...

,
THE SEVENTH ARMY IN SICILY
REPRODUCED BY
PUBLISHED SEPTEfolBER 1943 BY
THE 62ND ENGINEER TOP COMPANY
THE STAff Of THE SEVENTH ARMY


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PAR! 0
a. !be PlaJa.
o. I.e8 tean..d.
II2d.b1t )Jo. I - PJannlwa InItruc
10. 1 - Fore. lla.
El:hibit n - ~ Far 343
0utlJ.M pl.an tor JOSS, DIllE, eDT A... t.
I:dd.bl 10. In - t orpD1aat1011l,
CODCCtr&Uon, ."....lD't or 12th A.S.C.
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B. cal ....'tare Iupector
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Public Relat1aD8

1fNdqurter. t Spec1al
I. 0rdDID
Chlrpla1a
n.r or ottlcen.
I. CIIG.lJf.IZI.TIOIf
1. C0R91t.1on or !P Nvl- Wh11e J.nIT 18 a nebalou organisation, it 1
tel that as & dat p1aDe. wiDima Anr.r should conalat of t 1Dt&Dtry oorpe or
three din.eio Each co should r iDtorc d b.T corpe artUIer,. brigad
'!'be itT tor three din-lona 1e that b.T inc th it is poslll1 1. to _inta1Jl
the preeam-e. VerT rare17 do .ittlatic:ma aria. where a tiro din-ion oorps can rest
ODe or ite diT1tllou.
2. Troop L"MI- A. In..t1ng up the troop list tor the usault CotlVOT,
it t alft:1S be r bered that while and equipment to operate harbors,
hes, grpes regutraticm, hospitals, or to restore and lI&1ntain .!rti.Ida are
neoees817', th81 are ntter17 nluel.ss untU the righting intentlY, supported b.T
artillery' and taDb, bae MIltured a beaohhead.
}. Fro our e:xperiellc, unit. not engaged in the 1n1t tight at the
beao are a1 'T" euper-optb18tio sa to how long it take!! to seeur. a beaohhead.
lfon-kill "e held to an 1.rhduoabl. win1... in -.r17 eohe1ona.
1. StaU S!ctiOYI- keh etarr .eetion ehoold be at tnll etretlgth when the
1n1t1al d 18 rec Iftd and plann1ng 1D1tiated. '!'he ftltme or work 18 uaual17
reater clm'1Dr this pbue t it 18 uri.D@ t e operatiOJ3&1 stage. J.upenUDg the
8tatt prior to the cupa1gn 18 t1atacto!'1'. ott'1oers tbraat into
the Id.ddle or the planning with a saril1' 1lwlequat. backgro1md are placed at
a 41.a4ftDtage whioh ter1all1' 1e 8D8 their valu.
4. AdditIonal StaU Segtionl 10 'fLO allows sutfioient perecmne1 tor the G-4
Sect10ll ill a landb tnneportation PCl'tian in G-4 u an additional
. epec1a1 .tan .eetlon on the J.nir 18ftl. 18 an essential adjunct to the '\lCoessM
t1 the nppq ttmetiona ot a mdem tl.14 or IUlJ)hiblou taak
tore. It shoald ecata1.b tom to .,., o!"tioen about t1Nl1t}' elUted 118D.
'fhia 1. pro1:BblT the 1108 1JIportant ion in 0-4.
,. Q-2 etiT1.t1Ht- J.ll per8GD8 ted with 1Dte1ligeo e acthi.tiee .boD.1d
be pla er on. , 11', the ta8k toroe 0 er, who would exarc18e thie
uthoritT throogh h18 .....letaDt Chief at Statt, 0-2. It 1AI orth1' at DOte that in
t B'OSII operation there aD;1 UDCorrelated G-2 aotlT1.tl.. wMoh resulted in
no l1tU .CCIltUaioza.
6. :- 1. nn1 to prorlda tor the terception ot 0 aa&p8
nbord1Date unite ot the an4 particularq beth other trlCld11'
Jor 1IIdta 1D the operation, eDUar to 'th, Brit1eh -J" Serrloe, shoa1d be
.ltabl .. a t UD1t.
7 statt otN.oer ror air .hould be ueigned to the 0-) Seotion ot
all db1aione &Dd big er 1Drl.ta. H should be hom tbe air torce, pret'erab1;r ot
tield and thorough1;r trained in a1r-groImd eapport.
fhe J.nir 1iai8 a,.t.. t be turthc' den1oped.
eJ 18 1 ahoa1d be Ntah118bed in J.nIT hee.dquarten. Personnel
tulq selected eqa1pped and train It 18 iJIpo t that tbe1 be
taDetlO11l at the ince\)tlan ot planning. J.deqaate ion tor lateral
t be ked out.
9.. t- It 18 ed that the G-) Slctt "-4 T Ib1.
cml1' tor li.Ib1Dg th priorit1' or at units, and the. u- !"'&D8po1'
.. _ a sepuate t8 S t1on, be responsible tor iasu1ng detaUed
ord , prori41ng th nec a:rr a4dit1onal , and ooordinating and rol
WOT t.
10. s- Antr n ar sbore control organisation ehould be
pert'eeted at the iDoeptlon t4 pl.nniDc. !hill group should be oompletel;r etatte4
with 1Dt'ormed repruGDtatiTQ or all etion sary the operat phu
In IIBtJSJcrlf due to 1n1t1al starr sbort&gea and ror other reuo it ... not t ...lb1.
to t neh an organ! tlon uatU sbortl, D OaT.
11. CorpI ArtU1,al- OOrp8 art1l.1.er1 bripd. should ona18t ot nc1
mexrt or l5S gcme, CCl' reg! nt ot 8 1neh howits.rs, and cme regiJlent ot 4.5 h
guD8, aho one 'battalIon. All cot1'8 artllleJ'1 0Q1d be prorlded nth
-4 raotore now used b.T e Col .lA.
12. EprlDeer Upita:- In Nght.1ng in bad com:rt!'1' qaiDat an who ruta
to demolitIons tor it 18 cCClcebab1e that the ratio ot Eag1D.eer nt.
to IDtantr1 reg1JIenta should be tU"t7-t1tt1'. Certa1nl1' fIft'rT lJItentl'7 di ion
activel)' enpged require. the services or 0Be EngiDeer ill addition to ita
diT1.eicmal Th. Corps Artill.er;r certa1Dl1' requ.ire8 an
and others _t be ntUIHd to II" that th supplies broQgJ:rt up b.T the
the Corps and Divisi ns.
II. AIIlINISTRATIOH
1. Changes !rHigher There is D8Y IIJOUgh preparat.1CID tDe.
Changea iiiPlaDs the speoifying 0 II1Dute datails should be
inso ar u poasj,bl. b;y higher headquarters. Valuable t1ae dur1Ds the traiD.1n&
period can thus be saved IDd loww UDits be g1nc1ts benetit faJ' ustab:Q',
ping, am training.
2. Channels CommaDdt- Det1D1te chann 18 or CQIIItarxt shoaJ.d be set 1JP t.
JIIlId1ately Jtsr the c cept!Ou ot the oper&t.'1C1D. The 0 1 at l>'C7nx', troa
task toroe ccmaander to the highest authorit;r, should definite and cl1rect
subs1di.&1'1' or adjacent headquarters should be 1Dcl ed in t.b1a channel
3. All troops selected tor the oper t.1 sbould be
placed cl1rec er tc;;;;;...nd ot the task tore. cQlll!'DJl1"der. 'fh1a 8hou1d
be all acing. Troops eboul..cl DOt UDder one ee-und tor tr , ancl undc'
ano cOllllllaDcl tor attarlnhtratiTe purpos.s.
4. All coabat unite should be bll"ouIht up to rio p1u
tor II and orticer8 ot junior iX'-.1e, ud all par frOND. TbU
i.e ot rltal UIportanc it the aall cOJlbat units woh .. boat teaa, pla , eto.,
are to go into action f'ull strength. It should be a nco sed act that cln to
sickness md other reasons, 10 to 1,% ot arsr c will not be an.U
able to the cOlllll&Dder OIl D-dq. 'l'beretore, m order to han cOllpleteq tra1ned t-..
made up of MIl accustomed to ...orkiDi tog.ther, an onr-stNDgth ala" be prorlcled at
the earl1 st possib1. JIOII8nt.
S .Record ot Unite J0in1Di SI1b-Tuk J'orc.SI- 1. chec ays t be e
8 whIch'ii1l1 proiid. for an accurate record tba tee on ... hi h l1D1ta
parts or l1D1ts jom Sllb-task tore... 'fb1a i speciallJr nee ssary tor op.ra
tio phase.
6. AccCllllOdati t- , tber on l.ao1 or. ,
be adequa acCOiKidi all pcaonmt cOlDCC"lled, and the
S8 t be uple to h.m:U. he...,- trartic that nol'll&l.:q aphib1
operations, both during the planning &Del the operations p
7. Desi!tjtion or Ports aDd Units to In planning tor an ...
phibious opera1Ol1 it 18 essent!i1 tb&t & d iion ot ports, eabarkation poin
and tinal etag1ng areas be 1nclvMd in th 1n1t1&l. d1recti..... Dnipat1.on unite
to cOlllpr1ae the tore. and prov1.alon tor the r ease or th s un!!ilI to the task torce
concerned alst also be acCOlllPll.ahC 1I1th the tart or planning that prior1tia
c-2
he United Rations' transition troa the -eM of the beginning" to the "begin
ning or the eM" is spanned by the history or the United State3 Seventh Ant3".
For though it had a new name - acquired at sea as its embat ed convoys bore
d01lD upon the Sic1l1an coast - the Seventh Antq was not a new organisation. '!'be
eo-ander, essen ially the UJI8 tatf, and JDaJl;1 at the same troops bad once
before shared the title "greatest aIlphibiO'l1s fa e in history." Wes
Task 1'0 e, they had ended the beginninB 1dth the assault a North Africa in ov..
ber, 1942. As the Seventh A:rrq they began the end with the attack on icil;y that
opened the first breach in the European fortress.
That cont.inuity of historT had a profound effect on the su cess or the SicU
ian ..sault for the starf U 11'811 &8 the troops had the benatit or a:perlence.
LesSOM of the "Torch" operation 11'81'8 well learned; its mistakes e rectified,
and the result was an operat.lon as well planned and as 8lIIOOth1 eucuted as the
uncertain fortunes of war permit.
'lbe Torch operation was ha.:rd4 thre months past, its assoM were still be
1JIg studied, when the decision to put that experience to a new test was made.
'!'he W.stern Task Force bad rea3sumed its old D&1IIB, the I Armored Corps. It 'lIaS
baaed t Casab ca, ch Morocco, in Jzuary, 1943, whe t that T ry plac ,
though unlalO1lD to lIIIOSt of its members, its 1'u ure was being decided.
In the suburb or Anfa, President Franklin D. Roosevelt am Pr1me llinister
Winston Churcb1ll met to isCU8S the futur conduct of the war. They and their
statfs, loold.ng months ahead to the successful concl113ion of the North African
caapaign, planned the knoek-out or Italy' - to start with the invuion or Sicily
in July.
Less than three weeks afte the end of the Ant'a Conference, the complex
uchinery planning had been set in motion. on February 12, Planning Instruc
tiOD o. 1 was issued by orce 141, the pJann1 ng h adcparters set up in Algiers
under General Sir Harold Alexander.
!he "favorable Jul;y moon" was designated as the target date. The forces
were to be of sufticie t s rength to guarantee success and 11"61"8 to consist of:
Combined A1ll Forces
COllllllill1der in Chief' General Eisenhonr
Force 141 (Combined All.ied Ground Forces) General Alexander
Force S45 (One British Field Utq) General l4ontgomery
Force 343 (American '1'a8k Force) Lt. General Patton
American and BriUsh )laval Fo ces Admiral Cunningham
American and BriUsh Air Forces Air Chief Marshal Ted er
Although th pl.am1ng instructio anticipated "\.hat I ArD:>red Corps' pJwming
r woW.d done initially at Casablanca, then probably at an, an interim 8
to Rabat was already under way when the 1netructions were issued. An adTance d
tac t had lett on the ninth of February an d choseD the ChalIIber of ComDerce
buUding in the Moroecan capital for the hea&luarterlS. On the 2Jrd the move was
cOlllpleted.
By thie date, chiefs of the prin ipal star sections had been informed that
the headquarter was entering a lanni.ng phase, and on the fifth of lIare let
ter from ed Force Headquarters designated the units to be assigned to Foree
343, for an aaphib10us operation to begin &IS 800 &II possible tar the eod. of
the Tunisian Campaign.
'lbey Headquarters, I Armored Corps; Hea uarter, VI J.nq rp J one
Combat Co1lD8JX1 of 2nd Ar1Iored Division; 3rd Infantry naiaD; 36th In! try
T sion; 45th Infantry Division from the United States and tbB lat or 9th Infan
try Division.
(G llarch 11, t e section opened the special pl8'ln1JJg room in tiM
ot the headquarters builiHng in Rabat and began &IIseab
l1
ng research uw1&l on
Sicily. Tbi s cti n was the first to deta.U personnel on a full time baais to
the HUSKY plan, realizing that it would have to lay intelligence groundwork ore
other sections c uld begin planning. One officer, a draft.sman and a
became the nucleus of a planning starf wbic , within a few 1IlOnths, was to total.
hundreds of
This group began 'WOrk on an "Outline of Intelligence Intoraation on Siclly",
known to the starf &II the "Black Book". Couposed principally of extracts from
secret reports, the Black Book SUDJIl,Qrized all information available at that time.
It covered ieneral topography, conmunicati n and transportation facUities, beach
es, defenses, IIilitary reso ces and battle order, aId financiaJ., political an
social factors.
To point up essential teatures of the island, an early G-2 project was the
preparation of special overlays for general display. Drawn in color on translu
c nt acetate sheets, the showed natn, roads, ratlroads and disposi
tion of eneuw troops. They were made to fit over the standard 1:100,000 map or
'the island, but a more 1Japressive 113e of them was on a specially- t back
lighted frame that made it possible to view at nee any esired c mbination of
features. Used by G-2 itself for makiJ:lg estimates of enemy capabilities, the
overlays were also kept n pe ant display for the us. of aIV IIlSDber of the
plamrl.ng starf.
Hardl.y less :1JIIportant, in the early phase, was G-2's responsibility for s
curing or the headquarters and its growing fUes of m1l1tary secreta. The prin
ciple established was t t the personnel informed of the plan shou1d be kept to a
IIdn1mum md that those informed should be giVIn only such information &8 their
plrticular duties r uired. A classification system, CO'I'ering both officers and
enlisted men, was set up, and the Provost Ilarsha1 section provided special gu&l'lU
for the plamdng room to which classified personnel were adm1tted. The list
11&8 lengthened whenever necessary, but even at ebarkation time, there were still
some m8llIbers of the headquarters who did not know where they were going.
The reversion of Weetern Task Force to a type corps had involved the 10s8 ot
a substantial portion of its experienced personnel. The new ass1gn:Mnt 1Japosed
on 0-1 the task of bringing all sections up to the strength required by rapidly
growing duties. on ch 18, 0-1 directed the starf sections to subdt personnel
requirements, together with names of those spec1.all desired. On the 27th, the
first large request was subDitted: 14 officers by name from the Firth ArJv, 13
from Atlantic Base Section, 11 rr other unita; and 17 by qual.1t'ication fr<lII
units or replacement depots. Soon afterward, arrangements were made with ABS and
JIBS depots for lists of available officers and for personal interviews by G-l.
llATOUSA gave authority to select ;my in grade of Captain aIl higher. On April 6,
T/O 110-1, modU'ied, was approved for the headquarters, authoriZing a strength of
178 otricers. Actual strength at that t:1JDe was 85.
Probing both past and future for data on which to base an estiJlate, 0-1 on
Karch 26 submitted its first requisition for medal.s far the Sicilian CaDpalgn.
They ranged from eight 1Iedal_ of Honor to 15,000 Purple H ts and 125,000 Afri
can CaJlPaign edals and hattie stars. ese represented one-ball o! the estimated
requirements.
-2
INITIAL PLAB
KeamrhUe initial plans for the assault 1I81"e being dft'eloped. A p-eJiminary
d1scusa1 was held at Force 1I.a1 headquarters on Karch 18 where Forces 141, 3lU,
and .54511'8l'8 npresented. On week laterthe outline plan was issued. (See Plate
1) It called for a British aasault on Soutbeastern SicUy, and
Gw, on aDd two distinct American assaults: The DiS! Force Ord DiTision
Reini'orced) was to attack the Se1acca-kzara area of Southwestern Sicily on D plus
two; md D plus !'in, the FISH Force (36th Division) was to land in the Caat.el
&rq; the HOOK Force (45th DiviBion) in th Capaci area, and the GROO Force
(1 RCT of 36th DiTis10n and 1 RCT of the 45th DiTision) in the Trappeto area, all
in Horthnstem SicUy. 82M llrborne DiTision, less parachute elements &asisting
ENSA, was to be prepared to assist the stern assault on call after D plus two.
'l'bis en1:.ire plan was predicated upon the North Mricm1 Campaign ending b1
April 30. The sustained drive of the British Eighth Arrrr:r across Libya, the oper
ations of the American II Corps and Br1t1sh First Anty in Tunisia, were closely
followed b1 the Force 343 p1a.mling - not only because the outcome of that
capaign would haTe a decisive effect on their own, but also because there were
UDY spec1!ic lessons to be learned.
One of the IIIOst bIportant of these 'WaS the necessity for being able to pass
1dne!1e1dB, planted profusely by retreating German units. The &lgiDeer Sec"t1on,
early in the planning period, undertook an Brlensive program of a1ne training aDd
exper1JIIeDtiDg. During arch the 17th Armored EDg:!.neers were apen.mting in the
se of bangalore tol't'edoes to clear .a1nef'ielde and at the end of the .mth an
&Jgineer detail -.a also sent to the Eighth Artsv mne lSchool at Tripoli to study
Br1ti h _thods. A special COIlYO)" was sent to 'l\m1a1a to collect a.rman mines
for ecq>er1ment and training. So 1JIportant was this type of trainiDg coDB.idered
that it 1IU proposed to n,- sufficient JII1nes to the United States to enable the
45th Dirlsion to load th on its transports tor study during the tr8Dl!l-At.lllltic
crossing. 'l'bis plan was found 1JIIpractical.. Throughout the planning period close
l1.a1SOD 1rM DAintalned 'With the Fifth Anqy II1De school and 'With II1ne iDstructian
at the Fifth A:nr Imaslon Tra1n1Dg Center. and during June officers of the &:g1
neer Section Tisited all Arm;y &gineer Units to supen:iee mine, as 11 as caam
Oage, training.
0THm SPECIAL mooP5
Other speciaJ. A%'my troops alao egaged in tr 1DiDg progrlll8 throughout the
Spr1J:Ig. Pending arrival tree the United States of the motorised che:1cal battal
icoa assigned to the opSl"ation. tests or white phosphorus shells, colored ke
and name tbronrs wer. collducted bT units a1.ready in North Africa. On
ord..s of the General efforts were .-de to obtain .. large a supply as
possible of lIP gob greMdes. FollcndDg the arriTal of the thr-ee chemical bat
dalOnstrations of the 4.2 inch chem1cal 1IOrt&r, tiring bleh uplosive
and te phosphorus, were held for the Cb1e1' ot Statf. To reduce the weight
carr1 b7 as t 'troops, the Chemical Section alao srranged tor all troops in
the assa t to be equipped 'With train1Dg gas maaka, in place ot the bulky ernce
m&8b.
Basic first aid tra was checked in all units b1 the lledica1 Section,
lIbieh also made cClqllete studies or intelllgence _ter1al on Slc1.ly to prepare
tor special medical problems likely to be enoountered during the operation. All
hospitals, as -.ell hotels and schools that II1ght serYe as emergency hospitals,
1IWe listed, and iDformation on diseases peculiar to the island was studied.
Jnv cal units were requisitioned and assembled. for tra:1D1ng, plans for
ftaCUat of casualtle" dra1lI1 up.
The training of Signa troops presented a pro _ dur1IIg the plmn1Dg phase
because one Signal battalion and two dinai S1gDa1 bad hid
combat experience. The units 1Ih1c too no pert in the '1'uD1s1an CapaigD had
been operating the COI!IIIDmicaUon ag8DCies at various hea.dquarters aDd bad ll.ttle
or no opportunity to carT7 on aD adequate S 1 traiDiDg prograa. Most of the
aniJab1e SigD&l. traiDiDg schools had courses ( to three -emtba),
md it was f 1t that there 1rU not enoagh t:lJlle to send troops to these IICbools.
The tra1Ding of all radio operators in L1nk sign procedure, as ordered bT
AFHQ, was begun 'With two one-day IJChools at IIostaganem. Represctatives of mat
ot the Signal unitIS atteDded.
Training in the use al d tAmance of the British Speech plus S1JIp18lt aDd
Speech plus Duplex equ1 t 1Ia8 given at the req-aeat of the SigDal Offic.., I
Armored Corps, tor JDelIIbc's of the lat red S Battalion to lib the eqo1p
ment was to be JDade avaUable.
Tra1n1J:lg in the lDstallation, operatiOD and u1DtArlaDce of S1eDal Corps 0&1"
rier equ1pment WlUI given at a BenD dq school cODducted bT the llediterraneu
Base Section for a l.bI1.ted DlDIber of
In the selection 0 Quartenlaster troops fur the operatlon, train1De of units
had to be takeD tor granted. 1boe. al.readT in the theatAr ..... eDCaeed 1D the sue
type of work apected of tbEID in e operation, but under d1!!..ent conditiCllllJ.
Those enroute to the theater arrived too late to enter into err COJII'ftbensift
tra.1ning program.
ASSAULT UHITS
The 1IIOVe:me:nt, tr.a1n1ng, am stag1ng or _jar assault units ecbeduled tar tbe
HUSKY Operation during the p1anD1:og pMae was centered about the Fitth A.n1T IDvu
ion Training Genter at Port .lux Paules, J.lger1.a (Arsew Area). Th1a area was .-de
available for the .pblbious tra1.niDg of the 1st Infantry Division, 9th Int'ant17
Division, 3rd IDtad.l'1' Dirls1on, 2nd AruJred DiTislon, 1st hlblous
Brigade, and later, the 45th Division. The 82Dd llrbome DiTision did not .av.
into the Ann area, but .aved directly troll Casab to its tra.1.D1Dg area near
OuJda aul f1Dl1 17 to the staging area near lariouan, Tunisia.
The 45th Division was CDat-1oad in the United States and reached. Oran 011
June 22Dd. '1'h1s division coDducted its rebear al in Anew gulf on June 24-25.
and after five dqsI conditi tra1.DiDg at the Fifth Imuion Tra1D1ng
Center reloaded tor the ope-a on. Movement of as t units attached to the
various sub-task forces was ace Ush during the period May 1 to JUDe 22, 1943.
'1'h1s .,vement im'olved the u.se 0 ad, raU, .ter, aDd airborne transportation
facilities trQIIl erne end of Ur1ca to the other.
The special tra1n1ng tor the operation consisted of IIIIphlbious tull acaJ..e
rebearsals b1 the separate b- k forces. training bT units CQDSla
ted ot load1ng units 111th all personnel and equiJaent into shipe and craft (as
plamed tor the operation), am then approachini a selected beach 8Dd debarldDc
under cl3lbat ccodit.i during am in darkness. Tbese
cises were conducted at least once b1 each unit 1Ib1l.e tra1niDg at FAI'l'C, aad .are
thaD coce b1 D>st units.
0-4
types of tra1n1ng for small un!ts in special operations were conduc
ted in conjunction nth uphibious training. Other special training included the
uae of liTe ammunition, simulating battle conditions to such an e:cten't as to give
the individual soldier the max1 JmlJll of preparation for battle, Beach defenses
were constructed to giTe the troops opportunity to by-pass such obstacles.
Units which did not engage in unit tra1ning at the FAITC sent
selected cadres to schools in water-proofing of vehicles for driving in water,
transport loading, and unloading of ships and craft. These cadres lRlre then re
turned to their units to instruct the remallrlng personnel.
Special courses in driving and maintenance Dukws (21 ton Amphibious trucks)
were conducted by the 1st Fc1g1neer Special Brigade at Port Aux Poules in order to
tram drivers for the large numbers of Duk1rs received just prior to the op8l'ation.
It was iJIIpossll>le to conduct rehearsals nth all units participating, but
rehearsals follawed. the same scheme of maneuver as planned for the actual opera
tion and were on a scale as near full Rtrength as possible. It gave all sub-task
forces the benefit of a dry-run.
Following the rehearsals, sub-task forces were assembled in staging areas
tor final loading or units to ship in the assault IIIOV'ement. Loca.tion of staging
areas was determined by location of sub-task forces at the end of rehearsals,
available bivouac areas, dock space for loading ships, protection of ships and
craft fr en8ll\V' sea and air, the necessity for maintaining the maximum secrecy,
and the type of ships or craft in which units were to be lifted.
In late April, Headquarter13 I Armored Corps IIIOved from Rabat, lIorocco, to
the same stretch of Algerian coast where ma.JV of its major units were training
and rehearsing for the HUSKY operation. The forward echelon was otficial1.y es
tablished in the College COlIII1Unal in lIostaganem on the 26th. Three days later,
the classified HUSKY planning group, which still comprised only a small portion
of the staff, arrived in Yostaganem by a special, fast, heavily-guarded convoy.
Its mil s and and its files of plannine instructions and intelligence
material, were deposited in the secret joint map room 'Which had been repared in
advance.
Soon, however, the volume of work had grown to such an extent that
it overfiowed the confines of the joint map room. More and lIIOre personnel of the
starf sections were classified, more and more offices in the school building nre
roped off, placed under special guard and given over exclusively to plaming work.
While the HUSKY plan was being worked. out in lIostaganem, the headquarters
rear echelon was 0PEll"&ti,ng at Oran. Routine administrative and personnel matters
were handled there, as well as details of the HUSKY supply plan that required co
ordination nth 50S NATOUSA.
Coumunication and liaison between starfs working on the HUSKY plan were in
lves major operations. The J4J staff was split into two lf1de1 separated
echelons. Some troops under control of Force 34J were on the east coast of the
nited States, others were scattered. frol!1 Casablanca to Bizerte, a distance of
aver 1,000 miles. Headquarters at Oran, liostaganem, Algiers, La. }(arsa, lIal. ta,
even Cairo had to be tied together into tast-working channels. A co tant
stream of intelligence material, directives, requisitions, inquiries and miscel
laneous correspondence nowed back am forth across half' a continent and on to
London and ashington.
Prepar1Dg, sending and receiving and sa!egu.arding an nse volume of high
1 classified matter taxed to the utmost the facilities and personnel of the
Adjutant General. and Signal Sections. Hundreds of papers were registered daiJ.y.
S}:e cial courier routes were established, direct teletype lines installed be een
major headquarters, radio and their accolllpal'l31.ne code rooms p1&.ced in con
stant operation, and telephone circuits opened and kept open.
fut there is no adequate substitute for direct cont.act and throughout the
pl.ann1ng period general and special staff officers attended canterenees and vis
ited back am forth to discuss the manll'old problems presented by the plan.
On 23, there was a meeting at Headquarters Foree 343, Rabat, presided
over by the Conmanding General and attended by senior cOllllWlders and senior
starf officers of I Armored Corps, and representative of Force W. At this
meeting General Patton gave an introduction and the general plan for the HUSKY
Operation.
The day Force 1.4l decided, in response to a request from Force 343, to
substitute the 1st Infantry Division tor the proposed 36th Intmtry DiTision it
the Tunisian Campaign ended in time to make the change possible. Just a IIIOntb
later, attar the Tunisian Campaign clo.ed, the II Corps 'Was substituted tor th
VI Corps.
CliAWE IN PLAN
. On May 3, the plan of attack of Force 343 was changed trom the western end
of the island to the beaches between Pozsalo and Licata in the southeast. The
outline plan of the new JOSS-DDIE-CENT assault _s published on the 18th ot llq.
The general mission was to assault the southeaatern portion or Siclly in conjunc
tion with the 12th British A:rtq ani capture it as a base for further operations.
(See Plate 2).
The specific mssion of the new assault plan callErl tor landing and operat1.ng
west of the line VIZZINI - RlGUS! - POZALLO, all exclusive; to seize and hold the
airfields just north of Com1so am at Ponte Olivo and the air l&nding fields at
Biscari and northwest of Licata; to seize and operate the small port at Licata;
and to prepare for further operations under the directions of the Deputy Commander
in-ebier, ll.l1ed Force.
The scheme ot l!lBDeuver was to make a simultaneous assault. in the Licata
Gela - Sampieri area in order to capture the airfields and t 1'..... Lica.ta by
dark on D plus 2; to extend the beachhead to the generaJ. line (YELLOW), P.AIJlA. Dr
IlONTECHIARO - CAMPOBELLO - I4A.ZZARINO - CllTIDlRONE - mwoaCHE:IE, and to the east
to contact the British in the vicinitY" of RAGUSAJ to include (BLUE) the high
ground in the vicinity ot PIAZZA. AMERINA. - AIDONE to prevent hostile interference
trom the Northwest.
The CENT - DIllE Aaeault was to be under the 1JlImediate cOlllllaIld of Lieutenant
General O. N. BRADLEY, II Corps. The participating troops were to be the lst
Dirt.ion (-1 RCT), llSth DiTision, 2 Ranger Battalions, 91st Reconnaissance Squad
ron, Paratroops (82nd Airborne Dinsion), and supporting troops.
This Aaaault Group bad three :1DIediate missions: (1) Under cover of darien ss
to D Day to land in the Gala - Sampieri ar a and to capture and 88cure the air
field at Ponte Olivo b;y dalight on D plus one; the airfield north ot Comso b;y
daylight of D plus two, and tb air landing field north ot Biscari by dark ot D
plua two. (2) To extend the beachhead to YELLOW and gain oontact With theBrit
ish in the vicinity ot Ragusa to makB contact nth the 3rd Infantry Division on
the left.
The JOSS usault, c ed by or General L. K. muSCOTT, was to cauprise
the 3rd Infantry Division, Combat C'UIIIlIWO.LIU A of ths Second Armored DiTislon, one
0-6
Ranger Battalion and lJUpporting troops, and 1IU to land in the Li ta area. It
1IIU to capture and aec e the port and airfield by' dark ot 0 Day, extend the beach
head to YEIU:IW', protect the lett tlank of the operation against interference tram
the northwest, and on its right tlank, to II&ka contact with II Corps.
'n1e Force .34J Reserve na to consist or three principal elements: The loot
fore., under Vajor General HUGH G!FFEY, made up or el8l18Dts of the Second Armored
DiT1810n (less Combat CommaD1 A), ona ReT of the lst Intantr;y D1:vieion, and sup
porting troOP8, ftB to sail with the uSallt and be prepared to 1alId in support
ot an;y ot the assaults; the 82nd Airborne Division 1e8s paratroop e1eMnts was to
be prepared to support the assault on call atter H-Hour on D-Day; 1 RCT and Divi
eion art1llery ot the 9th Intantr;y Division was to be alerted to moYe trom Disert.
on call of the C__rxUng General, Force 343, after
The WOLF Force coq>Clsed ot one Parachute RCT reintorced, trom 82nd Airborne
Division was to assist ODIE Force in landing and capture ot airfield in vicinity
of Ponte Olivo night ot 0 II1nu8 1, (prior to seaborne sault) and be attached
to II Corps upon contact on land.
In the C&8e or some statf eections, the change in plan bad 11ttle erfect and
the7 continued mrk:lng along the "... lines as bet'ore. In the C&8e or others, bow
"mo, many weeks or work had to be done OYer frOID the beg1nn:1ng.
Again IIlch ot the initial burden feU on G-2, whose intelligence _terial had
to be amended and supplemented to coyer the new area. A new intelligence plan and
new G-2 estimates e written during subsequent dq's. Hew cwerlqs, s1.ldlar to
those coye:r1ng the western half of the island, 'Dre prepared firet tor the south
east, and then for the no ast portions or the island. Frequent cOD!erences
were held with the &1gineer Section to rearr&llge priorities on IlIlp publication.
Arrangements were also ude to transfer to Force 343 the beach .cdels for the
Oela Licata sectors. '1'hese re.l1et llOdels, produced by' .Anv Ecs1neers .bond
beaches, to.ns d terrain teatures in caet data1l; a -xlel of ite 0lIl1 landing
area 11&8 delivered to each nb-task force 1Dvolved. In addition, a 1:100,000 ter
raiD B:ldel of t entire 1slaIxi was JD&de during the planning phaH, and oarried
witb the G-2 coabat intelligence section throughout the operation.
As additional intelllgtmee intonaat1on became &Vanab1e, a stMd1' etreaa of
battle order, terrain and Il1scellaneous 1nt01'll8t1on smated frOID G-2 to the other
ltatf sections and the nb task forces. On Kq 10 the first of eeries or gen
eral int'ormation bulletine was published, the series continuing until the end of
the operation.
Photographic intell1gence bec:aae the principal source ot detailed intonaation
during the plann1.ng period. Starting with one orficer in reh, the photo
interpretation section apanded steadily untU bT D-Dq it comprised 3$ Officers
IDd 70 Fnlisted Ken. Prior to D-DayI sorti.. t'lcnID by' the Horth Urican Photo
Reconna1ssance nng, yielded 19$,000 prints and 1,400 us.mled .ewcs.
Ini'omation gleaned by interpreters -.s dis88lll1D8ted in spec1al over-printed
collatiCll1 JIIllPS aDd a series of written interpretation reporte.
To teke :ru.u ad'Y8Dtage of this important activity aDd itl!l imDediate ettect
em operations duriDg a critical period. there ere arreDged plans for both visual
air observation (Plate 3) aDd photographic reccmnais88Dce f'raD D to n,lS (plate 4).
'lhese were te be used 10 case ot eIIlI!I1"gency in the event ot waat1stactory coamun
lcaticms. bearing in mind that radio silence 1I8S to be e1'tective until ordered
lUted on the morning ot D Day.
During the operation proper. there -.s ceneid ra 18 satisfaotion in knowing
that these two 1JD.portant activities being prOYided tor. "en thougb it 1lB8
salble to gain oontaot through direct chaJmels. -UTeDgemeDt wae made 111th
the tactical reconna1ssance unit. 1Ihich _s pertorm1Dg the visual observation.
that laold.Dg suitable ccmmmicat1ons. steps would tUeD through air cClllll8Dd
channels tor the honor1l3g of requestl!l against targets so d1scloaed. and arrange
ments were also made in ad"ance tClr th6 report1Jlg ot any results of photographic
recCllDDaissance far 1JIIDediate action trClll Atrica. WIlere both ot these unita had to
be located 1n1tially. BCIIlbardment missions were executed without f\.u"ther orders
trCll1 this headquarters as a result ot the cClllb1ned activities. aIY'I. the a'Y'Y inter
preters mo had joined. the Interpreters Group tr8Il.8lll1tted over :redio broadcast
channels. such 1ntomation as it was del!llll8d essential either tor the 1aDding or
againat targets tOUDd SUbsequently based on both of these services.
'lbe sectian principally affected by the change in plan -.s 0-4.. Which bad to
re"fmll,p itl!l plan of supply. As OrigjMUy outl.1ned. the Yoree 343 operatian would
ha"e lDcluded early capture ot the port of Palermo. and 11.. portl!l in the _st
of the island. But the new area did not boast a s1Dgle 1m;portBnt port and plans
therefore had to prortde tClr S\lllPly the beaches for a period ot thirty days.
if neoesS81'7. bei'ore a port could be
force -.s to be 1n1tially equipped. and su,pplied UDtil D plus 14. trCIIl
North .African SOM'Ces. On D plus 14. the t1rst conTOY' loaded in the llDi ted statea
w.s to put in at Sici11aD. ports.
'lhe basie supply plan -.s to provide the soldier with the essentials tor cem
bat and not overload h1m or the beaches with UDD.eC sS1U7 supplies.
'!be general plan for 8X8CutiC'l1 of the supply mission .. that su task force
cazmanders _re to be r8sponslble for their own su,pply f'r ships and other land
ing craft OYer the beaches or through aDY sub-ports. to 1JJclude the operation of
all bee.chh880s tmUl that duty -.s takeD over by Force 343.
When iIle supply activities wre to be taken OTltr by Force 343. the CCIIIIIlmder.
1st Engineer sPecial Brigade. would 88S\11118 ccmae.nd ot the beach groups and of all
non-divisicmal and non-eorps UD1ts attached thereto and such necessary serrice
unit8 as be attached by the CaJJDBndblg General. and also be responsible tor
the executian of all supply plans wi thin 'the theater of operations I11118D8t1ng fran
Force 343. including the operation of any seized ports.
Force 343 .. to be respcm.sible for the coord1Dation with Headquarters sos
HATOUSA in iIle aaS&llbllng ot supplies at ft1'ious parts of eIll arkatian and their
transportatiOll. to the theater of operatiClD8. and that supplle8 would be 0 tained
trCIIl 50S and torw.rded em an au1lclDaUc basis err on special uest by 'l'esk
Force and SUb-Task Force CCIIIIIlUIders.
ibe administrative ch8DD8l for S\QlPly w.s to be trClll the SU 'Iask oree C
JDaDdere and ArrI13 troops direct to Force 343. '1be II Corps 'as to have no edminh_
trative fUnctions other than those pertaining to its Corps trooPS. e t in
geDOy.
Initial maintenance .. to be over the beaches tmtll such t1me as a jor
port coul4 be captured. Plans wre accordingly made tor continued beach mainte
nance tor a period ot at leut thirty days. In event that each maintenance
should prove 1Dadequate. arrangeamts made tor a tial use of the Port or
Syracuse after 0 plus 14.. J. force ot 2..500 service troops loaded on ODe troop-
A
a-8
By the end of D f 1 the Seventh ....rnt,{ extended beac'lhea1g inland on both
its right and left flanks, and haJ withstood JetanaineJ c.:>unterattacks at its ceJ,lt.er.
The eneMy air attacks that had begun on D day were maintained, with repeated raicia
on be3ches and transport areas, by both high altitude and dive bombers. Early in
the morning, the cOlMl8.nd ship U.S.S. ilonrovia suffered a near miss at 50 teet. The
air attacks continued throughout the day until 2400B.
Our losses tor the day stood at 117 killed, IB94 missing and 466 wounded. A total
of 4390 prisoners were taken. B,y 1400B about 400 prisoners had been gathered on the
Gela beach awaiting evacuation by S88 to Africa.
Among documents found in an enemy headquarters captured in Gela 1'Ias an Italian
map giving the location of minefielda along th south coast and the coastal roads.
Atter translation, copies were sent to the Divisions.
o pI s 2, 12 July
The second lift ot the 82nd Airborne DivUion was due to land in Sicily from
North Africa the night ot the 11th-12th. But for the second tae an unfortunate
incident of war interfered with the execution of the aii'bome mission. The transport
planes arrived over the beachhead area simultaneously with a fleet of enemy boaben.
In the two hours that followed many paratroopers miased their mark.
n the ground, the again launched counterattacks against the II Corps,
throwing both infantry and tanks into battle south of NiscemL Th attsck 1'&8 re
pulsed b1 the First Division supported on its right by elements of the 2nd A. D. and
by 1400B the enemy had been forced to abandon his last attempt to prevent our estab
lishment ot a secure beachhead. During the lIlOming the Ponte Oliva airfield. had
been captured.
D I- 2, 12 July
On the extreme right of the Seventh Army sector, elements of the 45th Divi
sion n Ragusa, contacted elements of the British Eighth ATm1 under General Mont
gomery.
Howev r, the Seventh I.r'tq beachhead wae still divi ed into two distinct 38C
tors. 3d Divieion advanced rapidly' against scattered infantry and tank
units, pushing its line to Canicatti and improving positions at Pa di Monte
chiaro and Riesi; but on its right, patrols contact en8ll\7' e1ements south of
Riesi between the 3d and lst Divisions. Exoept tor this gap, the Seventh Arm:1
foothold on SicllT extended from eight miles deep at Gela to 15 miles on each
flank by' the end or D .; 2.
The Engineers had rel!lOVed obstructione from the runways of the landing field
west of Gela, and, acting to cut mine fuses, had saved the runways of Ponte
Olivo 011 destruction. Straggler control and traffic direction were organized in
Gela aM the seeuritT of ammunition dumps and abandoned enemy headquarters
1ftI.8 assured. The advance Army collllllaDd post' moved ashore from the Monrovia in mid
afternoon, established one echelon in a school building in Gala and another in a
grove north or the town. In short, the criti 1 phase of the &8l5&ult bad been
passed, and the Seventh Army was to stay.
EnelllY air action had been reduced considerably duri the day, but some bOl!lb
ing and strafing continued. One IST was bombed, burned and sunk.
Against the loss of 29 killed, 106 missing, 13 reported captured, and 183
Wounded, we had taken 4,206 prisoners during e day. The unsuccessful enem;y
counter attacks againJIt the 1st Division during the 11 aDd 12th hs.d cost him 4
Mark VI, 29 Mark m and IV, and 10 Italian tanks.
D I J, lJ July
Field Order no. 1 had ordered es.ch sub-t'lsk force to erlend its beachhead to
the line "Yellow" illUl'lediately af"ter \.i.t:I initial belichh s. When the
enemy hE.d been driven back to this line, hi:: 1anI< range artillery would be unable
to rea h the airfields pt Ponte Olivo, Comiso, an and these fields, to
/lether with the port and arrfield at Licata, 1'10uld be usable by th Seventh Arrrry.
On the 3th, a Sa-enth Arrrry irective made OMe revislone in the order. The
3d Division, which had alread reached "Yellow" was directed to continue reconnais
sance to Agrigento, and hold Canieatti Bnd th road junction two miles east of
Ries!. 2d Armored Divisiol'\ (lese Combat Command A), together with the at and 4th
Ranger Battalions, were detached from II Corps and assigned to Arrrry reserve. II
Corpe was then to continue on its ssion of securing the line.
82d Airborne D:lvis:l.on, in Army reserve, was to contin e The 18th
ReT was released to the st ivision.
The major enemy effort at this time seemed to be east and west of a ge era!
line Caltagirone - Gela. Elements of the Hermann Goering Division, estilllllted as
an armored "giment, were in action in this area. All Seventh ArrtJy forcee advanced
and further deepened the beachhead.
II Corps advanced to lrlgh ground 5 les north or ChiaralllOnte Gulfi, 5 miles
northwest of Com1so airport and 4 miles north or Biseari on its right (45th Divi
sion) !"lank; and to the high grOWld J miles north of Niscemi and Ponte Olivo in
the 1st Division sector. 3d Division continued its aggressive reconnaissance to
ward Agrigento and the north. 2d Armored Division, with the lat and 4th Ranger
Battalions, advanced to Mt. Nicola, 8 miles northwest of Gela, and continued to
rd Butera.
Now firmly established on the island, Seventh Arrq .... preparing to put cap
tured airfielde and cOlllllWrl.cations in early operation. The airfield at Ponte
Olivo, a glider strip northwest of Gela, and a landing strip 2 miles eaet of the
town, were reedy to receive planes. newly constructed 1anding strip was also
ready at Licata, and 3 P-3S's came in to the field on the 13th.
On 13 July, 2033 prisoners were taken, and by' this time the lIIOUDting total
of captured and deserting enemy troops, principally Italian, had presented a
difficult problem. Divisions were burdened with hundreds of prisoners, and Corps
and lacked sufficient transportation to provide substantial relief. Addi
tional prisoner of war guards were requested to take OYer the processing or cap
tured enelll1 personnel.
The civilian medical problem had also becolll8 acute, due to an apparent lack
of adequs.te local facilities. Prevented from shouldering the tun civilian medi
cal burden by the limitation of its own supplies, the Arrsry had to limit civilian
hos ita1ization to rendering first aid to cases in dalli;",r death.
American oasualtiee for the daT totalled 58 killed, 36 missing, 4 reported
capt ed, and 157 wounded.
Tactical air reconnaiBaance kept clost! watch on anemy lIIOVements, and fre
quently its reports led to bomhlrdment missions. Bombers also served as
a sour e of valuable information, reporting observations through the XII Air
Support CommBnd on returning from missions.
Late in the evening of the 13th, a bat Ie group of the Hermann Goering
Division was reporte near H-4540, about 5 miles e!lS of Niscemi. An American
officer who had been captured by the Germans and then escs.ped confirmed previoUB
b-6
estima es that t r tho islenj, th"
he Panz8r Divis ons. c I nte
ro r+ed to be in 5i ly.
D .;. 4, lh Jul
the lLt:. it as that the fnlstration of er.emy cot.:.nteraUacks on
the sector on I.e llt" ani had 1 d a ecision to itt: isW, fi nt.i e
o dela;;in actions an.1 lI'.OLkiIlg lac counterattacks. Air rt-Connai ssance revealed
a general enemy movement to cl.Td the ':atania plain, and ther ....ere also s1 119 of
ener.JY wit aw northrard alrn: hir.h.,:ay 12l: beyond Cal 11' I e.
Orders from Arnry Group) now swune the e fort
of the '"eventh A 1Y tow? d thp. nCoL"U west. A bound . betw en the Sever.th arn
extended Vizzini the roa to Caltagirone, Piazza merina
and the roa junct.ion ten miles 30U t-t we'"; t. r &mao
II Corps continued 1ts rapid push northward on its extreme rieht an re ched
the line Yellow near Vizzini. In thtl cente the ll:'ft of the L5tb Divisi.on sec...
tor, stiffer opposition wa met, but units to the high ground i tiles
southeast of C tagi n!, and also cap scari laD lng fi Id.
On tt:e II orps left, the 1st Division ok Nisce and and held
p 5itio05 c n oiling the ad j tion three miles s theas 0 al.tagi nee A
small pocket of resis ce bene the 1st and h5ht J"vision was still being
m ped up, but contact been est.a lis h re - as weil as between the 1st
an Jrd Jivisio on the left a II 0 S an etlreen the 45th Division and the
Br"tish on its righ - thu as iog a continu0us Allied beachhead across south
eastern Sicily wi th th flanks anchored on the sea. 3 Ji maintained its
p sitions, with active rec ro ais:'ian nor an west; Co bat Cor.n.an B of the
2nd Armor d Division and the lst a 4th Ranger Battalio s operated on the II
Corps front, the former help1.nE: 0 clean 0 t t e eneo,:r pockets ne j iscemi, and
latter capturing Butera, with th ai f effect v_ Nava t)l1ro:-1ment.
The capture of scari airfield reported repairable Wi thin fiv to eight
hours, had marked completion of the initial. missions as iened Seventh Army.
The 4th Tabor of noums, from the nGoums ocains" of thf! Freud', .lerk . ri
can ed at Licata OT. the 14th.d ." re attached to the- .... Division.
Corresponding" strength to an iniantry bat.talion, the 4te ... a 0 fought with
the Jrd Division d ing its a v on Sciacca, ani later ....as at to II
Corps for operations in the rll'. countlj' of nortt.f-ast rn Sicily. It gaVEr a
good acco t of it elf hrouE;h ut tt-e caopaign.
2 estimat t t by J f 4, 13,000 prisoners of war had been cart. red,
enemy had suffered 1,400 casu ties, dead an wounded, had 10 t 85 aircrc.ft ca
t red, 67 guns arger than 75mm captured and destroyed, sixteen ark III auct
IV t sk and 7 !.lark VI ks were taken as as mne other tanks whos classi
ficati n was not rerorted.
All prisoners ex e t ltalj cedical of.icerw and chaplains, and Italian
soldl rs of Sid ian blrt ere being evacua.ted to 1 th Africa rapi y as
Red Cross later open or War
as p"ssi Ie, cared for b Italian ?ersonne1.
of t e Italian prisoners
w. they" accused 0 sa rificing to
one occa ion t. E: Gen::ans had ."ithrl
roads as t her lIIent, trapping the I
" ie d the rear.
h
Fi:"st of the cbnees to e affected..... he creation of a Provisio orps,
cot:iprised. f the 3rd "DiVision, reinforced by the 3rd ltaru;er Battal aD, Fifth
Field Artillery Group and other sup"orting troops, and the 82nd irborne "vis"on.
This latter division had completed reorganization and was reinforce by the 39tl
RC7 of th 9Lh 'ivision, 34th Field Artille Battalion of the 9 h ivision, the
83rd Chemical ttalion and ther troops.
Accor dur the next two days II Corps pivoted on the Provisional Corps
to s ing the entire Seventh Army 1"I"0nt to the north And northwest in pr"pa.ra 10n for
he r ve t the north
The 45th Division, n t e rirht flank, slsted tr.e at Caned Division of
th ritish XXX Corps in the oapture of 1Tj zzini, occupi. the rel'"8inde of t hill
ound south of the Vizzini - alta. one oa, and hus co plated hA in! ia ie
ston or IT Corps in th s sector. The Is Division COD inu its adva , vin
north of IAazzarino toward arafran a nd t}.e Jrd insion, no,," ..., of rovisional
Corps, sent strong patrols into Favara snc. . 'afnllllUto and reconnaissance patrols r ur
to five miles n rth of Canicatti dRiest. 82nd Ai bo e continu
sembling in prepara ion for ts visional orps ro e, an tend or D visio
which rE'gained Combat Comman A m e 3rd Dlv sion, asse blE'd he Campobello
area under Army
The initial objeetiv of the co bined Seventh AMerican and B itish
arJlli s (Firteenth Army Or ) as stated the irecti was th 1 e Cat.anl
Palma Di Montechiaro.
An tti ct.iv i8suec on the 15th erlended the left ary 0 I Corpe
to Palermo and the right boundary to e north coapt.
II Corps mission 1f88 to caoture Caltanilllletta an lIec e the highn.y north
1"I"om Caltanissetta, anc. to be nrepared for further action by dark Uly 19.
Provisional Corps' Jrd Division 'lmS to secure the hi....lmay frot'l Canicatti
San Cataldo and e pre ared for further action by July 1. The 82nd Airborne Divi
sion 1'I'aS to a83E1Dble Palma JIontechiaro elements 0, t 3rd Division
at that location by dark July 17 in preparation for a westward a vance.
As final preparations SM d up for the next phase of he c aign, the err
;Jcore thus far stood as follows:
A totu of prisoners been take, no r akdown available as :>
the proportion of Lie to Italians. The en 1 st an estimated 9CX' de
and wounded, 112 aircraft had been captured 0 5 on the ground. 80 ,
larger than 75 , 24 k ill and k IV tanks, and 7 Mark VI tan' had been cap-
t'lred.
Total strength t e Seventh Army then stood at 203,204.
In eparation for continuing 0 e at ons,
at Gela,
remappi of units began an the initial ....ate
wit an as-
t:1.r.lated capacity 0 25, g lons day.
8
by .ea. wUh a landing at Bro10. Proteated b7 air caver a.'ld supported b7
tr Task Faroe 88, the 2nd Battalion. 30th Infantry, reinforced
red artillery and tanka laDded suocesst'ully two m,les e at of Cape Orlando
pt'llred a position astride the highway and railroad Idles west of Brolo.
'l'his forc YaB c r-attacked during th day but held its position. The 7th
ReT push along the coast road, crossing t.he Zappula 4iver while the 15th RCT ad
vanced northward and captured Nasa.
o enemy attempt to evacuate south along the Naso - andazzo road had been made.
He continu rear guard action along Highway 120 to andazzo, using mines an,j de
molition. Alt.hough indicated earlier, no strong defensive posit;ion nort est of
Randazzo had been located by our troops moving in from the northwest. Other than
isolated pockets of resistance in the vicinity of .laso, which were nearly surrounded,
and the enemy continued rear guard. action along the entire front of the .;,eventh J\nQy.
The 60th Infantry of the 9th Llivision was its march eastward across
extremely rough terrain toward Floresta. In most places the regiment had to build
its own roads. 1'h 39th RCT passed through the 47th RCT and established contact with
the 78th ion ot the Etighth Arm;y which was moving on l4aletto. The 39th continued
to attack eastward toward Randa'ZoZo against strong enemy resistance.
By the end of the day, the II Corps units were closing in on Randazzo.
D .;. 33, 12 August
En evacuation across the llessina Straits was underway on a large scale. East
bound enemy traftic was fully loaded and westbound vessels we-a empty. Air photographs
which covered the llessina Straits on August 11 showed 33 water craft, including 10
ibel ferries.
Fnem;y forces were w1.'thdraw1ng east of Patti (C-84), breaking contact during the
night of August 11-12. The defense of iiandazzo consisted mainly of mined roads de
fended by artillery, mortar, and long range small arms tire. Generally, the enemy
continued delaying action in the north in he eventh Anrry zone. In the center, the
enemy evacu.ated noresta (C-83) and was withdrawing east of the Naso - Handazzo road.
Berore the British Eighth Army, the enem;rl" retrograde IDOV t re ched Riposto
(D-Ol) without indications of an organized de1'ense. In tile 9th Division sone t e
60th RCT ca:.;>tured noresta, ten lId.les north ot Randazao, cutting the Cape Orlando
Randauo road.
The 3rd Division's 7th RCT advanced aJ.ong the road and Cape Orlanio.
Both the 7th RCT and the 15th RCT made contact with the special 1s.nding force est
at Brolo (C-7$). The 30th RCT passed through the 7th Infantry, and aided b7
DaTal gunfire JIIOYed rap1d1y along the coast road to capture Brolo. E1 nte ot this
r gimsnt also entered F1carra (five miles south ot Brolo).
kiU11lrh1le the British nIl Corps 78th Division pushed north 01' l&a.letto to high
ground south ot RantUzso to effect a pincer movement on the ci ty with the 9th Di
vision attacking traJA the north and west.
At the close ot the 9th Division 1JllS in an aha...'ltageous po3ition north ani
nst ot Randazzo to wage an ill-out attack on the city. The]rd Division
advancing along Highway ll3.
o I 34. 13 August
ce AON en withdrawals were characterized by heavy d lit10ns and lIline
tield.! to b1pede the Advance ot the Sev nth Arm;,. In the norther sector ther W&8
a general eneIllY' withdrawal and app;lrent (l.l.sorganization. Little contact was de
west or Patti (C'J5).
In the vicinity ot Randazzo, the e wit dr und r coyer of darkn ,
upported by occasional artillery and rtar tire. A large concentration of otor
transport .walI observed in the vicinity of llesaina (D35), and three small freigbtera
and 30 8lIIa1.l. boat were s n at Porto D Ol1vieri, (C94).
'
By nighttall the 9th Division had captured the last strong en y
po3ition on the southern axis. The 39th RCT captur d the city against etu'.Jborn
reaietance, whUe the 60th RCT continued the attac eastward trom. !Plor sta (C33).
The 47th RCT passed through the RCT on the eastern outsld.rts or Randazzo.
In the .3rd Division zone, the 30th ReT continued its adYllOce to the east within
two mlee of Patti, whUe the 15th RCT and .3rd Ranger Battalion cleared pockets ot
reaiatance southwest ot Patti, The advance past Cape Calaya, four ailes northwest
ot Patti, was impeded by a large crater blown in the road at the eastern end ot the
CalaY& tunnel whertl the road had been carvoo from solid rock 8Ountailaide. LC1".
were used to terry infantry and artillery past this b10ci<, which required 24 houra
to repair.
A spec1&en or incendiary-filled 32 CW. (German rocket shell) was taken f
a capturoJei Genaan &IIIIlIW1ition dUlllp.
The number ot prisoners ta.l(en this date rose to following the brea!dng
up 0 remaining Italian units in northeast SicUy.
o .;. 35, 14 ugust
The enemy was by this time concentrating almost exclusiYely on trying to eYac
uate th i8land of Sicily successfully. Ene::ay air operations during thla phase
were con! ned to scattered night boalbing raids and an occasional daytime st:oating
and bombing mission along the coast road.
The enemy svaeuated east or Fa cone (C94) during the night of the 13-14 August.
Kild contact was gained at noon, northwest ot l'Unari (8sven ailes south est ot
Barcellona (83), but the enemy was primarily concerned with withdrawal.
Montalbano (C83) was also evacuated during the night of August 13-14. at
was continuing along the coast was evidenced by air reconnaissance whieh
reported two troop transports in the Kilazso Harbor earl,. in the 8Oming. A prl
oner of war stated that evacuation to Italy had been orderdd on August Rth.
The l'3th RC'l' ot the 1st Intislltry D1Yision passed through the 39th and 47th
RCT's of the 9th Division and adYanced eight lIl1les e:;.st of Randazzo along High '1
120. The advance was h8llpered by blown bridges and min.rield.!.
Meanwhile, the 9th Division continued its advance northwest and gained contact.
with the 3rd Division in the vicinity at Montalbano. The 3rd Division advanced
rapidly to the east, captur Oliveri (six Idles east or Patt ). $lld falcone.
Then they advanced three miles east of on the coast road.
o I- 36, 15 Aumurt
The e &cuated east of Spada ora (025), nowever. some attempt of organised
reaistance was encountered in the capture ot Barc llons.. Further activity was
observe in the Uessinli Straits anrl the en9lll7 s reported to h'.lve lost tour craft
1n the llessln'l Straits because of Xllied air action. In the British Eight. Anay
b-20
I. CEGAl'ITZATIOlf
1. C .- While an J:nt1T 18 nebalcnw organization, it 18
t.U t t as a datu. plane a Antr 8hould constat 0 two intantr7 corpe at
three diT1.eio ch. Each should be re1Df'orced by a corps artUlery brigade.
'!'be it}' tor thne dirldona 11!1 that by -1Dc the it 18 pollsibl. to ainta1ll
the PNeeure Verr rare17 do .1tuaticma ar:1JI. where 0 din.ion oorpll can 8't
ODe or 1 dlrle1oDa.
2. TrooP J4atp, - A. In up the troop list tor the atllt corrf'07,
it aast be I' bered that while and equipment to operate barbors,
hes, grayes reg1.ltratian, hospitals, or to restore and lIi!linta1D a1rti.Ida are
De0e88&r;y, thsy are utterq T&1.ueI.u lIDtU the tighting intantl'7, supported b7
artillel'1' and tanks, baa C&!ltured a beaohhead.
}. 7l'o our uperience mdt. not engaged in the 1Jrl.tial tight at the
bellOlM.. are aln78 8ttper-opt1Jd.etio to how long it takes to secur. a beaohhead.
lon-till t be held to an 1rreduoable lliDiJua in early ech.lons.
1. Stttt S!ot;ioy.- Each etatt etlcm should be at strength when the
1n1t1al d ... 1a c_ind and plarmi ng 1D1tiatec!. '!'be YO ot work 1.1 uual.l7
I'Mter chIr1J:l thil pbu_ thc.n it 1.8 during the operatiODa1 stage. A'QgMDt the
atatt prior to the 19D iii t1at.aetor;y. Otfioera tbraet into
the II1.ddle of the plaJDIing with a ar1l7 1Dadequat. background are placed at
a cl1.a&4'fantage which ter1all7 1. 8IUI their valua.
'- .&ddlt1op&l. Statt Seqtion. 0 'fLO allon euttioient personnel for the G-4
Sect 1D a 1aDdiD opeNtlon. tn:osportatlon ill G-4 as an aMitional
. apee1a1 .tart .8Gtion on the AnrT leftl. 18 an .sential adjunct to the sllCeeM
t1 or the nppq ttmctlOD1l of a lIOdern corps, ti.ld U'IV', or uphibiou tuk
tore.. It IIhoald conta1.n tl-oa tel to twl offioen aDd about tftlJt7 enlU MD.
1'h1JI i. pro b17 oat bIpol"ta!1t 1011 in G-4.
,. rlt 1- All pe ClD8 0 ted with intell1geDce actirlties .boo1d
he plued UD4 one , 817, the tuk toroe 0 er, who eDJ'Cue this .
uthor1t7 thr0t3gh hie Aulstant Chief at stan', G-2. It 1.8 wortb:r at DOte that in
t HDSII operation t re .uIT lIDCorre!ate4 G-2 actiriU88 wMoh rea ted 1D
DO l1t.tl cad'aai
6. t- A Hl"ri to prcrt1.4e tor the 1I1terception ot 0 8lI&ge8
bet...m ftborIUAate tm1ta ot the aDd ether t1'ia:ldl,..
tion, .1AUar to the Bl"itl8h e3" Serrlc., should he
peI"-.D1Il1t un1
7. 'k'- start otticer tor air .hould be assigned to the n-J Section of
all d1rt810 big er units. Re should be f'l"OII the air foroe, pr.terab1.7 or
field and tborough17 trained in a1r-grouDd support.
!he UwI 11..18 am.. t be fbrther d.....loped.
PIU"& ti ahoa1d be ..tabl1.ahed ill Anq headquarters. Personnel
tuJ.ly elected equipped and traiDed. It 18 UportaDt that the7 be
t'tmctlon t the lDceptiCID ot planning. Adequate 10D tor lateral
t be eel out.
ed that the G-3 Secti rMPCID8ible
cml7 t ll8h1Dg t prioritT of JaOV t or units, and tha:t G-4 T'!'aD8por
Secticm en" a .eparet. nents SeotiOl1, be Neponsible for isllU1Dl d taUed
, the nee al'7 aMltional 1l8tJl8, and coordinating and control
.,... .
10. 1- AD Anq near .hare control organi..tlon .hou14 be
perfected at the tDoeption or pJannlDc. 'fh1e group .bould be comp1ete17 statte4
with 1D!'onted repreeentati of all action ear,y to t aperat e.
In wBUSII- 4ue to 1Jrl.t1al statt shortage *lid tor other l'eUcme it .... not t ..lb1e
to ar ct 8QCh an organizati 1IIItU s rtl7 ore D Dq.
U. Corpl ArtUI,a.- bri hoa1d ona1et ot ncl
lIleJrt, or glma, GIl. reg1JIent or 8 inch ht.JW1tl.ra, and one reg1Bent ot 4.5 h
guM, aleo one battalion. All orpe artllle17 oW.d be prodded with
11-4 traaton now used by ca JJ..
12. Engineer Ugiy:- In l'ighting in bad cmmtr;y apiDat an who truta
to demolitions tor dela7, it is oGlloeiv.bi. that the ratio ot Eoginelll'
to Intantl'1 regiJlenta should be t1.tt7-t1t't,... CertaiDl7 flYf/r7 Intantr;y dl...uion
active17 ncaged requ.1.N. the .errloq ot one Eng1Deer reg1MDt in ad tion to i1;8
dirlslonal Eagheera. 'the Corpa ArtU1erJr certaiDl7 requ1ree a.
and others t be utUisEd to see that th suppli bro1lght up by the reae
the Corps and Dlv1.sions.
II. AIIlINISTRATIOH
1. Changes bLHisher Headquarters.- There,is DeY h pnparaUClIl u.e.
Changes 1npIiii8 iiiiI tbi speo1lYiiii O1l1i.mlte cata1l.a abou1d tbentore be &Y01ded
insot u possible b7 h1ghar beadquarters. Val ble t1ae dur1Dc t.be trai.D1ne
period can thus be saved lad lonr units be gi.... ite benefit tor usabq, !Q111P
ping, arxi tra1n1Dg.
2. Channels at Commanda- De!iDi1ie ohannet. ot ewwrand shoald be set up 1.
JI8d1at.el After the CODCtlptlOn or the oper t..1.oD. The c at c-.rend
tuk toroe coDDBnder to tbe highest author1t7, sbonld he de.tiDite and direct.
IJI1bsidiary or adjacent headquarters abould be 1Dcl eel 111 tb1a channal.
3. or 1'roop a- All troops selected tor the oper t1 be
placed ec or the ocmund or the tuk toree cOlllll8Dder. Tb18 should
be all-..braoing. Troops aholIld DOt be UDder one tor tra1n1.nl, and lIDder
ano o01lllllllDd t Ildm1n1 strati" purposes
4. Jfi. Ul coabat unite ahould b. brought up to 'I/o StnzJath, p1u
lS% o1'ticV' ot junior Fade, aod all per fro. TbU
i. ot rlta! 1.IIportenc. it the small combat units Rcb u boat tuu, platocD, eto.,
are to go into action h11 strength. It should be a recolDised tact that dile to
sickness 4IId other reasons, approxiaately 10 to lS% ot urr c will not be
able to the commander OIl J)...,dq. Tbe:retore, in order to haft cc.plet..eq tr eel teua
II&de up at MIl &eOl1.lltomed. to wOrkiJli together, an onr-st:r.ngtll IDl8t be prorl.ded at
the earliest possible t.
S .Record ot Units J01n.1Di Snb-'faak l'orea- A cbec fIPJ IIlSt be utab
lisbed which W111 prartae tor an accurate recora tbe tea ClI1l1'bi units
parts ot unite join sub-task tore. i, spec1.allJ' nec.ssary tor til 01*'&
tloaal phMe
6. cCOlllOdati 1- , 1Ibetber ClI1 land or , _lit
be &ccc.:id& ill pereo CClDCerned, Cld the
S8 m.st be ap1e to handle 1;he trartic that norul.J b10ua
operationa, both dur1.Da the planning aDd the operations p
7. DeIl1SItion ot Porte aDd Units to In plann1Dg tor an ....
phibious operaon 1t is ssentI&t tJi&t the of ports, t1cD po1n
final staging areas be included in the iDit1al dir cU Du!cn&ti unite
to comprise the tore. aDd provision tor the relus. of these UD1!iS to ta.ak torce
concerned Wl1st also be &ccc.pllibed 1I1th start. of plam"'ng 110 that priorltie
c-2
U. .lIR - aVI - GROUND
1. lotpt Pl.aPP'MI- ... Ia operatiolUl ot an uphiblow _tuN, it u .bIIo
....1&1 that all .enic rureeente4, I.e., GJ'OUDd, 1.1r, .boal4
be ea together or adjaeent to Neb otis duriDc tb eart pl.ami atac.. Fa11
are to 40 80 renl a ill oontu.lon, 1Mtt1a1-.101., aDd
naft! aDd air ioipat1nC .wit phD in j1IDDt 0 with the
rroaD4 tClll'C'. InBUS!Y" u in "TCIlCIJII the aDd 11."7 8tattII re 817 .epar
tea c!lIrbc the oritloal period ot planning. In botb opera 10M t I'Malted in
IIIMdl md the lOll. or ftluable tiM. The plan tor _ ed
.,....tlca -t be deftloped 1D close cooperation br all lc1pating .!b18
that ,Da, aid air toree etatt. aD! c0Dt1mlou17
...u.: other'.o that all the detaiU or tra1orl.ng, reheu'Mla, .,...MDt
to tqiDc areu, loading ot CClIl"f'01'8 aDd btion be etteotinl;r ooordinated.
It 18 ential that the air IIerri be nprMatea on tbe aU plann1.
lrtatt. 1leprMeatat1.... or air tacrti u U" not Rttic1atl7 t ..U1er with
HJ'rl.o. 1IIlita to 1D4icate with the required a:aotn.. a oe oem,..... NCiIU1lre
..m. tar .h1ppiDg 8]l&M.
2.. L""qn:- Cona l.1a18on _t be a1Jrta1n with all npp:q .,eo1N
et .. Ift1bordiDate hMdquarkre, air, , aDd Da"7, the pl'.'1lI
a.n4 operational .taI- or an operatl
3. S,lectiop at QbjmiyMl- 'lbe eral to .ttack
"" tbe It bIooMa the dut,. or the Pore, C er, in OOIIIlj.1lC
t1aD witJa the 1a"7 tb th .l1r Poree, to 4etendDe preoi8 1ooal1ts..
the 1uId1.Dp wUl be .t ted. Tbe:t or the 1IaY)' ill thia u 4e
..t1on fit" tU which, fro. na'ft1 .taDt!point, na1l.abl.. 'fbi in-
teJ'en of 'toM .lir 1AI and to nat :t t1b oernr 0&Il ... prorl4ed.
!1M aDd will be .ftl! 11 the YT, Ar..,., .1 I" , wi
ir rtQeGtb. a "" ,..a tb18 4ecuioD after the alii!
type of 1!f't 18 etermned. 'fbt realClD that the lif't ESt be 4eten!.Md nr.t 18
that ClID the lif't deptDd8 th. amant at t aftllabl" ...... OD tb ..,.t of
aa11ul. epead8 the IImIlber or landings whiob
4. IItrt. PmFPe1.- n. Ka"f7 ua Ur Po tbroagb their alllior offiMZ'll
-.t .tate ir tor equ1 t. S e tbue t8 wU1
elft, the QroaDd J'0l'0' .., the Ira."., an4 t Air_t
tbrub the .tt.. aDd.. th. Pl"Miden07 t a. ottie the ..
or u. -Gbiat 0 oan .ue ti.Dal dea18ion. Bot .at tb18 tiDal
dee1al_ .tate tb I' or .-t and .-nmt or it
1D til.,. w11l earr1..ltter i8iOlUl haft , DQ
t1rl.Dr aMPt utlon .hou1d in aD1' reduoe lin of stl8 or obs.IIp
emt.. of l,*,1ng.
,. _pal RecosnUion bT the .l1r tp! Grognd:- r 1JI TeJ'7 1IIportaDt , _re
..,etion he gina both sromd t.roop8 aDd a1J' troops ill recognising -.cb other.
It 18 btl1.end that the .. ot tr1 ,. plaDn ahot dOWD br groaDd 111 UI1
ope t 18 COD814 bl:7 1... than Dllllber ot tri Teb1ol.. deet!"CJ18d b:r
air. fb.1JI tut 18 t an ap1.Det clotir- eapport ch u ot
Rttlo1at to ftl'Tant t ti aboY .-tioned, it 18 NI!1"8t:ta1:al
that ncb oaaaalti coeur, aDd thoroQlh tra1n1Dg would
DUllber.
6. SwpriI' Pwpt:- H 8UZ"PrU OaD 1 ,
obaJla or l8Dding s c st'\lll ll!'! tt,. Ori.nc to the D018e or
shipe in the tranaport area, It U b18hl,. _1'0 lU that nrpr1ae later B
II1Du 1 boar w1ll en be secured. !'bU being so it U YI'f7 ct..irabl, that tbe
air u.ult tbe aelected btacbee B a1Du8 30 II1.mltu aDd II1Du l' m-tea.
It .ut 'be arraDged t it for reu ot tb.. t8 other the
a1:r 18 to .ttack Wore a1IaI8 the a .ttao -.t dDpaell! wi h.
W, :n
9nm1'- J'rGII the 8'taDdpoint ot tM grotmd troops, t rita!
betore planning narta detinit. t be .eoured l'rOlS tbe ..". u to the
IIIIIIher a4 type or ships &ft11abl.., and the deptb of 1 penUs bt. ill the
--u... oratt
2. Joint ORtrat1M1- loint UODII nmeqUllt to t ...
quire well qual.1fied li&Um offic.. work1ng fUll the
0-3 Section of intr. Direct wi tor tb1a om
an ntal. If.wl aupport duri.tIg pbuee ot the act10n nboequent to the 1D1t1al
1andiDI -.at be oareta1.l7 coordinated. 'fbt pr..-ture witJmoawl of lia1aclll
penannel -.be auab coordination cU.tftcult.
3. Co "" Sh!pal- A. .1 00IIb1Ded .lno", ...,., P ,h1p 18
DeCeU7 Dot cml7 tor tbe !'ut. Poroe bat tor 1'01"0I C..-M
en -.d .. tar down .. the C t.. 'fbi laity
ot the 1utallat10D8 d1Jdn1ehea with be ai.. ot he aD1t inYOlTed.
la. .hips ahould be spec oClllWt:ructed and DOt 0Y1Hd at
the la8t ..et. aboald ill oue be naftl tighting ab1pl .1nM 1Jm:al...........
1Jl t!N t1cbt reeulta ill j-U.t 41erupt all radio 0 tlon
a. au1table ort1c. _t be prorlded tor eacb of t !he
Cos.uId.1.Dg General, Chiat 0 Statf, 0-3, 0-2, aDd Air Support.
4. ahip eboal4 han tbree , cod' I OIl! tor the
1rIIt', OM tor th' lfa;r, ODI tor the .l1r Poroe co4 MattOD8. Eacb or tb...
oo4e r0C*8 .wit be 1arI' eaagh to pera1t ot ettic1ent operation ot !rlti8h
Cod. 'f... !be _age HD .bould be oOJmm1ent to the cod.
roo., aDd or eut'tic18Dt .1.. to aooOllodat the three age installat1ou,
DaIIIl7, .lrJq, Ra'91', and Air Corpe. All three eerrioes, bDw8Y!l', -..:r WI
:radio operation roOll. .lUo a !r1t18h Code R JmSt be proridll! WheNftr a je1Bt
operation 18 p ea. w, had nob a code roo OIl the .,aroria.
S. 7'be 'fuk Foroe beadquart8l'8 ship ehould. be bT
2Jl alternate coaand hip BUttlclent redio t to Oft!' the
cham1.l1 if' the heedquartere ship is oat. Where sible 1
Bhipe should n al t. wb un1t in qaaBtiCill eqaale or eat
0Ied8 e1se ot d1 dOD.
4. rm1n'M at 1!av lmgppN :- aphul. c tbe 11...,.
an t.n.1n1nc cODWaina to baDdle boat. to tind the _nAP ha .l1ao mre
tra.iniDC 18 1Jl the arrlftl at and the .udpalat 0 .,...e1e 1Jl the
tranaport
6. SpttdboIttI- 'fbcoe be-and biB 18 Tital--.t 1
apeedboeta tor Ant which s d 11 oloe. to the c lhip.
are rabl ooeu1 the 0 or .-peedboatll to take aagee
woald he tate _tten ., up c!Utano at t1tt to t1' lI11es,
.tart ottio in. 1IPMd'boat clel1nr tmd Neei... tar ruter than tbq
aD be coded, MIlt, aDd decoded. the quuotere
eaald 111 be .ft1la till 0 ion 18 ared.
1. CCEtro td ShippW Ott Sbol'l'- BRter shaald be proride4 to
ooatral et ah1rlP1nI ott Sappl1.. earrled em 'the ahipe. neede6 by 'the UD1til
uhore, aDd the po1D to 1Ih1oh the1 are el1Tered sh be determned b7 'tho..
r the npplu. iIlteded. Otherwise, 1Jl pqt 't.10D8, nppll will
ot'teD be ludec! c! t point whe. th81 are requi
e. ' - U aoem .. the en sbore batteri.. are put
oat ot BOtion, the trauporta ahould oloe OIl beach. '!'here two re&80D11
tar tb1B troll Anv nampo1Jlt. Pint, it tacilitates the speed ot 1111
loadiDg 117 a the tunl-ercnmd. Second, the air Goyer, which 1a prot t1.nc
beach, 18 alBo .ft1lable to protect the shipe. 'lhia 1. not true it the shipe
q1Dc t borisaD.
9. 1- OOIIbat 11'11 are wsed aDd loadiDg tor the auault
11 be , It 18 .-t 4.. ble that tb81 ban BUtt10ient 1.aDcl1Jlg cratt
0UTied 1Jl rit. 11ft a ....u1t UDit without ha'rlng to oall em other
a tPtl to 8UPPQ na1l oraft.
UDfire wpport to 'be lUMd
8I1tire toro.. It i. the
mlti:Jre ..ftW>l....... should DOt be 1IH4 8OaDB!'
aga.tut 1Ddt- ch are tir1Jlg, or ap1Mt
ra:ppo!"t 18 or baleuurabl. ftl_, aDd
tor puttiDg it on are ettic1ent.
u. W1elc- The eurler equipped witll _ter aal:w..lDOil.. al'! tar
.. to 8JI7 other ot _ter .....tion trw the beachee.
12. 1- ta ..t be _de with "'V tar a deti-
JIlte ibfiiV ttlf' tM teadiDg &be! eaard1Dc or pl'i.8OIlera or -.r. It
I'QIlfttlJw eazmot be dou 'bT the ....,., additloual IP Batta1icme ..t 'be prori.4ed
&"'4, to pu such aen 1Jl the ....ult CODWT rectuoe. tbe ....ult pen Poo4
at war whil. OlD boud ahipe ahoald prorlc!ed b7 e IaV.
JUl. J.I1
1. - s. Ur npport 41nd.. itself iDto t .. pbas... The
ti.rBt .. 18 the or oontrol or atu. air actinti.. iD the air. Th1a
18 . a t\mot1clll et the air. be nat .. 111 boIIbiDg or IJ'OUDd
toreee. ft1a bu heeD in the put ..tUtaotor1l1' UCOIIIPliabe4 'bT the I!'OtDd8tat
111I tarpt. OIl wIlieb aD .ttaot would taoUltate the ta
the pocad .. et the _ .., IIDcI 'bT the of a
'ftIa l1De Bboa1c! G"2" CID the a14. or beiDg too tar iD trcmt of oar OIIID
traope, Dc! it Uaa14 .. )dobc! oat oonsultatioD with .ir ott1081'l1 eo 'tMt
it wU1 be M1_ted _ ten'a1n t_tur. "U1' dlacernibl. tJooII the a1r. Te
cJra. l.iDe .........1JlatM 18 quite daDgerou people pus1Jl& O'f'er
the gJ"GaIII1 raJ. IIlaIdre4 .u.. aD hour ha... dift'icnalt;r 1Jl P1ctiDl out
10al 1aDd
lI. n.-11T,.. to what 1a .. e1Me air npportf t H,
._ to 1Jl COIlJ-eticm with cl.oee all ttack put
P""IB!. Bownr, atU dennte air 1IIdts can prorided to traiD with
IJ'OUDd UIlI to _ a 'PI"i8U7.uBi tbe dut1' ot .ttao1r1nc 1dd.ob
art t1.JlC the progress 0 the t!'OGj)B at he ti
b7 the grcnmd, it 18 -01'1 to cO'lDlt OIl ft1r7 great ettlOt. the ,
the IJ'O'UDd 'troope han taenq to upeet .,re ...18tan .baft
tor. or .ttack thaD 18 poel1b1. 'l'b81.ut be taught that it requires quite
wb1.le to .aunt .ttack witb the .ppropriate bowbB, etc
A. !'be teDd8llC1" to credit air .ttacb OIl road8 aDd rallft1W wi
oapaoit;r ot deBtl'071Dl nob artari 18 alao filWi 1D the tiNt plaoe the
chue.. or lettinc direct hit with. bon em wlnerabl. plaoe al'! ...11,
erta1.llq no better thaD the cbaDoea at gett1llg po1Jlt hit with lClllC aJ"
tille!'T, but toM. 1a DDt the Priar1 detlOt. W. all mOlt' that. d..,l1t1.oD to be
etteotb. mat be defended or we it will be :read1l1' reBOftd. 'lh18 tact 111 ecna1lLY
true n.tber the de.oUtion i. oaued b7 able p1.aDt.c! 1Jl the J'OUDl! b7
dropped the air.
2. RIOP1U. S'."I- s. point wh10h should 'be settled t the COII_1Oe
MDt or the p1ann'DI 1.8 whet .. or t.ir wpport will rapp11e4 during
iDe and lIUblIequent to the mg, he nature ot .apport ill _oh oue. U olM.
air npport 1a be nppl1ed, aD .ffort _t be .-de to utUiH cUrectiOD&1
!h1a eli et 011&1 note, p1"Od1Ioed either 'by s or greMI!.., 1Jl t
101"11 ad OCOU Neopiti light-
Ja. P I' W lOAD Dq, IIe!'O to 2400 , JUl. ,
b'ieadq troops; note .... .... the at l111e 1a aDcC"ta1D, or it
b'id11'.ir ttacb oar own t throaIb errar, ,.11. nob is pat oat 'by t
Wle t poenad... Whee the traDt lin 18.arbc! by '18 note, an;Jtb1Dc be
7'QDd it 111 the dirlOticm or the eq ..,. be .t ",. 0108 suppoI"t. a1rp
U, OIl the other , sa. partiaa1arl1' obIloziou en.. 1Iurta1 tiOll-1a 'be7mI4
the ponr the t, e.g., .!'eYers slope position, and 111 art1l1er7
, it wU1 be oatl eel 1Jl .-.o1te. sero 2400 D , red no
w1ll. iD!icate 11' J blue noke ...." etc.
a. It 18 telt that oould oar a1.rp1.aDu Ui_.... od or Bhow1JIc
ot oolor .. that been a.1D& t.ri
troops OIl that 4q, it woald reduce ace14eatal t1r1Dr at thea.
II. DCtICAL
1. gma".,.h- !'be p ror. 1ng amst be s e DO t.
the Poree.. wbo18 bat alao tor the Sub-!uk Pore 1D order bUN
.ted ettort, the DeManders ot the Sub-'!'uk Fore.. ahoald 'be ..
plan and objeo:tiT811 the land1Dg should up to tJ.t ill =
table ot -.r, iD which th81 will t1M 1.... the
efforte tor t t ot the '
2. 1- !be Farce
.. little poe8ibl. n the artlli..,. line baa _ reaohed br the !ID1)oo1!).u
PoreM. haTing dODe, he orden tor the pooaping or th
tor the turther 0 tiaaa wbioh Pl'Ment thnaelTM BowYer \he JliV'Bi
ot the Parae on ah during ear11' ud Ie ' arlti pbu
the rattail H Tfll7
12 berT ettort IIhou1d be ade B8YW lIsue belew tbe Bat
1CIIl or The big an tioer 18. the poeat.. ti be ... to _,_
'0 to b1'-PUs his 01"8 b1' telling the t e and - ot t 1Ib1oh
ar. ruot1 "J_
IM)St cl"1tical
be ot 0 pI 1, a dUJ'ing t t
in gaM and in 1nt tr7, aDd he
.. had tiM h18 is aDd up I' It 18 retore
.ent1&l t it the --tc'7 at the air pend.ta, ban IrU1 lsI. a1z"cl"att alott
to be UM4 qa1JI8t bolRUa t D. A .olution 18 to ba tbue a1rcntt.
ait on onr-be&d tor t 1d.mltes 1:4 f!IY8!'7 baaJo. !b.,. CaD haft a seooJ:ldar7 bomb
alIIsion to 1Ib1oh the7 0Cl PJ"OOMd and l!r'op their boll at the close ot thei!' t
II1Dr:lte wait. !bey should be ..-ph ed 1:4 t1n7 IdJmt b,r another e1aUar groa.p
with a e1Jd1ar e target. !bee. airplanu ..t be in ndio e loation
with the a1r support urdt em the ground. s,. noh a ..thod &DT oOUDterattaok 0&Il
be _ troll the dr.
16. tbt Iptaptrx BK!-' 1p elM! Cqgptn.- III 4"1) pne\ntioae ...,,-,
acrttft en 1t 18 prorlded with tanb, it baa bee t0aD4 a
ped1at to Uap-h'og battallou. n. 1eadUr battalion a4ftDON aDd ooaap1es or
oap a u.ttAld objeoU" on a ccnaDd1ng Bite. 1'he second battal101l )la
through the first ttall. which bIIc1na to orp.n1.se a del in
tion. 1Ihe:D t Dew 1eadiDg battalion baa reaohed a eui M. lUlted object1"
tartbe!' to the t:ront., it. wUl IIlal.t and the th1rd or r..r battalion will pau t.broach
1t. The.eooD1 ttaUan thea bec1ne to orguise. ID thi8 ...,. the dugv or a
ooaaterattaok 1a _ter1al.q .iDee, it the 4ep1.oJwd lNdue a..t on t.
Oftr-I'UD, the --:r apiMt. a part1allT podt.1 , u4 it t.h1a is
throaltl be t1Dall7 I'tr1kN a prwpe.re4 poII1tion.
- a. All hoa1d haft a creater &ppreo1ation the
nnr.u a 1'lIqlIMt. or -PIS dUl'1ng t.he operation pro bq,1"8 ted
t,1&l is were pMlrOU, g1T1ag the 1JIpr'e Bion that ape .... aftil
be apeded u d_ired.
]I. nere 1a a delmite need tOI' a _p 4epot c au;r Gr eillilar
Cll'pnisat,ion. ODe ot the t rl tlmctiODB at the eg1nee1' duriDI t.he operatiOD
the or -PII. '!'be TOIllM, be_. of the 1IJ1UP8C'tecU7 larg Ill:IIIber
c trated 1Jl a nall area, hu been tNMDdou. ID iutaM
a441t.1oDal pencmnel wu NqU1J'ec! to ..e1at th nal1 _p depot detaohJlente in the
.orting, aD4 i.e at.-pe. In addition, with a ra idq IIiOrl.nI torce,
-.p .upplr t be IIObU. so that pe are steadily ....ailabl. when and where
eal1e4 tor. ed 1'/0 1a attaahe4 u InclOllU1"e 14.
19. 41r Photo! - a. Baae4 particularl,. upon the 1ngenn1ty ot the 8n811V'1
pbotograpbs or fu areu -.at be taken tor P1J1"P08e ot eompe.riaan over a
lor. In that RT can del..ea which ar t.ed1a caaoatlage4
aDd b181ld into SI41'OUDd1Jlp be tetected.
.l et ot aer1a1 pbotoe CO'fWl"iDg the D1vidon reoutea at adftnoe ahould
be turn1abe4 -.ch Din-im aDd Corpll !'.ng1neel' 1 ahead ot the front 1
crti fiCllWD ahould 1n8pecrted b;r photo 1Dterpreter to lI1neti I
ODeucl.. aDd bJpu1. reporta t be gotten into the banda 0 the Dlrl
COZ'JM b;r cub plane couri , da..U,. 1%1 t1.IIIe to be of -ralue.
-9
20. Secpr1tx - RtcopitioD.- Countc.Sp8 and perol_ are ot great -ral
1a8t be kept UDder Anv' cont:rol .M -.at be pnbUshed b7 Anv hesdquarterll
at leut in a4ftD 1'heee.bould then d18.nd.nated b7 lowe!' echelcme
nth decnu t1 internle so that the cOlIJlUI\Y reo.ine them approxI..at.e:q 24
hcn:In 1%1 adftDCe. Great oare IIJIIt be taken that 1nI;r aDd Corpe troope l'eoeiTa thea
tbroach p:roper ebam:1e1e.
21. MebibiOM 4ttaokl.- When a pe.rallel t1aDk oo.aDded b,r the aT'! ai.te,
i 18 T8'r'f to .e up bioaa attaolal rear ot tbe en..'. pos1t.1oD.
1'hNe uphi'b1ou at. IIhou14 be 1D a stragth at least equ1ft1ent to a re1Dt01'0e4
ooabat t.., beoe,.. no a torae 0&11 1&Dd turther 1D or the en8IIIl1 aDd e&D 1te
.elt-suta1D1JI t .. pe1"1od of 4qB. RaT'! patiN .uppol"t 18 Tital.
1. 0eD8Y CoaYentiou:- P1eld Kmual. 27-llO, "Bales of Led Wazot..." 18
DOt f1c1a\l1i claar 1ii that 1t 1acka 1DtG'pretation and toOr7 data of
the lme!'al tal'lUl ot t.M Hape am GeDeYa e--tione, par q lI1th ret....
to the d1at1nction betneo print. am public plblic proper'tJ' cd ita u. by' _
ad1ng torce. '1'bere also m 1Dsutticieaq ot ...tezo1.U dea1.1Dc nth pria
of ft!' t...,. be utU1.sed
EXHIBIT I
HE DQUARTE S FORCE 141
PLA NING INSTRUCTIO NO.

11
Be :-ten tor ti.cm
15 being o. n1z.ed et. .ow
er-.!J' hiet. URnta and
:.rt.e-rs by coar1er, or U,
!lMdquertel'!l Porce 141,
A.P.O. 512.
ad,lres'l 15 'f'llf!I"ll !So and all cab "" .nd llIBssagee
t-15 Headquartera a be eo ad1res ed.
The plan calla 1'or
!. lIa1D ".5. &NaUlt flooD NOlITiI J.1RICJ. - ea1.ern Task Force
.\!. 1Ia1n Br tilh aaaault t'ro - Eas.m ':'aak Foree
!le Chieta of
and General Pattan as
'9"811'.
end loca 1 ns at C _
in be" he =erat. are'
ct P.poM1 e
!. Cor.I1n ?orce 141 I' of W1U
C _ 1:l&t!.on at de be .t u.-=.. re
tallecl plan:dag rll1 be located.
o.taUad llh=1ng POC'oIS of p!.ann1ng Will
ba in 'UmI AP!lIC
In1t1&l.1;r .t CJ.S1II'
"",,1nj; CP.,C.
_ern Task
I'aroe C er
S
1'_ or 1anrrl.nf w:l11
be in IfIlE Dn=A probab
1;r .t CAIRO.
.. In1t1atl r EDl
1'1" aet." to
Opera 1oD.
.lenciee_ .lY!I1 tor t ........
!.b1e IJ'P.IC.l.
1: he operation '.S. hiets at stat! tor
torees 11.5.1.
C-in-<:a 1I1ddl. East tor
'erc.. b'o East
Br1t15h Chieta d start
d1rla1on trOll .K.
"" ted in!ltacr- .ttaehld.
d.ddad t lleBdquart.... r a LU will un the
Ita rela 1m> to Al'!l 1 lustre .t!l1.agre n.
(S A '10'. S.
s. r-S,
Gen"rfll,
.9GS) I'la.n!t, 1Iq. Forc8 141.
D1a1ribution' (El
A. 1!l!l!1.
It ""7 be Il8SUIlIlIC! thAt Adal.ralty t!te of the
P'1e8ta rl1 e Anl1&b!e the n cess tlin'1'i in CCS 16 "t
dated 21st JlUluarv Annex A Lt sut't'10 ent tt .... +.0 ClllIT7 out tile
1'1!Ill1 reh_Is and to With the ordera ot the r.....1
C il'T'.
Air torcea or '.he tollorl.."lg order .re ""l'tlCt to be .""1labla in the
'-ter in suffic1ent t "" tor t'lb 0 t'
l!!:.1tWI ....lIr.L.
S.E.i'. 2J, uadrona 6 Crou Total 912 .ltrcratt
1"7 (Dar) J:lquedroDa ) Groupe 294 Atraratt
'rEF ( bt) ) Squadroaa
54.L1rcr&l't
tdpbt Bo 6 I Group 165 A1rcrat't.
IIod:l.ua Bo"lbera 6 'JId...""" 5 Gr
""
)75 .lirora1't
IIea"7 B n 2 Squadrcll>ll 7 Groupe 281. .l1rcr&l't
GR
8A1rcr&l't
TB 4 .. I Gl'OIIp lJ7 Atraratt
Pi!lJ Squadrans 1 Sq'--' 48 Atrerat't.
Trans;>a:-t 3 Squot\r<me 210 Airaran
Tcrtal 1586 .L1rcran
D' air me oporat ens are to be IIndertaken OD large aca1e, the
al1ot_nt or trans rt &1rcra1't Will ... to be .....b1;r in........ed
!!:l\7t?Jl TASlt FOIIl:B - l
llIl.U: At erupt 111 To be tm1rl!!l 1D lIo!mted fJ:gp
!lu!m
( DtT lIorth Africa Korth .lrri... lIorth .l1"rlca
.u,m BD
eta 1
(Two { 15
r
llS.l !forth Atr1ca
.Luault 'liTS
Or 1II.l
Forc.
Two Arm Blla
Rot. 1
(Spec1al S ce
( .(to rona C
(1'IUIdo U.D1ta)
do
1'011.
Up orth .ltrioa Atrlca .ltrioa
E&Sm!'/ TASK II - !II

(501T
(
{56 01T PAD: lC! IE:
(
iv uy;
{
Assault (One Tll.'Ik D I.e .t!:
If:
Force (ane p" lIE
1
01.. IlK IlK III
(ODe Me Op uy;
(
{Two C !I.E
( ""
II!
Po Ip {One lnt :ltv Z lIE
!!2Ji!!2. Alto,..".,tiTe1y -.y ... !.n .orth"
AIl!!l:'f.. ::: TPS
IJI( do
lIS (to be nottr1ed latar.
0,.2
19 Uov, 4J.
omura !!i!5lX
1. It bu been decided that. an \1"" la to be prepared to ...
and bo1cl the 1& of as hue tor tutu. ...
2. The operst .. a wbo1a will be I1IIllar
C The 'laft1 w:l11 un:!
C.-r>der-1D-Ch1at, terrane&D; Gromol torces
tile AU ron:
-.d of t.,., Air
c-m wUl a 1;r.
3. !be 1ntaat1clll of the .ei.ze and
bo1cl tile 1alaa! bT ....._ 1D
fIIIIII...a.. no. at tbe a,.\ a1r1' l ' a out. in Pbas. J.
The n4ulst1clll or tbe !.sland.
4. to1
(a)
aw
(1 -yal Cmr"'rr lelttm IMk Poret .t.dal Raa887.
(n) I!!nl C......n ptsp Tyt 'm'. Vi"" Adal 110oo1t
(b) &at.
(1) lmLJ'l.
(11 G..-al
c) !ok.
(1) IIf,A.I""I'.)
lIm.b
(11) l2!::sIJ!,l. Col. Hick1I7. ( .5.1. .r.)
(111
Air Vi...
5. Tuks will be OUTied 0IJt .. foll.oors: _ (2) Ur:
13. Task I"orce e-m.r. ..uJ. be in _In eontro1 at their
W !'r'ateation t'J'OII _Us 1Dtert......,.,..
troll the tl_ the troop" c_:1Jl& i ere 1.* UIIdal" their e-nd:u:ept
@ Ili or the poaDd troop,
that the 1la'l'&1 C-.r rlll be in _iye COIItrol dnr1Dg the period .t
l'WC0DIIIlie_ and pbato _1011oI.
(.) a and lIItt the fare are f1r1ll,. ...tebl18hed aahar W P1'oteatlO1l. and __ ,. at a1I1>ol'M lIl11te.
(i) Tho U8& t bet SDW:OSA and 1'l:U.lLLO. ""'I'P""'"ted by such The for 8lI al.lct.ted ere in tho Order at Bottle, 1IIdch
2. J!Il!! AIptult..
pe.nlcllute trocpe ... eon be Utt.ed in OIIe third at tho 10 to Tule I"aroe -m8l"l!l aeparately.
s. O-..r, .jar L. I
.....uable treDeport .iraratt.
Troops: DiYio
15. lco= liN! Plan, it' l>O1: a1.reed,. fonoarded, d be fo..-rded
C_ '. 2nd ...,red D1YioiOll
(11) Copture at the part or SIRAClJSI. and the e1r1'leld at PACHDIO. with tho leut _aibla delo;y.
1 !lAIlpr Battollon
lng pe (S. Trwp Lio1; to 1-.4
(111) Eotabliob ltaott' COl the Secerol iDe SIII.&CU9ol - P.lLlZZOLO _
Jl. ltIo.lon'
RACIlS.\ hieh ploee oUt be 1nolWll.... to I"aroe 545 and (1) 1hIder coyv of _. em tho mndJls or I) Dq to lend 1Jl
.hera toaah rlll be gained nth Force 3'-3. the mULl ..... ( 'Ill to 74 h. an.1lallle)
(S) ,. ,. RIC!WlD9 ,
capture and aecure the part and the e1r1'i at l"IB1lU by
(1,,) !'lie rapid capture or the parte of ,rollSrA and 0Ar.IJIU and ,. ,. RIClI.lRDSOlI,
OIl I) Do;r.
the C!JIIlDII group or airfields. illadl..... (2) I!:rtll>d tho boachbKd to m.uJI. protect1ns 18ft f1aJlk of
C.G
the operatlon oga1nst 1Dtert.......... rro. WorUlwwt.
(3) oontaot nth n Corp
(b) i. .1oten&Dce: o..r tho boacboe an<! throash nall port.
.t. Tranoport. Shore to 1Ihor1I. ( Troop L1ot)
(1) ",..nIt bet1rMD laP 9Ca1lA1lLl and LIIa!', oupparted by ouch :. Support,
parachute troope eo can be llt't 11> _thirda or the (1) .....,.. !IT n&Y&1 I\tCt'lno on ooll of Sub Took I"arce O-..dero.
anallebl. tranIlport a.ircraft. (2) 'ir:
(a) !'r'otactlol> troll _lle air lntarl.........
Cap1;are or Ci> Direct _. oupport of IJ'OlII"- troope. 1nolad1llB 10 (11) part of LE.I.fA and the a1rfields or Fam: and pboto _1
OLm, BISCaRI and COIllSO.
EXHIBIT
(ill) Eotebl1oh itaott' .0 .. to pin touch with Fore. 545 at
1lAGIlS.\, and proteot the airfiald. and port 11> autt-para
(b) (11) aberr
1. l!l!!I.'
". 0.-..1....' IIsj. GllII. Il1lCII GA.?PU. 2d!rBored DiY101,,,,.
(i,,) to p.........t _ ........ eutwarda 18 _1943
]Z. Troupe: 2d DiYioloa (leoa C ,)
ap1Mt. the lart f1aDII: at Fa!"08 545. sr 7 ,
1 RCT let DiYioion
OWLI!!E PLlJI "'lith OG DC
Suppartins T_ (S- Troop Llot to be a...a ......'te1T)
:In1tialJl
6. n. db1d1D8 u... bet_ I"orce 545 and I"arce 3'-3 all 1uo1.... to Jl. ltIo.ioa:
JalS - ODE - CENr :Yuglt
'cree 545 will be nDIJII - C1IU1WIJIft'I: GtJIn - lUG - POZZI.ILO. (1) SOU with _lilt emtrr7T and be to lend 14
I. IIISSICN at &lIT or the pl.aDMd -..Ite.
7. PIIrtIImo operatiClllll rlll be d-1CDed to aoteblloh Fore. lJ,1 ..rOd
S.B. __ at 10 rro. t LIC!TA, with. rlew to fillal 2. 82d tJ,rbo;pl DiYioi!!l (lm PN"tnrgp elwgte) I
operoti.- tar the reductloa or the 1olend. S. 0 be pNpored to tho -.alt OIl oall at'tc' B-Boar OIl
To usault the soat.beaotern pc:rtlO11 of 1DlRD'IID 11> junction
D D..,.
with the 12th British J.rrq capture it u hue for f'1Irthelo
l!. 0Ir1Jls to lacIr of parte tor ttmlUlce I"orce 343. it
operet10....
be lIIlC for I"oroe 5 to ..o1ot F 3'-3 11> ita e, 3. 9I!l DIV1SIOI. To be alerted to __ ... oall or the C-.!loI
the O-m.ro coacenwd Jol4tly decide allocatlon port capacity. Gecerol 3'-3 at'tc' D Ilq.
2. !aDd1Jl& and operat:1Jl& of liDe VIZZIlII - IWlIlS.\ _
POZ.UI.O. all
9. n. -...l Took I"arc. e-ndero ere c:huged with "'" eecart and
s S.ise and hold the a.1rt'ia1da Just north of Q1IE!JiII!% and at ROll&
lend of I" 545 and 1"0..... 343, and for the oubeeoj""nt.upport. Th.
SPtllf and tho air 1eDl:UJlg ri at and n_or
Iaft1 -..dora are &leo tar _bel...... dl i ..... I"IB
If. G
}. Sel. and operata the 11 port .t FIIlULl.
10. The prUary role or the Ulled Ur 1"0"". 14 aU phuee will be
Jl. tor t'urtbor operatlODll UDder tho d1reotion of the eouty 1. J!gzt
the -117 air f and to proyids an- 7 far abipp1ns
I"orce. S. Prorldo 8lIcort for ......ut and rnll""", -......ra thI"",gbmt
their pa.-p to and rro. IDUlIFIIID.
and beaebee ap1nst air attaal<. lfh1let _ foroeo ca.n. tUl operato
SleUian buea. the roYlolan or thlo aeeurltylo of auch aftrr1dlng
3. Sch'r ot !IIImauyer:
To d Jdne tUedo 14 the ne1D1ty 0 the ulta.
that the .oate of air at'fort aY&1lab1e tor the direot nppart of
lWI'IERI
lend faroee be strictI,. lh1ted. ........ in ord to capture airflelrl. and the port or rIBULl .u or the Sub-Tut I"ore. C.-ndero.
S -.J<e ,1Ia11teneouo a_lilt 11> the mULl - l'IIDllII.lL - Jl. To be prepared to urlot the plam.d uoaulta with IJIIlt'1r. ...
The 'ir Offioar -m1I:Ic ('.O.C.), '.'1'".1". will .-.>d all b7. dark n,Il.
4. To ...lot tho p1.oJmed _lilt. by .uiJlr t.1JJt lend1np
the air faro_. iDe1adU:s tho.. at aur" giY1ng d1roet 0UjJD0l"t to tho E:EtODd the beac!:bead to the g..- l1De (YEUOII). wboro.
opemtm. by I"orcee 3'-3 and 545. (1) P.u.Ill 01 lIllJInl:lIURO - C.uFalF.LI.O - IIAZ:WlIlll - CllTl!llGIP.OIE Prot8otlC11l of transport a.r
To ea.ch Tau I"oroe C.-nd.... an Ur Officer be allotted 0
- and tho!eat contact Ilritloh in the
will tho a.1r unita ...1ped to hill u ohowl> in the !iliad 'ir I"orc. rlo1D1ty RACOSA.
2. llt.
Ordar of Btrtt.le for 1lIISII. In tJ:o opon1J>c otqeo of tbe tho (2) To 1Dclude (BLllB) high sround 11> Y1c1D1ty or UZZA. _ .!. To proYide i for the uaeult end fnll_ in
lhdted area at JAJld tiona will pend.t operation of CIIl. air oontrcl ir _ acroea the Bl1TlRlWlZU. .llDOIII! to hostU. tert' the "
oal,-. 'rh1o will he ......,1oed by '.o.e. Force S45 u soon ... unita are
To OOC'lIP'l', repair, proteot and operate oapturod airf1elda ..
a to oper.te t'rOII SICILI. llur1Il& oteee '.O.C. I"aroe 3'-3 will n. PLUl
quickl,. u poe,ibl
ate the d1roction or '.O.C. 01"00 545.
.t. To prepared to aupport turther eat100 at tho eroand troopo
The aOODDd 1 to conJr Force 343 so.- will be operated a. 1. cm - OI!! Auaultl CIIl call the eaptaNd a.1rf1.lcIa.
'001I .. lend ha... .-targed tbe trcmt 811t"fic1ently to al.1Dw the at'fect- S. 0_..,.jor Cenerat O. IlRAJlIn, n Corpe. 4. To oarry 0IJt furth.. and pboto
1... opera-u... of ocmtnle. th10 oteee 10 reached. J. C. I" W .II. Troope: lot DiYiotoa (-1 _1011II u dl1'WCted by the Took I"arce e-...
DDerata indepomdeatlT subjeot to co-crd1Dot10l> by '.0.0., " ...T.A.I". 45th DiY1oion .t. To att&cll _ troop .,.,.... OIl
. The Ur Plan glY.. the detail of ..,. 1e>nrn1ng c !laDger t tallo,," :. To be preso:red to _ ertlU...,. beJ'-1 tho or tho
rar the 'IIbnl. !ilied Ur 1"........ era lc1pstiDll 11> 1IISIl'. 9lot BecOGb&1elWlCO S n ert1l1ery or the sroand troops.
P.... po (82d' C. To 1nOtIro t the 1D1tlal ahborne -"i.- .am.. teo
Teak F co C ere ....-1blo far p1.alm1ng the a...lIlt. 1u Sappart1ng Troops ( Troop Liot to be 10..-1 aeparateI,. third. ot the a1rJ:rsn; aft1lebl and oarric1eat
conjJlDctloa with the ..'1'&1 ook I"orce C-mar and the J.t'r1can Jl. _ione:
Il1dero to .... or to oarry tho glidar IlCT at tho 824 'irbonlil
Tactlcal Air I"orce e-ndar, and for p1.amW:g and out tJ:trf 1I'lIb8ecl.- (1) lJndor of darImeoa or 0 De)' to and 11> 1'!Dl2lll _
D1Yioion.
operoU by the ........ _ their c-..d lIh.1cll _y be. rwq 0 _ble
s.llFI!RI oree ( to iDel".i...Y&1labl. eapt....8 JI. To t.raz.part. pt'oteot and tho a.1rborno
thea to their 111..1.... ADd 88C:lre:
J.. To prortde .lIB oorTioe.
The airfield at Ptllf b7 de;7l1gbt on oil. J. Prvteet!oa or eb1l>p1ns ott' or 14 porte.
lJndar s-at .u.r.otloa or the Deputy e-nd..... b Tho e1r1'ie1d north or by day lit
.ull..t Pare TuII: I" e-ulera a.re tor !'lie air fi.ld IIOl'th PAR!:IIF.m by d.ort of . 2.
of' their and. in Ulan. 14 con,ltmction with the J(a (2) the to and 11> cout.ac with the
C-..." concerDlld. f tho l.1neII OIl wb1ch troJnir Ilrit10h 11> the 1D1b of QtIlr.lIlEZ.
Ibou1d be oarried out. (3 Oontact with )rd DiYio
t. the beaches and t!lroallb
ule I"orco .... ..-poaeibl. tor ...,....t d1roct1oa .I. Transport: Ship t shere and to a
tra1n1Dc at a1lt:arDe dlYiolan allDtted to tm-. throuch the DiYioional :. S
C-..dm- Copt- of all a1rborne tra 1.-t will be (1 l;ny. Il,. n&Y&1 lno on call the Sub uk I" e
the C_'"'1"11 e-ret, I"lt'th Uw;r. C-..!er'lI.
d-2
(IJ Corp., 45 D1..-)
Cbasa (at )
()dDt...
"ar IIq - II u:
'.
IILlIlOI
G-)
EXHIBIT m
PLd n'lII COIICDtIU.nc.
dD 1II1'1B11! at III J.JIl Il'lI!'PlIIIr
cc.LlIlD 1ImS II tftIlJ.!p
1. Ja erliM. of the aitut1lal will 1< pahlllla4 at a later data tor
tba all aabcIrd1ata -tta. l........t 1Dtal.U8oa- __will
be 1-.1 at pIIrlod1 prier ,0a4 dart.ac tba __tta. IlI..u-t
of data1lell operau-l J'l- ot lItbar rem.. lDwolftll 1a tbe
_ be fU1daba<I -.ita _oaftNo
&llW .... aN .. ....,.....t in __U- daaipad to
J.ir 1.a Sla1l7, 8arlI1.a1a _ SIlatbero Italy u a JlNl1a1aa17 to
a joint 1a Ib1AIb ..... Slc1ly 18 to ba ..MI1ted oa II dq by
_ r..- aDd a.pportad lI:r IIlnl .... J.1r Far_. Ilar1Ilg tbe
pa:1.od prlIlr to Il cIq ,_ will be to oar _ ..... air _.
Otbn' pnpara oparot.1D_ inel_ tboM ooodDcta4 with tbe ...,. to p1a tba
iliad ...... !x1o 1a tba to ..troy _ b1a
__ MT _tall __t to Slc1ly .... to protaat ald.ppinl ...
jar porta 1a .-Uri...
n - O!!ILIII Of ASS.1!1LI PWS
).
,.... W. will Soa_tar. MdJT tIavqb aJ.&b' eronpl ot
Ilaacbaa .t I ..... "II" dq to ..1. porto 1a tbe ..... omd to
aatab11ah i_a al""ll pIl8J'al l1Da Cataa1&, LI_ta, Pl"'\IU*I for fln'tbar
.....t.1oM. on. auaalta are u tollowa t
it ....la by Poroa 545, (arit.1ab)
to oaptara s,.r.- and J.GllS!J..
Ity For_ 545, all a1 aida of
Capa Puaaro, tel oaptara t'- air
flald at P .... to npport the
for_ at J.l'OLl..
, .... COIJ& Scorlaa lI:r Poroa 343 (U.S.) to captara ee.1ao a1rt1ald _ to
- to bicb p.....s Palluaolo BlK:C1IE!lI-VIZmI.
ma, it CKU, lI:r Poroa 343, to captara airfialdo at Ponte Olln 0IIIl
.IlIill, it LIlaU, lI:r foroa 343, to captara tbol port aDd aeart>r JI'OD'Sl..
4.
.. paratroop a_, dataUo of a!l1ch are DOt ...u&bla, will be
trwppad ta tba _ of , ..... 545, 1a ooajlmct.1oa with tbe bid IIazk ...-lta.
b. In _ ator, peratroope will ba dropped _th of liac1a:l.
per10d 2))0 11-1 to 0)00 D, too ...lot CEII'f ........ in utabl1ah1.n,J it-
TUIl< farco, oro
...opec ln1,. aDd wi
tl>ay are fbaly .at.ablia 011 .bore.
6. _J.j,r]1l"P_
Tbe pr1aary role t'- &ll.l.84 .u.r r wUl '- to """trw.li. tbe
air ........ aDd to arO'f1de aa:d.-.. itt elJlll1n8 msd l:aaoI>t.
air attadt. t'DtU t.lda a1a atU1.Ded lmtll CODd1tianll persit tbe
rol.uatlon wah NClIrltT ..uurea, tbe .cal.a a1.r .ffart a'r&11ablll for diftat
""PP""'t wU.l ba .tr1ctl7 liait.d.
7. OperotioDal pol1C7, Tactical .u.r roree 1ft ha pro11lablary pbaaa,
faoUcal _bet" 7l>roo a ...Cll>!'ted l.1&trt _bar attaeJca bT dq aDd bT
nillR &hoD _ u.iota apimt ..l.cted objaatina em ..stern &rea SloU,.
ud1Da _bar atta.o1ut apiDot objaoth.. on SaatarD -. laoort be
pro..-1_ tr<a IIainlaDd l1eht _bara and tr<a IIalta, ed1.. _ben.
UD1ta 1A IIalta will be in .lIr '1&bt1Di ua1Di ....ry artifioo to
.. _bat .1th ....", air On 11-1 dq, bl&Y)" 000'r0)" .,..utallOt dll
ba t.poaa<! on ti&btora in 1Ialt&. IIor1Dc tbe 1.n1tt uaatllt, tbe _in requl.r.
unte tr<a ta and Pa.otellaria are protectioll oollluta<! 1>eac!wJ. and abiPPilli:
ort by dq and Il1&bt. JI1g1>t tt&btor operatic... will include intruder aatint)"
againat Mill ......,. airdroasa on Iluriq t.Id. p.aa, tightora are
-.d port 1Di po.a1bl. on],y in axcoptlonol d.--.taDoo
On .,..."t of J.ir 'oroea tr<a IIalta to Slcily, bl&Y1 protect!..... oo-it1aent
for bae roduood aDd _ben wU.l ba__lohle for RPport -b1Jli.
J.t th1a .ta&-...carted light and aa<li.. _bar artort by dq proart'8DpCI at
_a will be practicabla aDd by night, 11&bt and di.. bar agalut
..laata<l objectlfta. Tbe a_ oyataa will oontinu in aff.ct untU oucb a _
&II it 18 practicable to ..tabll.h a "0000 t1ptar control in Slc1ly.
.. 1t1fll1t. l'byt. ill f'1htera are to be III1der oontrol of J.DC IIalta,
1DclIId1Di operat1D& tr<a P""teUarla. U.S.S. IIoarcrd. "Ul proYida fo...m
d1.raot1cm with VIII/'ir! in tbe DiM and 10........, aDd tho U.S.S .&ncoa in t'
e-t ....... __to to U.S.S. -..na oa4 proYid1nl douJ. diftatloa _
DiM aDd 10.. 1>eaabol. are U.S.S. C_ aDd Bl._ ....pectl....ly. Iight'llIhtor.
will operata C1CI Control IIalta and &leo lIIIdar C1CI Control of 13T'a,
b. J.DC Ialta wUl oeatl""" to oontrol all tara DatU Sq' a 2ll Group
18 Mtabllabold ubora. 'ornrd control 1D 34) area wU1 ba prorldad by Peata
011... iDfol'MUea Ceatar and by C_t sector operatlaa dl.....tly J.DC klta.
loa. Saotor will oparsta _ p""to 011... DatU aa-to ..-1oatLcma are
..ta1iliabad.
o. 0.. D/o) dq aac1ena De..rt .u.r Force and Sq. 2ll
lIroIlp will _00 to operoto 1.a tba PiCBIIIl oroa aDd wU.l oolltrol !IU oquadrooo
CII PJ.CKUO, ClIlISO and BISC.&llI airflelda. J.t this .tega.lR Dil wUl bol intagrel
with Sq. 2ll Ch'oul- aDd wUl _ lto _catianll, 1IIl U tba air 1IVIl1.ng, Gel
_oat1ol>a ayataa oaa ba .."trall.a<! in 211 Group, aul>orcI1Jato to 2U
Qroap will 00llt1Jme to operoto 1A ee.1ao aDd Syro.caaa areu. I. fo...m ooatrol
will operoto in adftDoa of 2ll 0r0ajI. 'orw&r'll lind aabo_to """tor OOI1trolo
will '- l1.nIood to 211 Goroup by BP R/f aDd -It aatll l&Dd llDal are .......bl1._.
011 D/o) 1afl>rutlO1l O&llter of Sq. 12th J.ir !apport ee-and "ill ba ..bore aDd
oparaUIlI. N. forutioa will proYide t1CI>tft colltrol botb torward in aapport
of l&Dd oparott- omd for _ dar- of airfi.ldoo oa4 buobe.. AIle De_rt J.1r
Poroa control 31st Groap in tba Ponto 011... are. throagb thia apDC7.
d. uter the captara of tba Catania area, threa U.S. 71ghter Gnmpa will
be operatiDg in Sic1ly LICAri, POll'rB OLIVO, BISC.&llI and lD' airfieldo
_ ooatrol .. epacifia<! in oub par, II _ DatU IIUCb &II it 10 practic
ahle to tabl18!> a ..ooad tightar oontrol ill Sic1ly "baa nI J.SC will to.. aep&Z'
ato ""tlty with diractloa ot ooord1ll&tioa lII1d.rtakell by Til.
In -IISSIOIl
9. a.-To pnw1da ll"""'nLl IIIIJlport for tba operatiOIl t Soatbautera
Sicily in conjaaatloa with ot'-r J.ir 'oroos, by Ila1n1n8 and _lnt&1a1nK a1.r
...ta17 aYer tba battle area aDd in partioalar oftr baaobal, ..nl a.corta, aDd
during tba 1aU1al ......!t.
b, To tura1.b Tactical .u.r Reommaia....oa for faroo )4), aDd to ..tcb
p&rtloalarly for tbe __t ot _ r'Il8&!'ft. tato tba battla arM tr<a tba
_and _..t.
c. To be JIN to operato in cloM aupport ot sUbar far .... XJ or
545 -.. 01_tioa perai to tlIa di-ra1oa of tba .u.r .ffort r.... 1to
obj_lft of de&IJ1.a& tbe air to tbe .... 1D ......t a _jar _1"gBDC;)" ..,iMa
dariDg tba ....ly .taps of tba operat.1oa.
IV - lMlIIWIOI
10. ..
.. III iSC aaita, locota<! CD tbol aa1.nleDd, will ba DDdar tho operatl D
ol ooatrol of J.DCf1F, ,,110 aU1 Garci.. oontrol roar 1Iq. III J.SC.
b. 111 J.SC UD1 locetecl Oll PaatoUaria, wUl ba UDder oll"ratl
COlJt;rol, J.DC IIa ta, lIIIder diractioa &OCTlf.
c. II! LSC UD1 ta<! in wUl ba an operatioaal control
tbroogb Ilq. nl J.SC.
.1. Tbe lllth Obo.rntiOll Sq. is UC8n tr<a ahonl. fh1a UDit
wU.l ba uailabl. tor diftct call C.O. III J.SC for ra-.aa1a...,oo in &apport of
"orca 34), P"JDII'I.
a. III J.SC will fora Mporate allt tT with d raot1oo ot artort oa4
000. t1cm by J.DC, Tlf a tba toraatica of _ eaperate in tba
Slc:1l1en u-.a 18 practicable.
f. _nto by D, 0,4, omd DIS 000'r0)"& will ba coord1aata<! with
diT1a1oa ..-.adar. 00I1001'D0c!. So _to will ba ooord1aata<!
"'roo 343.
g. fbe _ of _bat .chelou into Slc1ly a1J.l be soo...u-ta<! wi
J.DC, DU'.
11. l.OJ: jea1Atp,g&..
Ilbaa the d.-omda for 11' ...lot.aaoo 0XIl8&d the capac1tT of DD1to lIIId...
tbol operat1.onel -.tro1 of tba C.O. III J.SC, roqaaato will ba 1.n1t.1ated and for
.ordad to Beadq1Iart:era .. fOllows.
Requasta for protaotiTa air _ cIar1.nc tba uaa1t p!IaM .... to
ba ude to J.1r Ortl.... CCllUlld1Jla, 1Lolta.
b. lIboa air forcae are .atahl1abold in Slc1ly aa4 oIar1.nc t'- aaoaalt
reqa..to for air aapport are to be II&IIa to the J.1r om..... C_..."'I,
Delart .u.r Foroa.
0, ute!' tba ualt ata&-, requaato for haay boabar attadl: by 4q
(by Strategic .u.r J'orca) &ad for aiPt rooo:u>a1uanoo or.J.lot-blaa '" lItoNtaI1c
J.1r 'oroo or Tactlcal _bar rorca ro.peotiftly are to ba ..... 41raat to TaotioaJ.
J.1r "'roo Sq. rapeata<! to .u.r om.... C-..d1JIg, Da..-t J.1r Feroo, aDd J.1r
ortl.oor IIalta. Coordl.ll&Uoa ot t.bia .ffort will be ...4ortalt. lI:r
TactioaJ. J.1r 'or_ Sq'
d, Ita tor PHD reooaaai_oo 1Iill be forauodaol 4trMt to tMUoaJ.
J.1r 'orca Sq., rapeata<! to .ur Crtl..... e:-ed1al Daaart J.lr Poroa aa4 J.1r arn_
e-;!lllg, 1Ialta.
12. ..t.1oJl.
Sq Sq. Sq. rainforeed by al8mto of the )I II!tIa will Ita lIl'IIt'1H4 1DtlD
u adYaDCli. aDd a 1"8&Z' ecbeln.
a. adnDoo acbeloa 1Ii1l _lat of 2S ortt_ ..... 40 IIlliatad -.
Tbe tllDotioao tb1tI bIalIqaartara will ,-,
(ll fo coatrol Oporat!olla of tba lllth CIbolarftUa. 1Iq.
(2 To ba JlNperad to taD ....... _ -.ito N1auad
to operotiocal OOI1tro1 of tba CO m uc.
0) To M1Dta1.n 11ai_ with rorca 343 aa4 ta 1A1tate or tutor
racputa tor air _1otaae& 1D witla
of t'- .1_tioa.
(4) To rrioe operatiaa of tbo ferauoII fiptw ..trol -.it
lllr_ 34' ......
(5) To oontrol aa4 aaparna tIIa iaatallats- of III As: -.ita _
.bore.
(6) Collect aDd ....oluato operots.-l aa4 1Jltons.-t data ...
fornrd part1.n&llt iDf_tioa to letanl .... .ur
JlNdquartara
(7) J.rraage for ...-t of J.1r Ia1ta1aaa rr. '!WI1a1a in ooo1"lliatlDa
with J.DC, roroo 545.
(8) 1I.tablloh a standby IIMdq'aartera to tat........ tba .
tllDatloa in net "'rca 343 e-na obip 1. cIeotroJwd or
l.Qwd enrollto to tho ......
b. Tbe leU' Ec!wJlon will:
(1) Coatro1 operatLcma ot III UC 1IIl1to aparatiDI 1D
lIIIdar direat ordara M:J:flf.
(2) aa1Jd.eter _ 1IIl1to oa4 ooa1"ll1ate tbe1r _t to
porta of _baJobUaa.
() Dispatch air .che1ou to S1aSly u tI1.-tad lI:r C.0. III J.SC
13. b'lPiWlJle.1. -'<'1ItA.
.. !Ida 1IIl1\ will incl_ tba M1<lodDI.....,.t-.tSoM.
Det. )ri .u.r Daf_ -1Di.
82ad F1&btar Coatrol SqaalbooD.
ProYis1onal .u.rcreft Ion:1Dg Ba.
b. J'lIacts.oa. will iDcbda tbe ..tohlla'-eat 0IIIl operatioa of.
(1) RDr ra.1l1tl... omd IJ'OIID'i oboerftU.. &tat!
(2) .u.r - groand _oatica rac1l1t1ol.
() 00 Plghtar C'ooltrol.
(4) OperaUoaaJ. control of J..J.., artUlery oanriIII air
oa4 roar arou to lacleda porto.
(5) D1apetch omd 00Dtr01 of airc:ran. 1D aocordaaoe .1th oparotioD
al plons C.G., III UC or .. dlrocta4 bT
d-3
l.4. -_<ri..
Groap
27th Group
86th ..bor Group
J3r'd 71&bter Group
324th l1&I>tc
7tlI W1Dc 80atIl un.,.,. (n&bt-r8)
?9th 71gbtel' Sqaadro.
lUth Obn......t.1OD Sqaadnna
1 Group "ltru.. - OOZll
1 Group P-40'. - PurELUllIi
Ro.aiJl1Jlc tlD1to - Cil'I BOI PUIlISllLl
(2) tID1to 1111 bI lIClI'ed to odTmce a.1l'tIl'cael 11> SicU7 AI rapidJ.T
AI coDdi t1<ml pera1t 1D web a amMI1' .. to pr..o:m cont1Dait;)
ot operat1ano 1D tho tDlloriDc order ot pr:l.orit;)-.
311ft J'lchter Qr<mp
lllth Obeenation SqnadroJI
J3r'd J'lchter Group
27th PlgbteMlaabor Group
86tl> 71chteMlaabor Group
b. Tactical (III ASC).
TbI tollowiJlc a1II1 w1.ll be by m iSC mdta 1D
OOIlj1mct1an with othor tomatiOlUl ot Tactical Air Poroo.
(1) Ilnr1Dg tho period 7 to 11-1 1Iq.
Ca) tlD1ta baMd 111 tbI IIalta ad Goa<> w1.ll bI e.plO1*! to
_tra1ise air tOl'CM ba....s 111 Weatarn SlcU7.
ad to protact ah1pp1Dl. B.oort will be prorl.ad tor dq
"""ratlO1111 b.1 tbI Tactical Stratac1cal _bar Ferae.
(b) i1r Par.. (III AlIC) a:bMllto _ 1D PantaUar1a &lid
Tlmiall w1.ll bI -.pl.OJ1Id to uoort ....u,. boeberl ot till
Stratell10 i1r r ...... &lid Tactical i1r POl"" 111 attLoko
II4lIL1Drl objocrtJ.y.. 1D .0riAna SlcU7. and to protect
8blpp1Dl.
(2) Pw10d ot tbI t.
TbI air ottort rl1l bI ....tratea to prorlde protecrtJ.otI
to abiPP1D& and boa.cbo. Il1rect nwort tor I'OIIII'l "",,"t1alY
w1.ll be prcrrid8d 1D aoopu-J. cu-tu-.. Air
.. w1.ll bI flI:rIWbad tor Fer.. w.
(3) BltabliI-...t ot Br1AIpbIad rn. LICUi TO CUiIIU.
(I) Conu-l air oporatlono to -uau. _ air tDl'CII
... to pl'Oteot ebipp1DC ad -..-..
(b) i1r '-'"_" tor rar.. W.
(c) Ibea air tOl'CM OlD bI lo..tea 1D SicU7. 41.rect eapport
to ...I1ft tbe edftIIae ot lad toroea.
(4) na:1tdl1t;)- 1a t.ploJ-t.
(.) bito eqa1ppe4 with i-;16 and P-4O t;rpe airaratt rl1l bI
pnpeN to """rate .. tighten Ol" figbtc boeberl.
(b) ObHrntioa mdtol rl1l bI ....taiMcl tor ...
obllrfttion rol. bat rl1l bI t.ra1Dod 11> taotioo.
o. (l.It ad 2114 .obelotl) ad G\lIfttioMJ. taoiliti.. rl1l
be ootablilW fa rorce 34J _ ad _bit oobel..... will bI llInDoo4 to tbe ......
.. 1'Il'idJ.T II OOIOI.it1ou porait. Tb1a........t will bI 00 arraopd .. to Ki
teia _tiali'" ot .,...ttoa.
.. "'nard -..01 ond U taoUit.1_ rl1l bI prorlde4 tor aircratt
oporat1Dl withia _ at ...tiOll at ParOl 343. -n.ac ........ G\lIftt1ono.
beubeo. ad II&ft1 ....rt.. TbI rl1l bI t10d 1D with tbat
wteblioW bp D.i.P.
u.at- rl1l bI .1ItIblUhod with PC1'OI 343 ODd aaiato1Da4 tIIroacl-t
tile "\lI1'&Uoo. ......._ tor air ...10_ w1ll bI filtered ODd actacl OIl withia
tile oopahllltiw ot alto __ oporat1<mal control C.G III AlIC. BI",,"to 'l!licll
bI Mt rill bI po..-cl to JI1IbIr toreatioU.
VI - DEt.lIUD IlOVEIIE]jT PLAII
16. Oll&-hslf Il.q " Hq Sq and J09th Squa (loss 0 on),
wi e to . s for concentrat.1.cn, traWng and reh sal with
II:1'amly Divi"i"". The... mdt. w1ll ace the assault lehelor., "!l1me'
Porce end will establish f.-.J.ve on iI>ote vo air prepare<! .erlica
aircraft coo. te operat.ion. el,y arrival o.r . ochalons of
tho reap. Iletai.lod arr;u:c tor ! w1ll be coordinated wit.n Il.q., lot
Intam.ly
I. !be t eebel of J07f.h. JoBtb,)09th and 1/2 IIq
" be ......ed to GOZO tv a.1r pr to undertako inten iv 0 a
tiolul 1Il:ldoor ADC IIalta 0 On "" call, llDits w1ll be llI>YCd .0
tu i1r -.bere t.hq wll1 operaf.o UDder control iOCWIl, throllgh J.dvanco Hq., XII
iSC.
.1
1n>.he
c.a., UT ASC:
in t.hb Ca e Bon pr=pal"Cld
bera ov' icU;; lz; il-7.
b. Group "5 17t.n F1(;hter-Boabcr 3qua.dron
(Ie" co 3: ecnelon) . J. be t1CTed 1:.0 point of echar :ltion ". 1t.As It. Force,
'l'ur.d.s by d.a3, prepared .for shore to S!.10rc I:I1II7'" to .:dcilJ. These "!i _' .,L.l
leave the .Q'h convoy and nll e3tablUh by If'8 on C . so 1irdr I
prepardd to service aircra.!'t Md to coordinate ooerations iJ!media 0 or val
of the eOllbat echelons 01 tJle o. !let.ailed aiT .....nt. will b. coordmat.od
-nth C.3., 1st L"ltant.J:. Division.
c. ce"""t wahe on, 17th f'i,;htor-Bo r Squadron, the i1r llchelon.
of tJ>e 16t.h an:! 910t F1.;l1t.et'- ber Squadrons, and 1/2 roup Hq "Hq 'I., will
ClOVe b-I a.1r to C 30 on or about on order- C.o. n iSC, idY. Hq. i1r ans
port .rt.l.l be fum shod by ::u.sC. t. wUl be PI' for . . to 0 a_ions
on laIld . "t Co:i o. &seort Ccr t.ronsport. to be provided b" cemba echelons.
Gro":j.
a.. .L Group rill be c.cncentr.it.ed in e cape Bon area prepared to
undertake operations as or 3,9 b;r 0-7.
c. e co:nbat echeJ.on 309th ,'1,;bter- ",ber S a or. the air echsu",,,
of the 3lOth and 311t.h Fi.&h Beebe" s. on :<ill be lIOVed to Sicily on
on. crder. C.O., Advance Echelon 1. I !jC. Air tran.orts . II be furni.hed by 1lAASC.
Units wi.ll be prep for opera!.ions . ..ely' en ,'. Escorts for trans
port.. will be I'rO'T1da1 by ccmbat ec. el ns.
d. e grc achal""" of the 310th 311th ,. &htar-Boaber Squadron.
'Ifill be mov to 'l'u.nis on Qt12 epar for I!IJbarkatio. nth eleQents of the "01.:ie"
I.. ault rce. !leta!. of the """,,,,,,,,,,t frc- '<unis to SiciJ;( to be coordinated th
H Force JU3, b C.G., m C.
atlon Squadron.
.. , 5 uadron will be concentrated pI'....
parad for opera.tions in Farce .3L.J 8-""9:1.
The r_.lDd.or of t'le ",",uadron w1ll
Tunis on or:ler"l C, ASC P
Force. llIlt&Uo to be coordinateo:!
",,1 Force JlU
(Ilonr<>na )
11 Corp"_ 8 attic_ Or
45 h W Div lD Enll.
(Ancan)
1st. Il'lf Div 4 otticer.
(Chase) S ted losl
)n1 Ir.f Diy 4 ot'f1c..r.
(lli cll\1l1e) :> I!Dll tod II8n
2 att1cers Orlll'l
b. Ccaound ship parti.. (lea. 2 l1eUoo officer. tor o.>ch be.KIaoar-ter.),
will "".emble at GEU. at he ", I !SC em-.&lI'rlvol ill S1a1J,y.
c. !he e to GEL! "" ordero C. ., III ASC attAr
cOllbat unit. hnve 01
22.
(1) Provision will be _ for oporat1cn ! fig 01
fae t.io. on board CCla:l8IId .ntpo III foll.owa,
===-:::SKIP=. TIn OF COlT
(lIoI1rovia) 6 Ofl'icere IIs1n l'tr. Control
2S El:l1. V1Iual Dir
(inoon) 6 Of cero tanlq, Ftr.
25 Snl. IIorl and isual D1rect1orl
(Chase) 3 Visual lll..rect<
B
3 Qf!1cara Vi Ili.rect.ion
B El:l1. Ilea
2) ot 20 llfCicor" end 221 IIl1li.st.od (lnc:cme"
of 3 llffj.c.... and 31 tod Ilea aDd 6
Ilea)
(J)
( )
(5)
e.
d-4
!oilalB:
?Dr -I eo",.
for t.h Diy. H.
2. 'ar H l!:3
For In DiT.
t, 2. Far 3rd !liT.
XOOL Farce 2. ar at J.noored Dl.v.
by Air 1. for 2nd llrborne Di
1 "nt.h 9th Divis1cm
(2) !ach ";P lIi.ll 1nc1ude arUcnr, d:; Iisn. dll be con
centrated" tial..l3 in the Algi..... area or tr.linine =II r ....
and 1dll be ..,..00 to j in d.ajgn:>ted b.adCWL-t8r, at
th8 ractica.ble date. these unit& will o! v
18:.on Corp' and l'F Hq.. 011 C<>lm<md 9bips. The i.>P s. up for
the 2nd Airborne DiTisio" rl..ll be lid by p.arachute .-:it
approprlata Ite8dqu.arters.
0) For details, .ee Signal Plan.
co "-"-"-'. Parties.
4 ie, Of.ic.... and 13 !OeD each, be 0 'mi.zed. i.'bs;r
will be centra ce:l inthe "er. area for r<>-a oUr" ""'"
t.rain.1nI _ad to DiVi.ional areas b:, 25.
(2) t1.8 ..uJ. QC.OI!IpaI;Y COIlT07' 8Ild ""tabli h IIY lind c
c ..ionS an sa ted:
Jrd "nu D
Dl.Tision D
1st lll.vis

ht vi

2 Algiers
2 Dran
o llberte
o Dran
o Dr""
"""",,1 Till. be ua led at GU C.F., nI La cpo ns on shore.
b. jn advaDc detaclD.on or and IJ =:nllsted >dl be or
gmisM to rorlda oo:=1cation' for !i;:, nI ASC, 00 inolude tbe c na .r.ct10n of
l1Des f elli.aenee 8Ild Operational' ea. Thia etac t rill be concen
t.ratsd r.h <hll Divislon CII1 for trA1l:Wlg and rehearcal. It will "",ve to
cll;r witll the A..au1t ;;CbalDn, Dl.v., on D <U:1: nil rt to Hq. iI! ASC
upon an-ival on shore.
c. ... fol1.aw up data t of 3 arficers and 96 =1sted \;en Liehl
CoDstoruatioo SIV nll be.,.. to Faint. or ",,-uon lat vi . s,
Clll ",,",s nUl Il'4 convoy 1li71>Ii<m and reports to Hq. nI ABC
ae on uri ' CR1 s e.
eo1.ele:rts .n.il coni.o1nue to 0 dte 5" facllitie8 f
til tba latter ur.it to :>icil;r on orders C.O.,
_ \.fSC1 LlWnu;
26. -41.- '< Artill.&.
OperstiQllL1. control .. ...u be IIDde-rtsl<eD c.o., _J.5C 'When sa s
ta.ct.0::7 C:GBmmicat..1oc5 are eS't&blished.
inthe
expedite
of units.
3.. tic' to ..field.
A ISiniJIml of one u . 0, fi:hteTs oil1 novetl '.., Licato ;cri r to
tba tiJ>o the port ie opened for use by Force .3l.J.
VITI - :rs O? N!lC! IN!'ORlIATIQlI
33. Preparotory Period.
l"eparations are bei.n;;; e to con-
b. "l.t tional beach defmscs are be ..: established ir. S c.i...l,y?
c. ;that. erfec't is our bocbinC ha:vi.ne on :i!i ter st. h and dis
pos tions7.are s beir.- lI1trAra,m as a COl 5 e of this i:xJDbinc:? If so
to what
d. '.ha:' are his CUlT t air de!ense po tinlitie=7
8. Are any ",.,eaknesses in ..h 's logi.st..ic:1l ar.d eccamications
1O"3t.eIlc; which can be e!'!e:: oJ air 3ction?
34. Period of the t.
a. ..hat is r.he current. sU"ength r.U.:;loposition and loc.a.tion of ,\Xis ll.r
fore 5 in position to intenir.e in the" tile ar ?
b. 1be,." is the ene"lY"" Artillery loca
c. Raw is the ene!lV'" :playing his .lir Forces? In mass at. cks or piece
lIhich objectives 3-'r8 .heir llr Forces bei.: b ccmcentratej?
. do H..... is the enEEU disposing hi. and general reaerTes of UOund
forces7
s. lIhat sffect is our attack having on his Air defense organization?
f. 1'Ihat organized defenses including .\ortillery are holding up our UOuni
forces?
g. mat is 'the BIl.eJZI1I a reaction to our paratroop attack?
h. Are there a:ru indication. of weak pointa in the en""U' s
and comunica ions systemsJ
J5. Estsbli :nt or a Briigehelll! froD Licata i:.o Catania.
a. "'hat. are t current re:J.ctions ar.d .future ca:pabi ities ot Axis .Air
Forces?
b. 4j;a1n3< lich objecti s 1 the en cone tr3 ;; biB Air .Forces?
c. 1Iba is he a sit.ion and. capabil1tie of the Axis Air
Forces?
d. are his r5serves bei s:pl ed?
e. lIha:t 1R!ala1ess has been dev opeci in tus A de!en88 sys
f. his Artillery located?
a wi tbdrawal full reo <?
Are SIV iD1!.c dons or "8ak 'ts in 't 1S 10 stic.al
and t10ns qst;Ss?
1.1 L. P. liicks;r
L. P. HICX3Y,
Colonel, Air Corps,
C u..;.
Peragra. 25!'
2'" The fol.J.Dwin& unit. based the cape Bone .ires
of .be Rear t:cbelon fl. II! J.SC that fOl"<lation .,......... iciJJ' ""
ths;r will pass to direct central of !I. 1...1.. T.!.'. i'h&3e ts be prepared to
operate OTer the o.rea or Force 3, .fual.linl. if nacesSl')S ..10 Pant
324th Fighter Group
7th , South.l!'r1ean Air Forca
b. The .,,9th Fighter SoWLdrcn, attached to the 33rd Fighter !lroup ini
tiallY, ;d.ll not under present plan. "",Va to 5iclly, but 1Iill continue operati"""
rom Pantelleri urdar aon of Coccand1ng !1car, Pantalleri...
For .ba CoI:lllllDdinc cneral..
I s/ ........ -It. Lederer,
A. R. L&D!REIl,
Captain, Air Corps,
Acting Adjutant.
,EXHIBIT TIl
WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE
OPERATION PLAN NO. 2-43
SHORT TITLE" HON/W
2 "
DS1'IlRIl !lUlL TAoSl PllRCI
U.S.S. IIl!IROm, P'lapb.jp,
8oII'W. 002lB
AUlIIIIS,
.,. 26, 190 (10)0)
BJOOt - BPm
-
lIPWUOIl pw!
110. 2-43
00.1 lorg.
IIlIIROVIA ", IcLA!WWl.
00.2 !loon Grggp
D_ S- laM Desd1T 14 and !&IO, 11c!Jt (9 lID).
00.3 SllI!!!!IiM Grogp
CIlDROIlo\llI,
Imlroa rut...... (17 PT).
80.4 !lMoMtmig!! Grgpp
10 - OIla,
P! 213.
80.5
;s:a:r.., WBIBdDI,
lesort. (....s1De4).
00.6 1M.." Grgpp
lIlJZ&lll., CIIATEAU 1'IImcR!,
6 ISr,
7 ISr,
11 UlI(L),
16 UlI(t), BntiP.
(b) 81
PPE .Stagl< r:'ll' R...- AdIl1J'a1 1I&ll, U.S
orn-419 Three U ...-u.)
I ..s. 1'RIIIC! ClIIIW!S (ISI(S
I.LS. PRIlICISS CIWlIDl"rZ (ISItS ,
SAVAIIlWl, BOm (2 CL) I
De8raa S-t.ee (9 DO ,
S1'I&IJf, SIIIUIIl (2 J.IIl,
IE 62, fR, W, 2<8, 226, 2rT, (6 IE),
l'C 621, 624, 625, 62'7, (4 pc),
SO fn6, 690, fRl, fR3, 694, (6 SO),
IIlPI (ta.1III poatocm 01""_),
16 IS! (1Delad1Dg 2 ee.ny1Dg
19 UlI(L),
U.S. Anlr toroee (u --1IDed).
d-5

(a) 85. t.ta 1'!O!'O'Z. uou tirl< I
A! I (Fl, ' .-
':'ranad1,." P'ive, SaY'" (18 AJ
l'!IIUDW'IlIJ. 1 CL), '
E5. IE,
Desran Tit'teec., S1:rte"" lea. N, 011>= UX (16 00),
COLE, llDlIallOll, 1IAI.L&.S (3 CIlD),
Ilinl!.i.. S.....m.een less STElJJ!, S$TJ. I (4 All)
i: SIll. 64, irz, 83, (1:' 1 ),
se 1029, 1030, 104J, lll44, (4 se). ,
':.I." , = (E:ach towing pontoon --JII)
14 rsr (Including 10 laadad ror 45th D1.. J __)
8 ICT-5 '
6 ICI(LI,
U.S. I!rIv Farces (.......4-nad).
(d) 86. .ross AttacLPoree, Rear J.dadral. C""o11:7 U.S.l/.
BmcAYNE (F), ,
B.II.S. AlnJ:E IEOPOID (LSI(S)l
R.II.S. PROC"ESS ASTRID (LSI(S I,
Crudi.. Tb1rteell (1lROOlttYN, BIll lIlfJR.tll) (2 CL),
Deeron Tb1.00t." (9 DD),
SEm, (2 J.!i),
!lfI 3, 13, 15, 20, 21, 78, (6116),
R: 543, 545, 51,6, 550, 559, 562, 626, (7 pc).
s:: 497, 498, 503, 506, 508, 522, 526 530, 532, 533, 534,
5'c, 6)9, 640, 651, 655, 6 :;; 695, 697, 770,
Tn, 977, 978, 9'JCl, (26 se),
1GlE?1O (toIr1ne ;>antoon IIIr!Wl', llESOLl7rE,
40 rsr (IncludiJIs 5 carrying paatoou; athsrs carrying 6 IeVP
85 rcr_s
ard
fittad .... hoepit&1 aerrlera),
54 ICI(LI,
12 ICT-) ar 4, !l>-U1ah,
9 tee(L), BriUah
8 tee(L), !l>-1Uah,
5. J..rrJq rorcee (........s\pad).
(e) 87. IIS!!, C.ptain , U.s.II.
D=.t.,
1'JIIa.'1,
IOJ!I'l'
UIl.lZ!1l,
1II'lOC5tI, TUPO!II, CHICO!'O:, SA.LJ. 1IItI!lWlJ.,
ClWel:'lLJ.r1.
Inranatiop. (1) C . t. 1nf.....t1on oa !wetU. fer""" an char
acteristics or 'l'he&t.er or OpsratioDs 13 l1at.ed 1A In:'or::ation An
inror.>et on, as available, will be a.per
(2) Tbe ;;estern Teal< Foree 1a pa.oot of conbinad ll1ad torc. ""ich
lao as it. a1asion the c.pt1J1"lt of SII:= ..... baa. ror tuture open
tl..ana.
(3) The IIIN1t.c'n Teal< Porce 1a being eJlP10Tac! l..a the ...t...." to the
eestward at the pnrt of the 1a ns by '!! t1ah
r csa "" the eachalon are -.elt1nf: lace Il1&lltalle=l;r l..a _tars
to the eesteanl or the aout_at.m portion or the island.
(4) The ar. or the lleatern T....k Forc. is bo1m1ad:
On the lIar.b, by th. parallel or tb1rty-.ight deere !forth.
b) (h the IIeat, by the ..-!dian or bel... d ..... t.
0) On tJJ.e Southwest, by line dra"" one OM .era d_. rrom
!'OIIiT SPADILLO (PAlrr::LI.\RIA).
(d) On 'the Southeast, by line dnnm two two tive degrees
RELmIO$ !'Om \SICILY).
"
(5) parts "hich will CO"" UDd.r the oontrol tlllIT:D S7.t.n:9
ro an I'(RJ'O 'tll'SJ.Ll, TRAPA,lIT, end PliERlIl. Other
porta on tha sout t .,. be _led dur1 the l;r pIae
or the operation in ord.r to _irrta1n IIilit.o.ry rar inten
"""" oS Ou:" lI1llt.o.ry forces .... ..11 be undertaken ilio tilroal:" the po
at SI?.J.C'lS!!: soon ... that is ....pturad end -.d......ua.h tp
oar shipp1.... lJoon the opening 0 porta to the shipping or the East
ern Teak Porce, o.ddit10llll1 British leniin,g ordt . be o.1l.acat to
the lleaten> Toak Paroe to ua1at in the ..tntenance over the beeches
a!: !Jlrrr:::D sor= a1 it&r7 far_,
(6) 9ritish ..-rillN will .ct u r..gat1cn Wac.... in .ch ar.
lected tor J.1IU1C11.t1 at.taaka (I.. S', 1nII Plan, .inner H).
(7) F!JrIrt.r or the II...., !'uk Faree will be pranded: by
arth Uri""" C<>&.etel C _.a el.allg t.he north coast
at Ur1ca end jl!rin pueep tbroaeh tile TlIlf:SIU ...... clllumel; by the
IW.U _ duru... t.he DOrt.hern .paroech on D .t=s one day. utU
the aactur f SICILIJ.Il ..ir rields. conr cmor the C J.tta JI' rc
and D' J.ttaclc F9!'ll' will be nrav1ded by 1!U1f.t; CO? the
?'orot by PJ..'IrZLLJ.I\IA. SICIL!.l.ll air n.lda .... capturad
ard placed in opero. l..an, (probably D plus tbree), day and ni,ght tlihte,.
ccmor be 0'f'U' _che., Ihi". l,yl..ag ot1'-ebor.,
and aOfm>1 _teo (See.t1r PlI.n, J.nnaJ: 1').
(8) Fri'!:ld.l;r &irarat't ic1pat1DC l..a the aperat.1cll will be ....xed
with sr1at' t1anal ....xing., arcept that. th. tmIl'::J STJ.TE:s "hi e
.tao- 1 be 11> ,..u.oor circle. TI=I o.ll .tlliad a1.rvrat't
will have the JVDSral .J..ailarlt1 af .. circle, 1.e., t e Ilrl.tish ard
be STA'1'!3 c r (s
Ur Plan, J.nnerx F).
(9) Porc. Britis ror ,will CCTft!r the J.1liad.."sa to
tNoo .urf""..._01 .npr"""h!'ro th lOll SEo'.. U th.. ltal1an
n ..t sorties -.tern parta or =, Torce 'Z', .....rang Br1tish
rare., will n or SJJ nm l..a DOeiUana r.""""bls
1Jle the lll1ed _ults troo enell\f aur1'.ce ...s l .-.preach b'oD the
TI!lIIIIrIUN
(10) (h D lIinu9 two, Co-.er-1Dg Group, COD8istl..ag of = IJU.ns
cnd.a and ar Ullad .r.....,....._. "Ul C01' the _ward _
oparatl..ar; l..a .cccm1llnc. with Covering 0rallP Direct1", An.
(11) """" D a1mD two Ilrl.t1ah ......ening force co--uiAI
two rlatUlaa ard one 9 flatUla will operate to .creen the
.....t.m rlanl< or the Western Tule oree. The operaU"! ..... or this
screen will be wa't ot tha lIOrld1t.n thLoot East. and IlOr'th
or a 11.'Ul cor.nect.1ng Latitud. th1rt,...,......., legr_ 1I0rth. Lonj;i ud.
t.b1rtaen degr.es last, with Latit.ude th1rt _1ght degrees lIorth LoDgi
t.ude e1<mIn degr.. East. J.t zero eight Inmdrad 0 D d"1 th1a ;0.-"""
lf1:l;l C<>:Dll under the c-..nd (>f'lIenal Co-mer, lleat,,", T.."le Farce.
(12) Controllad IItl..ae tielJlD are re, t.a lIldet or all .outhern
-.:hea, em.pt beech mmber etsJrt,....,ight. Beo.ah d&ta gi....
l..a Inr01"Olltion Azmu, _ A.
(13) Darin,g lIOOul1iht on D IIl..aus one, OlIn paratroop., will be dropped
rra" trana:>ort planas into lIOIl8. beb1nd the ene 111 order to
cnpture en_ .1r-'l.ld. ard dinrt roraea t'ro15 tbe beech dofen
lies prior to the lUI. !I--.rd.
(14) lIhen operat.1 are -:mdertak tor th. raduct1011 or
th. 1a ,. Support ]I'orea, cOJll'rl.al..ag light cruisers ard destro,-ara,
will ba e.u1gnad to support ths rad ion opar..t1ona by ""nal Ilal:lbard
MItt.
(1) ThIrt. ths l..a1tiel land
darkn01l8.
(2) That s su !J>e, E-boet, and air attacks are to he emeetad
(3) That lI1ne .,. enceunto.rad. . -
(4). no bo.r will be ...aUable end that . 1tiel land !B1St
be
(5) That ""ather coad1t1ans will pendt 1an:\ h the surt' OD
dee1glllltad
(6) Thet r e baachP will .clud. the shiP!' and
rr land on the true _chea.
(7) That own paratroops will d11'V't _ rorees t'r"", the beech deren
.M pr the 1.aJld1.ogu _e!'rc s __
(8) That. the .l..at,<nance and , "'1IP or a11it&r7 forces can be
oont.1Anad o...,r _ untU edeqtate part. becOlll8 a...llebla sud .....
rend.red unble to "",at lag1atic requirtment
2. Th1a torce "ill lIest..,." Teal< F. l..a pas t10ns .."hore
he island or SIC:LY mlitahle to 1 cantara 0 the south_ern
portion or t island n orde to usiat in bi"" and hold!: that
leland as base tor tlrta:-e o. t'ODS.
3.
rar""" on the !::an. S
ecoorda..",., with 1'1""
SUanee batter1es 11M
beach, and land cra!'t. T
t-rImInort. bore dur'..nc dar
terl. bave bean .U_. Sill UZJ.B.1 OJ
aerno G!OW? raleulDg i., accordaDe th 1J1"It and ..m.noua
!'lAD, J.Jmex G. 'xl.U" tra:>anorts; utU
ICT's IDt-JQl1 At.tacl< Farce.
(d) JOS3 ... le aat.a ish.. J.:: 1'0,..... ulla,.. l.lI:J.U
by aUnlta_ ..ttaclaJ on lected -.._ at. 8 em D day 1A ac
:'dance with plan or ..ttack d.....lapad by C Gimm"al coacen>ad.
C.ptors and .ecur. the port and a1rt1.ld ..t L.II:.lU.1 pratect u.. left
r1Jull< of the oper.tloa apiMt 1ntarl....",. !'ros the nortmut. S
part lI1llter]' operat1ou by llllnal pfire l..a ..llCOr'danc. with Fire S
part !'lAD, J.nnu B. Silence batteries aM deat....,- .M1'ClIl1i IIh1ch
threetcl landing aro.ft and _chea. ere.ft !!-em C!'l!!!!l ..
rol1.<ml; !.C':"'. in T -1, '. l..a , and ICI(t)'. 11> Tn-l. Pr1
to """aut1on or JalS A_ch 'Plen, rel..... Res!M!l 0t1ll!!!. P:x!>lait
part r",,1l1t.1es to __ to ......... troop .11>_. B
to lIIl1aad r out&l t're1gbter1l lIpOC II:< im D plus r IIbc
lmlO8llad t'roII .....alt f'l noleaaa t.wI... lCT-5 to At. F
and roarteen lCT-5 to
(.) :tl:!.J.lI ...- l"1lt.tia rnc. ill Tul< Farcee u lW(U1nd.
Baae on CIWI, .lJ.GIEIlS, BIZfM'A, u dlrectad.
(r) (1) Thi. Oper&t.1op Plap !ill be P aad 11> "ttegt. bx d1lp!tch or
(2) D H boar be II
(3) Tha uaault is to be pnleeea bo-. t.h,.,.lent. &!'d
1... at lOll" ar dU 1ault,..
(4) Take ........,. .-...11.& e.....",.. ,
(. .....lieat of ....-riDe .ttack, and
( destruat1 of Ilaat
(5) D ..".,.,. rorcea encoantllZ'ed.
(6) Tu. ill cties le __ut10Cl8 age.
(7) Take epp t.e .... to ....ret,' or .m-rl.I>ee lltat.iaoed
.. _c Escort l..a with !'lAD,
_H.
(8) e_ to tallest llEtent tar dar...e against _ act
aDd to s own atiOl:J8.
(9) Talte aoeciel precaut10D3 to ..""".... -rol,. or l;r
e1rcro.t't
(10) Take speed! _utl0D8 to .. ill of l..af'ts
cei'Nrs.
(11) Ertend t.ia1ng or ..vee to ....,14 co::weet1on on -..
(12 Site In-IJlilee upectlt.1oual;r.
'I) etteat1ve hoet ael-reg" ope:rst.1ona.
(14) Clear land .hipe and cr&t't -U,. l..a order to ...,....
rolloe ,,<,. Prarld. edeq.... eacort.e. !lout. e!>1!'l'1Dll 111 aoearde!Ice
with C"'""1 !'lAD. _ r.
(15) 1le1nta1n r&d10 en...., and wieual .U...... IDtCePt .. 1!'1ed by
C >1cat1 n Plen, Ann.." c.
(16) The ollClr1Jli dCC1l:>8llta, l..a the _ sion a! or At.-
Porces, ...... l..a otreat:
(.) ''UJ !11') C 1l1n.ad 'YT/Ur lln1are.
(h) ITERR.t: 'I I'll ,. nal Air llerence er
(c) I'1'EIl!'A! .) S at e-ral Ordaro.
(17) IADding.hi ard cra."t. bes. on BIZI!?rJ.JfllllI5; at ehipe bu.
an (p.J.l/ - .lJ.GIEIIS.
4. Dn.ouat.1on or llOUlldad l..a .ccordance e1 lIod.1oa1!'lAD, _ D.
Logistlc support l..a aocordance "ith Logistic FlI.n, A.....'" I.
5. u C cat1 Plan, .f.nnar C.
Rend .-.ouo: A. CJ.S.UILJ.
B. GllllW.TAR P. UlIl"ZllllllJ.
C. awr Q.
D. J.RZEII !!. Ln
1:. .tIe S.
P. B<UlIS
G. l'lIILIPPEVIWl
8. 90ll! v.
I. BImlTJ.
J. CA!'E FAR .n
I. IS 1. :"'Utud.36" 53'11
L. CJ.PI B Long1 a SO'E.
Z. lat1tud. 3IP 07'
II. 'nlIl'OLI I.ocmg1t.-ad. 13
0
30'
O.
The Short itl. of tIWo Plan is
nal C-..av .Ntern T. :Pore. with
DPE Attac!l rare.
(..I *" H. I.
R. I.
1ca J.d:1ral, U. s. "r-!'
-"""er:> Tul< ceo
-6
(fa be t.-! " tal.Y) ti) J.TD14 a_. Pia tho _ boT boBtol f1ft
t.
IDt......uou-. u4 a1:t&ck troa .......
I. Fire !'laD.
J. QlVII
C. C.-m1cat "" P1&Il. (4) J.ttad< both boT a.;, ud !debt to l1a1t of .....
D. .-...".,. Illd tbm to att&alt. 1d,
rroop.. 505tb c.r.
!'laD. let. Illd ocmt1Jmal. at rill will.
3 Ba, Sll4th PozoaoIIIrto IDhntry It.
F. A.lr Plan..
C. 0-. lind a-d._ Plan.. <I) 1Iillta.,. OJ' 01Y1liaD 1IIII1to or 1M.1rldaWo otttlriac
a. ......1-.. rill bot d.tror-\.
I. CaIm>T Plan.
(1) to 01 to CllID be 11fte4 111
1. J."'!"'O&oh P1&Il.
r. Groap DirlIat1.... ImI1lable t.n>op DIIT1lr a1.rerU't of 1).1, D Doo1 1a
(t) 11llta.,. lind 01Y1liaD ..a.orlt1_ cl.1Jpl.q1ac _
drop I OD CJ'OlIDl! east at POII!Z OLIVO. o111&to". .Wtaa. rill be _ted
L Group DU'ocrt1....
L. Groap D1roct1_
2) bl1lt DDIB 1'00 111 laod1ac, lind tho capture of I1rt1l14
no1a1ty Plm'E 0 Loeal Clrtl1 1Ja coptore4 10 1 rill
I. SId!> DU'ocrtb
(3) J.ttae:bod to SlWIl ltlIIl3 1Ip01l lltahl1lb1al: ooataet with urpd to <:OI1t1.11u tho1J' odIId..a1atrot1'l. ud jM101al
DDIB 1'00 attor H t\mct1ollol.
O. C..- D1r<MOtI....
P. rnw.ue--.
lJi) 1IoaI of WONhip, __, lind prl. to 1Iea_ rill
DDt be diatorbod OJ' ""_ thq 1IIOll &I
EXHIBIT Y..
4_ <!Ifnn... worIuI.
(1) lOOt ltlIIl3 (noat1ac Bo_""). (1) -.. rill be __ with tbo _t ... SII14111n
FI D ORDER NO. I FORCE 343
ID1l1;)' of &II&&Dlt _ or rill be eIIDt.
la' CIorr H. 1. GA1PZI
oK Order ) 0) ..... rill II" _roo 1a tbo 1Il1t1Jal beach..-1t
11ao1Db1
1ac II1Dw. eqI&1pMIlt -'*I toJ' tbe tI*
1 ) at had.
(a) S&1l witlr ....".'U C<rIm>7, preparwd to lam 1a
SlPS. srclU, 11500.000 toh) port at IIztT of tho t F.......". (J) J.ll ... , _ to &I>d 1IlclDd1ac .., rill ..
bani orior to 1l11oar, D Doo1 tbo __ of tbo __ ...
1. .. SolI.......... n IntolllpDoe. tIdrd 111 -..4 of tho1r mrl.. or orpai_t1-.
(2) 82ID iIIIlOIlS DIV (.,Dete) W/2Dd B.. 509 Para Bolt atobl
.\I. (1) I'llES 1U. DOIIII1et1.aI of JQICI 30 ) lind BiI!'1SB Soe lIRDIll 10. 1 .1_.
e.-emer. IIaj II. B. IlIIXZIIAI
l2tIr 4IlIII (Jl1&bt), II1lpPCll"tod boT 1lS UIIl. IIr1
A.lr lind &nl r......., &IIIIIIlI1to tbo eoutboutoro PDrtica 1t1I11.c>II. 5. Soe A-.: ... I. .laDIrz.
at SICILl' to ceptoro it .. a baeo tar tlIrtber op."...U-.
(a) 82Dd J.1rbome Di. (-Doto) "",,-._to boT 11. e-d POlIto. Faroe 343, (1) 11l1t1alJ7 aboard
(2) aI!'IS1I l2tIr 4IlIII (let ca..d1an Di., OIl lett (hot)o, __b. a1r I1fte 111 SICIU, boT D 17, 1a .ltbor
.-1
4
, Yith1Ja ito ".>II of act1o.. At H Boor 00 D Doo1. or both the ODIB OJ' JOSS ....... , &I irected. (2) .lobo..., rtc1ll11;)' lJlLl. at a
(Sol Operat1<me lop) (b) 2Dd BD, 509th Para lot, 1a TB CJ., 1a tho to be """"",004.
10IlCI JU , ImI1labll for cIrop &lliOD1 &I
2. JU ..-1t.o of tho l.1D8 POZZWl - IIlGUSJ. - CIIIW'I01ft'! d1rocted.
_ TIUIn, oll UIllui..., .t B Boor D Dq to 11II1 rmd lrolJ tho a1.r
t1ol4e ,...t IIDJ'th of cc.ISO, It POm:Il OLIVO, tho I1r lu41ac f1al4e at lllSClllI (3) '1fIIIIP DIV.
t at Ucu.&.l to Hue &I>d ope....te tho.-l port lIt I &I>d
t J' tI1rtbIIT Oorr II. S. EIlDI OIS. alIoor<I 1UC4111
_1orr.
o Doo1. To be """"",004. .-'"
B Iiam'. To be .......,.",004.
rroop.. Soe 10. m, 'I'roop L1It a) ODe IIC'1' (-/84th lIprrl Brr .telld) t ...
01. J.rty rill be _blad preparwd to -..no to SIClLI
0.. coll ea;rt1ae attor D Doo1.
(b) Raa1Dder of Di. (lei" 1 IIC!' &I>d Di. _,.) orill be
3. ... _ 10. I. (CIporatiODl lap) 1'1'IIJI&1'ad to -..no 011 coll to SICIU a t1aII Arter IDOL, _4 OIIIAM
D " 8.
PQllCB ( UIIl. DID PIlII:ES)
lI2U J.1J'bcmI. Dl., (1) ...... cp .-on&.
S. FOllCI t'IlOOJ'S (S. ""'- 10. I I, f.-p L1It).
C-mere. lot CIorr O. u;r (I) aP. 1J.DIllU. !lIIIIII&.
(1) 11111to otbor thol" ollot_ to _Tuk oroel rill
00" f. C.
be JII'OPC'Od to ...... rr.. IORTH U'RlCJ. to SIClLI 1a IIIb
la'
la' Go.. D 1'!llIII III I.l II. J.LI.IIl
uquerrt 00IIY070 &I eb:l.JlP1nI be.....1 .'I'I1.leble, LClOO1'd1lll
to priont1l" UllDUnoo4 lIT th11 1IMdqQarte....
t. IIStmII IIJ.VJ.L TAa P'OllCI.
(1) II ..... 0 Ilq 14 tbo SoUIPIJl\I - CIII.l ...., .....-
IIDd
(1) Ianl .... tire lRIPIl"rl. (5. ""'- ... IV). 1 - Op....
The a1rt1llc1 at. OLIVO. U a-rp11
a1rfl.14 IIDJ'th at CCIlISO.
". lDl (S- __ .... V). I U - Troop L1et
IT - '1'&1 _ Fir. hppon
&1J' laod1ac tl.lcI oorth of 1t1I0U'i.
(1) DI J.1J' Support ea--l. , - J.lr IIapport
n - n,,14 _111
"I - J.et1a1J'or.
0) I:IMDIl 14 to I!IJDI UIIl. DOlltaot with tbo nIl - Coeat Do
I 12th.tJlll!, 1AJ.t1l.ll7 .101a1t,. 1Wl1lS.t..
(2) C taot Yitl> JOSS

I. II
)I. (1) .Lll -..4en _ill 1rrearo that t.roopa Ia... t U Cloa1lal ....tve
1IltomatiOD of tbo operat1 pr10r to 8 Ibrr 0 Doo1 to
Ible t_ ....""te tbo1J' _ 1Jatoll UIIl. ott It-
Inl:r.
L. I. T tt
PJ.
C....
III Ma44a
IWlDOX
0
a .t I
d-7
10. D to PI) 10. 1
aadquart.ro PDr...
..... llI'If'" (_I) til.
4.P.o. 758. 17. a. 1I,..,.
20 JIm. 194,
1. -.T or nm ..., .1=01
to. Battl. Ordar ot Sull,. (to bo 111_ b7 T-clq). thh II clquartor
!. _ oo11.U.. _ 0 dat .. corr.ct to 19 thi. B06dq n.
2.
(1) Ita of .1_ of oa-.y _..,.,. boat Salb.
terri.. BOth:1U?
(2) _10 ot loeatl_. sall....... .to
P'lrl.ac attlot.la,.,
_ POIeIB.
(1) I_ltlo.tl troop. _. oallbor.7 '.tlooal1tT _ ..u.,
-...I _ ... ot S tWl of loaal aa1D_.a .. .t
(2) SaIIGtac d_11tlOD. aI..:a boob trap w:1r.' 10 tlOD ot alb
tlelda _ roo4 bloot., ...uti_ of utl11tl (rall-J'. ataotrtl101.
tal talaer tar)' "tar pol11at10D' C...utl.. or walla.
OPr:1.oc' .t ,
'-ati_ ot trllOp ... aT
ot .... aDd 01 1& ort.).
(4) tilltary ..ttit.... (t,.,. aDd quall",. ot ...lat_a)7 CIY1l1u .ttitud.'
_ -. "lac .ra by cl1'111... or all1t..,.,.,
(5) t.oa.tlOD _ t,.,. ot .....rod ValaaT ruin
or 1_11_
(6) ar actlYlt:rt (rw., ts.. .......... cl1ractloa ot tUcht. aDd ..aoult.
--),
(7) lttatuo urtl.lda aDd alrtl.ld ...,11__ ...u1_U llNwta ot
__ -lac. pnor to aDd -lac _.Uoo!'
(8) fwrra1a r
!.
(1) 'o.....at to 1'101bl11t,.. _cl1tT. hleh aDd 1_ pre..ura ..,....
_ cl1raGtl000 aDd ...loa1t)".
(2) ctfaotl of tor_ata em otr_. _lo,.aat of _oal _a aDd
aotual aGa to 'bura1ac. aDd ..1...1 obrn:tloa'
2:
of --:r air .ctlYl"'"
(1)1 2!!.. (7).
(3) 1oc.U... ot -rPacl tarr.lD f t.Ira. (10k... rl...... clatlln).
() rllOp _ta .. raMo .nr-tIOD. type _1_'", 1._
_. to &Del lIouth. (-. ecapotlOD. 11111taty G1Y111&.
b,. Uem. LoaUl.. or _ tra1u aDd t .... .-Ita'
(5) Iat.Ioity.. ot.. raratt tint
(6) .....,. _tor t. (ts... _ """ 41rMtl.. ...
aotl1'1tT 1Jr 9tn1ta at -'1Aa).
.. b7 nu 4et&.cJ:-.;ot. , UDder
uta d.1rMt to AC or S, 0-2
10.). G-2 Om ....1
Dvlag lalUat pM ot op
nod aDd clhpoood ot b,. -Taole 70roo
1Dt;.Ut.c- PI... 22 1943. 8q Tao!< Fo 343. lolo tl
will b at OIlce. S.. etter, tJ\ I I.' ,ubj.ot.
II&p. rill b. llillOcl.. rorlclod 1. lima>< o. 4 to G-2 Inhl11Il_. PI... thla
...rt.ro. 'n 1Iq 1943. S...100 ..oat 21 J""" 19103. iii 343. to _
ot 2 tot.ll1oao. Flu.
6. IIISCELUnO
C.I.C. 8M G-2 Goaeral ...tl...
1-'la fiZJ.. 19 """. 43. Bq 343.
PIloto ..... and IDwrpretltlDd. Plu. See 0-2 ca.ral IDtor
_Uoo bwlatla 14 JIm. 43. Bq 343.
o. "J" S_oa. 8M lattar 1 JuDO 43. Bq 343_ J.ot.
P t. S Iatall1gaa<>. Plu r.f..reel to 1. 4 abo .
. Ida..,.......... ._ nll be pronda4 trOll "". SM paraqaph IV.
_at I.tor.oatl... BullatlD tll. 12 J 43. Bq 343.
1. IlG'alTS llISft181l!IOII.
A.-.y G-2 report ..111 ba .u1llo1ttacl b,. _-ruk PDrea. cla11)" aoYarl.ac
tha p.. 24 hoar period to 2I,ooa aDd nll ra.ch th10 Baa4qu&rtor. by
O6OO1l the da,. tollowl.Dc clq npoO'tacl upoa. r ao ..... tharaott.. .. practicable.
b. IDto.-ti.. to ....,. .atl... &C"lDot our to...... nIl
be tFu.ttacl b,. the _.t oxpacllt1ou...... to thh ll..dQ"""'lra lD brlat fo..
.... epoC I"K\II"1d.
o. T.ll _. 1Ir-.ul nIl ba uoacl by .ttaaldD .-1_ to clNl_ta
-PT1'iDd.l, 'troop. are h....
CllY
Chiet or St&tt.
omcUL,
/./Coob
IOCB.
_.002
: : : : : : : : : : : : : ; : : :
CCFI
r
:::::::::::::::::
5
To F.
IIq Co II Corps
1 InC D1.y (-16 d:T)
1st - .,.
IQ Co In!
lJrt IImI Trp
lJrt XDv IlI1 (-Co B)
iii &. iii Bt.>7 In IlI." Arty
5th Jolla
7th FAlla
334 Jo llIl
16th In!' Rest
2 In! Rest
l.st lIe:l a. (-Co B)
1.Irt Ord Co
lJrt Co
S1.gllaJ. Co
Pla 1st IlI.y
16th In! Di..
B< 16th In!' IlI...
HQ Co 16th In!' D1...
16th Rcn Tp
20th EDgr a.
iii &. Hq Bby lL.r;'tb DiY Arty
JSllth FA Bn
l6llth 'fA lID
17lst FA en
189th FA Bn
157th In! Rest
179th In! Rest
l1lOth In! Rest
l20th Wedical Bn
7 5th Co (Lt llaint)
IPth Ql. Co
16th 51g Co
1!P t 16th In! Illy
rBn
L"th !In
co.tsr A.'lTILLEX!'
mid Barr_ llallooZl lltr7 VLt
Btl:r VLt
lD5th AAA IJ1 lb 51')
s B J..U. lib
Iiq 1Iq Bby 06th J..U. Op
iii J.A.l Op
IOOth ll.l JII an
l4l1st. All OUD Bn SII)
!JUst All A!X lb (9)
16l.st. All Bn
&.iOth III Bt1'Y Sepj
691st All III Btory Sep
ll.l III Btry
a::
696th All III Sap
&.I7th All III Btory 5ep
C1lE1m:.lL lURFARE
2& Cill1 lib llii Sap)
21st CIIl C (-1 Plat)
Det; CmJ. Co
BJd Iltsd Bn Sep
12th C Co llaint (-!let)
CAVALllI
... 5cl
11: !9
ISJd 'l'iiiilC lID (aL
7 rank !In (L
2 lIed1,. Tank P
FU:ID
Dth fX Ili'ii (- BIl 36th v.
13
- 1
& lltr7 (-Flub U ) In BIl)
Ezlgr Rest C) ..
.5)
d-9
1'oree
r....... ( psr
AJ'Ilr - "rrry lbrOI
l' till _ject.1,. beaabu will DOt be
m till J1Idpeat. or Sub--taak area
;lecrto1- beacbea bawo _ cI1.....-...l by tlIe
by 1d.thml<11Dc :an.
lnal pm :an 1d.ll be all epecn
iIIIAllT Il. an,
OoS.c.,
Cb:lA1' or statt.
PlIlC! 3l.l
58
20 19lU
PLU!
01' m ordlIr 01' pr1Qr1t:T will be

'by .... d.r lADd.
lil1ed laDd taroea be in
or tbe operst1or:le.
to 0Irt ..
poaQble, CODI:1.at1Dg ot co1Dred ..,kIt or n.r.. prw1' abl;r ill
""""""o:tl='1I1 .. _ cIat1DecI natural or .. '"V" atZ"1p
Qp.- Uoo I_ 21>-1). (Yellow .. or
__ ot! 1m be UMd tor tbU purpoao). Iu pold.t.1aD will be

1D U. ta-pt ........at. all Cllo..... po.-1bJA to U.
_a bllt 1D IIUCh pold.t1<lIl that it """ be w1t.bo11t _
"I'll"ld.t1on. !be a::rta&l 001= or _ or to be 1IMCl will be
a&IICIlt. _ onIlr-.l tllrou.&b llr S"apport ee-am *- ts.. to ts...
ot par&obate t.1'oopa.
!be 8O" or tlJIrwe llboald be llt _e betaro U. .ataated
or attack of the (nocd.ftl! en.- .ur SUppcrt
!!. the taak ot der.ra11n8
pr1or'1t1 ........ al.1

CoarcUnat1oD F1:JnI ot TCJI!\ IIeqgeN
4. Hq In Air 1JIIl>OMo ) and w1ll 9. tor tc-pte will 1.D:>ll:Ide dllIGZ'1pt1oD. or llDd IIIIp
tlInz1JIh II1r lIIIppCII"\ perU... to all Corpe llDd D1'rU1""".
ret , attaclc 11 re'l'dred (11' _eaG7), BooII>l1Jle II>d
I1q opec:1IliDlrtruot1ona, 1!b1ob ...wI 1JlOlDdio t.bI -.p rete
Ilil'Di'i 'D' Ilq
w.tbDd
o! _ la1ldurk ,pat ant. II ID a1d to all' att.ck.
S. _ 343 will
tor _ondc'litJlDD o! at batto-l.
1be terget IIIP re1'tIl'SICe will aJ.wlO'" be ..,t ill olNrl ot.bI:r cI&
.ur I'onle, tIIroaII:I
be 1t ooDll1dared aalCt1al aDd t1Ae pem1ta.
'!be to a t..-pt c!slaIId. g1Y1ng dltIiJA of all' .ort llDd
tUe of ..tteck will be ancodlcl.
tIIroI>gl\ till _ 01' d1...-.1DDory tx.b:i:a& ta
Tarpta w1t.1dn art1ll.Ir:r range, by spec:1.t1c 1d.th
to _ drbanlB <>per 1oIl8.
lDJiu oollC<lll'lllld, wq be iYrked by ..,...
.o-md.a for

1O.!' 'bcahl.1Da 1.1 det1Ded II the llDI 01' r.......-d troapa
dI>r1D& tba DIIltt 1;.:> boar..
!!. Air Support IIl1st be Ia!lpt _t.:Q- 1nto..-! all to
1Do&t1oD 01' 1lcabl1m.
7.
w dq or a1;;bt whlm IDllR! an,
ColoDll, a .0
SlIllh .. will be in be -&1117 Ie/a. G. oc Cb1e1' of 5t.eU.
II&1nta1Ded '111__appol1 H. O. lUJIIXII.
Col.one1. 0 .0
.1. c. o! 5.. .3
t ,,- ....
letter or ..
F
by IJilllIt JDO yan1a loag. till w1c1tb of
k bod.ng at least , ,.erda.
mllCr. by
Auth ot :3
*- Un 0&111 (opeaed out IIld b
Ia1 e _
Cow o. __1_
or g:roll:ll1 paIlIl Rr1pe.
19 ,; 1
tol .. or &8Olim
n.r.., or eleCltr1Jl .VI
TO F.O. 1.
IW'S:
_5__

d-13
rps art.il1 ery:
(1) AttAcl:ed JOOS:
5th AnI:! FA Gl>
77th FA
st lin 16th FA
e ry B st an &1 (les 1 FlB.811 t).
(2) Ac .... c:hed SHA!lX:
l1L'J FA (le55 In an 36tll FA Olld rr B 1. Obm Bn (_
Bt G (Prov), }6tb FA (155_ ).

a. &1l:'-taa.\t orce ca:JDt:nders will be resporuJibl.e r r a.l.l counter
bat.tery in Lheir respective lones.
b. Count.erbilttery ftUb-section or arti err ...clion, R IAC (R) is
svai1&ble to OSS f counterbatte use, from ll-:20.
4. l'fIO'l'CCRAPHIC C<M.RAGE:
a. Force 43 s.,d SHAIlJI: will eseh establish, at Force 343 Photographic
Inte re "on C :T.er, Arti11 Plloto Liaison Section which will locate
"llerr targe on pertinent prints troc all photographic sortie. for
rd de.criDti- n" 1 cation of targets direct to CounterM t.ery
lections ot JOSS &nd SHAll!(.
b. Artillery roque for air photo II1ssion.. 11111 be su1:llllit.tad to the
Art11lerr Photo Liaison 5ect.ion. through the r speetive Counter ttpry Sub
ection.. of JOSS and S!IoIIlK.
5. UR ATIOH:
Reauesta tor art..illery oheena ion or surveillance oissions to fiown
by he lith Oban 90 W1ll be eubmi ted to G-2, Force 343, through Artillerr
Officer, Force 343.
6. OOUII!D OK!: SHELL:
a. 110 7"11"" e.,ke .hell will be fired bT srtillel'7 uni.ta in this
operati....
- ,
b. Other co ors 11111 be used:
(1) Prloari.1.1: F:or tire control purposes and to "ssist 1n ha ac
curate of tires.
(2) 5econd&rilT:
Ca) Il7 specific Drearr&ngellODt th su rtiDl! air uni. ta for
each r to gets tar air attack.
(b) Il7 III1tUal arrangement with _ned unit oalll>Ooder. for
ai.mle aisnaJ.llng Ma auc:h &5 to indicate the e.-pletion of an arlille..,.
concentration
J
to Ilark terrtlin objec.t-ins, and toO designa:te sector boundaries.
(3) In _gemy, a. nor...l snoke.
(cl U... of white 5IIlOke remain. UDl'eatricted.
7. CO'ISERVATIOII OF IJIWlllTION,
taken under fire.
Il7 Cu.and of LIEU A!Il' GEIIDlAL PATTDII:
1l1.'lT R. GAY,
GOlDJli>L, G "'
/ a/ H. G. IIaddox hief of Staff.
Of}C
H. G. IlADOOX,
CO , .S.C.,
AI: of S, G-3. u c fFIED
AIIllU VII
TO F.O. 1
lind .Aw-r1cm air lIIl&1
D Dq md 1'r.- I-
Air CO
the n sh1. Ii ee 3!U
n1.ll P'fOve asho:-e au 0 or D.f 2.
Did'm of or: 08 343 . e
...43; I'rOV1de II ilefense or be_5.
ll} r Force Ca!nanders, Until rel1 of area 111 ty
uJ II-[ ree 3hJ, lA. dafe0&8 in areaa cc:a.:lng un:.er 'tne1r cJn-;.rol, inclu '; C.>ol'"...
inat. n tin:en Air Forces, eMS, mvi Navy on Air De!'en.- ...tero; c-oJOrd.in.c.
tion ot A ::> AAJJ:; t uen Lbe All Op 1 and air pport Cont.r<>ll.er 1; iib e.J:h
sub-t. force.
(2) 00, 34th AM Br18'
(a) PreparetJ.on and loiitlint> 0 aLkcbed .mits o! 0 I- 12 to:u.o
up.
(b) ar"i-'al SICILY, cluIrged Wi tb8 AA detense 0' o.U
port.s, airports, ache. and Force _ U control in Y.
OJ, 2626th AA Br1g:
la) l"raining. local a 1Ip1o_t, preparation and loading as
scheduled, or at.t.ached un1':3.
lb} On ",ri.al SICILY, responsible tor the All def....se of
airports, ports, beaches UIcI ::>orca in ua1gnlld .......
Civil ..siva will coordinate All dafense. 'Tit.h
b. Urgaaaatioo tor ccabst,
ATTI.CIIKD SlUJlI[ ATl'ACii"D JOSS A AOfIED!tOOL
lU2 & l.u3 Bar Bln iltr1ea lUStIl AM lip Hq LUr-.h All Afl !lD
VLA 443rd All AlI!lD {SP} lle.. Btries A & ll)
2 Bln Oat lU7, lUbt.i: All U Bn lSP) IUJrd J.AA A. Ill:
2 Bln Oat 1lAF, I 436th All AOi Ill:
2Uth All ()m lin
Clft D2nd. !legt
1lT7Dl All IIp Hq . and" 7 All I()
1&41st A.I Bn (SP) Bt.r1ea AD}
IAJth .uA All lin lU4 Bar II1Jl BbT VLA
45lst AAA A;/ Bn ls..'P)
W1>:t All llUIl BIl l5ll} 1 Bln Pet. , flo'.
/l:fu. 0/5, b:to, OY7 All ><.>.:
Btrlea {5eP!lAll}
nms
m;u. IIp Hq
lU5th Aff!lD lSP}
lU1th AAA A;, Ill:
A ,. B
lUJrd J\.ll Ali Ill:
215th A.J.A ()m Bn
b9U, 091, 92, 6)/3 u..
I!l atrie. l5epHAIl)
Force I 3 TrOOPS.
1U2nd All J. !lD
!,;J6th J.J.A QlIIl Ill: {SIIJ
07th All Reg\:. {-3.d BIl}
68-.h All ,lIIgt
2l3th
4th All Hq
6th IIp 1Iq
1b1tll All DuD Bn lSIIJ
lU>th J.ll BIl
..,)nI All GIlD BIl
4Wtb All BIl }
c. Co!Jdqct or AIItiaiJ:'crs1't
lJnj.t; not:ln c..-.nu.c:atiDa with U\ Air ""orce (;ontroller W1ll
onJ,y "t dr<:r.>!t t - ad as ho -tJ..1= or = ct.1<\. a hostile ac
2} fire
1lben pJawa .... 1.n -
f0110 " b7 1M ""-0 lIS "CIlII1'" or 0
.rr:umJ.y ai.rcra!t leaves the "- by tho
/l..rr bol1Dcm
t (tr
in 5i<;la!nt ot barre
b. A1r arn1Jl Bro ast
on
Ra 0 and "
(1) AU &:,,-268 sns us a
1'requemy or 20alc to __c.
(2) All Gel wl.U opuate on a frequancy or
0) 0""" will be ex rc sed -t poww allotted on a:tIIf Tod1D fre
is not exceeded.
6. Sacond.--ry AA' role.:
a. AAA C
"'8pcmaible for
(1) CoordinPt1on or de!e=ive with AA der.na.. Df CiT 1IavaJ.
1.n the ccx::::mxlers ar"" of re_1bul
(2) or AA in ncirl1l;y of be Ilea aD! porto far
deferu:e against surface craft.
be Where iMicated by the AM ex-anders 'lI1.ll ait<l II
o u=e 1.n dual defe:> e e!l!lll1 II8Clw:1sed.. elsa.
ByC or
" i"ICIAL,
/s/ H. r,. _
H. G. YADIXlX.
COI..OH'"":L. u.s.c
AC of 5, D-3
_-BlOO! BlOO! liT
AUtI1 CO, Faroe }to,
Copy II !IllS P'OllCB 1Jl11:101o
0/0 Bq I ..........a COrpo. leW
APOf758
/Jala
J.Dlll 110. TI II
!II r.o. 1.
1. 11&010 or a. Tb1. C0a01: Der- PI.. 10 ..s CD tol
low1& 1:1oa. cODt&1aod 10 Pl_1JIc Iao1:ruot1oa Jo. 10. Bq
Poro. 141,
(1) DO throat ood.na or 1u'p ot_ oa .-zrr liT
_ n_ ar .." _jar ponl_ tIoaraor.
(2) !bat 00&1. at1:aobo by onn: _ -..J.- .... tho
calT fora or ocaotal thr..t __
11. It la p""- _ CII
a. 1Jl vi_ ot 11Jo1ted 111t.....ail 1 _ -U or
pTOnt.l>le tarpto, a a1m- of Coeot .... troop. _t...1el 18 lle1J:c
_. aYaU"le tor _ port 0101,..
d-14
fIE
REPORT OF THE A.C. OF S. G-2 (MILITARY I
TELLIGENCE)
FOREWORD
INDEX
I.
IL
Il.
TV.
I.
VII.
VIII.
1. INTELLIGENCE PLAN
b pl.AD lor 1nWn'O u....
and Dl."\'iJd.GD
aoIl&1.st.1D& of "- -;
ofOa.....
!be Counter Intll1_"""e act!v1Un pl 110 t.h.trt 0D8 P1e1.cl t
Detao 'd be as ;;nod to A:nV ,.,. and to CoTPS
0 "- oft1cers and e1e """ NC. tiro fort s-.rtty DetachMnt.,
colllJ1.rtdni of oUi and e e ..." be.. gned to J.nv headquartOl'" and
!at.!' uoe<1 t d.,1Dl&ted porta. Each dhill!.on """ lUIs:!.gne4 & dat_ 01 CII8
officer and fi rr- tbe ClC. The counter _aglf plan irm>1...." on],y
weh pereomel ......... olrea.' aTn:Ual>1e to tactical unita and included iJ\stroc
tiDM to aabotag. Later, COUlIter ouDnrs1ft contral .... IltlDCW1C8d and
Clollfl cooperation ........-r lor counter lIUln'm'si"" con ral <luring the opel'
tiODa1 1tI... of occupi. tertit.o17.
C RSIlIP
cenac. p """ to be proTided 1l:r Force W, to consiot 01 too<>
riel:!. preas C"""""'" c.v1llan ..aU cenaero, t.hree telephone and tel"gra;Jl
cenaora, three otticer and three clerks. The IIl!1J. censor ...... to
!oUoor instructi eil1l1.l1Ued in t.he At'rlcan theatr, c."""raMp of civ1ll
..n oec:up1od territory ..... to become the tnnctian of Ci'IiJ. :.finn. The
!ield prea. cenOOI' to DaTe ... his eole reaponsl.bility lol,. d1spatche. of or
e<>--reapondell.. S1gn.a1 oecurl.t,. plans were &ImOUDCed lUI confoming to s1gnol
operaticn rucUans be 1aoued bJ" t.ho Sii:Jl&l Officer, Foree )lU.
, oll I theae pllln3 were laid for the inns1.on of
, upon roTinon 01 the b&sI.c pl..:n aDd amounced l!i."eCti're
3 d operate with " ShS, in Southeast
mnar c were IIo>de :mil the pl..." ". & wl'u>le otood up. Tile late
uuaed & ol.1&bt d1fficulty in ouch _tera as were long range in preparation;
for e:J:lIIIIll.e, t:>e beach _1& 1lhich .ere at that. apprcx1a&te tLs t r
10...." to rol'!'s were 01 no TOlue, and .- one bad to be prepan!Cl t t.lle ...
iU'U. the 5tll of , 1943, an ..-nded plan ...... loso.ed lor
d1stribut1cn to the sub-task lorc" call1l3ldel'8.
Itll t1z8 rogreesed in th.s ",,",cut.ion at this plan, the G-:! Section ...
broken up 1IIto V;l%'1CWl so.b-.sct.1ons lIldch !nnctioned in the planning phas .
tntun cleft o! tIle.5ect n int<> the CJ>Ar anal pbaae loll....cl with the
al11 chqed to -" opcratiar.al conditions. AnMD. 1
10 ot the ..2 Section.
"" those!\meti iiith their e:q>erience"
II. ADMIN ISTRATION
o ratio.n began .!..n. t. J tor .-c ri
rl 1on.s was 1 Ai.N ['or he
C-J
SUPPLY l'tlO!!:
wa. nor..u in ..poet except tor SUct. rd-to-- .et thl.n;ts aa
clear acetate, u.1.re all sorts of extraordlna.ry e.Crcrt.s & crV.,
tho use l>! niacar<led Lray tia !r.. OUr hosp1W.. In h. ttar or
equipllart., cont.1l'11o:Js.st es 7 th .e:tlon. r vine n:1 reproduC't.ion
dlnices which c:oWA help out. Klre made.. nO. iiscu5llions ith chler.
and spe aline led to the cone usion tmt certain AIlC could
be prot "ly OI:IJlloyed by the .. 1n previn" the ll11lity and ed
or o..1sSiltll1natlon to tbB lo..-er units. For a mlt1l1t.h as oNered
to et ne1tds bqond the scope 0:,... the ci. eo3raph and ditto lIlaei\.ine. Due
to dtrl'1cultie. this ha. not yet b""" o"ta.tn<od.
A large Pl'OP:>J"tion or add.1tiCllll officers ar.d men were attached. tor
t_po.-.,. duty n the lat. planning.t e, and the task l>! or entation
and t.-1n1ng place turther burdon. on a ar alreaclY cerryir.' mdt.
load. f."t tor sev.-al week. they we l>! little r no ue. loaa
not a question of experienc., as among them ere officers of considerable
bacKground in combat intelligence I>;,t at the 81'1lV evel the identity ot
u ts, t.heir c:oamnder4, the ._ at' the rt officers a. t. phy"sl
omt.lon of the of ticas, It 5 e hannels, Dletho:b, am 30 on _e a
b_ilaerinP.: arre.y that could not be: &ssirUl.a ed at onco.
The a.d:Dinistrat.10n aectian had a c nsider.;.,bl :1: in the :york of
div1c11ne the sec ion 0 th e echelons, or tnlve1 respectively tho
LST which left late in June, the loleci1uarterhi .hich left
AJ..eier:l t.he first. Mte.k in Jul.y, and the rear echelon Which moved to izeTte
and ceme over in odd lota froJ:1 0 plus 'lifO 0.. Spice and lista
were ar ed (an btt.f!lDpt. _81 made to h& an opera'li 911!:ction on
each boat.), vehicle requirement.s were etemdned, a.nr. the eq,u1puerrt.
oupplia. _are apfOrtioned and p"cKl!d. i this last minute ru.h e
number or ferenee ':ocumem. requiring careful checking "ere sent
by 1 .ter unit... AS it WAS FO.5s1b to h1. e th J:1 properl,y it. e
necessary 0 carry t.hea al0 l:.. ' t1ng in 5 ve al -ired fO :s f u. el eS5
ut&., not to be fol'i arded unt.il aft.er p. ces n& for ien t.t.ere s no
tiM, an:! not to Le ad a t.here .;&.8 no provision for ::.t.ora"e of
b1& lesa1t1o doc nt.
Tba admnistra"tion seet.ion reopened brie . 1n bivouac: n r Algiers,
nv a few lI!JDeo aphed ite c earing .some docwuents to Foree lU,
and cco.:>Pli.h1llg laat l:l1nute di.tribution ot elata to UDit ....nt n
tne ba r.
OP:JU!IO.aL PH4SS
tf!fl f the a.dm1.nistrtltion :section .r8 inclu d in tr.e D-day ou iog,
nd t 058 to transj:Ortation. The were up i. lizerte
tor Md In 'Jela, the sectior. was r" ssenbled and At and
t.,er-.fter tne Bub silli tnt two eche os. Cne
.s concerned with no G-2 activities, and the other prine! ls under
tald.njr tbe ad!:l1ni.stretion of rr..lll:er us special lectionl under the headil1l of
tile lIi.cell /lOOU.
The several Dn'''S in the Cinal or tJ!! opera ion, and an
'01tb a ca ured tNcIc I aa ofl'1ce imicat.ed thn tho admin1st
seeUon could &ave: about t.nree ho s on eve:"".! ve,
.,t'e efficiently 3.J'I! \'1'1 lesG harm 0 ty- nj mit!leo-ra
pI r:Vlfrt od t rock or t r. er .
On D plus I, an advance detail ltent. asho fro.m he com.'tlJ,.nd shir
to .tabli.h thlection at :lEJA.
i'nm u.lJr 12 to the end ot ttw 0,","'1.10 a COCl ned G-2 and G-J VI r
room wa.a caintained. An operation'll n:'\p of t.he entire i:J1.and, to
:leal or l:lOO,CXX>, W315 at each location, am Ule terrain model
place<! in 3 rroper releti". po.ltio wUh this Illap. G-2 C t Section
j:Ost.ed on1,:r neral locations of known eDe.alJ" WJ1 s on t.rcis opcr::u.lonal '" r-
It u.s found that 8trr.ra1 de -l.e:d ape wel"lJ needed. Awcrk JIl3P was
.lllinte. d, 'Ilt1ich w tJ placed all nt-e I!I1ce inCormat.i. without regard
to ita credi tty. 'I'lI11 p po.t bJ G- d.a.y oIf1 ran .as tho
beaio tor tha G-2 Pv:1od1c a-port blUe<! d&ilr
J. cOlibined fisual aDd oph1 ar r",omai. sarre map wu MiTtain.d.
All l'eq1e.-t.ed ir reconrai.SlS8DCe "&3 plotted OD. t s , which revealed a.t.
a &1&n:e those aiooio"" which were cu..... ctly being t com. Viaual rec
and .pot phot.ographic covulge, as "ell as request-a on G- showing
prontlble be targeto .,e udtiated by the Co.,.t sect n bas on the
0Il8Q" oitult10
1ng tbe lett pert of the S illan caapa1gn, 1. ...... r ... m advUable
to keep poated a _p eb""in- the roe<! b leo and c1e.uiUma IIX",ur.od r the
....... leae nf abreast at en int..t1 no portr'll'.d rebr in ..1. d<!l'l}'ing
action in ditficult tarr found 1n the no.....heaat ...: portim of ttw
Is1
A ch t. oo1ng il;r and"'!gN! e total ene pri."""re l>! war, dead
and .<WIlled, un:raft, SWUI, .,d tank> :'Oot.ed b7 tho C..- see d t
otticer IU1 AU. to haftJ' -to-Ut.-.1n. rec<r or Co,.. .,..,. c:uual.
tie.. Sine. these r1f;l.u'e1 ...,. cbt&1red !rca spot -. .. of IUbar e
unita. the t1 ..... not l>!l1cial.
TIW a D.1rce. or CCIIlba\. Int.elligmCl In!OIll laD.ere f'Kraa , 1ncludLn
the NaY7, .ur, al'lS higher, lowl!I", adj-=:el1. :\elold! caM&nd, and radio
im.crcept. Ca'Ftured doClll nts. p-isooe:r Ji of .. ar, 1nd1'Y ob_" t.ion,
and ci'01l5&o intoneera pro.. r.ral.uabl.l,
RWT1lC CF S
All _.sa&.. ceind 1n the Camat lnt.e II erc e sect1eu were .1Jrst
4D&II.1oed by the orflcer n dl.it7ho in on the _u .itael! the
etion to be takeuj thJ.t. 13, wbeU.,r it. .tDald go the Q&tt.l. order, Situat.ion
.... , Work sheet, .tUe, or be .a1.rated t.o h:1.h. lo,.-,r, a." adjacent. units ..
or 3'taft Sections. Spot asamination in t.he fa-mot ra:tio or
tel one .as llIOdo 1 .La!y or 1. it re cpir:l.n,' proJl1pt act1on..
Rout ino d em1nauon requiring rtprodueUon, as p"is oMr of war art.,
.... by the Admlniotr","lw !>-3action.
.t JOlI1'IlO1 __ apt, 1Ib:l.ch included tho e1ispo.i tiClll l>! acti... tal<Bn
011 ..... 1J>d:1Y1dDal -..p. IIltel.l.1pooa _ (ISUII) tar
pnoodlnc 2b-oboar pai.od ..... prepared at 16008 cIa1l7, eo diftct.d bJ
h1&bH bNdquartere. Copi.. ot _ lSUIIS act ell eallord1nato lID1t
!o rep1u' IS1lIIS, 11. .... __&1 poll...,. to II8Ild 040
eli opot NpOl"ta nvy aU hooro.
m. COM BAT INTELLIGENCE
Frier w D daT ell .ttort..... cI1rec:ted u-zod the eau.ct1OII ad...-.u._
tloll of ell 1Dtell1pnoe iDtonat.1011 ooocerul:og 'ICD.T. aD4 d1et:r:1but1oD of
th1. iDtOlat.1011 in d1cIIot t.,.. to all ...-pomut UDit... .
Onrl.op 1D oolar, 011 tr-""t. acetoto, obDw1nc tcra1n, roo4a, n1lroodo.
ad d1opoo1t1oa ot _ tJooopo, ...... pnporod tor .... of tho I'1...m start ad
tor pre.at1.Dl ._w. of tho e_ e1taatioll in br1a."1."1 tho nrloao -....
......
lIeliat of az.I1n& beacbe. tor ...... apec1fic -... torce .......
de...." aD4 .-tt_ to the UDit. c:ot>oermd. Qle terra1JI 80dal ot oart.1:ra is
1IIDd to tile .ll81e or 1,100,000, _. _do cIarl.nc the pbue, aD4 th1. __
el we -..d w1tA the Coobat Section. It ...... tOUDd 1malualil. tor aD <mI!'8ll
of plumed OJlC'l'tiooa, aD4 pemit_ 'I11111.1bat.1011 of __ c:opabU1t.1
trooo a terra1JI etaDdpoiDt.
rinv plann:'n'" orerotional hase, 2 pl lIS ard F.abl ... c.sU.ons 1
oon:si st of tr folloltin :
!. Intelligence FICln.
InteJ.U",ence AM8X to :i-.ld lrder. 0_ _
.. G-2 uti Le9 '03. 1,2,3,4,5, t. b l nnex ,io. )
J!. G-_ 1 Info tion uU.tina (.nnex !lo. 4).
.1_ OiJtline of Intelligenee Info tion - "!Jl de Book"
(Table of "Qnl.ent. only)( 1\.0"" 5).
oppl:QlClaotol;r D a1JIn.o 10 tbe 8'lIpJll1oo, equ1poent, &JId. p.raoanel ..... d1
'I1dod into tMM pute, two of 1Ib:l.cb ...... lDade<l on _ .....t. boadqnl>rterll ob1p.
...nac w1tA eoAJl1t torce. One UDit mftCI on to BIZIIIlTII end oabeclnlod
tar ClII tho D plne 8 COIm'.
lDit1oll:1. it """ to operate w. lIOct.1on in 1... c..biI>ocI Jb'. ,
0perat10Jl0 _, headquartera a!I1p. L1II1.Wd apace, """""', _
S1JIca"'" &JId. Jb' ...... cb1. .a;,. ClClI><l&nIed w1tA operotiono
dIIr'1JII tId.. traIle1tloll jC'iod, the ca.bat section wu DOt phpicolly P ill
eo.b1ned Opc'atiOllll _ prior to D do.
OPIUrIll U SICD.T
llDtU __ on D pl 2. tbe ...,t1... op8II'aWd w1th 1JI.sutt1c1am
cine to tho UJo1Wd of G-2 JlG"lOIlIlOl 1Ib:l.ch coul be tranapartod
witA tho ....w.t t ........ Opc'at.10Dl1 ...... em a 2l...- a dq bUla, &JId. d1
'11s1DG of ...opoam.b1llU- dIIr1ng thi. peI'1od .....
2 om-. on St.7. o1tut.1on Pf (l..!lcll>otlng IlIIpO pt ap to
cmta1de tar ..-.aJ. intonoationJ, oDd rto.
2 t7P1eto on joartlOl end wor1<
1 etatt ........... on batU. order IIlIp and tila syota.

N. BATTLE ORDER
An o.......ll pj..cttlft 0
e.u-ted. IIIIIIller of
:m:sber or = l>nd c
Y. PHOTO INTELLIGENCE
C-2
unit to repcrt on elleY
the oparat.ioo I..r- u follaul:
eal)
135
6.5J
3.
n

o
130
tileR' nown
" on the
.... l1.lJ'distributed
elSe!, to to Ivtsion.!l
to
:J ,100 prints d.
,""ct.on. In .'dition to tI: Ir
t.O :::omaissan:e 3quadron,
tor A
Fhoto I<> i es o(
ed -en printed. d
ad ce !.m.o I".e c .
Pr.l.OT t J,..1OS.I all phoLo int.e retallon wa. carried 0".Jt. b1 i-tt.
r 1ft enth A. v roup. ;:.eFOrta of' dere I, .t.c ... forwarc1ed to
.:H!VenLr.
en I.. ,& c'" tf"QCI .1.?f1.'f. concl.!!ti. to d. en
oCficer photo lntel"Freters, t. plo1.ten, two were
to ,:,evcr.th of the!.. L"1terpNter8 were placed on det.achttd 1\00.
5enic., ODe Ath each Co rt.:: Div son..m lnd.er {orad the hq.
A:"'!I3' ?bDto IrIte:;:retation .Jetac_nt.
Sorties ..ere 1nt.arpretea Q8.lly &8 Nedved and lnterpE";.'(..a:t1on reporte
w""" i ..ued . 1nni'" J June. .ho.. report. d..cribed in de"au all
'-enee5 J inci d.i ene:. to rle" 5, a1nerltlds, nt -tank dit.ch I,
barr.cl<S, etc. }, total ! lil reporu "a l ..ulOl1 bot""on ':3.l1ne nd ll-ciq.
Sp<cial air!i.ld ..ere ia'lIOd an tho airport, in the 3e""nth
Arr;t area. Detauad d",,:r tions .er "" n( :he l'1'orts includinr.
to dtl!!en.-s, typ. of I.1r-:ra.tt., '1 tb !:ratersJ -etc.
and
un .l:JC& do w1:t.h t.he pilato sect.lo ,. ce:1t
aiI1>Ort
t,
he
e printed by (.dUtla. sV1l.1.l
prior to D day aU collat on
blo to r;roul'.
The (irst edition" pr-inted on 19 1Ia. 10 :muty (200
copies), and overpr1rted 1nIOMI&tion fU",,"lJOd by II'!. ?ieteent
8l1ition s for plonn1ng use onlJr.
The second ed..LUon w !! prir.ted on 20 Jun@, the Photo rnt.erpret. ticn
section of Rq. se""nth An:z;y rumishing the for the ps of
sev-onth AI"lI\Y area. collated ""l'S of t ares adjacent to the 50 ..,th
A)TSif area u.s !'urni.ehed by Hq. rUteenth.\ 7 0uP. U. S. lUlltuy
a:;mboI. werC! \lsed. 1,900 copies .ere prin ed o! each r ..
(Wi :>-10 tl>t 66tn '1'Opoff oo1c&1 COlllpiUlJ located at J,ri.e e.irf eld
"aa .,ade aV&1labla (or the purpo.e of intin- collated mar. Baa saps
of the eot.1re _e.stero partion 0 thil 1olar. pr-epared and overIa 8
were kept up to c1At.C! Cor .1J8ediate print
on D the ropo phical start.ed ",r r' - the collation
of tho< Sevwntb A are lops ""re pr1rted ani distri ted fro II July
unt 120 Jul
FieH
were de..
au..U i.bution -.s copi of e
CO!') of collation mp ard OlIi'rla.
AMoUes 9 and 10..
h 1r.:: p5 ted.re tt eh
Pre1..1a1nary 8eaeh ...vtL.:.U4tlons Il'9re by
G-2 Infon:utlon 1.etln 10.... ttl 3 sup 1 nts.
'TI. AIR LIAISON AND OBSERVATION
C-3