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NUCLEAR SECURITY INDEX

Assessing Modern Nuclear Threats and the Tools to Combat Them By Dr. Janne Nolan and Eric Auner Introduction by BGen Stephen Cheney, USMC (Ret.)

America needs a new national security vision for this new era and a dialogue at home that is as robust as it is realistic.

Mission
The American Security Project (ASP) is a nonpartisan initiative to educate the American public about the changing nature of national security in the 21st century. Security is a fundamental responsibility of government. In the new millennium, however, U.S. national security policy has not kept pace with rapidly changing threats to American interests. Globalization has quickened, but the United States has not built sufficient alliances or institutions to protect and advance American security. International terrorist networks span the globe and threaten the United States and her allies. Associated with this risk is the growing number of failed or rogue nations, creating further instability. Changes in the earths climate are more evident every day, but the United States has failed to act, alone or with allies, to avoid disaster. Gone are the days when a nations strength could be measured by bombers and battleships. Security in this new era requires a new American arsenal harnessing all of Americas strengths: the force of our diplomacy; the might of our military; the vigor of our economy; and the power of our ideals. We believe that America must lead other nations in the pursuit of our common goals and shared security. We must confront international challenges with all the tools at our disposal. We must address emerging problems before they become security crises. And to do this, we must forge a nonpartisan consensus at home. ASP brings together prominent American leaders, current and former members of Congress, retired military officers, and former government officials. Staff direct research on a broad range of issues and engages and empowers the American public by taking its findings directly to them. We live in a time when the threats to our security are as complex and diverse as terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, climate change, failed and failing states, disease, and pandemics. The same, old solutions and partisan bickering wont do. America needs an honest dialogue about security that is as robust as it is realistic. ASP exists to promote that dialogue, to forge consensus, and to spur constructive action so that America meets the challenges to its security while seizing the opportunities the new century offers.

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Brigadier General Stephen A. Cheney, USMC (Ret.)

CEO

Board of Directors

The Honorable Gary Hart

ASP Chairman

The Honorable Norman R. Augustine

Lieutenant General Daniel Christman, USA (Ret.)

Nelson Cunningham
McLarty Associates

Admiral William Fallon, USN (Ret.)

NeurallQ

Vice Admiral Lee Gunn, USN (Ret.)

The CNA Corporation

The Honorable Chuck Hagel

Lieutenant General Claudia Kennedy, USA (Ret.)

Population Action International

The Honorable John Kerry

United States Senate

General Lester L. Lyles, USAF (Ret.)

The Lyles Group

Ed Reilly
FD

The Honorable Warren B. Rudman

Albright Stonebridge Group

The Honorable Christine Todd Whitman

Whitman Strategy Group

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MANAGING THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR ARSENAL: THREATS AND TOOLS

In a world of diverse and growing threats, the spread of nuclear weapons continues to be a national security concern for the United States. The United States has traditionally used a combination of tools to reduce and manage nuclear dangers. In a changing world, the United States must continually re-evaluate the nature and extent of modern threats, as well as the best ways to adapt available tools or create new ones. The Nuclear Security Index presents unbiased, fact-based information and analysis to encourage productive, informed debate about nuclear security challenges. The sections in this report have been categorized threat or tool which can be identified by the following symbols:

AMERICAN POWER IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

It has been over seven decades since the start of the nuclear age. After the first successful test of a nuclear weapon in 1945, human beings developed the ability to destroy an entire city with a single weapon in the blink of an eye. This irrevocably changed warfare and international conflict. The United States was the first nation to harness the destructive power of the atom. This unique status helped the United States cement its position as a post-World War II superpower. Americas nuclear monopoly did not last long. It soon faced a world with several other nuclear powers, including the Soviet Union, China, France, and the United Kingdom.

THREAT ICON

TOOL ICON

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THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

As nuclear technology and know-how has become more widely available, it is clear that many more countries could build their own nuclear bombs. The expansion of the nuclear club poses a danger both to American interests and international stability. Fortunately, the vast majority of countries that considered building nuclear weapons since the 1950s subsequently decided that acquiring the bomb was not in their interests. The United States, in collaboration with many partner nations, has worked hard to control the spread of nuclear weapons and the systems to deliver them through an interlocking network of agreements and institutions that continues to operate and constrain the spread of nuclear weapons today. Many decades of American efforts to combat nuclear proliferation took place against the backdrop of a massive nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both superpowers built thousands of nuclear weapons and kept them on high alert. The threat of mutual annihilation, among other factors, meant that there was no armed conflict between East and West and nuclear weapons were not used during the Cold War. Nevertheless, a fear of surprise attack, as well as the risk of nuclear use due to miscalculation or accident, pervaded strategic thinking on both sides.

THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR SECURITY

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the bipolar Cold War world gave way to the more dispersed nuclear threats of the modern world. Ambitious nations in unstable regions can seek nuclear weapons to try to coerce their neighbors and guarantee their own survival. The international community increasingly fears the prospect of nuclear-armed terrorists. The threat of inadvertent or accidental nuclear weapons use has also not diminished. The tragic events at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant in Japan highlight the need to keep nuclear facilities and materials safe. America now relies on a combination of leadership, technology, diplomacy, and military capabilities to combat global nuclear threats. None of these tools is sufficient in isolation but all are important. American efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons continue to be a cornerstone of American strategy and American global leadership. The Nuclear Security Index is designed to serve as an introduction to these vital issues. We hope you will find the facts presented within this report useful. Sincerely,

BGen Stephen A. Cheney, CEO

A Note about Terminology

There is a wide variety of terms, phrases, and abbreviations used in the nuclear security field. Familiarity with these terms is immensely helpful in understanding the U.S. nuclear security debate. Some terms, like intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), have a precise technical definition. Others, like deterrence, are the subject of extensive debate. The Nuclear Security Index sets out to clarify terminology and abbreviations within the text, and provides an in-depth Glossary of terms and definitions on page 19 of this report.

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ThE STATUS ANd CoMpoSiTioN of ThE U.S. NUCLEAR ARSENAL

Source: The Department of State

he United States currently possesses a large and capable arsenal of over 5,000 nuclear weapons, of which approximately 2,000 are deployed and ready for rapid use. Most U.S. weapons are strategic thermonuclear weapons with a yield that is orders of magnitude higher than the weapons used against Japan during World War II. The United States is currently investing in its nuclear arsenal. The Obama administration promised to modernize the American nuclear infrastructure during the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) debate, but budget constraints may make the level of nuclear weapons spending a contentious political issue.

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Yields of current American strategic nuclear weapons compared to those used in WWII
Source: The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

The reduction in Russian and American operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War under both Democratic and Republican

Fat Man and Little Boy were the bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, respectively. Four W76 warheads are carried on a single submarine-launched Trident II missile. A Minuteman III ICBM carries one W87 warhead.

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NUCLEAR SAfETy ANd SECURiTy

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE THREAT
The tragic events at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant in Japan, where an earthquake and tsunami led to the accidental release of radiation, highlights the vulnerability of nuclear power plants and facilities to natural and man-made disasters. Securing nuclear materials, facilities, and weapons is just as important as ensuring that no country intentionally uses a nuclear weapon against another. The United States has led international efforts to secure nuclear materials, facilities, and weapons against theft, terrorist attack, or natural disaster. These activities, especially those aimed at preventing nuclear terrorism, have enjoyed bipartisan support.

Reasons to Secure Global Nuclear Materials

Prevent terrorists from stealing nuclear weapons and materials. Prevent terrorist sympathizers from diverting nuclear weapons or materials to terrorist groups. Prevent accidental radiation from poisoning people or the environment. Ensure that nuclear power plants operate safely and effectively.

Pakistan: Ground Zero for Nuclear Terrorism?

Many analysts cite Pakistan as a possible source of a terrorist nuclear weapon given the countrys political instability and multiple insurgencies. But the Pakistani military, which controls the countrys nuclear weapons, has many incentives to keep the nuclear weapons secure and there are no known incidents of Pakistani nuclear materials being stolen or transferred to terrorists.

The Nuclear Fuel Cycle

2010 Nuclear Security Summit: Forging International Consensus

Largest gathering of heads of state by a U.S. president since 1945. Participants discussed the threat of unsecured nuclear materials. Twenty-nine countries announced measures to support the goals of the summit. The next summit will be held in Seoul in 2012.

Source: The Center for American Progress

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ThE pRoLifERATioN of ThE woRLdS MoST dESTRUCTivE wEApoNS

uclear proliferation occurs when a new state undertakes the risky and expensive decision to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. Nuclear technologies, materials, and know-how are moving around the world at an increasingly rapid pace. At the same time, the transparency of the modern world is making it more difficult for would-be proliferators to escape detection. A nuclear weapon is not merely a bigger bomb. Nuclear weapons are so destructive that some once theorized that they had rendered war between countries that possess them inconceivable since no country would risk incurring such disastrous losses.

There is no consensus about why countries seek nuclear weapons although most explanations focus on the perceived security benefits. President John F. Kennedy famously predicted in 1963 that the United States could face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations have the bomb by the 1970s. This has not occurred. Nonproliferation successes have outnumbered the failures. Nevertheless, several countries possess the technical know-how and resources to build a nuclear weapon if they so desire. They are restrained from doing so by a combination of factors, including the nuclear nonproliferation regime (see pg. 10).

Fissile Material: The Source of the Bang

Fissile material is the uranium or plutonium used to produce a nuclear fission reaction. Weapons-usable material is not found in nature.

Fissile material production is expensive and time-consuming. Obtaining fissile material is the most difficult part of developing a nuclear weapon.

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The number of nuclear powers outside of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty India Israel North Korea Pakistan

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The number of countries that had nuclear programs but chose to give them up Argentina Belarus Brazil Egypt Iraq Kazakhstan Libya South Africa South Korea Taiwan Ukraine

The states most commonly seen as a nuclear proliferation threat Iran North Korea Syria

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE DIFFERENT:

While large amounts of conventional explosives can have a devastating effect, no other weapon can destroy a city in the blink of an eye and leave fire and persistent radiation in its wake.

POTENTIAL NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY METHODS:

LAND- OR SEA-BASED miSSiLE AiRPLANE shipping container

DEATHS 500,000

DAMAGE $1 trillion
Source: The Belfer Center at Harvard University

ExPLANATION: Estimated effects of a 10 kiloton nuclear weapon detonated in midtown Manhattan.

Iran: The Next Nuclear Power?

Iran is a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (see pg. 10), which forbids it from developing nuclear weapons. Irans uranium enrichment program, and its failure to open all of its facilities to international inspectors has convinced many observers that the country is determined to develop a nuclear weapon. The U.S. intelligence community cannot say with certainty when Iran would be able to develop a nuclear weapon and estimates vary widely.

Military Force: Mixed Effects

If a proliferator refuses to comply with international norms, military force can impede a nuclear program by threatening to damage or destroy key facilities. Israeli airstrikes against the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor are often cited an example. On the other hand, the threat of force can convince a proliferator to disguise their efforts to develop weapons and make it more difficult to acquire intelligence about possible violations.

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GLobAL NUCLEAR WEApoNS ARSENALS

ight countries currently have a declared nuclear weapons capability. Russia and the United States still retain the largest arsenals, by a wide margin.

The peak of the global nuclear weapons buildup came in 1986 when global stockpiles totaled almost 70,000 weapons. Over 98% of these were in the hands of Russia and the United States. There are approximately 20,500 nuclear weapons in the world today. It is impossible to know the precise size and composition of every nuclear arsenal. No government is completely transparent about its nuclear forces, but analysts and intelligence professionals have generated credible estimates. There are several kinds of nuclear weapons stored at varying degrees of readiness. The United States and Russia keep many nuclear weapons on high alert available for rapid use, while China stores many of its weapons in a disassembled form. All figures in this section describe total stockpiles.
Source: The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

These charts show total numbers of nuclear warheads, including strategic, non-strategic, deployed, and non-deployed.

Source: The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

* These terms can have different meanings that focus on range, yield, treaty classification, intended target, or regional context. The above definitions are most relevant in the framework of U.S.-Russia arms control efforts.

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NUCLEAR POWER SINCE: 1945 CURRENT STOCKPILE: 8,500 WEAPONS

United States

The United States was the worlds first nuclear power. It maintains a triad of nuclear weapons delivery systems (land-based missiles, bombers, and nuclear capable submarines). The United States deploys 200 low yield tactical nuclear weapons, most of which are based on the territory of European NATO allies. Russia has a triad of strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems, the majority of which are land-based missiles, and has over 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons. The fall of the Soviet Union and Russias subsequent fiscal woes have taken their toll on Russian conventional forces, according a relatively higher role for nuclear forces. The United Kingdoms nuclear arsenal is based entirely on missiles launched from submarines. The future of the United Kingdoms nuclear weapons force is currently under discussion.

NUCLEAR POWER SINCE: 1949 CURRENT STOCKPILE: 11,000 WEAPONS

Russia

NUCLEAR POWER SINCE: 1953 CURRENT STOCKPILE: 225 WEAPONS

United Kingdom

NUCLEAR POWER SINCE: 1964 CURRENT STOCKPILE: 300 WEAPONS

France

France values its nuclear deterrent as a guarantor and symbol of its independence and influence. Most of its weapons are launched from submarines although some can be launched from aircraft as well.

NUCLEAR POWER SINCE: 1964 CURRENT STOCKPILE: 240 WEAPONS

China

Chinas arsenal includes a small number of long-range missiles that can reach the United States but consists mostly of shorter-range systems.

NUCLEAR POWER SINCE: 1967 CURRENT STOCKPILE: APPROxIMATELY 80 WEAPONS

Israel

Israel does not confirm or deny that it has nuclear weapons and has not conducted any confirmed nuclear tests. Israel is believed to have an operational nuclear arsenal that can be delivered by aircraft and landbased missiles.

NUCLEAR POWER SINCE: 1998 CURRENT STOCKPILE: APPROxIMATELY 80 WEAPONS

India

India conducted a peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 that was widely believed to be weapons related. India waited over two decades to test again in 1998. India has been in persistent conflict with Pakistan, and fought a war with China in 1962. Both countries now have nuclear weapons. Pakistans nuclear weapons program was developed in response to Indias program. Pakistan tested shortly after India in 1998. Pakistan worries about aggression from India, which has a much larger conventional military force.

NUCLEAR POWER SINCE: 1998 CURRENT STOCKPILE: APPROxIMATELY 110 WEAPONS

Pakistan

NUCLEAR POWER SINCE: 2006 CURRENT STOCKPILE: FEWER THAN 10 LOW-YIELD DEVICES

North Korea

North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 2003, and has since conducted two low-yield nuclear tests. It is unclear whether North Korea has operational nuclear weapons.

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ThE NUCLEAR NoNpRoLifERATioN TREATy

he Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is a bargain between the original five countries with nuclear weapons and non-nuclear states to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. Not all countries signed on to the NPT when it was negotiated in 1968. But today, the NPT includes almost the entire world. There are widespread fears that the NPTs ability to restrain proliferation may be breaking down. The Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs are the most frequently cited examples. The vast majority of countries have not built nuclear weapons. More countries have abandoned nuclear weapons programs than initiated them since the treaty came into force. The NPT is not the only reason for these successes but there is evidence that the basic bargain of the NPT still holds.

India, Pakistan, and Israel are the only countries that have never signed the NPT. The international community still considers withdrawal from the NPT to be an unacceptable provocation. The only country to have ever done so is the hermit kingdom of North Korea.

ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL: ABORTED NUCLEAR RIVALRY These Latin American countries both covertly pursued a nuclear weapons capability while under military rule. Both have since abandoned this effort and signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Almost every country in the world is a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, an agreement which forbids new states from acquiring nuclear weapons.

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Three Pillars of the NPT:

NONPROLIFERATION
States without nuclear weapons will not acquire them

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
States with nuclear weapons will pledge to pursue negotiations in good faith to reduce their nuclear stockpiles

PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

All NPT members have the right to use nuclear energy under international safeguards

Foundations of the nuclear bargain

IRAN: LEAVING THE TREATY? Many fear that Iran is developing a nuclear weapons program under the guise of a peaceful nuclear power program.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN: NUCLEAR RIVALS OUTSIDE THE NPT The two nuclear-armed South Asian nations have consistently denounced the NPT as discriminatory.

NORTH KOREA: THE ONLY Ex-MEMBER North Korea announced its departure from the NPT in 2003 and went on to test nuclear devices in 2006 and 2009.

SOUTH AFRICA: Ex-NUCLEAR POWER, CURRENT NPT MEMBER South Africa secretly developed a nuclear arsenal that the country voluntarily gave up shortly before it signed the NPT in 1991.

ISRAEL: NUCLEAR OPACITY Israel never joined the NPT and is widely believed to have developed a nuclear arsenal, which Israel officially neither confirms nor denies.

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oThER ARMS CoNTRoL TREATiES, AGREEMENTS, ANd iNSTiTUTioNS

he United States has used international treaties and agreements for decades to control the spread of nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (see pg. 10) lies at the center of an overlapping network of international institutions and agreements. There is an active debate about the contribution of these treaties to American security. Outlier states like Iran and North Korea openly flaunt treaties. Consensus-based institutions like the Conference on Disarmament can be stalled by one intransigent member. But virtually all countries with nuclear capabilities embrace the organizations and institutions of the nonproliferation regime. Stewardship of that regime, both through leadership and adherence to its rules, is a key American national security priority.
NS

NUNN-LUGAR COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) American CTR programs have helped Russia and other former Soviet states to secure nuclear materials and facilities, as well as provide employment to nuclear scientists who might otherwise be employed by would-be nuclear proliferators or terrorist groups.

NUCLEAR SUPPLIER GROUP (NSG) NSG members create export guidelines for nuclearrelated items, including nuclear reactors and dual use items with possible nuclear and non-nuclear applications. NSG guidelines require that buyers of such items must have international safeguards in place to prevent theft or diversion of nuclear technologies and materials.

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (NEW START) New START is an agreement between Russia and the United States to establish a bilateral inspection and monitoring regime, and to limit deployed strategic nuclear weapons. As the international body charged with regulating the peaceful use of nuclear energy worldwide, the IAEA is key to all U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals, including monitoring the Iranian nuclear program.

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TREATIES ON THE HORIZON

FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY (FMCT) An FMCT would ban the further production of weapons grade uranium and plutonium. Pakistan is currently blocking FMCT negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, which requires consensus of all parties. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT) The CTBT would ban all nuclear test explosions. The United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom stopped testing nuclear weapons in the 1990s. Explosive tests are considered to be a prerequisite for development of a new nuclear arsenal. The United States and eight other Annex 2 countries must ratify the CTBT before it can enter into force.

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iLLiCiT NUCLEAR ANd MiSSiLE TRAdE

he global nonproliferation regime, along with national policies to restrict nuclear trade, has made it difficult to acquire nuclear weapons. Proliferators must go through expensive and time-consuming covert domestic development, often based on illicit transfers from outlier states or nonstate actors. These activities result in sanctions or other punishments. Modern surveillance technologies and detection techniques mean that enduring deception is difficult. The most infamous example of illicit proliferation is the Abdul Qadeer Khan (AQ Khan) network. AQ Khan acquired components and technology for the Pakistani nuclear program and eventually came to operate a clandestine retail nuclear proliferation network that operated in many countries and sold nuclear-related goods to countries like Iran and Libya. North Korea has sold missile technology to other states, including Pakistan and Iran. The Chinese government, as well as firms within China, has also been involved in the transfer of nuclear technologies, including nuclear assistance to Pakistan.

Abdul Qadeer Khan established an illicit network that that sold nuclear technologies to several countries (see chart below).

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NUCLEAR wEApoNS TESTiNG ANd SToCkpiLE MAiNTENANCE

t takes many steps to build a working nuclear arsenal, including explosive testing. Test explosions can also be used to warn and intimidate rivals and to test the reliability of weapons designs. The established nuclear powers, including the United States, have observed a moratorium on explosive testing since the 1990s. The United States signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would ban all nuclear test explosions, in 1996 but the Senate declined to provide consent to ratification in 1999. Above ground tests were banned in 1963 by the Limited Test Ban Treaty (a precursor to the CTBT), which was ratified by the United States, the Soviet Union, and most other states.

How Does the United States Maintain Its Nuclear Arsenal?

Using data collected from over 1,000 American nuclear tests. Stockpile Stewardship and Life Extension Programs. Simulated (non-explosive) testing.

Provisions of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Bans all nuclear test explosions. Establishes an International Monitoring System to detect nuclear explosions anywhere in the world. Is intended to prevent the development or substantial improvement of nuclear weapons. Provides for on-site inspections of suspected nuclear test sites.

Source: The Stockholm international Peace Research institute

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U.S. MiSSiLE dEfENSE

efending against ballistic missiles has long been a U.S. goal. The United States has spent over $100 billion since the early 1980s to achieve it. Some ballistic missiles can carry nuclear weapons. Many see missile defense as a strategy for addressing nuclear threats. Destroying multiple missiles in flight remains a daunting technical challenge. A working missile defense system must be able to quickly detect a missile launch, accurately track it over very long distances, and then precisely intercept a fast-moving object before it reaches its target.

The missile defense mission is controversial in the United States. The spectrum of opinions runs from those who see missile defense as a core and urgent American defense requirement to those who see it as an unworkable waste of resources. But an emerging consensus among Americans is accepting a role for missile defenses. What that role should be is still being debated.

MIDCOURSE PHASE After the missile exits the atmosphere, it travels to its destination guided by the force of gravity. The missiles warhead separates from the missile and continues toward the target. SYSTEMS: Groundbased Midcourse Defense, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System/ Standard Missile-3

BOOST PHASE A ballistic missile burns its fuel for several minutes as it lifts off the ground. The missile moves relatively slowly during this phase. SYSTEMS: Airborne Laser Test Bed (experimental, undeployed system) SM-3 launched from the USS Hopper, an Aegis BMD-equipped guided missile destroyer.
Source: missile Defense Agency and U.S. Navy

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The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)

The EPAA calls for the four-phase deployment of American missile defenses to defend Europe against limited missile attack. The system is centered on the sea-based Aegis missile defense system and the SM-3 interceptor. The system is initially intended to counter short- and medium-range missile threats, but will eventually be upgraded to counter long-range missiles.

The 2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration: A NATO Commitment to BMD

The NATO alliance committed, for the first time, to deploy a missile defense system to defend the territory of European NATO members.

BMD Cooperation with Russia: An Opportunity for Progress?

The United States and the NATO alliance are exploring missile defense cooperation with Russia against states like Iran. Missile defense has been problematic for U.S.Russia relations for decades. Cooperation could ease tensions and provide the United States access to valuable Russian radar data. Concerns remain, however, about Russia gaining access to sensitive U.S. data and technology and whether cooperation would compromise the independence of Americas missile defense system.

SENSORS
The U.S. BMD system uses a variety of systems to detect missile launches and track them throughout their flight.
SYSTEMS: Sea-based X-band Radar, Aegis SPY-1, Space Tracking and Surveillance System, AN-TPY-2, Upgraded Early Warning Radars

TERMINAL PHASE The warhead re-enters the earths atmosphere and continues toward its target. The warhead is traveling very rapidly during this brief phase. SYSTEMS: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, Patriot Advanced Capability-3, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System/Standard Missile-2

Sea-Based x-Band Radar. Source: missile Defense Agency

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CoNCLUSioNS
<< Almost three thousand Americans were killed in the terrorist attacks against the United States on 9/11. After the 10th anniversary of this tragedy, it is important to remember how much more catastrophic this event would have been if the attackers had used a nuclear weapon. A single, 10 kiloton nuclear weapon detonated in midtown Manhattan smaller than the bomb used in Hiroshima could kill an estimated half a million people and cause $1 trillion in economic damage.* << Two decades after the end of the Cold War, the United States faces real and persistent dangers from the global spread of nuclear technologies to potential aggressors including the specter of nuclear terrorism. << United States relies on a wide range of tools to combat nuclear threats, The from maintaining its own strong and credible nuclear deterrent, developing effective missile defenses with close allies, creating wide-ranging programs to lock down global nuclear stockpiles and prevent their theft or compromise, to imposing harsh sanctions on nuclear outliers like Iran. << This complex network of national and international instruments to deter aggressor states and non-state actors from gaining access to nuclear weapons requires the highest priority attention and support from all law-abiding states. No single tool is sufficient to combat global nuclear threats, but each one is important. Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is at the top of the American national security agenda. << Despite predictions during the 1960s that the world would have a dozen or more new nuclear states by now, today there are only a few nuclear outliers including Iran and North Korea. The majority of states either never sought nuclear arsenals or chose to renounce their nuclear ambitions including Argentina, Brazil, Libya, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Nonproliferation successes significantly outnumber failures. The 189 members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in good standing underscore the strength of the global norm against nuclear proliferation. << United States cannot afford to be complacent. Irans clandestine nuclear The program has set off alarms throughout the world even though Iran is not yet able to produce nuclear weapons. Along with North Korea, which has conducted two nuclear tests and is an active exporter of illicit weapon technologies, Iran is the target of international isolation and punitive sanctions. Both states demonstrate the high political and economic costs faced by nuclear proliferators.
*Source: The Belfer Center at Harvard University. See Further Reading section.

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GLoSSARy
GLOSSARY Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System A U.S. naval weapons system that tracks and intercepts ballistic missiles. It combines advanced radar, computers, and interceptors. Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) An unmanned aircraft that delivers an explosive payload and flies at low altitude. An ALCM is launched from an aircraft such as a strategic bomber. Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) A missile designed to intercept an incoming ballistic missile. ABM deployments were previously limited by the ABM treaty, from which the Bush administration withdrew in 2002. Ballistic Missile A missile that carries a payload towards a predetermined target. Ballistic missile spend a portion of their flight outside the atmosphere. While the launch of these missiles is powered, they rely on gravity to descend towards their targets. Some are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Cold War A hostile standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union that lasted from the end of World War II until the Soviet Unions collapse in 1991. Both sides built large nuclear arsenals. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) A treaty establishing a ban on nuclear test explosions. Though signed by 182 countries and ratified by 154, the treaty must be ratified by 44 Annex 2 states in order to enter into force. Nine of these key countries, including the United States, have not yet ratified the treaty. Counterforce targeting When weapons are targeted against the forces of an opponent. Countervalue targeting The practice of targeting the civilian infrastructure or population of an opponent. Cruise Missile A guided missile used to deliver an explosive payload. Cruise missiles follow a low trajectory, and unlike ballistic missiles, do not leave the atmosphere. Deployed nuclear weapons Nuclear weapons available for rapid or immediate use. The New START treaty limits deployed strategic nuclear weapons. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) An effect of nuclear explosions that can disrupt the functioning of communication and other electronic systems over a wide area. European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) A fourphased program announced by the Obama Administration in 2009 to protect Europe, and eventually the United States, from limited ballistic missile attack. It is based on upgraded versions of the SM-3 interceptor. Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) A proposed treaty that would ban the future production of fissile material. FMCT negotiations are currently stalled in the consensusbased Conference on Disarmament due to Pakistani concerns about Indias existing fissile material stockpile. Fukushima Daiichi power plant A Japanese power plant that was damaged by an earthquake and tsunami in March of 2011, leading to the release of radiation. Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) An anti-ballistic missile that is part of the US national missile defense system. GBIs are deployed at Fort Greely, Alaska and at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) An intermediate range unmanned aircraft that delivers an explosive payload and flies at low altitude. They were designed to be fired from mobile ground-based launchers. GLCMs are no longer in service. Highly Enriched Uranium Uranium that has been enriched so that it consists of over 20% of the Uranium 235 isotope. Uranium that has been enriched to 90% Uranium 235 is considered weapons grade. Horizontal proliferation The acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities by a new state. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) A ballistic missile capable of reaching targets 5,500 kilometers away (approximately 3,500 miles). ICBMs have traditionally been used to carry nuclear warheads. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) An international organization created in 1957 dedicated to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEAs headquarters are in Vienna, Austria. International Monitoring System (IMS) The IMS is a global network of sensors intended to detect nuclear explosions and verify compliance with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It detects seismic activity in the ground, radioactive particles in the air, sound waves that travel through the water, and sound waves that travel through the air. The IMS provided data on the spread of radiation after the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant. Kiloton A measure of nuclear explosive yield equivalent to approximately 1,000 tons of TNT. The blast from the Fat Man bomb dropped on Nagasaki was roughly 20 kilotons. Life Extension Program Activities that extend the usability of nuclear weapons. Some components of nuclear weapons become less functional as time goes on, and must be refurbished or replaced. Megaton A measure of nuclear explosive yield equivalent to approximately 1,000 kilotons.

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Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) A MIRV allows a single missile to carry multiple warheads, which can strike multiple targets. MIRVed missiles are widely considered to be more destabilizing than single-warhead missiles. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) The Cold War concept that a nuclear attack by one superpower on the other would lead to the total destruction of both sides. New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) A strategic nuclear weapons treaty between the United States and Russia. It establishes a bilateral verification and inspection regime, and it limits each countrys deployed strategic nuclear arsenal to 1,550 warheads. Nuclear fission The splitting of an atoms nucleus. In a nuclear warhead, fission is used to trigger a chain reaction which causes a nuclear explosion. Nuclear fusion The joining together of two or more atomic nuclei. This process released energy. Thermonuclear weapons use a nuclear fission reaction to trigger a nuclear fusion reaction. Nuclear modernization The process of updating nuclear weapons infrastructure in order to ensure that they are safe, secure, and functional. Also can refer to the development of new weapon designs. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) A multilateral treaty designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and enable the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Five nations (The United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, and France) are allowed to possess nuclear weapons with the understanding that they will pursue nuclear disarmament. Nuclear Security Summit A meeting between heads of state to ensure that nuclear material is protected. The United States hosted the first Summit in 2010. The next Summit will take place in Seoul in 2012. Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Created in response to Indias 1974 nuclear test, the NSG is a group of nuclear supplier countries that agree to control and limit the export of nuclear-related items. Nuclear terrorism The use of a nuclear weapon by a non-state group like al Qaeda. There are no known incidents of nuclear terrorism but the United States has identified it as an important threat. Nuclear triad The trio of nuclear weapons delivery systems, including nuclear-capable bombers, landbased missiles, and submarine-launched missiles. Only Russia and the United States possess a nuclear triad. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) The PSI is a U.S.-led effort to prevent and interdict the trafficking of WMDs and related materials. Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) The former coordinated nuclear war plan of the United States specifying numbers and types of weapons to be allocated to various categories of adversary targets in the event of a nuclear confrontation.

Six Party Talks The diplomatic forum dealing with the North Korean nuclear weapons program, involving China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Russia, and the United States. Stockpile Stewardship The techniques and capabilities to maintain and test the reliability of nuclear weapons without explosive nuclear testing. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) A treaty negotiated between the United States and Russia to limit deployed strategic nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. It also set up a verification regime to ensure compliance. It expired in December 2009. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) This follow-on treaty to START I between the United States and Russia never entered into force. It would have allowed each side to retain fewer strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems than START I. It would also have banned the use of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on ICBMs. Strategic Bomber Long range aircraft capable of delivering strategic nuclear weapons to intercontinental (5000 km) range, such as the American B-52 or the Russian Blackjack. Strategic nuclear weapon A long range nuclear weapon. American and Russian strategic nuclear weapons are limited by the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) Also known as the Moscow Treaty, SORT was a strategic nuclear weapons reduction treaty between the United States and Russia, effective from 2003-2011. The New START treaty superseded SORT. Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) A long range ballistic missile launched from a submarine, such as the American nuclear-equipped Trident II D5 SLBM. Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) A long range cruise missile launched from a submarine, such as the nuclear-equipped Tomahawk SLCM. Tactical nuclear weapon A short range nuclear weapon typically intended for use on the battlefield. U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear weapons are not limited by any treaty. Thermonuclear weapon A nuclear weapon that uses nuclear fission and nuclear fusion to achieve a high explosive yield. Uranium enrichment A process by which natural uranium is prepared for use in nuclear reactors or nuclear weapons. The Iranian uranium enrichment program has convinced many observers that the country seeks a nuclear weapons capability. Vertical proliferation Vertical proliferation occurs when a nation augments its nuclear weapons capabilities. Weapon of Mass Destruction A term encompassing nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons.

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ThE CoNSENSUS foR AMERiCAN SECURiTy

he Consensus for American Security is a group of distinguished retired military leaders and analysts from both sides of the aisle. The Consensus advocates for the pragmatic center of the national security debate.

The Nuclear Security Index is intended to advance the Consensus goal of educating policymakers, the media, and the public on the most pressing nuclear security issues that our country faces.

Amb. Morton Abramowitz BG John Adams, USA (Ret.) Dr. Graham Allison COL David Allwine, USA (Ret.) Mary Catherine Andrews RADM James Barnett, USN (Ret.) Scott Bates The Hon. Samuel R. Berger Dr. Coit Blacker Dr. Barry Blechman, PhD Dr. Mark Brzezinski Amb. Richard Burt LtGen John Glad Castellaw, USMC (Ret.) The Hon. Dr. Antonia Chayes BGen Stephen A. Cheney, USMC (Ret.) LTC Chris Courtney, USA (Ret.) Nelson W. Cunningham Dr. Sidney D. Drell MG Paul D. Eaton, USA (Ret.)

LTG Robert G. Gard Jr., USA (Ret.) Dennis M. Gormley VADM Lee Gunn, USN (Ret.) Senator Chuck Hagel Maj Gen Marcelite J. Harris, USAF (Ret.) Senator Gary Hart Gen. Richard D. Hearney, USA (Ret.) ADM Bobby Ray Inman, USN (Ret.) Lt Gen Arlen Dirk Jameson, USAF (Ret.) BG John Johns, USA (Ret.) Clarence Juhl Dr. David Kay Dr. Geoffrey Kemp LTG Donald Kerrick, USA (Ret.) Col Richard L. (Dick) Klass, USAF (Ret.) Dr. Lawrence J. Korb RADM Rosanne M. LeVitre, USN (Ret.)

Gen Merrill Tony McPeak, USAF (Ret.) Col Mark Puck Mykleby, USMC (Ret.) Dr. Janne Nolan ADM William Owens, USN (Ret.) Amb. Steven Pifer Dr. Alan Platt Dr. Christopher Preble Col Guy B. Roberts, USMC (Ret.) Dr. Scott Sagan Lt Gen Norman Seip, USAF (Ret.) Dr. Sarah Sewall Amb. Wendy R. Sherman The Hon. George P. Shultz The Hon. Strobe Talbott LTG James Thompson, USA (Ret.) Caren Z. Turner, Esq. Maj Gen Jasper Welch, USAF (Ret.)

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THE STATUS AND COMPOSITION OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR ARSENAL
U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, http://www.defense.gov/npr/ docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20 Report.pdf (accessed August 10, 2011). U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, October 25, 2011, http://www.state.gov/t/ avc/rls/176096.htm (accessed October 26, 2011). Fitzpatrick, Mark (Ed.), Nuclear Black Markets: Other Countries and Networks, Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks, May 2007, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, http://www.iiss.org/EasySiteWeb/ getresource.axd?AssetID=2642&type=full&servi cetype=Attachment (accessed August 10, 2011). Sagan, Scott D, Why do States build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb, International Security, (Winter, 1996-1997), Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 54-86, http:// iisdb.stanford.edu/pubs/20278/Why_Do_States_ Build_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf (accessed August 20, 2011).

NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY

Nikitin, Mary Beth, Securing Nuclear Materials: The 2010 Summit and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, July 18, 2011, http://www.fas.org/ sgp/crs/nuke/R41169.pdf (accessed October 20, 2011). The White House, Key Facts about the Nuclear Security Summit, April 13, 2010, http://www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/key-facts-about-nuclearsecurity-summit (accessed September 12, 2011).

GLOBAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARSENALS

Norris, Robert S. and Hans M. Kristensen, Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945-2010, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2010, Vol. 66, No. 77, http://bos.sagepub.com/ content/66/4/77.full.pdf (accessed August 10, 2011). Woolf, Amy F., Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, Congressional Research Service, February 2, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/ RL32572.pdf (accessed October 20, 2011).

THE PROLIFERATION OF THE WORLDS MOST DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS

Allison, Graham, Nuclear Disorder: Surveying Atomic Threats, Foreign Affairs, (January/ February 2010), Vol 89, No. 1. Bunn, Matthew, Anthony Weir, John P. Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, March 2003, http://www.nti.org/e_ research/cnwm/cnwm.pdf (accessed October 11, 2011). Farber, Dan, Nuclear Attack a Ticking Time Bomb, Experts Warn, May 10, 2011, http://www. cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20003954503543.html (accessed September 12, 2011).

THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

International Atomic Energy Agency, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Information Circular, April 22, 1970, http://www.iaea.org/ Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/ infcirc140.pdf (accessed August 10, 2011). United Nations, Background Materials for 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, http:// www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/background. shtml (accessed October 27, 2011).

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Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January to 31 December 2010, http://www.dni.gov/reports/20110208_ report_wmd.pdf (accessed October 20, 2011). Weiss, Leonard, Turning a Blind Eye Again? The Khan Networks History and Lessons for U.S. Policy, Arms Control Today, March 2005, http://www.armscontrol. org/act/2005_03/Weiss (accessed August 19, 2011).

NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING AND STOCKPILE MAINTENANCE

Medalia, Jonathan, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Background and Current Developments, Congressional Research Service, October 5, 2011, http://www.fas.org/ sgp/crs/nuke/RL33548.pdf (accessed October 20, 2011).

U.S. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Hildreth, Steven A, Ballistic Missile Defense: Historical Overview, April 22, 2005, http://dodreports.com/ pdf/ada472866.pdf (accessed August 10, 2011). Missile Defense Agency, The Ballistic Missile Defense System, http://www.mda.mil/system/ system.html (accessed October 27, 2011). North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Lisbon Summit Declaration, November 20, 2010, http://www. nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828. htm (accessed August 10, 2011). The White House, Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy: A Phased, Adaptive Approach for Missile Defense in Europe, September 17, 2009, http://www.whitehouse. gov/the_press_office/FACT-SHEET-US-MissileDefense- Policy-A-Phased-Adaptive-Approach-forMissile-Defense-in-Europe/ (accessed August 10, 2011).

OTHER ARMS CONTROL TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND INSTITUTIONS

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, Text of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, http:// www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/content/treaty/ treaty_text.pdf (accessed August 10, 2011). Nuclear Suppliers Group, What are the Guidelines, http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/02guide.htm (accessed August 10, 2011). The White House, Key Facts about the New START Treaty, March 26, 2010, http://www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/key-facts-about-newstart-treaty (accessed August 10, 2011). Woolf, A.F., Mary Beth Nikitin., and Paul K. Kerr, Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements, May 2, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/ crs/nuke/RL33865.pdf (accessed August 10, 2011).

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WHAT MAKES ASP DIFFERENT?

The American public understands the complexities of todays global challenges, but has too often been misled by empty rhetoric and cherry-picked facts. The American Security Project (ASP) is organized around the belief that honest public discussion of national security requires a better-informed citizenryone that understands the dangers and opportunities of the 21st century, the spectrum of available responses, and the benefits and drawbacks of each course of action. Understanding and articulating American beliefs and values related to U.S. foreign policy and national security is crucial to creating effective policy that builds consensus. ASP was formed to help Americans from opinion leaders to the general public understand how national security issues relate to them, and to explain challenges and threats in a way that can spur constructive action. To accomplish this, ASP is dedicated to building collaborative communities, exploring divergent viewpoints and engaging Americans across the country.

YOUR DONATION
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THANK YOU

A special thanks to Amber Allen and Nathan Donohue for their assistance with the Nuclear Security Index.

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