Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
,
I
,
(l:ffU
The Paorric problem.
lB. of the United Statee and ,in facti of all the white having
their ebores washed by the waters of the Pacific Ocean,is to keep their soil,
their institutions and their manner of living free from the ownerehip,the dominion
)
and the customs of the Orientals "ho people the other shores of this the grenst
of all oceans.
Eventually in their search for eXistence the white and yellow races will
be brought into armed conflict to determine which shall prevail.
7
thy has this not occured before it may be asked. For two very good
One)the yellows 'conquered everything worth having in the world and then deWmta
war and physical strife were the means of gaining the goal of life whi
in their philosophy ia the pursuit of pesce and that the
nations of the western world had become 80 expert in the Brt of war and iwn ttP
that
making of gun powder that they not only no longer feared the invasions of
the li!Pngolian hordes but their COICmerce under the guns of their men
of war to the sates of Pekin and ths Bay of Xedo' in as far as the
continents of and Asia are concerned )their people have reached a state
of more or less geographic equilibrium as to centers of population.Thsir
people however are increasing in number constantly, their soil is supporting
. CfIJ'"
as many as look after)so all that remains is the finding of
a new outlet and haven for their ever increosing millions.
Westward from the old corllinenp of Europejand
eaetward from the still older continent of Asia)lie the new and undeveloped
vaetneeeee of the new world. Fortunately for us the; were seized and taken
poe.eion of by the whites in spits of the fact that they undoubted1 were
I .
dleooYered end visited by the yellows many centuries before.In those days
tbe problems were so difficult that a crossing of the Pacific
2
meant months of sailing on uncharted eeae with the crudeet navigating
umente and compaeees that were juat being und-retood.Now the croBsing of t.
acific is nothing,it is no more than a ferry two poin,s across tre
water.It is not miles that count in transportation it is the time required
to negotiate the distanceTJ1e Pacific is no rider today than _s the Atl_
antic at the time of our civil war ,it is becoming increasingly narrower
and the day is not far off when, neither months, weeks NOr days will be used
in computing the trip but hours and minutes alone
TJ1e asiatics know this
full well and already had not restrictive measures been adopted by the whitea,
Australia and Oanada,the United Statee and Mexico have been the haven
of millions of the Mongolian race,capablejstrong and virile people brought
up in the atmosphere of intense economic competition and perfectly able
to defeat economicslly,possess and eventually absorb any othet races cro sing
their pnth'
TJ1e pressure of these eastwrn people has become more pronounced and
accentuated 88 they have again taken to recreating their _r making power'
The oj apanese organized into one of tl:B great world powers are dl!laanding an
equal voice,an equal position and an equal right to live and labor where they
and under the same conditions with the whites. They have
ste ped firmly on to the continent of Asia where their powere of organization
may easily lead to a recreation of the greatest military machine the world
) ...
ever saw,the ies of Ghenghis lhan and Tarlemane.
,...
So we are face. with a
problem much greater than it appears on the surface,thet of aintaining not
oD17 the political eupremacy but also the veryf existence of the white race.
Uld lurope with it. feuds)it. wars and even wors. its commercial piracyjis
_t1r.q uaab1e and 1Dcapabl. of oarrying on any grent effort outeide of
1v ..........."1 ur Bbould thq be,Did they not stop the ongol1an invasion
-}tJ'U
at the walle of Vienna and hue they Itat,.. SO populated
their own valleys)ste
p
ee
end lande 1'0 that it would scarsely pay for anyone else to intrudeT
Therefore
it is quite evident that the struggle must be taken up by the white inhabit
ants of the new world/and of this new world by the inhabitants of North America
primarily' The northern continent ie gifted by nature to a greater extent than
any other portion of the earths surface. It is rich in coal and iron while a
very percentage of superficial area is potentially rich in
ulture,grazing lands and all necessary woods and metals.
The southern continent not only
is much smaller than its neighbor to the north but is proportiona1ay very
poor in coa) iron/and agricultural spaces)while much is covered with mount-
aine and vaet wooded eW8.JlPB.Today the population of the whole of south Amer-
ica is barely one half that of the United Wtates alons.The north American
continent can without doubt support no less than 800,OCO,OOO people.
The rumblings of this coming strife have censed
to be inaudible whiepere;but are the loud protests of the Japanese people)
the vanguard of Aeiatics,over the exclusion laws, the land laws and their
unequal treatment at the hande of our citizens.
Sooner or later... the diplo-
matic meane of handling these queeticns will fail and a physical means of im-
preesing our will on the hostile state will be the 'only recourse In other
wordelar.
Three things are necessary to the of a
war.'iret the deetruction of the boetile armed forces .second th estructlon
tAe hoetUe power to make war end third the deetruction of the morale
tAe holtile population eo that the war will not be renewed at an early
:toe.
lone of these measures are possible of accomplishment by a passive defensive
alone. The offensive must bs assumed and maintained until a successfUl con-
clusion of the war is obtained.If this is not done and the wer of initiative
and offense is handed to the will certainly be the result.
continent untU at Attu after having covered ,/4 of the distahce to Asia
from Asia
find United States soil only 600 miles away/or about ths same distance
'000 milee,and about 600 miles further to Puget
possession
about 1 miles from. Attu. This Island
may be considered as the northern end of the Japanese baseiErom h"re on the
ielands lie in unbroken eequence to Formosa.An ieland offers many advantages
for an air station.lt is easy to dllfend on the ground/easy to organize
aeroneutically and easy to operate from.ltt disadvantage is that it is easy
bombardment attack.
Any advance along the northern line by either Japan or the United States
against the other) can neither be flanked 1101' taken in reverse. An advance
by the northern line on the part of Japan would completely turn the
position of the Hawaiian Islands for instance. On the other hand an advance
on the part of the United States against Japan by the northern line)would com-
pletely turn the position of the Bonin Islands. In both cases of
communications .ould be shortened about twenty five per cent.
,
Turning to the south snd pro.eeding .est from Honolulu,the first land that
I
we encounter is yalte Island a d1stance of j:?OO miles. This is owned by the
United 'tate ," l1111e. 80uth of Waite Island the northern 1sle.nds of the
Marshall group are encountered. theBe belong to Japan or at least oJ apan has
the lIlII1dat,ol7 oyer th-.The.e are a little cloeer to Honolulu than 1s
10
K1cronieeian Archipelago)hundrede of little islands,all in the poseession of
Japan except the ieland Of Guam.Roughly Guam lies half way between Wake
) )
Island and Kanil. the distance from it to both being about 1600 miles.It is
, I
surrounded by the Japanese Islands of the Marianna group.lpmost directly to
the north of GU8111 and at a dietance of about 1000 miles lie the Bonin
1!hose
IBIEnds,connected to Guam by a Btring of Ielands greatest gap
is 400 miles or four hours flight for thr ordinary bombardDlent airplane.
Outaide of Japan itself/the Bonin island ie Japans etrongeet pOBition for
either offense or detenee along the southern line Iwhether by air or by water.
011 a rediuB 01'
From it} " f about 1500 miles 1
6nY
force advancing west trom the
United statee along the Honolulu-Kanila line may be attacked in flanf
from Wake Island to the distance of over '000 miles.In caee of
deteat the United States forces would have to fall back on their magazines
of ManUa or Honolulu,both to a flank,or be deetroy'ed wheras the Japanese
would have their whole base to retid to in case of necessity. The distance
from GuBlll to Yokohama ie about t800 miles or about 600 miles less than the
dietance froc Manila to YokohOllla,furthermore it is connected by a tringe of
islands whose gretaest distance apart i8 400 milee.Prom a strategic stand-
point Guam is of the greatest importance.
1600 miles west 01' Guam/we reach the Phillipines}
our own PDssessiOD)very rich)not only agriculturally but also
the very beet POint from which to pueh trade into the continent of Asia
with it's people. A 2000 mile radius from Manilla will cut or
encloee the great marte of eaetem Asia.This ie the actual value of the
Phillipinee and 18 no) only a treaendous alYantage to the United States but
a180 to all white peopl.,becauBe if the Phillipines became a possession of
JaPllll tne poB1tiOl1 ot Great Britain in the East would be greatly threatened
it not t1n1med end Great Britain 18 the only other White power oapable
ot ....rt1Jtc 11.1 in the far kst it 18 to their intereBt that
11
the United States remain in possession of these islands. This is particularly
so since the defeat of the United States ship subsidy bill which ElllgIllJld
i.. .t.e i.Att. .
tI'! e4 ." lI.ra to defeat. j - - 0
Therefore a survey of the Northern Pacific Ocean
_ould not be comnlete without taking into account the relation of Great Britain
to our problem in that quarter. As has been mentioned British possess-
ions flank our southern line of advancefrom Honolulu westward. With conditions as
they exist at present with German sea power extinguished En&lan.d can release
.J ....t&h
a great part of her sea power for use in the Pacifil.tier own i.dMuh are conn-
ected by an unbroken line of magazines up to and including the Malay
With Singap9re at it's extremity. This position situated about 1500 miles
south east of' Manila dominates the whole western Pacific and the Indian
Oceanos only from a standpoint of sea power but even more f'roo a standpoint
of' air power. A combination between Japan and Great Britain against the
United States would entirely preclude the use of' the .outhern line of advance
W.4
by any sea force. alone of' the United States.An under those circumBt-
ances could be made only by air power.Formerly the Anglo-Japanese alliance
made a combination between powers possible; since the signing of the
treaties growing out of' the conference for the limitation of armamants)
the Anglo-" apanese alliance has come to ani end, so that at the present time
should seem imminent between the United States and Japan,England
would observe a strict neutrality because in a way the United States would be
" )
waging a campaign to protect the British possessions in the Pacific,much as
Japan fought Englands war for her against the Russians in 1904-,.It would not
j
be in keeping with Englands traditional policy to actively aid anyonejunless
her own possessions were direotly menaced.ThisjJapanJat the would be
caretul to BYoid. The Singapore base therefore puts Great Britain in the position)
first of protecting herselt in the Pacific and Indian Elceans and at the same
tiae otten a coqust.tlllh inYitation to the United States to come around and
Ybit M little in the far last.
."
1hUe th18 apparently proferred Brit-18h ass18tance 18 allu.ring in the
particularly to our navy)which not only is reaching out for any root to
to keep from sliding over the precipice of the eouthern lineJbut also because our
navy is greatly influenced by British opinion or expressed opinion.
,
Consequently the United States must
be of itls negotiations with great Britain in anything
military operations against Japan. Should we be led to adopt the southern
route as a line of operations with the expectation of British
,
Japan/any sea power experiments along that line would snd
in utter failure without their assistance. For
of sea power across the Pacific except as the
that matter any advance
X{b;,
auxiliary of air power is
a practical impossibility.
Having taken thia hasty survey of ou.r strategical
position in the Pacific let us turn a moment to a consideration of what is
necessar/ to establish a military depot or magaZine sometimes erroneously
) )
called a base.
An 9J'm;f may occupy a position and if given a few days to prepare
it for defense,it is capable of developing it to almost as great an extent
as it would if it had been there for a protracted spac'A1f its communications
hostile
are squarely bshind it and particularly if ground forces have to
captw-e of the Danish fleet with hie cavalry when they
such examples as Cervera at Santiago,Makaroff at Port
,.-__-
across the water it has little to fear Sea forcesjbattleships etc. ,can do
k...,.... .. J
no hera,on the other hand if an army catches a fleet in a harbor it may des- 0...:.
troy it. There being
,
Arthur or lapileoDs
were frozen tight in the ioe.
JO l>- 4t.rn- "
A naYJ must first seek out a harbor with a depth of water of forty feet at
"
low'tide,othetwise a wounded battleship will be unable to enter it,8ftd if it
v.. ,J'l' ...u-i-ttL
aeppo! he at all times)when it is needed the most will be just the
CQu".rt I,...
time t' at it's use will be required. With., the complexity of modern naval
armaments has como e corresponding augmentation of shore establishments. The
dock yards take years to build,ths technical repair and supply facilities
require not only vast sums of moneY7but infinite pains and a great deal of
time. This is rapidty becoming s' ntricate a proceeding)that fleets are bedl;lng
less and less lbnobl1e;are chained to their depots change of
, r l' t'
theatre of operations)require a new arrangement of .Any app
of sea power at a distance of over a couple of miles from it's base
requires years of preparation and not only millions but billions of dollars
eXpenditure. As naval preparations increase in size and extent,just so much
do they become better targets for air attack,and as the utility of the
great surface battleship is rapidly drawing to a close,most of the effort
expended in naval armaments 18 largely a waste of energy.
An air force on the other hand can establish itself with the greatest
ease.An unoccupied field,a stretch of ocean beach,even the crater of a
volcano may be occupied and operated from with a minimum of preparation
when compared to the installation of a naval depot or the emplacement
of artillery of position. Air forces are easily landed from seacraft.The
'
s
t.Bombardment troup landed on and operated from Hatteras Island during
the past Summer with little preparation. All their supplies including
2000 pound bombe,treators,gasoline and tuel were landed in ,1/a feet of
water.In Iovember a pursuit plane was landed in an open roadstsad on
surf boats frca the lighthouse tender Itukui and set up and made ready for
flight in a oouple of hours by two mechanics. Aircraft may be carried as
deok loads Oil .ubllarin",a modem submarine may carry 6, landed in their
01111 wararproo1' oa... md set up in a short time. The csses can then be
uae4 .. boat. aad llgbt.rs tor the debarcation of other supplies.
14
It operating oYers... a well organized air force can be ready to strike
within 6 hours of its arrival at itts debarcation point.
In the applicatin
of air power certain principlee muet be clearly held in mind.To begin w i ~
any operation in tae air requires that the advantages d rived from it
must be fought for. just as a corresponding operation on land worth while
requires armed contact because if it ie worth while the enemy will attemptb
stop it. To ineure the 'peration of aircraft therefore the pursuit aviation
must be concsntated at the decisive point at the inception of the operation.
To be effective aviation has to act in coacentrated compact bodies because
if it does not it can be defeated in dstail no matter what the size of
the opposing force may be. For this reason ae much as many othere an air
force cannot operate with success from floating or seacraft airdromes
against an air force firmly established on land airdromes. There is
nothing whatever to fBsr from so called naval airplane carriers,beausee
not only can they not operate effecisntly on the high seas but even if they
could they cannot place suufficient aircraft in the air at one time to
insure a concentrated operation. Consequently a hostile air force will
seize land airdromes from which to launch itt. attacks against i t ' ~ n t e n d e d
victims. In selecting it!s primary objective due consideration will be
giveb to the hoetile airpower.it's airdromes, shops, supply points and
communicating systems
15
Withe this brief survey of the conditions 'n the Petifie,let us pass
to a consideration of the defense of the Hawaiian Islands in part1c-
ular.ln our disoussion we ahall assume that Japan is t he adversary and
that no matter ..ether the position of the Hawaiian Islands is used
as an offensive point on the line of operations along the southern
~
route against Japan,whether it 1s used as a flank position in an
offensive operation by the United States along the ~ o r t h e r n line
or whether it is merely held to prevent the islands falling into the
hands of the enemy irrespective of their strategical import from a
strictly military standpoint,the principles of defense of the group
of islands in particular will remain much the same.
The Inhabited islands of the Hawaiian
group stretch from north west to south east for a distance of '50 miles
or three and a half hours flight by air)lane.(We shall assume 100 miles
per hour as the ave.age speed of locomotion of an air forse.Roughly
then 1000 miles means 10 hours flight etc.)!ll of them are very suitable
for the installation and operation of air forces. The climate is espec-
ially propitious. There are no fogs,comparativsly little rain,steady
winds,prectiaally no storms,a wind of 50 or 60 miles per hour is consi-
dered a very severe storm,the nights particularly are clear and espee-
ially favorable to the operation of aircraft. The question of navigation
over and between the iUands is very easy not only by the system of
plotting the course and compass steering but also by the use of dire-
ctional radio.'rom the northern island of Niihau a chain of small
islands aJId reefs stretch out for 1100 miles to Midway lsland,a
cable station, which alao i4 suffioiently large and suitable for the
eetabl1shm8l1't of airdromes.ln addition the submarine cable runs from
1114ft7 to eJu. thence north through the Bonin Islands to Japan.From
tap,no. in the possion of Japan,," miles south weet of Guam,a cable
16
rW\s to Shanghai Ohina and connects with the cables al along the .J apanese
basefrom Formosa north. The posaesoion of Midway Island and Guam therefcr e
lfould give cable commW\ication from Midway to Japan and
the whole Japanese bese by -y
time would sever communication
of both Guam and Yap
j
and' at the seme
t.. 'I"-
over our cables from Honolulu lfesX.While
1
the importance of cables may be somewhat cortailed due to the develop-
ement of the radio telegrapl,they are still a much surer and more secret
means of communication. Several of the small islands and reefs between
Midway and Niihau Island are not only suitable for the installatio n
of observation posts and radio stations but also for landing fields and
emergency airdromes.The distance of Midway Island from Yokohoma and the
m
Japanese base is eome 2JOO miles or a couple of hW\dred miles more
distant than Honolulu is from San Franchco. The difference in t ime being
8 days by seacraft from YOkohamaAagainst 1 days from Francisco to
Honolulu. The distance from Midway to the Aleutian Islands of Alaska is
about 1'00 miles or 4 days by seacraft," hours by air.
Assuming a state of war to be impending
and with the mission of the Ia_iian Department to be the holding of
the Island of Oahu for four months before the arrival of supporting
troops, let us estimate what the action of Japan will
Japan 'knows that she owes her existsnce to her milUtary power, she knows
that without the applicstion of the latest developments in the art
of war she cannot hope to prevail against a great power like the United
States any more than she did against Russia/had she, Japan still used
the organization and methods of her traditional military policy and
system. She knows full well that the United States will probably enter
..
the next n.r with the methode and weapons of the former war, and will
therefore orrer the enticing morsel which all nations that have followed
thie ..,et.. haTe done tefore.Japan aleo knows full well that the defen8e
ot the 8&.11. p'CIUP h bued on ths defenee of the Island of Oahu
17
alone and not on the defense of the whole glloup.
The leland of Oahu with
lL\.nd I
its militsry depots both naval s airdromes,water supplies)
the oity of Honolulu withit's wharves and su ply points forms an easy
oompaot and convenient objeot for air attack. The whole area of the
island is only about 600 miles,of this about one half is very
mountainous, while the rest is taken up in great part by agrioultural
develop,ments.The area having an important military bearing consiete
of about 100 square miles or about the seme military area for air defenee
ae the city of New York.
In eelecting the weapons to be used against a
of th6s kind an air foroe has the ohoice of toxio gaeee,explosive bombs
dmt laison system for the ail! force should be installed,a tracking
board for hostile aircraft should be maintained at air force headquarters
and all antiaircraft organizations, listening posts and sea organiza
connected with it.All islands should be connected to this point .by radio
and these should be exclusively under the jurisdiction of the army'The
present system of naval control of radio for these islands is entirely
unsatisfactory and will result in great harm during war.)All light
house organizations,keepers and tsnders should be incorporated in the
defense against aircraft observation and laison net. This personnel is
very effecient and is now distributed on practically all the islands.All
light houses should be connected by telephone with the radio net.A system
of airways to all the islands should be installed, with aias to navigation
"".Mn'vi-JU
As to training,a definite system of command abd operations should be
put effect and the headquarters of the air force
commander. Without a system of that kind practically no result can be
obtained from the air force. The commander of the air forve should handle
his organizations in person in the air wh,enev;r the whole fo ve i )
I! -.. :(.,
gaged and frequently with each &-.. .... tY.,., .. k :1"<.1 ;0-
The pursuit aviation should concentrate' on individual
combat and target practice.By this ,is meant shhoting at moving targets
of various kinds in the air and not on the ground' There has been none of
this so tar here and no place offers a better oppertunity.
I
The bombardment aviation should practice on still and moVing
tuc
ete
both on shore and at eea with all sizes of bombs.Large dUllllll
baati. oan b. mad. of concrete for prectice.There should be plenty of
loaded shipe. Machine gun practice againot mOVing t rgeto
J
21
still targets to represent hostile balloon barrages and ground targets
should be practiced.!.b course in radio of all the use ofl
instruments and particularly bomb sights.
The observation aviation should concentrate on radio and signaling,
and be trained in the tactics of attack aviation.
All aviation should be given 8 very stiff course in map reading sketc-
hing and navigation. This work here hae been of the moet rudimentary
nature. Without proper methods of navigation position cannot be maintained
to and from objects out of sight of land in storms or clouds