The recollection argument in the Phaedo is this: a.

If we have knowledge not acquired in this life, we acquired it prior to this life b. c. bodies We have such knowledgeknowledge of the Ideas Therefore, our souls existed prior to birth into our

A priori knowledge is that which is known independent of the senses. The dialogue between Cebes, Simmias and Socrates in the Phaedo gives rise to the idea(s) that the theory of recollection justifies a priori knowledge; the innateness of apriori knowledge through recollection and that recollection of a posteriori knowledge is impossible. The crux of this idea is an assertion made by Cebes at 73b in regards to recollection and apriori knowledge: That when men are interrogated in the right manner, they always give the right answer of their own accord, and they could not do this if they did not possess the knowledge and the right explanation inside of them. Then if one shows them a diagram or something else of the kind, this will show most clearly that such is the case. This is more or less a paraphrase of the example in the Meno when Socrates examines a slave boy about a particular mathematical proof, that is unknown to the boy, but the boy produces the answer only by answering, truthfully, Socrates questions. It was by intuition that the answer was produced by the slave boy, making a strong case that some propositions in a particular subject area, S, are knowable by us by intuition alone. Socrates states at 73c in the Phaedo that they all surely agree that if anyone recollects anything, like in the preceding case, he/she must have known it before. This justifies apriori knowledge by way of recollection, but it seems to be innate that one produces the other. The proof of recollection as a priori was proved by Cebes restatement of the Meno exchange, but there is something more to the proof, that is the innateness of a priori. Innateness is S originates exclusively in the mind. So, then recollection is possible, if a priori knowledge exists. Since, it was proven that a priori knowledge exists, then it should be agreed that a

priori knowledge is innate. Socrates states at 73c5-9 in reference to knowledge coming to mind as recollection: In this way, when a man sees or hears or in some other way perceives one thing and not only knows that thing but also thinks of another thing of which knowledge is not the same but different, are we not right to say that he recollects the second thing that comes into his mind? This sums up the proof of the innateness of a priori knowledge. Innateness exists because we possess knowledge of things without their sensible existence i.e. ideas in your mind about things not sensible immediately to ones self and also prior to the time whence we first experience S. A posteriori knowledge is impossible to recollect. Since, a priori knowledge is innate and recollection possible, then sense experience is not possible to recollect. A posteriori knowledge can only give rise to the fact that what we perceive through the senses enables a priori knowledge and thus recollection of the intelligible. And since before we began to perceive through the senses, we must have possessed knowledge of S, itself, if we refer to our sense perception of S and that all were like S of our mind but were inadequate

A priori (intelligible) knowledge is knowledge gained independently of sense experience. Rationalist, those holding a priori knowledge to exist, state that some propositions in a particular subject area, S, are knowable by us by intuition alone; still others are knowable by being deduced from intuited propositions. We will grant knowledge to be any true justifiable belief. A posteriori (empirical) knowledge is knowledge that is dependent on sense experience. The empiricist holds that a posteriori knowledge to exist; the thesis that we have no source of knowledge in S or for the concepts we use in S other than sense experience. In Platos Phaedo these two camps of knowledge are well documented. There are two worlds that are discussed in the dialogue, the sensible/empirical and the intelligible. The sensible realm would describe the a posteriori camp. And the intelligible would cover the a priori camp. The Phaedo

addresses the sensible world when Socrates and his interlocutors discuss the sensible world, bodies, sense impressions and particulars of sense. On the other hand, the a posteriori is discussed in depth when the subject in the dialogue concerns the soul, thought/ action distinction, the world of forms and the forms themselves. Take for example the likeness argument in the Phaedo. Within the argument we can see a weaving in and out of the sensible and the intelligible for the sake of trying to discover what the soul is akin to. Consider this exchange: Socrates: Can the Form(s) ever be the same and in the same state, or do they vary from one time to another; can the Equal itself, the Beautiful itself, each thing in itself, the real, ever be affected by any change whatever? Cebes: It must remain the same and in the same state, Socrates. Socrates: What of the many particulars, be they men, horses, clothes, or other such things, or the many equal particulars. Do they remain the same or, in total contrast to those other realities, one might say, never in any way remain the same as themselves or in relation to each other? Cebes: The latter is the case, they are never in the same state. Socrates: The latter you could touch and see and perceive with the other senses, but those that always remain the same can only be grasped by the mind. (78d-79a) Cebes and Socrates are discussing whether the soul and body are compound (sensible) or invisible (intelligible). The arguments main tenet is that if the Forms are compound (a posteriori), then it is subject to erosion and change over time, but if the Forms are invisible (apriori), then it is able to exist free from physical change and is unchangeable. Additionally, they discuss that the particulars (those that the Forms apply to) are changeable and therefore able to be perceived by the senses, similar to life and death/ nature. Thus, it is possible to know the particulars by sense only. But when they consider the Forms themselves it was determined that they are invisible and remain the same over time. This is contrary to particulars, which are sensible, in that the Forms are conceivable to the mind but not perceived by the senses. So, then we can see how apriori and a posteriori knowledge play a part in the search for the theory of

Forms. The two, apriori and a posteriori, are intertwined in the dialogue of Phaedo and proves to be a difficult hurdle to leap for the interlocutors.