate the very problem of racism and to struggle against it necessarily requires a different scale of political geographythe United States, or Americathan that of the indigenous nation-state-on-the-reservation. My second example concerns Indian voting rights. Prior to the 2000 general election, a voter registration drive targeted all of the reservations in South Dakota, and the Indian vote was credited with the reelection of Democrat Tim Johnson to the U.S. Senate by a slim margin. The lesson was learned by Indian leaders, and the National Congress of American Indians organized Native Vote 2004, an effort to mobilize the American Indian and Alaska Native vote (National Congress of American Indians n.d.b), although the Indian vote in South Dakota was not able to return Democratic minority leader Tom Daschle to the Senate. Both tribal governments and individual Indian people have been keen to enforce Indian voting rights under federal law. In September 2004, the U.S. District Court for South Dakota ruled on a challenge to redistricting by the state brought by four Lakota citizens and voters. Argued for the Indian plaintiffs by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the suit claimed that

District 27, which includes Pine Ridge and Rosebud Reservations (see Figure 5), packs Indian voters into a single district, thereby depriving them and other Indian voters in the neighboring District 26 of the equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice (Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, Civ. 01 3032, Complaint [U.S. District Ct. for South Dakota, 2001]). In other words, the ACLU argued that Districts 26 and 27 are drawn so that Indian voters have a majority only in the district where they are packed (in District 27, Indians are 89 percent of the population; in District 26, Indians presently compose only 39 percent of the population but could well constitute a majority if this district were redrawn to include some of the Indian people now residing in District 27 with a supermajority of Indian voters; Ross 2004). The district court held that illegal packing was, indeed, involved and ordered the state to remedy the situation (Bone Shirt v. Hazeltine, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19265). Beyond voting and officeholding by Indian individuals, tribal governments are also in a position to make campaign contributions that may influence electoral outcomes, particularly when tribes can deploy substantial war chests on the basis of gaming revenues, as, for example, in California and New Mexico (see Mason 2000). Most Indian people do not see dual citizenship the simultaneous claim of rights as American Indians and general civil rights as U.S. citizensas problematic. Neither do most tribal governments or the National Congress of American Indians. As the chairman of the Mohegan Nation put it at the beginning of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Mohegan Tribe is [a] sovereign nation but [a] sovereign loyal to the United States (Indian Country Today 2003: A3). Indians do, after all, serve in the U.S. military and die in U.S. warseven CNN carried the death in Iraq of Hopi soldier Lori Pistewa, the first American Indian woman in the U.S. armed forces killed in combat

Figure 5. South Dakota legislative voting districts; graphic by Thom Little Moon. Adapted from Steinberger 2001: A3. Reprinted with permission of Serenity J. Banks, Lakota Journal editor.

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(see Figure 6). Even Indians on reservations are required to pay federal and some state taxes. The list of the obligations of U.S. citizenship borne by American Indians goes on in this vein, so why should Indians not claim rights as U.S. citizens? What is more, for Indians and tribes not to take U.S. citizenship and participation in the U.S. federal system seriously would be unwise. State and federal legislatures regularly enact laws, or fail to act, impacting the rights and welfare of tribes and Indian peoplethink, for example, of the annual federal Indian budget for the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service and of the necessity for states to approve tribal gaming plans and deliver state welfare programs on reservations so tribes and individual Indians have a direct interest in influencing elections and public policy through voting, campaign contributions, political advertising, and lobbying. Clearly, dual citizenship is a matter of recognizing a hybrid political space in which the simultaneous existence of two nations in the same physical space is naturalized. As discussed above in the case of tribal sovereignty as it actually exists on reservations and that of tribal claims to off-reservation rights, in this hybrid political space the single-point perspective associated both with the modern national citizen and with the exclusive and panoptical jurisdictional gaze of the state (Ruggie 1998:185) is shattered into multiperspectival optics. I do not, by any means, suggest that Indian people do not have situated standpoints on their U.S. citizenship standpoints often at odds with those of other Americans. As is to be expected, September 11, the war on terrorism,

and the war in Iraq are all subjects of intense debate in the Indian public spheremediated by local, regional, and national newspapers, e-mail discussions, tribal council deliberations, and, of course, face-to-face dialogues in Indian communities. One woman on Rosebud Reservation wrote in the local newspaper in March 2003: I believe this war [the invasion of Iraq] has nothing to do with us Lakota people (Todd County Tribune 2003). A friend of mine from Rosebud Reservation, Howard Valandra, wrote the following in an e-mail to a list of Indian recipients in September 2001, putting into writing what must have been in the thoughts of many Indian people: As I watched the newscast of the senseless strike against the World Trade Towers and the federal building in Washington my thoughts and feelings went back generations. In the not too distant past our relatives were attacked while they slept, ate, or sat around talking. The attackers thought our relatives to be bad and probably not worth the bullets shot into them. Our relatives were children, little children, women, elders and protectors. Our relatives cried and wondered how one human could do this to another. The past few days, many, if not most of the people in the Untied States are feeling the bewilderment and anger that has been passed down from generation to generation to me. Time will tell if they are as strong willed as Native people. Echoing the view of many Indian people across the United States, Lakota Journal editor Tim Giago has written repeatedly in his weekly, nationally syndicated column of the long history of terrorism experienced by Indian people at the hands of the United States. Nevertheless, in September 2001, he insisted that as a U.S. veteran he had rightly fought to defend this nation [the United States!] in hopes that war would never come to our shores, and he specifically denied the equivalence of the Wounded Knee Massacre of 1890 and September 11 (Giago 2001; emphasis added). Many, if not most, Indian people also know full well that the overrepresentation of young Indian men and women in the U.S. armed forces is a function of reservation poverty. And many tribal leaders believe that the war on terrorism will be partly paid for with cuts in the federal Indian budgets, even while Indian young men and women fight and die overseas (Bourland 2002). But the (apparent) willingness of most Indian people to take seriously their U.S. citizenship in addition to their tribal citizenshipeven in, or perhaps because of, these most trying of times (see Figure 7)is a noteworthy (and perhaps remarkable) social fact (see Figure 8). But clearly some Indian people see the exercise of dual citizenship as fundamentally undermining Native nationhood. Perhaps the most outspoken Native

Figure 6. The Iraq war; by Marty Two Bulls. Source: Indian Country Today, March 25, 2003.

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flicted upon Indigenous peoples by virtue of that status (1999:174). In other words, Porter is concerned that urban Indians will come to see themselves politically merely as a U.S. racial minority, whose best avenue for seeking justice is U.S. civil rights lawand perhaps coalition with other minoritiesrather than seeing themselves as citizens of sovereign nations. Porter correctly recognizes that the view of racial discrimination as politically actionable presupposes the shared legal, political, and moral space of the United States, where Indian people might assert claims to equal treatment as U.S. citizens. Thus, he not surprisingly goes so far as to urge that Indian people understand much of the oppression they face as national origin, rather than race discrimination (Porter 1999:158). National origin discrimination implies distinct nationalities, not races within a multiracial nation, and in the context of Porters article implies that Indian people might best remedy discrimination not by asserting their rights as Americans, but by disengaging and returning to the placesthe reservationswhere they belong.14
Figure 7. September 11, 2001; by Thom Little Moon. Source: Lakota Journal, September 28 October 4, 2001. Reprinted with permission of Serenity J. Banks, Lakota Journal editor.

Conclusion
This narrative of imagined Native geographies suggests that spatializations are constitutive of subjectivities. To have or to claim particular rightsthat is, to be a political subject of any kindis necessarily to inhabit particular forms of imagined or achievedeven if unstable or contestedpolitical space. Furthermore, although the nation may be a modular form available for pirating, seeing nationalism or modern state-space as hegemonic or obligatory worldviewseither among the privileged or among the subalternwould be an error. The nation

intellectual on this matter is Seneca tribal member and Syracuse University law professor Robert Porter. Like most scholars, Native and non-Native, Porter sees the 1924 act by which Congress unilaterally bestowedor, imposed, depending on ones point of viewcitizenship on Native Americans as part of the project to assimilate Indians and eradicate tribes, not as an exercise in what one would now call inclusion or cultural citizenship in a multicultural nation. But Porter goes further than most in his analysis of dual citizenship: Failure to hold absolute political allegiance toward [only] one nation can compromise ones political loyalty to either or both of the nations of which the individual is a citizen (1999:169). Porter sees dual citizenship as a zero-sum game of political participation in which time spent participating in the American political system is time taken away from participating in the tribal political system (Porter 1999: 173). American citizenship . . . [for] Indigenous peoples undermines the loyalty that one has to ones Indigenous nation, [and] as the commitment of Indigenous citizens to their Indigenous nation diminishes, dual citizenship will have the effect of destroying the Indigenous nation from within (Porter 1999:169 170). Porter is particularly concerned about urban Indians who have left their reservation homelands: In the absence of the need to concern themselves with Indigenous self-government, urban Indians have become increasingly preoccupied with their status as minorities in the American political system and the racism and discrimination that is in-

Figure 8. Swift Bear Community, Rosebud Reservation, South Dakota, August 2000. Photograph by Thomas Biolsi.

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and the modern state may well be weighty culturally and institutionally, both as received social conditions faced by disempowered groups and as critical tools of contestation, but the nation-state is only one among several (perhaps many) geographies generated within the horizon of the modern political imaginary. A critically observant anthropology would see these heteronomous or nonnation-state geographies not as anomalies or exceptions to the nation-state rule, but as concrete realities in which many people live and think about their rights and interests. This leads to questions about place and essentialism. All of the imagined geographies described here are based on deeply primordialist notions of indigenous locations in place. Even the national indigenous space of American Indians is, after all, a place. The challenge for anthropology is to make sense of this specificity of the Native American situation without falling into the trap of Native American or indigenous exceptionalism (no matter how strong the political and disciplinary pressures are in that direction). Toward that end, recognizing the tensions of race and nation for American Indians is important. Obviously from the material examined here, Native nationhood is a critical site of identity and political struggle for Indian people. The American Indian sovereignty movement of the last 30 years has kept this focus on indigenous nation-states at the center of discussions about Indian affairs in the United States. This is no less true of university curricula or scholarly publications on American Indians than it is of the deliberations of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs; tribal sovereignty is a household phrase in both placesas, it is, of course, in Indian households throughout the United States. But no matter how prominent the concept of indigenous sovereignty is in the scholarly literature and curricula of Native American Studies and in the political discourses of Indian people nationally, one would be mistaken in assuming that U.S. civil and constitutional rightsU.S. citizenship rights, legally, politically, and culturallyare not of continuing value and concern to Indian people. After all, in many ways the history and current situation of Native Americans is parallel to that of other racial minorities in the United States. Indian people are harmed by racist media representations and hate speech and by institutional racism and exclusionary practices just as are others who are not white. Indian people are also harmed, or are at risk of being harmed, by current calls for a color-blind society and for a retreat from the social justice envisioned by the civil rights movement. Indian people, thus, cannot afford not to see themselves as a racial minority in a race-stratified society and not to ask how their being brown, or red, or even blackgiven that many people of African ancestry now also claim their Indian ancestry (see, e.g., Brooks

2002)is a condition shared with many other people who are not Indian but who are nonetheless victims of racism, exclusion, denial of full citizenship, and white privilege. And this is true even of Indian people whose contact with non-Indians goes no further than radio, satellite TV, video, or an occasional newspaper or magazine because they will inevitably encounter the deeply racist depictions of Indian people in those media. Indian people, like other people of color, in other words, are necessarily opponents of notions of a color-blind society, or of color-blind social policythat is, a policy blind to racism. As scholars, how could we hope to understand the situation of Native Americans without asking systematic questions about its linkages to the construction of race and the shoring up of white privilege generally? These are questions, however, that the anthropology of Native Americans and interdisciplinary Native American studies have largely yet to pose, much less answer, because of academic fetishizing of individual Indian tribes as sovereign nations (see, for the critique of anthropology [and history] in this regard, Biolsi 1997; Clifford 1988; Dombrowski 2001, 2004; Hoxie 2005; Sider 2003).15 But at the same time, understanding the antinomies of racial identity for Indian people is critical. Although racial identity is, and claims to racial justice are, a potential basis for social remedies and empowerment for Indian people, race also has inescapable pitfalls. Tribal governments have been keen to argue for the past three decades that tribal membership and the rights of tribes and their members are not at all about race-based entitlement within the United States, but about citizenship in aboriginal nations that did not disappear legally when the U.S. polity suddenly (as measured in native time on the continent) appeared on the scene in North America (and this political strategy on the part of tribes goes far toward explaining why anthropologists tend to have the essentializing tendencies we do regarding Indian tribes; after all, we understandably want to be allies, the friends of the Indians). The discourse of tribal nations can, and often is, profoundly at odds with the discourse of Indians as a U.S. racial minority. That is precisely what Porter (1999) argues. After all, many of the opponents of tribal sovereignty have asserted that tribal governments or special laws for Indian people are race based and, therefore, arguably unconstitutional (see, e.g., Citizens Equal Rights Alliance n.d.; One Nation United n.d.). The political danger of Indian entitlement appearing as racial privilege in the prevailing lights of the public sphere is particularly extreme at this time of mania for color blindness. This tension between race and nation discourses, I would argue, is one of the key specificities of the Native American situation in comparison with other disempowered groups in the United States.

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The comparison of Native Americans with (other) U.S. minorities raises the question of the unique legal and political status of American Indians. Anthropologist George Castile (1992), for example, argues that the special legal status of American Indians recognized by the U.S. government works ideologically to set the outer limits on what other racial minorities can expect in the way of justice in the United States. The message in federal law and national Indian policy is this (and here I am paraphrasing the main line of thought): U.S. society will countenance unique legal arrangements for Indian peoplecall them race based, if you likebut this is only because Indians are unique in their indigenousness to the continent, which makes them a special case. The society is even prepared to consider reparations for American Indians, and it has spent many millions of dollars over the years in settlement of land claims by Indian tribes. At this writing the United States has an annual federal budget for Indian affairs of $5.6 billion in the Department of the Interior and the Indian Health Service alone (this does not include the funding earmarked for Indian programs across a range of other federal agencies), which is equivalent to slightly more than $3,000 per federally recognized Indian. But nobody else may expect race-based or any other kind of group-based rights. The society does all of this for Indians only because Indians are a special case. That is the ideological subtext of federal Indian law and policy. In other words, Indian people are made to function as a model minority, not a model of how other minorities should pull themselves up by their own gumption (despite the federal Indian budget and even tribal gaming, Indian people as a group are too poor to serve as that kind of model minority), but a limit model of what other minorities should never expect as a remedy for racism because other minorities are not special cases but are just U.S. citizens like everybody else and should expect no more than anybody else. Indian law and policy do not exist in isolation, and examining their ideological resonances within the larger universe of civil rights struggles in the United States can go a long way toward understanding how the idea of color blindness is secured as a commonsense category in the U.S. public sphere. This kind of critical analysis necessarily takes into its view the geography of Native American politics.

Notes
Acknowledgments. I wrote this article while I was a visiting fellow at the Research Institute of Comparative Studies of Race and Ethnicity (RICSRE) at Stanford University. I thank the institute for its generous support of my research and for creating a rich intellectual environment that made me think harder and better. Earlier drafts of this article were presented at a RICSRE fellows forum, at a meeting of the How Do Identities Matter?

seminar at Stanford, and at the anthropology department at the University of California, Santa Cruz. All three audiences offered valuable comments that I have incorporated into the article. I also want to thank David Nugent, who read the manuscript carefully and, as always, helped me make it better. Finally, I want to thank AE editor Virginia Dominguez for very thoughtful suggestions, and staff associate editor Linda Forman for helping make this article as clear as possible to my readers. I dedicate this article to Noah Shintaro. 1. The complicating factor regarding indigenous groups in Alaska is that the U.S. Supreme Court held in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie (522 U.S. 520 [1998]) that Indian Country (the areas over which Native governments might exercise territorial jurisdiction) was extinguished in Alaska with the enactment of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act in 1971. Thus, even though 227 of the 556 Indian entities recognized by the United States are found in Alaska, their governments have no territorial reach (see Brown 2004). The problem of including Native Hawaii in this analysis is that, although the Native Hawaiian sovereignty movement makes claims that seem reasonably continuous with those examined in this article (see, e.g., Trask 1999), the U.S. government has yet to recognize such claims. There exists, at this writing, only proposed legislation that would provide a process . . . for the Native Hawaiian people to exercise their inherent rights as a distinct aboriginal, indigenous, native community to reorganize a Native Hawaiian governing entity (S. 344, the Akaka Bill; see Kapur 2004). 2. In Mountain View, California, near where I live, young Latinos without papers daily stand on a major thoroughfare, El Camino Real, seeking to get picked up by potential employers driving by and interested in hiring day labor for cash. Workers in one cluster make themselves visibly available for work (by their being male, Latino, and apparently idle) as cars pull out of the local home improvement center parking lot. 3. Much of the violent crime in high-crime areas has always been generated by the state itself because, as in the case of Prohibition, it is the criminalization of the drug trade that produces the violence associated with niches in the underground economy. Although the war on drugs has never done muchand never couldto lessen the production, sale, or consumption of drugs, it has done everything to institutionalize violence in minority communities. Incarceration itself, through the brutality experienced by inmates, acts to reinforce the violent niche of the drug trade, and it is critical to recognize that it is a particular category of citizen who is subjected to the violence of graduated sovereignty in both contexts: young minority men. 4. The interests of the central state in promoting tribal sovereignty of a particular kind has complex causes that include, among other matters, the role of Indians as a buffer race (see Conclusion as well as Castile 1992) and the effectiveness of tribal sovereignty in the neoliberal outsourcing of political responsibility for the welfare of Indian people from the federal government or general, tax-paying citizens to tribal governments and Indians themselves (see Biolsi 2004). 5. Just as bad as such reductions of tribal power through congressional plenary power is federal court recognition of Congress as the gatekeeper of the very statuses of Indian and tribe. Congress has the authority to terminate the federal recognition of tribes, to restore tribes previously terminated, and to recognize tribes that it had not previously recognized. 6. Before 1924, when all American Indians born in the United States were granted U.S. citizenship by an act of Congress, an individual Indian person could become a citizen if he or she was declared competent to manage his or her personal affairs by the Secretary of the Interior (see Biolsi 1995).

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7. The president also signed an executive order in 1996 on Indian sacred sites, which requires federal agencies managing federal lands to find ways to accommodate access to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites by Indian religious practitioners; and . . . avoid adversely affecting the physical integrity of such sacred sites (Clinton 1996). 8. Historical continuity is one of the criteria that the federal government seems to require persistently of polities that would claim to be Indian tribes (see Clifford 1988; Sider 2003). 9. From a tribal sovereignty standpoint, nonmember Indians are as alien as are non-Indians. This issue was raised in the case of Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project, in which a Hopi claimed that his U.S. federal civil right to protection from national origin discrimination by employers was violated when a (non-Indian) company operating on the Navajo Reservation and subject to tribal jurisdiction gave employment preferences to Navajos under the requirements of Navajo tribal law. Although from the point of view of the Navajo Nation, this was analogous to federal government regulation of foreign workers under immigration employment law, to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit it was federally prohibited discrimination (154 F. 3d 1117). 10. Congresss first response to Employment Division v. Smith was the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which recognized that laws neutral toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise (107 Stat 1488). The act restore[d] the compelling interest test, which would require that the federal and state governments not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling justification. This act, however, was overturned by the Supreme Court in 1997 in City of Boerne v. Flores (521 U.S. 507). For complex historical reasons, tribal governments now view Congress, in particular, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, chaired at this writing by Republican John McCain (Arizona) and vice-chaired by Democrat Byron Dorgan (North Dakota), as a reliable ally with a commitment to tribal sovereignty. By contrast, the Supreme Court is viewed as a more dangerous and unpredictable branch of government, a branch that has undermined tribal sovereignty in fundamental ways since 1978. 11. The controversy over individual Indian identity is closely related to the controversy among Indian people over the federal recognition of specific tribes that have not heretofore enjoyed such recognition (unrecognized tribes; see Sider 2003). 12. The degree to which this boundary drawing is naturalized among those who think often and hard about Indian affairs in the United States was made plain to me when Anna Tsing pointed out that I had not even noticed that the boundaries of Indian Country Today are conterminous with U.S. national borders. 13. In September 2004, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed a bill that would have prohibited the use of Redskins as a team name in public schools. 14. For a compelling account of the differences between rights based on citizenship in Native nations, on the one hand, and civil rights, on the other hand, see Deloria 1985. 15. Regarding Native American Studies, however, it is important to recognize the strategic function of tribal essentialism, something not relevant in the case of anthropology or history (see, e.g., Cook-Lynn 1997).

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