Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
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1. I am over the age of majority. I make this declaration based upon my
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personal knowledge, and I am competent to testify to the contents herein.
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6 2. I make this declaration in support of Proposition 22 Legal Defense and
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1 with a stake in the family and society. As such, marriage is a universal
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norm.
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4. From my comparative study of the worldviews of major cultures and
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6 religions and the worldviews of small-scale societies, I have found that
7 marriage has had universal features, nearly universal features, and variable
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features.
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11 5. Its universal features include the fact that marriage (1) encourages
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6. Its nearly universal features are (1) an emphasis on durable relationships
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between biological parents;1 (2) mutual affection and companionship; (3)
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family (or political) alliances; and (4) an intergenerational cycle
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23 (reciprocity between young and old). These universal and nearly universal
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1 knowledge from one generation to another. They create not only “vertical”
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links between the generations, moreover, but also “horizontal” ones
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between allied families or communities.
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6 7. As for the many variable features, these include monogamy or polygamy,
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1 marrying down; arranged marriage or chosen; dowry (from the bride's
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family) or bride price (goods given or services performed by the groom);
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equality (for instance, the legal ability of women to make contracts) or
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hierarchy (for instance, the lack of legal ability of women to make
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6 contracts); many children or few as the ideal; extended family or nuclear;
7 residence within the bride's family, with the groom's, or neither; divorce
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allowed or prohibited; and so on.
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11 8. Alternatives to marriage are celebrated in some societies (as in the case of
18 universal features that define the institution of marriage and provide the
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best context for children.
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devoted to romantic love and adult fulfillment than to the heavier and more selfless
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responsibilities surrounding procreation. Of course, adult love and the responsibilities
23 surrounding procreation are not mutually exclusive, but the gravity of marriage as an institution
comes from its demand that love be negotiated through these larger responsibilities. To be sure,
24 there are childless heterosexual couples and homosexual couples with children. But to define an
institution as important to society as marriage by exceptions to the norms of both sexual
25 orientations - rather than by the norms themselves - makes little sense. It could be argued that
marriage is quite literally an outgrowth of heterosexuality itself, an institution that follows from
26 nature's requirement that men and women sexually merge to perpetuate the human species"
(Steele, "Selma," 1). Marriage, he adds, evolved "to protect children and procreation from the
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vicissitudes of adult love," including the "explosive natural force of male-female sex" (Steele,
28 "Married," 2). Family life suffered among black Americans during slavery, and so did marriage
during another century of segregation; even now, with massive support from the government, the
black family is in bad shape.
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1 10. When historians describe changes in marriage systems (for instance, how
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Western marriage has changed from the time of ancient Israel, Greece and
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Rome to modern times) they are describing changes in the variable
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features of marriage. The universal, nearly universal, and variable features
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6 can be detected only by a comparative methodology. In other words,
12 with others will any repetitive characteristics stand out.3 When these are
13 examined in connection with the original example, the latter will be seen
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to have both universal and variable features. Put otherwise, when only one
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historical example of marriage is considered, the variables can mask the
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17 universals. This creates conflict between scholars whose perspective is
18 particular (yet make claims about marriage in general) and those whose
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perspective is universal (and base their claims on empirical evidence).
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My Qualifications
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It could be argued that focusing on the universal or nearly universal features would lead to the
26 methodological problem of essentialism. But that is a false problem for three reasons. First, there
really is an empirical basis for these features. Second, using inductive reason to discern patterns is
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a fundamental characteristic of scholarship. And third, any phenomenon so common as to be
28 universal or nearly universal must be examined extremely carefully, for it likely reveals
something basic in human nature.
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1 11. As a full professor in the Faculty of Religious Studies at McGill
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University, and as James McGill Professor, I have expertise in
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comparative religion (also known as the history and phenomenology of
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religions) in general and on Hinduism in particular. The assumption of the
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6 comparative approach is that one must have in-depth historical and
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12. Comparative religion is an empirical and social scientific approach to
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religion, not a theological or faith-based one. The German title of the field
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28 is Religionswissenschaft, often translated into English as the “scientific
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1 study of religion.” In France, it is known as sciences réligieuses. My initial
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training in comparative religion, in the late 1960s at the University of
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Chicago, was under Mircea Eliade. He was most famous (and probably
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still is) for his comparative approach. Although I learned much from his
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6 comparative method, I have refined it by drawing on the approach of
7 cultural anthropology. The latter pays more attention than Eliade did to
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patterns determined by economic and political organization. I find that
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religious worldviews and symbol systems change according to these
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11 variables. My interest in comparative religion also developed at the Center
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1 Arvind Sharma: Women and World Religions (1987), Today's Woman in
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World Religions (1993), Religion and Women (1994), Feminism and
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World Religions (as joint editor, 1999), Women Saints in World Religions
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(2000), and Methodologies in Religious Studies: The Interface with
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6 Women's Studies (2002). Women and World Religions has been used as a
7 textbook for courses in religion throughout Canada and the United States.
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Feminism and World Religions was selected by Choice as a book of
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excellence in January 2000. In 2003, Arvind Sharma and I edited yet
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11 another volume: Her Voice, Her Faith (Westview).
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13 14. The study of gender and religion could not be complete without a study of
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men. I have been working with a colleague, Dr. Paul Nathanson, whose
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expertise complements my own. For the past fifteen years, we have been
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17 writing a trilogy on gender and men: Spreading Misandry: The Teaching
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1 perspectives. Our goal has been justice for both women and men and
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elimination of old and new double standards.
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15. My third area of interest, developed over the past fifteen years, has been
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6 comparative ethics in general and Hindu ethics in particular. I am a
7 member of the McGill Centre for Medicine, Ethics and Law. I have sat for
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five years on a national advisory body dealing with ethical problems in
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research.4 And I have published comparative studies on religion, health,
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11 and ethics; euthanasia; Eastern concepts of death and dying; and Hindu
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1 reproductive power and autonomy for women; and natural law.5 For this
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project, in addition, we examined the positions of Canadian religious
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groups and their contributions to the Royal Commission on New
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Reproductive Technologies. Because we worked on this project and the
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6 one on men at the same time, we paid special attention to the ways in
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13 17. For almost twenty-five years, I have collaborated with Nathanson on
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funded research projects about families and marriage - the most recent one
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being on same-sex marriage.6 Our collaboration is based on the conviction
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17 that current debates over marriage must be assessed not only in connection
18 with historical and cross-cultural research into the function and meaning
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of marriage but also in connection with the risks involved in redefining
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marriage. To help correct biases, our approach involves both academic
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research and dialogue. One of us is a man, the other a woman. One is a
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23 Jew, the other a gentile. One is interested primarily in history and
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Paul Nathanson and Katherine K. Young, “On Biology and Destiny,” Ecumenist 27.2 (1989):
25 29-32; Work in Progress: Katherine K. Young and Paul Nathanson, Three Views on Assisted
Reproduction: A Comparative Perspective.
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Katherine K. Young and Paul Nathanson, “The Future of an Experiment” in Divorcing
27 Marriage: Unveiling the Dangers in Canada’s New Social Experiment ed. Daniel Cere and
28 Douglas Farrow (Montreal: published for the Institute for the Study of Marriage, Law and Culture
by McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004).
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1 anthropology, the other in contemporary popular culture. One specializes
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in Western civilizations, the other in Eastern civilizations. And one is
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homosexual, the other heterosexual. Together, through dialogue based on
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our life experiences and complementary areas of expertise, we have a
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6 unique vantage point. This helps us understand the complexity of gender
12 have used a comparative focus to see how world religions deal with
13 diversity, tolerance, and minorities. Teaching has helped me to consider
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the current demand for same-sex marriage in relation to minority status
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and discrimination.7
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18 19. My comparative studies over the past thirty years have led me to take a
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new direction. I have worked with a team of scholars from several
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disciplines (law, health sciences, and environmental studies) to develop
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ways of integrating expertise to solve major social problems. This
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23 approach is called “transdisciplinarity.” In my understanding, it takes
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1 near Paris, sponsored by the EOLSS Foundation and the UNESCO
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Division of Philosophy and Ethics; the proceedings were published in
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2000.8 The use of expertise in several areas, which is required for
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problem-solving and decision-making in court cases such as this one, is an
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6 example of transdisciplinarity at work.
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Comparative Religion: General Comments
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11 20. Scholars in comparative religion study the worldviews of both small-scale
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1 contraception, birth, and childrearing. They produce primary sets of
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“reproductive rules,” which constitute “parental investment handbooks.” 9
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21. Religions (and cultures) are concerned with social matters, too. Three
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6 major themes come up in the sociology of religion: “Religion is a social
7 phenomenon. Each religious tradition grows out of it, and in turn acts back
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upon, the social life of the people who participate in it. Religious traditions
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contain a systematic set of beliefs that are acted upon and sustained by
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11 rituals and institutions. Each tradition constructs a religious ethos that
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1 used to make inductive generalizations. These generalizations, in turn,
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invite explanations. Empirical data comes from the anthropological study
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of both small-scale and large-scale societies to discern what is universal,
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nearly universal, and variable.
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7 Marriage as a Norm: The Perspective of Comparative Religion
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23. The definitions of “spouse” and “marriage” in American law have been
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11 criticized by advocates of same-sex marriage for assuming that marriage
12 must be between a man and a woman; that its main purpose is procreation;
13 and that no explanation is given for this definition. In this declaration, I
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will use empirical evidence to show that marriage has been a norm
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essential to public order.
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18 24. A norm is a collective preference. Support is provided by religious or legal
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authority. Conformity is encouraged by rewards and discouraged by lack
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of rewards. All societies have found it necessary to establish norms not
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only for sexual behavior but for most other forms of behavior as well. That
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23 is because no society can have it all, just as no individual can. Every
24 society must make choices. And choosing one thing - one form of
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behavior, say - inevitably means not choosing others. Although nature
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helps identify and establish norms, nature itself does not enforce norms;
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1 instead, culture has had to do so1112 Every society, therefore, has found it
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necessary - whether formally or informally, directly or indirectly - to
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reward some forms of behavior and not reward others. Marriage is every
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society's norm for reproduction – whether society is secular or religious -
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6 and it has always been associated with the highest authority (ancestors,
18 have the norms on which order is based. The only question is whether this
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or that norm is useful and should be protected or preserved.
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26. Not only do all societies create norms, but all individuals live by them as
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23 well. There is no such thing as a human tabula rasa, someone who could
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Humans have developed a greatly enhanced capacity for culture. This has passed from one
25 generation to another. "Humans learn the rules that govern behavior and how to conform to them;
they also attach meaning to their ideas" – and - "Gender expands the definition of `sex' beyond its
26 physical connotation. Its scope spans the social, cultural, and psychological aspects of sex. This
point cannot be made strongly enough: the uniqueness of human sexuality lies in the interaction
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between biology and the social, cultural, and psychological worlds" (Robin Fox, Kinship and
28 Marriage: An Anthropological Perspective [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967], 72
and 75).
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1 engage in an activity without at least some awareness - no matter how
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rudimentary, distorted, or subconsciously manipulated by linguistic and
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other symbols - of its cultural context. Other species rely heavily on
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instinct. What instinct does for them, by and large, culture does for us.
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7 27. As I will demonstrate below, every society creates some cultural matrix
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for reproduction and parenting, for bonding men and women together, for
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giving children the best possible opportunities to grow to maturity and to
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11 develop identities that give meaning and purpose to their different bodies.
12 Or, to put it another way, every society fosters norms that are
13 advantageous for conception, childbirth, and childcare. Not surprisingly,
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no society (unless it is in the process of disintegrating) has ever left family
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life - including the supposedly biological mechanics of reproduction -
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17 entirely to nature.
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The five features of marriage elaborated
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28. We need culture to complement nature: This lies at the core of being
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23 human and has major implications for the reproductive cycle. Much of
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1 particular cultures are not genetically encoded, the ability and need to
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create culture is genetically encoded. We are equipped and even driven by
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nature, paradoxically, to be cultural beings. This has made us more
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flexible than animals, which rely entirely (or almost entirely in the cases
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6 of some other primate species) on nature. And this, in turn, has greatly
24 behaviors that are required by family life within a larger society. This
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Anthropologists distinguish between mating and marriage. See Vernon Reynolds, "The
26 Biological Basis of Human Patterns of Mating and Marriage," in Mating and Marriage, ed.
Vernon Reynolds and John Kellett (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1991, 46). For the latest
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scientific research on the relation between nature and culture in the process that bonds men and
28 women, see Helen Fisher, Why We Love: The Nature and Chemistry of Romantic Love (New
York: Henry Holt, 2004).
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1 leads directly to the following more specific needs of every society.
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Because these are basic needs, they inform the norms, or ideals, of every
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society.
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6 29. Children need a parent of each sex: Why? Because the sexes are not quite
24 view: that no female can teach any male about the experience of being
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male (and therefore about being masculine). Both claims are sometimes
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exaggerated, because each sex can teach the other at least some things
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The most obvious example would hermaphrodites, who are born with the sexual organs of both
sexes.
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1 merely by virtue of being observers or "outsiders." Boys do need to know
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how women perceive men and what they expect from men, for instance.
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Similarly, girls do need to know how men perceive women and what they
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expect from women. It could be argued (and often is) that parents can
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6 always bring in relatives or friends of the opposite sex to be models and
7 mentors for masculine identity. True, but these people are surrogates; they
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do not live with the children on a continuing and enduring basis. The need
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for fathers is particularly acute for boys, moreover. Like girls, they must
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11 separate from their mothers. Unlike girls, however, they must also switch
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1 against it, in the sense of having a complementary and not antagonistic
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cultural component, all societies have given priority to biological parents
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and encouraged unrelated parents to step in only as needed in unusual
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cases.
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7 32. But our ancestors knew nothing of DNA testing, so how did they identify
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these biological fathers? Not all of the men who once believed that they
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were fathers actually were fathers, true, but they were exceptions. Most
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11 men had good reasons for believing that they were fathers. Almost all
18 fidelity to their wives (so that the latter can be confident of receiving
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resources and protection). Third is the nearly universal rule that men and
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women should marry before having children (and therefore after taking
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those vows). Marriage is a public event, therefore, announcing that
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23 couples are ready to have children.
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33. According to G. Robina Quale, "marriage systems tend to be most flexible
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of all in the affluent modern urban industrial-commercial societies ... But
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G. Robina Quale, A History of Marriage Systems, Contributions in Family Studies, 13 (New
York: Greenwood, 1988), 25.
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1 even there, biological concerns continue to play their age-old role."18 A
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few societies have preferred social parenting, not biological parenting. The
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Israeli kibbutz is one obvious example. Even on the kibbutz, though,
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children know their biological parents and spend some time every day
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6 with them. By and large, social parenting is encouraged only in connection
7 with orphans, remarriage, and infertility. There are a few other exceptions,
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such as social fatherhood in some matrilineal societies.
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11 34. Every society needs to bring men and women together for the common
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1 35. At the heart of human existence is a natural asymmetry between the sexes.
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Because women produce a limited number of eggs, they choose their
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mates with long-term goals in mind; even now, most women invest
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heavily in gestation, childbirth (often painful and historically dangerous),
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6 lactation, and the care of infants and young children. Because men
18 pregnancy and the years before their children mature. Second, men are
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more likely to provide care for children, food and protection, if they know
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that these children are their own. Husbands can usually assume that their
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wives are loyal, because cultural rules ensure that no other men have
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23 access to them.20 Third, men receive not only sexual pleasure but also care
24 from long-term partnerships with women; most men learn21 that this is
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This is an argument made by evolutionists and evolutionary psychologists. For the former, see
David C. Geary and Mark V. Flinn, "Evolution of Human Parental Behavior and the Human
26 Family," Parenting: Science and Practice, 1:1-2 (January-June 2001): 5-61. The authors analyze
the transition from primates to humans. For a summary of the scholarship and additional
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references, see Browning, 106-111.
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Men learn this partly by experiencing it personally and partly by absorbing cultural traditions.
Society exacts a heavy price on those men who still fail to learn it and act accordingly.
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1 ultimately more satisfying than promiscuity. And fourth, the parental
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experience of caring for their children, what is called "kin altruism,"
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extends to their mates in a kind of reciprocal altruism.22
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6 37. Men need to have a stake in the family and society: Like women, men are
7 not merely pawns in the larger game of society. All people need to be
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needed in one way or another. Otherwise, no one could find meaning or
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purpose in life. Otherwise, in fact, no one could form a healthy identity.
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11 Nathanson and I have defined that elsewhere23 in terms of at least one
18 that men do indeed feel connected with society. This gives every man a
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personal stake not only in the welfare of society but also in the future of
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society. (Any adult who does not have a stake in society is by definition
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either reclusive or antisocial in the sense of hostility toward society, not
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23 merely lack of sociability.) For many men, this stake is represented
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39. To have a stake in the future of society is by definition to have a stake in
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future generations - which is to say, in communal survival. And that, in
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turn, means - for most, though not all men - having children. The second
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6 part of this statement might require some explanation. Ethologists would
7 focus attention on the genes and their reproduction. From that point of
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view, the relationships (if any) that men have with their children would be
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irrelevant.
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12 40. But men are people, not merely carriers of genes. From this point of view,
13 their relationships do matter. And marriage is the institution that
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establishes and supports those relationships. That is by no means,
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however, the only way in which men create identity by contributing to
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17 society. Even though I argue here that opposite-sex couples are more
24 children (and do not marry) are by no means cut off by that very fact from
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having healthy identities - what is referred to as "dignity" and "self-
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esteem." And any society that insists on conformity without exception to
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1 one model - in this case, marriage - would be greatly impoverished as a
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result.
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The Universal Features of Marriage
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7 41. I have already said that marriage is an institution with five functions. In
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this section, I will show that my general definition of marriage can be
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supported by the findings of cultural anthropology. In the section on
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11 historical evidence, I will show that the universal features of my general
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1 The second and third definitions depend on the first: social conditions for
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procreation. Here is another encyclopedia definition. “Marriage has two
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main functions: it is the means adopted by human society for regulating
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the relations between the sexes; and it furnishes the mechanism by means
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6 of which the relation of a child to the community is determined … The
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1 cultural method can test a hypothesis suggested by a single case and can
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check the validity of common assumptions derived from the study of a few
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cases. The results can help anthropologists to rethink their assumptions
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and the bases for concepts.”26 Frayser bases her analysis on a sample of
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6 sixty-two societies from Africa, Circum-Mediterranean, Eurasia, Insular
7 Pacific, North America, and South America. They represent eight types of
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economy and five types of lineage or descent.
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11 43. Frayser’s position is the following: "[T]he definition [of marriage] should
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1 people can be reproductive. In purely sexual relationships, they should not
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be reproductive."27
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Historical Evidence
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7 44. I have tested Frayser's definition of marriage, derived from a cross-cultural
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study, against my own definition of marriage that arises from a
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comparative study of the marriage norms of those world religions that
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11 have survived from earlier civilizations (Judaism, Confucianism,
25 28
The word "universalism" usually refers to proselytism. Universal religions are said to be those
that spread throughout the world through conversion (and sometimes conquest). Jews, though,
26 have often called that a spurious form of universalism - one that relies on conformity to a single
notion of truth. For Jews, the word signifies something more general: openness to the larger
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world. That is distinguished from "particularism," which refers to ethnocentrism. Both
28 perspectives have been around for a very long time, and the resulting tension could be described
as a characteristic feature of Judaism both ancient and modern.
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1 have been influenced by modernity and are undertaking reforms,
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especially to improve the position of women.
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46. Ethnic religions include Judaism, Confucianism, and Hinduism. These, at
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6 least in their early stages, have been associated with specific territories and
7 languages. People are “born into” them. Marriage and the family,
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including ancestors, are particularly important. Family solidarity and
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durability are valued very highly. Marriage and procreation are
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11 encouraged, therefore, and almost always required of the adherents to
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1 home in search of salvation. Denying the claims of family life altogether, they
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become monastics or saints. Nevertheless, most people orient themselves toward
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marriage and family life.
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6 Universal features
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48. The five major world religions apart from Buddhism29 - Judaism, Confucianism,
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Hinduism, Christianity, and Islam - illustrate the universal features of marriage.
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11 They (1) encourage procreation under specific conditions; (2) recognize the
12 interdependence of men and women; (3) define eligible partners; (4) are
13 supported by authority and incentives; (5) have public dimensions; and (6)
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provide mutual support not only between men and women but also between them
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and children.
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18 49. Procreation under specific conditions. Implicit in the importance given to
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maleness and femaleness, their union being central to creation or to the
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cosmic order, is the realization that group survival depends on unions of
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this kind. World religions use authority and incentives to bond biological
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23 fathers to their wives and children, thus providing the nuclear family with
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1
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50. The interdependence of men and women. Religions have recognized that
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maleness and femaleness lie at the heart of human existence - and that
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each has a cosmic dimension (an image of the deity, say, or a fundamental
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6 aspect of creation).
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51. Eligible partners. Restrictions on who may marry indicate that societies
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disapprove of marriage within the immediate family and permit marriage
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11 only between a man and a woman.
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13 52. Authority and incentives. The highest authority in traditional societies is
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mediated by scripture or religious law. Of interest here are not the details
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but the fact that marriage has been considered important enough to be
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17 supported with the highest authority and with the most attractive
18 incentives possible.
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53. Public dimension. Weddings are public events. This aspect might involve
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special times (seasons or weeks), witnesses, vows, the exchange of rings
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23 or other emblems, an exchange of gifts, processions accompanied by
24 music, feasts, and so on. All of these public features distinguish marriage
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from mere mating and define it as a norm.
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1 54. Mutual support not only between men and women but also between them
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and children. The contributions of both men and women - providing food,
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shelter, clothing, and so on - are necessary for family life. The duties of
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adults toward children include moral training and education.
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7 55. For these reasons, it is a universal that the highest authority (law in some
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societies) encourages marriage.
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11 Dissimilarity of same-sex relationship with universal marriage
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13 56. Advocates for same-sex marriage emphasize similarities between same-
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sex and opposite-sex couples and ignore the chief differences highlighted
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by these universals. They emphasize that marriage is appropriate for them,
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17 because they love each other and seek a life-long commitment to one
18 another.
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57. But notice that "mutual affection and companionship" are in the nearly
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universal category, not the universal one. That is partly because some
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23 small-scale societies do not base their social structures on long-term
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1 establish the historical and cross-cultural record, however, not to argue for
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arranged marriages. Even though "love and commitment" are reasons that
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many Americans now give for wanting to marry, they are not necessarily
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the underlying ones. People might or might not be conscious of the latter,
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6 because these are so deeply embedded in cultural structures that they are
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1
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61. For opposite-sex couples to do their job properly, as parents, they must be
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able to rely on a culture that openly and unequivocally supports the project
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of perpetuating society and addressing the special needs of heterosexual
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6 couples, who will remain the majority of reproductive couples. I am
7 referring to the symbols and ideals that have always been promoted by
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means of a massive cultural effort, one that now involves public
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"agencies" as different as schools and movies. If same-sex marriage were
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11 legalized and therefore defined as different in no significant way from any
12 other form of marriage, after all, then it would inevitably become illegal
13 (let alone "politically incorrect") to say in public that society relies more
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on heterosexual couples than it does on homosexual couples. And, frankly,
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it does. This is neither prejudice nor speculation. It is a biological and
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17 demographic fact (even if a few homosexual couples do have children and
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1 "flows back and forth between facts, including scientific facts, ethics and
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law ... This is not accidental: Good ethics depends on good facts, and good
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law depends on good ethics. Risk is often among the most important of the
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ethically relevant facts ... Even when we turn just to physical risks, there
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6 can be uncertainty, because the scientists cannot agree on the magnitude
18 physicians and scientists have "an obligation to inform the public of the
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risks of their research or those of its potential applications and uses." 31
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But, I would add, so do lawyers and politicians. Especially when they
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formally represent the government and advocate historically
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23 unprecedented experiments. The principle of informed consent applies to
36
1 these considerations should have been taken seriously but were not.
2
Consider a parallel from forty years ago: liberalizing divorce laws to
3
lighten the burden on a few unhappy couples. At the time, who could have
4
known that this would lead to the "divorce culture"32 of our time? No one
5
6 could have known, of course, but many could have taken the risk seriously
12
13 65. The risks for children: My argument against same-sex marriage and same-
14
sex parenting is not based on the spurious claim that gay people are
15
inadequate as parents but on the obvious fact that every child ideally needs
16
17 at least one parent of each sex. Advocates of sam-sex marriage are
24 and gay parenting would symbolically strengthen the bonds between all
25
parents and children. On closer examination, though, it is clear that this
26
would be unlikely to happen. The social-science evidence is sometimes
27
28
32
Barbara Whitehead, The Divorce Culture: Rethinking Our Commitment to Marriage and
Family (New York: Knopf; Random House, 1997).
37
1 ambiguous, but we do know by now not only that two parents are
2
generally better for children than one33 but also that families with both
3
mothers and fathers are generally better for children - even in a society
4
that has already minimized its support for marriage - than those with only
5
6 mothers or only fathers34 and that families headed by biological parents are
7 statistically less risky for children than those headed by social parents.35
8 33
See, for instance, Lingxin Hao, "Family Structure, Private Transfers, and the Economic Well-
9 Being of Families with Children," Social Forces, 75 (1996): 269-292; Frank F. Furstenberg and
Andrew Cherlin, Divided Families: What Happens to Children When Parents Part (Cambridge:
10 Harvard University Press, 1991); and Adam Shapiro and James David Lambert, "Longitudinal
Effects of Divorce on the Quality of the Father-Child Relationship and on Fathers' Well-being,"
11 Journal of Marriage and the Family, 61 (May 1999): 397-408.
12 34
See David Blankenhorn, Fatherless America: Confronting Our Most Urgent Social Problem
13 (New York: Basic Books, 1995). Even when other factors (such as race and intelligence are) are
accounted for, it remains true that boys without fathers are approximately twice as likely (and
14 boys who grow up in stepfamilies are approximately three times as likely) as other boys to end up
in jail by their early thirties. See Cynthia Harper and Sara McLanahan, "Father Absence and
15 Youth Incarceration," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological
Association, San Francisco, August 1998.
16 The same is true of teenagers. See Chris Coughlin and Samuel Vuchinich, "Family
Experience in Preadolescence and the Development of Male Delinquency," Journal of Marriage
17
and the Family, 58.2 (1998): 491ff.; R. J. Sampson and J.H. Laub, "Urban Poverty and the Family
18 Context of Delinquency: A New Look at Structure and Process in a Classic Study," Child
Development, 65 (1994): 523-540; Robert J. Sampson, "Urban Black Violence: The Effect of
19 Male Joblessness and Family Disruption," American Journal of Sociology, 93 (1987): 348-382;
Ross L. Matsueda and Karen Heimer, "Race, Family Structure and Delinquency: A Test of
20 Differential Association and Social Control Theories," American Sociological Review, 52 (1987):
171-181; George Thomas and Michael P. Farrell, "The Effects of Single-Mother Families and
21 Nonresident Fathers on Delinquency and Substance Abuse," Journal of Marriage and the Family,
58.4 (1996): 884ff.
22
23
35
Children not living with both of their married parents - that is, mothers and fathers - are at
greater risk of being physically or emotionally damaged. See S.J. Creighton, "An
24 Epidemiological Study of Abused Children and Their Families in the United Kingdom between
1977 and 1982, Child Abuse and Neglect, 9 (1985): 441-448; M. Daly and M.I. Wilson, "Some
25 Differential Attributes of Lethal Assaults on Small Children by Stepfathers versus Genetic
Fathers," Ethology and Sociobiology, 15 (1994): 207-217; M. Daly and M.I. Wilson, "Violence
26 against Stepchildren," Current Directions in Psychological Science, 3 (1996): 77-81; C.D. Siegel
et al., "Mortality from Intentional and Unintentional Injury among Infants of Young Mothers in
27
Colorado, 1982 to 1992," Archives of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine, 150.10 (1996): 1077-
28 1083; Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, "Evolutionary Psychology and Marital Conflict: The
Relevance of Stepchildren," in Sex, Power, Conflict: Evolutionary and Feminist Perspectives, ed.
David M. Buss and Neil M. Malamuth (London: Oxford University Press, 1996): 9-28; Martin
38
1
2
66. The risks for boys and men: Very few people today would deny that every
3
child needs a mother. But many people do deny that every child needs a
4
father as well. The message from both political rhetoric and popular
5
6 culture, at any rate, is often that fathers are practical or sentimental
7 luxuries at best (as assistant mothers) but dangerous liabilities at worst (as
8
potential molesters).36 In this environment, it is no wonder that so many
9
people see nothing wrong with a family that includes no man.
10
11
12 67. This matter is even more complicated than that, however, when you
13 consider the historical and cross-cultural evidence. Masculine identity has
14
always and everywhere been defined primarily in connection with three
15
functions of men: provider, protector, and progenitor.37 But women have
16
17 moved into the public sphere and become providers. Moreover, they have
18 demanded that the state take over from individual men as protectors. That
19
leaves progenitor - fatherhood - as the only possible source of healthy
20
masculine identity.
21
22
23 Daly and Margo Wilson, "Child Abuse and Other Risks of Not Living with Both Parents,"
Ethology and Sociobiology, 6 (1985): 197-210; Leslie Margolin, "Child Abuse by Mothers'
24 Boyfriends: Why the Overrepresentation?" Child Abuse and Neglect, 16 (1992): 541-551; and
Rebekah Levin Coley and P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale, "Stability and Change in Paternal
25 Involvement among Urban African American Fathers," Journal of Family Psychology, 13.3
(1999): 416-435.
26
36
See Nathanson and Young, Spreading Misandry.
27
28
37
David D. Gilmore, Manhood in the Making: Cultural Concepts of Masculinity (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1990).
39
1 68. We need no prophet to see that massive social problems, more widespread
2
than the ones we already have, are likely to emerge whenever and
3
wherever boys or young men are unable to feel deeply involved in either
4
the family or society as a whole – or, to put it another way, in the future of
5
6 society. Consider the soaring rate at which young men, unlike young
7 women, not only drop out of school but also commit suicide. Over the past
8
few decades, we have seen a resurgence of machismo in its most toxic
9
form. To many boys, it seems clear that even a negative identity is better
10
11 than no identity at all. This alone should give us pause in contemplating
12 the future.
13
14
69. The risks for women: The big winners of the reproduction sweepstakes
15
would be women who want little or nothing to do with men. Women,
16
17 whether lesbian or heterosexual, now have greater access to reproduction
18 than men for at least three reasons: their natural ability to gestate, the
19
prevalence of sperm banks, and the widespread belief that they have some
20
"right" to children. For the past several decades, feminists have
21
campaigned for reproductive autonomy and power. For women, of course,
22
23 not for men.
24
25
70. We should not take the involvement of men in family life for granted. Men
26
who lack strong ties with their families are unlikely to invest much toward
27
28 the welfare of the wives and children. Men who lack biological ties with
40
1 future generations, moreover, are unlikely to invest in the future of society.
2
The corollary, of course, is to live for themselves and for the moment.
3
That is the orientation of hedonism.
4
5
6 71. The risks for society as a whole: What we have here is a demographic
7 time bomb. To avoid detonation, we will have to see children as more than
8
personal possessions that supply us with emotional gratification. We will
9
have to re-create, in other words, a culture that actively promotes
10
11 demographic continuity. The only alternative is to maintain the population
18 between marriages and unions that have no function other than personal
19
and emotional gratification, one that considers them religious bigots for
20
even making that distinction. Although some gay people do indeed have
21
children, most do not. Which would be fine if we could continue to
22
23 promote marriage as the one institution that is fundamentally about
24 children - that is, about the future of society. But redefining marriage in
25
terms of the "love and commitment" between adult individuals would
26
undermine that effort.
27
28
41
1 Conclusions
2
3
72. From my study of comparative religions and the secular cultures that have
4
derived from them, it is my opinion that marriage is an institution with
5
6 five functions: (1) complementing nature with culture to create a culturally
12 biological parents whenever possible; (4) bring men and women together
13 for both practical and symbolic purposes; (5) providing men with a stake
14
in the family and society. As such, marriage has been a universal norm.
15
16
17 73. Today, though, many argue that the main reason for marriage is
42
1 as one context for producing or rearing children, both of which can occur -
2
and often do - without marriage. Marriage has always been defined as an
3
ideal context for producing and rearing children. An ideal context is
4
arguably needed now more than ever. Despite its imperfections, there is no
5
6 environment better than marriage for raising children. That is because
18 the point of norms but also the aims of those who advocate a society
19
without what they consider the “oppression” of norms. Either way, the end
20
result could be anomie.
21
22
23 75. Another effect inherent in legalizing same-sex marriage would be the
43
1 advocating repeal, have usually been content to imagine perfect societies
2
in some transcendent realm beyond history.
3
4
76. If same-sex marriage were legalized because of arguments for equality
5
6 based on “diversity,” the cultural norm of opposite-sex marriage would
7 have no basis. The whole idea of a norm, after all, would be precluded.
8
This could cause problems because culture complements nature in the very
9
definition of human beings, which means that marriage is necessary for
10
11 culturally approved forms of procreation and, by extension, of
44
1 families led by single women? Who would have predicted even ten years
2
ago that acts of compassion for a few childless couples, sponsoring
3
research on in vitro fertilization and other reproductive technologies,
4
would lead to debates over the ethics of human cloning? In all of these
5
6 cases and many more, the original solutions to problems turned into the
45
1 I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that
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the foregoing is true and correct.
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Executed this ____ day of November, 2004 at
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6 __________________________, Canada.
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By ___________________________
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11 Katherine Young
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