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Some facts About

THE (HONE CHllEfi

and the

1 TROOP C f l H

' . . . . ' " .

P a g e

THE

AIRBORNE

CENTER.

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1
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5 6

J r / ? 0 0 P CARRIER OPERATIONS
DOCTRINE... f ..

COMMAND..

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MANEUVER

MANEUVER

SITUATION.

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8 9 10 U

5 < 9 ^ r T F / 5 MANEUVER. ORGANIZATION........ PARACHUTE

TROOPS,..................

TROOP CARRIER GLIDERS.............. 12

CARRIER AIRCRAFT. .; . ..-*:.- .:... 13
EVACUATION... . v . . ... #.-. . .. .* . t4
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THE AIRBORNE CENTER

t The Airborne Center i s an agency of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, and operates directly under that headquarters. 2. The Airborne Center i s directly charged with the re sponsibility of the following: a. To conduct airborne training for troops attached to i t for that purpose. b. To develop and recommend improvements in the or ganisation, doctrine* tactics and technique, and training literature and visual aids for parachute and glider units. c. To t e s t and develop equipment and materiel for parachute and glider u n i t s . d. To .act as liaison between the Troop Carrier Com mand, Army Air Forces, and the Army Ground Forces. 3. The accomplishments of the Airborne Center and i t s predecessor, The Airborne Command, include the activation and training of all airborne divisions and separate air borne units of the Army. Certain Infantry Divisions have also been trained for transport by air. . 4 . The Parachute School a t Fo,rt Behning* Georgia i s an agency of the Rplacement and School Command, AGF, charged with the mission of training and furnishing replacements for parachute units in this country and overseas.

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Glider
Oper ations

I TROOP CARRlBJt COMMAND

The I Troop Carrier Connand was created by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, on April 30, 1942. It is the youngest command in the Army Air Forces and i s aJready larger than the whole U. S, Array Air Forces was i 1941* .,.-.. The Troop Carrier has a three fold primary mission: (1) To provide air transportation for airborne forces into combat. (2) To supply such forces until they are with drawn or can be supplied by other means. (3) To provide emergency supply and evacuation of casualties* The secondary missions of Troop Carrier Units are: (1) To provide emergency supply and evacuation. (2) To ferry troops and supplies. (3) To provide routine transportation for per sonnel, supplies, and mail. In theaters of operation, the primary missions take priority. It i s the responsibility of theater commanders to relieve troop carrier forces from secondary missions in adequate time to plan, prepare for, and rehearse pri mary missions.

OPERATIONS
The accompanying sketch of the world shows the spots where U. S. airborne and Troop Carrier forces have been employed together. (1) The first employment of American parachute troops was in the invasion of North Africa in November 1942. For that operation the Troop Carrier transports carried the Airborne from bases in England to drop zones in Algieria. (2) In July 1943 an Airborne Task Force spearheaded the attack into S i c i l y . Parachute elements of the 82nd Airborne Division dropped beyond the beaches, blocked the movement of enemy reinforcements, and assisted the land ings from the sea. (3) Parachute troops were used again in the late sum* mer of 1943 to reinforce the beachhead at Salerno, Italy. A regiment was dropped by the Troop Carrier Command to strengthen our right flank. Other elements were dropped beyond our lines to attack and disrupt enemy centers of communication and control (4) In the Southwest Pacific Theater, one of the most carefully timed and precisely executed airborne missions was the parachute drop of the 503d Parachute Infantry Regi ment in the Markham Val ley on September 7, 1943 by the Troop Carrier Command. (5) In March, 1944, a U. S.-British glider operation cut the Japanese supply lines in Burma and opened the way for the capture of Myitkyina. The Troop Carrier gliders carried airborne engineers and equipment from bases in India to the jungles of Burma. (6) The largest allied airborne operation to date was the invasion-of-Kormandy, France, on June 6, 1944. The Troop Carrier Command transported two American airborne divisions, the 82nd and 101st, both parachute and glider elements* over the Cherbourg Peninsula* Initial missions of the airborne forces were accomplished within six hours.

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(7) In August 1944, an Airborne-Troop Carrier force was the leading element in the penetration of Southern France, opening the way for the advance up the Rhpne Val ley toward Germany. ( 8 ) During the summer of 1944 in the advance toward the P h i l i p p i n e s , parachute troops were dropped by the Troop Carrier Command in the" landing onr Noemfoorv- ^Ttttfse were the same troops which had jumped in thelfarkham Valley. : ( 9 ) O September 17, 1944, the Allied Airborne Army n c o n s i s t i n g of American and B r i t i s h personnel under the command of Lt Gen \. H B E F O * made a successful airborne KXI N landing into Holland in daylight against the G*mn.

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DOCTRINE
Based originally upon theory and later proved sound in actual operation, certain points of basic doctrine have been established for the employment of Airborne and Troop Carrier forces. Fundamental points of the doctrine are the following: (1) Surprise.' This i s the greatest single factor in favor of an airborne attack. It i s gained through secrecy regarding projected operations and through speed in execu tion both of the air move and the ground attack. (2) Employment In Mass*' The bulk of the airborne forces should be committed in a relatively small area as fast as possible. (3) Part of a Combined Effort,The airborne attack should not be incidental to the main effort, nor super imposed on an effort already planned. It should be an in tegral part of the basic plan and closely coordinated with a l l air, ground, sea-borne, and naval forces engaged. (4) Contribute Most to the Major Effort.' The mis sion assigned the Airborne Force should contribute the most possible to the success of the entire operation.

(5) Used Only on Missions that cannot be Performed as Economically or as Expediously by other Ground Forces.- If
other ground forces can reach the objective easily, they .should be used since they are better equipped for ground operations. The airborne force should be used on import ant objectives beyond the immediate reach of other ground units*

Glider

Trooper

Mock-up Loading

THIS MANEUVER
The purpose of this maneuver i s to complete and t e s t the combined training of the 13th Airborne D i v i s i o n and the 60th Troop Carrier Wing. The mission of the 13th Airborne Division i s to land in the area of Hoffman arid Camp Mackall to capture and secure the Camp Mackall A i r f i e l d for subsequent a i r land ings , and to prevent the movement of Red troops through Hoffman and v i c i n i t y . Landings by parachute and g l i d e r w i l l be made a t n i g h t and day. Three departure a i r bases w i l l be u s e d . A minimum flight of 100 miles will be made from each departure base to the landing area. A e r i a l resupply w i l l be accomplished by the 60th Troop Carrier Wing on and a f t e r D plus one day. Evacuation of c a s u a l t i e s w i l l be by a i r . The 130th Evacuation Hospital w i l l be attached t o the 13th Airborne D i v i s i o n for the a i r movement. The airborne d i v i s i o n w i l l be r e l i e v e d on D p l u s Four day by ground units attacking from the Southwest.

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SITUATION MAP OF AIRBORNE-TROOP CARRIER MANEUVER

SEPTEMBER 1944

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THE MANEUVER SITUATION

1. Blue Forces which have reached the line of the Pee Dee River will continue the attack on D-Day. The Blue 11th Division i s expected to relieve the airborne units in the v i c i n i t y of Hoffman on D plus 4. 2. The airborne task force will attack dn D-l to seize and hold Camp Mackal 1 Airport and to block the movement x of Red Forces thru the Hoffman area. ; v 3. Air reconnaissance indicates that the a i r f i e l d defended by antiaircraft and small ground u n i t s . is

4. The terrain is generally rolling and cut up by wood land, stream l i n e s , and swamps. 5* Cotton fields and open a,ras provide adequate landing areas for parachutists and gliders*' 6. A night landing will increase the elements of security and surprise. It also increases the difficulty of gaining ground control. 7. The landings will be made not on the objective but close to i t and beyond the range of small arms fire from the airport defenses,* 8. A coordinated attack executed with speed and surprise will be necessary to capture the objective with a minimum of fighting. 9. Once the airfield i s secured, reinforcements and sup p l i e s can be landed in Troop Carrier transport airplanes. Casualties can be evacuated in these same aircraft. 10. The eneny must be pushed back so that he cannot place observed artillery fire on the airport. 11. A strong defensive position must be organised to block the movement of Red Forces through the Hoffman Area. 12. After capturing the objective the initiative aust be retained through aggressive ground action and vigorous patrol a c t i v i t y .

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MORE ABOUT THIS MANEUVER

This maneuver i s divided into two phases. The first* or air phase, will include the air movement, reinforce* ment, resupply and evacuation by air. The second phase is the ground maneuver of the 13th Airborne Division after landing and after i t has been joined by other ground forces and normal channels of supply have been established. The maneuver Command and Staff and function as a Corps headquarters. The Commanding Officer, Airborne Cent er, a s s i s t e d by the Commanding General, I Troop Carrier Command, will direct the air phase of the maneuver. The Commanding General, XXII Corps, w i l l direct the ground control of the maneuver successively as airborne units land. In tactical operations airborne units remain under control of the theatre commander until units are in flight, at which time control passes to the air commander. When units are landed, control passes to the officer in command of that area. Normally the airborne force should be re lieved as soon as possible following the break through of friendly ground forces. Relief i s necessary because air borne forces are not equipped for e f f e c t i v e sustained action, and because prompt r e l i e f will result in a mini* m m of reequipping and reoian.ization prior to their com u mitment again on airborne missions.

Ground
Action

ORGAMIZATIOff
A airborne division i s about one-half the sise of n an infantry division. .Its approximate strength is 8,500 officers and men. Its weapons and transportation are necessarily limited to those which can be dropped by parachute or landed by glider. The principal a r t i l l e r y weapon i s the 75-mm Pack Howitzer, which can be disassembled and dropped in nine parachute aerial delivery containers or landed intact by glider. The4-50 caliber antiaircraft machine gun on the air borne mount, M-63, i s the principal weapon for a n t i aircraft defense. The rocket launcher* M9A1, and the 3 m antitank 7m gun are the principal antitank weapons. The infantry has as i t s principal weapons the r i f l e ,
the machine gun, and the infantry mortars.
The division comprises one parachute and two glider infantry regiments, the division artillery consisting of one parachute and two glider battalions, engineer bat talion, antiaircraft, battalion, signal company, medical company, quartermaster company, ordnance company, and military police platoon. In tactical operations the division headquarters i s divided into a forward and rear echelon. The rear echelon stays in the departure area. The division commander with his staff and elements of the signal company go into the combat area by parachute or gl ider close behind lead ing combat elements to establish the commend post, to gain control, and to direct the tactical operation.

PARACHUTE TROOPS
Parachute troops receive their basic jump training at The Parachute School, Fort Benning, Georgia. Each parachutist jumps with a main parachute and a reserve parachute. -

Size of the main canopy i s 28 feet in diameter. The parachute i s made of a high grade s i l k or nylon. The c o s t of the parachute i s about $200.00. After a training jump, the parachute i s recovered by members of the Parachute Maintenance Company. This may be impracticable in combat. As many as 18 men can be jumped from a C-47 airplane in a s i n g l e pass over the.drop cone. Troop Carrier p i l o t s are trained to slow the airplane down t o about 110 miles per hour during the time of the jump and t o keep the t a i l of the airplane h i g h . Men jump from an a l t i t u d e o f about 800 f e e t . The time o f descent from 800 f e e t i s about 40 s e c onds . The. parachute canopy w i l l s u s t a i n a load of 300 pounds a t 150 m i l e s per h o u r . In t a c t i c a l m i s s i o n s a l l n e c e s s a r y items o f i n d i v i d u a l equipment are jumped on the i n d i v i d u a l . Crew served weapons, additional ammunition and equip ment are dropped in aerial delivery containers.

TROOP CARRIER

GLIDERS

The glider used today in largest quantities i s the CG-4A. The CG-4A w i l l carry 13 men in addition to p i l o t and c o - p i l o t . It is designed to carry a payload of 3,750 pounds. The cargo compartment will accommodate the tt-ton truck, or the 37-mm AT gun, or the 75-mm Pack Howitzer, or the crawler tractor. Either one or two CG-4A gliders can be towed behind one C-47. feet The glider tow rope i s made of nylon - 300 to 350 long. Cost of the tow rope i s about $1.00 per foot. The glider is towed at speeds from 120 to 140 miles per hour. M xm m safe towing speed is 150 miles per hour. ai u The glider pilot i s a key man in glider operations. Safe landings are dependent to a large extent on his skill and good judgment. Glider landings are made at speeds as slow as pos s i b l e consistent with safety; this will approximate 65 miles per hour. The great tactical advantage of the glider i s i t s a b i l i t y to safely land concentrated loads from the air in r e l a t i v e l y restricted areas.

TROOP CARRIER AIRCRAFT

The C-4T airplane i s known as the *Woraorse" of the Army Air Forces; i t i s the a i r counterpart of the jeep. The C-47 carries paratroopers, tows gliders, lugs supplies; and evacuates c a s u a l t i e s . It i s a two*engine transport. It has seats for 27 men. The width of i t s cargo door i s 84H inches. Its normal useful load i s 4,900 pounds. It can carry a tt-ton truck, or a 105-mm howitzer 113* without disassembly. It can carry the 105-mm howitser 112 disassembled. The 2)6-ton cargo truck disassembled can be carried in two C-47's. Cruising speed of the C-47 i s 170 miles per hour. Maximum range w i t h n p fuel reserve .is 1660 miles. A s t r i p approximately 2,000 feet long i s required for the take-off and landing of the C-47. Normally each Troop Carrier Squadron- includes 16 C-47 airplanes and twice as, many cargo gliders. There are 256 C-47 "s in a Troop Carrier Wing. Cargo gliders now in use are the CQ-4A and CQ-13A. The CG-13A cargo compartment can accommodate the 105 m howitser M2 or the 1*4-ton 6 x 6 cargo truck without m disassembly.

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AIR

EVACUATION,

Through Air Evacuation, i f wounded, the l i v e s of thousands of soldiers have been saved, many that other wise would have been forfeited. Each transport that lands troops in combat carries one air trained nurse assisted by a non-commissioned technician to care for a return load of wounded sol d i e r s . Pay load each way. When used for air evacuation, a C-47 accommodates 18 stretchers in t r i p l e t i e r s . The plane i t s e l f i s convertible in a matter of eight minutes from a troop carrier to an ambulance plane. Morale of troops i s kept at a high level through knowledge that hospital isat$on i s available within a few hours from the front. Gliders have also been equipped with stretcher hold ers, and used for speedy evacuation. Newest development i s the use of "Snatch Pi<;k-up" of glider carrying wounded patients from isolated spots where plane could not land.

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Not*s

il*H*i*-C1?
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ENGR RkPRO SEC

HQ AIRBORNE CENTER
CAMP MACKALL N C
SEPT 1944

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