Chapter2:IntrototheUSLegalProfession Lawyersregulatedbyindividualstates noofficialnationalbarassociation(ABAisavoluntaryprofessional organization) requirementsforadmissiontopracticeest.bystatesupremecourt,state legislatureorbothandvarynationally prohacviceWhenacourtadmitsalawyertoappearinaparticularcasein anotherstateifthereisaspecialneed ABAsModelRule5.5modelruleformultijurisdictionalpracticein specifiedsituations o StatevariationsinMJPregulationhavecreatedsomeconfusionand conficts o GATSGeneralAgreementonTradeinServicestheUSandnearly 150othercountriesenteredinto.

into.UnderGATS,membercountries mustpublishrulesregulatingpracticewithintheirbordersbyforeign lawyers Lawyerscanonlybedisciplinedordisbarredbytheirstatebarortheir higheststatecourt Chapter3:IntrototheUSLegalProfession Federalismreferstothedynamicrelationshipb/tthefederalandstategovernments whichsharegovernmentalfunctionintheUS.AccordingtoJusticeBlack(76),this entails: (a)properrespectforstatefunctions (b)arecognitionthatthecountryismadeupofaunionofseparatestate governments (c)continuationofthebeliefthattheNationalgovernmentwillfarebestif thestatesareleftfreetoperformtheirseparatefunctionsintheirseparate ways. PrincipalsourceofthisdivisionofpoweristheUSConstitution o Constitutionlimitstheenumerationofspecifiedfederalpowers, leavingthosepowersnotgrantedtothefederalgovernmenttothe states YetSupremacyClausealsoprovidesthattheConstitutionandfederallaws arethesupremelawoftheland,sowhenstateandfederallawsconflict, federallawprevails. Statecourtsreferredtoascourtsofgeneraljurisdictionincontrastto federalcourts,whichrequireashowingtheypossessjudicialpowertoheara particularmatterb/citcomeswithintheirlimitedsubjectmatter jurisdiction. AbstentiondoctrinesOutofrespectforthestatecourt,thefederalcourt willtrytobelievethatthestatecourtisascompetentandzealousin protectingconstitutionalrightsasthefederalcourtwouldbe.Statecourts willbegivenfirstopportunity.

TheFederalGovernment:TheLegislativeBranch NecessaryandProper McCullochv.MarylandWhetherN&Pincludedpowertoest.fedbank. HamiltonbelievesN&P=convenientanduseful;JeffersonthinksN&P= requiredandessential.JohnMarshallacceptsHamiltonsinterpretation. Twoenumeratepowersdominatelegislativeagenda o Powertoregulateinterstatecommerce PowertoreachallcommercialtransactionsacrossUS CongresssCommerceClauselimitsstatesabilitytoregulate commercewithintheirownborders o Powertotaxandfundgovernmentprograms,includingthoseofother branches Powerofthepurseovereveryfederal$spent TheFG:TheExecutiveBranch Hasexpandedwiththeadditionofexecutivedepartmentslikethecabinet andadministrativeagenciesliketheFDAandEPA TheFG:TheJudicialBranch Constitutiondoesntest.anyfedcourtsbuttheSupremeCourt,forwhichit doesntspecifyaparticularstructure FedjudgesappointedbyPresident,confirmedbySenate,andremaininoffice forlifeunlessimpeached Structure USSupremeCourt Powertoreviewalllowerfedctdecisions 16CourtsofAppeal Powertoreviewtrialcourtdecisionswithinjurisdiction 100+TrialCourts Wheremostcivil&criminalcasesareinitiatedandresolved Primarytrialcourtscalleddistrictcourts(dc) UShas94geographicareascalleddistricts,andlargerstateshavemoredistricts Onedistrictcourtineachdistrict Eachdistricthasatleasttwojudges,andmorepopulousdistrictshavemore Districtcourtmayhavemorethanonecourthouseatdifferentlocations Districtcourtjudgesdontspecializeandhandlerangeofcases Judgesdeterminetherulesoflawtoapply(e.g.juryinstructionsandsometimes bothquestionsoflawandquestionsoffact) 2typesofjudgesserveindcs:dcjudges(DJ)andmagistratejudges(MJ)

Butfederalcourtscaninterferewhenthestatecourtallowsan unconstitutionalconviction,whichcanbechallengedbyapetitionfor certiorari.

DistrictjudgesnominatedbyPresidentandconfirmedbySenate Magistratejudgeshavemorelimitedauthoritywhichisdelegatedbydcjudges MJtypicallyholdhearingsonpretrialmotions&recommenddispositionstotheDJ MJalsoauthorizetoconducttrialsincivilandcriminalmisdemeanorcases MJappointedbyDJfor8yearsw/possibilityofreappointment Congresscreatedseveralothertriallevelcourtstohearspecialkindsofcases(Tax Court,CourtofFederalClaims,bankruptcycourts,CourtofIntlTrade,Foreign IntelligenceWiretapCourt) Veryfewcasesgototrial Activecasemanagementensuresresolutionwithoutunduedelayandexpense Fedjudges(FJ)activelytrytoresolvecasesshortoftrialthroughaffirmativecase management ManycourtshavealsoestAlternativeDisputeResolutionprocedures(ADR) UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals(CC) circuitcourtscreatedbyCongress providesintermediateappellatereviewofdistrictcourts reviewscasesbasedonsubjectmatter reviewsdecisionsofthedcswithineachof11circuitsterritory 11ofthecircuitscoverdesignatedgeographicarea,includingseveralstates 2circuitsinD.C.whichhandlemorespecializeddocket(challengestofedlegislation &regulatoryprovisionsinadditiontoreviewingroutineappealsfromdcs) 3separateAppellateCourtstohearspecialkindsofcases: CourtofMilitaryAppeals Reviewscourtmartialconvictionsofmembersofarmedforces CourtofVeteransAppeals ReviewsdecisionsofVeteransAdmdenyingbenefitstoclaimants TemporaryEmergencyCourtofAppeals Hearsappealsfromdcsinvolvingcertainprovisionsoffedenergyregulations AppellateCourts allappellatejudgesnominatedbyPresidentandconfirmedbySenate limitedinscopetocorrectingerrorsoflaw o erroneouslegalinstructionscanbegroundsforappellatereversal o trivialerrorsignoredunderdoctrineharmlesserror o doesntacceptnewevidence&willnotreviewquestionsoffact CCsitinpanelsof3judgeswhenreviewinglowercourtdecisions o Whendecisionsofthesepanelsconflictinimportantmatters,the courtmaydecidetorehearcaseenbanc Congressauthorizeslimitedenbancreviewallowingacircuit withmorethan15judgestositenbancwithfewerthanallits members Twotracksystemisaproceduralshortcutresultingfromincreasedcaseload o Courtsincreasinglyrelyonstaffattorneystosortcases o Lessimportantcasesreceivelessattention

SupremeCourt(SC) 9JusticesincludingoneChiefJustice o JohnG.Roberts,Jr.,ChiefJusticeoftheUnitedStates o AntoninScalia o AnthonyM.Kennedy o ClarenceThomas o RuthBaderGinsburg o StephenG.Breyer o SamuelAnthonyAlito o SoniaSotomayor o ElenaKagan AllJusticesparticipateineverycase Haspowertoreviewallfedcourt,fedappellatecourts,andsomestcourt decisionsinthissenseistopofthepyramid o Powertoreviewhigheststatecourtdecisionswhenquestionsoffed lawareinvolved QuestionsmaybebasedoneithertheConstitutionorafederal statute o SChasnoauthoritytoreviewquestionsofpurelystatelaw Reviewofacaseisalmostentirelydiscretionary PartyseekingSCreviewfilespetition,if4/9assent,theygrantawritof certiorari o Iffewerthan4/9,decisionoflowercourtbecomesfinal Courttriestofocusonimportantquestionsaffectingsignificantnumbersof people Indeterminingwhichcasestoreview,SCconsiders3mainfactors: o WhetheraCChasreachedadecisionthatconflictswithdecisionsof otherfedCCorstcourtsoflastresortonanimportantissue o Whetherastcourtoflastresorthasdecidedanimportantfed questioninawaythatconflictswaCCorotherstcourtoflastresort o Whetheralowercthasdecidedanimportantquestionoffedlawthat hasnotbeenbutshouldbesettledbytheSC FederalJurisdiction limitedtodisputesinvolvingfedquestionsorinterstateorinternational controversies o fedquestioncasesarethosearisingundertheConstitution,anational treaty,anactofCongress,federalcivilstatuesandcriminal prosecutionunderfedcriminallaws alsohavejurisdictiontoheardiversitycasesinvolvingcitizensofdifferent statesorcountrieswheretheissueexceeds$75,000 o diversityjurisdictiondesignedtopreventlocalprejudice o transferfromstatetofederalcourtiscalledremoval o federalcourtsarefrequentlycalledupontoapplystatelaw o exceptionsareissuesoffamilylaw(divorce&childcustody)and estates(admofpropertyofadeceasedperson)

JudicialReview 2meanings:1)appellatecourtreviewoflowercourtdecisions o criminaldefendantentitledtoatleastoneappellatereviewof convictionpartofdueprocessunder5th&14thAmendments o nofedconstitutionalrequirementforacivilcaselitigant,butallstates andthefedcourthaveprovidedforsomerightofappeal o fedsystemandmoststatesystemsalsoprovidesecondlevelof (usually)discretionaryreviewintheirhighestcourt;usuallya broader,policyorientedreviewsometimescalledinstitutional reviewtorationalizeanddevelopthelaw 2meanings:2)FederalCourts,espSC,havethepowertoruleonanddeclare actsofCongressandthePresidenttobeunconstitutionalMarburyvs. Madison SeparationofPowers intendedtodividegovernment,diffuseitspowers,andprovidecheckson eachbranch recurringthemeforcourtsandfundamentaltothedoctrineofjudicialreview oflegislativeandexecutiveconduct bothconstitutionalprovisionsandstatueslimitingfedjudicialpowerhave beeninterpretednarrowlyandcautiouslytolimitinterferencewithboththe legislativeandexecutivebranchesofthefedgovtaswellasstateinterests fedcourtsinsistoninjurysufficienttogivepartiesstandingapartymust demonstrateaconcretestakeintheoutcome,notmerelyahypotheticalor philosophicalone StateGovernments StateCourtStructure SupremeCourts IntermediateAppellateCourts TrialCourts TrialCourts entrypoint;wherecasesinitiallyfiled dividedintotwolevels o lowestleveltypicallyacourtoflimitedjurisdictionhearingcases involvingsmallclaimsandpettyoffenses informalproceedings dissatisfiedpartycanusuallyseeknewtrialinthenextlevel trialcourt o nextlevelhasgeneraljurisdictionandhearsawiderangeofciviland criminalcases maybeorganizedintodepts.orspecializeddivisions

o inaddition,courtsoflimitedjurisdictionhearonlycertaincases(e.g. trafficcourts) reformerswanttoconsolidatetierstoachievegreaterefficiency conversely,otherstatesestablishingspecializedcourtstohandlecommercial cases o generalfeature:onejudgeassignedforlifeofacasesolitigantsnot requiredtoeducatedifferentjudgesoncomplexitiesofcase o e.g.businesscourts,healthcourts,mentalhealthcourts MIcreatednationsfirstcybercourtforbusinessand commerciallawsuitswhereamountexceeds$25,000 Proponentsbelievespecialtycourtswillattractbusinesstothe communityandrelievecourtsdocket Criticswarnthatjudicialresourcesmayshiftatexpenseofrest ofcourtsdocket

IntermediateAppellateCourts Dissatisfiedlitigantentitledtoinitialappealherebutwillonlyreceive hearinginstateSCwithdiscretion Reviewrecordoftheproceedingsinthelowercourts Structurevariesfromstatetostatesomeorganizedgeographicallyand othersbysubjectmatter LikefedCC,limitedtoreviewingerrorsoflawandnotfactualdisputes AlsolikefedCC,donotreceivelivetestimonyornewevidence sitin3judgepanels SupremeCourts attentionandresourcesreservedformostimportantlegaldisputes alsocalledCourtofAppealsinNYandcourtsoflastresortinTX&OK reviewislargelydiscretionary sometimesrequiredtoreviewcertaintypesofcases,suchasattorney disbarmentsanddeathpenaltycases insomestatest theintermediateappellatecourtshaveauthoritytocertifycasesforreview directlyundertheSCthisprocessisbypassjurisdiction alsoinsomecasestheSChasauthoritytotransfercasestoitselfreach downjurisdiction ParallelsandContraststotheFedSystem writtenconstitution 3branchesrestrictedbyseparationofpowers judicialreview almostalldividedintotrialcourts,intermediateappellatecourtsand supremecourts fedcourtshavelimitedjurisdictionv.stcourtsincludecourtsofgeneral jurisdiction

Majorareasofstatelaw Criminalprosecutions Familylawmanystateshavespecializedcourtstodealwiththis Contractdisputesbusinesslitigationandconsumeractionsaregovernedby contactlaw,whichisgenerallybasedonstatelawunlesssupersededby federallegislation Realpropertytransactionsanddisputes Probatelaw(e.g.wills,inheritance,trusts,etc.)manystateshave specializedcourtstodealwiththis Tortlaw(thebodyoflawgoverningtherightsofonewhohasbeeninjured byanothertorecoverforthatinjury)sameconductmaybegroundsforboth atortactionandacriminalprosecution,andstatelawwouldgovernboth actions Inaddition,statecourtsalsoresolvedisputesinvolvingfederallaw,which theyareboundtofollowundertheSupremacyClause Commonlawvs.Civillaw Mostwesterncountrieshavelegalsystemswhichmaybeclassifiedaseither commonlaworcivillawsystem heartoffederallawisconstitutionaland(federal)statutory incontrasttofedsystem,statelawincludesconstitutional,statutoryandnon statutory,judgemadecommonlaw;statelawstronglyinfluencedby commonlawheritage guidedbyprecedentsordecisionsinpriorcases Justascommonlawmustevolvetomeetchangingtechnology,itmustalso evolvetoaccommodatechangingmoral,politicalandsocialrealities Upkeepofcommonlawisastrugglebetweenmaintainingthelaws continuityandstabilitywhileadaptingtohistoricalandsocietalchange Thelifeofthe[common]lawhasnotbeenlogic;ithasbeenexperience (108) TwoKeyCharacteristicsofUSJudicialProcess staredecisis reflectstheneedforstability,predictabilityandprincipleoffairnessthat requiressimilarcasestobetreatedsimilarly;curbsarbitraryexerciseof judicialauthority underthisdoctrine,courtsgenerallyconstrainedtostandbyprecedents (priorjudicialdecisionwithinthesamejurisdictionresolvingalegaldispute involvingthesamematerialfacts

statelawstillgovernsmostofourdailyactivities,andvastmajorityofcases filedinstatecourts federaljudgeshavelifetimetenurev.periodicelectionformoststatejudges o electionsareusuallyretention,butsometimescontested; politicizationisincreasing

nevertheless,fairnessmayalsorequiredifferentcasestoberesolved differently operationofprecedentshasbothterritorialandfactuallimitations determininghowtohandledistinguishingfactsisoneofthedistinctive hallmarksoflegalanalysisinourcommonlawsystem(whatfactsarethe materialfactswhichshouldinfluencethelegalanalysis) staredecisisonlybindingwherethectwhichissuedthepriordecisionhas authorityoverthecourtresolvinglaterdispute butacourtmayelecttofollownonbindingdecisions,andthisisdescribedas persuasiveauthority sdnotabsolute o highestcourtinajurisdictionhasrighttodisturbsettledpoints o evenlowercourtswillsometimesrefusetoadheretoaveryoldand perniciousprecedent o federalCCpublishfeweropinionstocopewithworkload,and unpublishedopinionsarenotprecedent MergerofLawandEquity Courtsmustalsodeterminetheproceduretoapplyandtheremedyto provide MedievalEnglandhad2courtsystems:courtsoflawandcourtsofequity Burdensomedualsystemdevelopedintomergerweusetoday,butmergenot complete Keydistinctionsbetweenlawandequityremainimportanttoday o Jurytrialgenerallyavailableinlawwhilejudgeisexclusivedecision makerinequity o Remedyavailableinlawgenerallylimitedto$damageswhilecourts inequityhavediscretiontoprovideadditionalrelief Partiestodaycanseekbothlegalandequitableremediesinsamecourtroom, butproceduresdiffer Equitableremediesinclude o Prohibitoryinjunctions Courtorderfordefendanttoquitedoingsomethingharmful o Mandatoryinjunctions Courtorderfordefendanttotakeaffirmativestepstocorrect behaviororpreventfurtherharm o Specificperformance Courtorderfordefendanttoperformacontract o Constructivetrusts Courtorderthatrequiressomeonewithlegaltitleto money/propertytoconveyittothepersonwithanequitable righttoit Indiversityactionswherethepartiesarefromdifferentstates,thefederalcourtis oftencalledupontoresolvemattersofstatelaw.

IntrotoStatutesandStatutoryInterpretation Doestheliteraltextofthestatuteortheunderlyinglegislativeintent determineitsproperinterpretation? 3basicapproachesusedbycourts: o theliteralrule wherethelanguageisplainandadmitsofnomorethanone meaningthedutyofinterpretationdoesnotariseandtherules whicharetoaiddoubtfulmeaningsneednodiscussion o thegoldenrule themeaningofastatutemust,inthefirstinstance,besoughtin thelanguageinwhichtheactisframedrebuttedonlyinrare circumstances,whenacontrarylegislativeintentisclearly expressedandaliteralinterpretationisrejectedifitwould leadtoanabsurdresult o thesocialpurposeapproach acourtwillnotapplyastatuteliterallyifitwouldproducea resultatvariancewiththepolicyofthelegislationasawhole Indeterminingthemeaningofastatute,welooknotonlyto theparticularstatutorylanguage,buttothedesignofthe statuteasawholeandtoitsobjectandpolicy.(126Justice Stevens) CanonsofConstruction Thecourtshavedevelopedageneralsetofconventionstohelpconsiderstatutory languageanditsinterpretation. PlainMeaning Wheretheactisclearuponitsface,andwhenstandingaloneitisfairly susceptibleofbutoneconstruction,thatconstructionmustbegiventoit. EjusdemGeneris(OftheSameKind) applieswhereastringofspecificdescriptionsisfollowedbyageneral descriptionthecanonprovidesthatthecatchalldescriptionislimitedto theclassofthingswhicharespecificallydescribed. NoscituraSociis(ItisknownbyitsCompanions) holdsthatthemeaningofaword,andconsequentlytheintentionofthe legislature,istobeconsideredinlightofthecontextcanonoftenpaired withejusdemgeneris ExpressioUnius(TheMentionofOneThingExcludesOtherThings) expressiouniusestexclusioralteriusmeanstheexpressionoftheoneis exclusionoftheother:whenspecificthingsareexpresslyincludedinthe statutescoverage,otherthingsareimpliedlyexcluded NarrowConstructionofPenalStatutes Thiscanonisgroundedinthebasicruleoffairnessthatapersonshouldonly bepunishedforacrimewhenthestatuteprovidesnoticethattheconductis illegalrelatedtoguaranteesofdueprocess Inhibitsthepolicefromengaginginarbitraryanddiscriminatoryconduct

BroadConstructionofRemedialStatutes remediallegislationshouldbeconstruedbroadlytoeffectuateitspurposes e.g.TheAgeDiscriminationinEmploymentActADEAisremedialand humanitarianlegislationshouldbeliberallyinterpretedtoeffectuatethe congressionalpurposedofendingagediscriminationinemployment SpecificStatutesTakePrecedenceOverGeneralStatutes whentwoormorestatuescouldbereadtogovernthesameissue,acanon providesthatthemorespecificstatuteshallbeapplied DuelingCanons Therearetwoopposingcanonsonalmosteverypoint.(139,Llewellyn) thisconvincedtwogenerationsofscholarsthatcanonscouldnotbetaken seriously butcanonsenjoyingarevivalandmanythinkthatadherencetoestablished rulesmightmaketheprocessofstatutoryinterpretationmorepredictable, effective LegislativeIntent Courtswillexplorethelegislativehistoryofastatuteinanattemptto reconstructthelegislativeintentbehinditsenactmentlookingatthe courtsuseoflegislativehistorytodeterminelegislativeintent o Legislativehistoryistherecordoftheprogressofapieceof legislationasitmakesitswaythroughthelegislature o courtsoftenturntothepapertrailfollowingabillfromits introductionbythelegislaturetoitssigningbythePresidentinorder todetermineintention evidencemayincludesponsorsstatements,committeeand subcommitteereports,debates,conferencecommitteereports, presidentialsigningstatements,andpostenactment statementsbylegislatorsandadministrativeagencies responsibleforimplementingthelegislation HowaBillBecomesaLaw LegislationpresentedtothePresident ^ House/Senatepassesmeasure ^ House/Senatedebatesandcanamendmeasure ^ Leadershipschedulesmeasureforfloorconsideration ^ Measurereferredtocommittee(s)whichholdshearingsandreportsmeasuretothe House/Senate ^ MeasureintroducedintheHouse/Senate (AllmeasuresmustpassboththeHouseandSenateinidenticalformbeforebeing presentedtothePresident.Iftheyarenotidentical,theprocesscontinuesin Congress(141)

IfthePresidentdoesntsignthemeasurewhileCongressisinsession,themeasure becomeslawafter10days.IfCongressisnotinsessionandthePresidentdoesnot signthemeasure,itfailstobecomelaw(pocketveto).ThePresidentcanvetoa measureandCongresscanoverridethatvetobya2/3voteofeachhouse. TheRetroactivityProblem Americanlegaltraditioncondemnstheretrospectiveapplicationofthelaw andlegislationisgenerallyenactedforprospectiveapplicationonly ExpostfactoclauseoftheConstitutionforbidsretroactivityincriminallaw Inthecivilcontext,constitutionalconstraintsonretroactivityarerelaxed sincetheexpostfactoclausedoesntapply o Twocenturiesago:inmattersofnationalconcern,courtsmustdecide casesaccordingtothestatutesinexistenceatthetimeofthedecision, evenwhenthestatuteswereadoptedafterjudgmentinthelower courtifthelawchangeswhileanactionisonappeal,theappellate courtmustapplythenewlaw o Now:SCrecognizedthatinmereprivatecasesbetweenindividuals retrospectiveapplicationwastobeavoidedifitwouldaffectthe rightsofthepartiesalsoreaffirmedtheviewthatinmattersof publicconcernstatutesshouldgenerallybeappliedretroactively o