Hieserich, Mathias MKTG 4082W 22 September 2011 Case 1: Intel Analysis Multiple key actions made by Intels marketing

team contributed heavily to Intels success between the late-1980s and mid-2000s, primarily the creation and launch of the Intel Inside campaign as well as the 2003 Centrino platform launch. 1) Having just lost in court the ability to protect the 386 and 486 names and given an expanding breadth of products, Intel recognized the need to create distinct brand equity based around the company name. Intel launched the Intel Inside campaign in late 1991, consisting of $125 million in spending on print, billboard, and TV advertising coupled with a co-op advertising program including over 240 Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) initially. 2) The Intel Inside campaign rates extremely well measured against its intended objectives. The Intel Inside swirl logo was consistent through forms of media and, after translation, internationally. Also of note is the distinctiveness of the program; no other microprocessor company was building a brand around the company, choosing instead to fixate on each chip. 3) Intel hoped to use the Intel name, rather than specific chips, to position the brand as the technological quality standard-bearer rather than simply a microchip manufacturer. Awareness and associations were the key outcomes in the consumer mindset aspects of the campaign. The swirl Intel Inside logo should expose the consumer to the components that comprise the purchased end product and represent not a nice-to-have but a need-to-have level of quality. 4) Intel benefitted from several marketplace multipliers that increased the effectiveness of their campaign. Competitors such as AMD had no competitive reaction and did little to refute the

messaging that Intel was sending. Also multiplying the effect was the channel support through the co-op advertising program; Intels logo and message appeared not only in their own ads but those of over 700 OEMs, greatly increasing the campaigns coverage. 5) By the end of 1992, the swirl logo appeared consistently in over half of computer ads in PC magazines. Through this campaign, Intel generated mass consumer awareness and created the core associations of top-quality and reliability in the minds of the public. Over 50% of surveyed consumers said they looked for the logo specifically when they made a purchase, demonstrating positive attitudes and even attachment. Rated the third most valuable brand in 1993, Intel had become the market leader across the board among OEMs. 1) Intel recognized the growth of laptop computers and the need of consumers for performance on the road. Centrino was designed and launched to stand as a brand for a combination of products, based around the Pentium M processor, that optimized on-the-go computing and wireless communication. A $300 million effort including print (targeted toward the tech-savvy), TV (targeted at moms and students), and the One Unwired Day sponsored by the New Yorker. The Blue Man Group, wildly successful in Pentium promotions, also returned. Co-op advertising with OEMs was also brought back. 2) The Centrino campaign rates fairly well in reference to intended objectives. Promotional efforts around the Centrino were clear, with a focused message of not only unwiring, but unburdening, unstressing, and uncompromising. TV spots aimed at the everyday consumer displayed families benefitting from a wireless home rather than engaging in technical discussion. The Intel Inside logo and Blue Man Group were consistent with past programs, while the One Wireless Day uniquely took Centrino to a technical level beyond competitors and past Intel products with a direct consumer experience of Centrinos benefits.

3) Intel hoped to use the Centrino launch to increase awareness of and become the first word in wireless computing among consumers, providing a one-stop bundle of solutions. Also important was refocusing the brand as a reliable option and tech leader after the failure of many of the early 2000s startup projects. 4) Again, the co-op marketing program between Intel and OEMs served to provide some channel support to multiply the Centrinos reach. However, this support was more limited than Intel Inside had, as OEMs were not happy they had to purchase the entire bundle to participate; the Pentium M was the seller. OEMs turned to upgrade options for some components in their own selling process so as to benefit from Intels brand equity in advertising while not tying down consumers. AMD introduced Turion as a direct competitor to Centrino, but again neglected to spend significantly on promotion in 2003-04, and choosing to promote primarily Athlon and Opteron in they did choose to spend in late 2004. The lack of an effective counter-message again boosts the Centrino programs effectiveness. 5) Results in the marketplace for the sales of Centrino-powered PCs and notebooks are not provided in the case. I would look to sales figures/ROI and market share of Centrino-branded notebooks and mobile devices to determine the direct success with consumers. Survey data from consumers around wireless adoption and brand awareness/attitudes would also be beneficial. However, it is important to note that the stock price of Intel made significant gains during Centrinos launch in 2003, showing attachment from investors and a positive outlook after a terrible 2001 financial year.