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Phenomenology of Religion

Ia|mon 1hadath||
TABLE OF CONTENT
Introduction.
1.1 History of Development.
1.2 ,t is Penomenology of Religion?
1.3 Cl,ssifying Definitions
1.3.1 Teologic,l Definition of Religion.
1.3.2 Mor,l definitions of religion.
1.3.4 Pilosopic,l Definitions
1.3.5 Psycologic,l definitions
1.3.6 Sociologic,l definitions
1.4 Distinctives of Penomenology of Religion.
1.5 Princip,l Elements of te Penomenology of Religion
1.5.1 Te penomenology of religious experience
1.5.2 Religious experience ,s encounter wit God
1.5.3 Emotions ,nd Religious Experience
1.5.4 Emotion,l feelings ,nd encounter wit God
1.5.5 Religious experience ,nd rel,tionsip to m,teri,l context
1.5.6 Gener,l Critique.
1.6 Religious Consciousness
1.6.1 ,t is religious consciousness?
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1.6.2 Religious consciousness ,nd its existenti,l expression.
1.6.3 St,ges of Religious Consciousness
1.7 Levels of te Existenti,l Expression of Religious Consciousness
1.7.1 Te mytic ,nd mytologic,l levels
1.7.2 Mystic,l religious consciousness ,nd tese levels of expression.
1.8 Te emergence of religious consciousness in m,nkind.
1.8.1 Anthropological theories:
1.8.2 Psycologic,l Teories
1.8.3 Historic,l Teories
1.9 Ev,lu,tion
1.10 Te Rise ,nd Growt of te orld Living Religions
1.10.1 Some Historic,l Penomen,.
1.10.2 Gener,l consider,tions.
1.11 Religious Consciousness ,nd Religious Plur,lism
1.12 Conclusion.





Phenomenology of Religion
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Pbenomenology of Religion
Introduction
The term has come to be widely used in scholarly religious discussion only in the twentieth
century. ThereIore, as a discipline it is still relatively new and even the term phenomenology is
not used with the same meaning by all religious scholars. For some phenomenology oI religion
reIers to an attitude toward or the study oI religious phenomena in the broadest sense. For others,
it reIers to the actual cross-cultural comparative study and classiIication oI religious
maniIestations. For still others it expresses a commitment to a specialized method oI inquiry oI
religious expressions. Though it is impossible to give a universally agreed upon deIinition,
generally phenomenologists oI all types are concerned with the believers' awareness oI the
maniIestations oI liIe, how they express that awareness, and how those expressions can be best
understood. In a common usage, phenomenology of religion means the comparative study and
the classiIication oI diIIerent types oI religious phenomena. It concerns the experiential aspect oI
religion, inquiring into what is central to an understanding oI what is involved practically,
cognitively and aIIectively in a religious way oI liIe.. It views religion as being made up oI
diIIerent components, and studies these components across religious traditions so that an
understanding oI them can be gained. It distinguishes various perspectives on the subjective
character oI religious experience, and examines the relation between religious experience and
experience oI the material world. It also considers the interaction between experience, conceptual
Iramework (including religious doctrine) and practice, and the contribution, iI any, oI emotional
Ieelings to the epistemic signiIicance oI religious experience.
1.1 History of Development.
The Ioundations Ior the use oI phenomenology in religious discussion may be traced to
Schleiermacher's Speeches on Religion (1799), in which he responded to the rampant rationalism
in religious inquiry oI his day. He called his contemporaries back to a sense oI the role oI human
awareness in religious reIlection. The phenomenology oI religion as a discipline, however, was
not developed until the late 1880s. It was then that P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, sometimes
thought oI as the Iounder oI the phenomenology oI religion, proposed in his Handbook oI the
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History oI Religion (1887) that the state oI historical study oI religious traditions needed to
progress toward a phenomenological study oI the inner essence oI religious experience. The Iirst
explicit use oI the phrase "phenomenology oI religion" occurs in the ehrbuch der
Religionsgeschichte (Handbook oI the History oI Religions), written by Pierre Danil Chantepie
de la Saussaye in 1887. Chantepie divides his science oI religion into two areas oI investigation,
essence, and maniIestations. For Chantepie, it is the task oI phenomenology to prepare historical
data Ior philosophical analysis through "a collection, a grouping, an arrangement, and a
classiIying oI the principal groups oI religious conceptions." William Brede Kristensen, a
researcher oI Chantepie`s ehrbuch, held lectures on phenomenology oI religion, some oI which
was edited posthumously, and the English translation was published in 1960 as The Meaning of
Religion. In deIining the religious essence oI which he explores historical maniIestations,
Kristensen appropriates RudolI Otto`s conception oI das Heilige ("the holy" or "the sacred").
Otto describes das Heilige with the expression "mysterium tremendum"a numinous power
revealed in a moment oI "awe" that admits oI both the horrible shuddering oI "religious dread"
(tremendum) and Iascinating wonder (fascinans) with the overpowering majesty (mafestas) oI
the ineIIable, "wholly other" mystery (mysterium). Kristensen argues that phenomenology as a
search Ior the meaning oI religious phenomena Ior the believers is not complete in grouping or
classiIying the phenomena according to their meaning, but in the act oI understanding.
'Phenomenology has to come as Iar as possible into contact with and to understand the
extremely varied and divergent religious data. He was interested in a concrete depth-research in
the incidental religious phenomena. These subjects concerned mythological material (such as
Creation, the Flood etc.) as well as human action (such as baptism), and objects oI nature and
handicraIts. In all oI this he only made use oI the authentic sources: writings and images by the
believers themselves. Consequently he reduced his Iield oI research to the phenomena in
religions living around the origin oI Christianity: during the millennia beIore and the centuries
aIter Christ, in Iran (Avesta), Babylonia and Assyria, Israel, Egypt, Greece and Rome. Gerardus
van der Leeuw`s Phnomenologie der Religion (1933) Iollows Kristensen in many respects,
while also appropriating the phenomenology oI Martin Heidegger and
the hermeneutics oI Wilhelm Dilthey. For van der Leeuw, understanding is the subjective aspect
oI phenomena, which is inherently intertwined with the objectivity oI that which is maniIest. He
articulates the relation oI understanding to the understood phenomena according to the schema
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outlined in Dilthey`s deIinition oI the human sciences as sciences that are 'based on the relations
between experience, expression and understanding. He correlates subjective experience,
expression, and understanding with three objective levels oI appearingrelative concealment,
relative transparency, and gradually becoming maniIest or revealed, wherein the understanding
oI what is becoming revealed is the primordial level oI appearing Irom which the experienced
concealment and expressed transparency oI appearing are derived. Appropriating Otto`s notion
oI the 'holy he deIines the essential category oI religion. The transcendence becoming revealed
in all human understanding can be Iurther described as sacred an overpowering 'wholly
other, which becomes revealed in astonishing moments oI dreadIul awe ($cheu) and wonderIul
Iascination. Moreover, van der Leeuw recognizes that, although dreadIul, Being-in-the-world is
Iundamentally characterized as care ($orge), the existential structure whereby Dasein is
concerned with meaningIul relationships in the world alongside other beings. Because all
experiences disclose concealed (wholly other) transcendence to the understanding, all
experiences oI Being-in-the-world are ultimately religious experiences oI the sacred, whether
explicitly recognized as such or not. Human being as such is homo religiosus, the opposite oI
homo negligens. It is the task oI the phenomenology oI religion to interpret the various ways in
which the sacred appears to human beings in the world, the ways in which humans understand
and care Ior that which is revealed to them, Ior that which is ultimately wholly other mystery.
The descriptive Iorm, or morphological, is the dominant and most commonly practised Iorm oI
the phenomenology oI religion. Here, the descriptive Iorm is comprised oI the Iormation oI
knowledge via phenomena, compiled in a descriptive manner, which Iinally, allows the
classiIication oI types and the thematic determination oI what characterises religion(s) in a
structural sense. The descriptive Iorm, Iollowing van der Leuuw, also tends to utilise the
methodological approach oI suspension oI judgment and empathetic-intuitive understandings.
The descriptive Iorm is also oIten connected to historical studies oI religion(s) insoIar as the
phenomena to be analysed is oIten only given via historical interpretations oI religion(s). Finally,
in its aims and preconceptions, the descriptive Iorm Iollows the Hegelian inIluence oI
preconceiving Religion as the unity and essence oI religion(s), and moreover, the attempt to
deIine Religion via the maniIestations and phenomena oI religion(s). The hermeneutic Iorm does
not diIIer to any great extent Irom the descriptive Iorm in actual approach and preconceptions,
but rather, tends to have an additional theoretical dimension added to it. In this, the hermeneutic
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Iorm oIten gets discussed as having two historical grounds, the descriptive Iorm oI
phenomenology via van der Leuuw, and the hermeneutic theory based upon the thinking oI both
Riceour and Gadamer.

The hermeneutical Iorm grounds its methodological approach in van der Leuuw`s
methodological appropriation oI Husserl`s epoche` and eidos, expanding and uniIying these
terms within in a singular notion oI attitude`. In this, the approach is both hermeneutical, i.e., a
theory oI interpretation, but also phenomenological, in van der Leuuw`s Hegelian` conception
oI it. This attitude` gets discussed as an art` which is grounded in a common human essence,
and Iurthermore, is constituted as the genuine attitude oI humans. In this attitude, then, the
scholar oI religion(s) is purportedly able to reach a critical selI-awareness oI their own
situation/situated-ness, which therein allows the scholar to overcome their own bias and
approach religion(s) in a truly objective, universal Iashion. The interpretative and attitudinal
approach oI the hermeneutical phenomenology oI religion is described Irom an external point oI
view as a methodological position wherein the analysis oI interpretative attitude is constituted as
methodological. Alternatively, the hermeneutical Iorm is characterised as a descriptive
phenomenology oI religion(s) grounded in, or driven by, a particular theory oI interpretation.

In general, it is possible to characterise the phenomenology oI religion as containing two primary
dimensions: oI preconception and oI method. In the Iirst case, the common preconception oI the
phenomenology oI religion is that Religion has an object-like-ness, a universal essence,
determinable via the maniIestations oI religion(s) or religious phenomena. However, the
phenomenology oI religion repeats the problem oI Religion, remains in the problem, and
Iurthermore, maintains the avoidance oI theoretical investigation oI the notion oI Religion. As
such, it is no surprise that where the phenomenology turns to the problem oI Religion in
deIinition, it does so Ior the most part within the same preconception oI Religion as religion(s)
and religious phenomena.61 In this case, the phenomenology oI religion again preconceives the
notion Religion via the immediacy oI religion(s) and the phenomena associated with religion(s).

This continuation oI the problem oI Religion is evidenced in one oI the modern masters` oI the
phenomenology oI religion, Ninian Smart. In Smart`s text, The Phenomenon of Religion, it is
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argued that the phenomenology oI religion must be characterised as the descriptive and structural
study oI the phenomenon oI Religion and the phenomena oI religion(s). In this, the phenomenon
Religion is discussed as being approachable as an object in two ways: as religious phenomena,
and as religion(s). As such, insoIar as it is implied that religious phenomena belong inherently to
religion(s), the notion oI Religion must be conceived oI as a phenomenon inextricably associated
with religion(s) and Iurthermore, as an objectlike phenomenon. It has also been made evident
that the phenomenology oI religion presupposes that Religion, as object-like, may be approached
properly through the phenomena associated with religion(s), as that which uniIies, and is
common to all religious phenomena.

1.2 ,t is Penomenology of Religion?

Phenomenology oI religion is nothing but a description oI what religion and its practices and its
elements as it appears. This entry examines the relevance oI phenomenological considerations
Ior the concept oI God (or the sacred otherwise characterized) and the question oI what sort oI
rational sense is implied in the adoption oI a religious point oI view. The discussion
distinguishes various perspectives on the subjective character oI religious experience, and
examines the relation between religious experience and experience oI the material world. It also
considers the interaction between experience, conceptual Iramework (including religious
doctrine) and practice, and the contribution, iI any, oI emotional Ieelings to the epistemic
signiIicance oI religious experience. In all oI these ways, an appreciation oI the 'phenomenology
oI religion' proves central to an understanding oI what is involved practically, cognitively and
aIIectively in a religious way oI liIe.

1.3 Cl,ssifying Definitions
Various scholars Irom diIIerent Iields have suggested sometimes contradictory criteria to
determine what can be included or excluded as religious phenomena. In the process, they have
sought to provide deIinitions they regarded as providing a true account oI what constitutes a
religion but on closer scrutiny it soon becomes apparent that the way religion is deIined convey
the presuppositions oI the one doing the deIining. This Ilaw was noted by phenomenologists,
who attempted to develop a methodology that would neutralize the eIIects oI what they regarded
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as distorting and biased deIinitions. For the purpose oI clarity let us attempt to deIine Irom
diIIerent Iive perspectives such as theological, moral, philosophical, psychological and
sociological. This is reIerred Irom the book oI John Ferguson 'religions oI the world
1.3.1 Teologic,l Definition of Religion.
DeIinitions which insist that religion reIers to god or supernatural spiritual powers oI some sort
can be classiIied as theological. Religion is believing in God. Religion is belieI in spiritual
beings. This roughly is a summary oI the view oI the late nineteenth century anthropologist E B
Tyler. He held that in its earliest Iorm, religion involved a belieI in a hierarchy oI spirits Irom the
lower to the most powerIul beings. Religion is a mystery, at once awesome and attractive. This
statement is derived Irom the twentieth century German theologian RudolI Otto who Iound the
essence oI religion in the idea oI the holy which he claimed attracts people due to its mystery and
its power.
A theological deIinition makes the central criterion oI religion belieI in transcendent power
which usually is personiIied as a supreme being. But sometimes is conceived as diIIused through
powerIul spiritual beings or is held to be impersonal as a mysterious, supernatural Iorce.
1.3.2 Mor,l definitions of religion.
DeIinitions which stress that religion consists oI telling its adherents how they ought to live may
be termed moral deIinitions. Religion is leading a good liIe. This is another commonsense
deIinition is attributed by Ferguson to a school girl. It simply asserts that to be religious is to be
moral without deIining what morality entails. Religion is the recognition oI all our duties as
divine commands. This is a Iorm oI the eighteenth century philosopher Immanuel Kant`s
categorical imperative which contends that there is a moral law which we all ought to obey.
Religion exists when that moral law is interpreted as a commandment Irom god.
A moral deIinition makes the central criterion oI religion a code oI correct behavior generally
aIIirmed by believers as having its source in an unquestioned and unquestionable authority.
1.3.4 Pilosopic,l Definitions
Although related to theological deIinitions, philosophical deIinitions generally describe religion
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in terms oI Ian abstract, usually impersonal, concept derived on the basis oI human reason.
Religion is what man does with his solitariness. This deIinition, Irom the twentieth century
philosopher AlIred North whitehead, identiIies the abstract notion oI solitariness as the
Iundamental religious dimension within human existence. Religion is the relation oI man to his
own being, but as being outside oI himselI. Religion is ultimate concern. This Iamous deIinition
oIIered by the twentieth century theologian Paul Tillich Iorms one oI the simplest yet basic
deIinitions oI religion. For Tillich, religion is a relationship which people hold with that which
concerns them ultimately. Obviously, this could be god or spiritual beings, but since it is much
broader than this, it conveys an abstract idea which can be embodied in a variety oI speciIic
objects, symbols, or concepts. A philosophical deIinition makes the central Ior religion the
positing oI an idea or concept which the believer interprets as ultimate or Iinal in relation to the
cosmic order and to human existence.
1.3.5 Psycologic,l definitions
Psychological deIinition oI religion stress that religion has to do with the emotions, Ieelings or
psychological states oI the human in relation to the religious object. Some examples Irom
Ferguson are as Iollows: Since it stresses inner experience, it can be classiIied as a psychological
deIinition similar to that oIIered by the nineteenth century theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher
who described religion as a Ieeling oI the absolute dependence`. Religion is a universal
obsessive neurosis. This deIinition Ialls within the viewpoint oI the Iollowers oI the
psychoanalytic school oI Sigmund Freud. It deIines religion as a psychological disturbance; one
which, although universal, must be overcome iI humanity is to attain psychological health.
A psychological deIinition makes the central criterion oI religious Ieelings or emotions within
people which cause them to appeal to Iorces greater than themselves to satisIy those Ieelings.
1.3.6 Sociologic,l definitions
DeIinitions oI religion which emphasizes religion as group consciousness embodying cultural
norms or as a product oI society in general may be termed sociological deIinitions. Religion is
the opium oI the people. This classical deIinition constructed by Karl Marx indicates that
religion results Irom the oppression oI the masses by those in positions oI social or economic
power who use the message oI religion to keep the oppressed content with their lot in this liIe in
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the hope oI a just order in the next one religion thus plays a sociological Iunction Ior both the
oppressor and the oppressed.
1.4 Distinctives of Penomenology of Religion.
There are several distinctives oI the phenomenological oI religion. First, it is descriptively
oriented. Phenomenologists do not seek evaluative judgments, which are considered the domain
oI philosophy oI religion. Rather, they seek accurate and appropriate descriptions and
interpretations oI religious phenomena. Such phenomena include rituals, symbols, prayers,
ceremonies, theology (written or oral), sacred persons, art, creeds, and other religious exercises,
whether corporate or individual, public or private. One particularly vexing problem in evaluative
engagements in the scholarly arena is that IruitIul discussion is oIten stiIled as antagonists stake
out emotional territories which color their attempts at careIul reIlection. Ideally, the
phenomenological approach is a more productive one in which the researcher's goal is to allow
the phenomena under investigation in some sense to speak Ior themselves, and issues oI external
validity are temporarily suspended.

Phenomenologists have as a goal the maintenance oI a descriptive outlook in gathering, siIting,
comparing, and analyzing the data oI their studies. Above all, in the phenomenological approach
one attempts to describe as accurately as possible the phenomena under consideration, including
not only the events that occur but also the motives behind the events. The problem with
explanation as Iound all too oIten in the empirical sciences is that in the process oI explaining
(and later predicting) the actual events themselves may be lost. The phenomenological approach
is not oriented towards problem solving, but towards empathetic description. It thus keeps the
events themselves as central. Further, the phenomenological method seeks to describe the
phenomena Irom the perspective oI the practitioner, known in anthropological circles as emic (or
insider) description. As Smart has pointed out (1987), in crossing religious boundaries we are at
the same time all too oIten crossing cultural boundaries, and thus a genuine cross-cultural
approach is inherently necessary Ior an appropriate phenomenological method.

Some phenomenologists maintain that the phenomenological method does not have as a goal to
explain the phenomena it describes (see Westphal, 1984). They maintain that explanation,
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Iollowing the behavioral science approach oI Hume, Mill, and Hempel, is rooted in being able to
discover universal laws which can be used to predict Iuture behavior. It is this sense oI
explanation which phenomenology does not seek to posit. This does not mean that a
phenomenological approach does not aim at understanding and interpretation, Ior it does.
However, it does not seek explanation oI a law-governed predictive nature--rather, it seeks to
discover motives and intentions in the particular environment oI the phenomena under
consideration. To put it another way, the stated desire oI the phenomenologist is not to Iind an
explanation Ior a problem as much as to achieve an adequate understanding oI it.

The phenomenological study oI religion is comparative, but only in a limited sense. Because oI
phenomenology's emphasis on data, the more data incorporated the more potential signiIicance
oI the study. Meaning may best be Iound in the data by using comparative methods, but the
phenomenologist does not seek to list or describe similar practices across diverse religious
traditions Ior the purpose oI rating them Irom best to worst. Having divorced themselves Irom
the evolutionary approach to religious development earlier in the twentieth century, and having
bracketed oII truth questions, phenomenologists are loathe to return to a Iorm oI comparison
which might imply superiority or inIeriority oI one type oI experience within a religious tradition
as opposed to a similar practice in another religion. Because the comparative approach works
best when harnessing signiIicant types and amounts oI data, the phenomenological study oI
religion is also systematic in its approach. Individual phenomena can best be understood not as
isolated snap shots, but as belonging to a complex system oI experiences all oI which are related
together, and thus an approach to religion as a system characterizes phenomenological
methodology.

Following philosophical phenomenology, the phenomenologist oI religion avoids reductionism.
This is so signiIicant that the criticism oI reductionistic tendencies in the study oI religion has
occupied a signiIicant amount oI the phenomenological literature. To the phenomenologist,
trying to reduce, and ultimately trivialize, religious phenomena to purely sociological,
psychological, anthropological, economic, or environmental terms is a Iundamental mistake.
Such reductions ignore the complexity oI the human experience, impose social values on
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transcendental issues, and ignore the unique intentionality oI the religious participant.
Phenomenologists do not seek a bird's-eye view, but, in Jonsson's term, a worm's-eye

Phenomenologists suspend questions oI truth Ior the sake oI developing insights into the essence
oI religious experience. The emphasis is on developing a genuine empathetic understanding oI
the experience in question, at times involving participation in the experiences under
consideration to gain Iirst-hand inIormation. The phenomenologist oI religion does not Iollow
the metaphor oI the detached, scientiIic observer. A more appropriate metaphor is that oI an
actor, who requires an intimate, empathetic knowledge oI the part being portrayed Ior a
successIul production.
1.5 Princip,l Elements of te Penomenology of Religion
1.5.1 Te penomenology of religious experience
Commentators on religious experience disagree on the role oI phenomenological considerations.
Is there a phenomenology that is distinctive oI religious experience? And iI there is, do we have
a reliable vocabulary to describe it? Is there a phenomenology oI mystical experience which
crosses Iaith boundaries? Or are such experiences saturated with tradition-speciIic doctrinal
assumptions? Are reports oI religious experiences in central cases best read as doctrine-inspired
interpretations oI the subjective character oI the experience, rather than as accounts oI their
phenomenology? And does the aIIective phenomenology oI religious experience do any
epistemic work? Let's consider some oI these issues.
The development oI insight into the essential structures and meanings oI religious experience is
the ultimate goal oI phenomenology oI religion. To arrive at such insights while demonstrating a
rigorous methodology remains an unrealized hope Ior phenomenologists. This is in part because
rigor and intuition are extremely diIIicult to combine in a Iield as laden with emotional content
as religious studies. More importantly, however, once an "essence" is discovered, the question oI
ontology (or truth) can no longer be ignored. For example, when Eliade suggests that modern
man is poorer than archaic generations because we have desacralized our view oI the cosmos, he
is no longer merely describing. Rather, he has moved into the type oI ontological discussion
which phenomenologists bracket out (Baird, Category Formation, 1971). At the same time that
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phenomenologists attempt to bracket out ultimate questions oI truth, their methodology posits
that the researcher accept the evaluations oI the believers being studied. These are not to be
accepted in regard to the ultimate question oI truth, but in regard to the intentionality oI the
believers themselves. For phenomena to be interpreted in their context, the intentions oI those
who participate in the phenomena must be accepted. In this sense, the phenomenologist serves as
a translator. In this metaphor, the intention is that oI dynamic equivalence rather than wooden
literalism, and the phenomenologist has the task oI IaithIully representing the experience oI the
devotee in the idiom oI the phenomenologist's audience.
1.5.2 Religious experience ,s encounter wit God
William Alston says that we don't have a well-developed vocabulary Ior the description oI the
phenomenal qualia oI 'mystical experience. William James would say that 'mystical
experiences are 'ineIIable. Alston suggests that our inability to describe the elements oI such
experiences Irom a phenomenological point oI view does not imply that they lack a distinctive
phenomenology, or that they Iail to be directed at some mind-independent reality, in rather the
way that sense experiences are. And thereIore we cannot reIine a vocabulary Ior the description
oI mystical experience by replication oI relevant conditions and renewed attention to the
phenomenology oI the experiences that occur under those conditions.
Alston and other commentators have noted that in the Christian mystical tradition anyway there
is in Iact quite a well-developed vocabulary Ior describing the subjective quality oI such
experiences. This vocabulary is modeled on that oI ordinary sense perception. So there are
'spiritual sensations oI touch, sight, taste, smell and hearing which are taken to be in some way
analogous to their counterparts in ordinary sense perception. As Nelson Pike notes, this tradition
has commonly diIIerentiated three varieties oI experience oI God: those associated with the
'prayer oI quiet, the 'prayer oI union, and 'rapture, in order oI increasing intimacy oI
acquaintance with God. And each oI these phases oI the spiritual liIe, it has been said, is
associated with its own distinctive phenomenology. Mystical perception is epistemically
deIective because we lack a reliable vocabulary Ior the description oI the phenomenology oI
such experiences. On the contrary, it may be said, there is such a vocabulary, although that it is
not as developed or its Iull meaning as generally accessible as the vocabulary that we use Ior the
description oI the phenomenology oI ordinary sensory experience.
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John Hick's study is a particularly inIluential application oI this Kantian sort oI perspective
within the domain oI religious experience. Hick argues that religious experiences are structured
according to tradition-speciIic sets oI religious concepts. On this view, all the major Iaiths oIIer a
way oI encountering one and the same ultimate religious reality but Christians encounter this
reality in Trinitarian mode, while Hindus encounter it as Brahman, and so on.
Hick is clear that this is not a matter oI the advocates oI the various Iaiths having an experience
whose phenomenological content is much the same across the traditions, but just diIIerently
interpreted and diIIerently reported; rather, tradition-speciIic concepts (such as those oI the
Trinity and Brahman) enter into the content oI the experience. Analogously, we might say that
there is a sense in which a newborn inIant and I have the same experience when we look out
upon a room oI tables and chairs, in so Iar as the same image is imprinted on our retinas; but we
would presumably wish to say that the phenomenology oI these experiences remains quite
diIIerent even so, and that only I have an experience which seems to be oI tables and chairs, and
in which my visual Iield is organised accordingly (so that regions oI color are sorted into table-
and chair-like conIigurations).
This account oI religious experience and the contribution oI doctrine in shaping its
phenomenology sit very well with Hick's deIence oI a pluralistic reading oI the major Iaiths. On
this view, these traditions are all valid in so Iar as all provide a vehicle Ior experience oI ultimate
religious reality or what Hick terms 'the Real (an expression which is intended to be neutral
between the various designations Ior this reality which are Iavoured by the diIIerent traditions).
And the traditions are indeed all equally valid in so Iar as there can be no question oI the
doctrinal content oI any one tradition's experience oI the Real corresponding more closely to the
character oI the Real 'in itselI; rather, the doctrinal content oI such experiences derives in every
case Irom the side oI culture or a person's religious Iormation, rather than mapping the character
oI the Real in itselI. IdentiIying the intrinsic character oI the Real is beyond the scope oI any
human enquiry. Instead, we have to make do with appearances oI the Real, where these
appearances vary with the culturally constituted ways oI being religious that are made available
in the various Iaiths.
So philosophical treatments oI the phenomenology oI religious experience draw quite diverse
conclusions: religious experience (in at least some central cases) is said variously to have no
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phenomenological content (not to be like anything), or to have a content which at any rate cannot
be communicated readily in verbal terms, or to have a phenomenological content that can be
described because it is analogous to the 'sensational quality oI ordinary sensory experience,
where this content can then be interpreted in doctrinal terms, or to have a phenomenological
content which is given in the doctrinal scheme oI the relevant Iaith tradition, where this scheme
Iunctions rather like a lens through which religious reality is viewed, or to have a
phenomenological content which never comes clearly into view in public discourse, since reports
oI such experiences typically Iocus upon the implied doctrinal meaning oI the experience which
is, on this account, to be sharply distinguished Irom its phenomenological content.
1.5.3 Emotions ,nd Religious Experience
Many commentators have thought that the phenomenology oI religious experience is given in
signiIicant part by its aIIective tone. When God is made known in the experience oI guilt, as
someone to whom we are accountable and who summons us to newness oI liIe, or when God is
revealed in the Ieeling oI wonderment at the scale oI the cosmos, or when God is maniIest in the
experience oI encountering some thrilling and awe-inspiring 'other, or in many other cases too,
the religious import oI the experience is given in large part in our aIIective responses. It is
noteworthy too how oIten the language oI 'spiritual sensations involves reIerence to states oI
Ieeling. And perhaps this is a conceptual requirement: what sense would there be in the idea oI a
religiously authentic encounter with God, the supreme good and maker oI all, which leIt the
subject oI the experience unmoved.
1.5.4 Emotion,l feelings ,nd encounter wit God
As with the question oI its phenomenology more generally, so there is controversy surrounding
the contribution oI emotional Ieelings in particular to the character oI religious experience.
William Alston asks: iI the phenomenological content oI a religious experience were purely
aIIective, would this be a reason to doubt that it was directed at anything? In this case, he notes,
we might well suspect that the experience consists in a Ielt response to some believed presence
rather than some presentation oI God to the believer.
II we allow that emotional Ieelings can have some intellectual content in their own right, then we
have a powerIul tool Ior understanding how the aIIective phenomenology oI religious experience
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may turn out to be integral to its God-directedness. For example, returning to Alston's concerns
regarding the contribution oI emotional Ieelings to the phenomenological content oI religious
experience, iI we take emotional Ieelings to be intrinsically contentIul, then we may wish to say
that the phenomenological content oI a religious experience could be purely aIIective without
this posing any diIIiculty Ior the thought that the experience is directed at some mind-
independent reality rather than being simply a sensation-like Ieeling which is caused by the
thought that God is present.
1.5.5 Religious experience ,nd rel,tionsip to m,teri,l context
Some commentators have argued that the philosophy oI religion literature has not paid suIIicient
attention to the Iact that religious experience is oIten in the Iirst instance experience oI some
material context, a building or landscape Ior example. And the phenomenology oI the experience
is thereIore given, at least in signiIicant part, in our experience oI a set oI material objects. On
this sort oI approach, religious experience is sometimes conceived not so much as an encounter
with God considered as a particular item oI experience, but more as a matter oI seeing 'in depth
the religious meaning oI some material context. II we take up this suggestion, then a new range
oI possibilities Ior developing a phenomenology oI religion comes into view. Expounding this
tradition oI thought, Thomas Barrie notes that: To reach the threshold and sacred place, oIten
there is a path and entry sequence. The path that leads to the place can take many Iorms . and
typically involves a series oI spaces or events, each becoming increasingly more sacred. This
sequence acts as a marker oI the sacred ground, as protection Ior the uninitiated, and as a trial to
be endured Ior those seeking the divine.
Some Christian commentators have taken exception to this sort oI picture, arguing that what
makes a place religiously special Ior a Christian is simply the presence there oI a Christian
community, engaged in a liIe oI other-regarding love. Acknowledging this diIIerence oI view,
Harold Turner distinguishes between the domus dei and domus ecclesiae approaches to sacred
architecture. On the Iirst perspective, a holy building is conceived as a house oI God, and it
should thereIore be a suitably imposing space, displaying superior craItsmanship and adorned
with the Iinest materials all oI which will imply a correlative phenomenology, whereby the
mind is liIted up towards God. By contrast, on the domus ecclesiae perspective, the church
building Iunctions primarily as a meeting place, and its construction should thereIore serve the
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needs oI the community which gathers there, and Iacilitate their interaction and Iellowship.
On the other side, Barrie notes that while the sacred place is set apart as a zone where the gods
may be encountered, this is not to say that such places have no part to play in the liIe oI a
community. On the contrary, sacred spaces will typically serve as an important Iocus Ior a
community's proIession oI the values which bind it together.
It is reasonable to suppose, Ior example, that the religious signiIicance oI the great cathedrals oI
the medieval period was not just a matter oI the Christian stories with which they were
associated, in so Iar as they were connected with, say, the deeds oI particular holy Iigures or their
relics. Their meaning is also given in their sheer sensory impact: through their monumental scale
and controlled use oI light, and through the interplay between the solidity oI stone and the
diaphanous qualities oI glass, these structures can speak oI the sacred by inducing a response oI
hushed wonderment.
We have been considering various understandings oI the phenomenology oI religious experience,
where religious experience may be construed as an encounter with God as a particular entity, or
as an encounter with some material context, given by our built or natural environment or some
combination oI these. In this latter case, it may be that God is maniIest not so much as a
particular item in our perceptual Iield, but instead as the meaning that is presupposed in our
making sense oI a material context. In this way, diIIerent emphases in the phenomenology oI
religion are likely to correlate with diIIerent conceptions oI God: not only in so Iar as a given
conception oI God has a phenomenal content, but also in so Iar as diIIerent phenomenologies are
likely to be associated with diIIerent conceptions oI the sense in which God may be conceived as
'individual.
1.5.6 Gener,l Critique.

There are several areas in which phenomenology oI religion Iaces diIIicult questions in its quest
to understand the essence oI religious. In light oI the recent deconstructionist critique oI how we
tend to deIine ourselves by the ways we describe others, phenomenology's claims oI pure
description have been open to examination. No one is immune Irom the inIluences oI culture,
historical setting, and social situation. Each oI these areas lays assumptive claims on our world
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view. To claim to be purely descriptive is recognized as impossible in light oI human conditions
and constraints, let alone sin. Every person, phenomenologist included, has what might be
termed hidden agendas driving the choice oI data, method oI analysis, and presentation oI
Iindings. In the literature, phenomenologists regularly cross the boundary Irom description to
evaluation. Indeed, crossing such boundaries is part oI what it means to be culturally and
historically placed human beings and to have religious identity. Thus, the claim oI
phenomenology to be a purely descriptive methodology has come under attack.

Along similar lines, the phenomenologists' desire to simply accept the intentions oI adherents as
expressed naively eliminates the question oI the deceitIulness oI the human heart and our
inability to know ourselves. This also is an important consideration in the intuitive approach, as
the question oI our own motives in the intuitive process are inappropriately bracketed. In other
words, the personal psychology oI the phenomenologist is not subject to examination, though
this will have a considerable bearing on the types oI intuitions developed as interpretations oI
religious phenomena. For us as Christians, the impact oI sin on the human psyche dare not be
ignored or down played, and this includes not only the phenomena being considered but the one
who is reIlecting on and seeking to describe those phenomena.

Some have charged that phenomenology tends to look at religious events as though they were a
set oI slides rather than a living video rooted in an historical context. The exclusion oI
phenomena Irom history or oI excluding diachronic and developmental analysis altogether leaves
phenomenology open to the challenge oI Ilawed methodology. This lack oI ability to properly
contextualize the mass oI religious phenomena typically considered by phenomenologists results
in the presentation oI what are assumed (or posited) to be representative events. The question oI
the representative nature oI such events is diIIicult to resolve even when statistical
methodologies are employed, let alone when dealing with a discipline that tends to eschew the
expositing oI undergirding predictive laws as its goal.
The phenomenological reliance on eidetic vision or intuition also invites criticism. For instance,
the very combination oI "objectivity" and "intuition" is a contradiction oI terms. Further, reliance
on intuitive insights does not allow Ior escape Irom questions oI veriIication. In this area
phenomenology is open to charges oI methodological Ilaws, Ior substantiating intuition and
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showing that one particular intuitive insight is more adequate than another is exceedingly
diIIicult at best. This is particularly vexing when several phenomenologists study the same
experience and each develops signiIicantly diIIerent insights. The observation that the end result
inevitably involves personal subjectivism is diIIicult Ior phenomenology to escape. More
importantly, in light oI biblical revelation, Christians who utilize a phenomenological approach
must be willing to move beyond intuitive insight to ontological analysis in light oI biblical
revelation. This is especially signiIicant in light oI phenomenology's purported bracketing oI
truth in its methodology. This bracketing may be invaluable in the initial stages oI developing an
empathetic understanding oI the religious experience oI another. However, Ior the theologian or
missiologist it can only be viewed as a valuable starting methodology which has its limitations.

Phenomenology demands an empathetic approach, Ior to represent another's religious experience
in a way that the other would aIIirm demands empathy. In search oI such empathy, there will
always be a danger oI identiIication to the extent that religious conversion occurs. Further, some
phenomenologists advocate a Iorm oI participant observation. For the Christian, however, actual
participation in certain types oI rituals oI another religion is an area Iull oI diIIiculties. This may
limit our ability to empathize, but is necessary in light oI God's ultimate call on our lives.
1.6 Religious Consciousness
1.6.1 ,t is religious consciousness?
Like human consciousness in general, religious consciousness is Iirst oI all an experience. And
like any other experience (ex: love), it can only be Ielt to be understood, words which try to
describe it serve only to evoke it in the listener, to help him make the experience Ior himselI.
II Ior clarity`s sake, one were to try and distinguish between one human experience and another,
one would try to characterize each experience by its Iormal object. Thus Ior example, the Iormal
object oI the noetical experience is the true` that oI esthetical experience is the beautiIul`, that
oI moral experience is the good , that oI love experience is the weal oI the other`, etc. now,
many phenomenologists oI religion, aIter RudolI, characterize religious experience as the
experience oI the sacred` (oI the Holy the numinous`).
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The diIIiculty oI saying what the sense oI the sacred arises not only Irom the merely evocative
Iunction oI words which are used to describe any human experience, but also, and especially,
Irom the peculiar nature oI the sacred itselI. The sacred is essentially, supra-notional and supra-
conceptual. In itselI, it is unthematizable (ineIIable), what renders this diIIiculty more acute is
the Iact that when one tries to describe it, one Iinds oneselI obliged to borrow concepts and
words generally used to describe other human experience, and hence the description, Iar Irom
being helpIul, can lead to equivocation and misunderstanding.
Religious experience is absolutely speciIic and unique and requires thereIore, a speciIic category
oI interpretation precisely that oI the sacred. Otto calls this an ' a prioiri category` in the sense
that is not evolved Irom any kind oI sense perception. (Think oI the metaphysical Iirst principles
in scholastic philosophy)
Keeping all this in mind, we can describe the sense of the sacred as that feeling ingrained in
every man to be sincere and honest with one self, to be open and accept what he thinks to be true
and to act in accordance with what he thinks to be right. No matter how man explains the
psychological origin oI this Ieeling and the ontological nature oI this honesty, truth and right, this
Ieeling takes on Ior him necessarily an absolute value` something which is at least somehow
universal` and independent oI him. He may or may not existentially accept it, or respond to it,
but excepting cases oI psychopathology, it is always there in him as something inviolate not to
be tampered with something sacred.
This is perhaps stretching Otto`s idea oI the sacred and oI those who accept his analysis oI it.
Otto speaks in Iact oI the IearIul and Iascinating mystery in Iront oI which man Ieels a sense oI
awe and wonder, oI being overpowered and energized on the one hand and a sense oI the wholly
other (not necessarily in the sense, and here we are taking in consideration what Otto says in the
appendix oI his who experiences it, but in the sense that this experience is wholly other than his
other human experience).
Still, we believe that our description is in line with the Iundamental intuition oI Otto even though
it seeks, again in accordance with the same intuition, to bring out perhaps better, the non-
rational, the pre or supra conceptual, the intuitive and the un-thematized nature oI the sense oI
the sacred.
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1.6.2 Religious consciousness ,nd its existenti,l expression.
Like every other human experience, religious experience engages man`s whole being and not just
one oI his Iaculties and involves his whole existence. Indeed, Ior reasons which will become
clearer later, even much more than any other human experience. Another word which we shall
employ to designate this sense oI the sacred` is Iaith. We do so Ior theological reasons, even
though, the term as used by us here is to be distinguished Irom the commonly accepted meaning
oI the term in Christian theology.
Religious consciousness Iorms a part oI human consciousness in general. In many ways, though
not in all respects as we shall see, it is submitted to the same laws and conditions, which govern
the emergence, development and vicissitudes oI human consciousness in general. We shall later
try to evaluate some theories regarding the religious consciousness in the history oI mankind.
SuIIice it here to remark that to understand the progressive development oI religious
consciousness Irom it primitive to more sophisticated Iorms, it could be helpIul to think oI the
same gradual development oI human consciousness in general or oI any other oI its aspects(ex:
noetic , the moral etc.).
As we have described it, the sense oI the sacred can be linked to the metaphysical Iirst principles
serving as the condition a priori oI any Iurther development Irom an implicit to an explicit state
oI awareness (in our case oI religious awareness). This development is however by sense data
and empirical experience.
When man began to express his Iaith in concepts and words, when he perhaps still unreIlectively
and conditioned as he was by the state oI his human consciousness in general, started to account
Ior his Ieeling to be honest and sincere with himselI, to understand the truth about himselI and
the world surrounding him and the why oI having to act according to what was right and what
this right precisely was in other words, when he began to express in concepts and words that
mysterious something Ielt in himselI, so deeply aIIecting his whole being and existence,
Irightening as well as Iascinating him, the result was his belieI. BelieI then can be considered to
be rational expression oI his Iaith. It is an aspect oI the existentially involving nature oI Iaith.
But iI Iaith involves the whole man and not only his mind but his heart and will, it is natural that
with his belieI, there resulted man`s aIIective response and willIul ordering oI his liIe in
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accordance with and depending upon the way he perceptualized and spoken oI the sacred: with
belieI there resulted cult and morality last two terms understood in a broad sense.
This indicates how we are picturing, as it were, the relations between Iaith and belieI on the one
hand, and the relations between belieI, cult and morality on the other.
In our terminology, religion is this sense oI the sacred or simply Iaith; religious tradition or
religion is Iaith existentially expressed in belieI, cult and morality. We shall speak oI the so
called quasi-religion later.
1.6.3 St,ges of Religious Consciousness
II we distinguish here three stages oI religious consciousness, we do not intend the number three
stages oI religious consciousness; we do not intend the number three in a strictly mathematical
sense or to compartmentalize religious consciousness. What we want to indicate here that,
Iollowing many authors truly experienced in the religious liIe, religious consciousness generally
grows in intensity and gradually, passing as it were, through diIIerent stages. Though the number
oI these stages diIIers Irom one author to another, the progress they describe is strikingly similar.
The Iirst stage is what we might call the common stage, what is the one which belongs to the
common run oI religious minded persons. Most oI these are born in a particular religious
tradition. Their religious consciousness like human consciousness in general, is slowly aroused
by their Iamiliar, social, and educational milieu. Slowly their inherited religious belieI and
practice become, iI at all, a personal conviction and intelligent habit. This is already a genuine
religious experience in so Iar as every knowledge and Ieeling are in themselves genuine
experiences, no matter what inIluences had been at play and no matter what the truth oI the
content oI the religious knowledge and Ieeling is.
The second stage is what we might call the ascetical stage. Here personal conviction and
intelligent habits begin to play a primary role oI an ascetic. All the spheres oI his liIe begin to be
somehow or other aIIected by his religious convictions and more and more time is given to his
religious practices. This does not necessarily mean that man becomes an ascetic or in Christian
terminology a religious but whether he does or not very oIten he does religion begins to have a
greater grip on him.
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The third stage is what most authors call the mystical stage. This is when religious reality
becomes Ior man a Ielt consciousness in his liIe on earth seems to pass into another mode oI
existence. II, as we have said, religious experience in general is ineIIable this is supremely true
oI mystical experience which is the outcome oI religious experience. It is here that concepts and
words necessarily borrowed Irom other human experience are Ielt to be inadequate and even
misleading when they are used to describe this stage oI religious experience. But all mystics
speak oI their sense oI Oneness with the whole oI reality oI an intense and up to then never Ielt
peace, joy and bliss and oI an acquired mysterious light. Noteworthy too is their wonderIul
power oI concentration in meditation and prayer which oIten results in ecstasy or Samadhi.
1.7 Levels of te Existenti,l Expression of Religious Consciousness
1.7.1 Te mytic ,nd mytologic,l levels
When one studies the ways primitive man (in the two senses oI the term, prehistoric and
contemporary uncivilized man and modern highly religiously educated man existentially express
i.e. in belieI, cult and morality , their religion , one cannot help Ieeling the presence oI diIIerent
levels so to say oI this religious expression. This diIIerence in levels can oI course, be noticed
between earlier and later period oI the same religious tradition in general between individuals
living contemporaneously and belonging to the same individual. This diIIerence can be
accounted Ior by many Iactors: individual or collective growth in religious awareness, progress
in philosophical and religious studies and in other sciences, etc.
In belieI, the earlier levels are that oI the myth that is a story which appeals to the imagination
and Ieeling rather than to reason and logic. When the myth is understood to be myth and no
longer believed in literally In other words, when it is demythised then it becomes an allegory
recognized as such. One would have interpreted the myth as trying to express in the way it does a
higher truth. Hence the later levels oI expression in belieI: the mythological. Notice however,
that religious language, no matter how de-mythized remains always as said inadequate,
evocative- iI we preIer symbolical and tendential(tends to points to the truth rather than describe
it.
In cult the earlier level or the mythic is that oI idolatry in its (etymological meaning) that is that
desire Ior sense immediateness between man and the sacred. Here again when the idol is
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understood to be an idol(image, Iigure, Ietish) and this sense immediateness develops into a
spiritual union or communion, in other words when it is iconoclastic then it becomes a sign or
symbol. This would be the later level oI expression in cult. Similarly magic, the manipulation oI
the sacred through the eIIicacy oI the rite itselI used even Ior harmIul purposes belongs to the
mythic level; prayer to the mytho-logical. Even in prayer itselI, the two levels can be discerned
in the object oI one`s prayer material or spiritual.
In morality the earlier level is that oI the taboo( things or persons to be kept at a distance,
violation oI it bringing automatic reprisal) custom, dictating what is or what is not taboo aims at
ritual or physical purity above all. When the taboo gives place to an interpersonal relationship,
when ritual or physical purity is interiorized and becomes a puriIication oI the mind and heart,
when custom is assessed in the light oI all this, then the taboo is transIormed into a spiritual
ascesus.
1.7.2 Mystic,l religious consciousness ,nd tese levels of expression.
These two levels oI expression are possible in any oI the mentioned stages oI religious
consciousness. no matter how acute and sublime his experience, the mystic once he comes to
express it to himselI and to others, and thereIore in concepts and words, with which he is most
Iamiliar and can even be led to interpret his experience or less correctly, in the light oI his own
religious tradition or oI others which happens to be acquainted with. He is similarly conditioned
by the social, intellectual, moral and religious situation to which he addresses himselI. OI this he
may or may not be conscious.
It is signiIicant that many mystics preIer to keep silent or at least emphasizes the inadequacy oI
the concepts and words they employ to describe their experience.
All this is, we think, extremely important to bear in mind when one Iaces the riddle oI the
apparent, indeed the real, contradictions Iound in the teaching oI diIIerent mystics and even in
the teachings oI the same mystic. And it is still more important to bear this in mind when one
Iaces the greater puzzle oI the same contradictions Iound in the scriptures which diIIerent
religious traditions hold as sacred. We shall return to this point later.

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1.8 Te emergence of religious consciousness in m,nkind.
Many attempts have been made to account Ior the origin and growth oI religious consciousness,
particularly oI belieI in God, in man. Here we are not so much concerned with these attempts in
themselves but with it their philosophical relevance. in Iact , such attempts raise the
philosophical problem regarding the truth oI religious consciousness, particularly when it is
thematized and articulated ( that is when Iaith is conceptualized and notionalized in belieI)
scholars have taken diIIerent approaches: anthropological, psychological, historical.
1.8.1 Anthropological theories:
One theory that maintains that at the very beginning there must have been a primitive
revelation regarding a one and only God. Polytheism and other Iorms oI conceiving the
ultimate reality must have been degeneration (W. Schmidt). This theory is principally
based on anthropological studies oI contemporary uncivilized people, with the
assumption that they must have retained the originary belieI oI man regarding God. It is a
Iact that many oI these peoples, particularly in AIrica, have a monotheistic conception oI
god. Still this theory is today generally abandoned. How can one deduce Irom a study oI
contemporary tribal belieIs, no matter how primitive they seem to be, what the belieIs oI
man were thousands oI years ago? All these years must have wrought an evolution in the
human religious consciousness oI tribal people themselves and whether this evolution
was a progress or regress remains to be seen.
Another theory is the so called animistic theory (E B Tyler). According to this theory,
primitive man believed that all moving objects i.e. trees, clouds, streams and oI course,
all animals and men were animated by a mysterious stage arrived when these powers
were believed to be existent in themselves (anthropologist designate them by the term
mana) gradually became gods and goddesses and Iinally belieI emerged in the one God.
Similar theories, based too on anthropological studies trace the origin oI religious
consciousness to belieIs Iound in nearly, even iI not all primitive religions, e.g.totemism
(w. Robertson smith) the sense oI the primacy oI the group over the individual
(Durkheim) ancestor worship (Spencer) etc.


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1.8.2 Psycologic,l Teories

Structural and dynamic psychological studies attribute the origin oI religious
consciousness to some primordial sentiment in man. For example, primitive man, whose
existence and survival was constantly beset by so many threats and consequently
dominated by Iear, was led to believe in supernatural agencies , the ones to whom he
could have recourse. More generally still, man possesses an inIract able will to live (in
primitive, expressing itselI more as clan-preservation) . The prospect oI death, has led
man to believe in immortality and heavenly enjoyments.

Depth psychology discovers the source oI religious consciousness in the unconscious
(Freud), or more deeply still in the collective unconscious (Jung). Psychic Iorces
(acquired in early childhood through parental upbringing and social environment) still act
in one`s adult liIe unconsciously as a super selI-representing natural instincts, the Id and
thus conditioning conscious liIe, the selI by the creation oI symbols. God is the Iather-
symbol. According to Jung even beyond the individual unconscious and prior to every
experience had in in childhood, there is a collective unconscious consisting in archetypes,
which is centers oI energy creative oI psychological experiences and oI imaginative
symbolism. For example, Iather, king, old man, the chieI, are the produce oI the same
archetypes. Similarly, mother Iertile soil, earth, water, are the produce oI the same
archetype etc. the idea oI god belongs to the Iather-archetypes.

We could group here other psychologico-sociological theories, like, under the platonic-
Augustinian inIluence, postulated in man innate divine ideas. The Iathers oI the church
speak oI a certain kind oI a natural and inborn knowledge oI god in man. St. Thomas
accepts the notion oI certain kind oI common and vague knowledge oI god which, as it
were, is present in all men. Without excluding the possibility oI interpreting this by the
Iact that god is known by an internal evidence, he holds it more likely that this means that
at by natural reason, man can arrive immediately at some kind oI knowledge oI god Ior
example when men perceive order in the universe, they generally are led to conclude that
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there must be some order maker. But who or oI what nature this order maker is, or
whether he is only one is not immediately perceived..(Contra Gentes III,38)

1.8.3 Historic,l Teories

Some historians oI religion distinguish three stages in the historical development oI religion:
tribal religion, national religion and universal religion. This process oI development has not been
an unbroken progress nor has it been everywhere uniIorm.
We have already spoken, in another context, oI characteristics oI primitive religion. Our
considerations have not been deduced a prior but as we have claimed phenomenologically based.
Historians oI religion, however, are not always content with describing such characteristics but
attempt to speculate on the historical succession oI the Iorms religion took throughout the
centuries.
For many historians oI religion, monism has been the earliest Iorm oI religious consciousness.
One important step Iorward has been the passage Irom monism to animism, highlighted in the
belieI and reverence Ior the spirits oI the dead. This belieI may not have necessarily implied
belieI in an individual survival aIter death, but this belieI certainly evolved later. Among the
spirits, a certain hierarchy was gradually conceived; the greater, more important or stronger the
object, the higher and more eminent is its spirit. One could say that polycaemonism and
polydaemonlatry characterize tribal religion.
When number oI tribes Iused together Ior some reason or other ( Iear oI a common enemy,
conquest oI one tribe by another) to Irom bigger clans and Irom clans to nations a clannish and
then national consciousness was awakened and with this belieI in national gods. The demons
assume greater dignity and power. What is more important that whereas they were Iormless and
nameless, they now take a deIinite shape and acquire a name.
The objects to which they had been previously related disappear and are replaced by more
general ones: order, love, beauty, war, agriculture, Iate. With a name and a Iorm, these gods are
anthropomorphized and a mythology elaborated. One could say that polytheism and polylatry
characterize national religion.
Sooner or later one god was exalted above the rest or at least was considered to be the national
god to whom the devotee owed exclusive allegiance, while other nations were acknowledged the
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right to worship tier own supreme gods (henotheism, which however is used in other senses too).
With the emergence oI the belieI in one and only true god, the god oI all nations (monotheism)
there arise universal religion.

1.9 Ev,lu,tion
All these theories are concerned, as we have said, particularly with the origin and growth oI
religious belieI. Our approach then which permitted us to understand religious consciousness the
way we did and to distinguish between it and belieI remains immune to the conclusions which
can be and in Iact is admitted by people who proIess no religious belieI at all. In Iact, it is more
oI a datum oI experience, purposeIully unthemtized, than an intellectual proposition.
Still no matter how distinct in our description, Iaith and belieI, are also intimately related, the
latter being the intellectual as aspect oI the Iormer. And since religion is, as we have said, an
existential involvement, engaging thereIore the mind also, existentially speaking it is always
Iound in a thematized Iorm. On other words, Iaith is never without belieI. An evaluation the
above mentioned conclusions do thereIore have its relevance to religious consciousness even in
the way we have preIerred to describe it.
Underlying these conclusions is the implied argument; since religious belieI originates in the
rudimentary and scientiIically Ialse belieIs oI primitive man or in some substratum oI the human
psyche in general, or in some easily explainable social Iact, etc.. Religious belieI, even as it
sophisticated elaboration oI the same rudimentary and scientiIically invalid belieIs oI primitive
man.
The illogicality oI such an argument is obvious. One has to distinguish careIully between the
question as to how religious belieI emerged in human consciousness (the genetic question) and
the question oI tis truth (the critical question). Certainly it is not up to the philosopher oI religion
as such to pronounce judgment on the Iormer question; as such to pronounce judgment on the
latter question. No matter how religious belieI emerged, the question oI its truth remains
unanswered.
Besides religious belieI, as we have said, it is an intellectual expression or interpretation oI
religious consciousness. Religious consciousness is a part or an aspect, oI human consciousness
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in general (indeed, according to us, its highest and noblest aspect). Hence it is subject to and
conditioned by the same laws oI growth, oI evolution, oI vicissitudes. As the present state oI
scientiIic consciousness should not be understood in the light oI its primitive state, but vice-
versa, the same is true oI the present state oI religious consciousness.
Finally, the way we described religious consciousness sheds a certain amount oI light, we think,
on the theories about the genesis oI religious belieI themselves. Was not the inborn sense oI the
sacred a kind oI primitive revelation and was it not it which Iilled man, Irom very earliest time,
with awe and wonder when we began to try to understand himselI and his world, which led him
to believe that even the immaterial world is alive with a power which is in` and above` it? Was
it not it which Iilled his whole being even with Iear at the prospect oI death and instilled in him
the will to live? Was it not so deeply ingrained in him that it aIIected not only his conscious liIe
but also the unconscious substrata oI his whole being, creating symbols and archetypes? Was it
not it again which mad him perceive his ideal nature and revolt against his present condition and
all the ills, including the social ones, oI the world? Was it not a kind oI a divine idea in him even
a certain kind and vague knowledge oI god? It would be, oI course, easier to give an aIIirmative
answer to these questions it we tried precisely to present Irom a thematically interpretation oI
revelation, manna, power, god etc. certainly this thematically interpretation (belieI) is highly
relevant to religious consciousness, as said. But the critical question regarding its truth is to be
tackled independently oI the genetic question.
1.10 Te Rise ,nd Growt of te orld Living Religions
By the world living religions we have principally in mind; Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity,
Islam, Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, ConIucianism, Taoism, Shintoism.
In tracing the rise and growth oI these religions, we are no longer gloating in a realm, oI
conjecture and hypothesis but, even though some Iacts remains obscure, we plant our Ieet on
sure ground since we possess historically proved Iacts on which to stand.
In this chapter we shall be dealing with some historical phenomena in the rise and growth oI the
world living religions which will provide us with a subject matter Ior our philosophical-religious
reIlection.
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1.10.1 Some Historic,l Penomen,.
At the beginning oI religion there stands a man, or men to whom this religion owes, or claims to
owe its origin. (This is no less true oI Hinduism and particularly oI Shintoism). All oI them are
credited with having had a religious mystical experience, iI not ( as in the case oI the theistic
religions and Hinduism) a divine revelation. (The special case oI ConIucius and Lao-Tze who
both however, oIten reIer to the old Chinese religious scriptures) still, somehow or other, all oI
them place themselves in their own pre-existent religious tradition and appear more oIten as
reIormers and teachers.
All oI these religious have their own religious scriptures which even where they are not
considered to be inspired are held to be sacred, not to be tampered with, to be kept intact and
handed down Irom one generation to generation in their integrity. They support to preserve the
doctrine oI their religious masters, in its original Iorm, and hence carry with them the highest and
deIinitive authority. Historical scholarship nowadays tend to incline more and more to the
opinion that none oI these masters put down in writing any oI their doctrine but that this done
later, sometimes much later by immediate or later disciples.
In all these religion we Iind another body oI books whose aim is to interpret, expound, deIend
and apply the scriptural doctrine to day to day living. However this literature derives its authority
Iorm the scriptures and hence the earlier it was written, the more it is presumed to conIorm to the
latter and hence the more authentic and reliable.
Either during the liIe oI the master or aIter, a community oI believers was Iormed, knit together
to a greater or lesser extent, but marked out by the veneration paid to the initiators oI their
religious tradition and tier acceptance oI their particular scriptures.
During the course oI time, e very religious community was split in diIIerent sects. Apart Irom
apostasies (rejection oI the scriptures) and schisms (rejection oI governing authorities iI any)
most noteworthy are the doctrinal splits where believers oI the same religious tradition basing
themselves on the same scriptures animated by the same religious spirit, sharing the same
religious concerns, trying to solve the same religious problems, can diIIer so radically the ones
Irom the other in interpretation and consequently, in general practice. Even when this does not
lead to outright alienation Irom the common religious tradition as oIten is the case the continuing
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presence oI a philosophical-theological pluralism in the same religious tradition is indeed
signiIicant.
All these religion underwent a certain dynamic growth. We notice a certain sameness and yet an
internal development. Whereas the scriptures continue to be the rule oI orthodoxy and source oI
the religious inspiration, none oI these religions can be said to be exactly identical with their
original Iorm. Even apart Irom historically proved inter-Ioundation oI one religious tradition by
another, each one oI them seems to possess a power oI growth and development. This does not
mean that this has been always a linear progress. Each religious tradition had had its times oI
crisis, period oI deterioration, reIorm movements. Note-worthy is the Iact that the possibility oI
this religious inter-Ioundation is most acutely Ielt today when people oI diIIerent religious
tradition have begun to try to understand one another-something which, Ior various reasons, e.g.
edition oI the scriptures, means oI communication, political interdependence, growth in religious
awareness, etc. could only happen today.
1.10.2 Gener,l consider,tions.
The men who have given rise to religious tradition can certainly be considered religious geniuses
whose sense oI the sacred was intensely acute. (Think oI other geniuses in other Iields oI human
experience, art, science, etc.) And this can be discerned not only Irom their sublime religious
teaching but also Irom the way they lived.
It is Irom the scriptures that we can hope to gather how they expressed their religious mystical
experience. But we have to bear in mind what we have said about the ineIIability oI the sacred
particularly when it is mystically apprehended, and consequently about the human situation
conditioning its expression (in concepts and words) and thereIore the scriptures themselves. (In
Christianity, the necessity oI hermeneutics the science oI interpretation, Ior the scriptures is
today commonly accepted. No so, or at least not to the same extent, is it in other religious
traditions, particularly in Islam-although already in the 11nth century A.D. this question was
hotly debated among its theologians.)
We do not think that it is totally impossible, although not very easy to discern a certain kind oI
central and basic inspiration in each religious tradition, running down, as it were Irom the
scriptures down through its historical development. Here it is well to remark that this is a
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religious inspiration. In any case, it is it which underlies the body oI doctrines taught in that
particular religious tradition, which accounts Ior emphases, gives certain coherence to the
religious tradition as a whole, and last but not least explains the very possibility oI that
philosophical-theological pluralism oI which we have spoken.
We shall be attempting to show that this central and basic inspiration is precisely the originary
experience oI the sacred expressed in a particular way.
However that may be, since belieI in a literal or propositional revelation as contained in the
scriptures is perhaps one oI the greatest stumbling blocks iI not the greatest, which stands in the
way oI inter-religious understanding and source oI doctrinal exclusivism, it seems to us highly
important to insist on the distinction we have drawn between mystical experience (including
revelation) on the one hand and belieI (including its scriptural Iormulation) on the other. II the
Iormer is uncriticizable, the latter is.
Furthermore, at this stage oI our considerations, we have toad in the scriptures themselves,
religious data have to be distinguished Irom non-religious ones (historical, geographical,
scientiIic, etc.) and no less Irom philosophical-theological explanation and elaborations, patterns
oI thought and categories oI speech.
Again, a religious tradition has to be understood as a whole and in the light oI its originary
religious experience; a tenet oI religious doctrine, and much more its philosophical-theological
explanation, has to be understood in the context oI the whole religious tradition and its primary
and positive import.
OI course neither the geniality oI the men who have given rise to the world religious tradition,
nor the unconditioned trust put in them by their Iollowers, is in itselI a guarantee Ior the
objectivity (that is Ior the truth oI their sense oI the sacred oI the sacred as thematically
expressed by them. Moreover we have been insisting all along on the human situation oI these
men themselves, and much more oII the scriptures. Hence all we have said so Iar, leaves the
whole question oI the truth oI religion open. On other words, the critical problem cannot be side
stepped by any appeal to religious intuition. However since most critics oI religion criticize in
Iact religious belieIs and not religious Iaith as we have understood it we have, beIore we being to
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tackle the critical question with which the whole oI natural theology will be concerned, to see at
least in a general way, how the sacred was thematized, in other words, how it has been believed
in.
1.11 Religious Consciousness ,nd Religious Plur,lism
As we have seen, there is a sense oI an absoluteness in the very sense oI the sacred as well as a
sense oI universality and oI its being there somehow independently oI a yet still aIIecting his
heart oI hearts and thereIore in him. However all this is till on a supra or pre-rational level oI
awareness and discourse or, on the level oI Iaith.
Now an attentive study oI the history oI religion shows us that man articulated and objectiIied,
his sacred or his Iaith in a bewildering number oI ways indeed but underlying them all thee is
present, as it were a play oI opposites.
Presenting now Irom the historical question oI the gradual development oI belieI and considering
man`s religious belieI as whole conIronting one way oI conceiving the sacred with another,
whether these conceptions are present in the same religious tradition or, and especially in
diIIerent one, we see this play or dialectic oI opposites very clearly.
It is indeed noteworthy that man gradually either personiIied or simply absolutized the sacred.
Think Ior example oI Yahweh, Azura Mazda, Allah on the one hand and Brahma, Shunya,Tien,
Tao on the other.) In a personality conception oI the Sacred, man wither conceived it as one
(monotheism) or as many (polytheism), whereas in an absolutistic conception, man either
conceived it in a negative way or a positive way. (Think Ior example, oI the diIIerent conception
oI Nirvana in Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism.)
II we, Ior clarity`s sake, conIront a personalistic conception oI the sacred, like the Judaic, Islamic
with an absolutistic one (like the Upanishadic, particularly the Advaitic, the Mahayana
Budhistic, it will not be too diIIicult to see how these opposites, indeed seemingly contradictory,
ways oI conceiving and speaking oI the sacred determines and conditions all one`s religious
outlook on liIe, the meaning he gives his existence, the way he explains the world`s and his
origin and Iinal destiny, etc. in a world, his religious belieI- and how thereIore, the dialectic oI
opposites is also at play there. This can be seen in the Iollowing table.
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THE SACRED PERSONAL ABSOLUTIZED
RELATION BETWEEN
SACRED AND WORLD
Otherness,
transcendence,
pantheism
dualism
Sameness,
Immanence
Ban theism
monism
ORIGIN OF THE WORLD Creation maniIestation
MATTER Real non-ultimate Ultimate non-real
EVIL: MORAL
:PHYSICAL
Sin
Trial
Ignorance (Avidya)
Illusion (Maya)
HISTORY Linear cyclical
MAN`S PRESENT
CONDITION
Fallen state Samsara(body assuming birth
and rebirth)
SALVATION:MEANS
FROM
Grace
Sin
Man himselI
Karma
ULTIMATE DESTINY Union Absorption

This is not an exhaustive table.....
One can see the dialectic oI opposites also at play not only in belieI but also and consequently
since, as we said earlier on, belieI conditions and determines in its turn, cult and morality in these
latter too. But here we need not go into that.
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How are we then to account Ior this dialectic? We can do so by recalling the intuitive (supra-
discursive) nature oI Iaith and the discursive (rational) expression oI it in belieI and hence, the
evocative nature oI concepts and words to express the sacred.
The theory oI analogy in scholastic philosophy (which will be studied in greater detail during the
course oI natural theology) can throw a great light on this dialectic which, in its turn, can help
one understand the meaning oI analogy. II all the concepts and words we use to designate the
sacred are borrowed Irom empirical experience, they can only be so used up to a certain point,
or, to put in a diIIerent way, they are used rightly to a certain extent and Ialsely to another extent.
To the extent that they are Ialsely used, we have to negate them.
Now, the opposites oI the dialectic are to each other an aIIirmation and negation (e.g.
transcendence is an aIIirmation; immanence is its negation but at the same time, it its turn, an
aIIirmation and transcendence is its negation.)
This explains the paradoxical nature oI religious discourse...
On a discursive level, these opposites remain in a perpetual tension, seemingly un-reconcilable.
But in Iact one serves to counterbalance the other, thus completing and puriIying the other. The
aIIirmation without the negation leads to anthropomorphism, the negation without the
aIIirmation leads to agnosticism.
But how can they be kept together without a logical contradiction? There would be logical
contradiction iI the concepts used are employed univocally. And they can so kept together
precisely on a supra-discursive level, the intuitive level that oI Iaith. It is by means oI this
intuitive Iaith that one sees the sacred is led to give it expression in concepts and words to aIIirm
thereIore but at the same time because oI the inadequacy oI these, is led at the same time to
negate them. In other words, every negative oI this type unlike the agnostic one-already implies,
somehow or other, a kind oI aIIirmation (one would not be able to say what the sacred is not
neti, neti- unless somehow or other one knows what it is) and vice-versa. It is on this supra-
discursive, intuitive level oI Iaith that the opposites seem to coincide (this is the coincidentia
oppositorum) oI which Otto, op.cit., borrowing the idea Irom Nicholas De Cusa, speaks. This
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coincidence is a kind oI synthesis on a higher level oI the two moments or polarities oI the
dialective (conIlict, antimony) oI the opposites.
In Christian tradition, this has been expression by saying that there are three ways oI naming
god: the negative way (by remotion apophatic) the aIIirmative way (the kataphatic) and the
eminent way. In our way oI understanding the latter, it is precisely a way oI transcendence
because it synthesizes on a higher level the Iirst two.
In the terminology oI St. Thomas, this higher level is precisely that oI the intellectus (oI
intuition) as distinct Irom that oI datic (oI ratiocination, oI dicursivity). In Iact, St. Thomas
speaks oI the via eminentiae as implying the other two ways.
The very possibility then oI a religious pluralism can be accounted Ior on the one hand by the
ineIIability oI the sacred and on the other by the human situation which necessarily conditions
man( his gradually developing religious consciousness, his time and place, Iamilial, social
religious milieu, etc.) to the extent that all authentic religious traditions try to express the sacred (
in belieI, cult, and morality) they can be said to be one on the level oI Iaith; but to the extent that
they express it diIIerently more or less perIectly, more or less comprehensively, etc., they are
certainly diIIerent. The phenomenon oI religious error (in all the existential expression oI Iaith)
is evident enough to need delay us here.

The phenomenological approach to the study oI religion has opened signiIicant doors which are
important in developing an empathetic understanding oI the rich complexity oI religious
phenomena in the world. Missiologists regularly utilize phenomenological methodology in
seeking understanding oI religious phenomena in the world's contexts. For the theologian or
missiologist, certain aspects oI phenomenological methodology may be utilized proIitably as a
starting point Ior religious understanding. The emphasis on description, with the attendant
caveats, is worthy oI emulation. The avoidance oI reductionism is a goal to strive Ior, since all
too oIten in examining other religious phenomena we are prone to limit our explanations to one
Iield oI study or to overgeneralize our conclusions. The reliance on intuitive insight is initially
helpIul, but must ultimately give way to biblical revelation as the Iramework oI our evaluative
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paradigm. Similarly, the ability to bracket questions oI truth Ior the sake oI understanding the
phenomena at hand it helpIul, as long as it is recognized that we as Christians must ultimately
move beyond this bracketing toward evaluation in light oI Scripture. In summary, and given the
limitations discussed above, the phenomenological approach to religious study may be proIitably
employed as a helpIul tool in understanding the bewildering variety oI religious experiences.
However, it must not be seen as an end in itselI. Because oI its emphasis on bracketing truth and
human insight, the role oI a phenomenological approach will oI necessity be limited to that oI a
Ioundational step towards a biblical response to the religious phenomena in our world today.




BIBLIOGRAPHY

'Religious Consciousness and Growth of World iving Religion are taken as ad verbum Irom
the class note oI ...........
Cox L James, Introduction to the phenomenology of religion November 2009
Moran Dermot Introduction to the Phenomenology, published 2000 by Routledge
Wynn, Mark, "Phenomenology oI Religion", the $tanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Winter2008, Edition), Edward, N.Zalta (ed.)

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