Metaphysics of Aristotle (A Textual Study)

Jaimon Thadathil A science beyond the human knowledge and grasping which is the science of all sciences.

METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE
(A Textual Study)

By Jaimon Thadathil

Under the Guidance of Rev.Dr. Henry Kodukuthiyil

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment For the requirement for the Degree Of the Bachelor of Philosophy

November 2009

3 Suvidya College Frasalian Institute of Philosophy and Social Sciences Electronic City

TABLE OF CONTENTS

METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE...................................................................................2 November 2009.................................................................................................................2 Suvidya College................................................................................................................3 Frasalian Institute of Philosophy and Social Sciences......................................................3 Electronic City..................................................................................................................3 TABLE OF CONTENTS..................................................................................................3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.................................................................................................5 GENERAL INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................7 CHAPTER-1......................................................................................................................8 WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?............................................................................................8 Introduction.......................................................................................................................8 1.1. The life and works of Aristotle..................................................................................9 1.2. The origin of the term Metaphysics......................................................................11 1.3. Nature and Scope of Metaphysics............................................................................11 1.4. Dignity and Object of Metaphysics.........................................................................13 1.4.1. The Basis of Difference in Animals......................................................................13 1.4.2. The Basis of Difference in Human.......................................................................14 1.4.3. Science and Art ....................................................................................................15 1.5. Metaphysics: the science of first causes and first principles...................................16 1.6. Nature and Goal of Metaphysics..............................................................................17 1.6.1. Speculative science...............................................................................................17 1.6.2. Metaphysics; a free science .................................................................................18 1.6.3. Metaphysics is not a human possession................................................................18 1.6.4. Metaphysics: the Most Honorable Science ..........................................................19

4 Conclusion............19 CHAPTER-2........20 METAPHYSICS OF CAUSALITY ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE.............................................................20 2.0. Introduction..............................................................................................................20 2.1. Material Cause.........................................................................................................21 2.2. Different views on material cause............................................................................21 2.2.1. Thales: the originator............................................................................................22 2.2.2. Empedocles...........................................................................................................22 2.2.3. Anaxagoras...........................................................................................................23 2.3. Efficient Cause and Final Cause..............................................................................23 2.3.1. Efficient Cause as a Principle of Good and Evil...................................................24 2.3.2. Efficient Cause as a Principle of Intellect.............................................................25 2.3.3. Efficient Cause as Love........................................................................................25 2.3.4. Love and Hate as Efficient Causes of Good and Evil...........................................26 2.4. Truth and Causes......................................................................................................26 2.4.1. Acquisition of Truth..............................................................................................27 2.4.2. Metaphysics: science of truth and knowledge of ultimate causes........................27 2.4.3. The existence of first efficient cause....................................................................28 2.4.4. The existence of first material cause.....................................................................29 2.4.5. The existence of a first in final and formal cause.................................................29 Conclusion .....................................................................................................................30 CHAPTER-3....................................................................................................................30 METAPHYSICAL PROBLEMS....................................................................................30 3.0. Introduction..............................................................................................................31 3.1. The Need for Questioning in search for Universal Truth........................................31 3.2. Question Concerning the Method of Metaphysics...................................................32 3.3. The Problem of One and Many................................................................................32 3.4. Unity and Being.......................................................................................................33 3.4. Being and Entity......................................................................................................34 3.5. Being and Essence...................................................................................................34 3.6. Being and Analogy..................................................................................................35 3.7. Being and transcendentals........................................................................................36 3.7.1. Being is One..........................................................................................................36

5 3.7.2. Being is True ..............................36 3.7.3. Being is Good .........................................................................................................................................37 3.7.4. Being is Beautiful.................................................................................................37 Conclusion......................................................................................................................38 CHAPTER-4....................................................................................................................38 FUNDAMENTAL NOTIONS AND PRICIPLES OF METAPHYSICS.......................38 4.0. Introduction..............................................................................................................38 4.1. Subject Matter of Metaphysics................................................................................39 4.1.1. Metaphysics: the study of Being as being.............................................................40 4.1.2. Being Specifically in Aristotle .............................................................................41 4.2. Being and Unity.......................................................................................................42 4.3. Unity and Plurality...................................................................................................43 4.4. What is Substance?..................................................................................................43 4.5.The Role of Substance in the Study of Being as Being...........................................44 3.6.Substance, Matter, and Subject.................................................................................46 4.7. Substance and Essence.............................................................................................48 4.8. The Doctrine of Categories .....................................................................................50 4.9. The Being of beings in Aristotle (The Concept of God).........................................51 4.9.1. Being as Being .....................................................................................................52 4.9.2. The analysis of the Infinite...................................................................................53 4.9.3. The Cause..............................................................................................................53 4.9.4. The Actuality........................................................................................................54 4.9.5. The Unmoved Mover............................................................................................55 Conclusion .....................................................................................................................55 GENERAL CONCLUSION............................................................................................56 BIBLIOGRAPHY...........................................................................................................58 1. PRIMARY SOURCES ...........................................................................................58 2. SECONDARY SOURCES......................................................................................58

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My heart fills with joy at this time of the accomplishment of this thesis, owing to myriads of persons. First of all with immense gratitude and contentment of heart I raise my heart and mind to the Being of beings (as Aristotle would call it) for His inspiration and enlightenment in this accomplishment of this thesis. I express my indebted gratitude to Rev. Fr. Henry Kodukuthiyil my moderator of this thesis for accepting the task of being my moderator and correcting the thesis in spite of his busy schedules and heavy responsibilities. I also extend my sincere thanks to all the staffs of Suvidya, viz., Dr. Emmanuel Uppamthadathil, Dr.Jolly Chakkalakkal, Dr.Joy Mampally,Dr. Panthanmackal Thomas ,Dr. Kalariparambil, Santosh Kumar, Dr. Dr. George Antony

Mookenthottam, Fr. Jose, and Fr. Michle Selvan for bringing me up in wisdom and knowledge. Finally I extend a Big thanks to all my friends and well wishers for their support and encouragement in making me what I am.
Suvidya College Electronic city November 2009

Jaimon Thadathil

GENERAL INTRODUCTION
All men by nature desire to know. So does Aristotle optimistically begin the Metaphysics, a book, or rather a collection of lectures. It is so difficult to read so much so the Arabian philosopher Avicenna said that he had read the Metaphysics of Aristotle forty times without understanding it. The above-mentioned statement manifests the desire, which is the origin of all knowledge. However it is this desire for knowledge that captivated the philosophers and thinkers of all times to think deeper and deeper and to explore higher and higher. Down through the centuries of western philosophy Aristotle remains as a star icon with his vast knowledge on myriads of disciplinary, which remains as a great influence on the thinkers of the western philosophy. His metaphysics, which is known, as Physics rather what he calls wisdom is no exception to this. It had a tremendous influence not only the philosophers of that time but also the religions of the medieval period evidently in Christianity. The metaphysics of Aristotle is a long as well as hard treaty, which treats being particularly. This being, which is gradually identified with God, becomes highly relevant for as Christians, as our Christian theology and doctrines are based upon it to a certain extent. It was Thomas Aquinas who had stridden to bring in the Aristotelian philosophy into the Christian thinking. What inspired me to choose this topic for my thesis is one of these reasons. And we will be seeing further metaphysics as the study of being ultimately in detail. This thesis is a textual study of the metaphysics of Aristotle. The first chapter of the paper would give an account of what metaphysics is exactly and the special features of this science. The second chapter brings out the theory of causality according to Aristotle and further discusses the different theories of causality. The third chapter deals with the problems of the metaphysics, which opens up the possibility of understanding the problem of one and many at large. The fourth chapter would give an account of the

8 different and principles of notions

metaphysics, which ends up in the notion of God as the unmoved mover and primary cause of the universe. So the entire paper is a birds eye view on the metaphysics of Aristotle.

This dissertation is a humble attempt to study the text of the metaphysics of Aristotle which covers probably the entire aspects of it, inclusive of being, Being of beings, ultimate causes, fundamental notion s and metaphysical problems etc. and every nuance of its principles and notions.

CHAPTER-1 WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?

Introduction

9 Aristotle considers metaphysics as the study of being. It is metaphysics because it deals with realities that are transcendental. Metaphysics can be probably described as the core of human knowledge or the ground or foundation of philosophy is the science of being as being. It is the core of human knowledge as it underlies, penetrates, transforms, and unifies all other departments of human knowledge. It underlies all other departments since its principles are the detached and disinterested drive of the pure desire to know the unfolding of the pure desire to know takes place in the empirical, intellectual and rational consciousness of the self affirming subject. All questions, all insights, all formulations, all reflections and all judgments proceed from the unfolding of that drive. Hence metaphysics underlies logic, mathematics, and all other sciences. Metaphysics underlies all other departments of knowledge .the most important principles of metaphysics is that there is always something? If at all one makes a statement that there is nothing at all, it would be self contradictory because there exists at least the statements that one would make. And this experience of something is the beginning of metaphysics. In this chapter we will analyze the nature, the scope, the origin and the object of metaphysics.

1.1. The life and works of Aristotle

Aristotle was born in 384 B.C at Stageira in Thrace, and was the son of Nicomachus, a physician of the Macedonian king, Annyntas II. When he was about seventeen year old Aristotle went to Athens for purpose of study and became a member of the academy in 368B.C., where for over twenty years he was in constant intercourse with Plato until the latters death in 348B.C. he thus entered the academy at the time when Platos later dialectic was being ground in the great philosophers mind. Aristotle found in Plato a guide and friend for whom he had the greatest admiration and though in later years his own scientific interests tended to come much more to the fore, the metaphysical and religious teaching of Plato had a lasting influence on him.

10 After Platos death Aristotle left Athens with Xenocrates and founded a branch of the academy at Assos in the Troad. Here he influenced Hernias, ruler of Atarneaus, and married his niece and adopted daughter, Pythias. While working at Assos, Aristotle no doubt began to develop his own independent views. Three years later he went to Mitylene in Lesbos, and it was there that he was probably in contact with Theophrastus, a native of Erseus on the same island, who was later the most celebrated disciple of Aristotle. In a343 Aristotle was invited to Palla by Philip of Macedon to undertake the education of his son Alexander, then thirteen years old. This period at the court of Macedon and the endeavor to exercise a real moral influence on the young prince, who was later to play so prominent a part on the political stage and to go down to posterity as Alexander the great, should have done much to widen Aristotles horizon and to free him form the narrow conception of the ordinary Greek, though the effect does not seem to have been so great as might have been expected. In336, Alexander ascended the throne. In 335 Aristotle had returned to Athens, where he founded his own school. The new school was in the northeast of the city, at the Hyceum, the precincts of Apollo Hyceus. The school was dedicated to muses.

In 323B.C.Alexander the great died and the reaction in Greece against Macedonian suzerainty led to charge against Aristotle. Aristotle withdraws from Athens and went to Chalices in Euboea, where he lived in an estate of his dead mother. Shortly after he died of an illness. To the credit of Aristotle there are number of works on philosophy, literature, history, esthetics, politics, biology etc. some of his major works are Categories, de Interpretatione, Metaphysics, Physics, Meteorology, histories of animals, De anima, Nicomachean Ethics, Politics, rhetoric, poetics etc.1

.Frederich Copleston, s.j. History of Philosophy vol..I Greece and Rome, Westminster, Maryland: the New Man press, 1953.pp.266-275.

11

1.2. The origin of term Metaphysics

The name metaphysics simply refers to the position of the metaphysics in the Aristotelian corpus, i.e. as coming after the physics. The term metaphysics is derived form the Greek word Meta ta phusika. In the 70 B.C the disciple of Aristotle namely Andronicus of Rhodes who had a library of the works of Aristotle, and he placed this particular text after physics. So the term metaphysics means nothing but after physics. But the book is metaphysical also in the sense that it concerns the first and highest principles and causes. All men think that science which is called wisdom deals with primary causes and principles of things.2 And so involves a higher degree of abstraction than does the physics, which deals predominantly with a particular type of being that which is subject to motion. Still, it is true to say that if we wish to know Aristotles doctrine on the themes treated of today under the heading metaphysics, we must consult not only the metaphysics itself but also the physics.

the

Indeed, metaphysics is a term derived from a first century BC edition of Aristotles work, in which a collection of his writing was put together under the title ta meta phusika, which means simply what comes after the writings on nature.3

1.3. Nature and Scope of Metaphysics

Aristotle shows how metaphysics differs form other sciences in its method of considering the principles of being as being. And since the philosophy of nature was
2

.. Aristotle, 350 BC Metaphysics, trans. W.D Ross. New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 2002,

pp.41. . A companion to Metaphysics ed. Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa, Massachusetts USA: black well Publishers,1995, p.238.
3

12 considered by the ancients to be the first science and the one which would consider being as being, therefore, beginning with it as with what is more evident, he shows first, how philosophy of nature differs form other practical sciences: and second, how it differs form the speculative sciences, showing the method of study proper to this science. According to him, the philosophy of nature does not deal with being in an unqualified sense but with some particular class of being,4 i.e. with natural substance, which has within itself a principle of motion and rest: and from this it is evident that it is neither a practical nor a productive science. It is evident that philosophy of nature is not productive science, because the principle of productive sciences is in the maker and not in the thing made, which is artifact. But the principle of motion in natural bodies is within their natural bodies. Hence it is evident that the philosophy of nature is not a productive science. Then what it is? Every science is practical, productive or theoretical, therefore it follows that the philosophy of nature is a theoretical science.

The scope of metaphysics includes being and unity and those attributes which belong to being as such, and that all of those are used in several sense; in this regard the philosophers begins to establish the truth about being and those attributes which belong to being. This part is divided into two sections. In the first he explains the method by which this science should establish what is true about being. In the second he begins to settle the issue about being. The term being is used in many senses. The first part is divided into two sections. In the first he explains the method of treating beings, which is proper to this science, by showing how it differs from other sciences. In the second he excludes certain senses of being from the investigation of this sciences, namely, those senses, which are not, the chief concern of metaphysics.5

. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Trans. John P.Lowan,vol.II , Chicago : Henry Regnery Company, 1961,p.459. 5 . Ibid.

13

1.4. Dignity and Object of Metaphysics

Aristotle first sets down an introduction to this science, in which he treats of two things. First he points out with what this science is concerned. Second he explains that metaphysics is not a practical science. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that the office of this science, which is called wisdom, is to consider the causes of things. Secondly he explains with what causes metaphysics is concerned. In regard to the first he prefaces certain preliminary considerations from which he argues in support of h is thesis does two things:

Firstly he makes clear the dignity of scientific knowledge in general. Secondly he explains the hierarchy in knowing.6 Now Aristotle establishes the dignity of scientific knowledge from the fact that all men naturally desire it as an end. Hence, in regard to this he does two things. First, he states what he intents to prove. Second proves a sign of this. Accordingly she says, first all men naturally desire to know.7 Three reasons can be given for this: The first is that each thing naturally desires its own perfection. The second reason is that each thing has a natural inclination to perform its proper operation. The third reason is that it is desirable for each thing to be united to its source; since it is in this that the perfection of each thing consists. It is in this reason the ultimate happiness of man naturally desires to know.

1.4.1. The Basis of Difference in Animals

Aristotle considers the hierarchy in knowledge. He does this first with respect to brute animals he mentions first what all animals have in common and second, that by which they differ and surpass one another. He states, Now in some animals memory
6 7

. Ibid., p.7. . Aristotle, 350 BC Metaphysics, trans. W.D Ross. New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 2002.p.5.

14 arises it form does the not.8 senses, but in others Animals are alike in the respect that they possess by nature the power of sensation. For an animal is animal by reason of the fact that it has a sentient soul, which is the nature of an animal is the sense in which the distinctive form of each thing is its nature. But even though all animals are naturally endowed with sensory power, not all animals have all the senses, but any perfect animals. All have the sense of touch, for this sense in away is the basis of all the other senses. However, not all have the sense of sight, because this sense knows in amore perfect way than all the other senses. Again, from the fact that some animals have memory and some do not, it shows that some are prudent and some are not. But among those animals which have memory some have hearing and some do not. Hence it is evident, that there are three levels of knowing in animals. The first level is that had by animals which have neither hearing nor The second level is that of animals which have memory but are unable The third level is that of animals, which have, memory but arte unable to

memory, therefore they are neither capable of being taught nor of being prudent. to hear and therefore they are prudent but incapable of being taught. hear and therefore they are prudent and capable of being taught.9

1.4.2. The Basis of Difference in Human

Here Aristotle explains the levels of human knowing; and in regard to this he does two things: first, he explains how human knowing surpasses the knowing of the above-mentioned animals. Second he shows how human knowing is divided into different levels.

. Ibid.,p.5. . Thomas Aquinas, commentary on the metaphysics of Aristotle. trans. John P.Lowan,vol.II , Chicago : Henry Regnery Company, 1961,p.459.
9

15 Accordingly, in the first part he says that the life of animals is ruled by imagination and memory; by imagination in the case of imperfect animals, and by memory in the case of perfect animals. 10 Now in this discussion, life does not seem to be the being of a living thing. But life is taken to mean vital activity, just as we are also accustomed to speak of association as the life of men. In men the next thing above memory is experience, which some animals have only to a small degree. For any experience arises from the association of many singular intentions received in memory.11 And this kind of association is proper to men and pertains to the cogitative power (also called particular reason), which associates particular intentions just as universal reason associates universal ones.

And just as experience is related to particular, and reason, and customary activity to memory in animals, in a similar way art is related to reason. Therefore just as the life of animals is ruled in a perfect way by memory together with activity that has become habitual through training or in a similar way man is ruled perfectly by reason perfected by art.

1.4.3. Science and Art

Here Aristotle describes the way in which art arises. He says but in man science and art come from experience.12 And he proves this or the authority of Polus, who says that Experience causes art and inexperience luck. Because when an inexperienced person acts correctly, this happens by chance. An experiential cognition comes from many memories of a thing, so does one universal judgment about all similar things come form the apprehension of many experiences. Hence art has this unified view more than experience, because experience is considered with singulars whereas art has to do with universals.
10 11

. Ibid.,p.11. .Ibid. 12 . Aristotle, 350 BC Metaphysics, trans. W.D Ross. New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 2002.p.12.

16

There

upon

he makes this clear by means of examples. For when a man has learned that this medicine has been beneficial to Socrates and Plato, and to many other individuals who were suffering from some particular disease, whatever it may be, this is a matter of experience; but when a man learns that this particular treatment is beneficial to all men who have some particular kind of disease and some particular kind of physical constitution, as it has benefited the feverish both the phlegmatic and the bilious, this is more matter of art.13

1.5. Metaphysics: the science of first causes and first principles

Having shown that wisdom is the knowledge of the causes, the philosophers aim here is to establish with what kinds of causes and what kinds of principles it is concerned. Aristotle shows that it is concerned with the most universal and primary causes, and he argues this form the definition of wisdom. In regard to this he does three things;

First, he formulates a definition of wisdom from different opinions, which men have about the wise man and about wisdom. Second he shows that all of these are proper to that universal science which considers first and universal causes. Third he draws the conclusion at which he aims in view of everything.14 It is evident from his statement, we think that the wise man is one who knows all things in the highest degree as, becomes his, without having a knowledge of them individually.15 The criterion to know whether a person is wise or not is his capacity of knowing difficult things and not easy thing which are understood by everyone.

. Ibid.,p.18. . Thomas Aquinas, commentary on the metaphysics of Aristotle. trans. John P.Lowan,vol.II , Chicago : Henry Regnery Company, 1961,p.18. 15 . Aristotle, 350 BC Metaphysics, trans. W.D Ross. New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 2002.p.17.
14

13

17 Knowledge that is derived from the sensory perception is for every one and it not wisdom as such. Again, a person who is more certain in wisdom can be considered a wise person and this certainty arises from fundamental causes and principles. A person who is able to teach about the causes and of things is considered a wise man in every branch of science. Metaphysics is the science, which exists for itself and for the sake of knowledge than the sciences, which exists for itself and for ht e sake of knowledge than the sciences, which exists for the contingent effects. Metaphysics is superior to all other sciences. For, a wise man must not be directed but must direct, and he must not obey another but must be obeyed by one who is less wise.16

1.6. Nature and Goal of Metaphysics

Metaphysics is not a practical science because its wonder, the starting point of philosophy. Wonder began gradually from less important things to more important things. A philosopher is a lover of myths, because myths are made of wonders. They philosophized only for the sake of knowledge and not for any utility. 17 Aristotle speaks of metaphysics in four terms. First he shows that this is not a practical science but a speculative one. Second it is free in the highest degree. Thirdly, it is not a human enterprise. Fourthly it is the most honorable science.

1.6.1. Speculative science

No science in which knowledge itself is sought for its own sake is a practical science, but a speculative one. Metaphysics exists for the sake of knowledge itself; therefore it is a speculative science. He proves the minor premise in this way. Whoever
16 17

. Ibid.,p.19. . Ibid.p.24.

18 seeks as an end to escape ignorance from tends

toward knowledge for itself. But those who philosophize seek as an end to escape from ignorance. Therefore they tend toward knowledge f or itself. It was wonder, which was the guiding factor of philosophy, which had led philosophers to philosophize. The statement wisdom or philosophy is not sought for any utility but for knowledge of itself is proved by what has happened i.e., what has occurred in the case of those who have pursued philosophy. And from this, it is clear that wisdom is not sought because of any necessity other than itself but for itself alone.18

1.6.2. Metaphysics; a free science

Here Aristotle proves the second attribute namely that, wisdom is free; and he uses the following argument: that a man is properly said to be free who does not exists for some one else but for himself; for slaves exists for their masters, works for them, and acquire for them whatever they acquire. But free man exits for themselves and work for them. But only this science exists for itself and therefore among all the sciences only metaphysics is free.19

1.6.3. Metaphysics is not a human possession

Aristotle proves his thesis by the following argument. A science, which is free in the highest degree, cannot be a possession of that nature which is servile in many ways. Therefore this science is not a human possession. Human nature is said to be servile insofar as it stand in need of many things. Metaphysics which is sought, for itself alone, man cannot use freely, since he is often kept from it because if the necessities of life.

. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle .trans. John P.Lowan,vol.II , Chicago : Henry Regnery Company, 1961,p.24. 19 . Ibid.

18

19 Nor again to is it subject mans because

command,

man cannot acquire it perfectly.20

1.6.4. Metaphysics: the Most Honorable Science

Metaphysics, which is most divine, is most honorable, just as god himself is also the most honorable of all things. For he says, what is most divine is most honorable. 21 This science is most divine and is therefore the most honorable science. Metaphysics is said to be divine in both ways; first, the science, which God has, is said to be divine; and second, the science, which is about divine matters is said to be divine. Since metaphysics is about first causes and principles, it must be about God. Again such a science, which is about God and first causes, either God alone has or, if not He alone, at least He has it in the highest degree. Indeed, He alone has it in a perfectly comprehensive way.

Conclusion
From all these considerations Aristotle draws the further conclusion that all other sciences are more necessary than this science for use in practical life, for these sciences are sought least of all for themselves. But none of the other sciences can be more excellent than this one. In this chapter we analyzed what exactly is metaphysics. We have also analyzed the importance of metaphysics in the midst of all the other sciences. We should also understand the fact that this is the most honorable of all science because this is a divine one. So the study of metaphysics becomes highly relevant since it sits at the top of the hierarchy of all the other sciences, which is so divine.
20 21

. Ibid.,p.25 . Aristotle, 350 BC Metaphysics, trans. W.D Ross. New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 2002.p.32.

20

CHAPTER-2

METAPHYSICS OF CAUSALITY ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE

2.0. Introduction
To know a thing is to know the nature of the thing. But in what does the nature of a thing consist? Aristotle points out that philosopher in the past have by no means been as to what constitutes the nature of a thing. He says some hold that nature and substantive existence of natural products reside in their materials, the analogy of the wood of a bed steel or the bronze of a statue. And in like manner it is thought of the material themselves bear to them yet other substances the same relation which the manufactured articles bear to them. If for instance water is the material of bronze or gold or earth or bone or timber and so forth- then it is the water or earth in that we must look for the nature and essential being of the gold and so forth. And this is why some have said that it was the earth that constituted the nature of the thing, some fire, some air, some water, and some several and some all of these elements. For whichever substance or substances each thinker assume to be primary he regarded as constituting

21 the existence substantive of all

things in general, all else being modification, states, and disposition of them.

2.1. Material Cause

Accordingly Aristotle says most of those who first philosophized thought that only the things which belong to the class of matter are the principle of all things. 22 In regard to this it must be said that they took the four conditions of matter which seem to belong to the notion of a principle. Because first thing, that of which a thing is composed seems to be a principle of that thing. But matter is such a thing; for we say that a thing that has matter is of its matter, as a knife is of iron. Secondly, that from which a thing comes to be, being also a principle of the process of generation of that thing seems to be one of its causes, because a thing causes into being by way of generation. But a thing first comes to be from the matter, because the matter of things precedes their production. Now the matter which is the substance of a thing remains through out every transmutation, although its attributes, such as its form and everything that assumes to its own an above its material substance, are changed. From all these considerations they concluded that matter is the element and principle of all begins.

2.2. Different views on material cause

When some change occurs with regard to a things attributes, and its substance remains unchanged, we don not say that it is generated or corrupted in an absolute sense, but only in a qualified one. But matter which is the substance of things according to them always remains; and every change affects some of a things accidents, such as its attributes. From this they concluded that there is nothing generated or concluded in an absolute sense, but only in a qualified one. Even though they agreed in this point, in posting a material cause, nevertheless they differed in their position in two respects:
22

. Aristotle, 350 BC Metaphysics, trans. W.D Ross. New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 2002.p.36.

22 first with the respect to the number of material causes, because some held that there is one, and others many; and second, with respect to its nature, because some held that it is fire, others water and so on.23

2.2.1. Thales: the originator

Firstly, Aristotle gives the opinion of Thales who said that water is the principle of things. Aristotle says then that Thales, the originator of this kind of philosophy, i.e. speculative philosophy, said that water is the first principle of all things. Thales is said to have been the originator of speculative philosophy because he was the only one of the seven wise men, who came after the theological poets, to make an investigation into the causes of things, the other sages being concerned with moral matters. The first reason to show that water is the principle of being of things is that the nutriment of living things must be moist. The second reason is that its proper and natural heat conserves being of any physical thing. But heat seems to be generated from moisture. The third reason is that universal life depends on moisture. And for this reason he adopted this opinion that moisture is the principle of all things.

2.2.2. Empedocles
Here Aristotle gives the opinion of Empedocles, who held that there are a limited number of such principles. According to Empedocles there are four elements, which are the principles of things; i.e. water, air, fire, and earth. Empedocles held that these elements always remain and are neither generated nor corrupted.24

. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle .trans. John P.Lowan, vol.II , Chicago : Henry Regnery Company, 1961,p.32. 24 . Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, p.35

23

23

2.2.3.

Anaxagoras
He said that there are infinite number of material principles, whereas it is better to take a limited and smaller number, where as it is better to take a limited and smaller number. For Anaxagoras not only said that fire, water, and other elements are the principles of thing as Empedocles did, but also claimed that all things having like parts, such as flesh, bones, marrow and so forth, whose smallest parts are infinite in number, are the principles of things. For he claimed that in each being there are infinite number of parts of each type of thing, because he found that in the case of inferior things are of those can be generated from another. Second, Anaxagoras also agrees with Empedocles on this point, namely, that things are generated and corrupted only in so far as the parts of these infinite principles are combined or separated out, and that if this were not the case nothing would be generated or corrupted. But he said that the infinite number of principles of this kind, from which the substances of thing are produced always remain in being. From the opinion of these philosophers then, Aristotle concludes that the only cause, which these men recognized, was the one, which belongs to the class of material cause.

2.3. Efficient Cause and Final Cause

Aristotle points out that in the case of living organism formed and efficient and final causes are one and the same in fact, for form (essence) and end are themselves identical, since the proximate and of every object consist in the full development of its proper form as end. The actualized essence of a living organism the formal and final causes are the same, i.e., the form is actualized part of the sense whereas the final cause is the potential essence which will be actualized in the favorable circumstances.25
25

.Balakrishna S.Pandit A Simple Study of Western Philosophy Naik Sarak: Delhi, 1968, p.319.

24 Aristotle says then, that some philosophers have proceeded in this way in positing a material cause, but that the very nature of reality clearly provided them with a cause for understanding or discovering the truth, and compelled them to investigate a problem, which led them to efficient cause. This problem is as follows: no thing or subject changes itself, for example wood doesnt change itself so that a led comes from it, nor does bronze cause itself to be changed in such a way that a statue comes from it; but there must be some other principles which causes the change they undergo an this is the artist. But those who posited a material cause, whether one or more than one, said that the generations and corruption of things come from this cause as subject. Therefore there must be some other cause of change, and to seek this is to seek another class of principle and cause, which is called the source of motion. 26

2.3.1. Efficient Cause as a Principle of Good and Evil

Aristotle says that after the forgoing philosophers who held that there is only one material cause, or many bodies, one of which was active and the others passive, and after the other first principles given by them, men were again compelled by the truth itself i.e. the one which naturally follows the forgoing one, namely, the cause of good, which is really the final cause. Although they held it only incidentally, it will be seen below. They held that there is a cause of goodness in thing only after the manner of an efficient cause. But neither fire nor earth nor any such bodies were held to be adequate causes of this kind of good disposition or statue of being which some things already have but others acquire by some kind of production. However, this is also seen to be false by reason of the fact that good dispositions of this kind are found either always or for the most part, whereas things that come about by chance or fortune do not occur always or of the most part but seldom.27
26 27

. Aristotle, 350 BC Metaphysics, p.45. . Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, p.40.

25

2.3.2. Efficient Cause as a Principle of Intellect

Aristotle gives the views of those who held that the efficient cause is intellect. Aristotle says that after the forgoing doctrine someone appeared who said that there is an intellect present in nature at large, just as there is in animals, and that this is the cause of the world and the order of the whole i.e. of the universe, in which order, the good of the entire universe and that of every single part consists. Hence it is evident that those who held this opinion claimed at the same time that the principle by which things are well disposed and the one, which is the source of motion in things, are one and the same.28

2.3.3. Efficient Cause as Love

Here Aristotle gives the opinion of those who claimed that love is the first principle, although they did not hold this very explicitly or clearly. So Aristotle says that Hesiod had sought for such a principle to count for the good disposition of things or anyone else who posited love or desire in nature. And he also held that love, which instructs all the immortals, is a principle of things. He did this because the communication of goodness seems to spring form love, for a good deed is a sign and effect of love.29 Because love moves us to act, because it is the source of all emotions, since fear, sadness and hope proceed only from love. Thus Hesiod posited chaos and love as though there had to be in existing things not only a material cause of their motions, but also an efficient cause, which moves and unites them.

28 29

. Aristotle, 350 BC Metaphysics, p.48. . Ibid., p.11.

26

2.3.4. Love and Hate as Efficient Causes of Good and Evil

If the cause of all good things is good and that of all evil things is evil. 30 This was said by Empedocles, which Aristotle refers to what is evil? The definition of evil according to Thomas Aquinas goes, as privation of what is good. Love, which is considered to be absolute, the cause of all good things cannot become the principal cause of all evil things. Then how do we explain the evil things that are happening in the world? Is God accountable for it? If God who is absolute good is accountable for evil things would bring upon itself contradiction. Aristotle solves this problem by explaining and referring to Empedocles that strife or conflict is the cause of all evils. If we really understand this expression rather than taking as a faltering expression, we will discover that love is the ultimate cause of all things in totality and conflict is the cause of evil things. If we understand the context in which he spoke, we must first say that good and evil are principles. There is a tendency in beings to separate from Being, and then there is strife. But this strife is not absolute but only relative. There fore it is wise to say that causes of all good things are good and causes of evil things are evil.

2.4. Truth and Causes

It is right to call philosophy the science of truth. For the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action.31 What is the relationship between truth and cause? Truth and cause are related in a way that w know truth only by knowing its cause. For example, fire is hot and the cause of heat is actually other things. Therefore that is also true in the highest degree, which is the cause of all subsequent things being true. But there exists a truth in the highest degree which is the principle of things and which is always true too. Therefore Aristotle concludes in so far
30 31

. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, p.42. . Aristotle, 350 BC Metaphysics, p.35.

27 as each thing has being to that extent it is true.32 Philosophers are in search of truth and in the process of the discovery of the truth. Truth can be known only in terms of its causes. Therefore there is an intrinsic relationship between truth and causes.

2.4.1. Acquisition of Truth

According to Aristotle the theoretical or speculative knowledge of truth is difficult in one sense and in another sense easy. It is manifested in the fact that no one can attain an adequate knowledge, at the same time every one do not fail in this attempt but each one is able to say something true about nature. Personal effort of an individual can add nothing to the truth, all the same. A combined effort of all serves the truth to be known. And the difficulty involved in the cognitive process is that we cannot understand whole and parts simultaneously. However the cause of it is not in things but perhaps it is in us. Aristotle says that we must be grateful not only to those views that we agree with but those views that are superficial in the unfolding of the truth. Aristotle uses the example that; if there had been no Timotheus, we would not have been great part of our music; and if there had been no Phrynis, there would have been no Timotheus. In the same way we accept the opinion of some of them who have made statements about truth and others have been the cause in attaining their knowledge.33

2.4.2. Metaphysics: science of truth and knowledge of ultimate causes

It is only right to call metaphysics the science of truth because the end of metaphysics is the truth, whereas the end of practical knowledge is action. We know the
32 33

. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, p.120. . Aristotle, 350 BC Metaphysics, pp.34-35.

28 truth of something only by finding out the cause of it. In so far as each thing has being and to that extent it is true. Further, it is evident that there is a principle and that the causes of existing things are not infinite either in series or in species. For it is impossible that one thing should come from something else as from matter in an infinite regress, for example, flesh from earth, earth from air, air from fire and so on to infinity. In the case of reason, there cannot be infinite regress when something is done, or though walking was for the sake of health, health for the sake of happiness and happiness for the sake of something else. There fore we can say one thing is always done for the sake for something else. It is impossible to proceed to infinity in the case of quiddity i.e. formal cause too.

2.4.3. The existence of first efficient cause

We already know that causes of beings are not infinite in number. Aristotle first provides that there are no finite numbers of causes in a series; and second he proves that the classes of causes are not infinite in number. If we had to say which of three i.e., the first, the intermediate, or the last, is the cause of others, we would have to say first is the cause. What is last cannot become the cause because effect follows a cause. Nor intermediate can be said as the cause of all others. Because intermediate is followed by only one thing i.e., what is last? There must be a first cause of motion, which is prior to every intermediate cause. If we say that there is an infinite series of moving causes, then all causes would be intermediate ones. Consequently if the causes of motion proceed in this way there will be no first cause. But first cause is the cause of all things.34

34

. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, vol.I, pp.124-126.

29

2.4.4.

The existence of first material cause

Aristotle says it is impossible to proceed to infinity in the cause of material

causes. Now just as action is attributed to the cause of motion, so in undergoing action attributed to matter. Aristotle illustrates this by way of the process of natural direction, s if we were to say that water comes from fire, earth from water, and so on to infinity. With regard to the class of material causes, Aristotle assumes foundation and basis of the others. Matter is held to exist and Aristotle asks whether the things that are generated from matter proceed to infinity. Aristotle uses two common suppositions accepted by all of the ancient philosophers: First, that there is a primary principle and therefore that there is a primary principle and therefore that is the process of generation there is no infinite regress on the past of the generated; second that matter is eternal. Therefore, from this second supposition he immediately concludes that nothing comes from first matter in the second way, i.e. in the way in which water comes from air as a result of the latters corruption, becomes what is eternal cannot be corrupted.35 Now it is evident that a thing comes from this first material principle as something imperfect and potential which is midway between pure and non-being and actual being, but not as water comes from air by reason of the latters corruption.

2.4.5. The existence of a first in final and formal cause

Again, that for the sake of which something comes to be is an end.36 But an end does not exist for the sake of other things, but others exist for its sake. If there is an ultimate end, there will not be an infinite regress. But if there is an infinite regress, there will be no reason for which things come to be. Aristotle concludes that all those who
35 36

. Ibid., p.128. . Aristotle, 350 BC Metaphysics, p.37.

30 posit regress an in infinite final

causes do away with the final causes. When the final cause is removed, the good also is removed because the meaning of good also is removed because the meaning of good and are same. Every intelligent agent acts for the sake of some end. Therefore an intelligent agent cannot do away with the final cause. If we believe in infinite regress of the final causes, scientific knowledge would become impossible because when there is infinite number of causes, we cannot know anything. But unless we know the causes of things the scientific knowledge is impossible. If it does not exist (i.e., if the infinite does not exist) the essence of the infinite is not infinite.37

Conclusion
There seems to be a contradiction in the nature itself. There are things, which are good as well as evil, order and disorder etc; more evil things than good things and more base things than noble things. And because of this Empedocles brought out the term love and strife are the causes of all effects. If we really understand this expression, we will discover that love is the ultimate causes of all things in totality and conflict is the cause of all evil things. If we understand the context in which he spoke, we must first say that good and evil are principles. Like wise it is better to say that causes of all good things are good and causes of all evil things are evil. St.John says, God is love because love comes from God. St. Paul would say, love never ends, as for knowledge and prophecies; it will come to an end. Therefore Love is the ultimate principle of all causes.

CHAPTER-3 METAPHYSICAL PROBLEMS

37

. Ibid.

31

3.0. Introduction
In the book III, Aristotle proceeds with the study of truth. First he proceeds disruptively indicating those pints, which are open to question so far as the truth of things is concerned. Second he begins to establish what is true. In the first, he states what he intends to do. In the second, he proceeds to do. The basis of the problem one and many can be located in the question of the numerical nature of being which is implied in the basic metaphysical question of being as such which is the starting point of metaphysics. Metaphysics begins with the question of being.

3.1. The Need for Questioning in search for Universal Truth

Aristotle says first, then, that with a view to this science which we are seeking about first principles and what is universally true of things; we must attack, first of all, these subjects about which it is necessary to raise questions before truth is established. Now these are disputed pints of this kind for two reasons, either because, the ancient philosophers entertained a different opinion about these then is really true, or because they completely neglected to consider them.38 Aristotle says that those who wish to investigate the truth are worthwhile to examine carefully those matters, which are open to question. In so far as the mind is puzzled about some subject, it experiences some similar to those who highly bound. For just like a person whose feet are tied cannot move forward on an earthly road, is a similar way, a person whose mind is puzzled cannot move forward on the road of speculative knowledge. Further Aristotle says that those who investigate without recognizing the problem are like those who do not know where they are going. One, who knows the problem before hand, will know the goal when he reaches it but no the one who does not know. Further he says one who has made all the arguments of the litigants, as it were, and of those who argue the question, is necessarily in a better position to pass judgment.39

. Thomas Aquinas, commentary on the metaphysics of Aristotle. Trans. John P.Lowan, vol.I , Chicago : Henry Regnery Company, 1961,p.142. 39 . Aristotle, 350 BC Metaphysics, trans. W.D Ross. New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 2002.p.40.

38

32

3.2. Question

Concerning the Method of Metaphysics

The first problem concerns the things about the question, whether it belongs one science or to many to speculate about the causes. Here Aristotle raises problems about the things which metaphysics considers. First he enquires about the things which metaphysics considers about substances; and second about substances themselves. If metaphysics deals with substance, there is the question whether one science deals with all substances or many sciences. It is also necessary to inquire whether sensible substances alone exist or whether there are many substances in addition to these. There is also a problem whether this speculation has to do with substances alone or also with proper accidents of substances. And Aristotle says that we must inquire about sameness and difference, likeness and unlikeness, centrality, priority and posteriori, and all other such things, which the dialecticians attempt to treat basing their investigation only on probabilities. Further more, we must investigate all these essential accidents of these same things.

3.3. The Problem of One and Many

Being is that which is in some way or something. In so far as it is in some way, it is one. However each being is in its own way. In so far as each being is in its own way, all beings are in their own ways, which are many. In other words, Being which is in someway is also in its own way. In so far as beings are their own ways there will be a plurality of beings that is many beings. Aristotle asks whether it is the office of one science or many to study all the calluses of causes. In the case of many existing things not all the principles are present how can the principle of motion be present in all the invisible things or how can the nature of good be formed there? Because everything which is a good in itself and by reason of its own nature is an end and thus a cause, because it is for its sake the other beings come and exist. All actions involve motion; therefore it would be impossible for

33 this principle to be present in immobile things. In so far as metaphysics has been defined as the science of first causes and of what is most knowable, such a science will be about substance. For a while subject may be known in many ways, Aristotle says he who knows what a thing is in its being knows it better than he who knows it in its non-being.40

3.4. Unity and Being.

The most difficult problem which has to be considered and the one which is most necessary for a knowledge of the truth, is whether unity and being are substance of existing things, and whether each of them is nothing else than unity and being. Or whether it is necessary to investigate what a being and unity themselves are, as though there were some other nature, which underlies them. Empedocles would say that unity is being; and further, he says that being is love, since this is the cause why unity belongs to all things. Others would say that this unity and being is made up of fire and some others would say it is air. Unity and being are principles for those who say that there are many elements, which constitute being and unity. Being and unity are substances and they are the most universal of all. If there is no being-in itself, there will be hardly anything existing apart from what are called singular things. If unity is not a substance, number cannot exist as another reality. But if there is being-in itself, substance of these must be unity itself and being itself. Unity and being are predicted universally of all things. All beings are either one or many, each of which is a one. Further, if unity is indivisible, according to Zenos axiom it will be nothing. Aristotle speculates that it is possible for a thing to be indivisible in such a way that some answers may be made against him, because when something is added it will not make a thing greater but more.41

40 41

. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle.p.151. . Aristotle, 350 BC Metaphysics, pp. 55-61.

34

3.4. Being and Entity

Thomas Aquinas has hired most of his metaphysical notions from Aristotle. For him metaphysics is the science on ens qua ens. The whole attention of Thomas appears to be on entity. Being is the actual intrinsic principle, which explains entity. However in actuality Being for Thomas is more than a mere intrinsic principle. Because entity always finds itself in Being which is the act of existing of entity. It is the Being of entity. Hence the traditional Aristotelian definition of metaphysics as a science of ens qua ens, for Thomas, in the science of entity in terms of Being. In God, entity is still clearer from his theory of participation. Just as that which has fire but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation, so that which has existence, but is not existence, is an entity by participation. But God is his own essence. But he is not his own act of being; he will be an entity by participation and not by essence. In that case he will not be the first entity, which is absurd to say. Therefore, God is his own act of Being, and not only his own essence. God is related to creatures as pure perfection is related to its imperfect similitude. God is not related to its imperfect similitude. God is not heat or light as any other form, but Being itself. There is only one Being, the subsistent entity of God himself, which is communicated to the created entities.42

3.5. Being and Essence

All creatures are composed of Being and essence. They are two actually and objectively distinct, but inseparably related principles. The real distinction between Being and essence is evident right from the beginning of his writings. The main arguments given by Aquinas to prove the real distinction are three: According to first argument, being is not included in the definition of any creature. Anything that is in a gender has a quiddity that differs from its being. The second argument is based on the uniqueness of God in whom is the identification of being and essence. In God being and essence are same and they are not distinct principles. His essence is his own very Being. Third argument is based on the finitude
. George Panthanmackal, One and Many, Indian Institute of Spirituality, Bangalore: 1993,pp.38-39
42

35 of the creatures. The creatures are finite because they do not have the fullness of the perfection of Being.43 Every creature has finite Being, but whim being is not received in something else, it si not finite but absolute. Therfgore evry finite creatures hs being and essence wchich are distinct from each other. Aristotle also interprets bieng and esence in terms of act and potency. The funciton of th act belongs to beign asnd the funciton of the potency belongs to essence.44

3.6. Being and Analogy

Aristotle classifies anlaogy into three; That which is is analogous according to intention, and not according to existence. That which is analogus according to existence only, and not according to intention. That which si analogous according to intention and according to existence.

The first is the anolgy of proportion or attribution in which intrinsic form, or formal perfection, is found only in the primary analogate and is predicted of all other analogates throughextrinsic denomination. The second is the anlogy of inequality. In metaphysics and in antural secneces the term is not used in the same respect when it is applied to curruptible and incurruptible bodies. The third type of anolgy is th eanlogy of proper-proportionality since nothing is considered equal either according to a common inteniton or according to the act of existing. This si truly the metaphysicsl analogy of Being.45
43 44

. Ibid., pp.39-40. . Ibid., pp.38-41. 45 . Ibid.,pp.42-43.

36

3.7. Being and transcendentals

Transcedentals are those properites and modes of Being which are present in all entiteis is so far as they are Being. The main ones are one, true, good, and beautiful. Transcedental means inadequate and intrinsic supreme modes or attributes nesecesarily present on everything and every experience. Bieng means all the attributes of bieng are also tranascedentally present in evrything, such as oneness, truth, goodness and beauty.

3.7.1. Being is One

Everything is one in so far as it is in someway or something. Besides, every being is one. Every unity is a bieng, every being is a unity. Being is one which means undivided in itself and divided from all other beigns. There are two kinds of one: Perfectly one Imperfectly one

Perfectly one is one of simplicity without any composition. Ex: God. Imperfectly one is one of compostion with distict part or elements within it. For Ex: all materail biengs. one does not add any reality to Being, but is only the negation of division; for one simply means unidived Being.46

3.7.2. Being is True

Every being is true in so far as it is. Being is perfection. Perfection implies act. Hence actual beign is perfect. Being implies truth an dtruth implies being. They are both
46

. Ibid., p.43.

37 convertible and thus transcendental. There aer three logicla truth. Logicla truth is the conformity or correspondence of the intellect to a thing. Moral truth is the duo conformity of correspondence of expression and thought. Ontologicla truth is the conformity or compatiblity of the thing to the intellect. There are two kinds of ontological truth: in the conformity of correspoedece of an idea which is taken as the norm, the standard, or the pattern of a bieng. Indentical ontological truth is the original identity of being and knowing. Metaphysically speaking evry being is true in so far as it is.

3.7.3. Being is Good

Aristotle says good is that which all desire. Desiralbilty is the result of perfection. Perfection depends on actualtiy. The actuality of a thing depends upon actuality. The actualtiy of a thing depends upon the act of exsiting. To be good is really the same thing as existing. Goodness of a thing consits in its being desirable ; hence aristotles dictum good is what all things desire. The perfection of athing depends upon how far it h as achieved actuality. It is clear that a thing is good in as much as it exists. But the question arises is every thing that exists good?. In as much as they exist all things are good. Goood is absolute where as evil realative.47

3.7.4. Being is Beautiful

Beauty is the splendor of order by which a being can delight a cognitive faculty. According to Thomas, beauty is that which pleases the mind when seen or apprehended. Whatever is good is also beautiful at the same time. Beauty deals with experiential knowledge that delights the agent of experience. As good thing is also in fact a beautiful thing; for both epithets have the same basis in reality, namely, the possession of the form; and this is why the good is esteemed beautiful. Good deals
47

. Ibid.,pp.45-46.

38 with desire and so involves the idea of end. Beauty on the other hand has to do with knowledge and we call a thing beautiful when it pleases the eyes of the beholder. Ontologically, we say every being is beautiful is so far as it exists.

Conclusion
We have learned that Being is both one and many and Being is implicitly present in beings. We have also analyzed the difference between unity and being, being and entity, being and essences, being and analogy, Being and transcendentals etc. we have also learned that every being is one, true, good, and beautiful. Beauty is the combination of unity, truth, and goodness. Where there is unity, truth, and goodness, there is beauty. Beauty is absolute where as ugliness is relative. No being is apart from Being. So there is a perfect conformity between Being and beings.

CHAPTER-4 FUNDAMENTAL NOTIONS AND PRICIPLES OF METAPHYSICS

4.0. Introduction
Metaphyscis deals with being and its priciples. These notions and priciples are fundamental to metaphysics whcich means it is the foundaitons as basis of metaphysics. Priciple is that from which something proceeds in any way whatsoever. Notion is imperfect concept, and concept is a menatal representation of a thing outside the mind. There are three fundamental notions:

39 Action. The notion of Self. These three notions are implicitly present in all our experiecnes. Bieng is not only a notion but also ultimate priciple. In this chapter, we will analyse the pricples and notion of being. The notion of Being. The notion of

4.1. Subject Matter of Metaphysics

The subject matter of metaphysics is nothing but being. And metaphysics is a certain science which studies Being as being and the attributes which necessarily beong to being. Metaphsycis is not a sciecne which can be identified with other disciplines of sciences because none of the other sciences attempt to sudy being as being in general. Whaterver other sciences study only some parts and accidents of being. Here Aristotle shows that sceince that sceicne with which we are dealing has being as its subject, and he uses the following arguments: Every priciple is of itslef th epriciple and csue of some nature.48 But we are seeking the first priciples and ultimate cuases of things and therefore these are of themsleves the cause of some nature. But this nature can only be the nature of bieng. Therefore we can sya metaphysics is a sceince whch deal which seeks priciples of being as being. H ence being is the subject of this sceince, for any sceince seeks the proper cuaes of its subject but also the proper accidents of its subject, Aristotle therfore says there is a sceince which invetigates bieng as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature.49

48 . Thomas Aquinas, commentary on the metaphysics of Aristotle. Trans. John P.Lowan, vol.I , Chicago : Henry Regnery Company, 1961,p.127. 49 . Aristotle, 350 BC Metaphysics, trans. W.D Ross. New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 2002.p.62.

40

4.1.1.

Metaphysics: the study of Being as being

The term being is used in amny senses, but with reference to one thing an to some to one nature and not equivocally. Therefore the term being is used not univocally and equivocally but anlougously. Aristotle would argue in this way that those things which have one term predicted of them is common ,not univocally but analogously, belong to the consideration of one sceince. But the term being is predicated to all beings. Therefore all beings i.e., substance an accidents belong to the consideration of metaphysics which considers being as being. Accordingly Aristotle says that term bieng has sevral meanings. It is predicated of different things in various senses. Sometimes it is predicted according to a meaning wchih is the same and then it can be predicted of them univocally, as animal is predictated according to meaning which is entirely different. Therefore we say, the term being has many senses. Yet every being is caled such in realtin to one first thing, and this first thing is not an end or an efficient cause, as is the case in the forgoing examples, but subject. Because some things are called beings in the primary and proper sense. Others are called beings because theyh are affections or properties of substances. And otheres are called beings because they are processes toward substance, as generation and motion. And others are called beings because they are curruptions of substances; because curruption is the process toward non-being. Certain quantities and accidents ar ecalled beings because theya re generative priciples of substance. When a negation of posessses a being, it is called a non-being. Hence nonbeing is non-being. Then Aristotle shows that this sceince, even though it considers biengs, is chiefly concerned with substances.50 We have learned that metaphysics is the sudy of being in general. An every being is analogous which includes two things: Being is anlogous wchih means Being is analogously present in evrything.

50

. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. pp.216-220.

41 Every Being is analogous that means it is realated analogously to Being as such. It also means that every being is analogously related to other fellow beings.

4.1.2. Being Specifically in Aristotle

When the word being turns up in texts of Aristotle, it is this hidden history of its use, and not its etymology, which is determining its meaning. First of all, the word fills a gap in the language of being, since Greek has no word for thing. The two closest equivalents are to on and to chrema. To on simply means whatever is, and includes the color blue, the length two feet, the action walking, and anything at all that can be said to be. To chrema means a thing used, used up, spent, or consumed; any kind of possession, namely, that is not being. Being holds together, remains, and makes its possessor emphatically somebody. In the vocabulary of money, being is to to chremata as whatever remains constant in a thing is to all the onta that comes and goes. Being also carries with it the sense of something that belongs somehow to all but directly and fully only to a few. The word is ready-made to be the theme of Aristotle's investigation of being, because both the word and the investigation were designed by Plato. For Aristotle, the inquiry into the nature of being begins with the observation that being is meant in many ways. To Aristotle, this means that being is not a universal or a genus. If being is the comprehensive class to which everything belongs, how does it come to have subclasses? It would have to be divided with respect to something outside itself. Beings would have to be distinguished by possessing or failing to possess some characteristic, but that characteristic would have to be either a class within being, already separated off from the rest by reference to something prior, or a non-being. Since both are impossible, being must come already divided: the highest genera or ultimate classes of things must be irreducibly many. This is Aristotle's doctrine of the categories, and according to him being means at least eight different things.

42

4.2. Being and Unity

With regard to being and unity Aristotle proceeds to show that the study of common attributes such as one and many, and, same and different belongs to the consideration of one and the same science. Even though being and unity same and are a single nature in the sense that they are expresssed by a single concept. An even if we consider them as same, it makes no difference. Aristotle therefore says being and unity are the same and are single nature.51 He says this because some things are numerically the same which are not a single nature but different natures. The term one and being do not signify different natures but a single nature. One and bieng signify one nature according to different concepts, so they are like terms principle and cause. Aristotle uses these particualr arguments in explicating this;

For one man and human being and man are the same thibng; and nothing different is expressed by repeating the terms we say, this is a human being, a man, and one man. And it is evident that they are not separated either in generation or in corruption. The same holds true of what is one. Hence it is evident that any addition to these expresses the same thing, and that unity is nothing else than being.52

Hence Aristotle concludes that it is the business of the metaphysics to consider the parts of unity, just as it is to consider the parts of unity, just as it is to consider the parts of being. Since being and unity signify the same thing, species of being and species of unity also must be same and correspond to each other. Parts of being are substance, quantity, quality, and so on and parts of unity are same when they are one in substance, one in quantity, one in quality etc. hence all parts of metaphysics are united in the study of being and unity , although they are about different parts of substance.

51 52

. Ibid., p. 222. . Aristotle, 350 BC Metaphysics, p. 64.

43

4.3. Unity and Plurality

Here Aristotle shows that it is the duty of metaphysics to study opposites and plurality in opposite of unity. It is also the duty of metaphysics to study negation and privation, because in both cases we are studying the unity of which there is negation or privation. There are two kinds of negation: Simple negation- by which one thing is said absolutely not present in something else. Negation in a genus-by which something is denied of something else, not absolutely, but within the limits of some determinate genus. Therefore this difference is present in unity over and above what is implied in negation; because negation is the absence of the thing in question. But in the case of privation there is an underlying subject of which the privation is predicated.53 But plurality is the opposite of unity. Therefore the opposite concepts like otherness, unlikeness, and inequality, and any others which are referred to plurality or unity must come within the scope of metaphysics. Hence the term one is used in many senses and this term designate the opposite which are motioned above. Therefore it is the business of metaphysics to know them all. Aristotle draws the conclusion from what has been said, namely, it belongs to metaphysics to reason about these common predicated and about substance, and consideration on unity and being.54

4.4. What is Substance?

In his Metaphysics, Aristotle takes up the promised study of substance. He begins by reiterating and refining some of what he said of that being which is said in many
53 54

.Ibid.,p.65. . Thomas Aquinas, commentary on the metaphysics of Aristotle.pp.226-229.

44 ways, and that the primary sense of being is the sense in which substances are beings. Here, however, he explicitly links the secondary senses of being to the non-substance categories. The primacy of substance leads Aristotle to say that the age-old question What is being? Is just the question What is substance?55 Before answering this question about examples, however, he says that we must first answer the question about criteria: what is it to be a substance?The negative criterion (neither in a subject nor said of a subject) of the Categories tells us only which things are substances. But even if we know that something is a substance, we must still say what makes it a substance what the cause is of its being a substance. This is the question to which Aristotle next turns. To answer it is to identify, as Aristotle puts it, the substance of that thing.56

4.5.The Role of Substance in the Study of Being as Being

The Categories leads us to expect that the study of being in general (being as being) will crucially involve the study of substance, and when we turn to the Metaphysics we are not disappointed. First, Aristotle argues in a new way for the ontological priority of substance; and then,he wrestles with the problem of what it is to be a substance. We will begin with the account of the central place of substance in the study of being qua being. As we noted above, metaphysics is the science which studies being qua being. In this respect it is unlike the specialized or departmental sciences, which study only part of being (only some of the things that exist) or study beings only in a specialized way (e.g., only in so far as they are changeable, rather than in so far as they are beings).57
Frank A Lewis. Substance and Predication in Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.1991,pp.78-85 56 . J Michael Loux, Aristotle on Matter, Form, and Ontological Strategy. Ancient Philosophy Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp.81-123. 57 . David Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence. Oxford: Clarendon Press.2002, pp.125130.
55

45 But being, as Aristotle tells us is said in many ways. That is, the verb to be has different senses, as do its cognates being and entities. So the universal science of being qua being appears to founder on an equivocation: how can there be a single science of being when the very term being is ambiguous? Aristotle explains his point by means of some examples that he takes to be analogous to being. Consider the terms healthy and medical. Neither of these has a single definition that applies uniformly to all cases: not every healthy (or medical) thing is healthy (medical) in the same sense of healthy (medical). There is a range of things that can be called healthy: people, diets, exercise, complexions, etc. Not all of these are healthy in the same sense. Exercise is healthy in the sense of being productive of health; a clear complexion is healthy in the sense of being symptomatic of health; a person is healthy in the sense of having good health.58 But notice that these various senses have something in common: a reference to one central thing, health, which is actually possessed by only some of the things that are spoken of as healthy, namely, healthy organisms, and these are said to be healthy in the primary sense of the term. Other things are considered healthy only in so far as they are appropriately related to things that are healthy in this primary sense. The situation is the same, Aristotle claims, with the term being. It, too, has a primary sense as well as related senses in which it applies to other things because they are appropriately related to things that are called beings in the primary sense. The beings in the primary sense are substances; the beings in other senses are the qualities, quantities, etc., that belong to substances. An animal, e.g., a horse, is a being, and so is a color, e.g, white, a being. But a horse is a being in the primary sense it is a substance whereas the color white (a quality) is a being only because it qualifies some substance. An account of the being of anything that is, therefore, will ultimately have to make some reference to substance. Hence, the science of being qua being will involve
. Chung-HwanChen, Aristotle's Concept of Primary Substance in Books and of the Metaphysics. Phronesis,1957, pp.46-59.
58

46 an account of the central beings substances.59 case of

3.6.Substance, Matter, and Subject

Aristotle begins with a list of four possible candidates for being the substance of something: essence, universal, genus, and subject. Presumably, this means that if x is a substance, then the substance of x might be either (i) the essence of x, or (ii) some universal predicated of x, or (iii) a genus that x belongs to, or (iv) a subject of which x is predicated.The idea that the substance of something is a subject of which it is predicated. A subject, Aristotle tells us, is that of which everything else is predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else. This characterization of a subject is reminiscent of the language of the Categories, which tells us that a primary substance is not predicated of anything else, whereas other things are predicated of it. Candidate (iv) thus seems to reiterate the Categories criterion for being a substance. But there are two reasons to be wary of drawing this conclusion. First, whereas the subject criterion of the Categories told us that substances were the ultimate subjects of predication, the subject criterion envisaged here is supposed to tell us what the substance of something is. So what it would tell us is that if x is a substance, then the substance of x that which makes x a substance is a subject that x is predicated of. Second, as his next comment makes clear, Aristotle has in mind something other than this Categories idea. For the subject that he here envisages, he says, is either matter or form or the compound of matter and form. These are concepts from Aristotle's Physics, and none of them figured in the ontology of the Categories. To appreciate the issues Aristotle is raising here, we

. Alan Code. Aristotle: Essence and Accident. In R. Grandy and R. Warner (eds.), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends. Oxford: Clarendon Press.1986, pp.411-439.

59

47 must compare treatment of briefly his the

notion of a subject in the Physics with that in the Categories.60 In the Categories, individual substances (a man, a horse) were treated as fundamental subjects of predication. They were also understood, indirectly, as subjects of change. (A substance, one and the same in number, can receive contraries. An individual man, for example, being one and the same, becomes now pale and now dark, now hot and now cold, now bad and now good.These are changes in which substances move, or alter, or grow. What the Categories did not explore, however, are changes in which substances are generated or destroyed. But the theory of change Aristotle develops in the Physics requires some other subject for changes such as these a subject of which substance is predicated and it identifies matter as the fundamental subject of change . Change is seen in the Physics as a process in which matter either takes on or loses form.61 But from the point of view of the Physics, substantial individuals are seen as predicative complexes; they are hylomorphic compounds compounds of matter and form and the subject criterion looks rather different from the hylomorphic perspective. Matter, form, and the compound of matter and form may all be considered subjects, Aristotle tells us, but which of them is substance? The subject criterion by itself leads to the answer that the substance of x is an entirely indeterminate matter of which x is composed. For form is predicated of matter as subject, and one can always analyze a hylomorphic compound into its predicates and the subject of which they are predicated. And when all predicates have been removed (in thought), the subject that remains is nothing at all in its own right an entity all of whose properties are accidental to it. The resulting subject is matter from which all form has been expunged. (Traditional scholarship calls this prime matter, but Aristotle does not here indicate whether he thinks there actually is such a thing.) So the subject criterion leads to the
60 61

. B Jones . Individuals in Aristotle's Categories, Phronesis 1972, pp.107-123. . Ibid., pp.167-176.

48 answer that the substance of x is the formless matter of which it is ultimately composed.62 Being separate has to do with being able to exist independently (x is separate from y if x is capable of existing independently of y), and being some this means being a determinate individual. So a substance must be a determinate individual that is capable of existing on its own. One might even hold, although this is controversial, that on Aristotle's account not every this is also separate. A particular color or shape might be considered a determinate individual that is not capable of existing on its own it is always the color of shape of some substance or other.But matter fails to be simultaneously both eparateand some this. The matter of which a substance is composed may exist independently of that substance (think of the wood of which a desk is composed, which existed before the desk was made and may survive the disassembly of the desk), but it is not as such any definite individual it is just a quantity of a certain kind of matter. Of course, the matter may be construed as constituting a definite individual substance (the wood just is, one might say, the particular desk it composes), but it is in that sense not separate from the form or shape that makes it that substance (the wood cannot be that particular desk unless it is a desk). So although matter is in a sense separate and in a sense some this, it cannot be both separate and some this. It thus does not qualify as the substance of the thing whose matter it is.63

4.7. Substance and Essence

Aristotle turns to a consideration of the next candidate for substance: essence. Essence is the standard English translation of Aristotle's curious phrase to ti n einai, literally the what it was to be for a thing. This phrase so boggled his Roman translators that they coined the word essentia to render the entire phrase, and it is from
62 . T Scaltsas, Substances and Universals in Aristotle's Metaphysics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.1994, pp.107-128. 63 . Charlotte Witt, Substance and Essence in Aristotle: an Interpretation of Metaphysics VII-IX. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,1989, pp. 215-228.

49 this Latin word that ours Aristotle derives. also

sometimes uses the shorter phrase to ti esti, literally the what it is, for approximately the same idea. In his logical work, Aristotle links the notion of essence to that of definition (horismos) a definition is an account (logos) that signifies an essence and he links both of these notions to a certain kind of per se predication (kath hauto, literally, in respect of itself) what belongs to a thing in respect of itself belongs to it in its essence for we refer to it in the account that states the essence.He reiterates these ideas by saying; there is an essence of just those things whose logos is a definition, the essence of a thing is what it is said to be in respect of itself. It is important to remember that for Aristotle, one defines things, not words. The definition of tiger does not tell us the meaning of the word tiger; it tells us what it is to be a tiger, what a tiger is said to be in respect of itself. Thus, the definition of tiger states the essence the what it is to be of a tiger, what is predicated of the tiger per se. 64 Aristotle's preliminary answer to the question What is substance? is that substance is essence, but there are important qualifications. For, as he points out, definition (horismos), like what it is (ti esti), is said in many ways . That is, items in all the categories are definable, so items in all the categories have essences just as there is an essence of man, there is also an essence of white and an essence of musical. But, because of the pros hen equivocity of is, such essences are secondary definition and essence are primarily and without qualification of substances . Thus, he tells us, it is only these primary essences that are substances. Aristotle does not here work out the details of this hierarchy of essences, but it is possible to reconstruct a theory of such a hierarchy on the basis of subsequent developments.65 Aristotle goes on to argue that if something is primary and spoken of in respect of itself (kath hauto legomenon) it is one and the same as its essence. The precise meaning of this claim, as well as the nature and validity of the arguments offered in support of it, are matters of scholarly controversy. As Aistotle has already told us, only
. Charlotte Witt, Ways of Being: Potentiality and Actuality in Aristotle's Metaphysics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003, pp.148-152. 65 . Ibid., pp.182-184.
64

50 species of a genus have an essence in the primary sense. Man is a species, and so there is an essence of man; but pale man is not a species and so, even if there is such a thing as the essence of pale man, it is not, at any rate, a primary essence.66 At this point there appears to be a close connection between the essence of a substance and its species, and this might tempt one to suppose that Aristotle is identifying the substance of a thing (since the substance of a thing is its essence) with its species. But such an identification would be a mistake, for two reasons. First, Aristotle's point is not that a species is an essence, but that an essence of the primary kind corresponds to a species (e.g., man) and not to some more narrowly delineated kind (e.g., pale man). Second, the word eidos, which meant species in the logical works, has acquired a new meaning in a hylomorphic context, where it means form (contrasted with matter) rather than species (contrasted with genus). In the conceptual framework of Metaphysics, a universal such as man or horse which was called a species and a secondary substance in the Categories is construed as not a substance, but a compound of a certain formula and a certain matter, taken universally. The eidos that is primary substance is not the species that an individual substance belongs to but the form that is predicated of the matter of which it is composed.67

4.8. The Doctrine of Categories

The categories have familiar names: quality, quantity, relation, time, place, and action, being-acted upon. The question Socrates asked about things, what is it? Is too broad, since it can be answered truly with respect to any of the categories that apply, and many times in some of them? For example, I'll describe something to you: it is backstage now; it is red; it is three feet high; it is lying down and breathing. I could continue telling you what it is in this fashion for as long as I pleased and you would not
. Ibid., pp.184-186. . Michael Woods, Problems in Metaphysics , Chapter 13. In J. Moravcsik (ed.), Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays. New York: Anchor. 1967, pp.215-238.
67 66

51 know what it is. It is an Irish setter. What is different about that last answer? To be an Irish setter is not to be a quality or quantity or time or action but to be a whole, which comprises many ways of being in those categories, and much change and indeterminacy in them. The redness, three-foot-high-ness, respiration and much else cohere in a thing, which I have named in its thinghood by calling it an Irish setter. Aristotle calls this way of being ousia. Aristotle's logical works reflect upon the claims our speech makes about the world. The principal result of Aristotle's inquiry into the logical categories of being is, I think, the claim that the thinghood of things in the world is never reducible in our speech to any combination of qualities, quantities, relations, actions, and so on: that ousia or thinghood must be a separate category. What happens when I try to articulate the being of a thing such as an Irish setter? I define it as a dog with certain properties. But what then is a dog? It is an animal with certain properties, and an animal is an organism with certain properties, and an organism is a thing with the property life. At each level I meet, as dog, animal, organism, what Aristotle calls secondary ousia or secondary thinghood. I set out to give an account of what makes a certain collection of properties cohere as a certain thing, and I keep separating off some of them and telling you that the rest cohere as a whole. At my last step, when I say that an organism is a living thing, the problem of secondary thinghood is present in its nakedness. Our speech, no matter how scientific, must always leave the question of the hanging-together of things as things a question.68

4.9. The Being of beings in Aristotle (The Concept of God)

The Being of beings for Aristotle was the unmoved mover who moves the world with the highest actuality of thought. For him God was described as a living being, eternal, most good, pure, necessary, full actuality, Being as- being, unmoved mover,
68

. J Duerlinger, Predication and Inherence in Aristotle's Categories. Phronesis 1970, pp.179-

203.

52 indeterminate, infinite, immovable substance, the ultimate cause, the principle of non-contradiction, self conscious thought, the light that quickens the human thought etc and such in Aristotles God.. His God was not something altogether disconnected from the external world but was someone who reassures regularity in the nature and sets order in the nature itself. Here I take an attempt to explain a handful of above mentioned concepts which would refer to God. It is highly relevant to discuss on the topic of God in Aristotle, since his influence is very much evident in Christian faith and theology through the teachings of the medieval thinkers like St. Thomas Aquinas and many others. Having seen so much let us move on to the concept of Being as being which would speak of the divine Being.

4.9.1. Being as Being

Generally speaking, Being as Being means Being which is common to all beings. Aristotle interprets Being as Being in various ways, viz. grammatical interpretation, Being as Being to substance and metaphysical interpretation. Grammatical point of view interprets Being as Being to qualify the initial being, pure being, being without qualification or unconditioned being.69 The grammatical interpretations head towards the ultimate contemplation of unchanging or divine being. Aristotle simple speaks of being as being and its forms. The theological interpretations would move on rapidly from the science of being as being to concentrate on the science of substance. For some things are said to because they are substances: others because they are conditions of substance.70 Theological interpretations assume that in the last refinement he continued his search for primary and that the eternal or unchangeable substance was more basic to his mind than the other kinds. Ultimately, the metaphysical position of Aristotle is an attempt to discover the special kind of substance that is divine. And Aristotelian search for Being as being to substance would be a religious one
69 . Abraham Edal, Aristotle and His Philosophy, Chapel Hill: The University of North Caroline Press, 1982, p. 103. 70

23. Ibid., p. 144.

53 which speaks of the eternal nonchanging substance.

4.9.2. The analysis of the Infinite

The infinite literally means without any limit. Aristotle begins with the realization that there are features of endlessness time, division for magnitude and so on, that suggests that there is an actual infinite. What does the term infinite designate? A substance, a quantity, or what else? Aristotle plays with the ideas of infinite as substance. If infinite is substance, the parts of infinite would have to be infinite, just as parts of earth are earth. Thus the infinite cannot characterize a substance. Infinite is taken instead as a property for quantities. He considers infinite as potential. This potentiality is an endless process but it does not become a full actualization. Aristotle uses this analysis give a meaning to infinite in varied context. Physically the world is finite; any thing else would render observable properties of the heavens impossible, or else it would upset the doctrine of natural motion. 71 There are perishable and imperishable beings. The latter is a necessary kind and the perishable is only contingent. The infinite is an actuality and this actuality is prior, both in formula and in substance; but in time; its prior in one sense, but in another not.72

4.9.3. The Cause

Aristotle thinks of God as an efficient cause rather than a final cause. Efficient cause is that by which something is produced. The principle of causality states that everything that happens or begins must have a cause. God has neither beginning nor end and God does not begin to be. Therefore there is no cause for God and He is an
71

. Ibid., P. 103.

. Aristotle, Metaphysics: Books Zeta, Eta, Theta, Lota (vii-x), trans. Montgomery Furth, Indianapolis: Hacket publishing company, 1985, P.236.
72

54 uncaused cause. Only finite beings have cause because only finite beings begin to be. Aristotle describes God as an exercising infinite power, that he thinks of Him as an efficient cause of type; He causes motion as an object of desire or of love is too explicit for that. He exists eternally and differs from a merely imagined and anticipated ideal.73 The prime mover causes the sun to move round the earth once in twenty-four hours and this produces the rhythm of day and night and everything in terrestrial life for which that is responsible. The relation for God to the world is two fields; He is the primary object of knowledge and primary object of desire. Since the world is the creation of God, He exists immanently and transcendentally in the world. But essentially for Aristotle, God is the first cause. All other things other than God owe their being entirely to God, so that Gods self-knowledge must be at the same time knowledge of all other things.74 For Aristotle God should know Himself and that He should know other things are secondary, in a way of affirmation for the first one, he implicitly denies the second. From the view of all good things and strife is the cause for all evil things. And good and evil are principles. God is absolute and evil is relative and therefore love is the cause of all things.

4.9.4. The Actuality

Aristotle says, Being is in one way divided into individual thing, quality and quantity and is in another way distinguished in respect of potency and complete actuality.75 This complete reality is actuality. Actuality is prior to potentiality, essence and prior in definition and time. Actuality is prior in a stricter sense also: for eternal things are prior in substance to perishable things and no eternal thing exist potentially:
73 74

. Aristotle, 350 BC Metaphysics, trans. W.D Ross. New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 2002, . Ibid., p. 189.

p.188.
75

55 Actuality in prior to potency and to every principle of change. God is the pure act because everything has been actualized in God. There isnt anything in God to be actualized. Thats why God is called the perfect Being as nothing to be perfected in him.

4.9.5. The Unmoved Mover

In his metaphysics Aristotle says, One actuality always precedes another in time light back to the activity of the eternal prime mover. 76 From the unmovable substance Aristotle moves toward the notion of the unmoved mover, a mover who causes all movements but yet never moves or allows to be moved. He argues that there must be something that moves without being moved. The new feature of the Supreme Being is its immobility. The physical causation for movement implies a mutual contact of mover and moved and thus a reaction for the moved on the mover. The unmoved mover must cause motion in a non-physical way. An unmoved mover touches what it moves without being touched by it. Aristotles view is that the unmoved mover is not is not in this space. The mover who is unmoved, who is not in this, which cans it, be other than God. All things other than God owe their being entirely to God.77

Conclusion
We have already analyzed the various nuances of the notions and principles of metaphysics. Beginning with the subject matter of metaphysics which includes different concepts like Being as being, Being and unity, unity and plurality etc. in this regard we have also seen what exactly is essence, substance, categories etc. the major issue that I have tried to include is the concept of God according to Aristotle which is along and broad analysis based n the Unmoved Mover who is the cause of all beings. The god. Ibid., p.203. .Jaimon Thadathil and Jineesh Mathew, Being of beings in Aristotle, in the journal of Suvidya 08, 25th (October.2008), 47-49.
77 76

56 discussion becomes highly relevant as our Christian theology is based upon it which was adopted by Thomas Aquinas.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

Aristotle the greatest philosopher of all time has laid the foundation for the Metaphysics, even though he did not name it as metaphysics. The philosopher whom the world has ever seen could be called the father of metaphysics too. Aristotle calls this science as the greatest wisdom. What is wisdom? Wisdom is knowledge about certain causes and principles. Metaphysics can be called as the greatest of all sciences because metaphysics is the science of truth. Ultimately metaphysics is the study of being as being. Of the hierarchy of all sciences, metaphysics stands at the top of it, as it is the study of being which truth. It is also greatest of all sciences because it is the study of greatest of all beings, which is the Being of beings, that is God. Metaphysic is the core of h human knowledge because it is the foundation of philosophy. Metaphysics is always true because it deals with eternal things which is absolute truth and causes of all other beings and that is because eternal things are always true. The enquiry into beings and the search for many first principles to an ultimate ground: the divine, which is thought, is pure contemplation. Thus is this science of Aristotle which entitled metaphysics, theology and ontology are linked in primordial unity, though the name ontology inurn only came in turn into use in the 17th century. Aristotelian metaphysics does not try to reduce the phenomenon of nature to non-metaphysical, immanent and mathematically measurable laws, but goes back by onto-theological processes to the law of essence and being. One may recall for instance, how Aristotle explained the circular motion of stars or the fact that higher bodies tend to rise: Aristotle

57 reached this form of metaphysical thinking by taking up, criticizing and transforming the pre-Socratic tradition, and in particular the platonic view of the problems envisaged in this tradition. With his doctrine of Causes and principles, Aristotle undoubtedly added and modified Plato doctrine of participation and teleology. Even then Aristotle himself could not be understood except in the light of platonic elements of his philosophy. But Aristotle made all metaphysics a metaphysics of the spirit in the sense that the being of all being sis to be spirit, to be thinking and to be thought of. Under the heading of What is Metaphysics in the first chapter, I have attempted to narrate what exactly is metaphysics and the origin of it, followed by the nature and scope of metaphysics and dignity of this particular science. I have also pointed out the difference in human beings and animals, thereby illustrating the nature and goal of metaphysics. So the first chapter gives us an over all view of what exactly is metaphysics for Aristotle. Under the caption of metaphysics of causality we have analyzed cause in its various names beginning with material cause, efficient cause, and final cause, referring to what Thales, Empedocles and Anaxagoras have spoken of. The analysis of causality completes with the idea that efficient cause is the principle of good and evil, which goes further and says Love is the cause of all good things and Hate is the cause of all evil things. Under the caption of metaphysical problems, in the third chapter, we have analyzed the various problems that occur in metaphysics, mainly the issue of one and many. The chapter gets it complete with the concepts like Being is one, true, good and beautiful. The final chapter discusses various principles and notions, which are fundamental to metaphysics, which proceeds with the subject matter of metaphysics.

58 This chapter gives an account of Being as Being, Being and Unity, Unity and Plurality, substance, essence, categories etc. the final scene of the chapter is the God concept which gives a broad outlook into the Aristotelian God the Unmoved Mover.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. PRIMARY SOURCES Aristotle. 350 BC Metaphysics. trans. W.D Ross. New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 2002. Metaphysics: Books Zeta, Eta, Theta, Lota (vii-x), trans. Montgomery Furth, Indianapolis: Hacket publishing company, 1985.

Aquinas Thomas. Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. trans. John P.Lowan, vol.I and II , Chicago : Henry Regnery Company, 1961.

2. SECONDARY SOURCES 2.1. Books Charles, David. Aristotle on Meaning and Essence. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2002.

59 Code, Alan.

Aristotle: Essence and Accident. In R. Grandy and R. Warner (eds.), Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends. Oxford: Clarendon Press.1986. Copleston Frederich s.j. History of Philosophy. vol..I Greece and Rome, Westminster, Maryland: the New Man press, 1953. Duerlinger, J. Predication and Inherence in Aristotle's Categories. Phronesis. 1970. Edal, Abraham. Aristotle and His Philosophy, Chapel Hill: The University of North Caroline Press, 1982. HwanChen,Chung.Aristotle's Concept of Primary Substance in Books and of the Metaphysics. Phronesis.1957 Jones B . Individuals in Aristotle's Categories, Phronesis .1972. Kim Jaegwon and Sosa Ernest.ed. A Companion to Metaphysics. Massachusetts USA: black well publishers,1995. Lewis, Frank A. Substance and Predication in Aristotle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1991. Loux, Michael J.Aristotle on Matter, Form, and Ontological Strategy. Ancient Philosophy. 2005. Panthanmackal, George. One and Many. Bangalore: Indian Institute of

Spirituality.1993. S. Pandit, Balakrishna. A simple study of Western Philosophy. Delhi; Naik Sarak 1968.

60

Scaltsas,T. Substances and Universals in Aristotle's Metaphysics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.1994. Witt, Charlotte. Substance and Essence in Aristotle: an Interpretation of Metaphysics VII-IX. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,1989. Witt, Charlotte. Ways of Being: Potentiality and Actuality in Aristotle's Metaphysics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,2003. Woods, Michael. Problems in Metaphysics , Chapter 13. In J. Moravcsik (ed.), Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays. New York: Anchor. 1967.

2.2. Articles

Sellars, Wilfrid. Substance and Form in Aristotle. Journal of Philosophy.1957. Thadathil Jaimon and Mathew, Jineesh. Being of beings in Aristotle In the journal of Suvidya 08, 25th (October. 2008).