Court may not construe where the statute is clear.

Court may not construe a statute that is clears and free from doubt. When the law is clear, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application. Limitations on the power to construe: 1. Courts may not enlarge nor restrict statutes (doing so would be considered law making). (a) Courts may not revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislature (b) Courts may not rewrite the law to conform with what they think should be the law. (c) Courts may not interpret into the law a requirement which the law does not prescribe. 2. Courts must not be influenced by questions of wisdom Presumptions to aid construction In construing a statue, the court may properly rely on presumptions as to legislative intent in order to resolve doubts as to its correct interpretation. In the interpretation of the statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. As to words, phrases and provisions. Include presumptions that the legislature understood their meaning and intended their use, and used them in their ordinary and common meaning, and that every word, sentenced or provision has a purpose and is to be given some effect. When a statute is ambiguous, then the court may resort to Departure from literal interpretation. In such a case, the Statute must be interpreted in such a way that: Interpretation will give the statute efficacy Purpose will be achieved Absurdity and inconvenience will be avoided A statute is ambiguous when it is susceptible to two or more interpretations. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Natural and Commonly Understood Meaning As a general rule, words used in a statute are to be given their usual and commonly understood meaning, unless it is plain from the statute that a different meaning is intended. The word principally as used in the codal provision is not equivalent to exclusively so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled. (Alfon vs. Republic 97 SCRA 856) It is well settled that the word may is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term may be connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. May is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility.

The word used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning. Hence, the phrase may be promulgated should not be construed to mean shall or must. (Philippine Consumers Foundation vs. NTC 131 SCRA 200) Disjunctive and conjunctive words OR is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from each of the other things enumerated AND is a conjunction meaning together with joined with added to, linked to Technical Terms Words and phrases having a technical meaning are construed according to their technical sense, unless it is apparent that a different meaning was intended by the legislature. Language used Statutes using words of command, such as shall, must, ought, or should, or prohibition, such as cannot, shall not or ought not, are generally regarded as mandatory. The use of words of command or of prohibition indicates the legislative intent to make the law mandatory. It has been held that the intention of the legislature as to the mandatory or directory nature of particular statutory provision is determined primarily from the language thereof. Grammar The ordinary rules on grammar will be applied for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning of a statute, but they are not controlling when an intent in conflict therewith is disclosed, and must thereupon be disregarded so as to give effect to the legislative intention. Associated Words (Noscitur a sociis) In accordance with the rule or maxim of noscitur a sociis doubtful words and phrases used in statutes are construed in connection with, and their meaning is certained by reference to, the words and phrases with which they are associated. Doctrine of Ejusdem Generis Where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words, under the rule or maxim of construction known as ejusdem generis will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated, unless an intention to the contrary is clearly shown. When applicable? Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to, it is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Constitutional Convention Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution and does not taped jingles. (Mutuc vs COMELEC 36 SCRA 228) When not applicable? If the intent clearly appears from other parts of the law, and such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to the result which would be reached by the application of the rule of ejusdem generis, the latter must give way. (United States vs Santo Nino 13 Phil 141)

The rule of ejusdem generis does not apply to the definition of the term employer in the Social Security Law. That definition is sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities, not organized for profit. It includes the Catholic Charities and all religious and charitable institutions and organizations directly or indirectly operated by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. (Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Social Security Commission 1 SCRA 10) Express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others (Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius) When applicable? Generally, the maxim Expressio Unius est exclusio alterius, is applicable in the construction of statutes, where the intention of the lawmaking body is not otherwise clear and under such rule of construction, where a statute enumerates the subjects or things on which it is to operate, or the persons affected, or forbids certain things, it is to be construed as excluding from its effect all those not expressly mentioned. When not applicable? is merely an auxiliary rule of statutory construction which is not of universal application and not conclusive; it should be applied only as a means of discovering the legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest, and should never be permitted to defeat the plainly purpose of the legislature. When no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included and manifest injustice will follow by nit so including them, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, should not revoked. (People vs. Manantan 5 SCRA 684) Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other things not so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not invoked. (Primero vs. Court of Appeals 179 SCRA 543) Cases By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. We can also refer to historical background as well as to records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to determine, with more accuracy, if not precision, the intention of framers of the 1987 Constitution. (Sarmiento III vs Mison 156 SCRA 549) Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. (Centeno vs. Villalon-Pornillos 236 SCRA 197) Statute as a whole and Intrinsic Aids to Construction statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. The intent or the meaning of the statute should be ascertained from the statute takes as a whole.

Statutes must receive a reasonable construction, reference being had to their controlling purpose. One part is as important as the other.

Intrinsic aids, or those found in the printed page of the statute, and extrinsic aids, those extraneous facts and circumstances outside the printed page. Title The title may indicate the legislative extent or restrict the scope of the law, and a statute couched in a language of doubtful import will be construed to conform to the legislative intent as disclosed in its title.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Statutes prescribing jurisdictional requirements Statutes prescribing time to take action or appeal Statutes prescribing procedural requirements Election laws on conduct of election Election laws on qualification and disqualification Statutes prescribing qualifications for office Statutes relating to assessment of taxes Statutes concerning public auction sale

Reason why contemporaneous construction is given much weight: it comes from the particular branch of government called upon to implement the law thus construed these same people are the drafters of the law they interpret. Saving Clause A clause in the provision of law which operates to except from the effect of law what the clause provides, or to save something which would otherwise be lost. Must be construed in the light of the legislative intent. Proviso It is a clause engrafted on a preceding enactment for the purpose of restraining or modifying the enacting clause, or of excepting something from its operation which otherwise would have been within it, or excluding some possible ground of misrepresentation of it, as by extending it to cases not intended by the legislature to be brought within its purview. Its office is to limit the application of the enacting clause, section or provision of a statute; introduced by the word. Exception and proviso distinguished An exception differs from a proviso. An exception exempts something absolute from the operation of a statute, by express words in the enacting clause. A proviso defeats its operation conditionally Construction of the Constitution The language of the Constitution , as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Rule: Statutes must be construed in harmony with the Constitution. Construction of statute to harmonize with the Constitution All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging the unconstitutionality must prove its validity beyond a reasonable doubt; that the law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional. (Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union) Statutes in pari materia (relating to the same specific subject matter) must be construed together to attain national policy. Legislature is presumed to be aware of prior law. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, or have the same purpose or object, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter. The later statute may specifically refer to the prior statutes. The fact that no reference is made to the prior law does not mean that the two laws are not in pari materia. It is sufficient, in order that they may be considered in pari materia, that the two or more statute relate to the same specific subject matter. Two laws are not in pari materia if they refer to different specific matters, although they both fall under the same broad subject. Strict construction Strict construction is that construction according to the letter of a statute, which recognizes nothing that is not expressed, takes the language used in its exact meaning, and admits no equitable consideration. Examples:

Preamble That part of the statute written immediately after its title, which states the purpose, reason or justification for the enactment of a law. It is usually expressed in the form of whereas clauses. Context of the whole text The best source from which to ascertain the legislative intent is the statute itself the words, the phrases, the sentences, sections, clauses, provisions taken as a whole and in relation to one another. Punctuation marks Punctuation marks are aids of low degree; they are not parts of the statute nor the English language. Intent or spirit of law Legislative intent or spirit is the controlling factor, the influence most dominant if a statute needs construction. The intent of the law is that which is expressed in the words thereof, discovered in the four corners of the law and aided if necessary by its legislative history. Conflicting Provisions In considering conflicting provisions, the great object is to ascertain the legislative intent, The rule that the provision last in the time or arrangement prevails, while frequently followed, has been criticized and limited in its application. Context and Related Clauses The words, phrases and sentences of a statute are to be understood as used with due regard to the context, and in expounding one part of a statute resort should be had to every other part. It is the rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts. Mandatory Statutes A statute which commands either positively that something be done, or performed in a particular way, or negatively that something not be done, leaving the person concerned no choice on the matter except to obey. Contains words of command or prohibition. Uses: shall, must, ought, should; prohibitions such as cannot, shall not, ought not Examples: 1. Statutes conferring power 2. Statutes granting benefits

Directory Statutes Permissive or discretionary in nature and merely outlines the act to be done in such a way that no injury can result from ignoring it or that its purpose can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed and substantially the same result obtained. Uses: may 1. Examples: 2. Statutes prescribing guidance for officers 3. Statutes prescribing manner of judicial action 4. Statutes requiring rendition of decisions within prescribed period What are the Extrinsic aids to Construction? 1. Motives and opinions of Legislature or its members or of third persons 2. History and passage of the act 3. Legislative Debates and Reports of Committees or Commissions 4. Contemporaneous Construction 5. Executive Construction Extrinsic Aid to Construction In construing a statute, resort to extrinsic facts is permitted where its language is ambiguous, but is generally not permitted where the language is plain and unambiguous, although it has been held that even in such case consideration of persuasive evidence is not precluded. Where the intent does not decisively appear in the text of the provision as it admits of more than one construction, reliance may be made on extrinsic aids such as the records of the deliberations of the body that framed the law in order to clearly ascertain that intent. Legislative Debates It may be resorted to when there is doubt as to what a provision of a statute means. However, the views expressed by the legislators during deliberations of a bill as to the bills purpose are not controlling in the interpretation of the law. Legislative interpretation The legislature may provide an interpretation or declaration clause in a statue by they cannot limit or restrict the power granted to courts. 1. While legislative interpretation is not controlling, courts may resort to it to clarify ambiguity in the language. 2. such legislative interpretation is entitled of respect especially of the executive department has similarly construed the statute. Contemporaneous Construction The constructions placed upon statutes at the time of, or after, their enactment by the executive, legislature or judicial authorities, as well as those who, because of their involvement in the process of legislation, are knowledgeable of the intent and purpose of the law, such as draftsmen and bill sponsors.

1.

Penal statutes Rule: Penal or criminal laws are strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused

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3. 4.

5.
6.

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8. 9. 10. 11.

Statutes in derogation of fundamental rights Rule: Construction of laws must be adopted which would not diminish the peoples fundamental rights. Statute in derogation of sovereignty Rule: Statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state so that its sovereignty may be upheld. Statutes granting privileges Legislative grants Rule: Legislative grants are construed strictly in favor of the public and against the grantee. Naturalization laws Rule: Should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. Statutes imposing Liabilities, taxes and custom duties Rule: Must be construed in favor of persons sought to be subjected to their operation. Statutes granting tax exemptions Rule: Must be construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Statutes concerning the sovereign Statutes authorizing suits against the government Statutes prescribing formalities of will

Penal statutes strictly construed. Penal or criminal laws are strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused cannot be enlarged or extended by intendment, implication, or any equitable consideration. While statutes prescribing punishments or penalties should be extended further than their terms reasonably justify, this rule of strict construction is subordinate to the rule of reasonable, sensible construction having in view the legislative purpose and intent, and giving effect to the same. (People vs. Padilla 71 Phil 261) Reason why penal statutes are strictly construed. Law is tender in favor of the rights of an individual; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts. Prospective Statutes Operates upon facts or transactions that occur after the statute takes effect, one that looks and applies to the future. Example: 1. Penal statutes, generally 2. Statutes substantive in nature 3. Statutes affecting vested rights 4. Statutes affecting obligations of contracts 5. Repealing an amendatory acts Retroactive Statutes It is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability with respect to transactions or considerations already past. Creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past. Example: 1. Procedural laws 2. Curative statutes 3. Police power legislations Statutes that are given retroactive effect Procedural laws adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion.

2. If applying procedural laws retroactively would not be feasible or would work injustice. 3. If it would involve intricate problems of due process or impair independence of the court. Curative statutes Healing acts; cures defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations. Makes valid that which before the enactment if the statute was invalid. Rule: if the thing omitted or failed to be done and which constitutes the

defect sought to be remove or made harmless is something which the legislature might dispensed with by a previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one.

Amendment Legislature has the power to amend, subject to constitutional requirement, any existing law. Supreme court, in the exercise of its rule-making power or of its power to interpret the law, has no authority to amend or change the law Revision and Codification Generally: restating the existing laws into one statute in order to simplify complicated provisions. Construction to harmonize different provisions The different provisions of a revised statute or code should be read and construed together. Where there is irreconcilable conflict: that which is best in accord with the general plan or, in the absence of circumstances upon which to base a choice, that which is later in physical position, being the latest expression of legislative will, will prevail. What is omitted is deemed repealed When both intent and scope clearly evince the idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the prior act that are omitted from the revised act are deemed repealed. LATIN MAXIMS Expressio unius est exclusio alterius The express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Rule: Legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. They are opposite the doctrine of necessary implication. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. Rule: Principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. The rule does not apply where it is shown that the legislature did not intend to exclude the person, thing, object from the enumeration. If such legislative intent is clearly

Liberal construction Liberal constructions means such equitable construction as will enlarge of a statute to accomplish its intended purpose, carry out its intent, or promote justice. Liberal construction means that the words should receive a fair and reasonable interpretation, so as to attain the intent, spirit and purpose of the law. Examples: 1. Statutes granting taxing power 2. Statutes prescribing prescriptive period to collect taxes 3. Statutes imposing penalties for nonpayment of taxes 4. Habeas Corpus Rules 5. Probation Laws 6. Election laws Rule: Must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. 7. Amnesty proclamations 8. Statutes prescribing prescriptions of crimes 9. Adoption statutes 10. Veteran and pension laws 11. Rules of Court Penal statutes It refer to those laws by which punishments are imposed for violation or transgression of their provisions. Acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violation; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature and provide for their punishment.

The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws.

Remedial laws laws relative to remedies or confirmation of rights already existing. Administrative rule interpretative of a pre-existing statute and not declarative of certain rights with obligations is given retroactive effect as of the date of the effectivity if the statute Exceptions to the rule General rule: procedural laws are applicable to pending actions or proceedings Exceptions: 1. When statute expressly provides or by necessary implication

indicated, the court may supply the omission if to do so will carry out the clear intent of the legislature and will not do violence to its language. Index animi sermo est Speech is the index of intention. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sententia Relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise requires. Rule: In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, preferential and qualifying words and phrases must be applied only to their immediate or last antecedent, and not to the other remote or preceding words or association of words. Ejusdem Generis Of the same kind Rule: Where a statute describes things of particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic words will usually be limited to the things of a kindred nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statute to repel such inference. This principle is based on the proposition that had the legislature intended the general words to be used in their generic and unrestricted sense, it would not have enumerated the specific words. Noscitur a sociis Words construed with reference to accompanying or associated words. Rule: Where the law does not define a word used therein, it will be construed as having a meaning similar to that of words associated with or accompanied by it. A word, phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated. In Pari materia. Of the same matter. Rule: A statute should be construed as to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system.

The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on various motions and pleadings, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General. Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code Held: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim casus omisus can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. The application of the rule of casus omisus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive sense the term judge includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention of the Legislature did not exclude the justice of the peace from its operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice of peace in the enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic and broader term judge, including therein all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace. The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case for trial on the merits. US. v. Hart G.R. No. L-8327 (March 28, 1913) FACTS: Respondent was caught in a gambling house and was penalized under Act No. 519 which punishes every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support. The said portion of the law is divided into two parts, separated by the comma, separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying through the country without means of support. Though it was proven that Hart and the other Defendants had visible means of support, it was under the first part of the portion of law for which they were charged with. The prosecution persisted that the phrase without visible means of support was in connection to the second part of the said portion of Act No. 519, therefore was not a viable defense. ISSUE: How should the provision be interpreted? HELD: The construction of a statute should be based upon something more substantial than mere punctuation. If the punctuation gives it a meaning which is reasonable and is in apparent accord with legislative will, it may be as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words in the statute as thus punctuated. An argument based on punctuations alone is not conclusive and the court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give the act the effect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous and incorrect

punctuation marks, or inserting others when necessary. Inasmuch as defendant had, visible means of support and that the absence of such was necessary for the conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons and gambling houses, defendants are acquitted. Employees Club, Inc. v. China Banking Corporation G.R. No. 40188 (July 27, 1934) FACTS: Respondent Corporation contends that the order requires it to surrender the register of deeds of the City of Manila which is the duplicate of TCT No. 21192 so that the contract lease might be noted and entered in the corresponding records. They argue that the contract lease cannot be registered in the register of deeds because it is not a real right; and under the Civil Code and the Mortgage Law, only real rights can be registered. The only exceptions, which it does not harbor, are a term exceeding three years, rent to corresponding years paid in advance, or an express covenant requiring the lease to be registered. ISSUE: W/N contract lease under the Mortgage law is not a real right and not be registered. HELD: The property in question is NOT under the Mortgage law but under Act No. 496, or the Torrens system, Sec. 51 and 52. This act expressly provides that all interests must be registered in order to affect third persons, which includes the interest arising from the contract of lease in favor of the Respondent. The Spanish text of the law was relied upon by the Petitioner the Mortgage Law. But the English enacted by the Legislature, Act No. 496, should prevail. Escribano v. Avila G.R. No. L-30375 (September 12, 1978) FACTS: Congressman Salipada Pendatun of Cotobato, filed a complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong before the Court of First Instance (now the RTC) to Judge David Avila. Escribano questioned Judge Avilas authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the offense. He contended that the city fiscal of Cotobato is the only one empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation, pursuant of RA 4363 and Art. 360 of the RPC which does not empower the Court of First Issuance to conduct preliminary investigations of written defamations due to an amendment made for Art 360. ISSUE: Whether the Court of First Issuance is invested with the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel or whether that power is lodged exclusively in the city attorney of that city. HELD: Yes. The Court of First Issuance may conduct preliminary investigations because this power is not lodged exclusively in the city attorney. The enumeration in the law of the public officers and the courts that may conduct preliminary investigations was designed to divest the ordinary municipal court of that power but not to deprive the Court of First Instance of that same power. The power of the CFT to conduct a preliminary investigation is derived from the constitutional grant of power for a judge to hold a preliminary examination and to issue warrants of arrest and search warrants. What is important to remember is that preliminary investigations by the CFT is the exception to the rule and not the general rule. Jose Antonio Mapa Corporation v. Hon. Joker Arroyo and Labrador Development

Cases: (Swertihan na lang kung alin ung ma-include sa exam! Ang dami eh! Just defend your answers!)
People v. Manantan GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684) Facts: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant s plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989) FACTS: Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable in ten years. Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued to do so despite constant reminders by Labrador. The latter informed Mapa that the contracts to sell the lots were cancelled, but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the four contracts. Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of the lots, except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the government, within 3 years from the date of the contract. Petitioner contends that P.D. 957 requires Labrador to provide the facilities, improvements, and infrastructures for the lots, and other forms of development if offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans. ISSUE: W/N Clause 20 of the said contracts include and incorporate P.D. 957 through the doctrine of last antecedent, making the cancellation of the contracts of sale incorrect. HELD: No. Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to Clause 7 of the said contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of default payment from Mapa. P.D. 957 does not apply because it was enacted long after the execution of the contracts involved, and, other than those provided in Clause 20, no further written commitment was made by the developer. The words which are offered and indicated in the subdivision or condominium plans refer not only to other forms of development but also to facilities, improvements, and infrastructures. The word and is not meant to separate words, but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or a union. Centano v. Villalon-Pornillos G.R. No. 113092 (September 1, 1994) FACTS: In 1985, the officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay in Bulacan. Martin Centeno, chairman of the group, approached Judge Angeles, President of Tikay, and the latter solicited P 1,500. However, this solicitation was made without a permit from the DSWD and as a result, it was contended that Centeno violated P.D. 1564, which states Any person to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall secure a permit from the regional Office of the Department of Social services and Development. ISSUE: W/N the phrase charitable purposes in P.D. 1564 is meant to include religious purposes. HELD: No. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The 1987 Constitution treats the words charitable and religious separately and independently from each other. Since P.D. 1564 merely states that charitable or public welfare purposes need a permit from DSWD, this means that the framers of the law never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. The term charitable should be strictly construed to exclude solicitations for religious purposes. Moreover, since this is a criminal case, penal law must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. People v. Palmon G.R. No. L-2860 (May 11, 1950)

FACTS: Palmon was charged with serious physical injuries (prision correctional in med and max period 2 yrs, 4 mos. 1 day 6 yrs) before the CFI of Capiz. Before the arraignment of the accused, the judge motu proprio dismissed the case on the ground that under Sec. 87 of RA 296, the crime falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace. However, the solicitor general contended that CFI has jurisdiction. ISSUE: Which court has jurisdiction to try the case? HELD: Sec 44(f) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 confers original jurisdiction on the CFI over all criminal case in which the penalty provided is imprisonment for more than 6 months. Sec. 87 of the same act also confers original jurisdiction on the justice of the peace and the judges of municipal courts over all criminal cases relating to assaults where the intent to kill is not charged upon the trial. Hence, the CFI and justice of the peace courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the case. People v. Garcia No. L-2873 (February 28, 1950) FACTS: The lower court, ignoring the Appellants minority, sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor for the crime of robbery. RA 47 which amended Art. 80 of the RPC by reducing from 18 to 16 the age below which the Appellant has to be committed to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable institution, instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison, has given rise to the controversy. The Solicitor General believes that the amendment by implication has also amended par. 2 of Art. 68 of the RPC, which provides that when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. ISSUE: W/N the Appellant, being 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of Art. 68, par. 2 of the RPC. HELD: Yes. We find no irreconcilable conflict between Art. 68, par. 2, as it now stands and Art. 80 as amended. There is no incompatibility between granting Appellant of the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance and fixing at 16 the maximum age of persons who are to be placed in a reformatory institution. All parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to each and every part thereof, and that conflicting interest in the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded, unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language