The Impact of Firearms on Japanese Warfare, 1543-98 Author(s): Delmer M.

Brown Reviewed work(s): Source: The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3 (May, 1948), pp. 236-253 Published by: Association for Asian Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2048846 . Accessed: 30/11/2011 15:37
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THE

IMPACT

OF FIREARMS ON JAPANESE WARFARE, 1543-98

DELMER M. BROWN*

Berkeley University California, of

DEVELOPMENT OF THE USE OF HAND GUNS

featureof Japanesewarfare, prior to the introcharacteristic in in ductionof firearms 1543,1was the use of swordsand spears2 bands Armies weremade up of small,independent fighting. hand-to-hand
* Dr. Brown is Assistant Professorof Far Eastern History at the Universityof California, Berkeley. He taught and studied in Japan from 1932 to 1938, served as an Intelligence Officer with the Navy in the Pacific during the war, and completed his Doctor's degree in Japanese history at Stanford University in 1946. His special field of interest is the development of money economy in Japan. expedition against Japan in 1274, used weapons which, accord'The Mongols, in their first ing to a Japanese militaryhistorywrittenin the fourteenthcentury,were called tepp6 .,Z (a word now meaning "gun" or "firearm"). The referencereads: "When the fightingbegan, mighty iron balls, known as tePP6, were [flung?]. They rolled down the hills like cart wheels, sounded like thunder and looked like bolts of lightning. Two or three thousand were [thrown?] at a time, and many soldiers were burned to death;" see "Taihei ki"**-k [Library of national literature] (10th ed., Tokyo: published in Kokubun s6sho ; [Scroll Hakubun Kan, 1918), vol. 4, pp. 478-79. The "M6ko shfirai emaki" t of the Mongol invasion], which was painted toward the close of the thirteenthcenturyat the request of a warrior who took part in the war against the Mongols, depicts one of these "iron balls" exploding, or burning, slightlyin frontof, and above, a Japanese warrior. For a picture of that portion of the scroll see L. Carrington Goodrich and Feng Chia-sheng;""The early in development of firearms China," Isis, 36 (Jan. 1946), 118. It appears that these balls were not discharged by an explosive but were a type of bomb or rocket,although Goodrich and Feng conclude that "there is valid literaryevidence for the development, by the thirteenthcentury, of real firearmsin China..." (p. 123). G. Schlegel also found that the Chinese knew and employed firearmsin the thirteenth century; "On the invention and use of firearmsand gunpowder in China, prior to the arrival of the Europeans," T'oung Pao, 2d ser., 3 (1902), 10. cannon Pelliot later showed, however, that what Schlegel considered to be a thirteenth-century was a type of bomb; P. Pelliot, "Bulletin critique," T'oung pao, 2d ser., 21 (1922), 432-34. For a picture of what is claimed to be the oldest-dated cast-iron cannon, cast in China in 1377, see Thomas A. Read, "The early castings of iron: a stage in iron age civilization," Geographical review, 24 (1934), 548. Boxer found a gun on exhibit in Kamakura which was claimed to have been in the possession of Ashikaga Takauji (1305-58), but he found no evidence on the gun or in contemporarysources that provided any basis for this claim; C. R. Boxer, "Notes on early military influencein Japan (1543-1853), Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 2d ser., 8 (1931), [Chronicles of the H6j6 71 (hereafter cited as TASJ). The "H6j6 godai ki" 4kA familythroughfivegenerations] contains an account of the presentationof a gun (teppogJM) to Hoj6 Ujitsuna in 1510 by a Buddhist priest who had just returned from China; Kond6 ed., Shiseki shfiran jkV Heij6 {E#J:*, ro [Collection of historical materials] (3d ed., Tokyo: Kond6 Shuppan Bu, 1907), vol. 5, ch. 26, pp. 58-60. Naganuma Kenkai has found numerous referencesto the existence of guns in Japan prior to the arrival of the

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of soldiers who fought more as individuals than as units of a tactical and naval units consisted of fishingvessels that were commanformation,3 deered for transportingarmies within bow-range or sword-reachof the enemy.4Thus, all battles,whetheron land or at sea, were little more than "monster fencing matches."5 But the introduction of the Portuguese arquebus and the subsequent widespread manufacture of firearmssoon led to radical developments in military techniques.
Portuguese; "Tepp6 no denrai" X2,fi [Introduction of firearms],Rekishi chir, 23, no. 6 (1914), 623-35; "Tepp6 no denrai (hosetsu)" Uj [Introduction of fire-

have discussedthe seki] (Tokyo,1907),vol. 6, pp. 335-41.Since his time otherhistorians subject; NaganUma see Kenkai, Nihon bunkashi ?lo kenkyitH *Mtt, PL[A study of the cultural history Japan] (Tokyo: KyoikuKenkvyu 1923),512-22fora summary of Kai, of theirstudies.But theywerenot concerned withthe total effect thesenew weaponshad upon Japanese warfare. The morerecent studiestoo have been limited, the mostpart,to for problems associatedwith the introduction itself:TsuLboiKumaz6 i9L.5 "Tepp6 denraik6" e [Consideration the introduction firearms], of of Shigakit zasshi,3, no. 30 (Feb. 1892),37-53; variousstudiesof NaganumaKenkai (citedabove); Gotb Shukud6 ,gX<n "Tepp6 ron b6kei no isshu yo mondai" MAri [An important problem associated withthediscussion guns],Rekishi of chir, 24, no. 5 (Nov. 1914),492-501;OshigamiMoriz6ot Aid, "Naganumakun no tepp6denrairon hosetsu' discussion Naganuma's to of study the intro'p8Ct),T@X~gR [Supplementary dluction firearms], of Rekishichirn, no. 2 (Aug. 1914), 172-79;"Tepp6 denrai ron no 24, Y'6setsi" - [Additional dliscussion the disputeabout the introduction of of firearms], Rekishichir, 24, no. 4 (Oct. 1914),371-81;"Tepp6 no hibiki" [The soundof guns],Rekishichiri, no. 5 (Nov. 1914),501-04.Of late somescholars 24, have

of each type of weapon and devoted the sixth volume to firearms: "Kakirui" et fi [Types of firearms],Arai Hakuseki zenshf-t jpjjjJ l t [Complete works of Arai Haku-

The first to Japanesehistorian makea studyof firearms Arai Hakuseki was (1656-1725) who wrotethe "Honch6 gunkik6" *-M prior to g4 (12 vols.) sometime 1709,the date of the earliest-known colophon.He studiedthe development advantages and

TokNo:

arms(supplementary Rekishichiri, no. 2 (1914),131-50and no. 4 (October1914), study)], 24, [Introduction firearms of 339-68;and "Tepp6 no denrai(W)" (reply)], Rekishichiri,25, no. 1 (1915),32-64. But it is generally agreed that guns were not used for until the end of the TembunXa extensively military purposes era (1532-54);Kuroita Katsumi d, Kokushi no kenkyiTt [A K 0 WftJ study of Japanese history] (6th ed.,
Iwananii Shoten, 1937), vol. 2, p. 273.

VAN~a
l

Tomi6 jX} of Tepp5 denrai ki [The introduction firearms] (Tokyo, 1939).But eventhisexcellent work misses significance defensive the of fighting behindbreastworks a directresult the adoptionof firearms 14)-58). of (pp.
i
nig

Louched upon various phases of the problem, and one has attacked the problem directly: D6

tection against arrows thattheoutcome mostbattles determined after opposing of was only the forces in closecombat. discussion pictures weapons met For and of and other military used gear 6 duringthe Middle Agessee Got Moriichi Nihon rekishi kakogaku *St , 4g, Aft [Japanese historical archaeology] ed.,Tokyo,1940), (4th 88-276, and FrankBrinkley, Japan,itshistory, and literature arts (Boston, 1901), vol. 2, pp. 128-72. 3Brinkley,op. cit., vol.2, p. 161. 4Arthur J. Marder, "FromJimmu Tenno to Perry, powerin earlyJapanesehistory," sea American historical review, (Oct. 1945),1-34. 51 Brinkley, cit., 2, p. 133. op. vol.

Bows and arrows were also used, but apparently the armor provided stucheffectivepro-

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of The effectiveness the new weapon deeply impressed local military barons. They paid high prices for the few guns that could be purchased and immediatelyordered their blacksmithsto undertake the manufacture of similar pieces. But such technical problems as closing one end of the barrel were solved only afterassistance had been received fromoccidental gunsmiths.6 Nevertheless, a Portuguese adventurer, in writing of his experiences in Japan at this time, reported that within two or three years the Japanese had succeeded in making several hundred guns, and that by 1556 there were more than 300,000 guns in Japan.7 At firstthe was confined to the island of Kyushu, where the manufactureof firearms Portuguese vessels called, but within a few years blacksmiths from the main island were journeying to Kyushu to study methods of making this new type of weapon.8 The more famous gunsmiths founded "schools,"9 and men trained in them were soon opening up shops in the most distant villages of Japan. Sakai in the province of Izumi and Yokkaichi and Kunitomo in the province of Kai became particularly famous as centers for the production of firearms.10 In 1549 Oda Nobunaga - the military baron who with his successor, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, succeeded in unifying Japan under one strong, central government- placed an order for five hundred matchlocks with the gunsmiths of Kunitomo.11 Two decades later Takeda Shingen, the
A, an account writtenin about 1600 by a Buddhist priest "The "Nanp6 bunshfi"-M of the province of Osumi, provides the most detailed and authentic informationrelative to the vol. 31, pp. 878-80 and into Japan; quoted in Koji ruien t$mt, introduction of firearms translated in James Murdoch, A historyof Japan (London: Kegan Paul, 1925), vol. 2, p. 42. The interestof the barons in the Portuguese guns is also described by Fernao Mendes Pinto, one of the firstPortuguese to visit Japan; Henry Cogan, tr., The voyages and adventures of Ferdinand Mendez Pinto, the Portuguese (London, 1892), 256 if. could 7Cogan's Pinto, p. 265. Pinto's whole narrativeis questionable, however,and the figures have been based on no reliable statistics. 8 Kasai Shigesuke [Chronicles of government L "Nankai jiran ki" , and war in the Nankai], Koji ruien, vol. 31, p. 884. 9When a certain artisan had gained a reputation for superior workmanship or technique, a group of apprentices would gather to study his methods. The more capable apprentices were adopted into the familyof the master and gained the privilege of practicing the art under the master's name, which became known as a ryilA or "School." The matchlocks of the in "schools" varied considerably.Therefore, we find no uniformity the caliber of these early guns; the weight of the loads ranged from 10 to 110 grams. Tokutomi Iichir6 [Modern history of the Japanese people] Kinsei Nihon kokumin shi rffy *RIX (Popular ed., Tokyo: Minyu Sha, 1935), vol. 10, p. 377 (hereafter cited as KNKS). For a matchlock made in Japan see Boxer, op. cit., p. 72. picture of a sixteenth-century 10Kuroita, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 274. The early development of the manufacture of firearmsis discussed at length in D6 Tomi6, op. cit., pp. 14-110. ""Kunitomo tepp6 ki" pqA;k E [History of the firearmsof Kunitomo], quoted in Kuroita, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 274.

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lord of the province of Kai, is said to have addressed the following order to his retainers: decreasethe Hereafter guns will be the mostimportant[weapons]. Therefore, guns. numberof spears [in yourarmies] and have yourmostcapable men carry and Furthermore, when you assembleyour soldiers,test theirmarksmanship order that the selectionof [gunners]be in accordancewith the results[of the test] .12 In the battle of Nagashino, which took place in the eastern part of Japan in 1575, Nobunaga had an army of about 70,000 men, and 3,000 of them were armed with matchlocks.13Thereafter the use of handguns spread rapidly. By the time of Nobunaga's death in 1582 probably one-third of the soldiers in the armies of most of the leading military barons were gunners. Toyotomi Hideyoshi, the lord who gained control of the territories conquered by Nobunaga, and who in ten years completed the task of placing the entire countryunder his sway, gave more and more attention to the problem of supplying his armies with a larger number of firearms. This emphasis woTas particularlyapparent in his preparations, in 1586, for the conquest of Kyushu.14Numerous extant documents signed by Hideyoshi at that time deal with arrangementsfor the procurement and distribution of guns and ammunition."5 During the course of the campaign hand guns were used extensively,not only by Hideyoshi but by the lords to of Kyushu.16It would be difficult prove that Hideyoshi's victory was but some basis for due to the employmentof a larger number of firearms, this view may be found in the memoirs of the Satsuma writer who, in relating details of the defeat, explained that the enemy had "several thousand" guns.17 In 1590 Hideyoshi sent over 950,000 men against Hoj6
1 Takeda Shingen order,8th moon, Genki 2 (1571), KNKS vol. 10, p. 384. Tokutomi expresses some doubt as to whether this order was really issued by Shingen, but it is probable that Shingen did place great value upon the use of guns at this time, for as early as 1555 he had [Chronicles of the supplied one of his castles with 300 muskets; "Myoho-ji ki" 4gj4, MIyOho Temple], KNKS, vol. 1, p. 103. j [Chronicles of Nobunaga], Koji ruien, yh,"Nobunaga ki" Kose Hoan , has been studied in Do, op. cit., pp. 126-96. vol. 31, p. 935. Nobunaga's extensive use of firearms 14 Kose Hoan, "Taiko ki" ;; j-t [Chronicles of Toyotomi Hideyoshi], Shiseki shuiran, vol. 6, ch. 29, p. 203. [Documents of Toyotomi HideKusaka Hiroshi VI -FA, ed., Ho Ko ibumn -, yoshi] (Tokyo: Hakubun Kan, 1914), pp. 77-113. 16"Taiko ki," Shiseki shuran, vol. 6, ch. 29, pp. 207-08. Hideyoshi wrote that "guns and ammunition" had been captured from the enemy; Hideyoshi to Sagara et al, 10th moon, 22d clay,Tenshfl 15 (1587), Ho Ko ibun, p. 170. Katsube Hyoemon kikigaki" u r t : F [Record of matters heard from i ff PII KatsUbe Hyoemon], KNKS, vol. 5, p. 287.

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Ujinao, the only important baron who had not yet submitted to Hideas yoshi's overlordship. It is known that Hoj6 used firearms, an account of the period contains the statement that he placed three muskets and one cannon at each loophole in his castle at Odawara.18 The author of the same account expressed the view that Hideyoshi planned to demolish the Odawara Castle by firing"several tens of thousands of guns."'19 The succession of victorieswon by the Japanese armies during the early part of the Korean invasion (1592-1598) was due in large part to the fact that Hideyoshi's troops were well supplied with muskets,20 whereas the Koreans apparently had none.21 In the firstland battle, fought at Fusan, Hideyoshi's advance divisions were met by a Korean force of comparable but according to Hideyoshi's chronicler,"the curtain of arrows" strength, It thrown up by the Koreans was "wiped out with gunfire."22 is not surprising, therefore,to read that within twentydays the Japanese armies had captured the Korean capital, about 250 miles distant from Fusan. The Japanese commanders were fully aware of the advantage which the use of muskets gave them, as is shown by the following comments made by Shimazu Yoshihiro in a letterwhich he sent to his home province early in the war: There is absolutelyno use for Please arrangeto send us guns and ammunition. spears. It is vital that you arrange somehow to obtain a number of guns. Furthermore, should certainly to it that those personsdeparting [for you see for Korea] understandthis situation.The arrangements guns should receive your closestattention.23 of The effectiveness the musket became even more pronounced during the battle foughtin 1593 between a Japanese army,under Konishi, and a
godai ki," Shiseki shfiran, vol. 5, ch. 26, p. 60. 19Ibid., p. 59. There was very little fightingat Odawara because Hideyoshi forced Hoj6 to surrenderby surrounding the castle with a superior army and waiting until Hoj6's provisions were exhausted (Murdoch, A history of Japan, vol. 2, pp. 256-58). 20 In preparing for the Korean invasion Hideyoshi ordered Shimazu of the province of Satsuma to arm 1,500 men with muskets, 1,500 with bows, and 300 with spears. Hideyoshi to Shimazu, Tensh6 19 (1591); translated in Asakawa Kanichi, ed., The Documents of the Iriki: illustration of the development of the feudal institutionsof Japan (New Haven, 1929), 332-35. 21John L. Boots found evidence that the musket was firstintroduced into Korea in 1590 when Japanese envoys presented several such weapons to the Korean king. He concludes, however, that the Koreans did not learn the method of manufacturingsmall arms at that time, battles with the Japanese since a Korean source (which he does not cite) shows that in the first the Korean soldiers met the enemy with flails, tridents,and arrows; "Korean weapons and armor," Transactions of the Korean branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 23, no. 2 (Dec. 1934), 25. vol. 6, ch. 29, p. 309. 2"Taik6 ki," Shiseki shfiran, 23 Shimazu Yoshihiro to Hishijima Kii no Kami, 9th moon, 28th day, Bunroku 1 (1592), KNKS, vol. 10, pp. 379-80.
1- "Hbj6

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Chinese force that had been sent to the aid of the Koreans. The size of the Chinese army is not definitely known, but estimatesrange from51,000 to 200,000, whereas the Japanese numbered about 25,000. Since the Chinese seem to have had no hand guns,24Konishi was able temporarilyto hold his ground even against such a superior force.25Again in 1597, during the latter phase of the war, the Japanese were outnumbered when Chinese and Korean forcesattacked them at Yol-san Castle, near Fusan. Both the Koreans and the Chinese had by this time armed some of their soldierswith matchlocks,26 theywere more advanced than the Japanese and in artillerywarfare,but the defenders,equipped with a larger number of small arms, were able to retain possession of the castle. A few days after the battle the Japanese commander, Asano Yoshinaga, wrote to one of his gunsmiths: "I have killed a large number of enemy soldiers, because I used the guns I practised with, for so many years,at your place. I have of also established the inferiority even the Korean and Chinese guns."27 On the following day the same commander dispatched a message to his father:"When troopscome [to Korea] fromthe province of Kai, have them bring as many guns as possible, for no other equipment is needed. Give strictorders that all men, even the samurai, carry guns.''28
DEVELOPMENT OF THE USE OF CANNON

Cannon were known in Japan as early as 1551, when two fieldpieces were presented to Otomo Yoshizume by the "King of Rome."29 The Japanese immediatelyattemptedto copy these weapons, but, because of numerous technical difficulties, not many satisfactory pieces were made during
24 Murdoch states that both the Jesuit and Korean sources show that the Chinese army had a large artillerytrain of small field-piecesbut no matchlocks(Murdoch, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 343). The lack of small arms is surprisingin view of the fact that there is a Chinese handgun dated 1421 in the Berlin Museum fur Vdlkerkunde; IV. Gohlke, "Das dlteste datierte gewehr," N fur historischewafjenskunde, (1916), 205-06. 7 Zeitschrift 5 W. G. Aston, "Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea," TASJ, 9, no. 3 (reprinted in 1881), 87-90; Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese expansion on the Asiatic continent: a study in the historyof Japan with special referenceto her international relations with China, Korea and Russia (Berkeley, 1937), vol. 1, p. 156; KNKS, vol. 8, pp. 16-35. `6For pictures of sixteenth-century Korean matchlocks see Boots, op. cit., plates 25-27. 27Asano Yoshinaga to Inatomi Ichimu, 1st moon, 10th day, Keich6 3 (1598), KNKS, vol. 10, pp. 378-79. 28Asano Yoshinaga to Asano Nagamasa, 1st moon, 11th day, Keich6 3 (1598), KNKS, vol. 10, p. 379. [Supplement to the historyof the rise and 29"Zoho Otomo kohai ki" J J ,fall of the Otomo], quoted in Takekoshi Yosabur6 Ad4z AR, Nissen gohyakunen shi =:Pi art [History of two thousand five hundred years] (Tokyo, 1909), 514-15.

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the following decade. There is a reference in one chronicle, however, which indicates that in 1558 artillery was fired from the coasts of the province of Bungo to drive off an attack of "several hundred" boats.30 Nevertheless, it was not until the last quarter of the sixteenth century that cannon attained a position of importance in Japanese warfare. Oda Nobunaga appears to have taken the lead in the use of artillery,as well as in the use of the musket, for in 1571 he placed an order with the Kunitomo gunsmiths for a gun that would take a load weighing 750 Cannon were employed in the battle of Noguchi in 1578,32and grams.31 by the time of Nobunaga's death, four years later, they were being used in such remote provinces as Etchu and Noto.33 The capture of the Kanki Castle by Hideyoshi in 1582 marksa milepost in the historyof siege warfare. The following account in the chronicles of Nobunaga shows that cannon had become recognized as most efficacious weapons in attacks upon fortifications: Korezumi Gorozaemon and his soldiers from the province of Wakasa were assignedto the easterngate of the Kanki Castle. Firsthe had two high towers The moat was filledin and artificial erected [fromwhich] cannon were fired. moundsweremade, and [fromthesethe castle] was attacked.Takigawa Sagon gate wherehe had laborerserecttowers to the movedfrom southern theeastern
30 "Nankai jiran ki," quoted in Takekoshi Yosabur6, Nihon keizai shi R *tidAl , [Economic history of Japan] (3d ed.; Tokyo: Heibon Sha, 1936), vol. 3, p. 17 and tr. in Takekoshi Yosoburo (sic), The economic aspects of the history of the civilization of Japan (London, 1930), vol. 1, p. 288. vol. 2, p. 274. A letter from 31"Kunitomo tepp6 ki," quoted in Kuroita, Kokushi no kenkyis, the lord of Bungo to a Jesuit priest in China in 1568 shows that this lord was still interested in obtaining cannon fromthe Portuguese. Otomo indicated that he had been given a cannon, but that it was lost at sea en route from Malacca. Otomo pointed out that he was protecting the Christians and the Jesuit priests in his province and went on to request another cannon, since he needed one badly in defending his frontiersand coasts against enemies. He closed with the observation that, if he were successful in defending his territory,the Christian churches, the Jesuit missionaries,the Christians, and the Portuguese all would be better off. Otomo Sorin letter,dated Sept. 13, 1568 (8th moon, 22d day, Eiroku 11), tr. into Japanese in [Japanese fl*Zi Murakami Naojir6 _i LfiX 05, Yasokai shi Nihon tsfishih I correspondence of Jesuit missionaries] (2 vols.; Tokyo, 1907), vol. 2, pp. 86-87. 32 "Bessho Nagahara ki" [Chronicles of Bessho Nagaharu], Gunshoruijis, FhvE PVJiA vol. 13, p. 1198. 33 Maeda Toshiie, who was fightinga campaign in the province of Etchui, ordered his brother,who was then stationed in the province of Nato, to send twentycannon balls; Maeda Toshiie to Maeda Gor6bei, 4th moon, 18th day (1582) (unpublished manuscript in Sonkeikaku of one Bunko Ft"3 ,, Tokyo). One month later Toshiie acknowledged the receipt cannon and asked that another one be made immediately; ibid., Maeda Toshiie to Maeda Gor6bei, 5th moon, 22d day (1582). But five days later Toshiie sent the cannon back to Gor6bei, complaining that the barrel was too small and ordering that it be recast; ibid., Maeda Toshiie to Maeda Gor6bei, 5th moon, 27th day (1582).

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and had thewalls and citadelbombardedwithcannon. The citadel caughtfire and burneddown.34 After 1582, artilleryplayed an important part in all Japanese siege warfare. For example, Hideyoshi, in preparing for his campaign against Haja Ujinao in 1589, placed an order for twentycannon.35Hoj6 likewise relied upon such weapons for the defense of his castle at Odawara.36 Accounts dealing with the seige do not include specific reference to the use of cannon - probably because Hideyoshi avoided direct assault and chose to keep the castle surrounded until its provisions were exhausted - but it is clear that the employment of heavy artillery had become a basic element in Japanese warfare. The Korean invasion, from the start,stimulated Japanese interest in artillery,because, during the early months of the war, Hideyoshi's naval forcesreceived an overwhelming defeat at the hands of the Korean ships equipped with cannon.37 There were several factorscontributing to the naval superiorityof the Koreans, but it is apparent that the Japanese soon recognized the importance of ships with greater firepower.To rectifythe situation Hideyoshi attempted, without success, to obtain two carracks fromthe Portuguese,38 and by the second year of the war at least the larger Japanese ships were armed with cannon.39Toward the end of the invasion these ships had sufficient firepowerto gain one important naval victory against a somewhat demoralized Korean fleet.40 Still greater interest in heavy artillery was caused by the difficulty which the Japanese had in capturing the strong Korean castles. During the first year of the war one of the Japanese generals sent a message to his home province requesting all available pieces of heavy artillery.41 One year later another general
"Noutinaga ki," KNKS, vol. 2, p. 490. KNKS, vol. 6, p. 94. 3""Hoj6 godai ki," Shiseki shfiran, vol. 5, ch. 26, p. 60. 3 As early as 1377, according to the historyof the Kory6 Dynasty,a department of cannon was established; Boots, op. cit., p. 21. The Orye-ii Sikh. [The five ceremonies], written in 1474, lists several types of cannon for stones and weapons; Boots, op. cit., p. 21. The oldest extant Korean cannon are heavy cast-iron pieces found in the Kudan Museum in Tokyo. It is claimed that theywere cast in Korea between 1522 and 1566 and that they were brought to Japan (Wring the Korean invasion. They are '2 feet 2 inches long, slightly tapering, 31/4 inches across the muzzles with 13/, inches bore. . . "; for illustration see ibid., plate no. 23. Cf. A. L. Sadler, "The naval campaign in the Korean war of Hideyoshi (1592-98)," TASJ, 2d ser., 14 (1937), 180. 8C. R. Boxer, "Notes on early European military influence in Japan (1543-1853)," TASJ, 8 (1931), 72-73. "Taiko ki," Shiseki shfiran,vol. 6, ch. 29, p. 347. Cf. KNKS, vol. 9, pp. 456-68. 40Murdoch, op. cit.,vol. 2, pp. 355-56. 41Shimazu Yoshihiro to Hishijima Kii no Kami, 9th moon, 28th day, Bunroku 1 (1592), KNKS, vol. 10, p. 380.
3'

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wrote: "Not long ago I despatched two messengers to consult with you regardingcannon, [and again I] insist that you send me more. It does not matterwhat size theyare. Inquire around the province and send as many as can be found."42Nevertheless,at the end of the war in 1598, the Koreans were still manufacturing and using cannon more extensively than the Japanese, but the Japanese had made great strides toward a more widespread use of heavy ordnance.
CHANGE IN MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS

close combat was largely As a direct result of the adoption of firearms, replaced by long-range fighting.A barrage of bullets from muskets was to effective determine the outcome of a battle before generallysufficiently the opposing forcescame into direct contact. In case the enemy's advance was not checked, bows and arrows, and finallyspears and swords, were used to supplement gunfire,but the new emphasis upon long-rangefighting brought revolutionary developments in the organization of armies and in militarytactics. effect upon the organization of the army was the almost comThe first plete displacement of cavalry,which had long been declining in imporAn army of Takeda Shingen in 1573 included aptance,43by infantry. but proximatelyone cavalrymanto two infantrymen,44 in 1590 Hideyoshi ordered that Date's army should be supplied with only thirtyhorses.45 The fact that guns could not be easily manipulated on horseback served warfare.The second change resultto accelerate the shifttoward infantry ing from the adoption of firearmswas a basic rearrangement of units within the army. Military accounts of the latter half of the sixteenth centuryabound in chartsshowing the organization of armies.46Generally, companies of gunnerswere placed in the frontranks;47theywere followed by companies of archers and the latter by spearmen and swordsmen. At the centerof the armyrode the general, with his retainersand messengers, and on each flank there were additional companies of gunners, archers, and spearmen. The supplies, horses, and infantryguards were placed at
to Ishida Mlitsunari Shimazu, 9th moon, 25th day, Bunroku 2 (1593), KNKS, vol. 10, p. 381. arts and literature,vol. 2, p. 136. Brinkley, Japan, its history, 14 Obata Kanbei [Military historyof the province t ir, "Kby6 gunkan" rp WW ,J* of Kai], Koji ruien, vol. 29, pp. 181-82. [Date diary], Gunsho ruijh, vol. 13, p. 1064. x Ed Date nikki" "Koji ruien, vol. 29, pp. 44-72. Early in the Korean campaign Hideyoshi instructed his generals in the field to keep gunners in the vanguard. Hideyoshi to Kobayaski et al, 12th moon, 6th day, Bunroku 1 (1592), Ho K5 ibun, p. 404.
42 43

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the rear. In other words, the Japanese had adopted the basic principle that the companies equipped with long-rangeweapons should be placed in the van where theycould initiate hostilitiesas soon as the enemy came within effective firingrange. Companies of archers followed the gunners, because they could provide support, at a somewhat shorterrange, for the gunners. Spearmen and swordsmen were moved to the front only when On the whole, therethe engagement evolved into hand-to-handfighting. fore, the armies came to be composed of interrelated units that could be maneuvered to meet the exigencies of the new type of warfare. Thus the military advantage came to lie with large armies under a central command - a significantfactor in the concentration of military power that led to the establishmentof a single governmentforall Japan in 1590, fifty years after guns were firstused in Japanese warfare.48 The more astute militarybarons soon discovered that when using firearms the advantage lay with the armywhich could remain on the defensive behind breastworks.In the battle of Nagashino in 1575, Oda Nobunaga placed three thousand gunners behind stockades that were hastily built on hills opposite the Takeda camps. He sent out small forces to make surpriseraids on the enemy rear and to feint frontalattacks. Finally these tactics caused Takeda to order his center to move against Nobunaga's breastworks; Takeda apparently hoped to storm the stockades before Nobunaga's gunners could reload their muskets for a second volley. But Nobunaga had ordered that only one thousand of his gunners should fire at a time, and thus a somewhat continuous fire was maintained. Takeda's center was forced to retreat and, with apparent success on both wingsas well, Nobunaga gave the signal forhis men to leave theirpositions behind the stockades and to close with the enemy in hand-to-handfighting.49Nobunaga's victorywas decisive, and it is clear that the outcome was determined before the armies came into direct contact. Subsequent battles show the influenceof the tactics used at Nagashino.
D6 Tomi6, op. cit., p. 145. The most detailed contemporaryaccount of the battle of Nagashino is found in the "Nobunaga ki," Koji ruien, vol. 31, pp. 935-36. The best recent study of the use of firearms in the battle is Lieutenant General Moriz6 Oshigami's _ "Nagashino eki higa no senjutsu to buki to ni tsuite" -A r, [Concerning the Aat weapons and tacticsof the armies in the Nagashino battle], quoted at length in KNKS, vol. 2, pp. 115-18. Oshigami concludes that Nobunaga's victory was due primarily to a wiser and more extensive use of firearms. For a general survey of the battle see Watanabe Seiyfi in Dai Nihon sen shi * t,(Tokyo, I't4j , "Nagashino no sen" Oda jidai shi p4R t [History of a 1924), vol. 2; also cf. Tanaka Yoshinari ftJ the Oda era] (Tokxo: Meiji Shoin, 1924), 138-49.
48 49

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In the engagement fought at Shizugatake in 1583, the generals of both armies had fought under Nobunaga at Nagashino, and both were convinced of the wisdom of defensive tactics, but Hideyoshi was able to remain on the defensive and to provoke one of Shibata's more daring generals to make a frontal attack. Shibata sent reinforcements the aid to of his general, but these too were annihilated.50 In 1584 the armies of Hideyoshi and Tokugawa Ieyasu met at Komaki in what promised to be a death struggle.Both generals spent several weeks in building unusually strongdefense works and then waited for the other to attack. As a result, the campaign ended in a stalemate, and the two generals came to terms battle.51 without offering Again in the Kyushu campaign in 1587 the same defensive technique was used. Hidenaga, the man who was placed in his charge of Hideyoshi's armies, fortified position against an enemy attack by throwing up long rows of entrenchmentsand by cutting down trees with which to make barricades. Behind these defenseworks he built towers from which "musketeers could play upon the enemy's ranks while at a The enemy unwisely relied upon old distance from the entrenchment."52 ideas of warfare,as is shown by the following account of their movements: First came a picked forceof 3,000 swordsmen, who were directed to abolish Behind thesewas stationeda body of cavalryin readiness the entrenchments. to chargeover the barricadesthe momentthat practicablebreacheshad been made. In the rear of the cavalrythe main body of the armywas drawn up, while a forceof 1,000 men was sent to assail the Imperialistsin the rear.53
50The historical materials relating to the battle of Shizugatake were collected, during the seventeenthcentury,under the title of "Shizugatake gasen ki" [Records of the g battle of Shizugatake], Shiseki shfiran,vol. 13, pp. 350-55. See also Walter Dening, The Life of Toyotomi Hideyoshi (3d ed., London: Keyan Paul, 1930), 203-08. "1 While the two armies were facing each other at Komaki, Hideyoshi wrote: "Our encampments extend fora distance of ten or fifteen ch5 pq along the frontof Komaki Castle. Although we have tried to force the enemy to fightit out in the open, Ieyasu absolutely will not come out of his castle at Komaki. So there is no use in being here. Forts have been built at three places before Komaki and strong forces have been placed therein...." Hideyoshi to Mori Terumoto, (5th?) moon, 9th day, Tensh6 12 (1584), quoted in Miura Kaneyuki =-;,AWj "Komakiyama jin to seikai sen" ,> Jj& (I [The encampment at Mount Komaki 9 and the world war], Rekishi to chir, vol. 3, no. 4 (April 1919), 427. See "Taik6 ki," Shiseki shfiran,vol. 6, ch. 29, pp. 182-86. Hideyoshi's defenses have been described as follows by A. L. Sadler in The maker of modern Japan: the life of Tokugawa Ieyasu (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1937), 125: "Hideyoshi on his part built a rampart 15 feet high and 3 feet thick between Nijubori and Iwasaki-yama,a distance of nearly a mile and a half, with several gates in it, so that he could hold the position safely against attack while he considered his next move... and thus the two armies dug themselves well in and lay opposite each other, both fearing to repeat the mistake of Nagashino by making a frontal attack." H. 52J. Gubbins, "Hideyoshi and the Satsuma clan in the sixteenthcentury,"TASJ, 8 (1880),
110.
5Ibid.,

p. 111.

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Of course, Hidenaga's forceswere victorious. The invasion of Korea presented new tactical problems, because the Japanese armies were fightingin a strange land. They frequentlywere surprised by attacks in open fields and often found their paths blocked by Korean armies stationed in advantageous positions. Since the Korean soldiers were not armed with muskets in the early years of the war, the Whenunder circumstancesof the firsttype.54 Japanese had no difficulty ever they found themselvesfaced with a Korean force in a well-fortified position, theyoften succeeded in erecting breastworksand then planning tactics that would trick the Koreans into making a frontal attack. Both where the Koreans were adequately proat Imjin River and P'yeng-yang, tectedby a broad stream,the Japanese succeeded in delaying mattersuntil the Koreans gave up their positions.55
EFFECTS OF FIREARMS UPON CASTLE CONSTRUCTION

and the resultant emphasis upon defensive tactics The use of firearms were operated to revolutionize castle construction. Before fortifications castles were built of earth, and their walls, which influenced by firearms generally were no higher than ten feet, had loopholes through which arrows were shot.56But as early as 1549 Ashikaga Yoshiteru, who was building a castle near Kyoto, ordered that stones be placed between the moat and the wall "as protection against guns."57 The erection of the Azuchi Castle in 1576 marks the first great advance in sixteenth-century military architecture. Azuchi was located on Lake Biwa at a strategicpoint on the lines of communication of Nobunaga's most powerful adversaries. The site chosen for the fortresswas a promontoryrising six hundred feet above the lake. On the sides that were not bounded by the lake, deep moats were cut. The stone wall enclosing the castle was "several" thousand feet long and seventyfeet high. Within
6 Early in the war the Koreans made a stand in a large plain surrounded by mountains, near Chhshh .ij M. The Japanese sent detachments to block the passes in the mountains and then descended upon the Koreans fromall sides. Guns, bows, spears, and swords were all used in the attack; KNKS, vol. 7, pp. 375-78. b5 Murdoch, History of Japan, vol. 2, pp. 328-32. 56A discourse on castle construction,written about 1565, provides the best description of castles built before firearms had seriously affectedmilitaryarchitecture.Kubota Saburobei no Jo, "Chikuj6 ki" *Ad [Discourse on castle construction], Gunsho ruiji2, vol. 14, ch. 49, pp. 942-47. 67"Manshbin dono anabo ki" it2 MC Kojitsu shsho, vol. 33, pp. 149-50. For details of militaryand political events associated with the constructionof this castle see KNKS, vol. 1, p. 100.

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the walls was a central tower58which was about 120 feet long, 102 feet wide, and 96 feet high. Chinese artisans were imported to cover the structureswith tile. Within the outer wall there were four distinct citadels, one withinanother. The walls and moats separating the citadels were Consequently, Azuchi differedfrom irregular, to confuse the attacker.59 earlier castles because of the following features: (1) massive proportions, (2) the use of stone as the prevailing building material, (3) the erection of a high central tower, (4) the irregularly formed inner citadels, and (5) the location of the castle on a plain, rather than in densely vegetated mountains. The first two features were meant to provide protection against the more destructiveweapons, and the last three were related to the shiftto long-rangewarfare.The towers and the location of the castle upon the open plains affordedbetter visibilityfor the use of guns,60and the adoption of inner citadels gave the defenders an opportunity to rely positions, even after the enemy upon the use of gunfirebehind fortified the castle. had broken throughthe outer walls of Many castles were built in Japan afterAzuchi was completed, but none until the Osaka Castle was constructed in surpassed Nobunaga's fortress 1586. The grounds of this castle measured a mile and one-halflong and a mile wide. It stood on elevated ground and was girded by deep running water on the northand east sides. On the west,open level ground extended to the sea. The walls were from18 to 21 feetthickand were made of huge, granite stones that in some cases were 10 feet wide and 40 feet long. The stones were fittedcarefully together,making the use of mortar unnecessary. A moat 20 feet deep surrounded each citadel, so that 3 moats were The 8-storiedtower,the crossed before reaching the center of the fortress. gates and the roofs of the buildings were all covered with sheets of iron.
- This tower,called tenshukaku i a, has been the subject of considerable discussion, Tanaka Yoshinari for it is claimed that it was influencedby occidental ideas of fortification. [Concerning the tenshukaku], Shigaku zasshi, 1, no. 2 (Jan. in "Tenshukaku k-" Stat 1890), 17-22, found that none of the features of the tower were new to Japan and that the word tenshukaku had a Buddhist, rather than a Christian, origin. Furthermore,Boxer, in his study of the Portuguese sources, found no evidence that the Jesuits had had any part in the constructionof the Azuchi Castle; Boxer, "Notes on early European military influence in Japan (1543-1853)," TASJ, 2d ser., 8 (1931), 71. 59An authentic contemporary description of the Azschi Castle is included in "Azuchi Yama ki" ?iWagE [History of Mt. Azuchi], quoted in KNKS, vol. 2, pp. 169-70. Also see "Nobunaga ki," quoted in Takekoshi, Nihon keizai shi, vol. 3, p. 20; N. Orui and M. Toba, Castles in Japan (Tokyo, 1935), 18-21; and Tanaka, Oda jidai shi, 163-66. 60 ProfessorKuroita attributesthis development directly to the use of firearms, because the densely vegetated mountains provided an attacker with natural defenses; Kuroita, Kokushi vol. 2, p. 284. no kenkyfl,

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Stone was used in most of the substructure.6'The greatersize and strength of the Osaka Castle may have resulted, in part, from Hideyoshi's ostentatious display of power, but the recent adoption of artilleryin siege warfare was undoubtedly a contributing factor.62
INFLUENCE OF FIREARMS ON NAVAL WARFARE

on noted in the construcThe influenceof firearms naval warfareis first "iron ships" in 1578. Once more Oda Nobunaga was responsition of six ble for the innovation. He had the ships equipped with cannon and built to withstand gunfire. They were 72 feet long, 42 feet wide, and were reportedlyable to carry about 5,000 men.63 Soon after the construction of was completed an opportunity arose for testing the effectiveness the new ships. During the sixth moon of 1578 they were sailing toward Kumano Village, when theywere suddenly faced with a large fleetof small pirate boats. The gunners and archers of the pirate craft peppered the big ships but caused no serious damage. The commander in charge of Nobunaga's fleetordered his men to withhold their fireuntil the pirate boats came within effectivefiringrange. When the cannon were fired, "many of the enemy boats were immediately sunk, and those remaining did not come near again. "64 Five months later the "iron ships" were once
61Kuwata Tadachika M V, in his study of source materials in relation to the castle, concludes that it was "rebuilt" by the Tokugawa government some time prior to 1650, "Toyotomi jidai no Osaka jb" "- pfl~l{-I X :' [The Osaka Castle of the Toyotomi era], Rekishi chiri, 74, no. 3 (Sept. 1939), 208. It is not clear just how basic the alterations were, but sixteenth-century sources reveal that the castle constructedby Hideyoshi was made of amazingly large stones and that the gate of the inner citadel was made of (or covered with?) iron; ibid., p. 209. Rev. J. Summers found that the Osaka Castle was modeled after a famous "Notes on Osaka," TASJ, 7, no. 1 (1879), 391. Also see Mathew Garbutt, Chinese fortress, "Military works in old Japan," TASJ, 2d ser., 8 (1907-10), 61, and Orui, op. cit., pp. 21-25. 62 The Koreans had strongercastles during the sixteenth century than the Japanese. Hideyoshi's invasion, therefore,gave the Japanese an opportunity to observe and study Korean techniques. As a result, the castles built in Japan after 1598 were influenced by continental ideas of fortification; Kuroita, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 284 and 348. " "Tamon In nikki" 1; RIp H PgI[Tamon In diary], quoted in KNKS, 2, p. 505. This diary,kept by a monk of a Nara temple, is considered one of the most reliable sources of the sixteenth century,but the figureof 5,000 seems too high. Father Frois visited these boats and saw the cannon with which they were equipped. Regarding the ships, he said that they were the biggest and best ships he had seen in Japan and that they were similar to those made in Portugal. Regarding the cannon, he expressed considerable surprise for he had at that time (about 1580) not seen cannon in Japan, except for small ones made in the province of Bungo. Father Frois explained that the ships were made to blockade the entrance to Osaka, and he predicted that, largely as a result of these new ships, Osaka would soon fall; Frois' report, tr. in Murakami, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 434-35. "Ota Gyflichi , [Chronicles Lord Nobunaga], of "NobunagaK6 ki" Shiseki shfiran, 19, ch. 5, p. 146. In general, the above version is in agreement with the

*m?g-

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more called into action, when six hundred small boats from Mori's provinces of westernJapan appeared offKizu. Nobunaga's chronicler reported in that the six ships had no difficulty routing Mori's boats,65but Yoshida, a writerof westernJapan, claimed that although Nobunaga's ships were equipped with cannon, Mori's boats were not forced to withdraw. One of the "iron ships," wrote Yoshida, was actually boarded, and because of the excessive weight of so many men, it capsized.66During the following two decades the Japanese apparently made no furtherattempts to construct ships armed with cannon,67possibly because the "iron ships" revealed serious technical deficiencies. In the naval engagements fought at the beginning of the Korean invasion, the Japanese navy was shown to be inferiorin both offensiveand defensive power. The Korean warship was a 2-masted sailing vessel that had from 20 to 30 oars and measured over 150 feet in length and about 25 feet in width.68It was equipped with bombs,69fire arrows, and ap[Tales of Yoshida], written description contained in the "Yoshida monogatari" -A: by a retainer of Lord Mori of western Japan and quoted in KNKS, vol. 2, pp. 501-02. [The firstChinese character for Ota Gyfiichishould be no. 1948 in the Daijiten.-Editor.] vol. 19, ch. 5, pp. 150-51. 65 "Nobunaga K6 ki," Shiseki shfiran, "Yoshida monogatari,"KNKS, vol. 2, p. 503. asIn 1586 Hideyoshi tried to purchase two Portuguese ships, but his attemptfailed; Murdoch, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 334. In the Hojo campaign of 1589 hundreds of boats were used, but there is no indication that they were equipped with artillery. Kuki Umanosuke, the builder of Nobunaga's "iron ships,",wasplaced in charge of 1,500 vessels,but this forcemet no opposition and was engaged primarilyin transporting supplies and blockading the coast of eastern Japan; Rikugun Sanbu Honbu, ed., Dai Nihon sen shi Es*@ [Military history of Japan], quoted in KNKS, vol. 6, pp. 143-44. e8Included in the Prince Yi Household Collection is a screen painting of a naval engagement fought during the Korean invasion, and it depicts the general characteristicsof the Korean warship (at the close of the sixteenthcentury?).For a reproductionsee Horace H. Underwood, "Korean boats and ships," Transactions of the Korea branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 23 (1934), fig.40. Underwood calculates that there must have been as many as six men to an oar and that the oars were about three feet apart; ibid., p. 55. I" One of the naval commanders of the Japanese force had a ship (or ships?) burned by which were thrown by the Koreans. "Wakizaka ke denki" horokubiya a 7Z ( k Z p, [Biographical sketches of the Wakizaka family], quoted in KNKS, vol. 7, was a metal ball into which 674-75. According to the Daijiten (vol. 23, p. 153), a horokuibiya explosives were inserted,and which was wrapped with cloth and then painted with lacquer. Fire was set to the cloth and the ball thrown into the midst of the enemy where it exploded. This weapon was mentioned in the "Nobunaga ki," writtenabout 1600, as having been used sometime prior to 1582, against enemy ships, Kojitsu sosho, vol. 31, p. 639, but effectively, there is no evidence that the Japanese had used such weapons extensively.The Koreans had long known similar weapons, as can be seen from the names and descriptions appearing in the Korean work, Orye-iii 3Jj4i written in 1474 and quoted in Boots, "Korean weapons and armor," Transactions of the Korea branch of the Rwal Asiatic Society, 23, no. 2 (Dec. 1934), 21. A later Korean source, the Ylly6sil kisul #;; -I[= which was writtenbetween 1567 and 1608, describes a weapon which fireda ball as far as 1,000 yards. The ball was filled

) '

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proximately fortycannon.70 The ship was also designed to protect the crew against the musket fireof the Japanese: the decks were covered with heavy planks, the crew was entirelyenclosed within the hull of the ship, and there is some evidence that the vessel was ironclad.71 Also, the decks were covered with iron spikes to make boarding more hazardous, because the Japanese were recognized as being expert swordsmen. Furthermore, the warship was comparatively fast and could be easily maneuvered.72 The Japanese ships, on the other hand, were seldom armed with heavy and according to a Chinese account written about 1600, they artillery,73 were inferiorin other respects: The biggestof themhold about threehundredmen, the middle size fromone to to or to two hundredand the smallerforty fifty, it may be seventy eighty. small,and if theymeet our big ships theycannot they Anyhowv are wretchedly do them any damage but are easily sunk. Therefore,theyare afraid of our thathave lofty and Fukien ships,especiallyof thoseof Kwangtung Kwangtung and sides like a wall. The Japanese ships are flat-bottomed so cannot cut the waves,and theirsails are hoistwiththe mastin themiddle and not on one side like ours. And theirspars are alwaysmovingwhereasours are fixed.They can one or none at all they onlysail beforethe wind, and if theymeet a contrary unstep theirmast and take to oars, fortheycannot tack.74 The naval tacticsof the Koreans were well adapted to the greaterrange of theirartillery.Instead of relyingupon the traditional technique of sailing alongside an enemy ship, pulling it in with grappling irons, and then boarding to fightit out with swords and battle-axes, the Korean comto mander, Yi Sun Sin, made every effort keep his fleet out of the range of the Japanese muskets but near enough for his own cannon and inwith powder and had a delayed fuse; it may have been the hhrokubiya mentioned in the Wakizaka records; ibid., pp. 22-23. 'I For pictures of the typesof cannon probably employed on the Korean warships,see Underwood, op. cit., figs.42D, 43C, and 43D. 7 Homer B. Hulbert in The historyof Korea (Seoul, 1905), 376-77, concludes that the Korean warship had iron plates on its sides, but Underwood could not prove the existence of such a feature,op. cit., p. 76. 72 Underwood, op. cit., pp. 74-76. Hulbert (op. cit., pp. 376-77) states that the Korean ship was equipped with a ram, but Sadler found no evidence of rams and concludes: "...what is fromthe latest Japanese researcheson this fighting that here also emergesvery significantly it was the gun and the incendiarymissile and not the ram that proved so deadly"; "The naval campaign in the Korean war of Hideyoshi (1592-98)," TASJ, 2d ser., 14 (1937), 180. "3Sadler, op. cit., p. 180. Underwood finds that "The Japanese thus had plenty of muskets but few cannon. The Koreans on the other hand had no muskets but plenty of cannon," op. cit., p. 59. According to H. A. C. Bonar, "On maritime enterprise in Japan," TASJ, 15 (1887), 113, Japanese vessels were equipped with more than 78 oars and carried one cannon. about for 7"Mao YVan LjIZ, Wu-peichih j,= [On preparations war], written 1600, KNKS, vol. 7, p. 623 and tr. in Sadler, op. cit., pp. 182-83.

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Only when a Japanese ship was crippled cendiary bombs to be effective. did the larger Korean ships ram or sail alongside for boarding. There is evidence also that the Koreans had adopted the line-head formation in order to bring as many of their cannon as possible to bear upon the enemy vessels, and that the principle of continuous firewas understood, since the cannon were shot in an orderlyfashionand only upon command. Finally, the greater speed and maneuverability of the Korean ships gave the commander complete freedom in carrying out his tactical plans.75 Japanese tactics,however, seem to have been limited to the "tradition of using warships as mere platformson which soldiers might fight.'"76 Of course, each vessel carried a large number of muskets,and presumably the Japanese had hoped to damage the enemy fleetbefore attemptingto board but in most of the early engagements.many for hand-to-hand fighting, Japanese ships were sunk before the Korean ships came within the range of the Japanese handgun.77 in The Japanese commanders soon realized that their inferiority naval and theyimmediately took steps to equip warfarelay in a lack of artillery, their ships with cannon. A Korean source reveals that during the second year of the invasion "great bolts and huge iron balls not inferior to our own, and huge round stones were hurled at us, and verymany struckour ships."78 At about this time Hideyoshi also made another attempt to procure two Portuguese carracks, but the Portuguese refused to supply him with these ships because they apparently did not wish to anger the Chinese.79During the second phase of the invasion (1597-98) more Japanese ships were armed with artillery. In 1597 a raid was made by the Koreans on a flotillalying offFusan and, according to a letter writtenby in Hideyoshi, the Japanese had no difficulty driving offthe attackers.He wrote that over 160 boats were captured and "several thousand" enemy killed.80It would appear that a fundamentalfactorin the Japanese victory was the demoralization of the Korean navy, largely because Yi Sun Sin had been deprived of his command,81 but contemporary accounts show
Underwood, op. cit.,pp. 79-81. "From Jimmu Tenno to Perry,sea power in early Japanese history,"American historical review, 51 (Oct. 1945), 26. 77 See KNKS, vol. 7, pp. 621-84, and Sadler, op. cit., pp. 179-208. 78 Chung mu hong chun soh a compilation of Yi Sun Sin E papers f,/.gtjkq (compiled in 1796), quoted in Sadler, op. cit., p. 190, footnotes. 78 Boxer, op. cit., pp. 72-73. 10 Toyotomi Hideyoshi to Aki Chinagaon, 8th moon, 10th day, Keich6 2 (1597), KNKS, vol. 9, p. 467. I" Marder, op. cit., p. 29.
75

7" Marder,

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that cannon were fired by the Japanese at the beginning of the engage-

SUMMARY

Firearms were clearly a basic element in the radical developments in Japanese warfare during the last half of the sixteenth century. It is also certain that these developments had far-reachingeconomic, social, and political implications. The large-scale manufacture of muskets and ammunition,the building of huge stone castles,the movementof large armies to distant points - all operated to stimulate greater industrial and comThe maintenance of standing armies at the castles led mercial activity.83 between to the growth of castle towns and to a greater differentiation especially after 1588 when the peasants were prosoldiers and peasants,84 Finally, the new long-rangeweaphibited by law fromkeeping firearms.85 barons with an important ons provided the more capable and foresighted means of extending their military power and, therefore,facilitated the strong,central establishment, Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, of Japan's first by government.86 34 [Outline historyof the Korean invasion], KNKS, vol. 9, p. 461. 82"Seikan ir)aku" ;f~ 83For an excellent survey of the economic historyof the Middle Ages, see Shiba Kentaro "Chfisei no keizai" rP#F 4:T [Medieval economy], Iwanami koza: Nihon rekishi,ser. 10, 3 (July 1934), but no adequate study of the expansion of industryin the sixteenth centuryhas been made. 8 "Some aspects of Japanese feudal institutions,"TASJ, 46, no. 1 (1918), 98. K. Asakawva, I" Toyotomi Hideyoshi order,7th moon, 8th day, Tensh6 16 (1588), Ho Ko ibun, pp. 202-03. The social repercussions arising from the introduction of firearms(leserve further study. It appears that at firstthe position of the professional soldier was undermined by the more for there was a definite tendency for companies of gunners to be extensive use of firearms, organized from among untrained peasants. But with the growing importance of large castles between peasand the concurrentestablishmentof political centralization,the differentiation ant and soldier again became quite clear, and during the prolonged period of peace that came after 1615 the warrior class formed the elite in the rigid social structurethat prevailed tinder the Tokugasva Shogunate. scas 88 DO Tomih drasss the conclusion: "We can not deny that the introductionof firearms an important factor in the establishment of the modern, centralized state," op. cit., p. 192. This view marks a definiteadvance beyond the traditional interpretationwhich ascribes the centralizationof Japan to the political and militarygenius of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, but this problem too should receive study. It is suggested that the discovery of new sources of precious metals, the introduction of improved methods of mining and better metallurgical techniques,and the general expansion of commerceand industryalso faciliated the emergence of a centralized feudal state.