Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
2011-12
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PRO ........................................................................................................................ 7
DIRECT ELECTION GOOD: GENERAL .............................................................................................................................. 7 DIRECT ELECTION GOOD: DECREASES LIKELIHOOD FOR A RECOUNT............................................................................ 8 DIRECT ELECTION GOOD: INCREASES VOTER TURNOUT ............................................................................................... 9 DIRECT ELECTION GOOD: EMPOWERS THIRD PARTIES ............................................................................................... 11 NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE COMPACT DESCRIBED ..................................................................................................... 12 NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE COMPACT GOOD ............................................................................................................. 15 NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE COMPACT IS DIRECT ELECTION ........................................................................................ 17 NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE PLAN: SHOULDNT USE IT; MUST END THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ....... 18 ELECTORAL COLLEGE BAD: SYSTEM IS ANTIQUATED .................................................................................................. 19 ELECTORAL COLLEGE BAD: DOOMSDAY SCENARIO .................................................................................................... 22 ELECTORAL COLLEGE BAD: MISREPRESENTS THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE...................................................................... 24 ELECTORAL COLLEGE BAD: DIMINISHES THE IMPACT OF SOME VOTES ...................................................................... 27 ELECTORAL COLLEGE BAD: DIMINISHES IMPACT OF THIRD PARTIES .......................................................................... 31 ELECTORAL COLLEGE BAD: INCREASES FRAUD ........................................................................................................... 32 ELECTORAL COLLEGE BAD: FOCUSES PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ON A HANDFUL OF STATES ..................................... 33 ELECTORAL COLLEGE BAD: BROAD SUPPORT EXISTS FOR ENDING IT ......................................................................... 37 ELECTORAL COLLEGE BAD: THE ELECTOR PROCESS IS BADLY DAMAGED ................................................................... 39 ELECTORAL COLLEGE BAD: FAITHLESS ELECTORS BAD ................................................................................................ 41 A/T: FOUNDING FATHERS SUPPORT THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE .................................................................................. 42 A/T: STATE/LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND FEDERALISM ARGUMENTS ........................................................................... 43 A/T: ELECTORAL COLLEGE PROJECTS MINORITIES/CREATE COALITIONS .................................................................... 45 A/T: ELECTORAL COLLEGE MEANS MODERATION/DECREASE OF POLARIZATION ...................................................... 46 A/T: ELECTORAL COLLEGE MEANS LEGITIMACY/MAGNIFICATION ............................................................................. 48 A/T: MINOR REFORMS THAT WOULD FIX THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE .......................................................................... 50 A/T: X OR Y STATE IS IGNORED BY CANDIDATES .......................................................................................................... 51 A/T: THE CONSTITUTION MANDATES THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE ................................................................................ 52 A/T: FRAMER OF THE CONSTITUTION WANTED THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE ................................................................ 53
CON ...................................................................................................................... 54
SHOULDNT DEFINE DEMOCRACY AS SIMPLY 50% + 1 ................................................................................................ 54 ELECTORAL COLLEGE GOOD: FOUNDING FATHERS DIDNT INTEND A DIRECT DEMOCRACY ...................................... 55 ELECTORAL COLLEGE GOOD: GOOD SYSTEM TO DEAL WITH COMPLEX PROBLEMS ................................................... 57 ELECTORAL COLLEGE GOOD: 2008 ELECTION WAS JUST FINE! ................................................................................... 58 ELECTORAL COLLEGE GOOD: HAS ADAPTED WELL OVER TIME ................................................................................... 59 ELECTORAL COLLEGE GOOD: FOCUSES ON STATE ISSUES ........................................................................................... 60 ELECTORAL COLLEGE GOOD: DIMINISHES SECTIONALISM ......................................................................................... 61 ELECTORAL COLLEGE GOOD: FORCES CANDIDATES TO CREATE REASONABLE, DIVERSE MAJORITY .......................... 62 ELECTORAL COLLEGE GOOD: WIDENS THE MARGIN OF VICTORY OF CANDIDATES .................................................... 64 ELECTORAL COLLEGE GOOD: = STABILITY AND MODERATION.................................................................................... 66 ELECTORAL COLLEGE GOOD: CRITICS DONT UNDERSTAND CONSTITUTION/CONCEPT............................................. 69 ELECTORAL COLLEGE GOOD: SUPPORTS TWO-PARTY DEMOCRACY........................................................................... 70 ELECTORAL COLLEGE GOOD: DECREASES VOTER FRAUD ............................................................................................ 71 ELECTORAL COLLEGE GOOD: MUST KEEP FAITHLESS ELECTORS.............................................................................. 72 DIRECT ELECTION BAD: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE ISNT PERFECT, BUT BEATS ALTERNATIVES .................................. 73
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META
THE RESOLUTION
The November 2011 NFL Public Forum topic is: Resolved: Direct popular vote should replace electoral vote in presidential elections.
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PRO
DIRECT ELECTION GOOD: GENERAL
THE UNITED STATES MUST MOVE IMMEDIATELY TO A DIRECT ELECTION PLAN-Raskin '07 [Jamin; Professor of Constitutional Law at American University; Deformed Reform: The cure for the Electoral College that is worse than what ails us; Slate; 24 August 2007; http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2007/08/deformed_reform.html; retrieved 2 October 2011] The current system is arbitrary, accident-prone, and increasingly untenable. On that I can agree with the Republicans who back the California initiative. What I cannot accept is that a more convoluted system, undertaken by a single state for transparently political reasons, is the solution. It is time for the American people to elect the president directly and democratically. Let us give every American incentive to vote in an election in which every vote counts. Let us (finally) agree to stop playing strategic games and let the chips fall where they may with a national popular vote. DIRECT ELECTION HAS SEVERAL BENEFITS-Edwards '04 [George C.; Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University; Why the Electoral College is Bad for America; 2004; Kindle Location 2160] The Automatic, Proportional, District, and National Bonus plans all have limitations as remedies to the problems caused by the electoral college. There remains the system that Americans use to elect every member of Congress, every governor, and virtually every elected official in the country: direct election. Direct election of the president would elect the people's choice by ensuring equal treatment of voters. Counting all votes equally (and making all votes equally valuable to the candidate) would not only strengthen political equality but also provide an incentive for candidates to clarify their stances rather than hedging them to persuade only the undecided in competitive states. Direct election would reduce the power of sectionalism in politics and encourage candidates to focus their campaigns on the entire nation, including racial minorities. It would also reinvigorate party competition and combat voter apathy by giving candidates and parties incentives to turn out voters in states they cannot win as a whole. Naturally, direct election would eliminate all the problems caused by the selection and voting of electors themselves, and aggregating votes nationwide would decrease the incentives for and impact of electoral fraud.
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DIRECT ELECTION WOULD ALLOW FOR EACH VOTE TO BE COUNTED EQUALLY-Robb '08 [Brandon H.; MAKING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE WORK TODAY: THE AGREEMENT AMONG THE STATES TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE; Loyola Law Review; Summer 2008; 54 Loy. L. Rev. 419] Modern presidential campaigns would be far better served by a system where every voter across the country has an equal say in the determination of who leads America. Currently, the winner-take-all approach is woefully inadequate to this task, reducing the presidential election process to a caricature of the kind of debates the country and the American people deserve. n247 The Agreement would eliminate a presidential candidate's ability to either blithely take for granted or callously ignore voters in the vast majority of the country, as they do now. n248 While candidates may still focus much of their strategy on certain large population centers, they would also be forced to compete for the votes of all Americans. For instance, in a close national election, the candidates would have an incentive to work for support in every state, regardless of its population, even though high-population areas would likely see an increase in attention from candidates. While cost-benefit analysis would still be used by presidential campaigns to target their efforts, the Agreement would eliminate the disproportionate power that voters in a handful of states currently enjoy simply because of the close political divides in their states. n249
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NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE PLAN DESCRIBED-Raskin '07 [Jamin; Professor of Constitutional Law at American University; Deformed Reform: The cure for the Electoral College that is worse than what ails us; Slate; 24 August 2007; http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2007/08/deformed_reform.html; retrieved 2 October 2011] Citizens who are truly serious about transforming the Electoral College actually have a sturdy nonpartisan vehicle by which to move us to the kind of popular presidential election that citizens in nearly every other democracy enjoy. We don't need a new partisan trick to "fix" our presidential process. We need only enact the existing obvious solution. The "National Popular Vote" plan, which is on the table in 47 states, has been signed into law in Maryland and had actually passed both houses in California in 2006 before it was vetoed by Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger. It simply calls for an interstate compact among all states to agree to cast their electoral votes for the winner of the national popular vote. It becomes effective and binding when states representing at least 270 electors enter the compact. This is the way we will get to elect presidents as we elect governors and senators: everyone acting together, without games and subterfuge. The plan has the backing of distinguished Republican statesmen like former Utah Sen. Jake Garn, former Minnesota Sen. David Durenberger, former Illinois Rep. John Anderson, former Alabama Rep. John Buchanan, and former California Rep. Tom Campbell, as well as distinguished Democrats like former Indiana Sen. Birch Bayh, and former New York Rep. Tom Downey. It has been endorsed by newspapers from the New York Times and Minneapolis Star-Tribune to the Los Angeles Times and Sacramento Bee. As far as I can tell, the only thing the plan lacks is active support from Republicans in office. Indeed, for some reason, there is a constant undertow of opposition from the party. I know this because when I introduced the plan in the Maryland Senate, I had expressions of enthusiasm from several Republican colleagues, one of whom even voted for it in committee. But when it came to the floor, all of the Republicans voted against it. They claimed that it would hurt small states even though small states that are safely red or bluelike Rhode Island or Montanaare ignored today just like the large ones (such as New York or Texas). They said that we should stick with the handiwork of the Framerseven though the current Electoral College process is distant from the way it was practiced in the 18th century and even though the Constitution clearly empowers the states to appoint electors as we see fit, including on the basis of the national popular vote. On the House side, only one Republican supported the bill. It passed with overwhelming (but not unanimous) Democratic support.
Big Sky Debate Public Forum NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE PLAN DESCRIBED-Dotinga '06 [Randy; A backdoor plan to thwart the electoral college; The Christian Science Monitor; 16 June 2006; http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0616/p01s02-uspo.html; retrieved 2 October 2011]
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Picture it: On election day in some future year, a presidential candidate ends up with the most popular votes but not enough electoral votes to win. It's a repeat of the 2000 election in which one contender, Democrat Al Gore, took the majority of the national popular vote, while the other, Republican George W. Bush, clinched the most electoral college votes and, hence, the presidency. But this time there's a twist: A bunch of states team up and give all their electoral college votes to the nationwide popular-vote winner, regardless of who won the most votes in their state. Then, the candidate who garners the most citizen votes in the country moves into the White House. Legislative houses in Colorado and California have recently approved this plan, known as the National Popular Vote proposal, taking it partway to passage. Other states, too, are exploring the idea of a binding compact among states that would oblige each of them to throw its electoral votes behind the national popular-vote winner. At issue is the nation's presidential election system governed by the electoral college. Established by the US Constitution in 1787, the system has occasionally awarded the presidency to candidates who couldn't muster the most votes nationwide, as happened in 1824, 1876, 1888, and 2000. While an amendment to the Constitution could change or eliminate the electoral college, battleground states and small states would probably oppose any change that would leave them with less influence. Indeed, since the system's inception, numerous efforts to amend it have been defeated. Instead, reformers have turned to the interstate compact, saying it would be constitutional because agreements between states already exist. The compact is designed to take effect only if states representing 270 electoral votes approve the compact legislation, giving those states majority control of the electoral college. The result: The "compact" group of states would be able to determine a presidential election. NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE PLAN DESCRIBED-Robb '08 [Brandon H.; MAKING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE WORK TODAY: THE AGREEMENT AMONG THE STATES TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE; Loyola Law Review; Summer 2008; 54 Loy. L. Rev. 419] A new and innovative plan being offered by an organization called National Popular Vote seems much more likely to succeed than any previous attempt to change the Electoral College, because it does not involve the cumbersome process of amending the Constitution. n6 The organization has drafted an interstate agreement (or compact), entitled the "Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote" ("the Agreement"), which, if enacted, would ensure that the winner of the most votes cast nationwide in a U.S. presidential election would also win the majority of electoral votes required to win the election. n7 The plan, which takes effect only on passage of the Agreement (in "substantially the same form") in enough states with a combined majority of votes in the Electoral College, would award the electoral votes of the member states to the presidential candidate who wins the national popular vote. n8 As of [*421] October 8, 2007, the Agreement had sponsors for the 2007 legislative sessions in 47 states, including Louisiana, with a combined 512 electoral votes, well above the 270 currently needed for an Electoral College majority. n9 National Popular Vote hopes to eventually have sponsors for the Agreement in all 50 states. n10 The organization is chaired by a bi-partisan advisory committee comprised of former members of Congress, n11 each of whom continues to be active in public or academic life. The Agreement has attracted much attention from the media as well. n12 It has also, however, encountered strong opposition from supporters of the current Electoral College system.
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THE THREAT OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE INTERSTATE COMPACT IN THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE PLAN IS MITIGATED FOR SEVERAL REASONS-Chang '08 [Stanley; JD Candidate at Harvard Law School; RECENT DEVELOPMENT: UPDATING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE: THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE LEGISLATION; Harvard Journal on Legislation; Winter 2007; 44 Harv. J. on Legis. 205] If adopted, the status of the NPV legislation, as an interstate compact, is at least theoretically precarious because any member state could withdraw from it at any time. n152 The NPV legislation attempts to foster at least election-year stability by prohibiting withdrawals from taking effect after July 20 of the election year. n153 Theoretically, this provides enough time for candidates to transition their campaigns to a battleground-centered race; however, it seems likely that such an event would still throw campaigns into disarray and undermine the purpose of NPV legislation. The possibility of state withdrawal may be mitigated by several circumstances. First, more states than necessary may join the interstate compact, making the withdrawal of a few states irrelevant to the guaranteed majority. Second, since the early 1800s, state legislatures have been reluctant to manipulate the presidential voting system. Third, the popularity and self-propagating legitimacy of a true nationwide popular vote may make any switch back to a state-based system politically unfeasible. Fourth, a switch would be advantageous and feasible only under the rare convergence of several circumstances. Specifically, the candidate would have to be trailing in nationwide polls, but have a reasonable likelihood of capturing a majority of the electoral votes under the state-based, winner-take-all system. Further, states that could affect the outcome of the election would have to be members of the NPV interstate compact. The composition of these states would have to be controlled by the trailing candidate's party and willing to manipulate the system for assigning electors. Practically, then, the danger of strategic withdrawals seems low. In sum, while state withdrawal remains a possibility, it is probably unlikely.
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NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE PLAN: SHOULDNT USE IT; MUST END THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
SHOULD END THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT-Gringer '08 [David; WHY THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE PLAN IS THE WRONG WAY TO ABOLISH THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE; Columbia Law Review; January 2008; 108 Colum. L. Rev. 182] Nevertheless, NPV supporters are correct to focus public attention on the electoral college. The way we elect the President is an anachronism that distances most Americans from choosing the most powerful official in the country. The best way to end the electoral college is through a constitutional amendment. Perhaps given the pressure NPV supporters are applying, Congress will finally pass an amendment. In the alternative, either submitting the NPV to Congress as an interstate compact for the approval of a majority of Congress, or adopting it through ballot initiatives [*230] in the states, provides a sounder method for ending the electoral college.
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THE ORIGINAL REASONS WHY THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS IN PLACE SHOULDN'T MATTER: MUST LOOK AT MODERN REALITIES-Davis '08 [Roy T.; Retired Businessman; Electoral College Revisited; Empire Page; 28 October 2008; Gale Group Databases] It appears there are many and varied reasons why the Electoral College exists depending on who you read or listen to. The fact is it was developed 200 years ago and has a structure to it that was meant to appease opposing forces back then so they could agree on other issues. With that being said, it doesn't really matter how or why it's in place, it just is and we should seriously consider eliminating it and go to a straight popular vote election. ELECTORAL COLLEGE ADVOCATES DON'T CITE DATA OR LITERATURE-Edwards '04 [George C.; Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University; Why the Electoral College is Bad for America; 2004; Kindle Location 98] It is disconcerting, then, to find that supporters of the electoral college are extraordinarily insouciant about their claims on its behalf and virtually never marshal data systematically or rigorously evaluate supposed benefits. Nor do they cite relevant literature. Instead, they make assertions. Yet there are ways to test claims. For example, do candidates really pay attention to small states? We can find out. Is the electoral college really a fundamental pillar of federalism? Let us examine the federal system and see. Is the winner-take-all system in the electoral college the critical institutional underpinning of the two-party system? Researchers have been studying party systems for years. THE BIGGEST PROBLEM WITH THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS THAT IT SENDS PEOPLE TO THE WHITE HOUSE THAT DIDN'T RECEIVE THE MAJORITY OF THE POPULAR VOTE-Levinson '07 [Stanford, Professor of Law at University of Texas Law School;SHOULD WE DISPENSE WITH THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE?; University of Pennsylvania Pennumbra; 2007; 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 10] So what are the primary deficiencies of the Electoral College? I begin with the most obvious one: It regularly sends to the White House persons who did not receive a majority of the popular vote. Since World War II alone, this has included Truman, Kennedy, Richard Nixon (1968), Bill Clinton (1992 and 1996), and George W. Bush (2000). (Gerald Ford's unelected presidency cannot truly be blamed on the Electoral College, though any spirit of fundamental reflection about the current Constitution might well ask about the necessity or advisability of having a Vice President at all.) More distant beneficiaries include Abraham Lincoln and Woodrow Wilson (1912), either of whom might have been defeated if the United States had adopted such a sensible election process as the Alternative Transferable Vote (ATV) or even run-offs between the top two candidates. One might, of course, applaud both of those presidencies; if that is so, then perhaps we should really be debating if we really believe in "majority rule" at all and why losers in such a process should feel obligated to accept what they believe to be fundamentally wrong decisions on the part of minority presidents. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE HAS RECEIVE MORE CRITICISM THAN ANY OTHER AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONDotinga '06 [Randy; A backdoor plan to thwart the electoral college; The Christian Science Monitor; 16 June 2006; http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0616/p01s02-uspo.html; retrieved 2 October 2011] The electoral college system is "distinctly American," says Shaun Bowler, a political scientist at the University of California, Riverside. In US history, there have been about 700 failed proposals in Congress to change the electoral college system, according to the Office of the Federal Register. "It's safe to say that there has been no aspect of what the founders worked up in Philadelphia that has received more criticism than the electoral college," says historian Rick Shenkman of George Mason University.
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THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE HAS A WIDE BASE OF CRITICS-Robb '08 [Brandon H.; MAKING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE WORK TODAY: THE AGREEMENT AMONG THE STATES TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE; Loyola Law Review; Summer 2008; 54 Loy. L. Rev. 419] Although many aspects and institutions of American government are controversial, few have come under such frequent attack and been the center of passionate debate among scholars, political leaders, and the American people as often or with as much intensity as the system of the Electoral College, enshrined in Article II of the Constitution. n4 Political scientists, American political leaders, and most of the American public have recognized for some time the wide range of flaws in the current winner-take-all Electoral College system, including its propensity to grossly misrepresent the magnitude of support afforded a candidate by the electorate, its allowance for various crises as a result of a few critical states determining the outcome in close elections, and the fact that, though rare, the system allows a candidate who received fewer votes from Americans across the country than an opponent to become President. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS A MENACE TO THE AMERICAN POLITY-Levinson '07 [Stanford, Professor of Law at University of Texas Law School;SHOULD WE DISPENSE WITH THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE?; University of Pennsylvania Pennumbra; 2007; 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 10] The only conceivable argument "for" retaining the Electoral College as a constituent aspect of the American political process is a basically Burkean one. It seems to rely on some mixture of the fact that it is indeed our unique method of choosing a chief executive/head of state; the highly debatable assertion that it has not disserved the country too badly and may even, on occasion, have served us well; and, finally, that it would be either futile, because of the barriers set out by Article V, to try to eliminate the College through constitutional amendment or too dangerous to accept my own proposal, in Our Undemocratic Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (and How We the People Can Correct It), of calling a new convention, as is legitimate under Article V itself, charged with examining the many grave deficiencies of our present Constitution. As should be obvious, I disagree with all of the proposed defenses and believe that the College is a continuing menace to the American polity. Complacent acceptance of its "inevitable" role in electing our presidents is equivalent to an equal complacency about driving a car with slick tires and bad brakes, after having had three drinks, on the ground that one had earlier successfully navigated the route home. Even if true, this is ultimately an adolescent way of thinking. We should recognize that there is also a significant chance that such a car will take us over a cliff and try to guard against such an unhappy future [*12] by buying new tires, installing new brakes, and resolving not to drive while drunk.
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2000 ELECTION IS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF THE NIGHTMARE SCENARIO CREATED BY THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE-Anderson '05 [John B.; Former Congressman and Presidential Candidate and Law Professor at Nova Southeastern University; The Electoral College Flunks the Test in an Age of Democracy; Human Rights Magazine; Spring 2005; page 17] Along with many other political observers, I have been mystified, if not confounded, by the fact that the 2000 presidential election failed to energize a strong effort to abolish the Electoral College. The voices for reform and the adoption of direct popular election have been muted. Rather, Ms. Best has been joined by Electoral College proponents like Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute, who wrote that "three (or four) crises out of more than fifty presidential elections is remarkably small." He continued: "Heaven forbid a direct vote and the 'horrific nightmare' of a possible nation-wide recount in a close contest, especially with lots of late-arriving absentee votes." At this point, one wonders if the nation's thirty-six-day wait for the announcement of the president-elect and the Supreme Court's five-to-four majority in the case was not in fact a "horrific nightmare." I believe that the occupant of the nation's highest office should be determined by legally registered votersnot 538 faceless, nameless electorsnot even if their role is decreed by five members of the U.S. Supreme Court. THE POTENTIAL ELECTION DOOMSDAY SCENARIO FROM THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE SYSTEM WOULD MAKE 2000 LOOK TAME-Plumer '04 [Bradford; Assistant Editor for the New Republic; The Indefensible Electoral College, Mother Jones Online; 8 October 2004; Gale Group Databases] The single best argument against the electoral college is what we might call the disaster factor. The American people should consider themselves lucky that the 2000 fiasco was the biggest election crisis in a century; the system allows for much worse. Consider that state legislatures are technically responsible for picking electors, and that those electors could always defy the will of the people. Back in 1960, segregationists in the Louisiana legislature nearly succeeded in replacing the Democratic electors with new electors who would oppose John F. Kennedy. (So that a popular vote for Kennedy would not have actually gone to Kennedy.) In the same vein, "faithless" electors have occasionally refused to vote for their party's candidate and cast a deciding vote for whomever they please. This year, one Republican elector in West Virginia has already pledged not to vote for Bush; imagine if more did the same. Oh, and what if a state sends two slates of electors to Congress? It happened in Hawaii in 1960. Luckily, Vice President Richard Nixon, who was presiding over the Senate, validated only his opponent's electors, but he made sure to do so "without establishing a precedent." What if it happened again?
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ELECTORAL COLLEGE INCREASES THE CHANCE FOR A TIE, WHERE THE HOUSE ELECTION WOULD TRUMP THE COLLECTIVE WILL OF THE PEOPLE-Anderson '05 [John B.; Former Congressman and Presidential Candidate and Law Professor at Nova Southeastern University; The Electoral College Flunks the Test in an Age of Democracy; Human Rights Magazine; Spring 2005; page 17] Finally, the present system actually increases a likelihood of ties in the Electoral College. A shift of about 21,000 votes in Iowa, Nevada, and New Mexico could have thrown the election into a 269-269 electoral vote tie, which is certainly a possibility in the future as well. Once the election goes to the House of Representatives, where each state has a single vote, the likelihood of extreme partisanship and deal making, which can trump the collective will of the people that has manifested itself in the popular vote, becomes very real. BECAUSE IT RELIES ON THE CENSUS, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE ALWAYS MISREPRESENTS THE POPULATION-Edwards '04 [George C.; Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University; Why the Electoral College is Bad for America; 2004; Kindle Location 120] When a presidential election falls in the same year as a census, the apportionment of a full decade earlier governs the allocation of electoral votes. In the election of 2000, for example, the allocation of electoral votes actually reflected the population distribution of 199o, a decade earlier. The increase or decrease in a state's population since 199o will not be reflected in that state's electoral vote apportionment until the year 2004. Because of this process, the apportionment of electoral votes always overrepresents some states and underrepresents others. For example, on basis of the 1980 census, California was allocated 47 electors. The Census Bureau estimate for California's population in 1988, however, would have translated into 54 electoral votes in the election of that year. Other high-growth states like Florida, Texas, and Arizona have also been penalized, whereas states with slower growth or population declines have benefited from the lag in reapportionment.' More important, presidential candidates who won high-growth states have been penalized whereas those winning lower-growth states have been helped. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE DISAGREES WITH THE NOTION OF ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE-Gringer '08 [David; WHY THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE PLAN IS THE WRONG WAY TO ABOLISH THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE; Columbia Law Review; January 2008; 108 Colum. L. Rev. 182] [*186] This frustration with the electoral college reflects a common view among political scientists that it weights some votes more than others. n25 The idea that all votes should be weighted equally is the core of the Supreme Court's "one person, one vote" jurisprudence, and is, as Justice Hugo Black declared in Wesberry v. Sanders, one of "our fundamental ideas of democratic government." n26 Yet, the electoral college is enshrined in the Constitution, and the Supreme Court has refused to extend "one person, one vote" to the electoral college. n27
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THE ELECTION OF 1888 PROVES THAT THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IGNORES THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE-Robb '08 [Brandon H.; MAKING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE WORK TODAY: THE AGREEMENT AMONG THE STATES TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE; Loyola Law Review; Summer 2008; 54 Loy. L. Rev. 419] Only twelve years later, in 1888, the result of another presidential election was skewed in favor of a candidate who had received less votes nationwide than his opponent. n160 This time, there were no widespread allegations of fraud, and no partisan commission was necessary to determine the outcome in the Electoral College. n161 The incumbent Democratic President, Grover Cleveland, exceeded his Republican challenger Benjamin Harrison's national popular vote total by nearly 100,000 votes, defeating him in a close race by 49% to 48%. n162 Cleveland's loss in the Electoral College despite a national victory was the result of the fact that he had managed to carry several small and mid-sized states (particularly in the South) by very large margins. n163 Contrasted with this, Harrison was able to carry a number of large Northern states by very close margins. n164 The net effect of this was that, because of the winner-take-all system, Harrison was awarded all of the electoral votes from these states, [*443] despite his close margin of victory, while Cleveland won an insufficient number of electoral votes to win a majority, despite his landslide wins in several smaller states, and very narrow losses in many of the larger states. n165 In any event, Harrison was elected, and the degree of controversy that surrounded the 1876 catastrophe did not materialize. n166 Nonetheless, the election of 1888 demonstrated that even before the dawn of the Twentieth Century and the arrival of presidential campaigns in the mass media age, the Electoral College had developed the capacity to overturn the national popular verdict. This potential would be highlighted again many times in presidential contests over the next hundred years. ELECTORAL COLLEGE IGNORES THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE-Plumer '04 [Bradford; Assistant Editor for the New Republic; The Indefensible Electoral College, Mother Jones Online; 8 October 2004; Gale Group Databases] As George C. Edwards III, a professor of political science at Texas A&M University, reminds us in his new book, Why the Electoral College Is Bad for America, "The choice of the chief executive must be the people's, and it should rest with none other than them." Fans of the Electoral College usually admit that the current system doesn't quite satisfy this principle. Instead, Edwards notes, they change the subject and tick off all the "advantages" of the electoral college. But even the best-laid defenses of the old system fall apart under close scrutiny. The Electoral College has to go. IN A TIE, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE GOES TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WHERE THERE IS DISTINCT UNEQUAL REPRESENTATION-Plumer '04 [Bradford; Assistant Editor for the New Republic; The Indefensible Electoral College, Mother Jones Online; 8 October 2004; Gale Group Databases] Perhaps most worrying is the prospect of a tie in the electoral vote. In that case, the election would be thrown to the House of Representatives, where state delegations vote on the president. (The Senate would choose the vice-president.) Because each state casts only one vote, the single representative from Wyoming, representing 500,000 voters, would have as much say as the 55 representatives from California, who represent 35 million voters. Given that many voters vote one party for president and another for Congress, the House's selection can hardly be expected to reflect the will of the people. And if an electoral tie seems unlikely, consider this: In 1968, a shift of just 41,971 votes would have deadlocked the election. In 1976, a tie would have occurred if a mere 5,559 voters in Ohio and 3,687 voters in Hawaii had voted the other way. The election is only a few swing voters away from catastrophe.
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THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE GIVES MORE POWER TO VOTERS IN WYOMING THAN VOTERS IN CALIFORNIA-Robb '08 [Brandon H.; MAKING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE WORK TODAY: THE AGREEMENT AMONG THE STATES TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE; Loyola Law Review; Summer 2008; 54 Loy. L. Rev. 419] Thus, the electoral votes from a closely-won state are awarded in their entirety to whoever has the slightest edge. When this phenomenon occurs in a relatively large state such as Florida, with a sizable block of electoral votes, it has a distorting effect on the overall Electoral College picture by effectively rendering meaningless the votes of millions of people in that state. In addition, a distorting enhancement of candidates' electoral vote totals results from the fact that each state is given two electoral votes in recognition of their Senate representation. This results in states with smaller populations being overrepresented in the Electoral College. n195 More than that, however, it gives the choice of an individual voter in the smallest states more power than a voter who lives in a larger state. For instance, in the 2000 presidential election (in which the electoral vote allocation to the states was based on the 1990 U.S. Census), Wyoming's 3 electoral votes, when divided among its population, corresponded to one electoral vote per every 151,196 persons. In contrast, California's 54 electoral votes, when similarly divided, corresponded to one electoral vote per every 551,112 persons. n196 Thus, an individual voter in Wyoming has more power in determining how his or her state's electoral votes will be awarded than a voter in California. WINNER-TAKE-ALL SYSTEMS OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE MEAN THAT SUPPORTERS OF THE LOSING CANDIDATES ARE DISENFRANCHISED -Edwards '04 [George C.; Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University; Why the Electoral College is Bad for America; 2004; Kindle Location 598] The operation of the winner-take-all system effectively disenfranchises voters who support losing candidates in each state. In the 2000 presidential election, nearly three million people voted for Al Gore for president in Florida. Because George W. Bush won 537 more votes than Gore, however, he received all of Florida's electoral votes. This effect is unusually well expressed in Matthew 13.12: "For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance; but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath." A candidate thus can win some states by very narrow margins, lose other states by large margins (as Bush did in California and New York in 2000), and so win the electoral vote while losing the popular vote. The votes for candidates who do not finish first in a state play no role in the outcome of the election, since they are not aggregated across states. For every other office in the countryevery governor, every legislator, on both the state and the national level-we aggregate the votes for the candidates across the entire constituency of the office. Only for the presidency do we fail to count the votes for the candidate who does not win a subsection of the constituency. The winner-take-all system takes the electoral votes allocated to a state based on its population and awards them all to the plurality winner of the state. In effect, the system gives the votes of the people who voted against the winner to the winner. THE WINNER TAKE ALL SYSTEM MEANS THAT VOTERS ARE DISENFRANCHISED-Edwards '04 [George C.; Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University; Why the Electoral College is Bad for America; 2004; Kindle Location 618] The winner-take-all system not only disenfranchises millions of Americans (distorting majority rule in the process, as we will see), it also distributes influence in selecting the president unequally. Large states enjoy a theoretical advantage in being more likely than small states to cast the pivotal bloc of electoral votes in the electoral college, and thus a citizen of a large state is hypothetically more likely to be able to cast the vote that will determine how his or her state's electoral votes will be cast.'? As George Rabinowitz and Elaine MacDonald have concluded, "In presidential elections, some citizens, by virtue of their physical location in a given state, are in a far better position to determine presidential outcomes than others.... extreme inequities exist between the power of citizens living in different states." 18
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THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE DISCOURAGES ATTENTION TO THE INTERESTS IN MINORITIES IN THE UNITED STATESEdwards '04 [George C.; Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University; Why the Electoral College is Bad for America; 2004; Kindle Location 1428] The electoral college thus discourages attention to the interests of African Americans because they are unlikely to shift the outcome in a state as a whole.' The winner-take-all system ensures that blacks have little or no voice in presidential elections in the South.22 This lack of attention to African American interests as a result of the electoral college is nothing new. Research has found a positive and significant relationship between a state's competitiveness and voting rights enforcement activity in the late nineteenth century.23 Under direct election of the president in which all votes are valuable, black voters in the South and in the urban Northeast, for example, could coalesce their votes and become an effective national bloc. The votes of southern blacks, in particular, might for the first time be important in determining the election outcome. One reason that Judith Best, perhaps the best known advocate of the electoral college, supports the status quo is precisely because it inhibits what she calls "private minorities" from uniting votes across state lines. 14 The evidence clearly shows, then, that the argument that the electoral college aids blacks is based on false premises. Although it may be possible to construct a principled argument that members of a disadvantaged race deserve more say in the election of the president than members of other races, such an argument is unlikely to win many adherents in the twenty-first century. It is difficult in a democracy to give people electoral weight based on the rightness of their cause.
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ELECTORAL COLLEGE IGNORES THE VOICES OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF AMERICANS-Robb '08 [Brandon H.; MAKING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE WORK TODAY: THE AGREEMENT AMONG THE STATES TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE; Loyola Law Review; Summer 2008; 54 Loy. L. Rev. 419] The Electoral College system has been maintained in its current form more or less for the past 130 years, with the minor exceptions of Maine and Nebraska. n149 During this time period, its presence as an institution has determined the course of America's presidential campaigns. The winner-take-all system has resulted in the nation experiencing unnecessary political crises in at least two presidential elections since the Civil War, and coming to the brink of similar crises in at least five more presidential elections in the twentieth century alone. n150 Additionally, and perhaps more perniciously, the Electoral College has shaped the way presidential candidates address the concerns of voters in a manner that effectively ignores the electorate in most of the country. Candidates are able to either write off or take for granted the votes of people living in a majority of the states, and thus campaigns have become less a national debate and more a focus on winning over so-called "swing" states by addressing issues in such a way as to cater exclusively to the population of only a relative handful of states. n151 Because of the modern winner-take-all Electoral College, the voices of the vast majority of Americans are largely taken for granted or [*441] ignored when it comes to choosing the President.
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THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE DISTORTS THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN TO COMPETITIVE STATES-Edwards '04 [George C.; Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University; Why the Electoral College is Bad for America; 2004; Kindle Location 1612] We must interpret the data on little or no media advertising with care. Even so, the story of advertising in the 2ooo presidential election is clear. People in a large percentage of the country saw little or no advertising on behalf of the presidential candidates, since the candidates essentially ignored twenty-six states and the District of Columbia. Thus, just as in the case of candidate visits, we find that the premises that the electoral college forces candidates to take their cases to small states and to build coalitions from all regions of the country are erroneous. To win candidates' attention, states must be "in play" and have a significant number of electoral votes. As a result, the electoral college encourages campaigns largely to ignore most people in the nation. The focus of advertising on competitive states is nothing new. Hubert Humphrey, the 1968 Democratic presidential candidate, told the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1977 that campaigns are directed disproportionately at large states: "We had to ignore large sections of the country." Douglas Bailey, who headed the advertising firm that handled Gerald Ford's 1976 campaign, added that "those areas that you are sure to win or lose, you ignore."42 Daron Shaw shows similar patterns for 1988, 1992, and 1996.4 In sum, the electoral college not only discourages candidates from paying attention to small states, it also distorts the presidential campaign, causing candidates to ignore most of the country. In theory, candidates make their cases to the people and citizens then choose for whom to vote. In reality, candidates under the electoral college do not take their cases to the people. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE SYSTEM COMPELS CANDIDATES TO FOCUS ON A HANDFUL OF STATES, LEAVING THE INTERESTS AND ISSUES OF A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION IGNORED-Levinson '07 [Stanford, Professor of Law at University of Texas Law School;SHOULD WE DISPENSE WITH THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE?; University of Pennsylvania Pennumbra; 2007; 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 10] I have focused on what might be termed "formal" problems of the Electoral College derived from its legal structure. But there are also pernicious "informal" consequences as well. Professor McGinnis, in a prior encounter, has challenged the common emphasis on the propensity of the Electoral College to elect candidates who did not win a majority of the popular vote by making the entirely valid point that presidential campaigns would not be dramatically different were elections [*15] conducted on a nationwide popular vote basis. George W. Bush may have lagged behind Al Gore in 2000, but one cannot confidently infer that the same outcome would have happened had Bush and Gore been contending in a national popular-vote election. He is surely correct, but that point cuts against the Electoral College itself, for it underscores the extent to which contemporary presidential campaigns have become perversely structured around the reality of the College and its generation of so-called "battleground states" that have become the obsessive focus of modern campaigns. In 2004, for example, a full 99% of all advertising expenditures by the two major-party candidates were concentrated in only seventeen of the states. Florida and Ohio alone accounted for more than 45% ($ 111 million) of the $ 235 million spent in all of these states. Wisconsin, another "battleground," received a total of thirtyone candidate visits, as compared with two visits to California. New York received only one such visit! Other ignored states included Texas and Illinois. This means, among other things, that neither candidate was ever required to prepare serious speeches addressing the needs of the largest states in the Union. As a resident of Texas, I can certainly testify to the fact that it is significantly different from, say, Florida, one of the principal "battlegrounds" in both 2000 and 2004. This undercuts the argument that the Electoral College and the purported benefit given to large states by their ability give the winner of a given state all of the state's electoral votes (and thus deprive the losing minorities of any representation at all in the College) undercuts, at least to some extent, the small-state bonus. Only some large states are "battlegrounds," and there is no reason at all to believe that the lucky few are necessarily proxies for their ignored sister states.
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ELECTORAL COLLEGE LEADS CANDIDATES TO FOCUS ON SMALL FACTIONS OF VOTERS IN BATTLEGROUND STATESChang '08 [Stanley; JD Candidate at Harvard Law School; RECENT DEVELOPMENT: UPDATING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE: THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE LEGISLATION; Harvard Journal on Legislation; Winter 2007; 44 Harv. J. on Legis. 205] In contrast, supporters of the NPV legislation argue that the current system leads Presidential candidates to focus disproportionately on appealing to small factions of voters in battleground states, possibly to the detriment of national interests. For example, Presidential candidates have consistently supported the Cuban embargo to woo Cuban American votes in Florida, "the swing bloc within the swing state." n110 Supporters of the NPV legislation note that other scholars have suggested that the present system can actually exacerbate sectionalist tendencies by awarding electors to candidates with strong regional followings, such as Strom Thurmond in 1948 and George Wallace in 1968, but not to broadly based, nationally focused candidates like Ross Perot in 1992. n111 The current system may foster candidates aiming to play the role of "spoiler." A spoiler could deny either major party candidate a majority and then bargain for concessions in exchange for their electoral votes. n112 THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE DISTORTS POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS BY DRAWING STATES AS BATTLEGROUND STATES OR SAFE STATES-Chang '08 [Stanley; JD Candidate at Harvard Law School; RECENT DEVELOPMENT: UPDATING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE: THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE LEGISLATION; Harvard Journal on Legislation; Winter 2007; 44 Harv. J. on Legis. 205] The fact that battlegrounds change frequently is not clearly a substitute for giving equal weight to every voter in every state. Sixteen states should not represent all fifty, especially as it is unlikely that the battleground states will reflect the interests of all fifty. By dividing the country into safe and battleground states, the Electoral College severely distorts the presidential campaign. If implemented, the NPV legislation would mean that no states are necessarily excluded from the campaign, because the focus of the candidates would be on garnering the majority of the national popular vote, rather than the popular votes of a select number of battleground states. By diminishing the strategic value of locally focused stump speeches, candidates may be motivated to address national issues more comprehensively. THE TENDENCY OF CANDIDATES TO FOCUS ON A HANDFUL OF STATES BECAUSE OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE SYSTEM IS BAD FOR OUR COUNTRY-Robb '08 [Brandon H.; MAKING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE WORK TODAY: THE AGREEMENT AMONG THE STATES TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE; Loyola Law Review; Summer 2008; 54 Loy. L. Rev. 419] The concept of voters exercising more power in a presidential election because they live in Wyoming instead of California, or Vermont instead of Texas, ought to raise serious concerns about the equity of the winner-take-all approach to the Electoral College, especially given that the system "punishes" voters for living in a larger state. Further, the fact that presidential candidates in the modern age can simply ignore or take for granted the vast majority of the nation's population while focusing on a handful of "swing" states ought to give pause to anyone concerned with upholding federalist ideals. While one of the major arguments behind maintaining the Electoral College is that it benefits smaller states, that argument is accurate only to the extent that the small state at hand has a [*448] closely-divided electorate. n197 States like Iowa, New Hampshire, and New Mexico certainly benefit under the current system, because presidential candidates focus their energies on winning over the voters in those states.
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THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE CREATES INCENTIVES TO FOCUS THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ON A SMALL NUMBER OF STATES AND DELEGATES-Davis '08 [Roy T.; Retired Businessman; Electoral College Revisited; Empire Page; 28 October 2008; Gale Group Databases] Slick politicians can focus their money and energy on a very narrow number of states in order to win. New York State is a good example of the deficiencies in the current system. Most heavily populated areas in our country like New York City have a large powerful Democratic Party organization which gives them a solid majority over other parties in the state each election cycle. That in itself is no cause to whine about them winning elections. They work hard to keep their power intact, obviously much harder than the Republicans, etc. In state elections, the candidate with the most votes wins. That's how we elect our Governor, etc. It's democracy; it's simple, it works and it's fair. Not so the Electoral College. Maine and Nebraska elect their Electoral College delegates exactly the same way they vote for their House of Representative candidates. It's not a winner take all but rather the way a democracy should work, by popular vote. The candidates running for President and Vice President in those two states get the number of delegates they deserve based on the popular vote received. It's so simple and the proper way for a democracy to function yet politicians and the media seem to find no fault with the Electoral College. I am more than a little distressed that my losing vote counts for nothing on the national total. The real crux of the problem is that every vote cast in New York State, or any other state for that matter except the two mentioned above, for a losing Presidential candidate does not count. But suppose that candidate carries a state by a large margin of popular votes which, combined with the losing votes in New York would put him ahead in the total carried. It doesn't matter because of the Electoral College. This has brought us to modern times where these slick politicians can focus their money and energy on a very narrow number of states in order to win. It leads to manipulating elections that our politicians are getting very good at. How much time in the last several national elections have candidates spent in New York State? Hardly any at all and particularly when you look at what they spend in the so called battleground states. New York has a guaranteed 31 electoral votes to the Democratic Party column. At the very least, if the popular votes were counted, both parties would win something and have to make some sort of effort to get votes here. Campaigning would be far different than we see today. This forces the politicians to pay attention to each voter and state before, during and after elections. It's clear proof of why the Electoral College needs to be eliminated. ELECTORAL COLLEGE HURTS THE MAJORITY OF SMALL STATES; NO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES VISIT THESE STATESRobb '08 [Brandon H.; MAKING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE WORK TODAY: THE AGREEMENT AMONG THE STATES TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE; Loyola Law Review; Summer 2008; 54 Loy. L. Rev. 419] These small states represent the exception rather than the rule, however. Voters in other - and more numerous - small states never see a presidential candidate set foot within their borders. In 2004, for instance, George W. Bush made virtually no effort to appeal to the populations of states like Rhode Island, Vermont, Delaware, and Hawaii, because John Kerry had opinion polling leads comfortable enough in those states that Republican resources were deemed better invested elsewhere. Consequently, Kerry need not have bothered, and in fact did not, to address many issues of concern to voters in those states. Conversely, Bush's large leads in small states like Wyoming, Utah, Idaho, Montana, North and South Dakota, and Nebraska meant that neither candidate had to concern themselves with those states either. There was no advantage whatsoever to either Bush or Kerry in attempting to inflate their vote totals in any of those states, or even many larger ones like New York or Texas, because one or the other of them were virtually guaranteed the electoral votes from those states, irrespective of the size of either candidate's ultimate win or loss in them.
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ALMOST 10% OF ALL ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION RELATE TO THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE-Chang '08 [Stanley; JD Candidate at Harvard Law School; RECENT DEVELOPMENT: UPDATING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE: THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE LEGISLATION; Harvard Journal on Legislation; Winter 2007; 44 Harv. J. on Legis. 205] From the beginning, the constitutional system for selecting the President has spawned proposals for reform. n37 Of 11,000 constitutional amendments introduced to date, more than 1000 have concerned the alteration or elimination of the Electoral College. n38 Of those resolutions, only one--now the Twelfth Amendment--passed, in 1804. n39 The last major congressional effort to pass an amendment pertaining to the Electoral College came in 1969, when the House of Representatives, alarmed by George Wallace's 1968 Presidential run, passed a direct popular vote amendment. n40 The proposal died the next year when it failed to attract sufficient votes in the Senate. n41 A similar effort in the aftermath of the close 1976 election failed as well. n42 By bypassing the Constitutional amendment process entirely, the NPV legislation may avoid some of the political hurdles encountered by earlier reform proposals.
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ELECTORS OFTEN DON'T SHOW UP FOR THEIR DUTY AND REPLACEMENTS ARE PICKED FROM RANDOM PEOPLE IN THE HALLS OF THE CAPITOL-Edwards '04 [George C.; Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University; Why the Electoral College is Bad for America; 2004; Kindle Location 244] On the appointed day in December, the electors convene, in most states at noon. The meeting usually takes place in the state legislative chambers, the executive chambers, or the office of the secretary of state. Under federal law, the governor of the state must by this time have sent to the administrator of General Services in Washington, D.C., a certificate reporting the names of the electors elected and the number of popular votes cast for them. A state official presents copies of these certificates to the electors when they convene, and the governor or secretary of state generally makes a short speech welcoming the electors to their august duty.28 Often, however, some of the electors fail to appear for their great day. Congress, in a law first passed in 1845, has authorized the states to provide for filling of elector vacancies. In almost every state today, the electors themselves are authorized to choose replacements. Sometimes the replacements are found by scouring the hallways of the state capitol for likely candidates. This process was followed by the Michigan electoral college in 1948, when only thirteen of the nineteen chosen electors-all pledged to Thomas Dewey and his running mate, Earl Warren-appeared. One of the substitutes recruited on the spot, however, a Mr. J. J. Levy of Royal Oak, had to be restrained by his colleagues from voting for Harry Truman and his running mate, Alben Barkley. "I thought we had to vote for the winning candidate," Levy was quoted as saying.29 Sometimes it has been necessary to designate substitute electors because federal officeholders have been improperly chosen as electors, in violation of the Constitution. ELECTORAL VOTES REGULARLY DEVIATES FROM THE POPULAR WILL OF THE PEOPLE-Edwards '04 [George C.; Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University; Why the Electoral College is Bad for America; 2004; Kindle Location 578] A popular misconception is that electoral votes are simple aggregates of popular votes. In reality, the electoral vote regularly deviates from the popular will as expressed in the popular vote-sometimes merely in curious ways, usually strengthening the electoral edge of the popular vote leader, but at times in such a way as to deny the presidency to the popular preference. Popular votes do not equal electoral votes-the former express the people's choice, while the latter determine who is to be the people's president.
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NO EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT SMALL STATE INTERESTS NEED PROTECTION FROM THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE-Edwards '04 [George C.; Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University; Why the Electoral College is Bad for America; 2004; Kindle Location 1400] It is difficult to identify interests that are centered in a few small states. Even if we could, however, the question remains whether these few interests, out of the literally thousands of economic interests in the United States, deserve special protection. I know of no principle that would support such a view. Why should those who produce wheat and hogs have more say in electing the president than those who produce vegetables, citrus, and beef? Is not the disproportionate representation of states in which wheat and hogs are produced in the Senate enough to protect these interests? There is simply no evidence that interests like these deserve or require additional protection from the electoral system.
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THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE DOESN'T INCREASE HARMONY OR COHESION-Edwards '04 [George C.; Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University; Why the Electoral College is Bad for America; 2004; Kindle Location 2077] Many of the justifications for the electoral college focus on maintaining the harmony and cohesion of the Republic. Its advocates argue that direct election of the president, principally the runoff provision, would harm the nation by encouraging fraud and recounts and corrupt and secret deals between the first ballot and the runoff, allowing for the possibility of the second-place finisher winning the runoff, eliminating a mandate for the winner, splintering and polarizing the party system, and creating disharmony in the nation. Once again, we find that these claims are based on faulty premises. The electoral college does not contain the results of fraud and accidental circumstances within states. Instead, it magnifies their consequences for the outcome nationally. Direct election, by contrast, would create disincentives for fraud and recounts. Similarly, there would be little incentive for secret deals under direct election and severe constraints on the bargains third parties could make. Moreover, there is much less chance of such deals under direct election than under the contingent election provision of the electoral college. There is also no reason to be concerned that the person who came in second in a first ballot would win the runoff. That is what should happen if this is the candidate the people prefer to the first-place finisher in the first ballot.
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THE MAGNIFICATION DEFENSE OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS SUSPECT; WHY DEFEND A SYSTEM BASED ON DECEIVING THE VOTERS?-Edwards '04 [George C.; Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University; Why the Electoral College is Bad for America; 2004; Kindle Location 712] Some commentators claim that the electoral college's magnification of the size of a popular vote victory is a benefit, at least to the president. The argument seems to be that at least some people will ignore the actual popular vote and focus on the electoral vote instead. This will give the president more credibility in claiming a mandate and more success in convincing Congress to support his programs. Such an assertion fails on three grounds. The first is ethical and the second and third are empirical. To begin, what possible justification can there be for a presidential selection process that may fool people as to the actual outcome? It is difficult to imagine a response. NO EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE MAGNIFICATION DEFENSE OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE-Edwards '04 [George C.; Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University; Why the Electoral College is Bad for America; 2004; Kindle Location 716] Second, there is no evidence that anyone ignores the popular vote in favor of the electoral vote." Electoral vote totalsexcept in 2ooo-are forgotten the day after the election. Journalists, scholars, and members of Congress know the popular vote, and they reflect it in their commentaries. Members of Congress, moreover, are attuned to how the president ran in their constituencies. (I focus on mandates in more detail in Chapter 6.) And third, there is no evidence that the electoral college vote increases the probability that a president will successfully claim a mandate. Presidents who win election by large margins often find that their victories are not accompanied by perceptions of support for the president's proposals. In nine of the thirteen presidential elections in the last half of the twentieth century, the disparity between the popular vote and the electoral vote exceeded 20 percentage points. Yet only the elections of 1964 and 198o produced perceptions of a popular man- date.27 Many of the most impressive electoral college victories (Dwight Eisenhower's in 1952 and 1956, Richard Nixon's in 1972, and Ronald Reagan's in 1984) did not elicit perceptions of mandates.28 There is more to perceptions of mandates than a sum of electoral votes. The disparities between the popular and electoral vote would be of only marginal interest were it not for the greatest violation of political equality: the candidate who receives the most votes loses the election.
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CON
SHOULDNT DEFINE DEMOCRACY AS SIMPLY 50% + 1
IF WE NARROWLY DEFINE DEMOCRACY AS 50% PLUS 1, MANY OF OUR CHERISHED AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS WOULD BE BROKEN DOWN-Uhlmann '08 [Michael M.; Professor of Politics and Policy at Claremont Graduate University; The Electoral College Strengthens Federalism; 2008; Gale Group Databases] Dissatisfaction with the electoral-vote system has been a staple of populist rhetoric ever since presidential elections became fully democratized in the 1820s. More than 700 constitutional amendments have been introduced to change the systemby far the greatest number on any subjectand although reform prescriptions have varied greatly in detail, their common assumption has always been that our electoral rules prevent the true voice of the people from being heard. But what is the "true voice" of the people? Public sentiment can be expressed and measured in any number of ways, but not all are conducive to securing rights. If ascertaining the consent of the people were only a matter of counting heads until you got to 50 percent plus one, we could dispense with most of the distinctive features of the Constitutionnot only electoral votes, but also federalism, the separation of powers, bicameralism, and staggered elections. All of these devices depart from simple majoritarianism, and for good reason: Men do not suddenly become angels when they acquire the right to vote; an electoral majority can be just as tyrannical as autocratic kings or corrupt oligarchs. MANY OF OUR INSTITUTIONS DO NOT HAVE SIMPLE MAJORITIES AS THE RULE; THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO FOR EXAMPLE-McGinnis '07 [John, Professor of Law at Northwestern University School of Law; SHOULD WE DISPENSE WITH THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE?; University of Pennsylvania Pennumbra; 2007; 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 10] But if one believes in what Professor Held describes as participatory or social democracy, the Electoral College may seem very unsatisfactory, particularly in its symbolism. Oversimplifying a bit, under the [*20] model of participatory or social democracy, the legitimacy of all social institutions ultimately depends on popular approval and should be subject to a continuous process of social reform. Thus, even if it is impossible to capture a stable majority with the election of a president, it is important to appear to do so if majority will is the source of legitimacy. Accordingly, it is not surprising that as the United States flirted with social democratic ideas, the Electoral College, which reflects the Framers' more circumscribed view of democracy's purpose, has come under attack. In a recent book, Professor Levinson himself combines his attack on the Electoral College with an assault on other features of the Constitution, like the presidential veto, which are in fact designed to insulate the order of civil society from rapid social reform by majority will. But if one believes, as I do, that social democracy is seriously wrong-headed and that majority rule in political decision making is far from sacrosanct, one will welcome the symbolism of the Electoral College. Its structure on its face rejects the notion of unmediated popular sovereignty--a notion that has made it harder to recognize that society is legitimated not by majority will, but by principles of natural justice, like the right to liberty and property. By giving states a role, the Electoral College includes within its structure elements of subsidiarity--a principle of governance that facilitates the exercise of these rights. Thus, I count it as a virtue, not a defect, that the symbolism of the Electoral College reminds us that simple majority will is not the legitimating feature of society, but that instead popular consent is merely an instrument to protect the deep and enduring principles that make us a free people.
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THE FOUNDING FATHERS BELIEVE THAT THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE STRIKES THE PERFECT BALANCE BETWEEN MAJORITY AND MINORITY RIGHTS-Ross '04 [Tara; Attorney and Legal Writer; Enlightened Democracy: The Case for the Electoral College; 2004; pages 42-44] Discussions regarding the mode of presidential election emphasized the importance of providing the people a voice in the process. The delegates praise for the final product reflected the importance that they placed upon electing Presidents chosen by the people. James Madison declared, [T]he President is now to be elected by the people.132 Alexander Hamilton promoted the Electoral College as an institution that would allow the sense of the people to operate in the choice of the [President].133 James Wilson of Pennsylvania supported the proposed election system during the ratification debates, noting that the President may be justly styled the man of the people.134 In the American republic created by the Founders, majorities canand shouldrule, but only while they are reasonable. The minority views in a 1970 Senate report reflected this sentiment: Accordingly, the crucial question in considering electoral reform is whether one method of election is better than another at creating reasonable majorities. One method might be better at obtaining a strictly numerical majority, but only at the price of failing to protect minorities; another might protect minorities very well indeed, but only at the price of frustrating a truly reasonable majority.135 The Electoral College was considered by the Founders to have struck the perfect balance between minority protection and majority rule. It was a balance that they hit upon only after several months of deliberation and compromise in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787.
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THE PRESENTATIONAL ELECTION SYSTEM FORCES CANDIDATES TO FORM REASONABLE MAJORITIES-Uhlmann '08 [Michael M.; Professor of Politics and Policy at Claremont Graduate University; The Electoral College Strengthens Federalism; 2008; Gale Group Databases] The presidential election system helps to form reasonable majorities through the interaction of its three distinguishing attributes: the distribution and apportionment of electoral votes in accordance with the federal principle; the requirement that the winner garner a majority of electoral votes; and the custom (followed by 48 of 50 states) of awarding all of a state's electoral votes to the popular-vote victor within that state. Working together, these features link the presidency to the federal system, discourage third parties, and induce moderation on the part of candidates and interest groups alike. No candidate can win without a broad national coalition, assembled state by state yet compelled to transcend narrow geographic, economic, and social interests.
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ELECTORAL COLLEGE ENHANCES AMERICA'S CONFIDENCE IN THE OUTCOME OF ELECTIONS-Lowenstein '07 [Danial, Professor of Law at UCLA Law School; SHOULD WE DISPENSE WITH THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE?; University of Pennsylvania Pennumbra; 2007; 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 10] The Electoral College turns the many winners who fail to win a majority of the popular vote into majority winners. It also magnifies small majorities in the popular vote into large majorities. These effects of the Electoral College enhance Americans' confidence in the outcome of the election and thereby enhance the new president's ability to lead. Professor McGinnis addresses this point effectively, so I shall not elaborate further.
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THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE ENSURES THAT EACH POLITICAL PARTY IS BROAD-BASED AND MODERATE-Schramm '04 [Peter W.; Professor of Political Science at Ashland University; Is the Electoral College Passe?: No; Ashbook Center; 2004; Gale Group Databases] The Electoral College is the lynchpin in this constitutional structure. Although Alexander Hamilton admitted that it wasn't perfect, yet he called it "excellent." The framers of the Constitution debated at length how a president should be chosen before settling on the Electoral College. In large measure because of the Electoral College, each political party is broad-based and moderate. At the Constitutional Convention they twice defeated a plan to elect the president by direct vote, and also defeated a plan to have Congress elect the president. The latter would violate the separation of powers, while the former would, they argued, lead to what Hamilton called "the little arts of popularity," or what we call demagoguery. So they crafted the Electoral College. This has come to mean that every four years a temporary legislature in each state is elected by the people, whose sole purpose is to elect a president. It then dissolves, to reappear four years later. In other words we have a democratic election for president, but it is democratic within each state. Yet, within each state, the winner of the popular vote takes all the electoral votes of that state. Citizens in Colorado this month [November 2004] made the right decision to keep a winner-take-all system. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE FORCES CANDIDATES TO CREATE A WIDE NATIONAL BASE LEADING TO MODERATION OF THE PARTIES-Ross '04 [Tara; Attorney and Legal Writer; Enlightened Democracy: The Case for the Electoral College; 2004; page 89] Currently, presidential candidates must build a national base among the states before they can be elected. They cannot target any one interest group or regional minority. Instead, they must achieve a consensus among enough groups, spread out over many states, to create a broad-based following among the voters. Any other course of action will prevent a candidate from gaining the strong base he needs to win the election. The necessity of building such a national base has led to moderation and a strong two-party system in American politics. Third parties are not usually able to achieve more than a minimal base of power, particularly because they tend to target narrower or special-interest groups. Third parties or special interest groups can wield influence only by working toward consensus with one of the major parties. On their own, they cannot usually win more than a fraction of the electoral voteif they even manage to win that much. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE MEANS MODERATION, COMPROMISE, AND COALITION BUILDING-Ross '04 [Tara; Attorney and Legal Writer; Enlightened Democracy: The Case for the Electoral College; 2004; pages 99-100] Given the general inability to obtain majority consensus, the Electoral College provides the country with the next best alternative. Electing Presidents by states votes, rather than individuals votes, creates a method of electing a President who is a good compromise candidate for the majority of Americans. The Electoral College requires moderation, compromise, and coalition-building from any candidate before he can be successful. Direct elections and a system of runoffs discourage such behavior.
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THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE DECREASES THE IMPACT OF FRAUD-Ross '04 [Tara; Attorney and Legal Writer; Enlightened Democracy: The Case for the Electoral College; 2004; page 110] The Electoral College system cannot be said to completely eliminate the incentive for fraud. Where people are vying for power, there will always be motivation to cheat. That is human nature. A successful electoral system can hope only to isolate the incidents of dishonesty and provide controls on situations that would otherwise get completely out of hand. The Electoral College system isolates fraud to the state in which it occurred. In most elections, the national election cannot be changed without a concerted plan of action, spanning several states. Recounts, when necessary to ferret out illegal votes, can be isolated in a state or two. The country is given a definite election outcome, even in the face of electoral challenges.
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DIRECT ELECTION BAD: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE ISNT PERFECT, BUT BEATS ALTERNATIVES
ALTHOUGH THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE ISN'T PERFECT, IT IS BETTER THAN THE LIKELY ALTERNATIVES-McGinnis '07 [John, Professor of Law at Northwestern University School of Law; SHOULD WE DISPENSE WITH THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE?; University of Pennsylvania Pennumbra; 2007; 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 10] I must decline the first invitation of Professor Levinson's nicely executed attack on the Electoral College. I readily concede that it might well be possible to devise a somewhat better system for electing the president than the Electoral College. Our Constitution is surely not perfect in this as in other respects. But the salient question in politics is always one of alternatives and thus the issue before us is to compare the Electoral College not with the best law that could be enacted but with a range of possible laws that might be enacted. If one believes, as I do, that the Electoral College works pretty well and is risk averse about changing basic political institutions, one will be loath to innovate, given the vagaries of politics and unpredictability of the content of amendments and their interpretations. EVEN IF NOT PERFECT, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BETTER THAN ALL OF THE BETTER OPTIONS-Ross '04 [Tara; Attorney and Legal Writer; Enlightened Democracy: The Case for the Electoral College; 2004; page 158-159] The Electoral College is not perfect, nor is it realistic to expect perfection out of a presidential election process. A flawless presidential election system is surely impossible in an imperfect world. The Electoral College system, however, is unusually clever. It is certainly better than the other options, which often sound reasonable but work out poorly in practice.
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DIRECT ELECTION BAD: INCREASES THE COSTS OF ELECTIONS AND INCREASE CORPORATE INFLUENCE
DIRECT ELECTION WOULD CAUSE THE COST OF ELECTIONS TO SKYROCKET, PUTTING MORE INFLUENCE OF BIG DONORS AT PLAY-Chang '08 [Stanley; JD Candidate at Harvard Law School; RECENT DEVELOPMENT: UPDATING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE: THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE LEGISLATION; Harvard Journal on Legislation; Winter 2007; 44 Harv. J. on Legis. 205] The skyrocketing cost of Presidential campaigns is already controversial, but a transition to a nationwide popular vote in which every vote counts may increase costs even more rapidly. For the 2004 election, the major candidates for President raised a total of approximately $ 919 million. n148 Both major party nominees also opted out of the federal matching fund program during the primaries, which would have set an overall spending cap and limits in individual states. In the future, more candidates are expected to follow this opt-out practice, which will probably contribute to further escalations in fundraising and spending. n149 The increased cost of a national Presidential campaign has gone largely unnoticed in the debate on a direct popular vote for President. n150 The practical difficulties of conducting a comprehensive nationwide campaign should be of substantial concern to NPV supporters. It seems quite likely that a fifty-state campaign would be much costlier than the present sixteen-state campaign. Instead of buying advertisements on local television stations, the candidates would probably need to buy time on the national networks, which although vastly more expensive than the local stations would still be the most cost-effective way to reach large numbers of voters. n151 The cost of candidates' direct mailings, automated calling, phone banking, public rallies, polling, radio advertising, canvassing, and other operations--all expensive already--would further increase, if expanded nationwide. The suddenly magnified need for fundraising and the accompanying increase in the stature of major contributors could exacerbate the perception that elites and large corporations hold disproportionate influence over the presidency. The influence of money on politics, already criticized, would almost certainly come under greater scrutiny as campaign expenditures ballooned. A serious study of the effects of nationwide direct election on campaign [*228] expenditures is essential in evaluating the ultimate desirability of the NPV legislation.
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DIRECT ELECTION BAD: ELIMINATING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE RISKS CHAIN REACTION
DIRECT ELECTIONS WOULD BRING A LAUNDRY LIST OF EVILS TO OUR ELECTION PROCESS-Uhlmann '08 [Michael M.; Professor of Politics and Policy at Claremont Graduate University; The Electoral College Strengthens Federalism; 2008; Gale Group Databases] As the late Rodney Dangerfield might say, the Electoral College just don't get no respect. Polls show that most Americans, given the opportunity, would cashier it tomorrow in favor of so-called direct election. That they'd live to regret their decision only reminds us of H. L. Mencken's definition of democracy: a form of government in which the people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard. What the people would get by choosing direct election is the disintegration of the state-based two-party system; the rise of numerous factional parties based on region, class, ideology, or cult of personality; radicalized public opinion, frequent runoff elections, widespread electoral fraud, and centralized control of the electoral process; and, ultimately, unstable national government that veers between incompetence and tyrannical caprice. And that's only a partial list. CHANGING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE WOULD CREATE A CHAIN REACTION THROUGHOUT OUR POLITICAL SYSTEMUhlmann '08 [Michael M.; Professor of Politics and Policy at Claremont Graduate University; The Electoral College Strengthens Federalism; 2008; Gale Group Databases] Reformers tend to assume that the mode of the presidential election can be changed without affecting anything else. Not so. As Sen. John F. Kennedy argued in the 1950s, by changing the method of the presidential election, you change not only the presidency but the entire political solar system of which it is an integral part. The presidency is at once the apex of our constitutional structure and the grand prize of the party system. Our method of selecting a president is the linchpin that holds both together. Capturing the presidency is the principal raison d'tre of our political parties, whose structure, thanks to the electoral-vote system, mirrors the uniquely federal structure of the Constitution. This means that two-party competition is the norm; in a country of America's size and diversity, that is no small virtue. ELIMINATING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE MIGHT CREATE NEGATIVE IMPACTS THAT CAN'T BE KNOWN UNTIL WE ACTUALLY TAKE THE ACTION-McGinnis '07 [John, Professor of Law at Northwestern University School of Law; SHOULD WE DISPENSE WITH THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE?; University of Pennsylvania Pennumbra; 2007; 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 10] Professor Levinson's other complaints about the Electoral College also do not show that it fails in any essential function. He argues that that the Electoral College redounds to the advantage of small states. But the states actually most advantaged by the current system are large states. It is true that small states get an advantage due to the "senatorial bonus" (the two electoral votes awarded any state regardless of population). But so long as states vote under rules awarding the winner all the state's electoral votes, this advantage is overwhelmed by the greater likelihood that the large state will prove decisive. Mathematicians better than I have calculated, in fact, that the voter in California counts more than twice as much as the voter in Wyoming in a presidential election. Oddly enough, the Electoral College compensates in some measure for the gross disadvantages large state voters suffer from the malapportionment of the Senate. I know Professor Levinson objects to the structure of Senate as well (with greater reason than to the presidential election system), but until that structure is changed, he may want to reconsider at least this aspect of his opposition to the College. This point is a small example of a larger truth. Changing complex rules in a reticulated system may have secondary effects not apparent on the surface.
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ELIMINATING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE MIGHT CREATE A YEAR 2000 FLORIDA PROBLEM IN THE WHOLE NATIONLowenstein '07 [Danial, Professor of Law at UCLA Law School; SHOULD WE DISPENSE WITH THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE?; University of Pennsylvania Pennumbra; 2007; 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 10] As I mentioned above, the kind of Burkeanism I subscribe to is the kind that places a high premium on learning from experience. The experience of the last several years has made two additional benefits of the Electoral College evident. The first is the lesson from Florida 2000, that the Electoral College has the great merit of confining such election conflicts to one state (or a few, as in 1876). It is true that there is some weight on both sides of the scale on this question. A squeaky close race in a single state is more likely than a squeaky close vote in a national popular election, because of the smaller number of total votes. The greater likelihood of a contest at the state level no doubt holds, even when one adds that it needs to be a pivotal state in the Electoral College. Point for Professor Levinson. But the greater point is that both types of problem are very unlikely, though both are also possible. So the tiny absolute difference in the probability is outweighed by the far more catastrophic effects that would occur if we were confronted by a Florida-type conflict in which the whole country was up for grabs. Game for the Electoral College. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS AN IMPORTANT LAYER OF PROTECTION AND SHOULDN'T BE MESSED WITH-Ross '04 [Tara; Attorney and Legal Writer; Enlightened Democracy: The Case for the Electoral College; 2004; page 10] It is dangerous to keep or change constitutional provisions just to accommodate one person. Good arguments can often be made for one trustworthy or sympathetic individualbut the status of one individual in one situation is never the primary concern. After all, others may later come along who are untrustworthy or unsympathetic. The most important goal of the Constitution is to protect the freedom of Americans from these latter individuals or situations, even if it sometimes means placing restrictions on people who have elicited our compassion or confidence. Americans would not, for example, consider repealing their right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,35 simply because the current Attorney General is an upright and moral man who has promised to use his newfound freedom solely to fight terrorists. Even if that Attorney General is truly honorable, what guarantee is there that his successor will not abuse the power? Nor would Americans give up their right to a trial by jury simply because the current batch of judges seems especially fair and impartial.36 These and other provisions in our Constitution exist to protect Americans freedom when undeserving people follow principled people into office. In many cases, the Constitution may even provide two or three layers of security against those individuals who would abuse the power of government once given the opportunity to do so. The Electoral College serves as one of these many layers of protection. Americans should not decide to alter it based upon the outcome of one election that may or may not have gone their wayeven if a popular vote winner faced with legal disputes in one state cuts an extraordinarily sympathetic figure. A more honest intellectual exercise is to consider carefully the benefits and protections offered by the presidential election process as a whole, over time, regardless of the caliber of candidates who seek the office of President. ALTHOUGH THE CHANCE IS REMOTE, ELIMINATING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE MAY MEAN FASCISM!-Ross '04 [Tara; Attorney and Legal Writer; Enlightened Democracy: The Case for the Electoral College; 2004; page 100] Granted, America is a long way away from such a multi-party, fractured political system. Psychologically, if nothing else, the electorate is used to thinking in terms of a two-party system. It could take a while before the system deteriorated. However, if the Electoral College facilitated the growth of the two-party system that has brought so much stability to American elections, would it not be natural to assume that eliminating the Electoral College would eventually lead to the end of the nations stable two-party system? Even if the danger of an American election featuring Fascists and Communists is somewhat remote, why remove one of the safeguards that have kept such a scenario exactly that remote?
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OTHER COUNTRIES PROVE THAT DIRECT ELECTION INCREASES EXTREMISM AND RADICALISM-Ross '04 [Tara; Attorney and Legal Writer; Enlightened Democracy: The Case for the Electoral College; 2004; page 100] Other electoral systems utilizing a direct popular vote have seen increased influence by extremist, radical groups due to the fractured nature of the popular vote. Professor Robert Hardaway of the University of Denver has noted the results of a December 14, 1993 Russian election in this context. In that election, the top three candidates were the liberal Democratic (or Fascist) Party (23 percent), the Peoples Choice Party (13 percent) and the Communist Party (11 percent). In other words, Russia was two percent away from having a runoff between Fascists and Communists, even with a democratic election and 66 percent of the population voting for other candidates.260 Historical evidence in other historical systems, Professor Hardaway notes, reveals similar results.
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DIRECT ELECTION BAD: WILL BRING THE FEARED TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY
FOUNDING FATHERS DIDN'T WANT A DIRECT DEMOCRACY BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED IT BROUGHT TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY-Ross '04 [Tara; Author and Political Writer; The Electoral College: Enlightened Democracy; Legal Memorandum from the Heritage Foundation; 1 November 2004; Gale Group Databases] The authors of the Constitution had studied the history of many failed democratic systems, and they strove to create a different form of government. Indeed, James Madison, delegate from Virginia, argued that unfettered majorities such as those found in pure democracies tend toward tyranny. Madison stated it this way: [In a pure democracy], [a] common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and results from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Alexander Hamilton agreed that "[t]he ancient democracies, in which the people themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of good government. Their very character was tyranny; their figure, deformity." Other early Americans concurred. John Adams, who signed the Declaration of Independence and later became President, declared, "[D]emocracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts, and murders itself. There never was a democracy yet that did not commit suicide." Another signatory to the Declaration of Independence, Benjamin Rush, stated, "A simple democracy ... is one of the greatest of evils.
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DIRECT NATIONAL ELECTIONS WOULD FOCUS CAMPAIGN RESOURCES COMPLETELY ON URBAN AND SUBURBAN POPULATION CENTERS-Franck '08 [Mathew; Professor and Chairman of the Political Science Department at Radford University; Junk Arguments Against the Electoral College; The National Review; 15 December 2008; http://www.nationalreview.com/benchmemos/50572/junk-arguments-against-electoral-college/matthew-j-franck; retrieved 2 October 2011] Soross other argument is that this year, for instance, the two major candidates devoted more than 98% of their television ad spending and campaign events to just 15 states which together make up about a third of the U.S. population. (Im not sure I trust that 98% figure, but let that go.) In any electoral environment, the candidates resources will go wherever the payoff is likely to be greatestand that means slighting the scenes of victories you can take for granted as much as those where your defeat is assured. So where would candidates resources be more efficiently expended in an electoral environment in which only the national popular vote mattered? Most likely, we would see campaigning in urban centers and vote-rich near suburbs. The northeast corridor (D.C. to Boston), the great cities of the West and Gulf coasts and the Great Lakes (from San Diego to Seattle, from Mobile to Houston, and from Buffalo to Milwaukee)many of them taken for granted in recent electionswould suddenly become relevant, and would remain permanently so as long as they retained their prominence as dense population centers. Some of the great river cities on the Missouri and Mississippi and Ohio might get some attention too. Advertising in and candidate travel to these rich seams of votes would be the order of the day. Oh, and has anyone noticed that most of them are biased heavily to the Democratic Party? Im sure that has nothing to do with the proposals popularity. Who would lose out? The states and localities in flyover countrythe rural areas, the small towns, the more culturally conservative parts of the country.
IN DIRECT ELECTIONS, SMALL STATES WOULD LOSE ATTENTION AND VOICE -Ross '04 [Tara; Author and Political Writer; The Electoral College: Enlightened Democracy; Legal Memorandum from the Heritage Foundation; 1 November 2004; Gale Group Databases] A second argument made by critics is similarly flawed. Although the winner-take-all system causes large states (especially large swing states) to elicit more attention than small states, these critics erroneously compare the amount of campaigning in small versus large states under the current system. They should instead compare the treatment of small states under the current system against the treatment they would receive under a new one. Today, small states undoubtedly receive less attention than large states (unless, of course, the large state is considered a safe state). However, a direct vote system would magnify, not improve, this problem because it would encourage a focus on highly populated areas. Small states would likely never receive as much attention as their larger neighbors. The goal is not to eliminate this disparity, but to minimize its severity. Under the Electoral College system, the states are as evenly represented as possible, given that they are not all the same size.
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POPULAR VOTE WOULD DECREASE THE INCENTIVE FOR VOTER FRAUD-Robb '08 [Brandon H.; MAKING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE WORK TODAY: THE AGREEMENT AMONG THE STATES TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE; Loyola Law Review; Summer 2008; 54 Loy. L. Rev. 419] Switching to a national popular election, if anything, would create a disincentive for voter fraud, given the extraordinary lengths a party would have to go to in order to succeed with it, and the greater likelihood that any such Herculean voterigging plot would be discovered and its perpetrators punished. In addition, a losing presidential candidate would be far less likely to contest an election if it involved having to "overturn" an election [*460] in which their opponent won by hundreds of thousands or millions of votes nationwide instead of by just several thousand votes in a few states, like in 1960, n258 or a few hundred votes in one state, like in 2000. n259
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NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE PLAN IS BIZARRE-Detweiler '06 [George; Former Assistant General in Idaho and Constitutional Law Specialist; Assault on the Electoral College: A Plan to Give the Presidency to the Candidate with the Most Nationwide Votes Would Make Less-populous States Irrelevant in Presidential Elections; The New American; 26 June 2006; page 33] Rankled by any institution which they perceive as less than pure democracy, these populists proposed a National Popular Vote Plan to change the way America chooses its chief executive. Each state's legislature is encouraged to enact legislation establishing a new, uniform method of selecting presidential electors. The program involves an agreement among participating states and goes into effect when adopted by enough states to constitute a majority (270) of the votes in the electoral college. The structure of the agreement is bizarre: Each member state conducts a popular election for president and vice president. The chief election officer of each state must determine the total popular vote for president/vice president in the entire nation even though some states may not have subscribed to the agreement. This is denominated the "national popular vote total." Presidential candidates will name their own state of electors. The state election officer will appoint the state of electors pledged to the candidate who is chosen as the "national popular vote winner" to be the official electors for the state. It is now common practice for states to elect their presidential electors on the popular ballot, with the names of these electors appearing beside the presidential candidate whom they are pledged to support. This will be changed by the new system, and presidential electors will no longer be chosen by popular vote, but by one person onlythe chief election officer in each member state. Note that the presidential candidate declared to be the "national popular vote winner" may thus win a state's electors even though he lost the popular vote in that state. In member states, the chief election officer's determination of the "national popular vote total" is final and no provision for recount (an impossibility since it could be a nationwide recount) is made. Neither is there provision for judicial or other relief in the event of voter fraud. Special provisions are made to break tie votes in the popular presidential vote. If any member state (acting only through its chief elections officer) selects too few or too many electors, the presidential candidate declared to be the "national popular vote winner" may appoint the presidential electors for that state. Note that the job of choosing the state's electors is thereby transferred to someone who is not a holder of public office nor even a citizen of the state in question. Any member state can withdraw from the agreement, except for a window of six months prior to the expiration of a presidential term. If the withdrawal occurs within that window, it is effective only after an intervening presidential election. The agreement terminates automatically if the electoral college is abolishedthe real goal of the plan and its supporters. NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE PLAN VIOLATES THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION-Detweiler '06 [George; Former Assistant General in Idaho and Constitutional Law Specialist; Assault on the Electoral College: A Plan to Give the Presidency to the Candidate with the Most Nationwide Votes Would Make Less-populous States Irrelevant in Presidential Elections; The New American; 26 June 2006; page 33] Does the Constitution permit a state to select its presidential electors by a means other than popular election? Yes. The electoral college's enabling provision uses the word "appoint" rather than "choose" or "elect." However, in Article 1, Section 10, the Constitution also declares: "No State shall, without the consent of Congress ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State." Congress would be likely to approve a National Popular Vote Plan if popular support gave the plan impetus: nevertheless, it is significant that the plan has no mention of any mechanism for securing, or even the need to get, congressional approval.
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NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE PLAN WILL CREATE ENDLESS LITIGATION AROUND ELECTIONS-Detweiler '06 [George; Former Assistant General in Idaho and Constitutional Law Specialist; Assault on the Electoral College: A Plan to Give the Presidency to the Candidate with the Most Nationwide Votes Would Make Less-populous States Irrelevant in Presidential Elections; The New American; 26 June 2006; page 33] Constitutional infirmities linger. The Constitution empowers each state legislature to determine how its presidential electors are chosen. By adopting the National Popular Vote Plan, a state delegates this power to the entire nation based on who wins the national popular vote. Both federal and state laws recognize that some powers are delegable, while others are not. Is this a power capable of delegation under either the federal or the various state constitutions? Will state or federal judges be able to grant injunctions in case of violations of election laws? The plan is, after all, a mix of the laws of many states coupled with congressional approval. The plan itself makes no provision for such relief. In such a situation, it would be a legal stretch for a judge to grant an injunction without specific statutory authority. What happens if a state withdraws from the agreement during the six-month window and fails to wait for an intervening presidential election as required by the plan before it pursues its own election laws? No other state has jurisdiction to prevent it. The plan provides no remedy and neither does federal law. All of these issues are food for protracted, unnecessary, costly litigation. THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE PLAN IS FRAUGHT WITH EVIL INTENTIONS-Detweiler '06 [George; Former Assistant General in Idaho and Constitutional Law Specialist; Assault on the Electoral College: A Plan to Give the Presidency to the Candidate with the Most Nationwide Votes Would Make Less-populous States Irrelevant in Presidential Elections; The New American; 26 June 2006; page 33] Despite the litany of infirmities, the National Popular Vote Plan has been introduced in a number of states including California. To date, none has completed the process of enacting it into law. It is important to remember that it is easier to oppose and stop bad legislation than it is to repeal it after it has passed. The usual suspects of the left-wing press ran with the story of the National Popular Vote Plan after it was announced at the press conference. Predictably, it has the New York Times' endorsement. The Times urged state legislatures to enact it. Falling in line were the Chicago Sun-Times, the Minneapolis Star Tribune, the Denver Post, the Houston Chronicle, and others. The National Popular Vote Plan is, or should be, an embarrassment to its promoters. To borrow a buzz word form the national education debate, it lacks "intelligent design." It is fraught with evil intentions. It must never be implemented.
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NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE PLAN VIOLATES THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT-Gringer '08 [David; WHY THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE PLAN IS THE WRONG WAY TO ABOLISH THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE; Columbia Law Review; January 2008; 108 Colum. L. Rev. 182] Aware of the difficulties of a constitutional amendment, several scholars have suggested what has become the National Popular Vote Plan (NPV). n32 The NPV's sponsors have developed a strikingly simple method for evading the constitutional amendment process. Under the NPV, a state, either through its legislature or via initiative, would pledge its electoral college votes to the winner of the nationwide popular vote. If enough states agreed to participate (a number of states whose combined electoral vote total exceeds 270 votes would suffice), the electoral college would be effectively abolished in favor of direct election of the President. The plan seems to encounter no constitutional barrier because the Constitution allows states broad discretion to choose a method of selecting presidential electors. n33 The NPV does, however, risk violating either section 2 or 5 of the Voting Rights Act. n34 Since its inception in 1965, the Voting Rights Act has guarded against racially discriminatory voting practices. n35 Its two most significant [*188] provisions are sections 2 n36 and 5 n37 of the Act. n38 Section 2 prohibits all states and their subdivisions from denying minorities the opportunity to "participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." n39 Section 5 requires certain jurisdictions to submit all changes to voting procedures to either the Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for preclearance. n40 Part I.B.1 discusses the standards courts have applied to determine what changes must be precleared and when preclearance should be denied under section 5 of the Act. Part I.B.2 presents current issues surrounding claims of minority vote dilution under section 2 of the Act. NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE PLAN PUTS THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE HANDS IN AS FEW AS 11 STATES-Gringer '08 [David; WHY THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE PLAN IS THE WRONG WAY TO ABOLISH THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE; Columbia Law Review; January 2008; 108 Colum. L. Rev. 182] As states begin their 2007-2008 legislative sessions, the NPV appears to be gaining support across the country. n296 Initially viewed by many as an ingenious pipedream, n297 it is possible that enough states will have joined the NPV to make it a reality by the 2012 election. Although we have come close before, n298 it appears that this time the electoral college might finally be in jeopardy. Such a dramatic deviation from the intent of the Framers requires a legitimate political process - not simply legislation passed by as few as eleven state legislatures. n299 Moreover, if state legislatures adopt the NPV, presidential elections will be forced into the murky arena of Voting Rights Act jurisprudence, ensuring vast amounts of litigation.
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