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REDEFINING THE
UNCONSCIOUS
Marcel Gauchet
To clarify the issues, I will divide the argument into two parts, dealing
respectively with problems coming from within and without; this division
should of course not be mistaken for more than a convention. I will first
consider the changes needed because of internal limits which obstruct the
theorizing of Freud’s discoveries, and then analyze the factors that have to
do with clinical, technical or cultural contexts of psychoanalytical procedures;
they appear as external pressures.
1. THEORETICAL DIFFICULTIES
As for the internal limits, I will single out the three most significant ones.
organization of the human being. Humans are not only characterized by con-
flictual patterns that define their singularity, but structured by antagonisms
and antinomies whose extreme psychotic forms should not make us forget
the less obtrusive dynamics of normal cases.
The task is, then, to reconstruct and understand the meaning of this
network of polarities. Let us note only the most straightforward aspect: we
are permanently torn between being absent from the world, which grounds
the possibility of an objective world for us, while at the same time opening
up the prospect of our own death, and being at the centre of the world,
without which we would not be capable of lending a subjective meaning to
it, without which the world would not exist for us. We shift from an integral
subjectivization of the world around us to an equally complete desubjec-
tivization which makes the world appear mute, strange and meaningless.
Even in the most ordinary moments of everyday life, we live with the tension
between two equally impossible and potentially ‘mad’ poles. The only viable
way is to keep hold of both and manage the in-between as well as we can.
By contrast, the constitutive mechanism of psychosis consists in articulation
of these extremes. That is why I referred to one-sided development. But the
term ‘mechanism’ should not lead us to think of the process as a simple
mechanical dissociation of the poles, which would leave them free to
function in mutual isolation. We are, rather, dealing with a paradox. In the
symptoms of psychosis, we never find one pole only, but both of them
combined in such a way that one of them predominates, and that movement
between them is blocked. To put it another way, there is a cleavage within
a forced conjunction of extremes, as if the terms of an antinomy were pushed
to the limit, but with one of them firmly on top.
It is only in the light of these pathological breakdowns that we can
understand the normal madness which haunts our everyday experience and
makes it possible. Conversely, only a clarification of the organizing role of
the antinomies built into the physical subject will lead to a better under-
standing of psychotic phenomena. But this disclosure of the subject in the
mirror of its madness has yet to be worked out in detail.
true knowledge and understanding. But we can never really move to the
other side: the impact of the original communication through separation is
decisive for that. We can only gain partial access, without ever getting rid of
the feeling that the main thing still eludes us. Sexuality remains essentially a
matter of phantasms and representations: something which one witnesses,
even when one is part of the scene. In short, separation persists. But the
same applies to every acquirement of which we might be capable. It will be
marked by the double constraint which fragments the ‘development’ of the
child. We will always be striving to reach from within that which is given
from without, but the only certainty we can have about the ultimate con-
vergence of the two lines will be indistinguishable from madness. This is the
ultimate reason why learning is so difficult. In searching for knowledge, we
have to confront a situation which tells us that we can never know.
The being of madness, the being of affects, the being of childhood:
these are the three problems encountered by psychoanalytical theory, the
three strategic cases to be explored; the result would in my opinion be a very
major reformulation of Freudian ideas. But I want to stress that it would
continue along the same lines, through a deepening of Freudian insights
rather than a break with them.
indicates to some extent what and why. The hypnotic dimension of trans-
ference needs to be re-examined.
We have the same return to the original problems with the cognitive
therapies. As I said, it is not difficult to rediscover behind their brand-new
vocabulary the intellectualist approach of the great epoch of ‘moral and
nervous treatment’ around 1900. It seemed that the very spirit of the enter-
prise had been definitively condemned for its naivety. The first lecture in the
first year consisted in instructing beginners what a bad method it was to take
at face value the symptoms of patients in their ideational or representational
presentation, elucidation of their affective substratum alone being capable of
modifying or overcoming them. The base axiom: the superstructure cannot
be altered without proceeding via the infrastructure. Things proved to be
more subtle, however. It turned out that the explosion and the action of the
underworld on the conscious part of certain disturbances classically called
‘neurotic’, for instance obsessional but also certain depressive disturbances,
did not only produce short-term effects – the well known difficulty lay here
in their superficial and fragile character, hence the sense of frustration rapidly
reached by this treatment. In fact they also produced, provided they were
conducted appropriately, deep, long-term changes. In other words, work on
the superstructure showed itself capable of transforming the infrastructure,
the very converse of a mode of reasoning held to be irreversibly consecrated.
To sum up: if the synthesis is unraveling, it is because each of its parts
still has something to tell us. If, then, articulation needs to be reconstructed,
as I’m inclined to think, it will be very different in its details to the one we
know.
supernatural and that the other in the self becomes more and more an other
of the self. The discovery of the unconscious is embedded in this sequence,
it is one of its important aspects. It corresponds to the decisive moment when
the subject cannot situate the other, which is still present anywhere but in
the self. We need, however, to refine the description if we want to seize the
continuation of the movement and not fall into the embrace of the end of
history, that is, to posit an already accomplished exit from religion. There can
be no doubt that a crucial threshold was crossed around 1900. But nothing
would be more deceptive than to consider this reworking of the articulation
of the invisible as terminal. The process of the exit from religion is still con-
tinuing. Everything seems to suggest that we are entering a new metamor-
phosis, a new stage. The constellation set up around 1900, which has shaped
our conception of the unconscious, is changing. If we wanted to sum up the
displacement which is occurring in two propositions, I would say: the
reworking of the 1900 constellation consists in a rearrangement of the
religious outside of religion at the same as we observe the installing of a reli-
giosity without religion.
The religious outside religion: this supposes an ongoing strength of
presence of the latter together with a hostile climate. We have reached an
acute point in the secular battle. In this atmosphere of conflict we have the
striking synchronism of a series of events which have in common that they
are external to the explicitly religious domain but which nevertheless consist
in reactivating knowingly or unknowingly the religious dimension outside its
domain. It is not a case of transference according to the secularization model,
but of a revival of or insistence on the religious by actors, who not only live
outside religion but are hostile to it, at least as regards the established forms
of belief. We are dealing with a loss of the hold of religion since it is wit-
nessing the development of activities which radically challenge it but remain
religions in this challenge. Where religion is reflected it is still present.
Four of these activities seem to me particularly significant.
The years around 1900 were, as we know, a great period for the occult
and for ‘psychic research’. I don’t have the space to dismantle the metamor-
phosis of the believable inherent in this will to science in relation to phenom-
ena which have previously been held to be supernatural, apparitions,
miracles, phantoms, ghosts, etc. If you take away the religious understand-
ing of things, it leaves the powers of the invisible.
Second, the crystallization of ‘secular religions’ belongs in the same
context and to the same fundamental operation. The Leninist reinterpretation
of Marxism provides the most telling expression, with to a lesser extent the
affirmation of ultra-nationalism in the opposed camp. The best way to situate
this phenomenon is to contrast it with the diffuse, even explicit religiosity of
the early socialist doctrines and more generally with the philosophies of
history of the early 19th century which has nothing in common with The New
Christianity.4 What entitles us to speak of secular religions is precisely the
01 Gauchet (jr/d) 11/20/02 1:32 PM Page 20
is not the substantial reality of the invisible world which they take for
granted. They feel inwardly obliged to believe in it, but they feel no obli-
gation to go in search of objective evidence for their belief, in the style of the
photographs of invisible fluids that were produced by the psychical
researchers of the late 19th century. Even more: they know, in an obscure
but significant way, that such objective manifestations are unlikely to be
found, and they find it easy to live without them. The whole matter has to
do with our way of thinking, rather than with the reality of things. Our mental
constitution is such that we cannot avoid thinking along these lines, that these
ideas irresistibly occur to us. We are not dealing with residual superstitions,
rooted in a remote past and destined to be overcome by the progress of
enlightenment. Rather, the phenomenon has to do with certain features of
our mind which predispose us to see something else in things and in our-
selves. The very process which culminates in the elimination of the invisible
from objective reality thus leads us to discover the subjective roots of the
belief in the invisible. Something that we might call the anthropological core
of the religious sphere is being brought to light.
I have used the revealing and undisputed example of magical or
‘paranormal’ beliefs to illustrate this core. But there is more to it, and the
field has yet to be mapped out. As suggested above, it involves all phenom-
ena which link our experience of the world and of ourselves to invisible oth-
erness and relate it to the unknown. In view of the forms which this
experience now tends to take – for example, in art, at least on some occa-
sions – we have some reason to speak of religiosity without religion. We are,
independently of any kind of belief, destined to live through intellectual and
personal experiences of the kind earlier associated with religion, even if we
cannot identify them as such. Let us imagine the impossible: if religions were
to disappear so completely that they would even be erased from human
memory, the anthropological core that has for many millennia functioned as
a substratum for religions would still exist, and it would retain its capacity to
shape our thoughts and experiences.
This shift in the forms of expression of religiosity is also reflected in
new approaches to religion as an object of inquiry, in contrast to the tradition
established by early 20th-century sociology of religion. The latter was, explic-
itly or implicitly, based on the assumption that religion fulfils an essential
social function (and for that reason, we can still believe in its return even
when it is obviously disappearing). But the transformations of our world lead
us to think that a complete de-functionalization of religion is possible, and
that – correspondingly – societies can function wholly without religion. But
this is not to suggest that the religious dimension has simply lost all meaning.
It is still there. The point is that it must now be defined primarily in terms of
an anthropological grounding rather than a sociological function. On the one
hand we must analyze the foundation on which institutionalized religions
rested, and thus explain what constitutes the human being as a religious being
01 Gauchet (jr/d) 11/20/02 1:32 PM Page 23
or at least one susceptible to religion. For we must, on the other hand, admit
that this anthropological core of religion is destined to survive its institutional
forms and likely to find non-religious expressions. It seems that we now stand
at the beginning of this new history of that which was known as religiosity.
We have, in other words, definitively entered the critical phase of
religious consciousness: the phase where belief returns to its subjective roots
and where the question of its anthropological foundations becomes fully
explicit. Two centuries ago, Kant made the first move in this direction. But
the domain of religion in human life goes far beyond the ideas of reason
within which he tried to confine it. The critical question is less about that
which makes us demand a complete explanation of the phenomenal world,
than about that which makes us beings of the other, divided within ourselves
and irresistibly tempted to link the world of the senses to a supra-sensual
one. It is this question that we will have to confront.
We are thus about to take a new step on the long road that leads out
of religion; it changes our experience of the invisible in a fundamental way,
and cannot but affect our perceptions and interpretations of the unconscious.
The implications involve the whole system of associations and intersections
between the body, the invisible and truth. The present state of confusion
indicates the need for restructuring. That task will take us far beyond earlier
approaches to the otherness within us; we used to call it ‘the unconscious’,
but we may soon have to invent another label.
Marcel Gauchet teaches at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales
and is editor of the journal Le Débat. His publications include The Disenchantment
of the World: a Political History of Religion, Princeton University Press (1997) and,
most recently, La démocratie contre elle-mème, Gallimard (2002).
Translators’ notes
An earlier version of this article was published in Le Débat, no. 100, 1998,
pp. 189–206. The text was translated by Johann P. Arnason and David Roberts.
1. See M. Gauchet, ‘A New Age of Personality: An Essay on the Psychology of
Our Times’, Thesis Eleven 60: 23–41.
2. See M. Gauchet and G. Swain (1980), La pratique de l’esprit humain. Paris:
Gallimard, 1980.
3. See M. Gauchet (1992), L’inconscient cérébral. Paris: Seuil.
4. This refers to Saint-Simon’s Nouveau Christianisme, first published in 1825.