John Stuart Mill argues that moral theories are divided between two distinct approaches:

the intuitive and inductive schools. Although both schools agree on the existence oI a single and
highest normative principle (being that actions are right iI they tend to promote happiness and
wrong iI they tend to produce the reverse oI happiness), they disagree about whether we have
knowledge oI that principle intuitively, or inductively. Mill criticises categorical imperative,
stating that it is essentially the same as utilitarianism, since it involves calculating the good or
bad consequences oI an action to determine the morality oI that action.
Mill deIines "happiness" to be both intellectual and sensual pleasure. He argues that we
have a sense oI dignity that makes us preIer intellectual pleasures to sensual ones. He adds that
the principle oI utility involves assessing an action's consequences, and not the motives or
character traits oI the agent. Mill argues that the principle oI utility should be seen as a tool Ior
generating secondary moral principles, which promote general happiness. Thus most oI our
actions will be judged according to these secondary principles. He Ieels that we should appeal
directly to the principle oI utility itselI only when Iaced with a moral dilemma between two
secondary principles. For example, a moral principle oI charity dictates that one should Ieed a
starving neighbour, and the moral principle oI selI-preservation dictates that one should Ieed
oneselI. II one does not have enough Iood to do both, then one should determine whether general
happiness would be better served by Ieeding my neighbour, or Ieeding oneselI.
Mill discusses our motivations to abide by the utilitarian standard oI morality. Man is not
commonly motivated to speciIic acts such as to kill or steal, instead, we are motivated to promote
general happiness. Mill argues that there are two classes oI motivations Ior promoting general
happiness. First, there are external motivations arising Irom our hope oI pleasing and Iear oI
displeasing God and other humans. More importantly, there is a motivation internal to the agent,
which is the Ieeling oI duty. For Mill, an this Ieeling oI duty consists oI an amalgamation oI
diIIerent Ieelings developed over time, such as sympathy, religious Ieelings, childhood
recollections, and selI-worth. The binding Iorce oI our sense oI duty is the experience oI pain or
remorse when one acts against these Ieelings by not promoting general happiness. Mill argues
that duty is subjective and develops with experience. However, man has an instinctive Ieeling oI
unity, which guides the development oI duty toward general happiness.
Mill's prooI Ior the principle oI utility notes that no Iundamental principle is capable oI a
direct prooI. Instead, the only way to prove that general happiness is desirable is to show man's
desire Ior it. His prooI is as Iollows: II X is the only thing desired, then X is the only thing that
ought to be desired. Thus iI general happiness is the only thing desired, thereIore general
happiness is the only thing that ought to be desired. Mill recognises the controversiality oI this
and thereIore anticipates criticisms. A critic might argue that besides happiness, there are other
things, such as virtue, which we desire. Responding to this, Mill says that everything we desire
becomes part oI happiness. Thus, happiness becomes a complex phenomenon composed oI many
parts, such as virtue, love oI money, power, and Iame.
Critics oI utilitarianism argue that unlike the suppositions oI the utilitarians, morality is not
based on consequences oI actions. Instead, it is based on the Iundamental concept oI justice. Mill
sees the concept oI justice as a case Ior utilitarianism. Thus, he uses the concept oI justice,
explained in terms oI utility, to address the main argument against utilitarianism. Mill oIIers two
counter arguments. First, he argues that social utility governs all moral elements in the notion oI
justice. The two essential elements in the notion oI justice are: punishment, and the violation oI
another's rights. Punishment results Irom a combination oI revenge and collective social
sympathy. As a single entity, revenge has no moral component, and collective social sympathy is
equal to social utility. Violation oI rights is also derived Irom utility, as rights are claims that one
has on society to protect us. Thus, social utility is the only reason society should protect us.
Consequently, both elements oI justice are based on utility. Mill's second argument is that iI
justice were Ioundational, then justice would not be ambiguous. According to Mill, there are
disputes in the notion oI justice when examining theories oI punishment, Iair distribution oI
wealth, and Iair taxation. Only by appealing to utility can these disputes be resolved. Mill
concludes that justice is a genuine concept, but it must be seen as based on utility.

The moral standards are diIIerent Irom ethics and laws because they govern behavior that could
possibly cause serious consequences to humans such as injure or beneIit people. Moral norms
against lying, stealing, and murdering are intended speciIically to address actions that can harm
people. The moral principle on dignity and respect is intended to beneIit human.
Anything that seriously aIIect human well-being are governed by moral standards Irom healthIul
or harmIul products, saIe or dangerous work environment, Iair or unIair personnel methods or
respect to one's privacy all these areas Iall under moral standards.
Another characteristic oI moral standards which separate it Irom the rest is it takes precedence
over all other standards including selI-interest. Moral standards are more important than other
matters in guiding our actions.
The third characteristic oI moral standards is that they depend on the reasons that justiIy them.
There are no authoritative bodies that can determine moral standards although some bodies do
support or reject them. The validity oI moral standards then unlike other standards does not
depend on authorities but on the reasons that support them. This determines the legitimacy oI
moral principles.
In case oI progressive taxation, moral rights support this particular issue in the sense that it puts
the interest oI the majority above the interests oI the Iew. People earning $750,000 or more are
relatively Iewer than people earning $75,000. Since people earning more generally enjoys more
privileges and luxuries thereIore they need to be taxed more Ior the privileges they enjoy. People
in the lower income bracket spend their money on the basic necessities because they don't have
enough to spend Ior expensive luxuries. ThereIore, imposing higher tax on them would greatly
decrease their ability to avail these basic necessities such as Iood, clothing and shelter. Those
with higher income can aIIord to buy the basic necessities and still have more to spare.
Increasing the income tax oI those earning more will not curtail their ability to buy the basic
necessities. It is only morally right that they pay more taxes because they enjoy more privileges
than those in the lower income brackets.

Ethics
The Iield oI ethics (or moral philosophy) involves systematizing, deIending, and recommending
concepts oI right and wrong behavior. Philosophers today usually divide ethical theories into
three general subject areas: metaethics, normative ethics, and applied
ethics. Metaethics investigates where our ethical principles come Irom, and what they mean. Are
they merely social inventions? Do they involve more than expressions oI our individual
emotions? Metaethical answers to these questions Iocus on the issues oI universal truths, the will
oI God, the role oI reason in ethical judgments, and the meaning oI ethical terms
themselves. Normative ethics takes on a more practical task, which is to arrive at moral standards
that regulate right and wrong conduct. This may involve articulating the good habits that we
should acquire, the duties that we should Iollow, or the consequences oI our behavior on others.
Finally, applied ethics involves examining speciIic controversial issues, such as abortion,
inIanticide, animal rights,environmental concerns, homosexuality, capital punishment, or
nuclear war.
By using the conceptual tools oI metaethics and normative ethics, discussions in applied ethics
try to resolve these controversial issues. The lines oI distinction between metaethics, normative
ethics, and applied ethics are oIten blurry. For example, the issue oI abortion is an applied ethical
topic since it involves a speciIic type oI controversial behavior. But it also depends on more
general normative principles, such as the right oI selI-rule and the right to liIe, which are litmus
tests Ior determining the morality oI that procedure. The issue also rests on metaethical issues
such as, 'where do rights come Irom? and 'what kind oI beings have rights?
%,-0 of Cont0nts
. Metaethics
a. Metaphysical Issues: Objectivism and Relativism
b. Psychological Issues in Metaethics
i. Egoism and Altruism
ii. Emotion and Reason
iii. Male and Female Morality
Normative Ethics
. Virtue Theories
a. Duty Theories
b. Consequentialist Theories
. Types oI Utilitarianism
i. Ethical Egoism and Social Contract Theory
Applied Ethics
. Normative Principles in Applied Ethics
a. Issues in Applied Ethics
ReIerences and Further Reading
M0t,0thics
The term 'meta means after or beyond, and, consequently, the notion oI metaethics involves a
removed, or bird`s eye view oI the entire project oI ethics. We may deIine metaethics as the
study oI the origin and meaning oI ethical concepts. When compared to normative ethics and
applied ethics, the Iield oI metaethics is the least precisely deIined area oI moral philosophy. It
covers issues Irom moral semantics to moral epistemology. Two issues, though, are prominent:
() metaphysical issues concerning whether morality exists independently oI humans, and
(2) psychological issues concerning the underlying mental basis oI our moral judgments and
conduct.
, M0t,5hysic, Issu0s: O-0ctivism ,nd R0,tivism
Metaphysics is the study oI the kinds oI things that exist in the universe. Some things in the
universe are made oI physical stuII, such as rocks; and perhaps other things are nonphysical in
nature, such as thoughts, spirits, and gods. The metaphysical component oI metaethics involves
discovering speciIically whether moral values are eternal truths that exist in a spirit-like realm, or
simply human conventions. There are two general directions that discussions oI this topic take,
one other-worldly and one this-worldly.
Proponents oI the other-worldly view typically hold that moral values are objective in the sense
that they exist in a spirit-like realm beyond subjective human conventions. They also hold that
they are absolute, or eternal, in that they never change, and also that they are universal insoIar as
they apply to all rational creatures around the world and throughout time. The most dramatic
example oI this view is Plato, who was inspired by the Iield oI mathematics. When we look at
numbers and mathematical relations, such as 2, they seem to be timeless concepts that
never change, and apply everywhere in the universe. Humans do not invent numbers, and
humans cannot alter them. Plato explained the eternal character oI mathematics by stating that
they are abstract entities that exist in a spirit-like realm. He noted that moral values also are
absolute truths and thus are also abstract, spirit-like entities. In this sense, Ior Plato, moral values
are spiritual obfects. Medieval philosophers commonly grouped all moral principles together
under the heading oI 'eternal law which were also Irequently seen as spirit-like objects.
7
th
century British philosopher Samuel Clarke described them as spirit-like relationships rather
than spirit-like objects. In either case, though, they exist in a sprit-like realm. A diIIerent other-
worldly approach to the metaphysical status oI morality is divine commands issuing Irom God`s
will. Sometimes calledvoluntarism (or divine command theory), this view was inspired by the
notion oI an all-powerIul God who is in control oI everything. God simply wills things, and they
become reality. He wills the physical world into existence, he wills human liIe into existence
and, similarly, he wills all moral values into existence. Proponents oI this view, such as medieval
philosopher William oI Ockham, believe that God wills moral principles, such as 'murder is
wrong, and these exist in God`s mind as commands. God inIorms humans oI these commands
by implanting us with moral intuitions or revealing these commands in scripture.
The second and more this-worldly approach to the metaphysical status oI morality Iollows in the
skeptical philosophical tradition, such as that articulated by Greek philosopher Sextus Empiricus,
and denies the objective status oI moral values. Technically, skeptics did not reject moral values
themselves, but only denied that values exist as spirit-like objects, or as divine commands in the
mind oI God. Moral values, they argued, are strictly human inventions, a position that has since
been called moral relativism. There are two distinct Iorms oI moral relativism. The Iirst
is individual relativism, which holds that individual people create their own moral standards.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Ior example, argued that the superhuman creates his or her morality distinct
Irom and in reaction to the slave-like value system oI the masses. The second is cultural
relativism which maintains that morality is grounded in the approval oI one`s society and not
simply in the preIerences oI individual people. This view was advocated by Sextus, and in more
recent centuries by Michel Montaigne and William Graham Sumner. In addition to espousing
skepticism and relativism, this-worldly approaches to the metaphysical status oI morality deny
the absolute and universal nature oI morality and hold instead that moral values in Iact change
Irom society to society throughout time and throughout the world. They Irequently attempt to
deIend their position by citing examples oI values that diIIer dramatically Irom one culture to
another, such as attitudes about polygamy, homosexuality and human sacriIice.
- Psychoogic, Issu0s in M0t,0thics
A second area oI metaethics involves the psychological basis oI our moral judgments and
conduct, particularly understanding what motivates us to be moral. We might explore this subject
by asking the simple question, 'Why be moral? Even iI I am aware oI basic moral standards,
such as don`t kill and don`t steal, this does not necessarily mean that I will be psychologically
compelled to act on them. Some answers to the question 'Why be moral? are to avoid
punishment, to gain praise, to attain happiness, to be digniIied, or to Iit in with society.
i. Egoism and Altruism
One important area oI moral psychology concerns the inherent selIishness oI humans.
7
th
century British philosopher Thomas Hobbes held that many, iI not all, oI our actions are
prompted by selIish desires. Even iI an action seems selIless, such as donating to charity, there
are still selIish causes Ior this, such as experiencing power over other people. This view is
called psychological egoism and maintains that selI-oriented interests ultimately motivate all
human actions. Closely related to psychological egoism is a view called psychological
hedonism which is the view that pleasure is the speciIic driving Iorce behind all oI our actions.

th
century British philosopher Joseph Butler agreed that instinctive selIishness and pleasure
prompt much oI our conduct. However, Butler argued that we also have an inherent
psychological capacity to show benevolence to others. This view is called psychological
altruism and maintains that at least some oI our actions are motivated by instinctive benevolence.
ii. Emotion and Reason
A second area oI moral psychology involves a dispute concerning the role oI reason in
motivating moral actions. II, Ior example, I make the statement 'abortion is morally wrong, am
I making a rational assessment or only expressing my Ieelings? On the one side oI the dispute,

th
century British philosopher David Hume argued that moral assessments involve our
emotions, and not our reason. We can amass all the reasons we want, but that alone will not
constitute a moral assessment. We need a distinctly emotional reaction in order to make a moral
pronouncement. Reason might be oI service in giving us the relevant data, but, in Hume`s words,
'reason is, and ought to be, the slave oI the passions. Inspired by Hume`s anti-rationalist views,
some 20th century philosophers, most notably A.J. Ayer, similarly denied that moral assessments
are Iactual descriptions. For example, although the statement 'it is good to donate to charity
may on the surIace look as though it is a Iactual description about charity, it is not. Instead, a
moral utterance like this involves two things. First, I (the speaker) I am expressing my personal
Ieelings oI approval about charitable donations and I am in essence saying 'Hooray Ior charity!
This is called the emotive element insoIar as I am expressing my emotions about some speciIic
behavior. Second, I (the speaker) am trying to get you to donate to charity and am essentially
giving the command, 'Donate to charity! This is called the prescriptive element in the sense
that I am prescribing some speciIic behavior.
From Hume`s day Iorward, more rationally-minded philosophers have opposed these emotive
theories oI ethics (see non-cognitivism in ethics) and instead argued that moral assessments are
indeed acts oI reason.
th
century German philosopher Immanuel Kant is a case in point.
Although emotional Iactors oIten do inIluence our conduct, he argued, we should nevertheless
resist that kind oI sway. Instead, true moral action is motivated only by reason when it is Iree
Irom emotions and desires. A recent rationalist approach, oIIered by Kurt Baier (5), was
proposed in direct opposition to the emotivist and prescriptivist theories oI Ayer and others.
Baier Iocuses more broadly on the reasoning and argumentation process that takes place when
making moral choices. All oI our moral choices are, or at least can be, backed by some reason or
justiIication. II I claim that it is wrong to steal someone`s car, then I should be able to justiIy my
claim with some kind oI argument. For example, I could argue that stealing Smith`s car is wrong
since this would upset her, violate her ownership rights, or put the thieI at risk oI getting caught.
According to Baier, then, proper moral decision making involves giving the best reasons in
support oI one course oI action versus another.
iii. Male and Female Morality
A third area oI moral psychology Iocuses on whether there is a distinctly Iemale approach to
ethics that is grounded in the psychological diIIerences between men and women. Discussions oI
this issue Iocus on two claims: () traditional morality is male-centered, and (2) there is a unique
Iemale perspective oI the world which can be shaped into a value theory. According to many
Ieminist philosophers, traditional morality is male-centered since it is modeled aIter practices
that have been traditionally male-dominated, such as acquiring property, engaging in business
contracts, and governing societies. The rigid systems oI rules required Ior trade and government
were then taken as models Ior the creation oI equally rigid systems oI moral rules, such as lists oI
rights and duties. Women, by contrast, have traditionally had a nurturing role by raising children
and overseeing domestic liIe. These tasks require less rule Iollowing, and more spontaneous and
creative action. Using the woman`s experience as a model Ior moral theory, then, the basis oI
morality would be spontaneously caring Ior others as would be appropriate in each unique
circumstance. On this model, the agent becomes part oI the situation and acts caringly within that
context. This stands in contrast with male-modeled morality where the agent is a mechanical
actor who perIorms his required duty, but can remain distanced Irom and unaIIected by the
situation. A care-based approach to morality, as it is sometimes called, is oIIered by Ieminist
ethicists as either a replacement Ior or a supplement to traditional male-modeled moral systems.
Norm,tiv0 Ethics
Normative ethics involves arriving at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. In a
sense, it is a search Ior an ideal litmus test oI proper behavior. The Golden Rule is a classic
example oI a normative principle: We should do to others what we would want others to do to
us. Since I do not want my neighbor to steal my car, then it is wrong Ior me to steal her car.
Since I would want people to Ieed me iI I was starving, then I should help Ieed starving people.
Using this same reasoning, I can theoretically determine whether any possible action is right or
wrong. So, based on the Golden Rule, it would also be wrong Ior me to lie to, harass, victimize,
assault, or kill others. The Golden Rule is an example oI a normative theory that establishes
a single principle against which we judge all actions. Other normative theories Iocus on a set oI
Ioundational principles, or a set oI good character traits.
The key assumption in normative ethics is that there is only one ultimate criterion oI moral
conduct, whether it is a single rule or a set oI principles. Three strategies will be noted here: ()
virtue theories, (2) duty theories, and (3) consequentialist theories.
, Virtu0 %h0ori0s
Many philosophers believe that morality consists oI Iollowing precisely deIined rules oI conduct,
such as 'don`t kill, or 'don`t steal. Presumably, I must learn these rules, and then make sure
each oI my actions live up to the rules. Virtue ethics, however, places less emphasis on learning
rules, and instead stresses the importance oI developing good habits of character, such as
benevolence (see moral character). Once I`ve acquired benevolence, Ior example, I will then
habitually act in a benevolent manner. Historically, virtue theory is one oI the oldest normative
traditions in Western philosophy, having its roots in ancient Greek civilization. Plato emphasized
Iour virtues in particular, which were later called cardinal virtues: wisdom, courage, temperance
and justice. Other important virtues are Iortitude, generosity, selI-respect, good temper, and
sincerity. In addition to advocating good habits oI character, virtue theorists hold that we should
avoid acquiring bad character traits, or vices, such as cowardice, insensibility, injustice, and
vanity. Virtue theory emphasizes moral education since virtuous character traits are developed in
one`s youth. Adults, thereIore, are responsible Ior instilling virtues in the young.
Aristotle argued that virtues are good habits that we acquire, which regulate our emotions. For
example, in response to my natural Ieelings oI Iear, I should develop the virtue oI courage which
allows me to be Iirm when Iacing danger. Analyzing speciIic virtues, Aristotle argued that
most virtues Iall at a mean between more extreme character traits. With courage, Ior example, iI
I do not have enough courage, I develop the disposition oI cowardice, which is a vice. II I have
too much courage I develop the disposition oI rashness which is also a vice. According to
Aristotle, it is not an easy task to Iind the perIect mean between extreme character traits. In Iact,
we need assistance Irom our reason to do this. AIter Aristotle, medieval theologians
supplemented Greek lists oI virtues with three Christian ones, ortheological virtues: Iaith, hope,
and charity. Interest in virtue theory continued through the middle ages and declined in the

th
century with the rise oI alternative moral theories below. In the mid 20
th
century virtue theory
received special attention Irom philosophers who believed that more recent approaches ethical
theories were misguided Ior Iocusing too heavily on rules and actions, rather than on virtuous
character traits. Alasdaire MacIntyre () deIended the central role oI virtues in moral theory
and argued that virtues are grounded in and emerge Irom within social traditions.
- Duty %h0ori0s
Many oI us Ieel that there are clear obligations we have as human beings, such as to care Ior our
children, and to not commit murder. Duty theories base morality on speciIic, Ioundational
principles oI obligation. These theories are sometimes called deontological, Irom the Greek
word deon, or duty, in view oI the Ioundational nature oI our duty or obligation. They are also
sometimes called nonconsequentialist since these principles are obligatory, irrespective oI the
consequences that might Iollow Irom our actions. For example, it is wrong to not care Ior our
children even iI it results in some great beneIit, such as Iinancial savings. There are Iour central
duty theories.
The first is that championed by 7th century German philosopher Samuel PuIendorI, who
classiIied dozens oI duties under three headings: duties to God, duties to oneselI, and duties to
others. Concerning our duties towards God, he argued that there are two kinds:
. a theoretical duty to know the existence and nature oI God, and
2. a practical duty to both inwardly and outwardly worship God.
Concerning our duties towards oneselI, these are also oI two sorts:
. duties oI the soul, which involve developing one`s skills and talents, and
2. duties oI the body, which involve not harming our bodies, as we might through gluttony or
drunkenness, and not killing oneselI.
Concerning our duties towards others, PuIendorI divides these between absolute duties, which
are universally binding on people, and conditional duties, which are the result oI contracts
between people. Absolute duties are oI three sorts:
. avoid wronging others,
2. treat people as equals, and
3. promote the good oI others.
Conditional duties involve various types oI agreements, the principal one oI which is the duty is
to keep one`s promises.
A second duty-based approach to ethics is rights theory. Most generally, a 'right is a justiIied
claim against another person`s behavior such as my right to not be harmed by you (see
also human rights). Rights and duties are related in such a way that the rights oI one person
implies the duties oI another person. For example, iI I have a right to payment oI $0 by Smith,
then Smith has a duty to pay me $0. This is called the correlativity oI rights and duties. The
most inIluential early account oI rights theory is that oI 7
th
century British philosopher John
Locke, who argued that the laws oI nature mandate that we should not harm anyone`s liIe,
health, liberty or possessions. For Locke, these are our natural rights, given to us by God.
Following Locke, the United States Declaration oI Independence authored by Thomas JeIIerson
recognizes three Ioundational rights: liIe, liberty, and the pursuit oI happiness. JeIIerson and
others rights theorists maintained that we deduce other more speciIic rights Irom these, including
the rights oI property, movement, speech, and religious expression. There are Iour Ieatures
traditionally associated with moral rights. First, rights are natural insoIar as they are not invented
or created by governments. Second, they are universal insoIar as they do not change Irom
country to country. Third, they are equal in the sense that rights are the same Ior all people,
irrespective oI gender, race, or handicap. Fourth, they are inalienable which means that I ca not
hand over my rights to another person, such as by selling myselI into slavery.
A third duty-based theory is that by Kant, which emphasizes a single principle oI duty.
InIluenced by PuIendorI, Kant agreed that we have moral duties to oneselI and others, such as
developing one`s talents, and keeping our promises to others. However, Kant argued that there is
a more Ioundational principle oI duty that encompasses our particular duties. It is a single, selI-
evident principle oI reason that he calls the 'categorical imperative. A categorical imperative,
he argued, is Iundamentally diIIerent Irom hypothetical imperatives that hinge on some personal
desire that we have, Ior example, 'II you want to get a good job, then you ought to go to
college. By contrast, a categorical imperative simply mandates an action, irrespective oI one`s
personal desires, such as 'You ought to do X. Kant gives at least Iour versions oI the
categorical imperative, but one is especially direct: Treat people as an end, and never as a means
to an end. That is, we should always treat people with dignity, and never use them as mere
instruments. For Kant, we treat people as an end whenever our actions toward someone reIlect
the inherent value oI that person. Donating to charity, Ior example, is morally correct since this
acknowledges the inherent value oI the recipient. By contrast, we treat someone as a means to an
end whenever we treat that person as a tool to achieve something else. It is wrong, Ior example,
to steal my neighbor`s car since I would be treating her as a means to my own happiness. The
categorical imperative also regulates the morality oI actions that aIIect us individually. Suicide,
Ior example, would be wrong since I would be treating my liIe as a means to the alleviation oI
my misery. Kant believes that the morality oI all actions can be determined by appealing to this
single principle oI duty.
A fourth and more recent duty-based theory is that by British philosopher W.D. Ross, which
emphasizesprima facie duties. Like his 7th and th century counterparts, Ross argues that our
duties are 'part oI the Iundamental nature oI the universe. However, Ross`s list oI duties is
much shorter, which he believes reIlects our actual moral convictions:
Fidelity: the duty to keep promises
Reparation: the duty to compensate others when we harm them
Gratitude: the duty to thank those who help us
Justice: the duty to recognize merit
Beneficence: the duty to improve the conditions oI others
Self-improvement: the duty to improve our virtue and intelligence
Nonmaleficence: the duty to not injure others
Ross recognizes that situations will arise when we must choose between two conIlicting duties.
In a classic example, suppose I borrow my neighbor`s gun and promise to return it when he asks
Ior it. One day, in a Iit oI rage, my neighbor pounds on my door and asks Ior the gun so that he
can take vengeance on someone. On the one hand, the duty oI Iidelity obligates me to return the
gun; on the other hand, the duty oI nonmaleIicence obligates me to avoid injuring others and thus
not return the gun. According to Ross, I will intuitively know which oI these duties is
my actual duty, and which is my apparent or prima facieduty. In this case, my duty oI
nonmaleIicence emerges as my actual duty and I should not return the gun.
c Cons06u0nti,ist %h0ori0s
It is common Ior us to determine our moral responsibility by weighing the consequences oI our
actions. According to consequentialism, correct moral conduct is determined solely by a cost-
beneIit analysis oI an action`s consequences:
Consequentialism. An action is morally right iI the consequences oI that action are more
Iavorable than unIavorable.
Consequentialist normative principles require that we Iirst tally both the good and bad
consequences oI an action. Second, we then determine whether the total good consequences
outweigh the total bad consequences. II the good consequences are greater, then the action is
morally proper. II the bad consequences are greater, then the action is morally improper.
Consequentialist theories are sometimes called teleological theories, Irom the Greek word telos,
or end, since the end result oI the action is the sole determining Iactor oI its morality.
Consequentialist theories became popular in the
th
century by philosophers who wanted a
quick way to morally assess an action by appealing to experience, rather than by appealing to gut
intuitions or long lists oI questionable duties. In Iact, the most attractive Ieature oI
consequentialism is that it appeals to publicly observable consequences oI actions. Most versions
oI consequentialism are more precisely Iormulated than the general principle above. In
particular, competing consequentialist theories speciIy which consequences Ior aIIected groups
oI people are relevant. Three subdivisions oI consequentialism emerge:
Ethical Egoism: an action is morally right iI the consequences oI that action are more Iavorable
than unIavorable only to the agent perIorming the action.
Ethical Altruism. an action is morally right iI the consequences oI that action are more Iavorable
than unIavorable to everyone except the agent.
Utilitarianism. an action is morally right iI the consequences oI that action are more Iavorable
than unIavorable to everyone.
All three oI these theories Iocus on the consequences oI actions Ior diIIerent groups oI people.
But, like all normative theories, the above three theories are rivals oI each other. They also yield
diIIerent conclusions. Consider the Iollowing example. A woman was traveling through a
developing country when she witnessed a car in Iront oI her run oII the road and roll over several
times. She asked the hired driver to pull over to assist, but, to her surprise, the driver accelerated
nervously past the scene. A Iew miles down the road the driver explained that in his country iI
someone assists an accident victim, then the police oIten hold the assisting person responsible Ior
the accident itselI. II the victim dies, then the assisting person could be held responsible Ior the
death. The driver continued explaining that road accident victims are thereIore usually leIt
unattended and oIten die Irom exposure to the country`s harsh desert conditions. On the principle
oI ethical egoism, the woman in this illustration would only be concerned with the consequences
oI her attempted assistance as she would be aIIected. Clearly, the decision to drive on would be
the morally proper choice. On the principle oI ethical altruism, she would be concerned only
with the consequences oI her action as others are aIIected, particularly the accident victim.
Tallying only those consequences reveals that assisting the victim would be the morally correct
choice, irrespective oI the negative consequences that result Ior her. On the principle oI
utilitarianism, she must consider the consequences Ior both herselI and the victim. The outcome
here is less clear, and the woman would need to precisely calculate the overall beneIit versus
disbeneIit oI her action.
i. 1ypes of Utilitarianism
Jeremy Bentham presented one oI the earliest Iully developed systems oI utilitarianism. Two
Ieatures oI his theory are noteworty. First, Bentham proposed that we tally the consequences oI
each action we perIorm and thereby determine on a case by case basis whether an action is
morally right or wrong. This aspect oI Bentham`s theory is known as act-utilitiarianism. Second,
Bentham also proposed that we tally the pleasure and pain which results Irom our actions. For
Bentham, pleasure and pain are the only consequences that matter in determining whether our
conduct is moral. This aspect oI Bentham`s theory is known as hedonistic utilitarianism. Critics
point out limitations in both oI these aspects.
First, according to act-utilitarianism, it would be morally wrong to waste time on leisure
activities such as watching television, since our time could be spent in ways that produced a
greater social beneIit, such as charity work. But prohibiting leisure activities doesn`t seem
reasonable. More signiIicantly, according to act-utilitarianism, speciIic acts oI torture or slavery
would be morally permissible iI the social beneIit oI these actions outweighed the disbeneIit. A
revised version oI utilitarianism called rule-utilitarianismaddresses these problems. According to
rule-utilitarianism, a behavioral code or rule is morally right iI the consequences oI adopting that
rule are more Iavorable than unIavorable to everyone. Unlike act utilitarianism, which weighs
the consequences oI each particular action, rule-utilitarianism oIIers a litmus test only Ior the
morality oI moral rules, such as 'stealing is wrong. Adopting a rule against theIt clearly has
more Iavorable consequences than unIavorable consequences Ior everyone. The same is true Ior
moral rules against lying or murdering. Rule-utilitarianism, then, oIIers a three-tiered method Ior
judging conduct. A particular action, such as stealing my neighbor`s car, is judged wrong since it
violates a moral rule against theIt. In turn, the rule against theIt is morally binding because
adopting this rule produces Iavorable consequences Ior everyone. John Stuart Mill`s version oI
utilitarianism is rule-oriented.
Second, according to hedonistic utilitarianism, pleasurable consequences are the only Iactors that
matter, morally speaking. This, though, seems too restrictive since it ignores other morally
signiIicant consequences that are not necessarily pleasing or painIul. For example, acts which
Ioster loyalty and Iriendship are valued, yet they are not always pleasing. In response to this
problem, G.E. Moore proposedideal utilitarianism, which involves tallying any consequence that
we intuitively recognize as good or bad (and not simply as pleasurable or painIul). Also, R.M.
Hare proposed preference utilitarianism, which involves tallying any consequence that IulIills
our preIerences.
ii. Ethical Egoism and Social Contract 1heory
We have seen (in Section .b.i) that Hobbes was an advocate oI the methaethical theory oI
psychological egoismthe view that all oI our actions are selIishly motivated. Upon that
Ioundation, Hobbes developed a normative theory known as social contract theory, which is a
type oI rule-ethical-egoism. According to Hobbes, Ior purely selIish reasons, the agent is better
oII living in a world with moral rules than one without moral rules. For without moral rules, we
are subject to the whims oI other people`s selIish interests. Our property, our Iamilies, and even
our lives are at continual risk. SelIishness alone will thereIore motivate each agent to adopt a
basic set oI rules which will allow Ior a civilized community. Not surprisingly, these rules would
include prohibitions against lying, stealing and killing. However, these rules will ensure saIety
Ior each agent only iI the rules are enIorced. As selIish creatures, each oI us would plunder our
neighbors` property once their guards were down. Each agent would then be at risk Irom his
neighbor. ThereIore, Ior selIish reasons alone, we devise a means oI enIorcing these rules: we
create a policing agency which punishes us iI we violate these rules.
A55i0d Ethics
Applied ethics is the branch oI ethics which consists oI the analysis oI speciIic, controversial
moral issues such as abortion, animal rights, or euthanasia. In recent years applied ethical issues
have been subdivided into convenient groups such as medical ethics, business
ethics, environmental ethics, and sexual ethics. Generally speaking, two Ieatures are necessary
Ior an issue to be considered an 'applied ethical issue. First, the issue needs to be controversial
in the sense that there are signiIicant groups oI people both Ior and against the issue at hand. The
issue oI drive-by shooting, Ior example, is not an applied ethical issue, since everyone agrees that
this practice is grossly immoral. By contrast, the issue oI gun control would be an applied ethical
issue since there are signiIicant groups oI people both Ior and against gun control.
The second requirement Ior an issue to be an applied ethical issue is that it must be a distinctly
moral issue. On any given day, the media presents us with an array oI sensitive issues such as
aIIirmative action policies, gays in the military, involuntary commitment oI the mentally
impaired, capitalistic versus socialistic business practices, public versus private health care
systems, or energy conservation. Although all oI these issues are controversial and have an
important impact on society, they are not all moral issues. Some are only issues oI social policy.
The aim oI social policy is to help make a given society run eIIiciently by devising conventions,
such as traIIic laws, tax laws, and zoning codes. Moral issues, by contrast, concern more
universally obligatory practices, such as our duty to avoid lying, and are not conIined to
individual societies. Frequently, issues oI social policy and morality overlap, as with murder
which is both socially prohibited and immoral. However, the two groups oI issues are oIten
distinct. For example, many people would argue that sexual promiscuity is immoral, but may not
Ieel that there should be social policies regulating sexual conduct, or laws punishing us Ior
promiscuity. Similarly, some social policies Iorbid residents in certain neighborhoods Irom
having yard sales. But, so long as the neighbors are not oIIended, there is nothing immoral in
itselI about a resident having a yard sale in one oI these neighborhoods. Thus, to qualiIy as an
applied ethical issue, the issue must be more than one oI mere social policy: it must be morally
relevant as well.
In theory, resolving particular applied ethical issues should be easy. With the issue oI abortion,
Ior example, we would simply determine its morality by consulting our normative principle oI
choice, such as act-utilitarianism. II a given abortion produces greater beneIit than disbeneIit,
then, according to act-utilitarianism, it would be morally acceptable to have the abortion.
UnIortunately, there are perhaps hundreds oI rival normative principles Irom which to choose,
many oI which yield opposite conclusions. Thus, the stalemate in normative ethics between
conIlicting theories prevents us Irom using a single decisive procedure Ior determining the
morality oI a speciIic issue. The usual solution today to this stalemate is to consult several
representative normative principles on a given issue and see where the weight oI the evidence
lies.
, Norm,tiv0 Princi50s in A55i0d Ethics
Arriving at a short list oI representative normative principles is itselI a challenging task. The
principles selected must not be too narrowly Iocused, such as a version oI act-egoism that might
Iocus only on an action`s short-term beneIit. The principles must also be seen as having merit by
people on both sides oI an applied ethical issue. For this reason, principles that appeal to duty to
God are not usually cited since this would have no impact on a nonbeliever engaged in the
debate. The Iollowing principles are the ones most commonly appealed to in applied ethical
discussions:
Personal benefit. acknowledge the extent to which an action produces beneIicial consequences
Ior the individual in question.
Social benefit. acknowledge the extent to which an action produces beneIicial consequences Ior
society.
Principle of benevolence. help those in need.
Principle of paternalism. assist others in pursuing their best interests when they cannot do so
themselves.
Principle of harm. do not harm others.
Principle of honesty. do not deceive others.
Principle of lawfulness. do not violate the law.
Principle of autonomy. acknowledge a person`s Ireedom over his/her actions or physical body.
Principle of fustice. acknowledge a person`s right to due process, Iair compensation Ior harm
done, and Iair distribution oI beneIits.
Rights. acknowledge a person`s rights to liIe, inIormation, privacy, Iree expression, and saIety.
The above principles represent a spectrum oI traditional normative principles and are derived
Irom both consequentialist and duty-based approaches. The Iirst two principles, personal beneIit
and social beneIit, are consequentialist since they appeal to the consequences oI an action as it
aIIects the individual or society. The remaining principles are duty-based. The principles oI
benevolence, paternalism, harm, honesty, and lawIulness are based on duties we have toward
others. The principles oI autonomy, justice, and the various rights are based on moral rights.
An example will help illustrate the Iunction oI these principles in an applied ethical discussion.
In 2, a couple Irom Bloomington, Indiana gave birth to a baby with severe mental and
physical disabilities. Among other complications, the inIant, known as Baby Doe, had its
stomach disconnected Irom its throat and was thus unable to receive nourishment. Although this
stomach deIormity was correctable through surgery, the couple did not want to raise a severely
disabled child and thereIore chose to deny surgery, Iood, and water Ior the inIant. Local courts
supported the parents` decision, and six days later Baby Doe died. Should corrective surgery
have been perIormed Ior Baby Doe? Arguments in Iavor oI corrective surgery derive Irom the
inIant`s right to liIe and the principle oI paternalism which stipulates that we should pursue the
best interests oI others when they are incapable oI doing so themselves. Arguments against
corrective surgery derive Irom the personal and social disbeneIit which would result Irom such
surgery. II Baby Doe survived, its quality oI liIe would have been poor and in any case it
probably would have died at an early age. Also, Irom the parent`s perspective, Baby Doe`s
survival would have been a signiIicant emotional and Iinancial burden. When examining both
sides oI the issue, the parents and the courts concluded that the arguments against surgery were
stronger than the arguments Ior surgery. First, Ioregoing surgery appeared to be in the best
interests oI the inIant, given the poor quality oI liIe it would endure. Second, the status oI Baby
Doe`s right to liIe was not clear given the severity oI the inIant`s mental impairment. For, to
possess moral rights, it takes more than merely having a human body: certain cognitive Iunctions
must also be present. The issue here involves what is oIten reIerred to as moral personhood, and
is central to many applied ethical discussions.
- Issu0s in A55i0d Ethics
As noted, there are many controversial issues discussed by ethicists today, some oI which will be
brieIly mentioned here.
Biomedical ethics Iocuses on a range oI issues which arise in clinical settings. Health care
workers are in an unusual position oI continually dealing with liIe and death situations. It is not
surprising, then, that medical ethics issues are more extreme and diverse than other areas oI
applied ethics. Prenatal issues arise about the morality oI surrogate mothering, genetic
manipulation oI Ietuses, the status oI unused Irozen embryos, and abortion. Other issues arise
about patient rights and physician`s responsibilities, such as the conIidentiality oI the patient`s
records and the physician`s responsibility to tell the truth to dying patients. The AIDS crisis has
raised the speciIic issues oI the mandatory screening oI all patients Ior AIDS, and whether
physicians can reIuse to treat AIDS patients. Additional issues concern medical experimentation
on humans, the morality oI involuntary commitment, and the rights oI the mentally disabled.
Finally, end oI liIe issues arise about the morality oI suicide, the justiIiability oI suicide
intervention, physician assisted suicide, and euthanasia.
The Iield oI business ethics examines moral controversies relating to the social responsibilities oI
capitalist business practices, the moral status oI corporate entities, deceptive advertising, insider
trading, basic employee rights, job discrimination, aIIirmative action, drug testing, and whistle
blowing.
Issues in environmental ethics oIten overlaps with business and medical issues. These include the
rights oI animals, the morality oI animal experimentation, preserving endangered species,
pollution control, management oI environmental resources, whether eco-systems are entitled to
direct moral consideration, and our obligation to Iuture generations.
Controversial issues oI sexual morality include monogamy versus polygamy, sexual relations
without love, homosexual relations, and extramarital aIIairs.
Finally, there are issues oI social morality which examine capital punishment, nuclear war, gun
control, the recreational use oI drugs, welIare rights, and racism.