Journal ofthe British Societyfor Phenomenology, 35, 3, October 2004

JACQUES DERRIDA'S DOUBLE DECONSTRUCTIVE

READING: CONTRADICTION tERMS?

The present essay constitutes a critical appraisal of Derrida' s
deconstructive double reading. This appraisal highlights a certain tension
between the two different "gestures" that deconstructive reading:
namely, between the first reading (a reading that reproduces or "doubles"
authorial or textual intention) and the second reading (a reading that
deconstructs the meanings that have been detennined and identified
the first reading). general position is that the absence an
extra-linguistic foundation for meaning, all textual meaning "js exceeded or
split by the intervention of that is, by a dissemination irreducible to
polysemy." et, while such a position renders possible the deconstruction of
semantically determinate and identifiable claims the second reading),
renders impossible the attainment of such claims the first reading).

Deconstructive as Double Reading.
the chapter entitled "The Exorbitant. Question of Method", Derrida notes
that deconstructive reading situates itself the gap between what the author
"commands" within her text (her "vouloir-dire") and what she does not
"command", that is, what takes place her text without her will. This
distance, fissure or opening is something that deconstructive reading must
"produce" (OG 158/DLG 227).1
et, order produce this fissure or opening, deconstructi ve reading
must first reproduce what the author "wants-to-say", something that requires
the submission to classical reproductive reading practices. The
reading (namely the reproduction the authorial or textual intention) is then
destabilised through th6 utilisation <?f all those elements that have refused
be incorporated within Hence, the meanings produced during this first
reading become "disseminated" the second reading. other words,
during this second reading the text loses its apparent semantic
detenninacy, organized around the axis its authorial intention, and is
eventua1ly pushed into producing a number of incompatible meanings which
are "undecidable", the sense that the reader lacks any secure ground for
between them. For example, Plato 's Pharmacy,2 Derrida
exhibits the way which the text of Phaedrus, despite Plato' s
keep the two opposite meanings of - namely the meanings of
"remedy" and "poison" - separate, ends affinning fois both.
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deconstructive reading, therefore, contains both a "dominant",3 \
reproductive ading and a reading. The first reading,
which ca11s a "doubling redoublant"J
(OG 158/DLG 227), finds a passage "lisible" and understandable, and
reconstructs the determinate meaning of the passage read according to a
procedure that the deconstructive reader shares with comrnon readers. The
second reading, which he calls a "critical reading" or an "active
interpretation", goes the meanings that the first reading has
already construed. this double reading or ."double gesture" ["double
geste"],4 is obliged to use classica1 and practices
at the same time, to negate their power to "control" a text, to construe
thorougWy a text as something detenninate, and "disserninate" the text
into a series of "undecidable" meanings.
The tension Derrida' s "double" interpreti procedure is rather
apparent. Deconstruction can only subvert the meaning of a text that has
already been construed. order for a text' s intentional meaning to become
destabilised, the text needs to possess a certain stability so that it can be
rendered In Derrida describes this "doubling
commentary" - the initial detennination or reading that the deconstructive
operation focuses - as
the deciphering of the "fm(" pertinen( or competent access to structures that are
relatively stable hence destabilizable.1), and from which the most venturesome questions
and interpretations have to ..." [italics added] 145/"Postface" 268)
The expression "relatively stable (and hence destabilizable!)", the
paradoxica1 presuppositions of the determination of
the metaphysical text has to be since the destabilising force of
deconstruction can take place only something that possesses a certain
stability whilst simultaneously being order for deconstruction to
be possible ..
Initia11y, seems to be justified arguing that a certain structure,
though stable
t
is potentially destabilisable: stability is not an
irnmutability" 151/"Postface" 279). Change is ineliminable,
possibility. Yet, Derrida those reasons for the
destabilization of a certain textua1 structure which would preclude (even
"relative") stability to Therefore, the question that is whether it is
possible to think together the possibility stable determinations and
meaning as "dissemination" a non-contradictory manner?
But how does Derrida justify the possibility of the stable"
structure of the "doubling commentary? For him, the analysis of the
constitution of meaning undertaken the part of and
condensed the statement that "[ t ]he absence of the transcendental signified
extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely", 5 does not
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constitute an obstacle to the existence of stable or determinate
meanings. the contrary, differance - a neologism which coins
order to under1ine the fact that meaning is the product of the endless
differential play of language - is not presented as a constitutive
but rather as "render[ing] both possible and
necessary" 149/"Postface" 275). Differance is the playful
which produces the differences that are for words and
conceptualisation general: "Differance is the systematic play of
differences, of the traces of differences, of the spacing by means of which
elements are related to each other" 27IPOS 38).6
Derrida' s differance constitutes the radicalization of Ferdinard de
Saussure's structurallinguistics and, particular, of the determination of the
sign as arbitrary and differential. Saussure, a linguistic sign "connects
not a with a name but an idea with an acoustic image"7 or, respectively,
a "signified" with a "signifier" this sense, the
elements the linguistic sign are not physical but mental. The
bond between the and the Saussure tells US, is not natural,
but instituted or So, signs are "arbitrary" within the
system of language and only within this system. The signs of
language are not autonomous ideas and sounds which exist independently of
the linguistic system. These ideas and sounds are simply elements of a
linguistic system, and have the status conceptual and phonic differences
produced from this system itself. sign has meaning through the
position which occupies within a chain of conceptual and phonetic
differences. As Saussure declares: a language, there are on1y differences"
(CLG 166). These differences are not differences
already formed acoustic images ideas: language there
are only differences without terms" (CGL 166). that respect,
language is' not a system of identities but a systematic structure
differences.
Derrida infers from Saussure' s position the arbitrary and differential
character of the sign that it is impossible "that a simple element be present
and of itself, to itself' 26IPOS 37). Signs do not reflect pre
existing meanings. The possibility of any signification is
dependent a silent system of differential references. this sense, order
for any present element to signify it must refer to another element, different
from itself, that is not present. Denida meaning as a process of
signification which functions according to this pattem and, thus, that the idea
of the capacity to grasp the essence or the meaning of a sign - a true
presence - is an illusion.
Since the signified is its full plenitude, the structure of the
sign is always already simultaneously marked by difference and
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presence. Derrida coins the neologism describe the
difference, or the being-different of these differences, the "production" as
well as the "contamination" of each present element by something which is
not present. The substitution of the "e" of "difference" by the "a" of
from the present participle reca11s the French verb
differer. The verb differer has two seemingly quite distinct meanings which
are drawn from the Latin verb differere. The double meaning of the French
differer is rendered English by the different verbs "to differ" and "to
defer". Hence, differer, the sense of the verb "to differ", signifies
difference as lack of resemblance between two things, distinction, lack of
identity, or discemibility, while, differer, the sense of the
verb "to defer", "the interposition of delay, the interva1 of a spacing
and that puts off until 'later' what is presently denied, the
possible that is presently impossible".8
Hence, for Derrida, does not obstacle that would
prevent someone from making determinations regarding a
text' s In fact, we are told, is the condition of possibility
and impossibility' of meaning: while it makes meaning present, it excludes it
from present. the non-identity of with itself,
this has not the slightest effect the establishment of a text' s
intentional meaning, as often argues e!llphatically in opposition to all
those who, he are misinterpreting him when characterising
deconstruction as "henneneutic (e.g. John Ellis )9: "this process of
and meaning differing from themsel does not negate the
possibility of commentary'" (''AfteIWord'' 147/"Postface").
this sense, "doubling commentary" does not differ
radically from other reconstructions of a text' s authorial
intentions. As himself confesses: ''And you are saying that
these 'practical for interpretation' are 'not so threatening to
conventional modes of reading'" 147/"Postface" 271). All
those readers, who would "hastily" conclude that the radical view of
language and meaning put forward the first part of
fundamentally overtums all our traditional of and
reading, would find themselves filled with when in the second part,
the section entitled "The Exorbitant. Question of Method", they are
suddenly prompted to "respect all the classical exigencies" and "all the
instruments of traditional (OG 158IDLG 227)
the same spirit, "Afterword: Towards an Ethics of Discussion",
Derrida cautions against reading as equivalent to
"indeterminacy" :
do not believe have ever spoken of whether in regard to 'meaning' or
anything else. Undecidability is else again ... undecidabi1ity is always a
286
determinate oscillation between possibilities (for example, of meaning, but also of acts).
These possibilities are themselves highly determined in strictly defined situations (for ex
ample, discursive - syntactical - but also political, ethical, etc.). They are
pragmatically determined. The analyses that have devoted undecidability concern just
these and these defmitions, not at all some vague ...Which is
to say that from the point of view of semantics, but also of ethics and tics,
'deconstruction' should never lead either to relativism or to any sort of indeterminism.
be sure, in order for structures of undecidability to be possible (and hence structures
of decisions and of responsibilities as well) , there must be a certain play, differance,
of but of differance or of nonidentity with oneseIf the
very process of Differance is not indeterminacy. It renders determinacy both
possible and necessary. ("Afterword" 148-9/"Postface" 273-4)
Hence, does not seem question the attribution "relatively
stable" meanings to words and, by extension, to texts themselves. This is
what allows to be able to decide, for example, whenever Plato uses
the equivocal word pharmakon whether he means either "remedy" or
"poison". The "essential" or "undecidable" equi vocity of the word
pharmakon is another nature. It lies the text' s refusa1 to decide, against
its author' s intentions, favour the identification the word with one
its two opposite meanings (thus the pharmakon is described as
"undecidable"). The text does not refuse determine different meanings
for the word pharmakon; it refuses to decide favour the one or the
other. .
et, differance "is not indetenninacy", it "renders both
possible and necessary" thereby allowing a text to possess a "relative
stability", then what is it that renders the deconstruction these "relatively
stable" determinations possible? The answer is again: Differance. those
elements previously as the production of meaning
play, difference, differance - are a1so invoked to justify the deconstruction of
that "effect" meaning wmch the differentia1 play itself has produced.
order justify the possibility a text's deconstruction, turns the
turbulent effects of differance, which, however, were previously declared as
constituting an the attainment those stable textual
determinations which are now subject deconstruction. The differential
play, by preventing a concept' s meaning to be "fully present (present
itself, its signified, to other)" (OG 8IDLG 17), is now posed as that
wmch pushes the concepts (see, for example, the concept pharmakon) - and
by extension the text its entirety - into "undecidability". The same "play",
which did not previously prevent concepts from possessing a relatively
stable meaning. If, as Simon Glendinning writes, "the necessity 'play'
ensures that any putative 'unity meaning' is priori 'dispersed'
advance",ll then which stability of meaning, even relative, is possible
begin from? If the term "dissemination"12 is another name for the "play",
which, for conceptual identities, then, the stability
287
of meaning that the "doubling commentary" requires seems its
possibility undermined.
fal1s a paradox when he presents this "play" or
the constant slipping of entities their passage into their opposites as a
perpetual of properties - as limited "a
oscillation between ... highly determined possibilities", without any
effect the process of the of these possibilities. If there
is a certain or 144/"Postface"
266) the process of as himself declares, how then is
determination possible the fonn required by the "doubling commentary"?
mterprets the effects of the differentia1 constitution of concepts
will. the extent that deconstruction needs the "doubling commentary", the
constitution of a sign' s meaning or identity through its differences from other
does signs or concepts from carrying with them, at the
of their use, a certain, stable" load of meaning (something that,
according Derrida, allows the existence of stable determinations of a text's
as that of his "doubling commentary"). the other when
needs to explain and justify how the deconstruction of this "doubling
commentary" is made possible, he a certain or
indetermination that was able to open the space of my for
example, that of the word supplement" [italics added]
144/"Postface" 266).13 Thus, Derrida seems to "remain blind" to the
consequences of 'the existence of this ."play or
relation to the possibility of "doubling commentary" itself. The "hesitation"
that exhibits regard to the exact role that plays
within reading - a hesitation imposed by the prerequisites
of dbuble reading - forces him into contradictory statements
such as when, the one hand, he explicit1y refers to a certain "p"lay
in order to justify the possibility of deconstruction, while
the other hand, he claims that "1 do not 1 spoken of
'indetenninacy', whether in regard to 'meaning' or else .. .
is not indeterminacy" ("Afterword" 148/"Postface" 273). Yet, a third
passage declares again that ]nce again, that was possible only if a
non-self-identity, a a opened the space of
this history" (italics added) 145/"Postface" 267). Thus,
due to the paradoxical presuppositions of reading, a11
descriptions will to oscillate uncertainly between the need for the
of stable and the possibility of their
11
Interpreting Authorial 1ntention. contradiction with what he says about
the endless play between concepts, the fissure that effects the
288
core of presence, the sign which is just a "trace", the "residue" of meaning
which is just meaning falling short of itself or the of meaning in
general, treats or textua1 intention (a text's vouloir-dire) as
something which can be determined univocally. And this seems to flow from
the necessary prerequisites of deconstruction itself. Deconstruction is installed
between a text's intended meaning (its layer) and the text itself
(its descriptive layer). If a text' s authorial intention was not fixed and
then it would be difficult for deconstruction juxtapose against it
contradictory elements found the same text. 14 Thus, contrary to the text as a
whole, which treats as heterogeneous and or
textual intention is presented as a1ways coherence,15 homogeneity,
and as being by lack of ambiguity. Derrida treats the
text, during its first reading, as if only one of intention
were possible. He examines the possibility, (without being theoretically
able to preclude such a possibility), that other interpretations of
intention are also possible. The aim of this is protect the effectiveness of
the strategy of deconstruction. If accepted, even potentially, that other
interpretations of a text' s were possible, then he could
preclude the possibi1ity that other, non-metaphysica1 determinations of a
text' s intentional meaning could be feasible, that would not
thus be dire need of deconstruction. This, in tum, would affect his whole
"narrative" about "Westem metaphysics," which is by the spffit of
an interpretation of the texts of the philosophical tradition,
thereby it of much of its credibility. if he conceded the
possibility of the existenc,e of other plausible interpretations, either
metaphysical or (although this is something that he could know
then the deconstruction of merely one out of this
potential plethora of plausible interpretations would have only a limited
significance and effectiveness.
The kind of certainty about a text' s that deconstruction
requires is possible only if authorial meanings are pure, solid, "self
identical" facts which can be used to anchor the work. However, this way of
conceiving meaning is direct opposition to deconstruction, for which
meaning is impossible to of a fixed entity or substance.
author' s intention is itself a complex 'text', which can be debated,
translated and interpreted just like any other text
143/"Postface" 265).
Derrida, for all his harsh criticism of organicist concepts, seems
paradoxica1ly to share the prejudgement that philosophica1 texts, at least if
only at an initial are integrated wholes, as if the of the work
resides the author' s However, there is, fact,
reason why the author should not have had severa1 mutua11y contradictory
289
or why her intention may not have been somehow self
contradictory. This is actua11y a possibility that Denida does not consider at
all. The way which appear texts does not necessarily
a consistent whole, and it may be unwise to rest this assumption
too heavily, particularly, if one speaks, as does, about intention as
an effect." There is absolutely need to suppose that or
textua1 intention either do or should 'constitute hannonious wholes.
this sense, s stance towards a text' s (i.e. its
could be described as juridical: anything which cannot be
herded inside the enclosure of 'probable' meaning is brusquely
expelled, and everything remaining within that enclosure is strictly
subordinated to this single goveming intention. Under such an approach,
authorial are order to be replaced with a
stable meaning. They must be "normalised". Such a "doubling commentary"
of or textual intentions is obliged to render mutually coherent the
greatest number of a work' s elements. it would not be "exorbitant" to
attribute to his treatment of or textual intention, the
same accusations he to the metaphysical tradition conceming the
way which it treats texts as unified wholes:
111
Conclusion. could have limited himself the less ambitious (and
also less ambiguous) claim that concepts and texts do not constitute vehicles
or containers of present meanings. Of course, he would not be the
first philosopher to make such a claim. Moreover, such a claim would not
necessarily exclude the of the existence of "re1atively stable"
it would exclude only the of perfectly
meanings.
16
et is not with merely doubting univocity. He
wants to do something bigger: to He thus takes the step
of arguing that the absence of an extra-linguistic foundation for our
linguistic practices the "dissemination" of construed meanings into
"undecidability" is endless. Now the possibility of deconstruction arises, but
a certain anomaly its "double" interpretive procedure seems arise too:
text must be read order to be disseminated into an
"undecidability" that never breaks completely free of its initial
detennination. Deconstruction can only subvert the of a text that
has already been construed So, what does deconstruction
ultimately favour: or needs to decide
17
whether promotes stability meaning (even a relative one) or
"dissemination." He cannot utilise both possibilities simply because
deconstruction needs them both.
18
University of Crete, Greece
290
References
1. Grammatology, trans. Gayatri C. (Baltimore: John Hopkins
Press, 1976 (OG) / De (Paris: Les Editions de
1967), (DLG).
2. Jacques "Plato's trans. Barbara Johnson, (Chicago:
Cbicago University Press, 1981) (D) "Le Pharrnacie de Platon"
Collection (paris: Editions de Seuil, 1972) (DIS).
3. Deaida cal1s this initial reading that deconstruction enacts the text "dominant
interpretation" ("interpr6tation dominant") [J. Toward an Ethic of
Discussion" in Limited Inc, trans. S. Weber, (Evaston, ll..: Northwestem Press,
1988), 143 / "Postface: Vers une ethique de discussion" in Limited Znc,
Les Editions de Minuit, 1972), 265 ("Postface")].
4. Jacques "Signature, Event, Context" Limited Znc, op.cit., / "Signature
Evenement Contexte" de philosophie, Les Editions de Minuit, 1972),

5. Jacques "Structure, Sign and Play the Discourse of Human Sciences"
Writing Difference, trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978),
280/ "La structure, le signe et 1e jeu dans le discours de sciences humains" Ecriture et
Difference, de Seuil, 1967), 411.
6. Jacques Positions, trans. Alan Bass, (London: The Athlone Press, 1987) /
Positions, (paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1972) (POS).
7. Ferdinard de Saussure, Cours de linguistique (Paris: Payot, 1973), 98 (CLG).
8. Jacques "Differance" Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass, (London:
Harvester Wbeatsheaf 1982), 3 / "La differance" in de philosophie, Les
de Minuit, 1972, 3.
9. JoOO Ellis, Deconstuction, (Princeton, N.J.: University Press, 1989),

10. The part of is presented by as a matrix", while
the second part Derrida' s deconstructive reading of Ro.usseau' s Essay and the
Con/esswns) is presented as an "example" of the fust part:
"The firsr part of this book, 'Writing before the Letter,' sketches broad outlines a
theoretical matrix. It indicates certain moments, and proposes certain
concepts. These critical concepts are put the test the second part, 'Nature,
Culture, This is the' moment, as it were, of the example, although strictly
speaking, that is not acceptable within my argurnent." (OG lxxxixIDLG 7)
11. Simon Glendincing, Being with Others:' Wittgenstein, (London:
Routledge, 1999), 81.
12. Explaining the term "dissemination", Gayatri Chacravorty Spivak mentions the following:
a false etymological kinship between and semen, offers this
version of textuality: sowing that does not produce plants, but is simply inficitely
repeated. semination that is not insemination but disseminaton, seed spilled in vain ...
Not an exact and controlled polysemy, but a proliferation of always different, always
postponed meanings." (G. S. Spivak, "Translator's Preface", Jacques .
While Ricbard Harland adds: must be
from univocity or the state of single meanings by the
the writer' s mind; but it must also be distinguished from polysemy or the state of multiple
maintained by the in the reader's mind. is the state of
perpetually unfulfilled meaning that exists the absence of all signifieds." (Richard
Harland, Superstructuralism: The Philosophy Structuralism & New
York: Methuen, 1987, 135).
13. In the next page of the Towards an Ethics of Discussion", the
possibility of the deconstruction of "doubling commentary" refers once more a
indeteoninacy" within as a prerequisite for the possibility of any
291
deconstruction: "[o]nce again, that was possible only if a non-self-identity, a differance and
a opened the space of this violent history" (italics added)
145/"Postface" 267).
14. In the declares consistency with what he thinks about language
and meaning that "'doubling is not a moment of simple reflexive recording
that would the originary and true layer of a text's a
rneaning that is and self-identical" (italics added) 143/"Postface"
265). However, in practice, treats the "doubling" of a text's intention
according those that he denounces above. Indicative of this is the fact that
from his multiple readings, hesitation is cornpletely absent.
15. Por example, in "Violence and Metaphysics", declares that "[w]e will refuse to
the self-coherent unity of intention [l'unit'e fidele soi de l'intention] to the
which then would be more than pure disorder." (1. "Violence and
Metaphysics" Writing Difference, 84).
16. This position would be also content with a certain conception of differance: while
differance makes meaning present, excludes from being present.
17. In "Structure, Sign, and Play the Discourse of the Human Sciences", when he refers to
two different "Interpretations of interpretation", the structuralist of a meaning
and the Nietzschean affmnation of play, which can be compared respectively with the two
different kinds of interpretation that deconstructive "double" reading itself,
Derrida declares that do not that today there is any question of choosing - the
first place because here we are a region (let us say, provisionally, a region of
where the category of choice seems particularly (1. "Structure, Sign,
and .... ", Difference, 293). Even if is accepted that this declaration
does not constitute attempt to escape from adequate justification of the paradoxical
demands of deconstructi ve reading, what are the interpretive resources that Derrida has
utilised order to reach such an assertion about the kinds of interpretation prevailing
today as well as today's regarding choice? 1s such an assertion made from either
the side of or playful Does not such an assertion violate what
Demda about choice?
18. would like to thank Dr Peter Langford for his invaluable help.
292