Matters to Consider Before Commencing Action

Preliminary matters
- 7 key areas that must be sorted through carefully first: The effects of ignoring these considerations include not
only having your case thrown out, but also being liable to disciplinary proceedings.

LOCUS STANDI

Locus standi: Plaintiff’s locus standi

- • Does Plaintiff have the locus standi to sue? – must be looked at carefully!
– Party to the contract - privity
- in other areas, may be problematic -
– Title over the property in dispute An example is the issue of whether an individual has the legal right to a
copyright. One must not assume that his client has the property right in the copyright.
– Equitable assignment of copyright (IP) – prob because if don’t contract properly with legal owner of cpr,
beneficial owner may have no recourse and may require seom other reative work to get cause of action started
in court
– Right to possession over property
– Who suffered the loss? – tort only completed where person suffers loss. In tort claims, it is vital to determine
who is the party that suffered the ‘loss’. (c/f in contract – where we deal with expectant loss)

Locus Standi: correct defendant

- • Who is the correct Defendant to sue?
- Esp where time bar applies. Eg in runner cases – 3yrs may be actually very short, may have passed. Who you
sue is impt. By the time you decide correct party, may be too late!
- – Who is the contract with? E.g. who is the employer – grp companies may also be a prob – diff pple work in
idff companies at diff pts in time and may have different contracts ie diff employers so who to sue? (i.e.:
Employment contract - who is the employer of your client) Example: When Japanese MNCs sent an employee
to work for another company, the employment contract continues to be with the MNC, and not the company to
which the employee was seconded. It is important to determine who is the employer in the contract of
employment.
- Who is principal/agent? – disclosed vs undisclosed principal. If join too many parties unnec, issues of cost
arise
- Who are the partners? Note that in a partnership, the partners change very often
- Joint tortfeasors – open to you to join all tortfeasors, play safe and let them run the defence. There may be
serious factual disputes that you cannot resolve. Cost orders may be complicated – someone may become
insolvent. Eg if inter se def to pay each other, then plaintiff not at risk if one goes bust, but plaintiff may take
credit risk of one party going bust if sue alterantive defendants. It is important not to neglect joining all the
tortfeasors in the action, as there is a 3 years limitation period.
- Alternative defendants If you do not know which company to sue, can sue in the alternative.
Yap Boon Sim v. Dr Lee Meng Kuan [2001] 1 SLR 407
- Facts: In this case, the plaintiff was the wife of the deceased, and she had commenced an action against the
defendants less than 6 months after the death of her husband – but before she had extracted the letters of
administration. (In most cases, the widow would have applied for the letters of administration, and would
therefore have the power to commence an action in the deceased spouse’s name.)
- Argument: Whether S.20(4) Civil Law Act should be given a conjunctive or disjunctive interpretation. It was
argued that the plaintiff was starting legal action even though she had not applied for the letters of
administration – so she had no locus standi
- Lai Siu Chiu J held: That the 2 limbs in S.20(4) Civil Law Act should be read disjunctively. The plaintiff was
not prevented from commencing the action by lack of locus standi. This mere irregularity should not prevent
the plaintiff from suing.

Steven Phoa Cheng Loon & Ors v. Highland Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors [2000] 4 MLJ 200

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- • Facts: Some of the Plaintiffs had assigned their rights and interest in their apartments to various financial
institutions. The apartment block collapsed and the Plaintiffs brought a suit against the defendants for
negligence. Bank takes mortgage but not total title – title passes nearer ompletion. Bet time of purchase and
completion, lag period where title belongs to developer but have already bought equitable interest. So in this
context – title not fully passed.
- Issue: How then could the purchaser sue when he does not have the title?
- • Argument: Whether the Plaintiffs’ rights had been assumed by the financial institutions and thus had no legal
ownership of, or possessory title to the property concerned when the loss or damage occurred.
o => no locus standi to sue
- Held : James Foong J; court sympathetic. On a literal interpretation, there was an assignment of all the
plaintiffs’ rights in the property to the financial institutions. However, he construed the assignment as being an
equitable mortgage or charge – that the Plaintiffs had not assigned their interests absolutely to the financial
institutions. As such, Plaintiffs did have locus standi to pursue the claim.
o Construing the assignment, it was in the nature of an equitable mortgage or charge. Construed in
nature of security arrangement. true intent of banks was to take security and not title. =>
o he Plaintiffs had not assigned their interests absolutely to the financial institutions.
o As such, Plaintiffs did have locus standi to pursue the claims.
CAUSE OF ACTION
• Elements of legal liability
- • Creativity with causes of action – merely because seldom used does not mean that they do not
apply. We should think ‘creatively’ about all the causes of action available; determine which are the
best causes of action to pursue. (i.e.: economic torts / restitution / breach of statutory, fiduciary duty
etc.)
 – e.g. economic torts – eg conspiracy: can bring inother tortfeasors who may not on the face of it seem liable
/restitution – seems an amorphous concept. Judges also not very clear. Usually concept of unjust enrichnment.
This is how law can develeop and causes of action be used to surmount potential probs in pleadings! /breach of
statutory duty
 More facts required/facts require clarification – factual matrix very impt. Documents must be construed, gaps
filled in, case theory developed. Also to make sure that can stand up to cross examination. Now practice of
having affidavits is good, lawyer knows what witneses will say. By determining the full facts from the client,
you can better determine the best cause of action to pursue.

LIMITATION PERIOD
 • Personal injury - 3 years
 • Action on judgment - 12 years
 • Judgment interest - 6 years
 • Recovery of land - 12 years
 It is important to note that the limitation period depends on the type of case. In some cases, parties may
contract from an extension of the limitation period.

• General rule - section 6 Limitation Act

• 6 years from date on which cause of action accrued :
(1) Contract claims
(2) Tort claims
(3) Enforcement of award
(4) Action to recover money by virtue of any written law other than penalty or forfeiture
Note: This general rule applies to non-injury claims. The limitation period for personal injury claims is 3 years.

Limitation of actions of contract and tort and certain other actions.

6. —(1) Subject to this Act, the following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the
date on which the cause of action accrued:
(a) actions founded on a contract or on tort;
(b) actions to enforce a recognizance;
(c) actions to enforce an award;

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(d) actions to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any written law other than a penalty or forfeiture or sum
by way of penalty or forfeiture.
(2) An action for an account shall not be brought in respect of any matter which arose more than 6 years before
the commencement of the action.
(3) An action upon any judgment shall not be brought after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the
judgment became enforceable and no arrears of interest in respect of any judgment debt shall be recovered after
the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the interest became due.
(4) An action to recover any penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of penalty or forfeiture recoverable by virtue of
any Act or other written law shall not be brought after the expiration of one year from the date on which the
cause of action accrued.
(5) For the purposes of subsection (4), “penalty” shall not include a fine to which a person is liable on conviction
for a criminal offence.
(6) Nothing in this section shall apply to —
(a) any cause of action within the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court which is enforceable in rem other than
an action to recover the wages of seamen; or
(b) any action to recover money secured by any mortgage of or charge on land or personal property.
(7) Subject to sections 22 and 32, this section shall apply to all claims for specific performance of a contract or for
an injunction or for other equitable relief whether the same be founded upon any contract or tort or upon any trust
or other ground in equity
Limitation Act - s 24A – key exception.

Section 24A Limitation Act deals with time limits for negligence, nuisance and breach of duty actions in respect
of latent injuries and damage.
 Section 24A allows for extension of the limitation period if one can prove that he had no knowledge of the
injury:
 Extension of limitation period. For limitations, usually to advise on whether any exceptns apply
 Section 24A - (Amended wef 26/6/1992)
 • where injury or damage is latent

Time limits for negligence, nuisance and breach of duty actions in respect of latent injuries and damage.
24A. —(1) This section shall apply to any action for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty
(whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or of a provision made by or under any written law or
independently of any contract or any such provision).
(2) An action to which this section applies, where the damages claimed consist of or include damages in respect
of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person, shall not be brought after the expiration of —
(a) 3 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued; or
(b) 3 years from the earliest date on which the plaintiff has the knowledge required for bringing an action for
damages in respect of the relevant injury, if that period expires later than the period mentioned in paragraph (a).
(3) An action to which this section applies, other than one referred to in subsection (2), shall not be brought after
the expiration of the period of —
(a) 6 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued; or
(b) 3 years from the earliest date on which the plaintiff or any person in whom the cause of action was vested
before him first had both the knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in respect of the relevant
damage and a right to bring such an action, if that period expires later than the period mentioned in paragraph
(a).
(5) Knowledge that any act or omission did or did not, as a matter of law, involve negligence, nuisance or breach
of duty is irrelevant for the purposes of subsections (2) and (3).
(6) For the purposes of this section, a person’s knowledge includes knowledge which he might reasonably have
been expected to acquire —
(a) from facts observable or ascertainable by him; or
(b) from facts ascertainable by him with the help of appropriate expert advice which it is reasonable for him to
seek.
(7) A person shall not be taken by virtue of sub-section (6) to have knowledge of a fact ascertainable only with
the help of expert advice so long as he has taken all reasonable steps to obtain (and, where appropriate, to act on)
that advice.

• Latent personal injury

– (if after 3 years), 3 years from date when Plaintiff had knowledge of injury

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- Latent ‘Personal Injury’ Cases (normal limitation period is 3 years): After the 3 years have lapsed, if the
plaintiff obtained knowledge of the injury, he has 3 years from the date of obtaining such knowledge to pursue
the action:
- s24A.2

• Other damage
– (if after 6 years), 3 years from date when Plaintiff had knowledge of damage

- ‘Other Types of Damage’ Cases (normal limitation period is 6 years): After the 6 years have lapsed, if the
plaintiff obtained knowledge of the damage, he has 3 years from the date of obtaining such knowledge to
pursue the action:

 s 24A (4)
o Knowledge – room for arg as to when he knew or ought to have known
o – knowledge which he might reasonably have been expected to acquire :

24A(4) In subsections (2) and (3), the knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in respect of the
relevant injury or damage (as the case may be) means knowledge —
(a) that the injury or damage was attributable in whole or in part to the act or omission which is alleged to
constitute negligence, nuisance or breach of duty;
(b) of the identity of the defendant;
(c) if it is alleged that the act or omission was that of a person other than the defendant, of the identity of that
person and the additional facts supporting the bringing of an action against the defendant; and
(d) of material facts about the injury or damage which would lead a reasonable person who had suffered such
injury or damage to consider it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a
defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment.

Section 24A(6) provides that “knowledge” refers to that which the plaintiff might reasonably have been expected
to acquire:
(i) From facts observable or ascertainable
(ii) From facts ascertainable with the help of an appropriate expert, which it is reasonable for him to seek help
from. (Time bar begins after expert hired/give report. E.g. leaking ceiling, hire expert to ascertain where
exactly it is leaking. Thus it is latent.)

MFH Marine Pte Ltd v. Asmoniah bin Mohamad [2000] 4 SLR 368
Facts:
- Plaintiff suffered injuries at work and shortly after made a claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
The Commissioner for Labour only replied a year later, rejecting his claim for compensation.
- • Only at this point in time did the Plaintiff learn that he could bring a civil action against his employers. •
- He subsequently filed a writ against his employers 3 years and 10 months after the accident.
Argument:
- the action was time barred under the Limitation Act.
 District Judge: Held that the Plaintiff should not be time barred since the Commissioner took so long to reply
him. Rajendran J (on appeal) reversed the decision of the District Judge.
Held : S Rajendran J
 • 1) The meaning of the word “knowledge” in s 24A (2)(b) of the Limitation Act is confined to the four
categories specified under s 24A (4)(a) to (4)(d).
 • 2) Ignorance of the right to commence civil proceedings does not entitle the Plaintiff to rely on the extended
limitation period available under section 24A (2)(b). ignorance of fact of damage is different!

Limitation Period - s 24B

 Extension is not forever
 • Long stop date
- – section 24B, maximum period of timebar is 15 years from accrual of cause of action (This applies even if
the Plaintiff only knew of the injury or damage only 15 years later.)

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Overriding time limit for negligence, nuisance and breach of duty actions involving latent injuries and
damage.
24B. —(1) An action for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty to which section 24A applies shall
not be brought after the expiration of 15 years from the starting date.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1),
"starting date" means the date (or, if more than one, from the last of the dates) on which there occurred any act or
omission —
(a) which is alleged to constitute negligence, nuisance or breach of duty; and
(b) to which the injury or damage in respect of which damages are claimed is alleged to be attributable (in whole
or in part).
(3) This section bars the right of action in a case to which subsection (1) applies notwithstanding that the cause of
action has not yet accrued before the end of the period of limitation prescribed by this section.

Limitation Act - Accrual of cause of action

Wilkinson v. Verity [1971] LR 6 CP 206

- Facts: Goods bailed to Defendant by Plaintiff for safekeeping. The Defendant wrongfully sold them. 6 years
after sale, the Plaintiff demanded return of goods.
- Held: In action for detinue [wrongful detainment], the cause of action accrues from the date of demand and
refusal, and not from the date goods bailed were sold.

Cartledge v E Jopling & Sons Ltd [1963] 1 All ER 341

- Abstract: An action for negligence accrues as soon as any damage (not being insignificant) is suffered. It
matters not that the plaintiff did not know of the damage or that medical science could not have discovered it
at that stage. The plaintiff steel dressers employed by the defendants contracted pneumoconiosis and issued
writs for damages for negligence and breach of statutory duty. They failed to establish any breach of duty by
the defendants within the six years before the writs were issued and it was proved that they all had the disease
more than six years before, though one of them had then suffered no serious damage to his lungs.
- Summary: Held, that all the actions were statute barred.

Pirelli General Cable Works Ltd v Oscar Faber & Partners [1983] 1 All ER 65
- Abstract: The date of accrual of a cause of action in tort for damage caused by the negligent design of a
building is the date the damage came into existence. P engaged D to design a factory chimney for them in
1969. Due to design faults P discovered serious damage in 1977 and it was found that they could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered it before 1972. They issued a writ claiming damages for negligence. D
pleaded the Limitation Act 1939.
- Summary: Held, allowing D's appeal, that time began to run from the date the damage came into existence, not
from when it could have been discovered (Cartledge v. E. Jopling & Sons [1963] A.C. 758 applied)

Seow Teck Ming & Anor v Tan Ah Yeo & Anor [1991] SLR 169
- The respondents were personal representatives of one Tay who died in a collision between a motor sampan
belonging to the second appellant Lim and a bumboat belonging to one of the respondents. They claimed
damages against the appellants on behalf of Tay’s dependants and estate. The writ was issued on 30 April
1981, almost three years after the collision. A date of hearing was fixed for 4 August 1988. However, on 26
July 1988, the appellants’ solicitors took out further directions to amend the defence to add the defence of
limitation based on s 8 of the Maritime Conventions Act 1911 (‘MCA 1911’). If applicable, this would have
barred the action upon the expiry of two years from the date of the collision. The assistant registrar gave leave
to amend the defence. The appeal against this decision was initially dismissed, but after hearing further
arguments, the judge allowed the appeal. Civil Appeal. No 76 of 1989 (the first appeal) was the appellants’
appeal against this order. Immediately after the appellants were given leave to amend their defence, the
respondents took out a notice of motion for an order to try the issue as to whether s 8 of the MCA 1911 applied
to this action, and if it did, for an order that the limitation period be extended and the respondents be allowed
to proceed with the action. The judge held that s 8 of the MCA 1911 applied to the action but refused leave to
extend time. The second appeal, Civil Appeal No 18 of 1989, was the respondents’ appeal against this
decision. The two appeals were heard together.
- Held, dismissing the first appeal and making no order on the second appeal:
- (1) In this case, the negligence, if any, of the respondents’ solicitors lay not in giving advice or drafting a
document but in commencing a worthless action. It was entirely foreseeable that the appellants would plead

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 limitation. The action was worthless when commenced as it was time-barred, and would only acquire some
value if the appellants failed to plead limitation at all. The respondents suffered damage when their solicitors
commenced a defeasible action.
- (2) The respondents would, therefore, be prejudiced if the appellants were granted leave to amend their
defence at this stage of the proceedings as whatever claim they may have had against their solicitors for
negligence was time-barred. The loss of the opportunity to pursue a viable claim was sufficient prejudice to
debar the appellants from obtaining leave to amend their defence.
- (3) The judge’s decision not to extend the limitation period was wrong. Although the prejudice to the
respondents was a post-writ factor, it had to be taken into account in an application for extension of the
limitation period under the MCA 1911. The judge adopted too narrow a view of the ambit of s 8 in limiting the
relevant factors only to those occurring before the issue of the writ. The relevant factors must be those
obtaining at the time the application was made or heard. Whether or not an extension of time ought to be
granted under s 8 of the MCA 1911 depended on the circumstances of each case; they need not be exceptional
or special.

Aberdeen Asset Management Asia v Fraser & Neave [2001] 4 SLR 441
- Pursuant to a suit commenced against the appellants (‘A & Y’) by the respondents (‘F & N’), the assistant
registrar held that a letter published by A & Y contained words that were defamatory of F & N. A & Y
appealed, and on 21 March 2001, the judge-in-chambers found the words to be defamatory, but modified
slightly the defamatory meaning from that determined by the assistant registrar (the ‘judge’s decision’). On
27 March 2001, A & Y’s solicitors requested for further arguments on the basis that the order made by the
judge was an interlocutory order, pursuant to s 34(1)(c) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1999
Ed). On 18 April 2001, the solicitors were informed that the judge did not require further arguments. On
8 May 2001, A & Y filed their notice of appeal against the judge’s decision.
- F & N sought to strike out the notice on the ground that it was filed out of time. It argued that under O 57
r 4(a) of the Rules of Court, A & Y had to file their notice within one month from the date of the judge’s
decision, ie, by 21 April 2001.
- A & Y sought an extension of time so that the notice, even if out of time, would remain valid. It contended that
s 34(1)(c) and O 56 r 2(2) applied, and that it had till 9 May 2001 to file its notice.
- Held, granting the application for an extension of time:
- (1) The test for determining whether an order (or judgment) is interlocutory or final was the Bozson test, viz
an order was final where it finally disposed of the rights of the parties, and interlocutory where it did not.
- (2) Applying the Bozson test, the judge’s decision was interlocutory. Although he determined that the words
were defamatory, the rights of A&Y were not disposed of, as they still could plead the defences of justification
and fair comment. However, unless his determination was reversed on appeal, A&Y could not re-open the
issue and canvas afresh the meaning of the words.
- (3) As O 57 r 4(a) required the notice of appeal to be filed and served within one month from the date when
the order was pronounced, A & Y’s notice was filed out of time. O 57 r 4(a), and not O 56 r 2(2), applied. If it
was intended under O 56 r 2(2) that time would only begin to run from the date the judge certified that he
required no further arguments, or from the date it was deemed that the judge had so certified, it would have
expressly provided as such.
- (4) The four factors which the court should consider in determining whether it should exercise its
discretion to extend time to enable an applicant to file a notice of appeal out of time are - (a) the length
of the delay, (b) the reason for the delay, (c) the merits of the appeal, and (d) the degree of prejudice.
- (5) A & Y was granted an extension of time for the following reasons: (a) the delay of some 18 days was due
to its solicitors misconstruing the Rules of Court, (b) the solicitors’ mistake was not gross, (c) its appeal had
merit and was not hopeless as there was room for argument as to the correct meaning of the words, and (d) no
real prejudice would be caused to F & N if the appeal was allowed to continue.
- Per Curiam:
- (1) Section 34(1)(c) required the party intending to appeal to first request from the judge the opportunity to
make further arguments. This was to allow the judge to review his decision and once he decided to affirm it,
the requesting party would have his right to appeal. If the judge decided to hear further arguments, then the
order already made was suspended until the hearing of the further arguments. In such an event, time only
began to run from the date the judge made his decision after hearing further arguments.
- (2) As to whether an appeal had merit, it was not for the court at the interlocutory stage to go into a full-scale
examination of the relevant issues; the threshold was lower and the test was whether the appeal was hopeless.
As to whether prejudice would be caused, the ‘prejudice’ could not possibly refer to the fact that the appeal
would be continued if the extension is granted. It referred to some other factors, eg change of position on the
part of the respondent pursuant to judgment.

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Limitation Act s 29
- • Postponement of limitation period for fraud
- • Section 29(b) Limitation Act
- Under Section 29(b) Limitation Act, the period of limitation does not run where the right of action is
concealed by the fraud of any such person, until the fraud could with reasonable diligence have been
discovered.
- The cases have held that “fraud” here does not mean “fraud” in the dishonest sense, something less may
suffice. E.g. breach of director’s duty may amount to fraud. Don’t have to prove dishonest intend.

Postponement of limitation period in case of fraud or mistake.

29. —(1) Where, in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act —
(a) the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant or his agent or of any person through whom he claims or
his agent;
(b) the right of action is concealed by the fraud of any such person as aforesaid; or
(c) the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake,
the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud or the mistake, as the
case may be, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.
(2) Nothing in this section shall enable any action to be brought to recover, or enforce any charge against, or set
aside any transaction affecting, any property which —
(a) in the case of fraud, has been purchased for valuable consideration by a person who was not a party to the
fraud and did not at the time of the purchase know or have reason to believe that any fraud had been committed;
or
(b) in the case of mistake, has been purchased for valuable consideration, subsequently to the transaction in
which the mistake was made, by a person who did not know or have reason to believe that the mistake had been
made.

JURISDICTION/APPROPRIATE FORUM
 • Section 16 SCJA jurisdiction – fundamental to get juris started. Usually not a problem.

(a) Section 16 SCJA jurisdiction S.16 SCJA states that the High Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and try any
action in personam where –
- The Defendant is served with a Writ or other originating process in Singapore or outside Singapore (in the
manner prescribed by Rules of Court);
- The Defendant submits to the jurisdiction of the High Court;
- Any written law confers such jurisdiction to the High Court.

 For jurisdiction, see Sections 16, 17 and 18 SCJA; Section 18 SCJA is relevant as the High Court has
jurisdiction if it has power vested in it under any written law, and under the First Schedule of the SCJA.

(b) Jurisdiction of the Subordinate Courts – Sections 19 – 54 Subordinate Courts Act

 • Choice of jurisdiction/law clause is client more likely to sue or be sued? - This should be the first thing that a
solicitor should look for in a contract. Under common law, the existence of a choice of jurisdiction / law clause
is enforceable

 • Arbitration clause (New York convention) (New York Convention) – Look at whether an arbitration clause
exists. Under the New York convention, an arbitration award can be enforced in other jurisdictions, except
where it would contravene public policy.

 • => Forum non conveniens principle is client more likely to sue or be sued in such a forum?
o current international framework – many countries where legal system very slow; sometimes may
need to decide between sg or very slow juris. If decide on slow juris, may never get to sg, cannot
come back to sg because of itme bar. Some juris where even service takes yrs. Must advise client
carefully and start in same place! safest is to start in sg – so that can move quickly. Get ruling to
see if sg appropriate so that if not, cn move off.

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 • Commercial considerations for choice of forum – cost; time incurred if make wrong decision
a) familiarity – opt for the one where client is most familiar. Or where lawer is mot familiar
b) assets of defendant is in that juris – so no choice
c) if drafting contract, will be factor – must ask whether client under contract likely to be one in the future
enforcing it or being enforced against. Choice of forum clause merely becomes academic if don’t address
this issue. – termination and choice of law clauses impt
d) state of advancement of legal system – certain undeveloped legal sytems have corruption – clients may
not be playng on same field. May be overdeveloped juris – then suing or being sued makes a difference. If
sue in partr juris, may get more damages. Or may be able to sue based on some other cause of action not
available in Singapore.
e) Politics – in various contries, if sue home groan corporation, may have discounted chances of success –
disadvantaged. May also occur at provincial level. may find judiciary biased.
- now huge issues because of nature of businesses – ‘cross border judicial cooperation’ now a hot topic

PT Ometraco case:
 This involved the first bankruptcy case in Indonesia after the introduction of the new Bankruptcy Code. The
Indonesian court did not allow the bankruptcy petition even though a valid debt was due. In the end, the
creditors decided to pursue their action in Singapore.
 Singapore’s letter of comfort in Indonesia: Although jurisdiction pointed to Singapore, the action was pursued
in Jakarta because the plaintiff would have lost if the action was pursued in Singapore where the common law
was against the plaintiff.

 • Other considerations
(a) When considering jurisdiction, we must also consider other relevant statutes which deal with the
question of jurisdiction. For example, the Land Titles Strata Act ss.93-104 are specific on matters that
can be brought before the Land Titles Board. Other relevant statutes
(b) Government Proceedings Act (S.19 & 24)
(c) Monetary limits – jurisdictional monetary limits; also client’s pecuniary state
(d) Societies Act
(e) High Court Admiralty Jurisdiction Act
Government Proceedings Act
Parties to proceedings.
19. —(1) The Minister shall from time to time publish in the Gazette a list specifying the several Government
departments which are authorised departments for the purposes of this Act, and the name and address for service
of the person who is, or is acting for the purposes of this Act as, the solicitor for each such department, and may
from time to time amend or vary the list.
(2) Civil proceedings by the Government may be instituted either by an authorised Government department in its
own name or by the Attorney-General.
(3) Civil proceedings against the Government shall be instituted against the appropriate authorised Government
department, or, if none of the authorised Government departments is appropriate or the person instituting the
proceedings has any reasonable doubt whether any and if so which of those departments is appropriate, against
the Attorney-General.
(4) Where any civil proceedings against the Government are instituted against the Attorney-General, an
application may at any stage of the proceedings be made to the court by or on behalf of the Attorney-General to
have such of the authorised Government departments as may be specified in the application substituted for him
as defendant to the proceedings; and where any such proceedings are brought against an authorised Government
department, an application may at any stage of the proceedings be made to the court on behalf of that department
to have the Attorney-General or such of the authorised Government departments as may be specified in the
application substituted for the applicant as the defendant to the proceedings.
Upon any such application the court may if it thinks fit make an order granting the application on such terms as
the court thinks just; and on such order being made the proceedings shall continue as if they had been
commenced against the department specified in that behalf in the order, or, as the case may require, against the
Attorney-General.
(5) No proceedings instituted in accordance with this Part by or against the Attorney-General or an authorised
Government department shall abate or be affected by any change in the person holding the office of Attorney-
General or in the person or body of persons constituting the department.

8
Appearance of legal officers.
24. —(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of any written law, in civil proceedings by or against the Government a
legal officer may appear as advocate on behalf of the Government and may make and do all appearances, acts
and applications in respect of such proceedings on behalf of the Government.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of any written law, in civil proceedings to which a public officer is a party —
(a) by virtue of his office; or
(b) in his personal capacity, if the Attorney-General certifies in writing that it is in the public interest that such
public officer should be represented by a legal officer,
a legal officer may appear as advocate on behalf of such public officer and shall be deemed to be the recognised
agent of such public officer by whom all appearances, acts and applications in respect of such proceedings may
be made or done on behalf of such public officer.
(3) An advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court, retained by the Attorney-General in the case of civil
proceedings by or against the Government or a public officer, may appear as advocate on behalf of the
Government or the public officer in such proceedings.
(4) In civil proceedings to which the Attorney-General is a party under section 8 or 9, a legal officer may appear
as advocate and make and do all appearances, acts and applications in respect of such proceedings on behalf of
the Attorney-General.

Societies Act

Jurisdiction.
31. —(1) Any offence under section 14 (2) may be tried by a District Court which may pass the sentence
specified in that section.
(2) Any offence under any other section of this Act or any regulations made thereunder may be tried by a District
Court or by a Magistrate’s Court.

High Court (Admiralty Jurisdiction) Act (S.3)

High Court (Admiralty Jurisdiction) Act

Admiralty jurisdiction of High Court
3. —(1) The admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court shall be as follows, that is to say, jurisdiction to hear and
determine any of the following questions or claims:
(a) any claim to the possession or ownership of a ship or to the ownership of any share therein;
(b) any question arising between the co-owners of a ship as to possession, employment or earnings of that ship;
(c) any claim in respect of a mortgage of or charge on a ship or any share therein;
(d) any claim for damage done by a ship;
(e) any claim for damage received by a ship;
(f) any claim for loss of life or personal injury sustained in consequence of any defect in a ship or in her apparel
or equipment, or of the wrongful act, neglect or default of the owners, charterers or persons in possession or
control of a ship or of the master or crew thereof or of any other person for whose wrongful acts, neglects or
defaults the owners, charterers or persons in possession or control of a ship are responsible, being an act, neglect
or default in the navigation or management of the ship, in the loading, carriage or discharge of goods on, in or
from the ship or in the embarkation, carriage or disembarkation of persons on, in or from the ship;
(g) any claim for loss of or damage to goods carried in a ship;
(h) any claim arising out of any agreement relating to the carriage of goods in a ship or to the use or hire of a
ship;
(i) subject to section 168 of the Merchant Shipping Act (Cap. 179) (which requires salvage disputes to be
determined summarily by a District Court in certain cases), any claim in the nature of salvage (including any
claim arising under section 11 of the Air Navigation Act (Cap. 6) relating to salvage to aircraft and their apparel
and cargo);
(j) any claim in the nature of towage in respect of a ship or an aircraft;
(k) any claim in the nature of pilotage in respect of a ship or an aircraft;
(l) any claim in respect of goods or materials supplied to a ship for her operation or maintenance;
(m) any claim in respect of the construction, repair or equipment of a ship or dock charges or dues;
(n) any claim by a master or member of the crew of a ship for wages and any claim by or in respect of a master
or member of the crew of a ship for any money or property which, under any of the provisions of the Merchant

9
 Shipping Act (Cap. 179) is recoverable as wages or in the Court and in the manner in which wages may be
recovered;
(o) any claim by a master, shipper, charterer or agent in respect of disbursements made on account of a ship;
(p) any claim arising out of an act which is or is claimed to be a general average act;
(q) any claim arising out of bottomry;
(r) any claim for the forfeiture or condemnation of a ship or of goods which are being or have been carried, or
have been attempted to be carried, in a ship, or for the restoration of a ship or any such goods after seizure, or for
droits of admiralty,
together with any other jurisdiction connected with ships or aircraft which may be vested in the Court apart from
this section.
(2) The jurisdiction of the High Court under subsection (1) (b) includes power to settle any account outstanding
and unsettled between the parties in relation to the ship, and to direct that the ship, or any share thereof, shall be
sold, and to make such other order as the Court thinks fit.
(3) The reference in subsection (1) (i) to claims in the nature of salvage includes a reference to such claims for
services rendered in saving life from a ship or an aircraft or in preserving cargo, apparel or wreck as, under
sections 166 and 167 of the Merchant Shipping Act or any regulations made under section 11 of the Air
Navigation Act (Cap. 6), are authorised to be made in connection with a ship or an aircraft.
(4) Subsections (1) to (3) shall apply —
(a) in relation to all ships or aircraft, whether of Singapore or not and whether registered or not and wherever the
residence or domicile of their owners may be;
(b) in relation to all claims, wheresoever arising (including, in the case of cargo or wreck salvage, claims in
respect of cargo or wreck found on land); and
(c) so far as they relate to mortgages and charges, to all mortgages or charges, whether registered or not and
whether legal or equitable, including mortgages and charges created under foreign law.
(5) Nothing in subsection (4) shall be construed as extending the cases in which money or property is recoverable
under any of the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act (Cap. 179).

WARRANT TO ACT
 Cannot assume that have authority fr client. Evidentially, burden of proof in your favour that you hve auth to
act. Lawyers have been called up by society for discip action for not acting without auth.
 Also protecting you fr negligence – entire proceedings commenced without auth will be struck out.
 Protects you fr discip action and akso negligencve therefore. But does not nec mean that you do have auth.
 • Order 64 rule 7 (1) - every solicitor shall obtain a warrant to act
 • Order 64 rule 7(2) - without warrant, prima facie no authority

Warrant to act (O. 64, r. 7)

7. —(1) Every solicitor representing any party in any cause or matter shall obtain from such party or his duly
authorised agent a warrant to act for such party, either generally or in the said cause or matter.
(2) The absence of such warrant shall, if the solicitor’s authority to act is disputed, be prima facie evidence that
he has not been authorised to represent such party.

 • Proceedings may be struck out for want of authority

 • For companies, was director authorised? A resolution by the Board of Directors is the least that the solicitor
should obtain.
 • But nowadays, a letter of engagement is usually issued (as recommended by Law Society).
 must get letter of engagement signed – protects you fr many issues

CLIENTS’ CONCERNS/NEEDS
 • Advising on what the law is, the lawyer must do and is expected to do.
 • What makes a lawyer a professional and what makes a lawyer good is the ability to
– tailor advice to suit client
– strategize with and for client – making use of law for client’s best interest
– recommend practical solutions to problems

10
 • Money – civil cases. This is usually the most impt. Must be addressed at start so that client knows how much
he is fighting over. There must be a certain thereshold before telling your client that it is worth it to sue. If less
than 5000, shldnt bother suing. Not worth the itme and cost!
 • Time Is the effort required worth it? Is time on your client’s side
 • Psychology – fear of being in the witness box, fear of litigation, etc?
 clients may be timid, problematic! How you relate to client becomes very impt. Clients may get pressured
when they receive docs fr other side. Must manage expectations of client. Prepare him psychologically.
Prepare client for full trial – show him another trial to prepare him. May also rehearse with him! corporate
hierarchy may also create tension.
 • Publicity/public relations – reputational concerns. Coporations tend to be very sensitive to this. Banks don’t
like to litigate, partly due to cost and partly because of reputation. Usually they settle out of court. Is publicity
your client’s fear or is it an advantage? As a way to provide value added services to clients you could advise
clients on how to manage public relations when legal issues are concerned – don’t make organizations appear
bad. E.g NKF where publicity can kill
 • Clients’ ultimate real objective – to sieve this out and then avoid unnecessary costs. The objective may be to
save reputation; protect confidentiality; revenge, anger, and not for judgment.
 • Non-legal avenues of recourse –
a) market competition – resolve issue in market place. Rather than sue
b) there may be potential win win in commercially mediated fashion. Duty on lawyer to find common grd
between parties. Find middle grd for both parties. Judges encourage this and appreciate it when lawyers
facilitate settlement. Lawyers are officers to court and shld find answer and a win win solution.
c) instead of civil litigation, can issue a private summons for a criminal charge.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST
1) Legal conflict of interest – Such a conflict occurs when the solicitor is privy to information of the opposing
party. Sometimes, it may not be clear whether there is a conflict of interest
- In such cases, the solicitor may (i) make an application to court for directions; (ii) obtain a ruling from the Ethics
Committee of the Law Society.

2) Commercial conflict of interest – Solicitors may not wish to act against their Firm’s valued clients (not a legal
conflict).
– acting against firm’s valued clients

 • Maintain firm database of clients. Verify before commence action.

 • Send email messages to all lawyers and staff (whether party is the firm’s valued client)
 • Have as much information on matter and client as possible (if just a conveyancing matter, no real dispute,
there may be no real conflict of interest)
 • Respond to conflict checks speedily. And respond to client. Don’t take on brief first! Be proactive about it.
Duty is on lawyer to tell client that he cannot act for him.

Service out of jurisdiction (order 11)

 • In July 1993, new rules came into force to complement the amendment to section 16 SCJA and section 19(3)
SCA
 • Service out of jurisdiction permitted if case falls within one of the circumstances in Order 11
 Application by:
- • Application by ex-parte Summons to Registrar supported by affidavit
- • All material facts must be disclosed. Must satisfy court if not may become time barred.
Client may stimes not reveal sth – so may arg order 2 rule 1. court to regard as irregularities
rather than void.

 Examples under Order 11 (order 11 is not automatic, lawyer will try to argue as many of these as possible)
 When the Person sued is an ordinary resident in Singapore

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  When the Person sued has property in Singapore (ie: US company with subsidiary in Singapore)
 Contract made in Singapore, governed by Singapore law, agreed forum in Singapore
 Breach of contract committed in Singapore
 Tort committed in Singapore
 Cause of action arising in Singapore
 See the rule

Consolidation or its alternatives

- Apply early if not later may become difficult to do so

- • Order 4 r 1 – Where 2 or more causes or matters are pending, where there is common question of law or fact
or same transaction –
- • The court may order :
– Consolidation of these actions; or
– Try at the same time; or
– Try one after the other; or
– Try one, and stay the rest till after that.
- Order 4 rule 1 takes into account the time the defendant applies to it, as well as the cost and injustice to the
parties.

Consolidation, etc., of causes or matters (O. 4, r. 1)

1. —(1) Where 2 or more causes or matters are pending, then, if it appears to the Court —
(a) that some common question of law or fact arises in both or all of them;
(b) that the rights to relief claimed therein are in respect of or arise out of the same transaction or series of
transactions; or
(c) that for some other reason it is desirable to make an order under this Rule,
the Court may order those causes or matters to be consolidated on such terms as it thinks just or may order them
to be tried at the same time or one immediately after another or may order any of them to be stayed until after the
determination of any other of them.
(2) An order for consolidation must be in Form 1 and shall direct that the cause or matter in which the application
is made shall thence forward be carried on in such other cause or matter and that the title of such other cause or
matter be amended by adding thereto the title of the cause or matter in which the application is made.
(3) Upon such order being made, the file of the cause or matter in which the application is made shall be
transferred to and added to the file of such other cause or matter, and the copy of the order shall be left in place
of the file so transferred, and a memorandum of the transfer shall be entered in the cause book against the cause
or matter so consolidated.

Lee Kuan Yew v Tang Liang Hong & Anor and other Actions (3) [1997] 3 SLR 178
- Facts :
o Eleven Plaintiffs and Two Defendants
o Question was whether property beneficially owned by the 1st Defendant. Each Plaintiff separately
represented, completed research, and done discovery separately
- Held :
o Impossible to consolidate. Normally this wld be donie and if did so, only one set of lawyers allowed
to represent all plaintiffs. If so, those other Plaintiffs without lawyers would have no recourse to
recover costs of their solicitors,so not fair to plaintiff because conseq on their legal repn and ability to
receover costs startng from coimmencement of action
o It was generally impossible to consolidate actions where the plaintiffs were represented by different
solicitors who each completed their research, getting-up and were in the process of discovery. If
consolidation was ordered, only one set of solicitors would have represented the lead plaintiff with
the unfair consequence that the other plaintiffs would have had to pay the costs of their solicitors
without recourse against the defendants. When considering partial consolidation, the court took into
account the right of each plaintiff to retain the services of his own solicitors to advance his cause. It
would have been unjust and too overbearing to compel all the plaintiffs to agree to one set of
solicitors.

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 o A partial consolidation, which Teo [Tang Liang Hong’s wife, who was joined as a second defendant
as it was alleged that she held assets on trust for Tang] wanted, would have entailed the element of
unwarranted compulsion. Instead of a partial consolidation, the court ruled in light of all the
circumstances of the case and the future probable course of the trial that the trial was to be tried at the
same time within the meaning of O 4 r 1(1) of the Rules of Court.
- Held : as compromnise, next best alternative to consolidation is to try all at same time.
a) Evidence led in one action will be treated as evidence in all actions.
b) Repetitions in cross-exam will not be allowed.
c) As deterrent, Judge will penalise with costs if lawyers are obstructive or unreasonable.
d) Also combined basis approach for documents for ease of reference. – fr opening statements to bundle of
docs to core bundle of doc. They shld agree to common set rather than multiple set.
e) Costs for solicitors other than lead solicitors will be less. In practice, pple know who lead counsel and
lead plaintiff is. If not, they will discuss and reach consensus, and that firm will then do all the
consolidation work etc
 Court will try to achieve result that achieves the impact of consolidation – help parties move the action
along, no strict principle – moves fr case to case as to whether can have common bundle etc

Goh Tok Tong v Jereyetnam (defamation) (CA) [1997] 2 SLR 679

- 8 Plaintiffs opposed consolidation because in defamation action here, defence is that the words are not
defamatory of each Plaintiff. So they each need sep advice as to how this refers to them separately each.
Vries fr politician to politicin.
- Whether it is defamatory of each Plaintiff varies with each Plaintiff, whether it refers to that Plaintiff, and
aggravation and damages issues are different. Therefore there has to be separate representation
- Eight suits were commenced by members of the People’s Action Party for libel and slander arising from a
statement made by the defendant on 1 January 1997. The defendant applied for an order of consolidation of all
the suits. Plaintiffs opposed consolidation because in defamation action here, defence is that the words are not
defamatory of each Plaintiff. Argued by counsel for the Plaintiff that whether it is defamatory of each Plaintiff
varies with each Plaintiff, whether it refers to that Plaintiff, and aggravation and damages issues are different.
Therefore there has to be separate representation. The Assistant Registrar dismissed the application. The
defendant appealed.
- Held by HC, which agreed with the Assistant Registrar
o (1) The facts were different in each suit as the first issue in each case was to determine whether the
words were defamatory of that plaintiff. Each plaintiff also had his own evidence in relation to
aggravation and the question of damages may differ from plaintiff to plaintiff. Hence it was necessary
that all the plaintiffs be separately represented.
o (2) The more appropriate order was for the actions to be tried one after another before the same
judge.
o court Referred to White Book and authority of Lewis v Daily Telegraph No 2 [1964] 2 QB 601
which held that there cannot be consolidation where there is separate representation unless all
plaintiffs agree to appoint one solicitor
o • No reason to order plaintiffs to have single representation, and too many of them . [But query: when
is there too many?]
o • Agree with High Court Judge

Lai Swee Lin Linda v Attorney-General [2006] 2 SLR 565

o Facts
o The appellant consolidated, in a single notice of appeal, two appeals against distinct orders arising
from separate actions to avoid having to furnish two sets of security for costs. The first appeal
concerned an order refusing a stay of bankruptcy proceedings that the respondent had commenced
against the appellant. The other appeal was against a decision to strike out certain paragraphs from
the appellant’s statement of claim in a separate action brought against the respondent regarding the
termination of her employment (“the employment action”). The relevant parts of the appellant’s
statement of claim were struck out on the grounds that they were either an abuse of process or
scandalous (“the striking-out order”). The paragraphs struck out as being an abuse of process

13
 related to the appellant’s application for judicial review and her claim for the costs of an earlier
action in which she sought leave to issue certiorari (“the public law action”).
o The respondent applied to set aside the appeal against the striking-out order on the following grounds: (a)
there had not been proper consolidation of the two appeals; (b) the appellant had not complied with s
34(1)(c) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1999 Rev Ed) (“the SCJA”) vis-à-vis the
striking-out order; and/or (c) the appellant had filed and/or served her notice of appeal against the striking-
out order out of time.
o Held, setting aside the appeal against the striking-out order:
o (1) The appellant’s consolidation of the appeals was irretrievably flawed. It could not ever have
been intended for O 4 r 1 of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2004 Rev Ed) (“ROC”) to apply to
appeals. Order 4 r 1 referred to “causes or matters” that had yet to be tried and “causes” and
“matters” did not fall within the natural meaning of an “appeal” but, rather, were concerned with
trials. Indeed, the appellant was not at liberty to unilaterally consolidate the appeals without an
order of court and then seek what was in effect ex post facto leave from the court to consolidate the
appeals pursuant to O 4 r 1: at [19] and [20].
o (2) Where a party wished to appeal against orders made in different actions, the ROC required
separate notices of appeal to be issued for each order, even if the actions had been tried together.
This would not be an appropriate case for the court to exercise its discretion under O 2 r 1(2) of the
ROC to cure this irregularity as the appellant’s reasons for consolidating the appeals centred on
financial convenience. Further, the appeal against the striking-out order was also “hopeless”: at
[24] to [26].

Parties to action
o • All appropriate parties must be before the Court
o • Refer to Order 15 Rules of Court – allows court to bring them in or parties to apply to court to bring them in
Joinder, misjoinder/ Non-Joinder

o In property dispute for eg - Legal owners/ beneficial owner/ occupants – tenants etc. court may have to make
judgement against more parties. Must address court in relation to those parties and court may feel that they be
jpined as parties to action because feel that concerns them
o • Court may order a person to be joined if:
– that person’s presence is necessary to ensure that all matters in that cause is effectually and
completely determined
– where there is a question/issue relating to any relief claimed which the court feels is just to determine
between the person and other parties to that cause
o • Application for joinder/misjoinder must be made a.s.a.p and with supporting affidavit

Joinder of parties (O. 15, r. 4)

4. —(1) Subject to Rule 5 (1), 2 or more persons may be joined together in one action as plaintiffs or as
defendants with the leave of the Court or where —
(a) if separate actions were brought by or against each of them, as the case may be, some common question of
law or fact would arise in all the actions; and
(b) all rights to relief claimed in the action (whether they are joint, several or alternative) are in respect of or arise
out of the same transaction or series of transactions.
(2) Where the plaintiff in any action claims any relief to which any other person is entitled jointly with him, all
persons so entitled must, subject to the provisions of any written law and unless the Court gives leave to the
contrary, be parties to the action and any of them who does not consent to being joined as a plaintiff must, subject
to any order made by the Court on an application for leave under this paragraph, be made a defendant.
This paragraph shall not apply to a probate action.
(3) Where relief is claimed in an action against a defendant who is jointly liable with some other person and also
severally liable, that other person need not be made a defendant to the action; but where persons are jointly, but
not severally, liable under a contract and relief is claimed against some but not all of those persons in an action in
respect of that contract, the Court may, on the application of any defendant to the action, by order stay
proceedings in the action until the other persons so liable are added as defendants.
This paragraph shall not apply to any relief claimed under section 15 of the Civil Law Act (Chapter 43).

14
o A ‘misjoinder’ refers to having the wrong ‘party’ to the suit. A ‘non-joinder’ refers to the failure to join a
‘party’ in the suit

Misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties (O. 15, r. 6)

6. —(1) No cause or matter shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or nonjoinder of any party; and the
Court may in any cause or matter determine the issues or questions in dispute so far as they affect the rights and
interests of the persons who are parties to the cause or matter.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Rule, at any stage of the proceedings in any cause or matter, the Court may,
on such terms as it thinks just and either of its own motion or on application —
(a) order any person who has been improperly or unnecessarily made a party or who has for any reason ceased to
be a proper or necessary party, to cease to be a party;
(b) order any or the following persons to be added as a party, namely:
(i) any person who ought to have been joined as a party or whose presence before the Court is necessary to
ensure that all matters in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated
upon; or
(ii) any person between whom and any party to the cause or matter there may exist a question or issue arising out
of or relating to or connected with any relief or remedy claimed in the cause or matter which in the opinion of the
Court it would be just and convenient to determine as between him and that party as well as between the parties
to the cause or matter.
(3) An application by any person for an order under paragraph (2) adding him as a party must, except with the
leave of the Court, be supported by an affidavit showing his interest in the matters in dispute in the cause or
matter or, as the case may be, the question or issue to be determined as between him and any party to the cause or
matter.
(4) No person shall be added as a plaintiff without his consent signified in writing or in such other manner as
may be authorised.

- Order 15, rule 6(1) states that an action is not defeated by reason of mis-joinder or non-joinder of the parties.
- Order 15, rule 6(2) states that the Court may order a party to cease being a party if he was improperly or
unnecessarily joined. The Court may also order a person to be joined if:
(a) that person’s presence is necessary to ensure that all matters in that cause or matter may be effectually
and completely determined and adjudicated upon; or
(b) where there is a question or issue relating to any relief claimed which the court feels it just to determine
between the person and other parties to that cause.
- Order 15, rule 6(3) states that application for joinder or misjoinder must be made as soon as possible and
supported by affidavit.
- Order 15, rule 6(4) states that no person shall be added as a Plaintiff without his consent which must be made
in writing.
- If the person refuses to be joined as a Plaintiff, he must be made a Defendant (even though he is joined in
order to get a benefit together with the Plaintiff) (This is a weird rule – must in most cases, the person is
more likely to agree to be a joint plaintiff. Very often in oppressive action under s.216CA, the company is
joined as a Defendant because the company needs to be bound by any order of the court. In such cases,
the company will not agree to consent to be a joint plaintiff since the directors are the wrongdoers in
control of the company)
- Court will not allow joiner to parties after limitation period.

Abdul Gaffar v Chua Kwong Yong (1995) 2 SLR 645 CA

- The appellant Gaffar, while driving his employer’s vehicle, collided into the respondent Chua’s vehicle.
Chua suffered injuries but subsequently recovered. Chua then sued Gaffar’s employer but omitted to include
Gaffar in the action. In the course of giving evidence during the trial, Gaffar admitted that he was negligent.
Chua then applied to add Gaffar as a party to the action. Although the action had already become time-barred
on 3 January 1990, the application was allowed. The insurers and their solicitors were informed of the
addition of Gaffar as a defendant but refused to take any action in response thereto. As Chua was unable to
effect personal service on Gaffar, service was effected by substituted service. Judgment in default of
appearance was entered against Gaffar who subsequently applied to set aside the judgment on the ground that
the action was time-barred. His application was dismissed with costs and Gaffar appealed, arguing that the
joinder deprived him of his right to limitation had the action been brought against him alone, and as such,
joinder should not have been allowed. Chua argued that so long as the new cause of action arose out of the
same or substantially the same facts and it was just to allow the amendment.

15
- Held, dismissing the appeal:
- (2) This was an appropriate case for leave to be granted for a new party to be added as: (a) there was
sufficient overlap between the facts supporting the existing claim and the claim against Gaffar; and (b)
adding Gaffar became necessary to prevent injustice to Chua.
- (3) Gaffar did not not have an unassailable defence of limitation. The court had a very wide discretion to
add a party under O 15 r 6 of the Rules of the Subordinate Courts (‘the Rules’) which must be construed to
bring all parties to the dispute relating to one subject matter before the court at the same time so that the
dispute could be determined without delay and inconvenience of separate trials.
- (4) Although the Limitation Act (Cap 163) did not specifically provide the court with discretion to disapply
limitation as in the English equivalent, it was necessary to consider all relevant circumstances of the case.
Reading s 4 of the Limitation Act with O 18 r 7 of the Rules, limitation had to be specifically pleaded as a
defence.
- (5) The court would refuse to exercise the discretion to add a party only if serious embarrassment or
injustice would be caused. Here, the proceedings had from the very beginning been properly formulated.
There was no prejudice to Gaffar’s defence, and his employer and the insurers had been put on notice of
Chua’s claim within the limitation period of three years. They were accordingly not caught in a situation of
facing a stale claim after having got rid of relevant papers and evidence, a situation which the defence of
limitation was intended to prevent. The likely prejudice to Gaffar had to be balanced against the hardship and
costs to be suffered by Chua of having to proceed against his solicitors in the event Gaffar’s case was
allowed

- So when joining, have to consider whether it makes action time barred. Thus in practice better to join more at
the beginning and then unjoin later if not needed.

Pegang Mining Company Ltd V Choong Sam & Ors [1969] 2 Mlj 52 (Privy Council On Appeal From
Malaysia)
- Lord Diplock (delivering the judgment on behalf of the board) –
- “It is nevertheless submitted on behalf of the company as an alternative ground of appeal from the Federal
Court`s interlocutory order that the Federal Court had no jurisdiction to add the contractor as a party because
he had no sufficient interest in the subject matter of the proceedings.
- The Federal Court has the same power to add an additional party to an appeal as the High Court has to add a
party to an action. This power is conferred by O 16, r 11, which is in the same terms as the former O 16, r 11,
of the English Rules of the Supreme Court.
- To come within the words of the rule the party to be added must be one "who ought to have been joined, or
whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to
adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause or matter".
- These words have been the subject of voluminous judicial exegesis and Amon v Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd
[1956] 1 QB 357 contains a useful collection of citations to Devlin J of many of the authorities prior to 1956.
Devlin J`s analysis of those authorities led him to reject the view expressed by Lord Esher MR in Byrne v
Brown (1889), 22 QBD 657 that the rule ought to be given a wide interpretation so as "to secure that, when a
court can see in the transaction brought before it that the rights of one of the parties will or may be so affected
that under the forms of law other action may be brought in respect of that transaction, the court shall have
power to bring all the parties before it, and determine the rights of all in one proceeding".
- Devlin J himself accordingly propounded in Amon`s case a much narrower interpretation of the rule which it is
unnecessary to repeat here for it was over-ruled, in their Lordships` view rightly, by the Court of Appeal in
Gurtner v Circuit [1968] 2 QB 587 a case decided after the date of the judgment of the Federal Court of
Malaysia in the present case.
- The cases illustrate the great variety of circumstances in which it may be sought to join an additional party to
an existing action. In their Lordships` view one of the principal objects of the rule is to enable the court to
prevent injustice being done to a person whose rights will be affected by its judgment by proceeding to
adjudicate upon the matter in dispute in the action without his being given an opportunity of being heard. To
achieve this object calls for a flexibility of approach which makes it undesirable in the present case, in which
the facts are unique, to attempt to lay down any general proposition which could be applicable to all cases.
- It has been sometimes said as in Moser v Marsden [1892] 1 Ch 487 and Re LG Farbenindustrie AG [1944]
Ch 41 that a party may be added if his legal interests will be affected by the judgment in the action but
not if his commercial interests only would be affected. While their Lordships agree that the mere fact that a
person is likely to be better off financially if a case is decided one way rather than another is not a sufficient

16
 ground to entitle him to be added as a party, they do not find the dichotomy between "legal" and "commercial"
interests helpful. A better way of expressing the test is: will his rights against or liabilities to any party to the
action in respect of the subject matter of the action be directly affected by any order which may be made in the
action?”

Meng-Eu Lim Judy v RSP Investments (S) Pte Ltd [1999] 1 SLR 231
- The plaintiff Lim claimed against the defendant RSP Investments damages for wrongful termination of a
contract of employment. Subsequently, Lim applied to add RSP Architects as second defendant on the ground
that misrepresentations of RSP Architects had induced her to enter into the contract with RSP Investments.
The application, which was opposed by RSP Investments, was granted by the assistant registrar pursuant to O
15, r 6(2)(b) of the Rules of Court 1996. RSP Investments appealed. The court considered whether, for r
6(2)(b)(ii) to apply, there must be a common question or issue between Lim and RSP Investments, as well as
between Lim and RSP Architects.
- Held, dismissing the appeal:
- (1) Under r 6(2)(b)(ii), the question or issue between Lim and RSP Architects need not be the same as the
cause or matter between Lim and RSP Investments, so long as the former arose out of or was related to or
connected with any relief or remedy claimed in the cause or matter, and it was just and convenient that the two
matters should be determined together. ‘Relating to or connected with’ in r 6(2)(b)(ii) did not necessarily mean
that the issue with the proposed new party must have a bearing on the relief claimed in the action or vice versa,
so long as there was a link, factual or otherwise. Such a construction was not too wide, as it was always subject
to the overriding consideration of ‘just and convenient’ before a joinder could be granted.
- (2) In this case, there was a clear factual link. It was eminently just and convenient that Lim’s claims against
RSP Investments and RSP Architects should be joined and there was no prejudice to either of them on account
of the joinder.

Joinder Of Causes Of Action (Note that this is different from Joinder of parties)
- if 3 etc claims, don’t need 3 etc suits, all can be joined so long as other party is sued in correct capacity
- • If more than one cause of action against same Defendant, practical and convenient to join causes of action in
one suit.
- • Order 15 rule 1 -
– Defendant is alleged to be liable in the same capacity in respect of all causes of action
– Defendant alleged to be liable in capacity of executor/administrator for one or more causes of action
and in personal capacity but with reference to the same estate

Joinder of causes of action (O. 15, r. 1)

1. —(1) Subject to Rule 5 (1), a plaintiff may in one action claim relief against the same defendant in respect of
more than one cause of action —
(a) if the plaintiff claims, and the defendant is alleged to be liable, in the same capacity in respect of all the
causes of action;
(b) if the plaintiff claims or the defendant is alleged to be liable in the capacity of executor or administrator of an
estate in respect of one or more of the causes of action and in his personal capacity but with reference to the same
estate in respect of all the others; or
(c) with the leave of the Court.
(2) An application for leave under this Rule must be made by ex parte summons supported by affidavit before the
issue of the writ or originating summons, as the case may be, and the affidavit must state the grounds of the
application.

Sivarajah v Yeoh Eng Huat Andrew [1994] 3 MLJ 271

- The plaintiffs applied for declarations that they were the duly appointed directors of a certain company and
that the appointment of the defendants to their said offices was null and void and for an injunction
restraining the defendants from holding themselves out or acting in their respective offices, damages,
interest and costs. At the same time, the plaintiffs commenced another two actions in the same division of
the High Court. In all three actions, the same parties, who were represented by the same solicitors, claimed
against the same defendants the same relief, on the same grounds based on similar facts but in respect of
three separate companies.
- Held, ordering that the three actions be consolidated as one action and that the principal action shall be the
present action:

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- (1).Under O 15 r 1(1)(a) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (`the RHC`) read with O 15 r 5(1), a plaintiff
may in one action claim relief against the same defendant in respect of more than one cause of action if the
plaintiff claims, and the defendant is alleged to be liable, in the same capacity in all the causes of action. But
if it appears to the court that the joinder of causes of action or of parties may embarrass or delay the trial or
is otherwise inconvenient, the court may order separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient.
- (2).Here the plaintiffs or their solicitors had not given any explanation as to why it was thought fit to bring
three actions instead of one, applying O 15 r 1 of the RHC, and there was no suggestion that by reference to
O 15 r 5, to bring one action would embarrass or delay the trial or be otherwise inconvenient.

- • If actions not joined when they are appropriate, and multiple suits commenced, Plaintiff penalised for
costs. Lawyers have knowledge of this! Not fair to client to pay cost, so lawyers shld bear cost
- Lawyer may have to bear costs personally.
- Order 59 rules 7 and 8
- Therefore better to join if appropriate.

Counterclaim

- • Counterclaim against Plaintiff and a 3rd party permissible (eg P, a partner, sue D. D has counterclaim against
P’s partnership, may counterclaim against partnership.). usually happens for partnership.

Counterclaim against plaintiff (O. 15, r. 2)

2. —(1) Subject to Rule 5 (2), a defendant in any action who alleges that he has any claim or is entitled to any
relief or remedy against a plaintiff in the action in respect of any matter (whenever and however arising) may,
instead of bringing a separate action, make a counterclaim in respect of that matter; and where he does so he
must add the counterclaim to his defence.
(2) Rule 1 shall apply in relation to a counterclaim as if the counterclaim were a separate action and as if the
person making the counterclaim were the plaintiff and the person against whom it is made a defendant.
(3) A counterclaim may be proceeded with notwithstanding that judgment is given for the plaintiff in the action
or that the action is stayed, discontinued or dismissed.
(4) Where a defendant establishes a counterclaim against the claim of the plaintiff and there is a balance in
favour of one of the parties, the Court may give judgment for the balance, so, however, that this provision shall
not be taken as affecting the Court's discretion with respect to costs.
Counterclaim against additional parties (O. 15, r. 3)
3. —(1) Where a defendant to an action who makes a counterclaim against the plaintiff alleges that any other
person (whether or not a party to the action) is liable to him along with the plaintiff in respect of the subject-
matter of the counterclaim, or claims against such other person any relief relating to or connected with the
original subject-matter of the action, then, subject to Rule 5 (2), he may join that other person as a party against
whom the counterclaim is made.
(2) Where a defendant joins a person as a party against whom he makes a counterclaim, he must add that
person’s name to the title of the action and serve on him a copy of the counterclaim; and a person on whom a
copy of a counterclaim is served under this paragraph shall, if he is not already a party to the action, become a
party to it as from the time of service with the same rights in respect of his defence to the counterclaim and
otherwise as if he had been duly sued in the ordinary way by the party making the counterclaim.
(3) A defendant who is required by paragraph (2) to serve a copy of the counterclaim made by him on any person
who before service is already a party to the action must do so within the period within which, by virtue of Order
18, Rule 2, he must serve on the plaintiff the defence to which the counterclaim is added.
(4) Where by virtue of paragraph (2) a copy of a counterclaim is required to be served on a person who is not
already a party to the action, the following provisions of these Rules, namely, Order 10 (except Rule 1 (4)),
Orders 11 to 13 and Order 70, Rule 3, shall, subject to paragraph (3), apply in relation to the counterclaim and
the proceedings arising from it as if —
(a) the counterclaim were a writ and the proceedings arising from it an action; and
(b) the party making the counterclaim were a plaintiff and the party against whom it is made a defendant in that
action.
(5) A copy of a counterclaim required to be served on a person who is not already a party to the action must be
indorsed with a notice, in Form 12, addressed to that person —
(a) stating the effect of Order 12, Rule 1, as applied by paragraph (4); and
(b) stating that he may enter an appearance in Form 13 and explaining how he may do so.

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- Order 15, rule 2(1) allows the Defendant to file a counterclaim instead of starting a new action. The
counterclaim is to be attached to his Defence.
- Order 15, rule 2(3) states that a counterclaim may be proceeded with even if the claim is stayed, discontinued,
dismissed or judgment given. (Therefore, a counterclaim has a life of its own. It remains alive even if the main
claim is dismissed.)
- Order 15, rule 3 deals with Counterclaim against Additional Parties - A counterclaim against the Plaintiff
AND a 3rd party is also permissible. (Example: The plaintiff (a partner in a partnership) may sue the defendant.
The defendant, who has a counterclaim against the plaintiff’s partnership, may also counterclaimed against the
partnership)

- To be distinguished from third party proceedings (Order 16). MUST DISTINGUISH!! Between order 16
and 15!

Whom to sue and how to sue?

Persons under disability

Person under disability must sue, etc., by litigation representative3 (O. 76, r. 2)
2. —(1) A person under disability may not bring, make a claim in, defend, make a counterclaim in, or intervene
in any proceedings, or appear in any proceedings under a judgment or order notice of which has been served on
him, except by his litigation representative3.
(2) Subject to these Rules, anything which in the ordinary conduct of any proceedings is required or authorised
by a provision of these Rules to be done by a party to the proceedings shall or may, if the party is a person under
disability, be done by his litigation representative3.
(3) A litigation representative3 of a person under disability must act by a solicitor.

- Order 76, rule 1 states that “person under disability” means a person who is an infant or a patient; and that
“patient” means a person incapable of managing himself or his affairs.
o : - litigation representative reqd
- Order 76, rule 2(1) states that:
o For a ‘person under disability’ to sue – requires “his next friend”
o For a ‘person under disability’ to defend – requires ‘guardian ad litem”
- Order 76, rule 2(1)
o A person under disability may not bring, or make a claim in, any proceedings except by his next
friend and may not defend, make a counterclaim or intervene in any proceedings, or appear in any
proceedings under a judgment or order notice of which has been served on him, except by his
guardian ad litem.
- Order 76, rule 2(3) states that “A next friend or guardian ad litem of a person under disability must act by a
solicitor. – safeguard, prevent abuse. That litigation representative must have a solicitor – to protect interest of
infant or disabled person to ensure no ill behaviour by litigation representative
- Appointment of litigation representative3 (O. 76, r. 3)

Partnerships – Order 77 ROC

Suit
- Partners may sue or be sued in name of partnership (O. 77 r. 1).
- Order 77, rule 1
o Subject to the provisions of any written law, any 2 or more persons claiming to be entitled, or alleged
to be liable, as partners in respect of a cause of action and carrying on business within the jurisdiction
may sue, or be sued, in the name of the firm (if any) of which they were partners at the time when the
cause of action accrued.

- • Use of firm name is tool of convenience, a firm is still not a separate legal entity
- • As names of firm may be confused with individuals, add “sued as a firm”

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- This provision merely seeks to provide a convenient approach for court action; it does NOT give the firm a
new separate legal entity. The advantages of this rule is that there is no need to (i) set out all the names of the
partners individually; and (ii) the writ may be served at the business address. As names of firm may be
confused with individuals, add “sued as a firm”. E.g. Wong Chan & Tan (sued as a firm).

- Read RCB searches (ACRA?) carefully when suing partnerships - check exactly who were partners when, and
when cause of action accrued. Also double check the partnership deeds.

Service of Writ: Order 77, rule 3

a) On any one or more of partners – must serve on partner at time of action accrued. When partnership changes
constitn, is a totally new partnersthip! Must know who partners were at relevant time
b) At principal place of business on any person having the control or management of the business there -
safe course is to look for partner; though office managers held to also be having control. but safest to serve on
partners. Safest approach is to serve on all partners because not sure whether left or not, or acra records not
accurate
- Therefore, there is no need to look for the individual partner in order to effectively serve the writ. Note: A
receptionist is not a person who has ‘control or management of the partnership business.’

Service of writ (O. 77, r. 3)

3. —(1) Where by virtue of Rule 1 partners are sued in the name of a firm, the writ may, except in the case
mentioned in paragraph (2), be served —
(a) on any one or more of the partners; or
(b) at the principal place of business of the partnership within the jurisdiction, on any person having at the time
of service the control or management of the partnership business there,
and where service of the writ is effected in accordance with this paragraph, the writ shall be deemed to have been
duly served on the firm, whether or not any member of the firm is out of the jurisdiction.
(2) Where a partnership has, to the knowledge of the plaintiff, been dissolved before an action against the firm is
begun, the writ by which the action is begun must be served on every person within the jurisdiction sought to be
made liable in the action.
(3) Every person on whom a writ is served under paragraph (1) must at the time of service be given a written
notice in Form 205 stating whether he is served as a partner or as a person having the control or management of
the partnership business or both as a partner and as such a person; and any person on whom a writ is so served
but to whom no such notice is given shall be deemed to be served as a partner.

Appearance
- Appearance CANNOT be entered in name of firm. (O. 77 r. 4(1)) must be entered in name of partners!
Because of partnership law – recog the partners resp at time cause of actionb accrued

- Order 77 rule 4(1) deals with Entry of Appearance in an action against the firm: It states that appearance
cannot be entered in the name of the firm. The aim of this rule is to ensure that every partner of the firm is
aware of the lawsuit, because composition of the partnership may change.

Entry of appearance in an action against firm (O. 77, r. 4)

4. —(1) Where persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm, appearance may not be entered in the name
of the firm but only by the partners thereof in their own names, but the action shall nevertheless continue in the
name of the firm.

Societies Section 35 Societies Act (Cap 311)

- May sue or be sued in their own name as registered
- The service of the writ may be by one of these modes:
(i) Serve the writ on an officer of the society (President, Treasurer or Secretary); or
(ii) Leave the writ at the registered address of the society; or
(iii) Send the writ by registered post to the registered address of the society.
Service of the writ is done most often by mode (ii).

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Provisions applicable to registered societies.
35. The following provisions shall apply to all registered societies:
(a) the movable property of a society, if not vested in trustees, shall be deemed to be vested for the time being in
the governing body of the society, and in all proceedings civil and criminal may be described as the property of
the governing body of the society by their proper title;
(b) every such society may sue or be sued in the name in which it was registered under this Act;
(c) a writ of summons or other legal process may be served on a society by serving it on an officer of the society,
or by leaving it at, or sending it by registered post to, the registered address of the society;
(d) except as otherwise provided in section 36, no judgment in any suit against a registered society shall be put
into force against the person or property of any officer or member of the society but only against the property of
the society;
(e) any member who is in arrears of subscriptions which, according to the rules of the society, he is bound to pay,
or who takes possession or detains any property of the society contrary to those rules, or who injures or destroys
any property of the society, may be sued for the arrears or for the damage accruing from his wrongful possession,
detention, injury or destruction of that property by and in the name of the society;
(f) any member of the society who steals, purloins or embezzles any money or other property, or wilfully and
maliciously destroys or injures any property of the society, or forges any deed, bond, security for money, receipt
or other instrument whereby the funds of the society may be exposed to loss, shall be subject to the same
prosecution, and, if convicted, shall be liable to be punished in like manner as any person, not a member, would
be subject and liable to in respect of the like offence;
(g) in the absence of any specific provision in the rules of a society any number not less than three-fifths of the
members for the time being resident in Singapore of the society may determine that it shall be dissolved
forthwith, or at a time agreed upon, and all necessary steps shall be taken for the disposal and settlement of the
property of the society and its claims and liabilities according to the rules of the society applicable thereto, and if
none, then as the governing body finds expedient:
Provided that in the event of any dispute arising among the members of the governing body or the members of
the society, the adjustment of its affairs shall be referred to the High Court, and the Court shall make such order
in the matter as it thinks fit;
(h) no society shall be dissolved unless three-fifths of the members so resident as aforesaid have expressed a
wish for such dissolution by their votes delivered in person or by proxy at a general meeting convened for the
purpose.

Representative Actions – Order 15, rule 12 ROC

- • Not commonly used
- Order 15, rule 12(1) deals with representative proceedings – where numerous persons have the same interest,
proceedings may be begun by one or more representing all or representing all except one or more.

Representative proceedings (O. 15, r. 12)

12. —(1) Where numerous persons have the same interest in any proceedings, not being such proceedings as are
mentioned in Rule 13, the proceedings may be begun, and, unless the Court otherwise orders, continued, by or
against any one or more of them as representing all or as representing all except one or more of them.
(2) At any stage of the proceedings under this Rule the Court may, on the application of the plaintiff, and on such
terms, if any, as it thinks fit, appoint any one or more of the defendants or other persons as representing whom
the defendants are sued to represent all, or all except one or more, of those persons in the proceedings; and
where, in exercise of the power conferred by this paragraph, the Court appoints a person not named as a
defendant, it shall make an order under Rule 6 adding that person as a defendant.
(3) A judgment or order given in proceedings under this Rule shall be binding on all the persons as representing
whom the plaintiffs sue or, as the case may be, the defendants are sued, but shall not be enforced against any
person not a party to the proceedings except with the leave of the Court.
(4) An application for the grant of leave under paragraph (3) must be made by summons which must be served
personally on the person against whom it is sought to enforce the judgment or order.
(5) Notwithstanding that a judgment or order to which any such application relates is binding on the person
against whom the application is made, that person may dispute liability to have the judgment or order enforced
against him on the ground that by reason of facts and matters particular to his case he is entitled to be exempted
from such liability.
(6) The Court hearing an application for the grant of leave under paragraph (3) may order the question whether
the judgment or order is enforceable against the person against whom the application is made to be tried and
determined in any manner in which any issue or question in an action may be tried and determined.

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- Representative actions are usually used in the UK for unincorporated associations. In Singapore, most
unincorporated associations are registered as societies under the Societies Act. Representative actions in
Singapore like the Raffles Town Club, representing 5000 PF but only 10 go court to give evidence. The rest
will concur.

- Note that the concept of “representative actions” is different from the concept of “class actions” in the United
States. In the US, the persons in the class need not be identified, whereas the persons in a representative action
inn Singapore must be identified.

- Leave of court not required (for other party to object)

- eg raffles town club suit – before case went on, issues of whether misrepresentation the same for all clerk
members. Reliance diff depending on each plaintiff? But parties sensibly felt that if force issue, defence
will come prepared with similar pov and may have to pay costs of the 4000 plaintiffs!
- Approach taken by plaintiff and defence in that case was correct
- No procedure to apply for rep action. So long as plantiffs agree to start on basis of rep action across board.
Defence cd have objected, but to be careful because clients may have to bear cost of all the plaintiffs!

Actions against estates / Estates of Deceased – Order 15, rule 6A ROC

Proceedings against estates (O. 15, r. 6A)

6A. —(1) Where any person against whom an action would have lain has died but the cause of action survives,
the action may, if no grant of probate or administration has been made, be brought against the estate of the
deceased.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1), an action brought against “the personal representatives
of A.B. deceased” shall be treated, for the purposes of that paragraph, as having been brought against his estate.
(3) An action purporting to have been commenced against a person shall be treated, if he was dead at its
commencement, as having been commenced against his estate in accordance with paragraph (1), whether or not a
grant of probate or administration was made before its commencement.
(4) In any such action as is referred to in paragraph (1) or (3) —
(a) the plaintiff shall, during the period of validity for service of the writ or originating summons, apply to the
Court for an order appointing a person to represent the deceased’s estate for the purpose of the proceedings or, if
a grant of probate or administration has been made for an order that the personal representative of the deceased
be made a party to the proceedings, and in either case for an order that the proceedings be carried on against the
person appointed or, as the case may be, against the personal representative, as if he had been substituted for the
estate;
(b) the Court may, at any stage of the proceedings and on such terms as it thinks just and either of its own motion
or on application, make any such order as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) and allow such amendments (if any)
to be made and make such other order as the Court thinks necessary in order to ensure that all matters in dispute
in the proceedings may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon.
(5) Before making an order under paragraph (4) the Court may require notice to be given to any insurer of the
deceased who has an interest in the proceedings and to such (if any) of the persons having an interest in the estate
as it thinks fit.
(6) Where an order is made under paragraph (4) appointing the Public Trustee to represent the deceased’s estate,
the appointment shall be limited to his accepting service of the writ or originating summons by which the action
was begun unless, either on making such an order or on a subsequent application, the Court, with the consent of
the Public Trustee, directs that the appointment shall extend to taking further steps in the proceedings.
(7) Where an order is made under paragraph (4), Rules 7 (4) and 8 (3) and (4) shall apply as if the order had been
made under Rule 7 on the application of the plaintiff.
(8) Where no grant of probate or administration has been made, any judgment or order given or made in the
proceedings shall bind the estate to the same extent as it would have been bound if a grant had been made and a
personal representative of the deceased had been a party to the proceedings.

- • When D against whom action would have lain dies, and cause of action survives, BUT
o • No probate or letters of administration granted AND
o • Time bar setting in
- The question then arises – Who to sue? And what can you do to prevent the action from being time barred?

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 o in some cases no one wants to be reptive or there may be squabbling
- • Order 15 rule 6A(1) permits personal representative of the deceased to be sued although not named. These
cases apply when there is no one who have come forward to represent the estate of the deceased
- • Title “Personal Representative of X, deceased” (Order 15 rule 6A(2)) preserves time bar, then go to common
law – get the representatives
- • Order 15 rule 6A(6) - Public Trustee may be appointed but only to accept service, unless Public Trustee
consents
o You cannot enter judgment in default of appearance against the OA. (lacuna)
o Order 15, rule 6A(6) provides that where the Public Trustee is appointed to represent the deceased’s
estate, the appointment shall be limited to his accepting service of the writ or OS, unless the Public
Trustee otherwise consents.

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