NavigatingtheCurrentsofLegalRegimesandRealpolitik inEastAsiasMaritimeDomain

CarlyleA.Thayer

InternationalConferenceonCooperationfortheSafetyof NavigationinEastAsia:LegalArrangementandPoliticalImplications NationalInstituteofSouthChinaSeaStudies HaikouCity,HainanIsland,PeoplesRepublicofChina November1718,2011

NavigatingtheCurrentsofLegalRegimesandRealpolitik inEastAsiasMaritimeDomain
CarlyleA.Thayer* Abstract: East Asias maritime domain is becoming more crowded and contested due to increased commercial traffic and naval modernisation. Good order at sea is increasingly undermined by weak legal regimes and interstate rivalry. This paper discusses the political implications of two major issues: (1) contending interpretations of the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, particularly as it applies to military activities in Exclusive Economic Zones and (2) current trends in naval modernisation, especially the expansion of submarinefleetsandnewmilitarytechnologiesthatraisetheriskofarmedconfrontation.The paper argues that safety of navigation is threatened in the near term by state behaviour in disputed waters and states Exclusive Economic Zones. The paper also argues that safety of navigationisthreatenedinthelongtermbytheunderminingofinternationallegalregimesby interstate rivalry in the maritime domain. The paper concludes with proposals to strengthen internationallegalregimesandmoderateinterstaterivalry.

Introduction
The theme of this conference is charting a cooperative mechanism for the safety of navigation in East Asia: legal arrangements and political implications. This paper focusesontheissueofnavigationinEastAsianwaters:politicalimplications. Thesealinesofcommunication(SLOC)thatpassfromEastAsiathroughtheSouthChina SeaandStraitofMalaccatotheIndianOceanarethesecondmosttraffickedsealanes in the world. According to Malaysias Prime Minister, [e]very year, almost 100,000 shipstraveldowntheStraitsofMalacca,andmorethanaquarteroftheworldstraded goods pass through the South China Sea.1 Malaysias Defence Minister, citing figures from his countrys Marine Department, has observed that the Straits of Malacca handled over 74,00 vessel movements in 2010, carrying 30% of the worlds sea trade, and a quarter of all oil shipments (estimated at eleven million barrels) per day.2 The value of goods shipped thought the South China Sea is currently estimated at US $5 trillionannually,includingUS$1.2trillionintradewiththeUnitedStates.3 *EmeritusProfessor,TheUniversityofNewSouthWalesattheAustralianDefenceForceAcademy, Canberra.Hemaybecontactedatc.thayer@adfa.edu.au.
DatoSriNajibTunRazak, PrimeMinisterofMalaysia,KeynoteAddresstotheTenthIISSAsianSecurity SummitTheShangrilaDialogue,Singapore,June3,2011.
1

Dato Seri Dr. Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, Minister of Defense, Malaysia, Responding to New Maritime Security Threats, Presentation to the Tenth IISS Asian Secuirty Summit The Shangrila Dialogue, Singapore,June5,2011. AdmiralRobertWillard,CommanderUSPacificCommandcitedbyPaulEckert,NearPacificsummitsite, reminderofUSsecurityrole,Reuters,November10,2011.
3

The major economies of East Asia, including China, Japan and South Korea, are vitally dependentonglobaltradecarriedviasafeandsecureSLOCs.JapanandSouthKoreaare especially dependent on oil imports, while Chinas dependency israpidly rising from a lowbase.4 There are no observable threats by state actors to the safety of the large number of commercial vessels that ply these waters. The main threat to the safety of navigation comes from piracy.5 Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the littoral states along the maritime passageway through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, have conducted coordinated antipiracy patrols since 2004. In addition, these three states, along with Thailand,conductanaerialreconnaissanceprogramknownasEyesintheSky.6Alsoin 2004, seventeen regional states reached agreement on a voluntary arrangement to provide information on piracy, known as ReCAAP or Regional Cooperation Agreement onCombatingPiracyandArmedRobberyAgainstShips. Asaresultoftheseeffortspiracyattacksfellfromapeakof75in2000to38in2004,10 in2005andahandfulthereafter.OfparticularconcernistheriseofpiracyintheSouth ChinaSea.TheInternationalMaritimeBureaureported13casesofpiracyin2009,30in 2010 and 41 by July 2011.7 A different set of figures gathered by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) reveals that incidents of piracy and armed robbery increasedfrom406in2009to489in2010.Therewere214incidentinthefirstquarter of 2011 alone. The IMOs figures also highlighted the increase in piracy in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, the threat of piracy in Southeast Asia appears contained and wellbelowthelevelsofpiracyoffthecoastofSomalia.8 Why then has theissue of safety of navigationin EastAsian waters become a current political issue? The answer lies in longstanding geostrategic and political differences betweenChinaandtheUnitedStatesthatboiledoverin2010.USofficialsallegedthat
4

Japan imports 75 percent of its oil by sea; Peter Dutton and John Garofano, China Undermines MaritimeLaws,FarEasternEconomicReview,April2009,45.

Sam Bateman, Joshua Ho and Jane Chan, Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia, RSIS Policy Paper (Singapore:S.RajaratnamSchoolofInternationalStudies,NanyangTechnologicalUniversity,April2009), 1720.
6

JoshuaH.Ho,TheSecurityofSeaLanesinSoutheastAsia,AsianSurvey,46(4),July/August2006,571 572.

BrittanyDamoraandEvanJendrick,BraceforasurgeinSoutheastAsianpiracy,TheJapanTimes,July 6,2001.

MaryGeorge,CanaLimitedPurposeMaritimeandAirDefenceIdentificationZonebeEstablishedover the South China Sea?, Paper presented to 3rd International Workshop on the South China Sea, co sponsoredbytheVietnamLawyersAssociationandDiplomaticAcademyofVietnam,Hanoi,November3 5,2011,36.

ChinaraisedtheSouthChinaSeatoacoreinterestandthisthreatenedUSaccessto theglobalcommonsorthehighseas.9 AccordingtoEdwardWong,theBeijingbasedcorrespondentforTheNewYorkTimes:

In March [2010], Chinese officials told two visiting senior Obama administration officials, Jeffrey A. BaderandJamesB.Steinberg,thatChinawouldnottolerateanyinterferenceintheSouthChinaSea, nowpartofChinascoreinterestofsovereignty,saidanAmericanofficialinvolvedinChinapolicy.It wasthefirsttimetheChineselabeledtheSouthChinaSeaacoreinterest,onparwithTaiwanand Tibet,theofficialsaid.10

The Chinese officials were identified as State Counselor Dai Bingguo and Assistant MinisterofForeignAffairsCuiTiankai.Later,SecretaryofStateHillaryClintondisclosed thatatthe2ndU.S.ChinaStrategicandEconomicDialogueinBeijing(May2425,2010) the Chinese stated they viewed the South China Sea as a core interest. In Secretary Clintonswords:
AndwhenChinafirsttoldusatameetingoftheStrategicandEconomicDialoguethattheyviewed theSouthChinaSeaasacoreinterest,Iimmediatelyrespondedandsaid,Wedon'tagreewiththat. Sotheywereonnoticethatiftheywere Question:WasthatDaiBingguothatsaidthattoyou? Yes, yeah. So if they were in the process of extending their efforts to claim and control to the detriment of international law, freedom of navigation, maritime security, the claims of their neighbors,thatwasaconcerningmatter.Andtherefore,weworkedwithalotoftheASEANcountries whoaredirectlyimpactedand12ofusraiseditatheASEANRegionalForumlastJulytomakeitclear thatissueslikethathavetoberesolvedinaccordancewiththeruleoflaw.11

During 2010, US officials repeatedly pressed the argument in multilateral forums that the United States had a national interest in freedom of navigation. For example, SecretaryofDefenseRobertGates,speakingattheShangrilaDialogueinSingaporein June,calledforopen,transparent,andequalaccesstotheglobalcommon,including the maritime commons, for security, for tradeand commerce, and free passage. He thenpointedlydirectedhisremarkstotheSouthChinaSea:
Inthisrespect,theSouthChinaSeaisanareaofgrowingconcern.Thisseaisnotonlyvitaltothose directly bordering it, but to all nations with economic and security interests in Asia. Our policy is clear: it is essential that stability, freedom of navigation, and free and unhindered economic developmentbemaintained.Wedonottakesidesonanycompetingsovereigntyclaims,butwedo opposetheuseofforceandactionsthathinderfreedomofnavigation.Weobjecttoanyeffortto

Foradetailedcriticalexaminationofthecoreinterestissuesee:MichaelD.Swaine,ChinasAssertive Behavior,PartOne:OnCoreInterests,ChinaLeadershipMonitorNo.34,2011,125.
10 9

EdwardWong,ChineseMilitarySeekstoExtendItsNavalPower,TheNewYorkTimes,April23,2010. BaderisAsiaDirectorattheNationalSecurityCouncil;SteinbergistheDeputySecretaryofState.Chinas thirdcoreinterestisXinjiang.

InterviewwithGregSheridanofTheAustralian,HillaryRodhamClinton,SecretaryofState,Melbourne, Australia,November8,2010.

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intimidate U.S. corporations or those of any nation engaged in legitimate economic activity. All parties must work together to resolve differences through peaceful, multilateral efforts consistent withcustomaryinternationallaw.The2002DeclarationofConduct[sic]wasanimportantstepinthis directionandwehopethatconcreteimplementationofthisagreementwillcontinue.12

ThismessagewasrepeatedbySecretaryofStateHillaryClintonatthe17thmeetingof theAssociationofSoutheastAsianNationsRegionalForum(ASEANRegionalForumor ARF).SecretaryClintontoldreporters:

The United States, like every other nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asias maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea. We sharetheseinterestswithnotonlyASEANmembersandASEANRegionalForumparticipantsbutwith othermaritimenationsandthebroaderinternationalcommunity. The United States supports a collaborative, diplomatic process by all claimants for resolving the variousterritorialdisputeswithoutcoercion.Weopposetheuseorthreatofforcebyanyclaimant. WhiletheUnitedStatesdoesnottakesidesonthecompetingterritorialdisputesoverlandfeatures intheSouthChinaSea,webelieveclaimantsshouldpursuetheirterritorialclaimandthecompany [sic] and rights to maritime space in accordance with the UN convention on the law of the sea. Consistentwithcustomaryinternationallaw,legitimateclaimstomaritimespaceintheSouthChina Seashouldbederivedsolelyfromlegitimateclaimstolandfeatures. The U.S. supports the 2002ASEANChinadeclaration on conduct ofparties in the South ChinaSea. We encourage the parties to reach agreement on a full code of conduct. The U.S. is prepared to facilitateinitiativesandconfidencebuildingmeasuresconsistentwiththedeclaration.Becauseitisin theinterestofallclaimantsandthebroaderinternationalcommunityforunimpededcommerceto proceed under lawful conditions. Respect for the interests of the international community and responsibleeffortstoaddresstheseunresolvedclaimsandhelpcreatetheconditionsforresolution ofthedisputesandaloweringofregionaltensions.13

The United States also used the inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Defence Ministers MinisterialMeetingwithitseightdialoguepartners(ADMMPlus)torestateUSpolicyon freedom of navigation and the South China Sea. Secretary Gates enunciated four principles essential to regional peace and stability: free and open commerce, a just internationalorderthatemphasizesrightsandresponsibilitiesandfidelitytotheruleof law, open access by all to the global commons (sea, air space and cyberspace), and resolutionofconflictwithouttheuseofforce.HethenframedUSpolicytowardsthe SouthChinaSeawiththesewords:
Disagreementsoverterritorialclaimsandtheappropriateuseofthemaritimedomainappeartobea growingchallengetoregionalstabilityandprosperity. Onthatnote,weareencouragedtoseeclaimantnationsintheSouthChinaSeamakinginitialsteps todiscussthedevelopmentofafullcodeofconduct,inlinewiththe2002ASEANDeclarationonthe

Dr.RobertM.Gates,SecretaryofDefence,UnitedStates,StrengtheningSecurityPartnershipsinthe AsiaPacific,PresentationtotheFirstPlenarySession,the9thIISSAsianSecuritySummit,TheShangriLa Dialogue,Singapore,5June2010.IISSisanacronymforInternationalInstituteofStrategicStudies. HillaryRodmanClinton,SecretaryofState,RemarksatPressAvailability,NationalConvention Center, Hanoi,July23,2010.

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ConductofParties.Weapplaudthismultilateralapproachandwestandreadytohelpfacilitatesuch initiatives. The U.S. position on maritime security remains clear: We have a national interest in freedom of navigation; in unimpeded economic development and commerce; and in respect for international law.Wealsobelievethatcustomaryinternationallaw,asreflectedintheUNConventiononLawof theSea,providesclearguidanceontheappropriateuseofthemaritimedomain,andrightsofaccess to it. By adhering to this guidance, we can ensure that all share equal and open access to internationalwaterways. The United States has always exercised our rights and supported the rights of others to transit through, and operate in, international waters. This will not change, nor will our commitment to engageinactivitiesandexercisestogetherwithouralliesandpartners.14

Chinas response to these US policy statements has been to assert that it will uphold international law including freedom of navigation. For example, Geng Yansheng, spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Defense, responded to Secretary Clintons remarks by stating, China opposes the internationalization of the South China Sea issue.Atthesametime,Chinawill,inaccordancewiththerequirementsofinternational law,respectthefreedomofrelevantcountriestoconductnavigationandflightsonthe South China Sea as compatible with the requirement of international law.15 Chinese officialsalsonotethatnostateisthreateningsafetyofnavigation. Thequestionofsafetyofnavigation,however,arisesfromthefundamentallydifferent viewsheldbyChinaandtheUnitedStatesoverhowtointerpretinternationallawand the freedom of navigation provisions in the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea(UNCLOS).Thenextsectiondiscussesthisissue.

UNCLOSandFreedomofNavigation
UNCLOS is an international treaty that embodies a compromise between the rights of coastal states and maritime powers. China has acceded to UNCLOS, the United States hasnot.Article310oftheConventionpermitsstatestomakedeclarationsregardingthe applicationofUNCLOSatthetimeofsigning,ratifyingoraccedingtotheconvention.In 1996Chinaissuedadeclarationthatstated[t]hePeoplesRepublicofChinashallenjoy sovereignrightsandjurisdictionoveranexclusiveeconomiczoneof200nauticalmiles and the continental shelf.16 China also opted out of the UNCLOS dispute settlement
U.S.SecretaryofDefenseRobertGatesRemarksatASEANDefenseMinistersMeetingPlus8inHanoi, October12,2010. Tao Shelan and YingNi, Chinese Military Responds to U.S. Secretary of StatesStatements on South China Sea: [We] Oppose Internationalization of South China Sea Issue, Zhongguo Xinwen She News Agency,Beijing,inChinese,July30,2010. Eric A. McVadon, The Reckless and the Resolute: Confrontation in the South China Sea, China Security,5(2),Spring2009,13(note10).
16 15 14

mechanism for matters related to maritime boundary delimitation.17 The US Navy has stated that as a matter of policy it will adhere to the provisions of UNCLOS in its operationseventhoughtheUnitedStateshasnotaccededtotheConvention. UNCLOSestablishesaseriesofmaritimezones,includingtheterritorialsea,contiguous zone, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf.18 The key legal issue between China and the United States relates to foreign military activities in a states EEZ.19 The US argues that the EEZ is part of international waters and UNCLOS preservestherightstofreedomonnavigationandoverflight.20Inotherwords,UNCLOS doesnotprohibitmilitaryactivities,suchashydrographicandmilitarysurveys,thatare nonaggressiveanddoneinpreparationforselfdefense.21RaulPedrozo,forexample, argues that oceanographic surveys, underwater surveillance, hydrographic surveys, missile tracking and acoustic surveys carried out by the US Navys Special Mission Program are not subject to coastal state jurisdiction or control in the EEZ and are sanctioned under international law.22 The US also argues that the deployment of US Navy vessels in EEZs does not interfere with environmental protection measures by coastalstatesandthattheattempttousesuchdomesticlegislationtoconstrainmilitary activitiesisnotsupportedbyinternationallaw.23
EricA.McVadon,TheRecklessandtheResolute:ConfrontationintheSouthChinaSea,ChinaSecurity, 5(2), Spring 2009, 23 and Marianna Brungs, VietnamChina Relations on Maritime Borders, Europe ChinaResearchandAdviceNetwork,September2011,7.
18 17

PeterA.Dutton,ChartingaCourse:USChinaCooperationatSea,ChinaSecurity,5(1),Winter2009, 13.

For background see: Mark J. Valencia, Foreign Military Activities in Asean EEZs: Conflict Ahead?, NBR SpecialReportNo.27(Seattle:TheNationalBureauofAsianresearch,May2011).
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19

The term international waters is not used in UNCLOS. UNCLOS refers to the high seas. See: Mark Valencia,TheImpeccableIncident:TruthandConsequences,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009,23andJi Guoxing,TheLegalityoftheImpeccableIncident,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009,17.

EricA.McVadon,TheRecklessandtheResolute:ConfrontationintheSouthChinaSea,ChinaSecurity, 5(2), Spring 2009, 2. For the argument to the contrary see: Ji Guoxing, The Legality of the Impeccable Incident,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009,19. Raul(Pete)Pedrozo,CoastalStateJurisdictionoverMarineDataCollectionintheExclusiveEconomic Zone, in Peter Dutton, ed., Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons (Newport, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval WarCollege,2010),2336.Ontherightofoverflightsee:AndrewS.Williams,AerialReconnaissanceby MilitaryAircraftinheExclusiveEconomicZone,inPeterDutton,ed.,MilitaryActivitiesintheEEZ:AU.S. ChinaDialogueonSecurityandInternationalLawintheMaritimeCommons(Newport,RI:ChinaMaritime StudiesInstitute,U.S.NavalWarCollege,2010),4963. JamesKraska,ResourcesRightsandEnvironmentalProtectioninheExclusiveEconomicZone,inPeter Dutton,ed.,MilitaryActivitiesintheEEZ:AU.S.ChinaDialogueonSecurityandInternationalLawinthe MaritimeCommons(Newport,RI:ChinaMaritimeStudiesInstitute,U.S.NavalWarCollege,2010),7598.
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21

Chinaarguesthatmilitarysurveysfallunderthecategoryofmarinescientificresearch and the coastal state has the right under UNCLOS to adopt domestic legislation regulating such activity.24 China further argues that UNCLOS requires that states exercise due regard for the interest of coastal states and must be for peaceful purposes.25InChinasview,USmilitaryactivitiesmaybeviewedashostile(andillegal) becausetheyareintendedtogatherinformationthatarenotforpeacefulpurposes(i.e., theycouldbeusedtoprepareforwar).26 Thislegalargumentiscloudedbecause,asChineseandUSlegalspecialistsagree,many key terms in UNCLOS are either not defined or illdefined. Dutton and Garofano, for example, point out that the terms hydrographic surveys and marine scientific researcharenotdefinedinUNCLOS.27JiGuoxingconcedesthattheissueofmilitary and informationgathering activities in the EEZ is an unspecified grey area in the Convention.28 Since1992Chinahasenactedagrowinglistofdomesticlawsandregulationstosupport itsjurisdictionoveritsmaritimedomain.29In1992itadoptedtheLawontheTerritorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone that claimed sovereignty over all of the islands in the SouthChinaSea.In1998Chinaadvanceditjurisdictionalauthorityovernearlyallofthe South China Sea through the adoption of the Law on Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf. Article 14 of the law asserts Chinas historical rights over the maritime area. China also has issued Regulations of the Peoples Republic of China on the Management of Foreignrelated Marine Scientific Research to regulate foreign
YuZhirong,JurisprudentialAnalysisofrheU.S.NavysMilitarySurveysintheExclusiveEconomicZones ofCoastalCountries,inPeterDutton,ed.,MilitaryActivitiesintheEEZ:AU.S.ChinaDialogueonSecurity and International Law in the Maritime Commons (Newport, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. NavalWarCollege,2010),3748;WuJilu,TheConceptofMarineScientificResearch,inPeterDutton, ed.,MilitaryActivitiesintheEEZ:AU.S.ChinaDialogueonSecurityandInternationalLawintheMaritime Commons(Newport,RI:ChinaMaritimeStudiesInstitute,U.S.NavalWarCollege,2010),6573andXue Guifang,SurveysandResearchActivitiesinheEEZ,inPeterDutton,ed.,MilitaryActivitiesintheEEZ:A U.S.China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons (Newport, RI: China MaritimeStudiesInstitute,U.S.NavalWarCollege,2010),89105. JiGuoxing,TheLegalityoftheImpeccableIncident,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009,18andPeterA. Dutton,ChartingaCourse:USChinaCooperationatSea,ChinaSecurity,5(1),Winter2009,23(note21). Ji Guoxing, The Legality of the Impeccable Incident, China Security, 5(2), Spring 2009, 1719 and PeterA.Dutton,ChartingaCourse:USChinaCooperationatSea,ChinaSecurity,5(1),Winter2009,13 14. Peter Dutton and John Garofano, China Undermines Maritime Laws, Far Eastern Economic Review, April2009,456.
28 29 27 26 25 24

JiGuoxing,TheLegalityoftheImpeccableIncident,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009,19.

Peter Dutton and John Garofano, China Undermines Maritime Laws, Far Eastern Economic Review, April2009,4546andMarkValencia,TheImpeccableIncident:TruthandConsequences,ChinaSecurity, 5(2),Spring2009,24.

military surveys in its EEZ. In 2002 China enacted a law to prohibit surveillance or surveyingactivitiesinitsEEZwithoutpriorpermission. Since1979theUnitedStateshasconductedaFreedomofNavigationprogramdesigned tochallengecoastalstatesthatadoptpracticesatvariancewiththeUSinterpretationof UNCLOS. Specifically, the US challenges the right of coastal states to regulate military activityintheirEEZsbydeliberatelysendingmilitaryshipsintotheseareas. Todayoversixtystateshaveassertedsomeformofrestrictionovershipstransitingtheir EEZs, including requiring prior permission to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance activities. Among the members of the ARF the following states fall into this category: Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Philippines,SriLanka,ThailandandVietnam.30OnlyChinahasphysicallychallengedthe USinitsassertionoffreedomofnavigation;andbecauseofthistheissueofsafetyof navigationofmilitaryvesselsinEEZshasbecomeapoliticalissue. In addition to differences between China and the United States, there are also differences between China and the South China Sea littoral states Vietnam, the Philippines,MalaysiaandBrunei.EachofthefourSoutheastAsianstateshavedeclared Exclusive Economic Zones under the provisions of UNCLOS and have asserted sovereigntyovertheresourcesinthisarea.TheEEZsaredeterminedbybaselinesalong theshoreline.Vietnamhasmadeanexcessiveclaimforitssoutheastcoastbaseline,and the Philippines has drawn excessive baselinesaround a group of islands in the Spratly archipelagowhichitcallsKalayaanIslandGroup(KIG).31 China, on the other hand, claims indisputable sovereignty over the islands and adjacentwatersintheSouthChinaSeaonthebasisofhistoricrights.InMay2009China officiallylodgedamapwiththeUNCommissionontheLimitsoftheContinentalShelf (CLSC). This map depicted nine dash lines forming a ushape along the coasts of the Southeast Asian littoral states. This line encircles approximately eighty percent of the maritimearea.Chinahasnotclarifiedthelegalbasisonwhichitsclaimsarebasedand international legal experts dismiss Chinas map as having no standing in international law.32 Nevertheless, China has taken increasingly assertive action to enforce its claimed jurisdiction in the South China Sea. There are two aspects of this. The first is Chinas
StuartKaye,FreedomofNavigationintheIndoPacificRegion,PapersinAustralianMaritimeAffairsNO. 22 (Canberra: Sea Power Centre Australia, 2008), 812; see also: Mark Valencia, The Impeccable Incident:TruthandConsequences,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009,24andJiGuoxing,TheLegalityof theImpeccableIncident,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009,19.
31 32 30

ChinatoohasdrawnexcessivebaselinesaroundtheParacelIslands.

Erik Franckx and Marco Benetar, Dotted Lines in the South China Sea: Fishing for (Legal) Clarity, in TranTruongThuy,ed.,TheSouthChinaSea:TowardsaRegionofPeace,SecurityandCooperation(Hanoi: TheGioiPublishers,2011),211231;seealsoPeterDutton,Introduction,inPeterDutton,ed.,Military ActivitiesintheEEZ:AU.S.ChinaDialogueonSecurityandInternationalLawintheMaritimeCommons (Newport,RI:ChinaMaritimeStudiesInstitute,U.S.NavalWarCollege,2010),47.

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annualimpositionofaunilateralfishingbanfromMaytoAugustintheSouthChinaSea abovetwelvedegreesnorthnorthlatitude.Thesecondaspectinvolvesconfrontations mainlybetweenChinesecivilianmaritimeenforcementshipsandoilexplorationvessels operating in disputed waters. Chinese naval ships have been involved in incidents on occasion.Thus,inadditiontosafetyofnavigationissuesinvolvingmilitaryships,there are also safety of navigation issues related to civilian fishing and commercial vessels operatingindisputedwaters.Theseissuesarediscussedinthefollowingsection.

SafetyofNavigationinEastAsia
There are three sets of safety of navigation issues related to East Asian waters: (1) military activities in EEZs, (2) fishing activities in disputed waters, and (3) commercial activities in disputed waters. Safety of navigation refers to both ships at sea and over flightbyaircraft.

MilitaryActivitiesinEEZs
PerhapsthemostnotableincidentrelatedtoforeignmilitaryactivitiesinastatesEEZ tookplaceinApril2001whentheChinesepilotofaJ811fighteraircraftcollidedwitha US Navy EP3 signals intelligence aircraft in the airspace above Chinas EEZ off Hainan island. The Chinese plane crashed killing its pilot and the EP3 was forced to make an emergency landing on Hainan. This incident occurred because the Chinese pilot maneuveredhisplaneinadangerousmannerindisregardforthesafetyoftheEP3. According to Mark Valencia, between 2002 and 2009 China recorded at least 200 incidentsinvolvingUSvesselsenteringitsEEZtocollectintelligencewithoutpermission. InthevastmajorityofcasesChinaavoideddirectconfrontations.33Butinthefourcases belowChinareactedinanassertiveifnotaggressivemannerendangeringthesafetyof navigation(andthusfreedomofnavigation)oftheUSshipsinvolved. Case 1. Since 2002, the USNS Bowditch, an oceanographic survey ship, has been repeatedly harassed by Chinese ships as it operated in Chinas EEZ in the Yellow, East ChinaandSouthChinaSeas.34 Case 2. On March 4, 2009, the USNS Victorious, an ocean surveillance vessel, was harassed in the Yellow Sea not only by a Chinese Bureau of Fisheries vessel but by a Chinese Navy maritimepatrol aircraft. The fishery vessel illuminated the bridge ofthe USNS Victorious with a highintensity light and in the evening crossed the bow of the USNSVictoriousatclosedistancewithoutwarning.Themaritimeaircraftmaderepeated lowaltitudepassesovertheUSNSVictorious.
33

MarkValencia,TheImpeccableIncident:TruthandConsequences,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009, 24. MarkValencia,TheImpeccableIncident:TruthandConsequences,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009, 23.

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Case3.InFebruaryMarch2009,theUnitedStatesdispatchedtheUSNSImpeccableto conductmilitaryscientificresearchrelatedtoChinesesubmarineactivityoperatingfrom Sanya Naval Base.35 The USNS Impeccable was reportedly operating 75 miles south of Hainan when, on March 5, a Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) frigate crossed its bow at a range of approximately 100 yards without first making radio contact. Two hours later a Chinese Y12 aircraft repeatedly flew over the USNS Impeccable at low altitude. Then the PLAN frigate crossed Impeccable's bow again, at a range of approximately400500yards. OnMarch7,aPLANintelligencecollectionshipcontactedtheImpeccableoverbridge tobridgeradioandinformeditscaptainthathisshipsoperationswereillegalandthe Impeccableshouldleavetheareaorsuffertheconsequences.36Onthefollowingday, fiveChineseships shadowedtheImpeccable,includingaBureauofMaritimeFisheries Patrol boat, a State Oceanographic Administration vessel, a Chinese Navy ocean surveillanceship,andtwosmallChineseflaggedtrawlers. The trawlers closed on the Impeccable, coming within fifteen meters waving Chinese flags,andorderingtheImpeccabletoleavethearea.Whenonetrawlermovedcloserto the Impeccable it was sprayed with water from its fire hose. The Impeccable then radioed the Chinese vessels and requested safe passage out of the area. The two Chinese trawlers then attempted to obstruct the Impeccable by stopping abruptly in frontofitanddroppingdebrisinthewater.TheImpeccablewasforcedtoexecutean emergencyfullstopinordertoavoidacollision.AstheImpeccableattemptedtodepart the crew of one of the Chinese trawlers used a grappling hook to try to snag the Impeccable'stowedsonararray(SURTASS). TheUSDefenseDepartmentrespondedtotheUSNSImpeccableincidentbydispatching aguidedmissiledestroyertoaccompanytheshiponitsnextvoyage.37Tensionsoverthe
Forthemostdetailedandcomprehensiveaccountconsult:JonathanG.Odom,TheTrueLiesofthe ImpeccableIncident:WhatReallyHappened,WhoDisregardedInternationalLaw,andWhyEveryNation (OutsideofChina)ShouldbeConcerned,MichiganStateJournalofInternationalLaw,18(3),2010,142. Forarangeofviewssee:EricA.McVadon,TheRecklessandtheResolute:ConfrontationintheSouth ChinaSea,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009,115;JiGuoxing,TheLegalityoftheImpeccableIncident, China Security, 5(2), Spring 2009, 1621; Mark Valencia, The Impeccable Incident: Truth and Consequences, China Security, 5(2), Spring 2009, 2228; Mark J. Valencia, Not an Impeccable Argument, Nautilus Policy Forum Online, April 1, 2009; and Peter Dutton and John Garofano, China UnderminesMaritimeLaws,FarEasternEconomicReview,April2009,4447. ForadiscussionofthelegalpositionsheldbytheUnitedStatesandChinasee:SamBateman,Clashes atSea:WhenChinesevesselsharassUSShips,RSISCommentaries,March13,2009;PatrickJ.Neher,Raul A.PedrozoandJ.AshleyRoach,InDefenseofHighSeasFreedoms,RSISCommentaries,March24,2009; and B. A. Hamzah, EEZs: US Must Unclench its Fist First, RSIS Commentaries, April 9, 2009. The RSIS CommentariesareproducedbytheS.RajaratnamSchoolofInternationalStudies,NanyangTechnological UniversityinSingapore. MarkValencia,TheImpeccableIncident:TruthandConsequences,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009, 25.
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USNSImpeccableincidentabatedonMarch20 whenChinacalledanendtoitsmilitary standoff.Nofurtherincidentsofthisnaturehavebeenreporteddespitethefactthat theUSstilldeploystheUSNSImpeccableoffHainanandUSreconnaissanceaircraftstill flythroughChinasairspace.Thishasledsomeregionalspecialiststospeculatethatthe USandChinahavequietlyworkedoutamodusvivendi. Case4.ThestandoffbetweentheUSNSImpeccableandPLANvesselswasfollowedby thecollisionofaPLANsubmarinewiththesonararraytowedbythedestroyerUSSJohn S. McCain on June 11, 2009. The USS McCain was one of three U.S. warships participating in combined exercises with six Southeast Asian navies in waters off the Philippines.
Table1 SelectedMaritimeIncidentsInvolvingChinaandJapan,200411 Date
July2004 Sept.2005 Sept.2010 April2010

Location
EastChinaSea EastChinaSea SenkakuIslands* MiyaKoStrait

Incident
APLANshipsmanoeuvredindangerousproximitytoaJapanese surveyship A Chinese warship targeted its main gun at a Japanese surveillanceaircraftnearadisputedoilgasfield AChinesefishingboatdeliberatelyramsaJapaneseCoastGuard patrolboat APLANflotillapassesthroughMiyakoStraitwithoutwarning,a ChinesehelicopterbuzzesaJapaneseMSDFshipatrangeof90 metres JapaneseF15fightersinterceptChineseY8surveillances PLANhelicoptersbuzzaJapanesedestroyer China State Oceanographic Administration helicopter buzzes Japanesedestroyeratrangeof70metresneardisputedgasfield

March2011 March2011 March2011

SenkakuIslands SenkakuIslands EastChinaSea

*NamedDiaoyuIslandbyChina SOURCE:RoryMedcalfandRaoulHeinrichs,CrisisandConfidence:MajorPowersandMaritimeSecurityin IndoPacificAsia(Sydney:LowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy,June2011),9.

ForanumberofyearsChinaitselfhasoperatedsurveyshipsandintelligencevesselsin the EEZs of other states.38 In 2000, for example, Japan claimed that a Chinese information gathering ship circled Japan. The following year a PLAN missile
EricA.McVadon,TheRecklessandtheResolute:ConfrontationintheSouthChinaSea,ChinaSecurity, 5(2),Spring2009,34.ForadetailedaccountofChineseactivitiesinwatersclaimedbyJapansee:Peter Dutton, Scouting, Signaling, and Gatekeeping: Chinese Naval Operations in Japanese Waters and the InternationalLawImplications,ChinaMaritimeStudiesNo.2(Newport:RI:U.S.NavalWarCollege,2009).
38

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observation support, survey and research ship reportedly sailed in waters off the east coast of Japan gathering information during the passage opposite Hamamatsu to Tsushima. Table 1 above sets out the details of other selected incidents. Japan may represent a specialcasebecauseChinaclaimsthewatersareindispute.39Infact,Chineseshipshave enteredbothdisputedandundisputedJapanesewatersintheEastChinaSea.Thedata in Table 1, however, reveal a pattern of unsafe and dangerous navigation by Chinese boatsandaircraft.

FishingActivitiesinDisputedWaters
A second set of safety of navigation issues arises from Chinas handling of its annual fishing ban in disputed waters of the South China Sea. This section reviews developmentsbetweenChinaandVietnamoverthelastthreeyears. In May 2009 China announced a unilateral threemonth moratorium on fishing in the SouthChinaSea(abovetwelvedegreesnorthnorthparallel)fromMay16toAugust1. Theostensiblepurposeofthebanwastopreservefishstocks,preventillegalfishingand protectChinesefishermen.ThiswastheheightoftheVietnamesefishingseason.Eight modern Chinese fishery administration vessels were dispatched to enforce the ban.40 Vietnamlodgedadiplomaticprotest. According to Vietnamese media reports, China detained or seized thirtythree Vietnamese fishing boats and 433 crewmembers in 2009.41 In one instance a Chinese fisheryvesselrammedandsankaVietnameseboat.42TheChineseroutinelychasedand seizedthecatchesoftheboatstheystoppedandboarded.Amongthosedetainedwere severalVietnamesefishingboatsthatsoughtshelterintheParacelIslandsduringstorms inAugustandOctober2009.43 During2010,ChinacontinueditsharassmentanddetentionofVietnamesefishingboats, particularlyinwatersneartheParacels.Duringthefirstquarteroftheyear,therewere 30 cases when Chinese authorities seized Vietnamese fishing craft and detained more

JiGuoxing,TheLegalityoftheImpeccableIncident,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009,1920provides anexplanationanddefenseofChinesenavalactivitiesintheEastChinaSea. PatrolshipstrawlfordisorderinBeibuGulf,ChinaDaily.com,May28,2009;Onemoreshiptopatrol South China Sea, Chinadaily.com.ch, May 15, 2009 and Reinforced patrol sails from Hainan, Chinadaily.com.ch,May19,2009. China seizes Vietnamese fishing boat, Deutsche PresseAgentur, April 19, 2010 and China releases Vietnamesefishermenbutkeepsboat,DeutschePresseAgentur,May4,2010.
42 41 40

39

ControversialChinesebanaffectsmoreVietnamesefishingvessels,ThanhNienNews,June5,2009 andFishermenintimidatedandharassedbyChinesepatrolboats,ThanhNienNews,June8,2009. VietnamprotestsChineseshipseizure,DeutschePresseAgentur,March30,2010.

43

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than 200 fishermen.44 Four of these cases involved 107 Vietnamese fishermen from QuangNgaiprovincewhowereheldindetentionfortwomonths.45 AseriousincidentdevelopedintheSpratlyIslandsinMarch2010whenChinesefishing trawlersreportedthattheywerebeingharassedbyVietnamesefishingboatsandcalled for assistance. China dispatched two Fishery Administration vessels from Hainan. On arrival, they were surrounded by Vietnamese fishing craft. China then ordered PLAN warshipsfromtheEastSeaFleettakingpartinnearbyexercisestorescuethestranded fisheryvessels.Bythetimethewarshipsarrived,alltheVietnamesefishingboatshad departed. OnApril29,2010,Chinaonceagainannounceditwasimposingaunilateralfishingban in theSouth ChinaSea to take effect from May 16 to August 1. China dispatched two Fishery Administration patrol boats to keep watch over an estimated 1,000 Chinese fishing craft.46 A spokesperson for Vietnams Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the ban was a violation of national sovereignty.47 A review of press reporting on incidents during this period reveals that Chinese authorities punished Vietnamese fishermen for intruding into Chinas EEZ by seizing their navigational aids, communicationsequipmentandspareparts.Thismadeasafejourneyhomeparticularly hazardous. Chinese authorities also regularly fine Vietnamese fishermen for taking shelterinChinesewaterstoescapefromstorms.48 OnMay11,2011theHaikouMunicipalGovernment,Hainanprovince,onceagainissued anannouncementimposingChinasannualunilateralfishingbanintheSouthChinaSea fromMay16August1ostensiblytoprotectdwindlingfishstocksduringthespawning season.VietnamprotestedthedeploymentofaChineseFisheryAdministrationVessel, Leizhou 44261, to patrol in the waters around the Paracel Islands from May 525.
44 45 46

NgaPham,VietnamputParacelrowonsummitagenda,BBCNews,April8,2010. Chinareleases23detailedfishermenVietnameseofficial,ThanhNienNews,May1,2010.

Vietnamprotests Chinesepatrols in Spratlys, Deutsche PresseAgentur,April6, 2010 and Seas fill withtensionoverChinasmoves.TheAsahiShimbun,October2,2010. VietnamsaysChinasfishingbansinEastSeatotallyworthless,VietnamNewsAgencywebsite,May 6,2010. TrungQuoclaibatgiutaucaVN:Nangnguocvavoly!,ThanhNiewOnline,March29,2010;China seizes Vietnamese fishing boat, Deutsche PresseAgentur, March 29, 2010; Vietnam protests Chinese ship seizure, Deutsche PresseAgentur, March 30, 2010; China continues seizure of Vietnamese fishermen,Vietnam.NetBridge,April19,2010;ChinaseizesVietnamesefishingboat,DeutschePresse Agentur,April19,2010;VietnamSaysChinaFishingBaninEastSeaIllegitimate,VietnamNewsBrief, May7,2010;AfterSenkakudispute,ChinaVietnamcrisisloomsinSouthChinaSea,Asianews,October 6, 2010; Seas fill with tension over Chinas moves, The Asahi Shimbun, October 2, 2010; Deutsche PresseAgentur,AsiandefencemeetingtoavoidSouthChinaSeadispute,October7,2010andDaisuke FurutaandKazutoTsukamoto,HanoidemandsBeijingletfishermengo,TheAsahiShimbun,October11, 2010.
48 47

15

Vietnam accused the patrol boat of causing difficulties for normal fishing activities conduced by Vietnamese fishermen in their traditional fishing ground and making the situationatseamorecomplicated.49 VietnameselocalauthoritiesreportedthearrivalofChinesefishingboatsinVietnamese watersingreaternumbersthaninthepast.TheheadofPhuYenProvinceBorderGuard Headquartersstatedthat,everydaybetween120and150fishingboatsofChinawere operated within waters from Da Nang City to the Truong Sa [Spratly] Archipelago Previously Chinese fishing boats have violated our waters, but this was the first time thereweresomanyboats.50Thenumbersroseto200onsomeoccasions.Vietnamese fishermen formed fishing teams of five to ten boats for protection because of intimidationfromlargerChinesecraftthatsometimesusedweaponstothreatenthem. Although Vietnamese fishermen vowed to defy the ban the Vietnamese press has not reported any major incidents of harassment or detention.51 One reason may be that Chinese authorities reportedly adopted different tactics from their previous heavy handedapproach.Chineseshipsformedacordonaroundthefishinggroundsnearthe ParacelIslandsandturnedbackVietnamesefishingcraftafterconfiscatingtheircatches. On June 1, however, it was reported that Chinese military vessels threatened to use their guns against a Vietnamese fishing boat operating in waters near the Spratly archipelago.52

CommercialActivitiesinDisputedWaters
In 200809 China applied behindthescenes diplomatic pressure on a number of American oil companies to stop their commercial activities in Vietnam or face the potential consequences in their business dealings with China. This form of Chinese intimidationdidnotrepresentadirectthreattothesafetyofnavigation.Howeveritwas animpliedthreattothefreedomofnavigationofUScommercialsurveyandexploration vessels operating in contested waters. This section will review briefly the response by theObamaAdministrationbeforeturningtoactualChineseinterferenceinthesafetyof navigationofcommercialvesselsoperatinginthedeclaredEEZsofthePhilippinesand VietnamthatliewithinwatersclaimedinChinasushapedmap.

ThreatstoUSCommercialInterests
InJuly2009,theObamaAdministrationmadeclearitspoliciestowardsmaritimeissues in the AsiaPacific and threats to US commercial interests in the South China Sea in
49 50

ChineseShipViolatesVietnamsSovereignty,VietnamNewsAgency,May13,2011.

Chinese fishing boats violate Vietnam waters; govt mulls patrol boats, Thanh Nien News, May 29, 2011.
51 52

DeutschePresseAgentur,VietnamdefiantonfirstdayofChinesefishingban,May16,2011. AnDienandMinhHung,EastSeaundercurrents,ThanhNienNews,June10,2011.

16

testimonydeliveredbytwohighrankingofficialstotheSubcommitteeonEastAsiaand PacificAffairsoftheSenateCommitteeonForeignRelations.DeputyAssistantSecretary ofStateScotMarcielbeganhistestimonybynotingthattheUnitedStateshasavital interest in maintaining stability, freedom of navigation, and the right to lawful commercialactivityinEastAsiaswaterways(italicsadded).Andmorepointedly,after reviewingrecentcasesofChineseintimidationagainstAmericanoilandgascompanies working with Vietnamese partners, Marciel stated, We object to any effort to intimidateU.S.companies.53 TheAdministrationspolicywithrespecttoharassmentofU.S.navalvessels,discussed in the section above, was addressed by Robert Scher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,whooutlinedafourpointstrategy:
In support of our strategic goals, the [Defense] Department has embarked on a multipronged strategy that includes; 1) clearly demonstrating, through word and deed, that U.S. forces will remain present and postured as the preeminent military force in the region; 2) deliberate and calibrated assertions of our freedom of navigation rights by U.S. Navy vessels; 3) building stronger security relationships with partners in the region, at both the policy level through strategic dialogues and at the operational level by building partner capacity, especially in the maritimesecurityarea,and4)strengtheningthemilitarydiplomaticmechanismswehavewith Chinatoimprovecommunicationsandreducetheriskofmiscalculation.54

AsaresultofUSdiplomaticinterchangeswithChinabothoftheaboveconcernswere satisfactorily addressed. In August 2010, Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Scher, acknowledged,IamnotawareofanyrecentexamplesofChineseintimidationofglobal oilandgascompaniesoperatingintheSouthChinaSea.55Also,Scherdidnotanticipate anotherUSNSImpeccabletypeincident.BothnaviesareveryresponsibleentitiesandI don'tforeseeanykindofclashes,hestated.Suchwasnotthecase,however,withthe PhilippinesandVietnam.

IncidentsInvolvingChineseShipsandthePhilippines
OnFebruary25,2011threePhilippinesfishingvessels,F/VJaimeDLS,F/VMamaLydia DLS and F/V Maricris 12, were operating in the waters off Jackson Atoll 140 nautical miles west of Palawan. According to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the fishing vessels were approached by a PLAN JianghuV Class missile frigate, Dongguan 560,whichbroadcastoveritsmarinebandradio,ThisisChineseWarship560.Youare in the Chinese territory. Leave the area immediately. Then the frigate repeatedly
Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scot Marciel, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations,UnitedStatesSenate,July15,2009. Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Scher, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense before the Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Senate CommitteeonForeignRelations,UnitedStatesSenate,July15,2009.
55 54 53

Daniel Ten Kate, U.S. Sees No Recent China Pressure on Global Oil Companies in South Sea, BloombergNews,August17,2010.

17

broadcast, I will shoot you.56 As the fishing vessels began to withdraw, the Chinese frigatefiredthreeshotsthatlanded0.3nauticalmiles(556meters)fromF/VMaricris 12. The F/V Maricris 12 left the area. The Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Liu Jianchao,laterdeniedthatanyChinesevesselhadfiredonFilipinofishermen.57 On March 2 two Chinese whitepainted patrol boats, No. 71 and No. 75, ordered MV VeritasVoyager,aForumEnergyPlcsurveyvesseloperatingintheReedBankareaoff PalawanIsland,toleaveandtwicemanoeuvredcloseinwhatappearedathreattoram the Voyager.58 The survey ship was Frenchowned and registered in Singapore. The Philippines responded by dispatching two OV10 aircraft to investigate. The Chinese boatsdepartedwithoutfurtherincident.ForeignAffairsUndersecretaryErlindaBasilio lodgedaprotestwithChineseChargedAffairsonMarch4.59 After the incident, the Philippines announced a temporary halt to seismic testing and orderedthePhilippineNavyandPhilippinesCoastGuardtoescortthesurveyshipwhen testing resumed.60 Later, President Aquino instructed the Philippine Coast Guard to providesecurityforoilandgasexplorationactivitiesintheKalayaanIslandGroup.61

ChinaVietnamCableCuttingIncidents
OnMay26,2011threeChinaMaritimeSurveillanceshipsaccostedtheBinhMinh02,a VietnameseseismicsurveyshipoperatinginBlock148,inanincidentthatlastedthree hours.ChinaMaritimeSurveillanceshipNo.84cutthecabletowingseismicmonitoring equipment.62 The next day Vietnam lodged a diplomatic protest with Chinas AmbassadorclaimingthattheactionsoftheChinaMaritimeSurveillanceshipsviolated
56 57 58

TessaJamandre,ChinafiredatFilipinofishermeninJacksonatoll,ABSCBNNews,June3,2011. JimGomez,Chinawarnsneighbors:StopoilsearchinSpratlys,AssociatedPress,June9,2011.

BBCNews,AsiaPacific,PhilippineshaltstestsafterChinapatrolchallenge,March8,2011;Nicholas HeathandDanielTenKate,VietnamSaysChineseBoatHarassedPetroVietnamSurveyShip,Bloomberg Businessweek,June9,2011;AureaCalica,PalaceinnohurrytofileChinaprotest,ThePhilippineStar, May 21, 2011 and Tessa Jamandre, China fired at Filipino fishermen in Jackson atoll, ABSCBN News, June3,2011.TheSampaguitagasfieldintheReedBankisestimatedtocontainbetween3.4trillionto20 trillion cubic feet of natural gas; Carps among the Spratlys, The Economist, March 10 2011, online edition.
59 60

TessaJamandre,ChinafiredatFilipinofishermeninJacksonatoll,ABSCBNNews,June3,2011

AFP,Chinastakesclaimondisputedislandsafterspats,March9,2011andAureaCalica,Palaceinno hurrytofileChinaprotest,ThePhilippineStar,May21,2011. CoastGuardtosecureoilexplorationinKalayaanislandgroup,GMANewsTV,April19,2011.TheKIG containsninegeologicalfeatures:Balagtas(IrvingReef),Kota(Loaita),Lawak(Nanshan),Likas(WestYork), Pagasa (Thitu), Panata (Lankiam), Parola (Northeast Cay), Patag Island (Flat Island is also considered a partoftheSpratlys)andRizal(CommodoreReef). Bao Cao Su Co Tau Truong Quoc Cat Cap Thu Dia Chan Cua Tau Binh Minh 02 Vao Luc 5H58 Ngay 26/05/2011,andReuters,VietnamsaysChineseboatsharassedoilexplorationship,May27,2011.
62 61

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international law and Vietnams sovereignty.63 Vietnam also sought compensation for thedamagecaused.TheBinhMinh02returnedtoportforrepairsandresumeditsoil explorationactivitiesaccompaniedbyanescortofeightships.64 Some news media erroneously reported that this was the first instance in which the ChinesehadcutthecableofaVietnameseexplorationvessel.AccordingtoDoVanHau, a senior PetroVietnam official, When we conduct seismic survey and drilling operations,they[China]haveaeroplanesflyingovertosurveyouractivities,theyharass us with their vessels, and in extreme cases they cut our [exploration] cables.65 Vietnamese sources have revealed that the first cable cutting incident took place in 2008butVietnamchosenottopublicisethematterbecauseitsexplorationvesselwas operatingoutsideVietnamsEEZ. ChinarespondedtoVietnamsprotestonMay28withthefollowingstatement:What relevantChinesedepartmentsdidwascompletelynormalmarinelawenforcementand surveillanceactivitiesinChinasjurisdictionalarea.66VietnamretortedonMay29,the area where Vietnam conducted exploration activities situates entirely in the exclusive economic zone and the 200nautical mile continental shelf of Vietnam in accordance withthe1982UnitedNationsConventiononLawoftheSea.Itisneitheradisputedarea nor is it an area managed by China. China has deliberately misled the public into thinking that it is a disputed area.67 China responded in kind: the law enforcement activities by Chinese maritime surveillance ships against Vietnams illegally operating ships are completely justified. We urge Vietnam to immediately stop infringement activitiesandrefrainfromcreatingnewtroubles.68 On June 9, 2011 according to Vietnams Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a second premeditated and carefully calculated incident occurred when Chinese fishing boat No. 62226 equipped with a cable cutting device snared the cable of the Viking II seismicsurveyshipoperatinginsurveyBlock13603inthevicinityofVanguardBank(Tu Chinh).69 Viking II is registered in Norway and was operating under charter with
63 64

VNcondemnsChineseintrusion,VietnamNewsAgency,May28,2011.

DeutschePresseAgentur,Vietnamstandsgroundinseadispute,surveyshiptakesupwork,June6, 2011;AgenceFrancePresse,VietnamcomplainstoChinaasseatensionsrise,June9,2011andNicholas HeathandDanielTenKate,VietnamSaysChineseBoatHarassedPetroVietnamSurveyShip,Bloomberg Businessweek,June9,2011. Ben Bland and Kathrin Hille, Vietnam and China oil clashes intensify, The Financial Times, May 27, 2011.
66 67 68 69 65

QuotedinReuters,ChinareprimandsVietnamoveroffshoreoilexploration,May28,2011. VietnamdemandsChinastopsovereigntyviolations,ThanhNienNews,May29,2011. QuotedbyHuyDuong,ThePhilippinesandVietnamattheCrossroad,ManilaTimes,June9,2011.

IanTimberlake,SeaspatraisesChinaVietnamtensions,AgenceFrancePresse,June9,2011.Talisman EnergyInc.aCanadiancompanybasedinCalgaryannouncedinApril2011thatitwouldconductamajor

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PetroVietnam.70TwoChinaMaritimeSurveillanceshipsandotherChinesefishingcraft cametoassistthedistressedfishingboat.AccordingtoNguyenPhuongNga,theofficial Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Chinas systematic acts were aimed at turning an undisputedregionintooneofdispute,tocarryoutitsambitiontomakeChinasnine dashlineclaimareality.71 ChineseauthoritiesclaimedthattheVikingIIincidentoccurredwhenarmedVietnamese ships chased Chinese fishing boats from the Wanan (Vanguard) Bank. One of the ChineseboatsbecameentangledinthecableoftheVikingIIshipoperatinginthesame area. The Chinese boat was dragged for more than an hour before the entangled net couldbecut.AccordingtotheChineseForeignMinistryspokesperson,TheVietnamese ship put the lives and safety of the Chinese fishermenin serious danger. Vietnamese ForeignMinistryofficialslodgedaprotestwiththeChineseEmbassyontheafternoonof the incident and announced that the Vietnam National Oil and Gas Group would be seekingcompensationfordamages.72 IthassincebeenreportedthattheVikingIIhadbeeninvolvedinseparateincidentson May 29 and May 31 in which Chinese boats the Fei Sheng No. 16 and Vessel No. B12549attemptedtoapproachitsreardeckandinterferewithitsoperations.Security escortswiththeVikingIIsuccessfullyblockedtheirapproaches.73Anallegedattempted third cable cutting incident took place on June 30 but was not publicised by Vietnam becauseofongoingdelicatediplomatictalkswithChina. TheaboveinstancesofChineseuseofforceagainstcommercialexplorationvesselsin disputed waters in the South China Sea is also taking place in the context of military modernisationprogramsbyregionalstates.Thesectionbelowaddressesthesetrends.

CurrentTrendsinMilitaryModernisation
China
In 2007 commercial satellite imagery confirmed that China was constructing a major navalbaseatSanyaonHainanIsland.ThepiersanddocksatSanyaNavalBaseberthed severalmajorsurfacecombatantsandasinglenuclearsubmarine.Furtherconstruction was underway to accommodate larger surface combatants including assault ships and
seismicprograminthisarea;NicholasHeathandDanielTenKate,VietnamSaysChineseBoatHarassed PetroVietnamSurveyShip,BloombergBusinessweek,June9,2011.
70 71 72

Reuters,VietnamaccusesChinaofharassinganotherboat,June9,2011. QuotedbyUnitedPressInternational,Vietnamallegeshighseasinterference,June10,2011.

Ian Timberlake, Sea spat raises ChinaVietnam tensions, Agence France Presse, June 9, 2011 and Reuters,ChinaaccusesVietnaminescalatingseatensions,June10,2011.
73

AnDienandMinhHung,EastSeaundercurrents,ThanhNienNews,June10,2011.

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eventually aircraft carriers. At the same time, China extended an airfield on Woody IslandintheParacelislands,consolidateditsfacilitiesatFieryCrossReefintheSpratly archipelago, and maintains a continuing naval presence at Mischief Reef off the west coastofthePhilippines. In sum, China is developing an enhanced capability to exercise its sovereignty claims overtheSouthChinaSeaandprotectitsvitalSLOCsthroughtheMalaccaandSingapore Straits as well as the capacity to surge expeditionary forces into the South China Sea fromthesebaseswithaconsiderablyshortenedlogisticstail.74Byextension,Chinawill alsohavethecapacitytointerdictthesameSLOCsonwhichJapan,TaiwanandSouth Koreaaredependent. OtherconstructionindicatesthattheSanyaNavalBasewillhavestrategicimplications forthebalanceofpowerintheregion.Portionsofthebasearebeingbuiltunderground toprovidefacilitiesthatcannotbeeasilymonitored.Satelliteimageryhasconfirmedthe presence of a Chinese Type 094 Jinclass submarine since late 2007. The Type094 submarine is a secondgeneration nuclear vessel and represents Chinas most lethal navalstrikeweapon.Upuntilnowallnuclearsubmarineswereunderthecommandof ChinasNorthernFleet;thismarksthefirstpermanentdeploymenttoChinasSouthern Fleet. An analysis of construction activities indicates Sanya Naval Base will be capable of housing nuclear submarines capable of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles. WhenthesefacilitiesarecompletedtheywillprovideChinawiththepotentialcapability tostationasubstantialproportionofitssubmarinebasednucleardeterrentcapabilities there. Chinasmostmodernstrategicnuclearsubmarineisnotyetfullyoperationalbutwhenit isthesubmarineisexpectedtocarrytwelveSeaLaunchedBallisticMissiles.Thisclassof submarine will be even more potent if China succeeds in equipping the missiles with multiplewarheads.Chinesenuclearsubswillbeabletopatrolandfirefromconcealed positions in deep waters off Hainan island if China can develop the necessary operationalskills.AccordingtotheUSDefenseDepartmentfivemoreChineseballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBN)75 are expected to become operational in coming

OnJune18,2009,GeneralZhangLi,amemberoftheChinesePeoplesPoliticalConsultativeConference, recommendedthatChinasendlargersurfacecombatantstotheSouthChinaSeaandconstructanairand sea port on Mischief Reef in order to control the Spratlys and bypass the Malacca Straits; L. C. Russell Hsiao, PLA General Advises Building Bases in the South China Sea, China Brief [The Jamestown Foundation],9(13),June24,2009,12.
75 74

SSBN is the designation used by the US Navy for a nuclearpowered ballistic nuclear missilecarrying submarine. The SS refers to a submersible ship, the B stands for ballistic missile, and the N denotes nuclearpowered.

21

years. It is this geostrategic aspect in particular that explains the interest by the US NavyinconductingmilitarysurveysinwatersoffHainan.76

UnitedStates
The United States has responded to Chinas naval buildup and development of anti access/area denial capabilities by strengthening its posture on Guam, by new arrangementswithAustraliagivingtheUSgreaterandmoreregularaccesstodefence facilities,77 porting Combat Littoral Ships in Singapore, and stepped up weapons and equipmentsalestothePhilippines. Significantly,inresponsetoChinasdevelopmentofalargesubmarineforce,theUShas deployed thirtyone of its fiftythree fast attack submarines to the Pacific. Eighteen of these subs are homeported in Pearl Harbor, others are based in Guam.78 The United StateshasalsodeployedthreeOhioclassnuclearsubmarines(socalledboomers)tothe IndoPacificOceanregion.Eachhasbeenmodifiedtocarry154conventionalTomahawk cruise missiles. In late Juneearly July 2010, in a calculated demonstration of naval power, the USS Florida, USS Michigan, and USS Ohio submarines, simultaneously appeared in Diego Garcia (Indian Ocean), Busan (South Korea) and Subic Bay (the Philippines),respectively.79TheUnitedStateshasstationedthefifthgenerationRaptor aircraft in Hawaii. The United States is also developing an airsea battle concept to counterChinasdevelopmentofareadenial/antiaccesscapabilities.Theairseabattle conceptisbeingdrawnuptoenabletheUnitedStatestoprevailinconflictswherearea denial/antiaccesscapabilitiesarewelldeveloped. Currently, Obama Administration officials are outlining a new US strategy to pivot militaryforcesfromIraqandAfghanistantoEastAsiaincomingyears.ThenewDefense Secretary, Leon Panetta, has indicated that theAsiaPacificwill be largely quarantined fromdefencebudgetcuts.

ThePhilippines
Chinas rapid military modernization, coupled with assertive behaviour in the South China Sea, has already led several Southeast Asian states to undertake force modernization programs of their own aimed at developing antiaccess/areadenial capabilities directed against China. This subsection discusses developments in the Philippines,whilethenextsubsectionfocusesonVietnam.
MarkValencia,TheImpeccableIncident:TruthandConsequences,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009, 24.
77 78 79 76

LauraMeckler,U.S.toBuildUpMilitaryinAustralia,TheWallStreetJournal,November10,2011. OyaolNgirainki,GuamGetsNewSubBuildings,NavyTimes,July21,2010.

U.S. Posts Pictures of Nuclear Sub in Show of Force, The Chosun Ilbo, July 8, 2010 and Mark Thompson,U.S.MissilesDeployedNearChinaSendaMessage,TimeMagazine,July8,2010,internet edition.

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In1995thePhilippinespassedintolawTheArmedForcesModernizationActwiththe aimofmodernizingtheAFPinfifteenyearswithatotalfundofPesos331billion.The PhilippinesCongressfailedtofollowthroughandtheAFPwasstarvedoffunds. In2011,inresponsetoChineseassertivenessinitsEEZandKIG,thePhilippinesdrewup a new defence strategy focused on both internal security operations and external territorialdefence.TheAquinoAdministrationhasallocatedP11billiontosupportforce modernisation.OfthisfigureP8billionwillcomefromtheproceedsoftheMalampaya Natural Gas and Power Project and the remaining P3 billion will come from the AFPs currentmodernisationfunds.80Startingin2012,thegovernmentwillimplementafive yearmodernizationprogramtotallingP40billion. On March 28,, 2011, AFP Chief of Staff General Eduardo Oban announced plans to upgrade Rancudo Air Field on PagAsa island.81 In May, a Philippine navy study recommended the acquisition of submarines as a deterrent against future potential conflicts.82 InSeptember2011,immediatelyafterPresidentBenignoAquinosstatevisittoBeijing, heannouncedthat4.95billionpesos(US$118million)wouldbeallocatedtotopupthe defencebudget.83Thesefundswereearmarkedforthepurchaseanavalpatrolvessel, sixhelicoptersandothermilitaryequipmentinordertosecuretheMalampayaproject locatedindisputedwatersoffthecoastofPalawan. The Philippines has taken delivery of a former US Coast Guard Weather Endurance Cutter (rechristened Gregario del Pilar) and will assign it to operate from Palawan in WesternCommandwiththemissionofprotectingthePhilippinesEEZ.Theshipwillbe fittedwithmoremodernradarsystemsandconsiderationisbeinggiventoequipitwith antiship missiles. The Philippines also expects to take delivery of three new Taiwan manufactured MultiPurpose Attack Craft and procure two additional US Coast Guard Cutters.84 At present Philippines officials have floated a wish list of new equipment including: coastalradar,longrangepatrolaircraft,strategicsealiftvessels,offshorepatrolboats, naval helicopters, air defence radar, six jet trainers, surface attack aircraft, antiship missiles,andasubmarine.85
AlexisRomero,SubmarineforNavy?NoybaresAFPshoplist,ThePhilippineStar,August24,2011. JaimeLaude,AFPtomaintainpresenceinSpratlys,ThePhilippineStar,March29,2011.

80 81 82

Katherine Evangelista, Philippines eye submarines to boost navy, Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 17, 2001.TheprospectofthePhilippinesacquiringsubmarinesisveryunlikely.
83 84

AgenceFrancePresse,PhilippinesUpsSpendingToGuardSouthChinaSea,September7,2011.

Reuters, Philippines says will spend $255 min on military helicopters, boats, April 13, 2011 and AgenceFrancePresse,PhilippineshopesseadisputewithChinashouldease,September3,2011.
85

AlexisRomero,SubmarineforNavy?NoybaresAFPshoplist,ThePhilippineStar,August24,2011.

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Vietnam
In contrast to the Philippines, Vietnam has embarked on a more robust program of modernizing its armed forces. In 2011 it took delivery of four Su30MK2 multirole jet fighters,twoGephardclassguidedmissilefrigates,itssecondBastionlandbasedanti ship ballistic missile system, and two Svetlyak class missile Patrol Boats.86 Vietnam officially launched its first indigenously built gunship this year.87 In October, during PresidentTruongTanSangsvisittoNewDelhi,thelocalmediareportedthatIndiawas prepared to sell Vietnam its BrahMos supersonic cruise missile.88 That same month, whileonatouroftheNetherlands,PrimeMinisterNguyenTanDungexpressedinterest inpurchasingfourSigmaclasscorvettes.89Vietnamwilltakedeliveryofsixconventional Kiloclass submarines in 2014 and currently has on order sixteen more Su30MK2 jet fighters.90

Regional
According to one noted regional security analyst, naval acquisitions in Asia have become especially disturbing, with undeniable signs of actionreaction dynamics, and NortheastAsiainparticulariswitnessinganemergingnavalarmsrace.91InSoutheast Asia the conventional submarine has been the hallmark of military modernisation. Securityanalystswarnthattheproliferationofsubmarinefleetsmaybedestabilizingin timesoftensionsandcrisesduetothecomplexitiesofcommandandcontrol. Vietnams purchase of Kiloclass submarines is part of a regional trend in naval modernisation. China has the largest submarine fleet (more than sixty) and most extensiveplanstoexpanditsnumbersincludingtheType095nuclearattacksubmarine (SSN)andType094(JINclass)nuclearpoweredballisticmissilesubmarine(SSBN).China isexpectedtobasebothattackandballisticmissilesubmarinesatYulinNavalBaseon Hainan. Indonesia,thefirstcountryinSoutheastAsiatoacquiresubmarines,isnowconsidering
RussiaexportsaircrafttoVietnam,TheVoiceofRussia,June22,2011;BBC,HaiquanVietNamnhan tauchienNga,August24,2011;RussiadeliverssecondcoastalmissilesystemtoVietnam,InterfaxAVN militarynewsagency,October11,2011;andBBC,NgagiaotiephaitautuantrachoVN,October25, 2011.
87 88 86

BBC,VietNamtudongtauchien,October3,2011.

India to sell BrahMos missile to Vietnam, The AsianAge, September 20,2011 and Robert Johnson, India is Preparing To Sell BahMos Supersonic Cruise Missiles to Vietnam, Business Insider, September 20,2011.
89 90 91

BBC,VNdamphanmua4tauchiencuaHaLan,October18,2011. RussiatosupplyVietnamsixsubmarinesin2014,ThanhNienNews,July3,2011.

Desmond Ball, Asias Naval Arms Race, Paper presented to the 25th AsiaPacific Roundtable, ISIS Malaysia,KualaLumpur,May29June1,2011.

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replacing them with newer South Korean models. Singapore has upgraded its fleet to include two Archerclass submarines, while Malaysia has acquired two Scorpeneclass subs. Both the Singaporean and Malaysian submarines are equipped with Air IndependentPropulsionsystems.Australias2009DefenceWhitePapersetoutplansto construct twelve new conventional submarines. Thailand is currently considering acquiringitsownconventionalsubmarines. Military force modernization has and will continue to result in the introduction of increasednumbersofwarshipsequippedwithnewtechnologiesandweaponssystems. A recent review of regional force modernization over the last decade highlights the introductionofnewcapabilitiessuchasstandoffprecisionstrike,longrangeairborne and undersea attack, stealth, mobility and expeditionary warfare and, above all, new capacities when it comes to greatly improved command, control communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks.92 This review concludes that new types of armaments promise to significantly upgrade and modernizethemannerofwarfightingintheregion[and]fundamentallychangethe conceptandconductofwarfare.93 Finally, new developments in military technology will see the introduction of more sophisticated aerial and undersea drones and unmanned systems for intelligence gathering, reconnaissance, surveillance and strike. Mark Valencia has drawn particular attention to Large Diameter Unmanned Underwater Vehicles, Persistent Littoral UnderseaSurveillanceSystemsandModularFloatingBasesthatcanbedeployedinthe EEZsoftargetstates.AccordingtoValencia:
Thesituationispresentlybeyondinternationalcontrol.Thuscontinuedintrusiveprobesarelikelyto generatefrustrationandresentmentthatmaytranslateintotheforciblehaltingofsuchintrusions whenandifdetected.Thescaleandscopeofmaritimeandairborneintelligencecollectionactivities arelikelytocontinuetoexpandrapidlyinmanycountries,involvinglevelsandsortsofactivitiesquite unprecedentedinpeacetime.Theywillnotonlybecomemoreintensive;theywillgenerallybemore intrusive. Indeed stepped up drone missions may even be considered a prelude to impending warfare.Theywillgeneratetensionsandmorefrequentcrises;theywillproducedefensivereactions andescalatorydynamics;andtheywillleadtolessstabilityinthemostaffectedregions,especiallyin Asia.94

AccordingtoViceAdmiralScottSwift,CommanderU.S.SeventhFleet,hisprimeconcern is not the outbreak of a major conflict but any tactical trigger with strategic
92

Richard A. Bitzinger, A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions, ContemporarySoutheastAsia,31(1),April2010,6364. Richard A. Bitzinger, A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions, ContemporarySoutheastAsia,31(1),April2010,64.

93

MarkJ.Valencia,TheSouthChinaSea,MilitaryActivitiesandtheLawoftheSea,Paperpresentedto the International Conference on Major Law and Policy Issues in the South China Sea: European and AmericanPerspectives,cosponsoredbytheInstituteofEuropeanandAmericanStudiesandtheCenter for AsiaPacific Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, October 78, 2011 and Mark Valencia, The ImpeccableIncident:TruthandConsequences,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009,26.

94

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implicationsIdohaveconcernsaboutaspecificbrushupthatcouldresultinatactical miscalculation95 In sum, regional sea lanes are set to become more crowded, contestedandvulnerabletoarmedstrife.96

PoliticalImplications:TheWayAhead
ThetitleofthispaperindicatesthatsafetyofnavigationinEastAsiasmaritimedomain may be secured by navigating carefully between the currents of legal regimes and realpolitik. If the current status quo remains the political implications are clear: maritime incidents could erupt at any time between China and the United States and undermine trust in their bilateral relations. If current maritime differences are not addressedtheycouldbecomeamajordriverinstrategicrelationsratheraproblemto bemanagedbymutualconsent.97 Legalregimes,suchasUNCLOS,arenecessarybutnotsufficientfoundationsforsafety ofnavigation.Thisisbecause,asnotedinthepaper,UNCLOSfailstodefinekeyterms usedinthedebatebetweenChinaandtheUnitedStates.UNCLOSitselfmayhavebeen overtaken by advances in technology both civil and military. In addition, China and manyothernationshaveadoptedlawstoregulateforeignmilitaryactivitiesintheirEEZ thatarenotsupportedbyinternationallawincludingUNCLOS.Finally,theUnitedStates, although a signatory to UNCLOS, has not yet acceded to the Convention. It is highly unlikely the US Senate will ratify UNCLOS for domestic political reasons and this possibilityislikelyreinforcedbyChineseunilateralinterpretationsoftheConvention. This paper has identified four distinct sets of cases where the safety of navigation is eitherthreatenedorundermined:(1)piracy;(2)foreignmilitaryactivitiesinastatesEEZ (read US military activities in Chinas EEZ); (3) fishing in disputed waters; and (4) commercial activities (read oil and gas exploration) in disputed waters. In order to chartacooperativemechanismforthesafetyofnavigationthispaperwillconcludeby discussingeachoftheseareasinturn.

QuotedbyStephenCoates,USPacificcommanderwarnsoftacticalerrors,TheChinaPost,November 10,2011.AdmiralSmithalsonotedthatheexpecteddiplomacytoprevailintheeventofabrushupand compromisetoprevail. RoryMedcalfandRaoulHeinrichs,CrisisandConfidence:MajorPowersandMaritimeSecurityinIndo PacificAsia(Sydney:LowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy,June2011),3andSamBatemen,Solvinghe WickedProblemsofmaritimeSecurity:AreRegionalForumsuptotheTask?,ContemporarySoutheast Asia,33(1),2011,1517. Foraconsideredsetofcooperativeproposalssee:CliveSchofield,IanTownsendGault,HasjimDjalal, Ian Storey, Meredith Miller, and Tim Cook, From Disputed Waters to Seas of Opportunity: Overcoming Barriers to Maritime Cooperation in East and Southeast Asia, NBR Special Report No. 30 (Seattle: The NationalBureauofAsianResearch,July2011).
97 96 95

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Piracy
As noted above, piracy in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore has largely been addressedbythelittoralstatesthroughcoordinatedpatrolsandaerialreconnaissance, andbytheinternationalcommunitythroughReCAAP.Piracyhasmovedfromthestraits intothesouthernreachesoftheSouthChinaSeawhereolderships,anchoreduntilthe global economy picks up, have been the prime victims. Combating piracy and armed robberyatseawasoneofthepointsformultilateralcooperationoutlinedinthe2002 DOC(Point6e)thatcouldbetakenupbyregionalstates.98 Onenewproposaltoaddressthisthreattosafetyofnavigationistoestablishalimited purpose Maritime and Air Identification Zone.99 This proposal argues that past impediments in international law against the use of force to combat piracy could be overcome by the application of Article 105 of UNCLOS. This would stimulate greater cooperation among regional states and the international community to address this growingthreattofreedomofcommercialshippingandnavigation.

USMilitaryActivitiesinChinasEEZ
The United States is the worlds leading naval power. Naval power requires the high seasformaneuvertobringthisforcetobearoncriticalsecuritysituations.100Duringthe negotiation process that led to UNCLOS the USwas adamant in defence of customary freedom of the seas. As a matter of both international law and realpolitik the United States opposes all attempts by coastal states to limit access to their EEZs by military shipsandaircraft. China, on the other hand, is a continental power that is gradually emerging as a maritimepower.101ChinaseekstocontestUSnavaldominanceintheWesternPacificby expandingitsnavalreachfromthefirsttosecondchainsofislandsoffitseasterncoast. China has adopted legal warfare as part of its military doctrine and utilizes both domestic legislation and its interpretation of international law to restrict as much as possibleUSmilitaryactivitiesinitsEEZ.
98 99

DeclarationonConductofPartiesintheSouthChinaSea,PhnomPenh,November4,2002.

MaryGeorge,CanaLimitedPurposeMaritimeandAirDefenceIdentificationZonebeEstablishedover the South China Sea?, Paper presented to 3rd International Workshop on the South China Sea, co sponsoredbytheVietnamLawyersAssociationandDiplomaticAcademyofVietnam,Hanoi,November3 5,2011,36. See Peter Dutton, Introduction, in Peter Dutton, ed., Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons (Newport, RI: China Maritime StudiesInstitute,U.S.NavalWarCollege,2010),913. PengGuangqian,ChinasMaritimeRightsandInterests,inPeterDutton,ed.,MilitaryActivitiesinthe EEZ: A U.S.China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons (Newport, RI: ChinaMaritimeStudiesInstitute,U.S.NavalWarCollege,2010),1522.
101 100

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GiventhatboththeUnitedStatesandChinaarealsonuclearpowerswithvitalnational securityinterestsatstakeitisimprobablethatanylegalregimecouldbeadoptedthat wouldsatisfyboth.102Inthesecircumstancesapoliticalsolutionbasedonrealpolitikis themostlikelysolution.Bothcountriesneedtoaddressthemanagementofmaritime incidentssuchasdescribedinthetextabove.Inordertodosothismatterneedstobe addressed at the highest political level such as the annual Strategic and Economic Dialogueandthenallocatedtoseniormilitaryofficialstoworkoutthedetails. Both China and the United States should agree that the existing International Regulations for Avoiding Collisions at Sea are the foundation for the management of safety of navigation. The USChina Military Maritime Consultative Council (established 1998,suspendedin2001andresumedinFebruary2009)103shouldtaskitsMaritimeand AviationSafetyWorkingGroup(orotherappropriatebody)todraftanIncidentsatSea Agreement(INCSEA)thatspecifiesregularconsultations,dangerousconduct,meansof communication and a mechanism to adjudicate, review procedures and correct transgressions. It is notable that several scholars from China and the US are in agreement that an INCSEA should be adopted.104 Such an agreement should also be accompaniedbyconfidenceandtrustbuildingmeasures.105 Inaddition,ChinaandtheUnitedStatesneedtoworkoutamodusvivendiorcodeof conduct governing military and intelligence gathering activities in each others EEZs. Valenciasuggeststhatonerelevantguidelinewouldenjoinbothpartiestorefrainfrom thethreatoruseofforceandprovocativeactssuchasactiveintelligencecollectionto support the use of force against the coastal state, or interfering with that states electronicsystems.106
Alan M. Wachman, Playing by or Playing with he Rules of UNCLOS?, in Peter Dutton, ed., Military ActivitiesintheEEZ:AU.S.ChinaDialogueonSecurityandInternationalLawintheMaritimeCommons (Newport,RI:ChinaMaritimeStudiesInstitute,U.S.NavalWarCollege,2010),107119andSamBatemen, Solving the Wicked Problems of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums up to the Task?, ContemporarySoutheastAsia,33(1),2011,128.
103 102

MarkValencia,TheImpeccableIncident:TruthandConsequences,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009, 27.

Eric A. McVadon, The Reckless and the Resolute: Confrontation in the South China Sea, China Security,5(2),Spring2009,69andJiGuoxing,TheLegalityoftheImpeccableIncident,ChinaSecurity, 5(2), Spring 2009, 2021. An INCSEA between the US and China should include procedures for coordinationsuchasclosestpointofapproachortheminimumdistancecalculatedwhenashiporaircraft approachesanothershiporaircraft.
105

104

SeethesuggestionsbyPengGuangqian,ChinasMaritimeRightsandInterests,inPeterDutton,ed., Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons(Newport,RI:ChinaMaritimeStudiesInstitute,U.S.NavalWarCollege,2010),1921. MarkValencia,TheImpeccableIncident:TruthandConsequences,ChinaSecurity,5(2),Spring2009, 27.

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FishinginDisputedWaters
ThreepointsneedtobemadewithrespecttofishingintheSouthChinaSea.Thefirstis thatmillionsofpeoplearedependentonfishfortheirdailysourceofproteinandthe fish stock in the South China Sea is being depleted through overfishing and marine pollution.Thesecondpointisthat fishdonot respectmaritimeboundariesandeasily pass from one states EEZ to another. Third, the waters of the South China Sea are in dispute. The2002DOCsuggeststhatcooperationbetweenstatescouldbecarriedouttoaddress marine environmental protection, marine scientific research, safety of navigation and communication at sea and search and rescue.107 The current situation calls out for a regional approach to manage the fisheries, control marine pollution and ensure the safety of navigation of all fishermen without prejudice to sovereignty claims by individualstates. IfChinasclaimsthatitsannualfishingbanistoprotectthefishstock,whyareChinese fishingboatspermittedtoputtoseawhilethebanisinforce?Aregionalmechanismto manage fisheries should involve all parties with a direct interest. Each of these state parties could together enforce an annual fishing ban on their own citizens. The state partiescouldmountjointpatrolstoenforcethebanwiththeminimumuseofforceand duerespecttodomesticlaw.Andstatepartiescouldrenderassistancetofishermenin distress. TwoproposalsweretabledatthethirdinternationalworkshopontheSouthChinaSea heldinHanoiinNovember2011.Thefirstproposedresolvingfisherydisputesthrougha regionalcooperationandmanagementmechanism.108Thesecondproposalconsidered thenorthwestquadrantoftheSouthChinaSeawherejurisdictioniscontestedbyChina andVietnam.Thisproposaladvancedtheconceptofamarineprotectedareabetween the two countries. As a matter of urgency, the states involved should adopt informal andvoluntaryprocedurestopreventincidentsinvolvingthethreatanduseofforcesuch asdescribedinthetextabove,includingtheaimingandfiringofweaponsbywarships, deliberateramming,andtheconfiscationofnavigationalaidssuchasGlobalPositioning Systems.

107 108

DeclarationonConductofPartiesintheSouthChinaSea,PhnomPenh,November4,2002,Point6ad.

KuanhsiungDustinWang,ResolutiontoFisheriesDisputesintheSouthChinaSeathroughRegional CooperationandManagement,Paperpresentedto3rdInternationalWorkshopontheSouthChinaSea, cosponsored by the Vietnam Lawyers Association and Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, Hanoi, November35,2011andVuHaiDang,ABilateralNetworkofMarineProtectedAreasbetweenChinaand Vietnam:AnalternativetotheChineseUnilateralFishingBanintheSouthChinaSea,Paperpresentedto 3rd International Workshop on the South China Sea, cosponsored by the Vietnam Lawyers Association andDiplomaticAcademyofVietnam,Hanoi,November35,2011.

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CommercialActivitiesinDisputedWaters
Chinas actions in threatening to ram a commercial oil exploration vessel operating in theReedBankareaclaimedbythePhilippinesandcuttingthecablesoftwocommercial exploration vessels operating well within Vietnams EEZ represent an unprecedented threattothesafetyofnavigationintheSouthChinaSea.InChinaseyesitsactionswere justifiedbecauseChinaheldlegaljurisdictionoverthesewatersandtheoilexploration vesselswereassistinginplunderingresourcestowhichChinawaslegallyentitled. Ifthissituationisnotaddressedthroughpoliticalmeansitwillonlybeamatteroftime beforeconfrontationtakesplaceintheSouthChinaSeabetweenarmedstatevessels. Theimmediatesolutionisforallpartiestorecommitthemselvestorefrainingfromthe threatoruseofforcewithoutprejudicetotheirsovereigntyclaims. As an immediate measure, China and the ASEAN states should expedite their Joint WorkingGrouptocarryouttherecentlyadoptedGuidelinestoImplementtheDOC.And on a bilateral basis, China and Vietnam should adopt practical measures under their recentlysignedAgreementonBasicPrinciplestoSettleSeaDisputes. All parties should publiclycommitnot to interfere in thecommercialoperations of oil explorationvesselsandoilrigspendingtheadoptionofalegallybindingCodeofConduct fortheSouthChinaSea.Atthesametime,theASEANstatesshouldendorse,fleshout andadoptspecificmeasurestoimplementtheinitiativebythePhilippinestoturnthe South China Sea into a Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation. This proposal is aimed at creating enclaves that divide theSouth China Sea into areasthat arerecognizedasbeingindisputefromthoseareasthatarenot.Onceareasindispute havebeenidentified,thestatepartiesshouldproceedwithapilotschemetotestthe efficacyofjointdevelopment. International law, including UNCLOS, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for establishing safety of navigation and freedom of navigation in disputed waters of the SouthChinaSea.ItisclearthatgeopoliticalrivalrybetweenChinaandtheUnitedStates atanymomentcanthreatenthefabricofweaklegalregimes.Internationallaw,which reflectstheconsensusoftheinternationalcommunity,cangoonlyso farwhenmajor powersareindisagreement. What are the political implications? In East Asia, international law serves to a certain extent to modify state behaviour, but state behaviour is largely motivated and constrainedbyrealpolitik.SolutionstosafetyofnavigationissuesintheSouthChinaSea should be addressed by the maritime working group established by the ADMM Plus process and as part of the ARF work process. In addition, maritime security issues in generalshouldbeaddressedbysummitmeetingsamongthemajorpowers(ChinaUS, USJapanSouthKorea,ChinaJapanetc.)andbyASEANmemberstatesthemselves(i.e., thefourclaimantstatesandthesixnonclaimantstates).Bothoftheseprocessescould feedintoEastAsiaSummitprocessandstrengthentheregionsnewlyemergingsecurity architecture

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