Review: [untitled] Author(s): B. Malinowski Reviewed work(s): Les Formes lmentaires de la Vie Religieuse. Le Systme Totmique en Australie.

(Bibliothque de Philosophie Contemporaine) by E. Durkheim Source: Folklore, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Dec., 1913), pp. 525-531 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of Folklore Enterprises, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1255655 Accessed: 05/11/2008 12:59
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RE VIE WS.
Le DE VIE RELIGIEUSE. Systeme ELUMENTAIRES LA LESFORMES Australie. (Bibliothequede Philosophie ConTotemique en Paris: Felix Alcan, I912. temporaine.) Par E. DURKHEIM. Carte. iofr. 8vo, pp. 647. IT is superfluousto drawthe attention of students to the importance of Prof. Durkheim'snew work,for the appearanceof a large volume from the pen of the leader of the French sociological school is a scientific event. The group of savants connected with l'Annde Sociologique achieved remarkablesuccess in dealing has with problems in primitive religion, and we have to thank it especially for the essays of MM. Hubert and Mauss on Sacrifice and Magic, ahd the articles of M. Durkheim on the Definition of Religious Phenomena, Classificationsin Primitive Thought, and Totemism, and of M. Hertz on FuneraryRites. To Prof. Durkheim the religious is the social par excellence. The distinctive characters of social and religious phenomena practically coincide. The social is defined, in R?gles de la rnltiode sociologique, its "exteriority to individual minds,"by by its " coercive action" upon individual minds; the religious,which is also "external" to individual minds, by its "obligatoriness.'' It is obvious, therefore, that the present volume is of special importance,being the systematicand final expression of the best organized sociologicalschool extanton a subjectspeciallyimportant to, and speciallywell-mastered this school. by, There is yet another reason why this book should particularly arouse the interest of the sociologist. It is Prof. Durkheim'sfirst
1 See "Sur la Definition des phenomenes religieux," in l'Ann6e Sociologique vol. ii.

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attempt to treat a "problem of origins" of such a fundamental and general social phenomenon as religion. In his methodological work, Regles de la mithode sociologique, he has strenuously

insisted upon the treatment of social phenomena "as things," upon the necessityof excludingall forms of psychologicalexplanations fromsociology.2 This postulateundoubtedly appearsto many a rule rather artificial and barren in its practicalapplications,who preferpsychological and especiallyto Britishanthropologists, of origins; and this volume enablesus to judge as to explanations the success of his method. The book has several aspects and aims. It attempts to state the essential and fundamentalelements of religion, being thus a revisionof the author'sformerdefinitionof thereligious; it investigates the origins of religion; it gives a theory of totemism; and it is designed as a substantialcontributionto philosophy. All these problemsM. Durkheim seeks to solve by an analysis of the beliefs of practically one single tribe,the Arunta. His keen eye detects in the facts we owe to Messrs. Spencer and Gillen much that is not patent to a less acute mind, and his researches through their two volumes, completed by the records made by Mr. Strehlow,yield him an abundant crop of theoretical results. Nevertheless, to base most far-reachingconclusions upon practically a single instance seems open to veryserious objections. It is extremelydangerous to accept any people as "the absolutely or primitivetype of mankind," as "the best exampleof elementary forms of social organization and creed,"and to forego the verification of conclusions by other available instances. For example, when M. Durkheim,in trying to determinethe fundamentalaspect of religion,finds it in an universaland absolutebipartitionof men, (pp. things,and ideas into "sacreet profane," 50 et seq.),hemayrefer to a well-knownpassage by the Australianethnographers,3 and, in fact, a sharpdivision of all things into religiousand non-religious seems to be a very marked feature of the social life of Central Australian natives. But is it universal? I feel by no means persuaded. In reading the detailed monographby Dr. and Mrs. Seligmannabout the Veddas,no such divisionis suggestedas exist2

Op. cit., Table of Contents, cap. ii. 3 The Aorthern Tribesof Central Australia, p. 33.

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ing among that extremelyprimitive people. Again, it would be difficult to maintain the existence of such a separation amongst the Melanesian peoples of whom we have very copious records. This may be due to a gap in our information,but, anyhow,it is not admissible to base a system upon a mere assumption,instead of on certainknowledge. One does not feel quite easy, also, about the assumption of totemism being the elementaryform of religion (liv. I, cap. iv.), especially as here again we find the investigationlimited to the beliefs of the CentralAustralians. Prof. Durkheim's theory of totemism is that the essence of totemism lies in the totemic symbol and badge, and that the sacredness of the totem is derived from the sacredness of the badge. A reconsideration, from this new point of view, of the problem of totemism, grown slightly wearisome owing to "totemic hyper-production"in recent times, cannot fail to be stimulating. M. Durkheim and his school accept, as is wellknown,Dr. Marett'stheoryof preanimism. The totemicprinciple, the totemic force, is for Prof. Durkheim akin in nature to mana. This principle,inherentin the firstplace in the totemic badgeand symbol, then in the species, and then in the clansmen, is thus explained:-" Le dieu du clan, le principe totemique, ne peut donc etre autre chose que le clan lui-meme, mais hypostasie et representeaux imaginationssous les especes sensibles du vegetal ou de l'animalqui sert de totem " (p. 295). Undoubtedly this is a in veryinterestingconceptionof religion,foreshadowed ourauthor's formerworks, in which so much stress is laid on the social nature of the religious,-but here plainly expressedfor the firsttime. M. Durkheimproceeds to show how it comes aboutthat society is the real substance,the materiaprima, of the human conception of divinity. " Une societe a tout ce qu'il faut pour eveiller dans les esprits,par la seule action qu'elle exerce sur eux, la sensation du divin; car elle est a ses membres ce qu'un dieu est a ses fideles" (]bid.). Again, "parce qu'elle a une nature qui lui est propre,differentede notre natured'individu,elle poursuitdes fins qui lui sont egalement speciales; mais, comme elle ne peut les atteindre que par notre intermediaire,elle reclame imperieusement notre concours" (Ibid.). Let us note that here society is

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conceived to be the logical subjectof the statement; an active being endowed with will, aims, and desires. If we are not to take it as a figure of speech (and M. Durkheim decidedly does not give it as such), we must label it an entirely metaphysicalconception. Society conceived as a collective being, endowed with all propertiesof individualconsciousness,will be rejected even by those sociologists who accept a "collective consciousness"in the sense of a sum of conscious states (as it is accepted, for example, by Messrs. McDougall, Ellwood, Davis, and, partly, by Simmel and Wundt). But, a few pages further, read a statementwhich we seems to allow of anotherinterpretation. Speakingof "manieres d'agirauxquelles la societe est assez fortement attachee pour les imposer a ses membres,"he says, " Les representationsqui les expriment en chacun de nous ont done un intensite a laquelle des etats de conscience purement prives ne sauraientatteindre; car elles sont fortesdes innombrablesrepresentations individuelles qui ont servia formerchacuned'elles. C'estla societe qui parlepar la bouche de ceux qui les affirmenten notre presence" (p. 297). Here we stand before a dilemma: either this phrase means that "social ideas " possess a specific character,because the individual who conceives them has the consciousness of being backed up by society in his opinion, in which case the statement is perfectly empirical; or the statement implies the conception of a nonempiricalaction of society upon the individual consciousness,in which case it conveys no scientific meaning. The writer expresses himself again on the subject, from the genetic point of view,-"En un mot, quand une chose est l'objet d'un etat de l'opinion,la representationqu'en a chaque individu tient de ses origines, des conditions dans lesquelles elle a pris naissance,une puissance d'action que sentent ceux-la memes qui ne s'y soumettentpas " (p. 297). Here the authorstands in front of the real problem. What are these specific social conditions in which arise "social consciousness,"and consequently religious ideas ? His answeris that these conditions are realizedwhenever society is actuallygathered,in all big social gatherings:-"Au sein d'une assemblee qu'echauffe passioncommune,nous devenons une susceptiblesde sentimentset d'actesdont nous sommesincapables quand nous sommes reduits a nos seules forces, et quand l'assem-

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blee est dissoute, quand, nous retrouvantseul avec nous-memes, nous retombons a notre niveau ordinaire,nous pouvons mesurer alors toute la hauteur dont nous avions ete souleve au-dessus de
nous-meme" (p. 299).

This answeris somewhat disappointing. First of all, we feel a little suspicious of a theory which sees the origins of religion in crowd phenomena. Again, from the point of view of method, we are at a loss. Above we had been dealing (with some difficulties) with a transcendentalcollective subject, with a "society which was the creatorof religiousideas ": "Au reste, tant dans le present que dans l'histoire, nous voyons sans cesse la societe creer de toutes pieces des choses sacrees" (p. 304). Then society was the divinity itself, i.e. it was not only creator,but the object of its creation, or at least reflected in this object. But here society is no more the logical and grammaticalsubject of the metaphysical assertions,but not even the object of these assertions. It only furnishesthe externalconditions, in which ideas about the divine may and must originate. Thus Prof. Durkheim'sviews present fundamentalinconsistencies. Society is the source of religion,the origin of the divine; but is it " origin " in the sense that "the collective subject . . . thinks and creates the religious ideas"? This wouldbe a metaphysicalconceptiondeprivedof anyempirical meaning; or is society itself the "god," as is implied in the statement that the "totemic principle is the clan,"thought under the aspect of a totem ? That reminds one somewhat of Hegel's Absolute, "thinking itself" under one aspect or another. Or, finally, is society, in its crowd-aspect,nothing more than the atmospherein which individualscreate religious ideas ? The last is the only scientificallyadmissible interpretationof the obscure manner in which M. Durkheim expounds the essence of his theories. Let us see how our author grappleswith actual and concrete problems,and which of the three versions of " origins" just mentioned he applies to the actual facts of Australiantotemism. He starts with the remark alreadyquoted about the double form of the social life of the CentralAustralian tribesman. The natives go through two periodically changing phases of dispersion and agglomeration. The latter consist chiefly, indeed, almost ex-

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clusively, of religiousfestivities. This correspondsto the abovementioned statement that crowd originatesreligion: "Or, le seul fait de l'agglomeration agit comme un excitant exceptionellement Une fois les individus assembles, il se degage de leur puissant. rapprochementune sorte d'electricitequi les transportevite a un d'exaltation.... On congoit sans peine que, degre extraordinaire a cet etat d'exaltation... l'homme ne se connaisse plus. parvenu Se sentantdomine,entraineparune sortede pouvoirexterieur le qui fait penser et agir autrement qu'en temps normal,il a naturellement l'impression de n'etre plus lui-meme. II lui semble etre devenu un etre nouveau: les decorations dont il s'affuble,les sortes de masquesdont il se recouvrele visage figurentmateriellement cette transformation interieure, plus encore qu'ils ne contribuenta la determiner... tout se passe, comme s'il etait reellement transportedans un monde special, entierement different de celui ou il vit d'ordinaire.... C'est donc dans ces milieux sociaux effervescentset de cette effervescence meme que parait etre nee l'idee religieuse. Et ce qui tend a confirmerque telle en est bien l'origine, c'est que, en Australie, l'activite proprement religieuseest presquetout entiere concentreedans les momentsou se tiennent ces assemblies " (pp. 308, 312, 313). To sum up, theories concerning one of the most fundamental aspects of religion cannot be safely based on an analysis of a single tribe, as described in practically a single ethnographical work. It should be noted that the reallyempiricalversion of this theory of origins is by no means a realizationof the "objective" method, in which M. Durkheim enjoins treating social facts as things and avoiding individual psychological interpretations. In his actual theory he uses throughout individual psychological explanations. It is the modificationof the individual consciousness in big gatherings, the "mental effervescence,"which is assumed to be the source of "the religious." The sacred and divine are the psychologicalcategories governing ideas originated in religiouslyinspiredcrowds. These ideas are collective only in so far as they are general, ie. common in all members of the crowd. None the less we arriveat understandingtheir natureby individual analysis, by psychological introspection, and not by treatingthose phenomenaas "things." Finally, to trace back the

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seems origins of all religious phenomena to crowd manifestations to narrowdown extremelyboth the forms of social influenceupon religion, and the sources from which man can draw his religious inspiration. "Mental effervescence" in large gatherings can hardlybe accepted as the only source of religion. But, while one is bound to criticizecertainpoints of principlein Prof. Durkhein's work, it must be added that the work contains in a relativelysmall bulk such thorough analyses of theories of religious facts,-several of which, of first-rate importance, are original contributionsby Prof.Durkheim or his school,-as could only be given by one of the acutest and most brilliant living sociologists, and that these by themselves would makethe book a contributionto science of the greatestimportance.
B. MALINOWSKI.

THE LOST An LANGUAGE SYMBOLISM. enquiryinto the origin OF of certain letters, words, names, fairy-tales,folk-lore, and BAYLEY.2 vols. Williams & mythologies. By HAROLD Norgate, i912. 8vo, pp. x+375, viii+388. Ill. 25s. n. A RECENT Chinese minister to this country contended, in a magazine article, that Europe would soon follow the example of China, abandon all attempts to representby writingthe temporary sound of words, and base a universal written language of the future upon pure symbols of ideas. However this may be, it is certainly the case that in the last generationand a half there have appeareda host of workson emblems and symbols, of which the best-known are those of Inman, Goblet d'Alviella, and F. E. Hulme. During the current year several additions have been made of books on animal and floralsymbolismin architecture and art. The present volumes have a much more ambitiousaim than these departmentalstudies, for their publishers claim that they "will be for Symbolism what Frazer's Golden Bough is for Religious Anthropology"! To many minds symbolismis a fascinating study, and to some it is a dangerousone by its temptationto read reconditemeanings into simple signs and scribbles,and to find a lofty philosophy in the crude designs of the savage. Where the symbol-users far are