Sunteți pe pagina 1din 25

International Baccalaureate Extended Essay

How did the special relationship of France with Algeria allow only part, and not all, of the French Maghreb to be decolonized in 1956?
History 3980 words Elizabeth Davis Notre Dame High School 2010-2012
,

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

Abstract This investigation identifies reasons for the nature of French involvement in the important colony of Algeria postWorld War Two, and the effects this had on French decisions leading to Moroccan and Tunisian decolonization in 1956. The research question How did the special relationship of France with Algeria allow only part, and not all, of the French Maghreb to be decolonized in 1956? was designed to explain this relationship and why it meant that Algeria was prioritised as a territory at a time when there were many difficulties threatening the survival of the French Empire. The essay identifies two major ways in which the FrancoAlgerian relationship influenced decolonization in the Maghreb. Firstly, the reasons for the importance of Algeria, the significance of its European settler community and the internal weaknesses of France are shown to have built up to cause France to focus on its control of Algeria at the expense of its other colonial territories. Secondly, it is argued that French decisions regarding management of Algeria and other territories in line with the policy of assimilation, linked to its reluctance to adapt to a changing political world, fuelled the spread of nationalistic movements across the Maghreb.
2

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

This essay concludes that although the use of violent repression in Algeria against rising nationalism up to 1956 put France under economic and political pressure, the special relationship between France and Algeria meant that it could not be decolonized and Morocco and Tunisia were sacrificed for its survival.

Words: 244
3

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

Contents 1. Introduction page 5 Map page 7 Timeline page 8 2. The important special relationship page 9 2.1 Metropolitan ties page 9 2.2 The French community in Algeria page 10 2.3 Politics in l'hexagone page 12 3. The Growth of Nationalism page 14 3.1 Foreign policy of La Union Franaise page 14 3.2 French methods of managing the Union pg 17 4. Conclusion page 23 5. Bibliography page 24 6. Acknowledgements page 25
4

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

1. Introduction
Algeria was part of the French Empire from 1830 until 1962. This period of foreign rule in North Africa greatly influenced culture and society in Algeria, and also in the other two French Maghreb territories of Tunisia (occupied from 1881) and Morocco (from 1912). The effects of colonization and shared history can still be seen today, most notably in the shared French language of these countries. France made an impression on North Africa which was deep enough to sustain through independence and which will continue to be evident in the future of these states. In the late nineteenth century Africa was claimed and divided up by European powers as an addition to their empires, known as the Scramble for Africa. Despite believing that these empires would last for hundreds of years, after the Second World War European leaders found themselves losing many territories to native peoples, whose struggle to claim back their ethnic lands was fought with more determination than Europe could combat. The French-Algerian relationship was an exception. France's two other Maghreb territories, Tunisia and Morocco, gained independence in 1956; by 1960 all of North Africa other than Algeria was free of colonial rule. Its independence did not come until 1962 after a bloody and infamous eight year guerrilla war between the Algerian Front de Libration Nationale (FLN) and the French governments of 9 different Premiers Ministres (see Table 1, page 8). This leads a historian to be curious about what was different in Algeria for it to deserve such a fight compared to other seemingly similar countries in
5

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

terms of culture and geography (see Map, page 7). Therefore the question How did the special relationship of France with Algeria allow only part, and not all, of the French Maghreb to be decolonized in 1956? looks at the reasons why Algeria was not decolonized in this year alongside its neighbouring states, and how this relationship might have affected their decolonization at this time. The majority of information and analysis regarding post-World War Two colonized Algeria focuses on the friction and later struggle between Algerian nationalists, European settlers and French governments during the Algerian War (19541962). This was one of the most violent struggles for independence in Africa, and interest in this topic is not without reason: the war directly caused the loss of at least 250,000 Algerian lives, 17,456 French deaths, the destruction of property in Algeria, the forced migration of millions, and a new French constitution. The French commitment to the war demonstrates the value of the relationship with Algeria, which was undoubtedly unique and special. The solid settler community in Algeria, unstable French government, imperial policy and violent repression were all factors contributing to political pressure in Algeria and France, resulting in the decolonization of Tunisia and Morocco in 1956.

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

Map during the French colonial period


French departements (territory) French controlled territories in the Maghreb Other Maghreb North African countries Mashrek (Middle Eastern) states

(<http://www.allcountries.org/maps/europe_middle_east_africa_maps.html>)

The Middle East and North Africa, including the Maghreb region comprising of Mauritania, Western Sahara, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. This is simply intended to show the regions geographical relation to France, as the borders of many countries changed through the twentieth century.

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

Timeline
Table 1 - Shows some factual context of the French-Algerian relationship

1830 1841 1881 1912 1941 1944 1945 1946 1951 1953 1954, May 1954, November

Algeria is colonized by France 37,374 colons in Algeria Tunisia forced to become a French Protectorate Morocco becomes a French Protectorate The Atlantic Charter agreement The Brazzaville Conference World War Two ends War for independence in Indochina begins Decolonization of Libya followed by many other African states over the decade Anti-French riots intensify in Morocco Indochina becomes independent of France Attacks by the Front de Libration National across Algeria begin the Algerian War

1956, March Morocco is decolonized 2nd 1956, March French protectorate in Tunisia ends 20th 1962 Algeria becomes independent

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

2. The important special relationship


Metropolitan ties Algeria more than any other overseas territory was politically integrated with metropolitan France, as its three departements had political representation in the French parliament. For a long time the colony had been part of a larger French ambition, dating back further still [than 1830] to dominate Saharan Africa from the Atlantic to Suez (Judt, 2005, page 285). In Principes de colonisation et de lgislation coloniale (1921), Arthur Girault states that the French colonies were considered as a simple extension to the soil of the mother country. In 1946 the Empire Franais was renamed the Union Franaise in an attempt to create a greater feeling of collective community. Following this, in 1947 a system was created to elect an Algerian assembly and a group of deputies to represent Algeria in Paris. This was a step to increasing integration, although many Algerians were still angry about the falsification of elections and the difficulties with gaining equal rights as a French citizen. Moreover, France conducted most of its African trade with Algeria and in 1957 extensive oilfields were discovered in the south of the territory. Their continued domination by French companies was to be an important aspect of the 1962 Evian Algerian Peace Agreements. In the context of empire, Algeria was dominated by the French more than any of the other French colonies (Rodgers and Thomas, 2010, page 281). Another reason for this was the large European settler community, which numbered 1 million by 1945.
9

2.1.

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

2.2. The French community in Algeria Algeria had been claimed as French territory for over a century, since 1830, and the settler community there was well established. These European colonizers 'colons' held a range of differing political beliefs and were of varying degrees of wealth. Thousands of them were second generation migrants for whom Algeria was their home. Many would have never been to France, despite being of European descent and practising French culture. It was generally in the interest of the 1 million colons in Algeria to oppose complete independence of the territory from France because of the affinity they had with this culture and the benefits they had from living in a colony. These included ownership of large amounts of land (Muslims had been expropriated), access to well paid jobs, and continued French citizenship. Compared to Tunisia and Morocco, Algeria shared a longer history with France and had a larger European community (See Table 2 below). Approximations for comparison Algeria 1939 Morocco circa 1950 Tunisia 1936 Arab/Berber > 6,000,000 < 6,000,000 2,336,000 European 1,235,000 1,000,000 264,000

Table 2 - The value of these figures is limited because they are only approximations spanning a decade. This has to be taken into consideration when comparing the figures, for example realising that if Morocco had 1,000,000 Europeans in 1950 it would have had significantly fewer than Algeria in 1939. (<http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007310>)

10

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

Because of the significance of the territory, this community included within it many influential Frenchmen. This meant that Algerian colons had a greater influence on the governments in Paris than their Tunisian and Moroccan counterparts. An example is Edmond Jouhard who was a general in the French Air Force in the Second World War and in Indochina and was one of the most decorated officers in the military, prior to his involvement in the attempted coup of Algeria in 1961. These colons were better positioned to claim the importance of Algeria and be listened to by politicians in Paris, therefore persuading them that it should not be given up for independence. Mansfield (1981) was led to conclude that this community prevented the application of the principles of social and political equality to the Muslim Algerians (page 314), which therefore increased friction and intensified the resolve of those fighting for rights. 2.3. Politics in l'hexagone The interests of the Algerian pied-noirs ('black-feet', an alternative name for the colons referring to the black sandals many wore) were helped to prevail by the weak nature of internal French politics and governance in lhexagone (France-in-Europe). The period of focus is the French Fourth Republic, which existed from 1946 to 1958. This era of politics came to be defined by the Algerian War which not only brought about the end of the Fourth Republic with the involvement of the popular Premier Ministre and later Prsident Charles de Gaulle, but plagued governments with problems which
11

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

required uncomfortable solutions. The revolt of nationalists across the Union and the subsequent loss of colonial territories caused increased upset in a country which was already struggling to redefine its national identity in a rapidly changed and changing world postWorld War Two. The Fourth Republic only lasted for 12 years, but consisted of 21 Premiers Ministres and their governments. There are many reasons why the governments were too weak to hold sustained office. France was recovering from having been occupied for four years of the Second World War. This had been an insult to its national pride and this hurt was coupled with the realisation that France had emerged from the war no longer the same leading power in international politics and relations. There were economic problems with government spending due to the huge cost of the War. The possibility of civil unrest, encouraged by the War, created an insecure situation regarding the colonies and the strain of managing these in order to retain control was tough. At a time of economic hardship, spreading effective resources around the world to protect the Union was difficult because it was so vast. Despite this, France felt forced to continue to grow and fund its armed forces at a time when other countries were scaling back after the settlement of World War Two. From 1946 the French were fighting for Indochina, a historically important trading territory formally controlled since 1887, but were defeated and forced to leave in 1954. In 1953 a survey of the French population in Europe had shown that the majority of people did not wish for the Indochina War to continue, no matter what the outcome, and similarly in the following year few in France
12

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

were sorry to see Indo-China go (Judt, 2010, page 285). Many French people were tired with their country being involved in conflict and so a lot of them also did not like the increased occurrence of repression of protest in North Africa. An extra 20,000 French soldiers were sent to Algeria in 1954. The governments were short lived partly because of the changing and divided opinion of the electorate which was in part due to the increasingly unstable situation of the Union. The decisions of these weak coalitions, seeking to please to gain long term support, were influenced by people of powerful status all over the Union. Governors and decision-makers were in many cases very unrestricted in their choices which, in reflecting their interests, implemented repression and subsequently caused increased nationalist opposition and pressure. Because the settler community in Algeria *...+ was politically more powerful in Paris than those in Morocco and Tunisia (according to Mansfield, 1981, page 314), any influence of pied-noirs concerning the situation in the North African territories was led by Algerian settler interests. The territories of the Maghreb might seem to have been of equal value to an empire due to their obvious similarities. But Algeria was held in high regard as a territory by French governments for decades and was considered to be an important piece of the jigsaw of Empire. When political pressure and economic strain were mounting on France concerning their colonies in the 1950s, Algeria was prioritised over Tunisia and Morocco to be kept as the territory of most worth.
13

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

3. The Growth of Nationalism 3.1. Foreign policy of La Union Franaise


French foreign policy with regard to its colonies was one of 'assimilation' and integration. Another name for this policy was the mission civilatrice, which encapsulates the idea of a duty to spread superior French culture around the world. It was described in 1921 by Arthur Girault as existing to create an increasingly intimate union between the colonial and metropolitan territory (Principes de colonisation et de lgislation coloniale). The date of this source also demonstrates to some extent the consistency of the French attitude over decades of colonial history. In the 19th century France had seen the advantages of close links within the Empire which brought it economic benefits and in this way, power. The French colonial minister of the post-World War One era, Albert Sarraut, wanted the French European and colonial economies to be interdependent through investing for development. France had every intention of continuing the process of consolidating the imperial 'community': during the 1940s plans were being made by the Vichy government to develop industry in the colonies to increase economic output in these areas, to give more support for la mere patrie, and to be of more usefulness and value. The universalist assumptions of French republican philosophy is how Howard and Louis (1998) described the ideas behind the mission civilatrice, which was the basis of the French desire to hold onto its overseas territories. It is argued that nationalists in colonies all over the world found their cause strengthened by an agreement signed between
14

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

Britain and the USA in 1942. The Atlantic Charter was negotiated between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt to secure vital American supplies to the Allies at a critical point in World War Two. However, Roosevelt would not sign unless it included Clause Three which said that the two countries respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live (quoted by Reader, 1998, page 632). Although the event could be judged to not directly affect France or North Africa, Muhammed Harbi specified that it had an impact on Algerian nationalism. He argued that recognition of the right of people to liberty and selfdetermination gave to nationalism the sanction of the Great Powers (quoted by Mazrui, 1986, page 280). This is because no matter how reluctant Churchill was to sign the charter including this statement, it set down principles which the two countries agreed to hold regarding self-determination in all colonies. This new attitude to imperialism was symbolic of a changing world and although the Empires did not like it or act to promote it, it gave new life to nationalist movements in colonies everywhere. It had an effect across the whole world because of the importance of the US as a world power and the influence Britain had through its empire. The French reaction, to this new ideological opposition which later came to be supported by the 20th century superpowers and the newly founded UN, was revealed at the Brazzaville Conference of French colonial administrators in 1944. Whilst intending to abolish the worst aspects of colonialism (Rodgers and Thomas, 2010, page 281), for many people the reaffirmation at the conference of the
15

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

policy of assimilation was certainly not progressive reform. Austin (1978) quotes its conclusion made on this issue:
The aim of the civilising labours of France in the colonies excludes all possibilities of development outside of the French imperial system; the eventual formation even in the distant future of selfgovernment in the colonies must be dismissed. (page 13)

The conference did pre-empt some changes in rights for Algerian Muslims. In 1947 regional elections were introduced for an Algerian assembly with some autonomous powers. Algerian Muslims could now become full French citizens without having to renounce their religion. However, as with other attempts of the mission civilatrice, this restricted reform did not make much difference to the lives of the six million Arab/Berber Algerians other than to further inspire nationalism. Furthermore, by doing this France was actually helping to equip Algeria with knowledge it needed to become independent: through the closer links, Algerian politicians had increased understanding and experience of French power and legal structures. Mazrui (1989) says that The West has, albeit unintentionally, inspired African resistance through [...] alliance with metropolitan political parties (page 288). On the other hand, The West had in some ways also been supporting the French imperial campaign: in the years after the Second World War, the French economy could never have sustained a long drawn out war in a far flung colony without significant external aid. Judt (2010, page 284) is here referring to the Indochina War and the economic support the USA had provided which allowed
16

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

France to fight it. He is highlighting the issue France had during the decade of the prioritisation of lacking resources. If France was going to hold on to Algeria from 1954, it could not afford to fight a similar war in Morocco or Tunisia as well. In addition to restricting political freedoms, in aiming for total assimilation, France unknowingly nurtured the nationalist movement by its use of colonial soldiers in its wars. In World War One France sent 450,000 soldiers, including 50,000 from Algeria, to fight in Europe. Between 1939 and 1945 too, over 160,000 troops were recruited from French African colonies. These men were coming home having been trained in European methods of armed combat and with experience of fighting. Ironically they had been risking their lives for the Allies' cause for democracy and 'the free world', and yet saw that within their own country these freedoms had not been allowed. This use of Algeria made it possible for ordinary men to see the outside world, the effects of which are summed up by Best et al (2008) by explaining that these travellers returned home more politically conscious than before and keen to achieve European standards of living (page 405). Thus the nature of the close French links to their colonies, particularly Algeria, conversely helped the growth of nationalism. 3.2. French methods of managing the Union French governments caused problems for their Union because they did not adapt its colonial policy to keep up with the changing world. The reasons for the repressive methods used in Algeria up to
17

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

1956, including during the Algerian War from 1954, are explained below. Repression sped up the growth of nationalism and influenced the timing of decolonization in the Maghreb. France felt that it needed to manage its colonies with military strength. This is because this was the best way it thought it could retain power and hold the Empire - and later Union - together and strong. It was desperate to keep this extended empire: Howard and Louis (1998) described an empire as having ability to enrich national power and to encapsulate national glory as well as to represent national power, prestige, and destiny (page 91). An empire was representative of France when it had been a 19th century world power and of the time before the physical and mental damage of the two World Wars. Along with many other historians, Howard and Louis (1998) believe that The demise of France as a Middle Eastern power was a result of the Second World War (page 98). After 1945, France reimposed its full authority (Mansfield, 1981, page 310) with the intention of a return to pre-war power structures and political order. It used its power in an attempt to bring it more power, by oppressing any political, usually nationalist, opposition using military force and violence. Even before the outbreak of war in 1954 this was often bloody, over the top and unjustifiable: after nationalists committed murder and vandalism in Algeria on Victory in Europe day in 1945, the French carried out a campaign in retaliation in which 40,000 50,000 Muslims were claimed to have died; according to the French, this figure was 1,005. This willingness by ministers, governors and the military to continue
18

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

with these types of actions demonstrated what Best et al (2008) described as France's efforts to win back its esteem (page 408), which it felt it had lost after occupation during World War Two and later in mid-1954 with imperial losses in Indochina. The influential professional officer corps harboured continuing grievances according to Judt (2010, page 285) and some younger officers began to nourish inchoate but dangerous resentments as breaking up the empire showed to the international community that Frances power was declining and it did not want further reason to appear weak. France had no wish to allow the risk of the repetition of war and subsequent decolonization in Algeria. Many politicians were also trying to win back support from sections of the French public for whom their country's international decline was an affront to their national values. Furthermore, the French showed themselves that they could be successful in continuing to manage the Union with violence. Their experience of violently repressing protest as early as 1945 in Algeria and suppressing an armed rebellion in Madagascar in 1947 showed that they could keep order in this way and gave them confidence in the way they continually chose to act. Repression in North Africa caused a 'domino effect' of nationalism due to pan-Arabism across the region, a reaction demonstrated today in the 'Arab Spring' popular uprisings of 2011. In particular, the overthrow of King Faroukh of Egypt in 1952 by Colonel Nasser encouraged nationalism to increase in the Maghreb. Mazrui (1986) says that In North Africa opposition to European imperial rule was often reinforced by some Pan-Islamic sentiment
19

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

(page 285). This adds weight to the claim that as a result of protest in Algeria and the French attempts to disperse it, nationalist movements became more popular and widespread. Violent repression continually used by French governments in their colonies characterised the Algerian relationship and stretched Frances power and resources across the three North African territories. Contrary to the success with which French officials believed their foreign policy to be working, according to Mansfield (1981) in many territories over many years the forces of nationalism only grew under French repression(page 310). This meant an increase of native rebellion and protest, discontent with the ongoing imperialist campaign in a growing section of the French public, and the outbreak of war in Algeria. The continued abuse of power polarized the argument for independence because there became a 'good' and a 'bad' side, particularly in the eyes of international observers. Although both the nationalists and the French committed illegal and horrific acts of violence, when justification was sought there seemed to be more sense in the Algerians' campaign for self rule over their ethnic land. The ugly struggle, from 1954 a war, not only helped to form stronger and more emotionally charged opposition to the French. Vadney (1991) states that it caused widespread dissatisfaction with the war in North Africa. This was internally in France as well as internationally, helped by what Best et al (2008) describes as the Front de Libration Nationale's ability to be very effective in presenting its cause to international opinion (page 408) and the following success of its campaign for international
20

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

support. To preserve France's international standing and to not become isolated in the fight, Premier Ministre Mendes-France had to give way somewhere in order to appease the opposition of the actions being used to retain Algeria. This distraction was found in Morocco and Tunisia. Initially, alternatives were sought: in 1953 the popular Sultan Mohammed V of Morocco was deposed by the French authorities and deported to Madagascar in an attempt to reinstate their ultimate control and to show their power over a state in which political protest was mounting. However, the nationalists were not deterred and were instead united behind a common symbol of Moroccan colonial defiance. In 1954 autonomy was offered but as protest and fighting became more intense, the following occurred in 1955:
Faced with a united Moroccan demand for the sultan's return, rising violence in Morocco, and the deteriorating situation in Algeria, the French government brought Mohammed V back to Morocco. (<http://www.arab.de/arabinfo/berbers.htm>)

France declared it relinquished as a Protectorate not long after and 1956 saw Moroccan and Tunisian decolonization, and a loss for French imperialists and the Union. In August 1954 the struggle of Premier Ministre Mendes-France was reported by a British newspaper as desperately trying to steer a middle course between African nationalists, demanding independence, and French conservatives, afraid he will give away valuable colonial interests (Mercer, 1995, page 762). Colonized
21

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

peoples had realised that it was possible to achieve freedom for themselves and by 1956 there had been a rise in nationalist support and protest. French actions exacerbated this growth in Algeria, which also affected other North African territories. Without the rise in nationalism, Tunisia and Morocco would not have been decolonized in 1956 as an act to protect the special relationship with Algeria.

22

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

4. Conclusion
The violent repression used to try to stop the growth of nationalism was the most significant factor contributing to the partial decolonization of the French Maghreb in 1956. These methods which so stoked the nationalist movement were used as a result of the interests of the strong settler community in Algeria, which was able to influence the short-term Paris governments, and the aims of Frances traditional imperial policy. France could not afford politically or economically to sustain control over all three of its North African territories by 1956, as the difficulty of the imperialist campaigns and international and public opposition increased. Algeria was symbolic by being the closest to fulfilling an old French dream of assimilation of the worlds peoples into French culture. That the ideology of many French conservatives, imperialists and colonists found the loss of Algeria an inconceivable idea allowed Frances abandonment of continued resistance in Tunisia and Morocco in order to retain this special relationship. The struggling governments and aged policies of France and the building of strong nationalist movements in the colonies combined to create a situation in which tradition and ideals had to make way for practical politics.

Words: 3980
23

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

Bibliography - Works Cited


Arabic German Consulting, 2011. [online] Available at: <http://www.arab.de/arabinfo/berbers.htm> [Accessed 15 May 2011] Austin, D., 1978. Politics in Africa. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Best, A. Hanhimki, J.M. Maiolo, J.A. and Schulze, K.E., 2008. International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond. 2nd ed. Oxon: Routledge. Howard, M. and Louis, W.R., 1998. The Oxford History of the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Judt, T., 2010. Postwar: a History of Europe Since 1945. London: Vintage. (First published 2005). Mansfield, P., 1981. The Arabs. 2nd ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd. Mazrui, A.A., 1986. The Africans: A Triple Heritage. London: BBC Publications. Mercer, D., 1995. Chronicle of the 20th Century. London: Dorling Kindersley.
24

Elizabeth Davis; IB Extended Essay; History

Photius Coutsoukis, 2006. [online] Available at: <http://www.allcountries.org/maps/europe_middle_east_africa_ma ps.html> [Accessed 21 September 2011] Reader, J., 1998. Africa: A Biography of the Continent. London: Penguin Books Ltd. Rodgers, K. and Thomas, J., 2010. History: Causes, Practices and Effects of Wars. Harlow: Pearson Baccalaureate Limited. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2011. [online] Available at: <http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007310> [Accessed 3 August 2011]

Acknowledgements
Horne, A., 2004. Friend or Foe: A History of France. Weidenfield & Nicolson. independent.co.uk, 1995. [online] Available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-generaledmond-jouhaud-1599695.html> [Accessed 9 August 2011] Wikipedia, 2011. [online] Available at: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edmond_Jouhaud> [Accessed 9 August 2011]
25

S-ar putea să vă placă și