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Square oI opposition
In the Venn diagrams black areas are
empty and red areas are nonempty.
The Iaded arrows and Iaded red areas
apply in traditional logic.
Depiction Irom the 15th century
Square of opposition
From Wikipedia, the Iree encyclopedia
In the system oI Aristotelian logic, the square of opposition is a diagram
representing the diIIerent ways in which each oI the Iour propositions oI
the system are logically related ('opposed') to each oI the others. The
system is also useIul in the analysis oI syllogistic logic, serving to identiIy
the allowed logical conversions Irom one type to another.
Contents
1 Summary
2 The problem oI existential import
3 Modern squares oI opposition
4 Logical hexagons and other bi-simplexes
5 See also
6 ReIerences
7 External links
Summar
In traditional logic, a proposition (Latin: popoiio) is a spoken assertion
(oaio ennciaia), not the meaning oI an assertion, as in modern
philosophy oI language and logic. A caegoical popoiion is a simple
proposition containing two terms, subject and predicate, in which the
predicate is either asserted or denied oI the subject.
Every categorical proposition can be reduced to one oI Iour logical
Iorms. These are:
The so-called 'A' proposition, the universal aIIirmative
(nieali affimaia), whose Iorm in Latin is 'omne S est
P', usually translated as 'every S is a P'.
The 'E' proposition, the universal negative (nieali
negaia), Latin Iorm 'nullum S est P', usually translated as 'no
S are P'.
The 'I' proposition, the particular aIIirmative (paiclai affimaia), Latin 'quoddam S est P', usually
translated as 'some S are P'.
The 'O' proposition, the particular negative (paiclai negaia), Latin 'quoddam S non est P',
usually translated as 'some S are not P'.
In tabular Iorm:
The Four Aristotelian Propositions
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The Four Aristotelian Propositions
Name Smbol Latin English SSF
Universal affirmative A Omne S est P Every S is P All S is P
Universal negative E Nullum S est P No S is P All S is not P
Particular affirmative I Quoddam S est P Some S is P Some S is P
Particular negative O Quoddam S non est P Some S is not P Some S is not P
Aristotle states (in chapters six and seven of the Pei hemaneia ( , Latin De Inepeaione,
English 'On Exposition'), that there are certain logical relationships between these four kinds of proposition. He says
that to every affirmation there corresponds exactly one negation, and that every affirmation and its negation are
'opposed' such that always one of them must be true, and the other false. A pair of affirmative and negative
statements he calls a 'contradiction' (in medieval Latin, conadicio). Examples of contradictories are 'every man is
white' and 'not every man is white', 'no man is white' and 'some man is white'.
'Contrary' (medieval: conaiae) statements, are such that both cannot at the same time be true. Examples of these
are the universal affirmative 'every man is white', and the universal negative 'no man is white'. These cannot be true
at the same time. However, these are not contradictories because both of them may be false. For example, it is
false that every man is white, since some men are not white. Yet it is also false that no man is white, since there are
some white men.
Since every statement has a contradictory opposite, and since a contradictory is true when its opposite is false, it
follows that the opposites of contraries (which the medievals called subcontraries, bconaiae) can both be true,
but they cannot both be false. Since subcontraries are negations of universal statements, they were called 'particular'
statements by the medieval logicians.
A further logical relationship implied by this, though not mentioned explicitly by Aristotle, is subalternation
(balenaio). This is a relation between a particular statement and a universal statement such that the particular is
implied by the other. For example, if 'every man is white' is true, its contrary 'no man is white' is false. Therefore the
contradictory 'some man is white' is true. Similarly the universal 'no man is white' implies the particular 'not every
man is white'.
In summary:
Universal statements are contraries: 'every man is just' and 'no man is just' cannot be true together,
although one may be true and the other false, and also both may be false (if at least one man is just, and
at least one man is not just).
Particular statements are subcontraries. 'Some man is just' and 'some man is not just' cannot be false
together
The universal affirmative and the particular affirmative are subalternates, because in Aristotelian
semantics 'every A is B' implies 'some A is B'. Note that modern formal interpretations of English
sentences interpret 'every A is B' as 'for any x, x is A implies x is B', which does no imply 'some x is A'.
This is a matter of semantic interpretation, however, and does not mean, as is sometimes claimed, that
Aristotelian logic is 'wrong'.
The universal affirmative and the particular negative are contradictories. If some A is not B, not every A
is B. Conversely, though this is not the case in modern semantics, it was thought that if every A is not B,
some A is not B. This interpretation has caused difficulties (see below). While Aristotle's Greek does not
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Frege's square oI opposition
The contrr below is an erratum:
It should read subcontrr
represent the particular negative as 'some A is not B', but as 'not every A is B', Boethius
|citation needed|
in his commentary on the Peri hermaneias, renders the particular negative as 'quoddam A non est B',
literally 'a certain A is not a B', and in all medieval writing on logic it is customary to represent the
particular proposition in this way.
These relationships became the basis oI a diagram originating with Boethius and used by medieval logicians to
classiIy the logical relationships. The propositions are placed in the Iour corners oI a square, and the relations
represented as lines drawn between them, whence the name 'The Square oI Opposition'.
The problem of eistential import
Subcontraries, which medieval logicians represented in the Iorm 'quoddam A est B' (some particular A is B) and
'quoddam A non est B' (some particular A is not B) cannot both be Ialse, since their universal contradictory
statements (every A is B / no A is B) cannot both be true. This leads to a diIIiculty that was Iirst identiIied by Peter
Abelard. 'Some A is B' seems to imply 'something is A'. For example 'Some man is white' seems to imply that at
least one thing is a man, namely the man who has to be white iI 'some man is white' is true. But 'some man is not
white' also seems to imply that something is a man, namely the man who is not white iI 'some man is not white' is
true. But Aristotelian logic requires that necessarily one oI these statements is true. Both cannot be Ialse. ThereIore
(since both imply that something is a man) it Iollows that necessarily something is a man, i.e. men exist. But (as
Abelard points out, in the Dialectica) surely men might not exist?
|1|
For with absolutely no man existing, neither the proposition 'every man is a man' is true nor 'some man is not a
man'.
|2|
Abelard also points out that subcontraries containing subject terms denoting nothing, such as 'a man who is a stone',
are both Ialse.
II 'every stone-man is a stone' is true, also its conversion per accidens is true ('some stone-men are stones').
But no stone is a stone-man, because neither this man nor that man etc. is a stone. But also this 'a certain stone-
man is not a stone' is Ialse by necessity, since it is impossible to suppose it is true.
|3|
|in progress: Mill on the problem oI existential import, Strawson's answer, Parsons's answer|
Modern squares of opposition
In the 19th century, George Boole argued Ior requiring existential import on
both terms in particular claims (I and O), but allowing all terms oI universal
claims (A and E) to lack existential import. This decision made Venn
diagrams particularly easy to use Ior term logic. The square oI opposition,
under this Boolean set oI assumptions, is oIten called the modern Square oI
opposition. In the modern square oI opposition, A and O claims are
contradictories, as are E and I, but all other Iorms oI opposition cease to
hold; there are no contraries, subcontraries, or subalterns. Thus, Irom a
modern point oI view, it oIten makes sense to talk about "the" opposition oI
a claim, rather than insisting as older logicians did that a claim has several
diIIerent opposites, which are in diIIerent kinds oI opposition with the claim.
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Frege's Begriffsschrift also presents a square of oppositions, organised in
an almost identical manner to the classical square, showing the contradictories, subalternates and contraries
between four formulae constructed from universal quantification, negation and implication.
Logical heagons and other bi-simplees
Main article: Logical heagon
The square of opposition has been extended to a logical hexagon which includes the relationships of six statements.
It was discovered independently by both Augustin Sesmat and Robert Blanch.
[4]
It has been proven that both the
square and the hexagon, followed by a logical cube, belong to a regular series of n-dimensional objects called
logical bi-simplexes of dimension n. The pattern also goes even beyond this.
[5]
See also
Boole's syllogistic
Free logic
Semiotic square
References
1. ^ In his Dialectica, and in his commentary on the Perihermaneias
2. ^ Re enim hominis prorsus non eistente neque ea vera est quae ait: omnis homo est homo, nec ea quae proponit:
quidam homo non est homo
3. ^ Si enim vera est: Omnis homo qui lapis est, est lapis, et eius conversa per accidens vera est: Quidam lapis est
homo qui est lapis. Sed nullus lapis est homo qui est lapis, quia neque hic neque ille etc. Sed et illam: Quidam
homo qui est lapis, non est lapis, falsam esse necesse est, cum impossibile ponat
4. ^ N-Opposition Theory Logical heagon (http://alessiomoretti.perso.sfr.fr/NOTLogicalHexagon.html)
5. ^ Moretti, Pellissier
Eternal links
The traditional Square of Opposition (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/square) entry by Terence Parsons
in the Stanford Encclopedia of Philosoph
International Congress on the Square of Opposition (http://www.square-of-opposition.org/)
Special Issue of Logica Universalis Vol2 N1 (2008) on the Square of Opposition
(http://www.springerlink.com/content/l8rj3631747w/)
Color-coded traditional square illustrating the various inferences
(http://bearspace.baylor.edu/M_Boone/www/color%20coded%20traditional%20square.JPG)
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Categories: Conceptual models Traditional logic Inference
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