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Aerospace Power Journal - Summer 2000

CombatSearch andRescue
ALongerLook
COL DARREL WHITCOMB, USAFR, RETIRED
Editorial Abstract: Several other authors in thisissueaddressmilitarycasualtiesingen eral;inthisarticleColonelWhitcomblooksat a casualty status unique to combat avia tionthat of the downed aircrew. In this sense,casualtyaversionrelatestoourstrong desiretorescueourpeopleandourhistorical practiceofdoingso.AsWhitcombpointsout, however, an inverse relationship appears to existbetweenthelevelofeffortdirectedtoward CSARandthelevelofmilitaryandpolitical effort/commitment involved in any particu lar conflict. Important to the issue is recog nizingthatCSARiscombat,notjustrescue. Commitmenttobringbackourpeopleispart oftheAmericansoldiersarticleoffaiththat willingnesstoacceptriskortosacrificeisbased ontwothings:(1)suchsacrificeisnotneedlessand(2)thenationwillmakeeveryeffort withinmissiondictatestorecoveritssoldiers from enemy territory. This keeps Americans fightingforeachotherandourwayoflife.

S THE RECENT events in Serbia indicate,combatsearchandrescue (CSAR)isstillwithus.Thesuccess fulrescuesofthepilotofanF-117 known as Vega 31and of Hammer 34, the pilotofanF-16,makeforexcitingstories,but littlehasappearedinprintonthesetwoop erations. No doubt, this is prudent because operationscontinuein-theater.Butwhenthe stories are eventually told, readers will find muchincommonwithSARsorCSARsfrom earlier conflicts. These accounts will take
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their place in the rich lore of rescue opera tions, which go back to the beginning of mannedflightandhonorthemenwhogoin harmswaysothatothersmaylive. From a historical perspective, these res cuesseemtofitintolong-termpatternsfrom whichwecandrawlessonstoapplytofuture operations. Winston Churchill, a great stu dentofhistory,oncesaid,Thefartherbackward you can look, the farther forward you can see.1 Aviation history abounds with sto ries of rescue. Perhaps some of that history

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wouldproveusefultostimulatediscussionor debate to help us take a longer look at the subject.Thereasonwedothisseemsobvious. Afterall,thoseareourtroopsoutthere,andwe willtrytogetthemoutiftheygodown.But perhapstheanswerisnotquitethatsimple perhapsthereisquiteabitmoretothiscom plexissue. Inanymilitaryoperation,wemustbepreparedforCSARforanycrew,group,orteam thatmaybeisolatedbehindenemylines.This means being able to rescue people from a single-seat fighter, an airborne warning and controlsystemaircraft,aspecialforcesteam, or myriad other sources. (The three US sol diersnotrescuedfromSerbiaduringtherecent Balkans conflicts were on a routine groundpatrol.) The first and perhaps main point is that CSARingiswarfightingpureandsimple.We cannotthinkofitseparately.CSARingisjust anotherformofbattle.Inthatvein,theprin ciples of war do apply. There will be a time andplaceformassoreconomyofforceand perhapsdeceptionoperations,dependingon the situation. Unity of command will be es sentialtofocustheeffort.Securitywillbecrit ical because of the need for timely, focused actionandtherealizationthattheenemywill trytocounterouractions.Wemustcarefully guardcriticalinformationandintelligence. In a theater of operations in which many actions,battles,andperhapscampaignstake place,CSARswilladdtothefogandchaosof war.Asopposedtoothertypesofoperations whose objectives are not clear or easily un derstood,however,aCSARsobjectiveisclear, understoodbyall,andeasilymeasurable.Fur thermore,itappealstousonahumanlevel perhapsadangeroustraitbecauseitcandetract from other efforts. That is, we find it easytodivertresourcesmeantforotherbat tlestoaCSAReffort.Arewewillingtorescue somebody regardless of the cost? Seemingly, themantratodayisthatthewarwillstopfor CSAR.Isthisprudent? ItgoeswithoutsayingthatCSARdemands absoluteprecision.Inalargertheaterofop erationswithsomanyotherthingsgoingon,

we literally have to reach into realms of or ganized chaos to pluck a specific person or personsout. Experienceshowsthatwhenanaircrewis down,timeworksagainstus.Ourenemiesre alizethatwewillmaketheeffortandwilltry torescueourpersonnel.Wemustassumethat they know of our efforts and probably have someknowledgeofourspecifictechniques.A recent test at Nellis AFB, Nevada, suggested thataftertwohoursontheground,theodds begintoturnagainstasuccessfulrescue.2 CSARing seems to involve two paths of knowledge. For lack of better terms, the la belslogos orlogicandpathos oremotionwill suffice.Bothhavearoleinthisbusiness.

Logos
Looking at all of this historically, the ac complishment of five things dramatically increasesthechancesofasuccessfulrescue.Of course, no one can guarantee success because,afterall,weareoperatingintherealm ofconflictandchance. First is the matter of positionwe have to find the survivor(s). This sounds very basic, but that is the point. It is absolutely funda mental to the whole process. As a recent CSAR report stated, Accurate coordinates arecriticaltorecovery3 (rememberthatthe S inCSARstandsforsearch).Intheolddaysof SoutheastAsia,weusedtosendinapackof A-1stosweeptheareatofindthesurvivor(s). Today, with sophisticated radars, guns, and missiles, this is becoming harder to do. We shouldbepreparedtouseallavailableassets, both theater and national, to locate the sur vivor(s). This is critical because we cannot begintoproperlymarshalourforcesforare covery until we know their whereabouts. We should also emphasize that we must prevent the enemy from discovering the location of thesurvivor(s). Positionappearstohavevalueonfourlevels: 1. Strategically. Thelocationofthesurvivor in relation to national boundaries can have a substantial impact on the rela-

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During World WarII,airmenwererescuedby USNavy submarines.

tionship of nations, rules of engage ment,andsuchmattersastheneedfor overflight privileges. In Southeast Asia, we had different operation rules for South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, andCambodia.Welaunchednorescue operationsforcrewslostoverChina. 2. Operationally. Wemustdeterminewhether thelocationofthesurvivor(s)willaffect anything else going on in the larger conflict.WillafocusedCSARoperation inaparticulartimeandplaceinterfere with some other operation, or can we conceivablyusesomeaspectofthatop erationtoaidtherecoveryeffort? 3. Tactically. Whatdowehavetodotoget into the immediate area of the sur vivor(s) to effect the recovery? This requires classic intelligence preparation to understand what we must do to counter enemy attempts to defeat the CSAReffort. 4. Precision. Whatdowehavetodotofacil itate the actual linkup of the survivor andhisrecoveryvehiclethemostcrit ical event in the entire process? Once wecommittherecoveryvehicle,itmust expeditiously maneuver to and link up withthesurvivor(s)andthendepartthe area. Second, we must establish communication with the survivor(s) and those agencies nec

essarytoplan,coordinate,command,andex ecutetherescue.TheKoreanWarshowedus that we needed to equip our downed crews with survival radios.4 Preplanning can prove very effective here in determining how dis parateunitsandelementscancometogether toexecuteashort-noticeCSAR.Theairtask ingorderandspecialinstructionscanbevery usefulinthisregard,aswellascommonterms understoodbyall.Conversely,codewordsun derstoodbyoneelementoftheCSAReffort but not by others can sow confusion at ab solutelythewrongmoment.Doweallagree on the meaning of bingo? How many fighter guys know what a spider route is? How many helicopterdriversknowwhatmagnum means? Moreover, during the intensity of a CSAR event, we must exclude those who cannot contribute. Useless information or chatter is justcommunicationjamming. Third,wehavetohavearecoveryvehicle. Theydonotjusthappen.Wealwaysthinkof thebigrescuehelicopterswecallthemJolly Greensasthevehicles,butwemustthinkbe yondthat.Navalvehicles,groundvehicles,or maybeevenagroundteamcandothejob.It does not matter what patch that vehicle wears. The vehicle is not importantthe re coveryis. Fourth,weneedtohavesmartsurvivors. As arecentCSARreportstates,Survivoractions areanintegralpartofthesuccessorfailureof any rescue operation.5 The history of suc cessfulrescuesresoundswiththistheme. Fifth,wemustbeabletoestablisharound thatsurvivorthenecessarylevelofsituational superiority sothatwecancontroleventslong enoughtoeffecttherecovery.Oneoftheles sons learned from the Korean War was that airsuperiorityiscriticaltothesuccessfulop erationofarecoverytaskforce.6 Butthenec essarysuperiorityisreallythreedimensional, forsomeofthemostseriousthreatstodayare ground based. This makes CSARs unique, separating them from SARs. The first four pointsactuallyapplytojustaboutanyrescue operation. But again, in combat the enemy willopposeouractions.Wemustimposeour will.Wemustcontroleventslongenoughin

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thesurvivorsareatoallowtherecoveryvehi cletomaketherecoveryanddepart.Thisis battle. This is war fighting. We now turn to several historical examples from which we canlearn.
WorldWarII

pilot. But the sun had gone down, and the current swept the Albatross toward highpowerlinesacrosstheriver.TohelpNajarian see the wires, the Mustang pilots turned on theirlandinglightsandflewjustabovehimas hemadehistakeoffunderthewires.9
VietnamWar

InFebruary1944,acarriertaskforceattacked theJapaneseforcesatTrukAtoll.Duringthe battle, a Grumman F-6F from the USS Essex wasshotdown.Thepilotditchedhisaircraft in the lagoon surrounding the islands. The flightleaderwatchedhimgodown,fixedhis position,andsawthathewasaliveandinhis raft. He then called back to the Essex, requesting air-sea rescue. Another ship in the task force, the USS Baltimore, launched an OS2U-3Kingfisheramphibiousaircrafttorecover the pilot. Before the aircraft could ar rive, however, the flight leader spotted a Japanese destroyer entering the lagoon, ap parentlytocapturethepilot.Heledrepeated attacksontheship,drivingitawayandmain tainingenoughsituationalsuperiorityaround thesurvivortofacilitatehisrescue.7 Thispro cedure repeated itself two months later but with a twist. As the task force once again pounded Truk, more Navy aircraft went down. In one incident, another Kingfisher, this time from the battleship North Carolina, recovered 10 downed airmen. Too heavy to takeoffwithsurvivorsliterallycampedouton the wing, once again Navy fighters covered theKingfisherasittaxiedouttoopenwater andtransferredsurvivorstoawaitingsubma rine,theUSSTang.8
KoreanWar

In June 1951, a pilot ditched his flak-damaged Mustang fighter in the Taedong River, 50 miles northeast of Pyongyang. His flight mates saw him swimming in the river and called for a rescue aircraft. An SA-16 Alba trossflownby1stLtJohnNajarianresponded andflewtotheirposition.ThecoveringMus tangs,joinedbyotherflights,suppressedthe enemy guns along both shores as Najarian landedinthecoldwatersandpickedupthe

AnumberofstoriesaboutSoutheastAsiadeserve telling, one of them being Oyster 01 Bravo. In May 1972, an F-4 was shot down northwest of Hanoi. The weapon system op erator (WSO), 1st Lt Roger Locher, evaded the enemy for 23 days before he established communicationwithfriendlyforces,whopos itivelylocatedhim.Rescueforcesinthethe ater responded, but enemy forces initially drovethemoff.GenJohnVogt,commander ofSeventhAirForce,directedthattheentire nextdayseffortbededicatedtoestablishing enough local superiority to support the res cue operation. Those efforts proved successful.10 Bat 21 Bravo/Nail 38 Bravo, a huge SAR, the largest of the war, took place in April 1972.Ourforcesestablishedcommunications withthesurvivorsandeasilylocatedthem.Al though we had rescue forces available, we couldnotestablishlocalsuperioritysothata rescue helicopter could recover them. Indeed,theenemyshotdownseveralintheef fort.Asmallgroundteam,usingstealthand very precise fire support, recovered the two men.11 Anunsuccessfulrecovery,Owl14Bravo,is nevertheless instructive. Another F-4 went down over North Vietnam in May 1972, just north of the demilitarized zone. Only one survivor (Capt Ray Bean, the WSO) made radio contact with covering forces, who lo cated him. Rescue assets were available, but thick enemy antiaircraft forces covered the area.Beforewecouldsuppressthemenough forahelicoptertoenterthearea,theenemy captured Bean, releasing him from Hanoi a yearlater.CaptainBeansaidthattheenemy forcesweresoheavythattheywouldhavede stroyedanyhelicopterenteringthearea.12

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GulfWar

On21January1991,anIraqimissiledowned Slate46,anF-14.Weestablishedintermittent radiocontactwiththepilotbuthadonlygen eral knowledge of his position. The enemy capturedtheradio-interceptofficer.AnMH53 piloted by Capt Tom Trask proceeded deepintoIraq.Inthegeneralvicinityofthe survivor,aflightoftwoA-10sjoinedtheheli copter. They managed to locate the survivor and vector the helicopter crew to him. But enemy troops were in the area, including some trucks obviously homing in on the pilots radio transmissions. Capt Paul Johnson, the lead A-10 pilot, attacked the enemy forces and vehiclesonly 150 meters away from the Navy pilotand facilitated his recovery.13
BalkansWar

Also useful is knowledge of the failed recov ery of Ebro 33, a French Mirage crew shot downinlateAugustof1995duringtheNorth AtlanticTreatyOrganizations(NATO)Oper ationDeliberateForce.Weneverestablished radio contact with the survivors and never determinedtheirlocation.Althoughwehad rescueforcesavailableandpossiblyhadsuf ficientforcetoestablishenoughlocalsupe riority, we never recovered them; in fact, friendlyforceswereinjuredinthesearchefforts.14

Pathos
We now turn to pathos, the emotional whyofallthis.Again,theanswerseemsob vious. The survivor is one of ours, and we neverleaveourpeoplebehind. But dont combat aviators accept the risk of loss and death in battle? Dont they get extraflightpaytoaccepttherisk?AsoneUS AirForcegeneralsaidin1972,attheheight of the Bat 21 Bravo SAR, As airmen or sol diers or sailors, we should expect that there aretimeswhenasoneperson,wemustbesac rificedfortheoverall[mission].15

Yes, we do accept the risk but have never easily accepted the view that our people are easilyexpendableespeciallyinawarwedo notseemintentonwinning.So,whysomuch foroneman?Severalreasonscometomind. First is human nature. Rescue stories are someofourmostheroic.Peoplealwayscome forwardtohelpthoseindistress.Thefactthat the enemy contests CSARs only causes us to redoubleourefforts.16 Secondisthefactthatwecan.Wehavede veloped the hardware to recover anybody fromjustaboutanywhere.Additionally,wedo nothesitatetouseanytechnologyifitbene fitstheprocess.Wehavealsolearnedhowto organize our forces to achieve the necessary levelofsituationalsuperiorityforourrescue forces to operate.17 For Joint Vision 2010 junkies,wecallthatdominantmaneuverand precisionengagement. Third, rescue operations involve a morale factor for our troops, something Gen Hap Arnold noted in World War II. He directed the initial establishment of rescue forces to recover downed airmen, as had the British and Germans.18 Part of his thinking was, in fact, pragmatic, for it takes an incredible numberofresourcestoproducetrainedcrew members.19 Thisisnottosaythatinhuman isticterms,theyaremorevaluablethanother Americansjust that they are harder to replace. Gen Hugh Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addressed this recently whenhesaid,Bypledgingtoputeveryeffort into recovering our highly trained [person nel], we send a powerful signal about their importance and help sustain their spirit underthestressofcombat.20 Fourth, rescuing our people denies the enemy a valuable resource. Intelligence and propagandavaluearetheobviousissueshere. Consider Mogadishu or the shootdown of Capt Scott OGrady by the Bosnian Serbs.21 During the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein tried to exploit captured aircrews. No doubt, he will do so again if we lose any personnel in OperationNorthernorSouthernWatch. Finally, a covenant or bond binds the brotherhood of airmen. Again, General

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Specializedrecovery vehiclessuchasthisSB-17aidedinsavingdownedaircrews.

Arnold noted that aircrews performed their missionsmoreefficientlywiththeexpectation thatiftheywentdown,wewouldmakeevery efforttorescuethem.22 Groundwarriorscallthisbondunitcohe sion,notingthat,overtime,soldiersmustbe lieve in what they do and must believe that thecausetheyfightforisworththesacrifice. Ifnot,theywillfightforeachother.Stephen Ambrose has eloquently documented this phenomenonamongAmericanfightingmen inWorldWarII.23 Ourcovenantisnotsomuchunitspecific asitisspecifictothebreedthebreedofairmen. It is the common thread stretching fromthebeginningofflighttotherecentres cuesinSerbia.Whatisthatbond?Itissimple: ifatallpossible,wewillnotleaveourdowned fellowsbehindwithoutmakinganattemptto getthemout. Thisdoesnotmeanthatweareunrealistic about war. Airmen understand, accept, and expectthatwewilltakelosses.Butwedonot give up those losses lightly. We expect that whateverweareaskedtodoisworththesac rificethat we will not be wasted for some specioustaskormissionandthatourtroops shallnothavediedinvain,asPresidentLin colnsaidatGettysburg.

ButIwouldsuggestthatourpropensityto prosecute CSAR missions exists on a sliding scaleinverselyproportionaltothelevelofef fortwearewillingtoexpendinanyconflict. Inotherwords,inatotalconflictinwhichna tional existence is at stake, we will pay any price.IclearlyrememberasanA-10pilotin the1980slisteningtoaNATOgeneraltelling usthathewouldlitterthewestbankofthe ElbeRiverwithA-10stokeeptheWarsawPact forces from crossing. I was horrified by his pronouncement until I thought through what that statement meant. Such an event wouldhavebeenatotalconflict,andthesur vivalofournationwouldhavebeenatstake. Theintensityofoperationswouldhaveforced such sacrifices upon us. Our nation has ac ceptedsuchlossesintimeofcrisis,suchasthe CivilWarorWorldWarII.Butinlimitedcon flicts, we will be prepared to pay only a lim itedprice.Why? Iamremindedoftheoldsawthatmilitary forces do not fight warsnations do. And they fight for political objectives. Carl von Clausewitz explained all this many years ago whenhesaid,Thepoliticalobjectisagoal, warisameansofreachingit,andmeanscan never be considered in isolation of the pur pose.24 Butthatgoalorobjectivedetermines

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the wars value, against which the public as sessesthecostsofthewarindeterminingits support for the war. The public measures these costs in terms of taxes and, more im portantly, risks to the lives of its sons and daughters. Again, Clausewitz explained this bysaying,Oncetheexpenditureofeffortex ceedsthepoliticalobject,theobjectmustbe renounced.25 Inatotalconflict,then,CSARswillbelim itedbut not so in limited engagements, in whichweprepareourselvestopayonlyalim ited price to achieve a limited objective. Today,itseemsthatairpoweristheweaponof choice for doing so. Indeed, our political leaders evidently feelbased on what they hearfromtheirconstituentsthatthepublic haslittletoleranceforloss.Thefactthataircrewsarenowabouttheonlyonesputatrisk puts a real premium on CSAR, accentuating thecovenant.Isawthishappenfirsthandasa younglieutenantinSoutheastAsia. About1969,mynationhadbeguntoturn against the war. The object, whatever it was, was not worth the price. America wanted to withdraw. President Nixon called it peace withhonor.ButIclearlyrememberhearing mysquadroncommandersaytous,Thereis nothing over here worth an American life except another American.26 That gave us causeforreflection,consideringthefactthat wewerefightingalongsideourallies. By 1972, after eight years of war, we were stillfightingtherewithoutanyrealdedication toacauseexceptwithdrawal.Likewarriors from earlier wars, we fought for each other. We kept that article of faith that if we went down,theJollywouldcomeforus.Infact,the rescuehelicopterbecamethesymbolofthat bondorcovenant.Totherescuecrews,itwas acallsign.Totherestofus,itwasaprayer.To many,itwassalvation.Itwasthebond. Now, we airmen have not been too good aboutrecordingthesefeelings.Butconsider thewordsofaUSNavyPTboatsailorwhoex plored this subject in a different way. When discussingafailedattempttorecoverbuddies lost in a night battle, he said, The gain in goingbackisinthemessageitsends.Evenif

youre seen to disappear in a ball of flame, your friends will come back looking for you.27 Again, General Shelton recently accentu ated this determination when he said, This bondamongwarriorspromisesnottoleavea comradebehindonthebattlefield,apromise that extends to a shipmate at sea or a wingmanwhogetshitdeepbehindenemylines.28 Butthereisdangerhere.Wemustnotdo thisattheexpenseofourgroundforces.We mustperformrescueoperationsaspartofthe larger battle and must do so in proportion. Where does the line break? I dont know. Again, Churchill gives us a useful vector. In 1940 the German armies overran the coun tries of Western Europe, driving the British armybackintoanenclaveattheFrenchport ofDunkerque.TheRoyalNavyandindividual Britishseamenintheirprivateboatsralliedto bringalargeportionofthatforcesafelyback to Great Britainwithout equipment or or ganization. After a spring of constant bad newsandhumiliation,theBritishpeoplecel ebrated this event as a major victory. But Churchill stood in Parliament to remind themthatwemustbeverycarefulnottoassign to this deliverance the attributes of vic tory.Warsarenotwonbyevacuations.29 One can also argue that they are not won by CSARs.Buttheabilityandpropensitytoexe cuteCSARsarekeytotheaircrewmorale,es pecially iftheyaretheonlyonesatrisk.Gen eral Vogt understood this when he sent that large task force up near Hanoi to rescue RogerLocherin1972. Wemustneverrescueourpeopleattheex pense of our allies. In coalition warfare, the relationshipbetweenalliesisacenterofgrav ity that a skillful enemy can exploit. Hitler tried to do this to the grand coalition in World War II. The North Vietnamese were very skillful in driving a wedge between us Americans and our South Vietnamese allies. Wemustmakesurethatwearewillingtodo CSARforallouralliesaswedidforEbro33. So that is the pathos. These are powerful forces, and we are occasionally reminded of theminsmallbutverysignificantways.InNo-

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vember1997,severalhundredofusgathered at Arlington National Cemetery to bury the crewofJollyGreen67,themenlostintheBat 21Bravorescueeffortin1972.Itwasabeau tiful, memorable day. One could not help noticingalltheveteransofthaterawhogath eredtowelcomehomethecrew.Indeed,the blue suits of the highly decorated vets cov ered the site and part of an adjoining hill. Two MH-53 helicopters, descendents of the Jolly Greens, made a magnificent flyby. Lt Gen Dave Vesely, representing the chief of staffoftheAirForce,said,Allofuswhohave flowninharmswayknowwhatadifferenceit makes to believe that every effort will be madetorescueusifwearedown....Today whilewecountthehighcost,weshouldalso countourselvesfortunatetobethebenefici aries of these, the best of menmen who gavetheirlivessothatothersmaylive.30 Astheceremonyended,manyofthenow aged veterans of those times, missions, and battleswentuptothecoffin.Somelaidtheir
Notes 1. James C. Humes, Churchill: Speaker of the Century (New York:ScarboroughBooks,1982),269. 2. ThisdatacomesfromtheJointCSARJointTestandEval uationrecentlycompletedatNellisAFB,Nevada. 3. JointServicesS.E.R.E.Agency,F-16LessonsLearned:Intro duction, 3December1999,17.(Secret)Informationextractedis unclassified. 4. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 19501953(Washington,D.C.:OfficeofAirForceHistory,1983), 583. 5. F-16LessonsLearned, 14.(Secret)Informationextractedis unclassified. 6. Futrell,583. 7. Robert J. Cressman, Rescue from Truk Lagoon, The Hook, Winter1993,24. 8. Battleship NorthCarolina:KingfisherTrukRescue,30April 1944; on-line, Internet, 16 March 2000, available from http://www.battleshipnc.com/kingfisher_truk_rescue.htm. 9. Futrell,57879. 10. Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price, Man on the Run, Air PowerHistory, Fall1989,45. 11. See Darrel Whitcomb, The Rescue of Bat 21 (Annapolis, Md.:USNavalInstitutePress,1998). 12. Ibid.,152. 13. Lt Col Tom Trask, interviewed by author, 17 February 2000. 14. AdmLeightonSmith,pressconference,Naples,Italy,22 September1995;on-line,Internet,4January2000, availablefrom http://www.hri.org/news/misc/misc-news/95-09-22.misc.html. 15. Earl Tilford, Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia: 19611975 (Washington,D.C.:OfficeofAirForceHistory,1980), 119.

In June 1951, an SA-16 made a dramatic rescue in NorthKorea.

maroonberetsonitorplacedrosesorstick ers.Somesalutedorjusttouchedit.Inallof that there was a message. Those still proud veteranshadcomefortheJollybecausethey remembered a time when, if necessary, the Jollywouldhavecomeforthem. That is the covenant, the bond that binds thisbrotherhoodofairmen.Itispalpable,and, aswesawagaininSerbia,itistimeless.

16. JointPublication3-50.21,JointTactics,Techniques,andPro ceduresforCombatSearchandRescue,23March1998,I-1. 17. Ibid.,II-12. 18. Tilford,57. 19. John Warden, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington,D.C.:NationalDefenseUniversityPress,1988),49. 20. Gen Hugh Shelton, remarks at the Department of De fensePersonnelRecoveryConference,FortBelvoir,Va.,27Octo ber 1999; on-line, Internet, 3 November 1999, available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/#NewsArticles. 21. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.6, Combat Search and Rescue,30September1998,4. 22. Tilford,3. 23. See,forexample,BandofBrothers:ECompany,506thRegi ment,101stAirbornefromNormandytoHitlersEaglesNest(NewYork: SimonandSchuster,1992). 24. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,1976),87. 25. Ibid.,92. 26. Whitcomb,142. 27. Dick Keresey, Farthest Forward, American Heritage, July/August1998,60. 28. Sheltonremarks. 29. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War (New York: TimeInc.,1950),72. 30. Jolly Green Funeral Ceremony, Headquarters United States Air Force TV Center, 11th Communications Squadron, Pentagon,Washington,D.C.,25November1997.