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ITERATION OF -COMPLETE FORCING NOTIONS NOT
COLLAPSING
+
.
ANDRZEJ ROS LANOWSKI AND SAHARON SHELAH
Abstract. We look for a parallel to the notion of proper forcing
among -complete forcing notions not collapsing
+
. We suggest such
a denition and prove that it is preserved by suitable iterations.
0. Introduction
This work follows [Sh 587] and [Sh 667] (and see history there), but we
do not rely on those papers. Our goal in this and the previous papers is to
develop a theory parallel to properness in CS iterations for iterations with
larger supports. In [Sh 587], [Sh 667] we have presented parallels to [Sh 64]
and [Sh:98], whereas here we try to have parallels to [Sh 100], [Sh:b, Ch.III],
[Sh:b, Ch.V,5-7] and hopefully [Sh:f, Ch.VI], [Sh:f, Ch.XVIII].
It seems too much to hope for a notion fully parallel to proper among
-complete forcing notions as even for
+
-c.c. -complete there are prob-
lems. We should also remember about ZFC limitations for possible iteration
theorems. For example, if in the denition of the forcing notion Q

in Sec-
tion 3 we demand h
p
e

, then the proof fails. This may seem a


drawback, but one should look at [Sh:f, AP, p.985, 3.6(2) and p.990, 3.9].
By it, if o

= o

, and (A

, h

are as in 3.4 and) we ask a success on a club,


then for some h

: o

) we fail. Now, if we allow only h

: A

2
and we ask for success of the uniformization on an end segment of A

(for
all such A

: o

)), then we also fail as we may code colourings with


values in .
In the rst section we formulate our denitions (including properness over
, see 1.3). We believe that our main Denition 1.3 is quite reasonable
and applicable. One may also dene a version of it where the diamond is
spread out. The second section is devoted to the proof of the preservation
theorem, and the next one gives three (relatively easy) examples of forcing
notions tting our scheme. We conclude the paper with the discussion of
applications and variants.
Key words and phrases. Forcing, iterations, not collapsing cardinals, proper.
Both authors would like to thank the United States-Israel Binational Science Founda-
tion for partial support. This publication has number 655 in Shelahs list.
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2 ANDRZEJ ROS LANOWSKI AND SAHARON SHELAH
Notation 0.1. Our notation is rather standard and compatible with that of
classical textbooks (like Jech [J]). In forcing we keep the older (Cohens)
convention that a stronger condition is the larger one.
(1) For a lter D on , the family of all Dpositive subsets of is called
D
+
. (So A D
+
if and only if A and AB ,= for all B D.)
(2) Every forcing notion P under considerations is assumed to have the
weakest condition
P
, i.e., (p P)(
P

P
p). Also we assume / P
is a xed object belonging to all the Ns we consider.
(3) A tilde indicates that we are dealing with a name for an object in a
forcing extension (like x

). The canonical Pname for the Pgeneric


lter over V is denoted by G

P
. In iterations, if

Q = P

, Q

: <

) and p lim(

Q), then we keep convention that p() =

for

Dom(p).
(4) Ordinal numbers will be denoted be the lower case initial letters of
the Greek alphabet (, , . . .) and also by i, j (with possible sub-
and superscripts).
(5) A bar above a letter denotes that the object considered is a sequence;
usually

X will be X
i
: i < )), where denotes the length of

X.
Often our sequences will be indexed by a set of ordinals, say o ,
and then

X will typically be X

: o). Semidiamond sequences


will be called

F (with possible superscripts).
In our denitions (and proofs) we will use somewhat special diamondlike
sequences (see 1.1(2)). The dierence between them and classical diamonds
is quite minor, so let us remind the following.
Denition 0.2. (1) Let D be a lter on . We say that

F = F

:
o) is a Ddiamond sequence if o D
+
, F



for o, and
(f

)( o : F

f D
+
).
We may also call such

F a (D, o)diamond sequence.
(2) We say that (D, o) has diamonds if there is a (D, o)diamond. We
say that D has diamonds if D is a normal lter on and for every
o D
+
there is a (D, o)diamond.
Denition 0.3. A forcing notion P is complete if every
P
increasing
chain of length less than has an upper bound in P. It is lubcomplete if
every
P
increasing chain of length less than has a least upper bound in
P.
Proposition 0.4. (1) If D is a lter on , then the family of all diago-
nal intersections of members of D constitutes a normal lter (but in
general not necessarily proper). We call this family the normal lter
generated by D.
(2) If P is a complete forcing notion and D is a normal lter on
, then in V
P
the lter D generates a proper normal lter on .
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ITERATION OF -COMPLETE FORCING NOTIONS 3
[Abusing notation, we will denote this lter also by D or, if we want
to stress that we work in the forcing extension, by D
V[G
P
]
.]
Moreover, by the completeness of P, if X D
+
V, then
P
X
D
+
, and if X V, p
P
X D
V
P
then X D.
(3) If P is a complete forcing notion and

F = F

: o) is a
Ddiamond sequence, then

P


F is a Ddiamond sequence .
Denition 0.5 and Proposition 0.6 below are not central for us, but they
may be used to get somewhat stronger results, see [Sh:F509].
Denition 0.5. Let pr be a denable pairing function on , for example
pr(, ) =
+
+, and let

F = F

: o) be a Ddiamond sequence.
For an ordinal < we let

F
[]
= F
[]

: o), where each F


[]

is a
function with domain and such that
F
[]

() =

(pr(, )) if well dened,


0 otherwise.
Proposition 0.6. If

F is a Ddiamond sequence, then for every < ,

F
[]
is also a Ddiamond sequence.
Throughout the paper we will assume the following:
Context 0.7. (a) is an uncountable cardinal, =
<
, and
(b) D is a normal lter on (usually D is the club lter T

on ),
(c) o D
+
contains all successor ordinals below , 0 / o, and o

= o
is unbounded in ,
(d) there is a (D, o)diamond sequence.
1. The definitions
In this section we dene a special genericity game, properness over (D, o)
semi diamonds and the class of forcing notions we are interested in.
Denition 1.1. Let P be a forcing notion and let N (H(), , <

) be
such that |N| = , N
<
N and , P, D, o N. Let h : N be
such that the range Rang(h) of the function h includes P N.
(1) We say that

F = F

: o) is a (D, o)semi diamond sequence if


F



for o and
() for every
P
increasing sequence p = p

: < ) P N we
have
o : ( < )(h F

() = p

) D
+
.
(2) Let

F be a (D, o)semi diamond. A sequence q = q

: o) N
P is called an (N, h, P)candidate over

F (or: (N, h, P,

F)candidate)
whenever
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4 ANDRZEJ ROS LANOWSKI AND SAHARON SHELAH
() for every open dense subset 1 N of P
o : q

1 = o mod D,
and
() if o is a limit ordinal and h F

() : < ) is a
P

increasing sequence of members of P N,


then q

is its upper bound in P.


(3) Let q be an (N, h, P,

F)candidate and r P. We dene a game
(r, N, h, P,

F, q) of two players, the generic player and the anti-
generic player, as follows. A play lasts moves, in the i
th
move
conditions r

i
, r
i
P and a set C
i
D are chosen such that
r

i
N, r

i
r
i
, r r
i
,
(j < i)(r
j
r
i
& r

j
r

i
), and
the generic player chooses r

i
, r
i
, C
i
if i o, and the anti-generic
player chooses r

i
, r
i
, C
i
if i o

.
If at some moment during the play there is no legal move for one of
the players, then the anti-generic player wins. If the play lasted
moves, then the generic player wins the play whenever
() if o

i<
C
i
is a limit ordinal, and h F

() : < ) =
r

: < ), then q

.
(4) Let q be an (N, h, P,

F)candidate,

F a (D, o)semi diamond. A
condition r P is (N, h, P)generic for q over

F if the generic player
has a winning strategy in the game (r, N, h, P,

F, q).
Observation 1.2. (1) In the game (r, N, h, P,

F, q), for each of the play-
ers, if it increases conditions r

i
, r
i
, its choice can only improve its
situation. Making sets C
i
(for i o) smaller can only help the
generic player.
(2) If forcing with P does not add new subsets to , then the game in
Denition 1.1(5) degenerates as without loss of generality r forces
a value to G

P
N; the condition does not degenerate, in fact this
condition (which implies adding no new sequences) is preserved
by (<
+
)support iterations (see [Sh 587]).
(3) Also if o
1
o mod D, o
1
D
+
, then in Denition 1.1 we can
replace o by o
1
. (Again, the generic player can guarantee C
i
o
1

o.)
(4) If P is complete and r is (N, P)generic (in the usual sense, i.e.,
r
P
N[G

P
] V = N ), then both players have always legal moves
in the game (r, N, h, P,

F, q).
Also if the forcing notion P is lubcomplete, then both players
have always legal moves in the game (r, N, h, P,

F, q) (for any r).
Denition 1.3. (1) Let o D
+
. We say that a forcing notion P
is proper over (D, o)semi diamonds whenever (there is a (D, o)
diamond and):
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ITERATION OF -COMPLETE FORCING NOTIONS 5
(a) P is complete, and
(b) if is large enough, p P and N (H(), , <

), |N| = ,
N
<
N and , p, P, D, o, . . . N, and h : N satises
PN Rang(h), and

F is a (D, o)semi diamond for (N, h, P),
and q = q

: o) is an (N, h, P,

F)candidate,
then there is r P stronger than p and such that r is (N, h, P)
generic for q over

F.
(2) P is said to be proper over Dsemi diamonds if it is proper over
(D, o)semi diamonds for every o D
+
(so D has diamonds). The
family of forcing notions proper over Dsemi diamonds is denoted
K
1
D
.
(3) A forcing notion P is proper over if it is proper over Dsemi dia-
monds for every normal lter D on which has diamonds.
Remark 1.4. Does D matter? Yes, as we may use some large D and be
interested in preserving its largeness properties.
Proposition 1.5. If P is a
+
complete forcing notion, then P is proper
over .
Proof. Straightforward.
Proposition 1.6. (1) If N, P, h are as in 1.1, P is -complete, and

F
is a (D, o)semi diamond, then there is an (N, h, P,

F)candidate.
In fact we can even demand:
(+) if 1 N is an open dense subset of P, then q

1 for every
large enough .
(2) Let r be (N, h, P)generic over

F for some (N, h, P,

F)candidate q.
Then
(a) if r

i
, r
i
, C
i
: i < ) is a result of a play of (r, N, h, P,

F, q) in
which the generic player uses its winning strategy, then
G

= p P N : (i < )(p r
i
)
is a subset of P N generic over N, and
(b) r is (N, P)generic (in the usual sense).
(3) If P is proper over (D, o)semi diamonds, , Y []

, Y V,
then:
(a) forcing with P does not collapse
+
,
(b) forcing with P preserves the following two properties:
(i) Y is a conal subset of []

(under inclusion),
(ii) for every large enough and x H(), there is N
(H(), ) such that |N| = , N
+

+
, N
<
N,
N Y (i.e., the stationarity of Y under the relevant
lter).
Proof. 1) Immediate (by the completeness of P).
2) Clause (a) should be clear (remember 1.1(2)()). For clause (b) note
that 0 o

, so in the game (r, N, h, P,



F, q) the condition r
0
is chosen by
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6 ANDRZEJ ROS LANOWSKI AND SAHARON SHELAH
the anti-generic player. So if the conclusion fails, then for some Pname

N for an ordinal we have r ,

N . Thus the anti-generic player


can choose r
0
so that r
0

=
0
for some ordinal
0
/ N, what
guarantees it to win the play.
3) Straightforward from 2).
Very often checking properness over Dsemi diamonds (for particular ex-
amples of forcing notions) we get somewhat stronger properties, which mo-
tivate the following denition.
Denition 1.7. We say that a condition r P is Ngeneric for Dsemi
diamonds if it is (N, h, P)generic for q over

F whenever h, q,

F are as in
1.1. Omitting D we mean for every normal lter D with diamonds.
The following notion is not of main interest in this paper, but surely it is
interesting from the point of view of general theory.
Denition 1.8. Let 0 < <
+
.
(1) Let o D
+
. We say that a forcing notion P is proper over (D, o)
semi diamonds whenever
(a) P is complete, and
(b) if is large enough, p P and


N = N

: < ) is an increasing sequence of elementary


submodels of (H(), ) such that |N

| = , N
<

,
, p, P,

N N

, and

= F

: o), F



(for < ),
h

: N

, PN

Rang(h

) and h

,

F

: < )
N

, and

is a (D, o)semi diamond sequence for (N

, h

, P),
and
q

= q

: o) is an (N

, h

, P)candidate over

F

,
and q

: < ) N

,
then there is r P above p which is (N

, h

, P)generic for q

over

F

for each < .


(2) We dene P is proper over Dsemi diamonds (and K

D
) and P
is proper over in a way parallel to 1.3(2,3).
Remark 1.9. Note that for = 1 (in Denition 1.8) we get the same notions
as in Denition 1.3.
2. The preservation theorem
In 2.7 below we prove a preservation theorem for our forcing notions. It
immediately gives the consistency of the suitable Forcing Axiom, see 4.1.
Also the proof actually species which semi-diamond sequences

F are used.
First, recall that
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ITERATION OF -COMPLETE FORCING NOTIONS 7
Proposition 2.1. Suppose that P

, Q

: <

) is a (<
+
)support
iteration such that for each <

P
Q

is complete.
Then the forcing P

is complete.
Before we engage in the proof of the preservation theorem, let us prove
some facts of more general nature than the one of our main context. If, e.g.,
all iterands are lubcomplete, then Proposition 2.3 below is obvious.
Temporary Context 2.2. Let

Q = P

, Q

: <

) be a (<
+
)support
iteration of complete forcing notions. We also suppose that N is a model
as in 1.1,

Q, . . . N.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose that (

+1)N is a limit ordinal of conality


cf() < and r P

is such that
( N)

r is (N, P

)generic.

Assume that conditions s

N P

(for < , < ) are such that


(

< < )(s

r).
Then there are conditions s N P

and r
+
P

such that s r
+
, r r
+
and ( < )(s

s).
Proof. Let i

: < cf()) N be a strictly increasing continuous


sequence conal in . By induction on choose r

, r

such that
() r

P
i
N is above (in P
i
) of all s

for < ,
() r

P
i
, r


P
i
r

, and r i

,
() if < < cf() then r

and r

.
(The choice is clearly possible as r i

is (N, P
i
)generic.)
Let r
+
P

be an upper bound of r

: < cf()) (remember clause ()


above); then also r r
+
. Now we are going to dene a condition s P

N.
We let Dom(s) =

Dom(r

+1
)[i

, i
+1
) : < cf(), and for Dom(s),
i

< i
+1
, we let s() be a P

name for the following object in V[G


P

]
(for a generic lter G
P

over V):
(i) If r

+1
()[G
P

] is an upper bound of s

()[G
P

] : < in Q

[G
P

],
then s()[G
P

] = r

+1
()[G
P

].
(ii) If not (i), but s

()[G
P

] : < has an upper bound in Q

[G
P

],
then s()[G
P

] is the <

rst such upper bound.


(iii) If neither (i) nor (ii), then s()[G
P

] = s
0
()[G
P

].
It should be clear that s P

N. Now,
s r
+
.
Why? By induction on N we show that s r
+
. Steps = 0
and limit are clear, so suppose that we have proved s r
+
,
i

< i
+1
(and we are interested in the restrictions to + 1). Assume
that G
P

is a generic lter over V such that r


+
G
P

. Since
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8 ANDRZEJ ROS LANOWSKI AND SAHARON SHELAH
s

i
+1
r

+1
r
+1
r
+
, we also have s

: < G
P

and
r

+1
G
P

. Hence r

+1
()[G
P

] is an upper bound of s

()[G
P

] : <
. Therefore, s()[G
P

] = r

+1
()[G
P

] r
+1
()[G
P

] r
+
()[G
P

] (see
(i) above) and we are done.
The proof of the proposition will be nished once we show
( < )(s

s).
Why does this hold? By induction on N we show that s

s
for all < . Steps = 0 and limit are as usual clear, so suppose
that we have proved s

s (for < ), i

< i
+1
(and we are
interested in the restrictions to + 1). Assume that G
P

is a generic
lter over V such that s G
P

. Then also (by the inductive hypothesis)


s

: < G
P

and therefore s

()[G
P

] : < ) is an increasing
sequence of conditions from the (complete) forcing Q

[G
P

]. Thus this
sequence has an upper bound, and s()[G
P

] is such an upper bound (see (i)


and (ii) above), as required.
In the proof of the preservation theorem we will (like in the proof of the
preservation of properness [Sh:f, Ch.III, 3.3]) have to deal with names for
conditions in the iteration. This motivates the following denition (which
is in the spirit of [Sh:f, Ch.X], so this is why RS).
Denition 2.4. (1) An RScondition in P

is a pair (p, w) such that


w [(

+1)]
<
is a closed set, 0,

w, p is a function with domain


Dom(p)

, and
()
1
for every two successive members

<

of the set w, p [

)
is a P

name of an element of P

whose domain is included in


the interval [

).
The family of all RSconditions in P

is denoted by P
RS

.
(2) If (p, w) P
RS

and G
P

is a generic lter over V, then we


write (p, w)

G
P

whenever
()
2
for every two successive members

<

of the set w,
(p [

))[G
P

] G
P

.
(3) If (p
1
, w
1
), (p
2
, w
2
) P
RS

, then we write (p
1
, w
1
)

(p
2
, w
2
) when-
ever
()
3
for every generic G
P

over V, if (p
2
, w
2
)

G
P

then
(p
1
, w
1
)

G
P

and for each two successive members

<

of
the set w
1
w
2
we have
(p
1
[

))[G
P

]
P

(p
2
[

))[G
P

].
Remark 2.5. If (p, w) P
RS

<

are successive members of


w, then p() is a P

name for a P

name of a member of Q

. One may look


at this name as a P

name. However note that if we apply this approach to


each , we may not end up with a condition in P

because of the support!


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ITERATION OF -COMPLETE FORCING NOTIONS 9
Proposition 2.6. (1) For each (p, w) P
RS

there is q P

such that
(p, w)

(q, 0,

).
(2) If (p, w) P

and q P

, then there is q

stronger than q
and such that for each successive members

<

of w the condition
q

decides p [

) (i.e., q

p [

) = p

,
for
some p

,
P

).
(3) Let (p
i
, w
i
) P
RS

N (for i < < ), and s P

N, r P

be
such that
s r and (j < i < )((p
j
, w
j
)

(p
i
, w
i
)

(r, 0,

).
Assume that either r is (N, P

)generic, or

is a limit ordinal of
conality cf(

) < and for every <

the condition r is
(N, P

)generic.
Then there are conditions s

N P

and r

such that
s s

, r r

and (i < )((p


i
, w
i
)

(s

, 0,

)).
Proof. (1), (2) Straightforward (use the completeness of P

).
(3) If r is (N, P

)generic, then our assertion is clear (remember clause


(2)). So suppose that we are in the second case (so
0
cf(

) < ). Let
i

: < cf(

)) N be a strictly increasing continuous sequence conal


in

. For < cf(

) and i < let p

i
= p
i
i

, w

i
= (w
i
i

) i

(clearly
(p

i
, w

i
) P
RS
i
). Since r i

is (N, P
i
)generic, we may inductively pick
conditions s

, r

(for < cf(

)) such that
s i

P
i
N, r r

,
(i < )((p

i
, w

i
)

(s

, 0, i

)), s

,
if < < cf(

) then s i

and r

.
Let r

be stronger than all r

s. Now apply 2.3.


Now we may state and prove our main result.
Theorem 2.7. Let D, o, o

be as in 0.7. Assume that



Q = P

, Q

: <

)
is a (<
+
)support iteration such that for each <

P
Q

is proper for Dsemi diamonds .


Then P

= lim(

Q) is proper for Dsemi diamonds.


Proof. By 2.1, the forcing notion P

is complete, so we have to concen-


trate on showing clause 1.3(1)(b) for it.
So suppose that is large enough, p P

and N (H(), , <

),
|N| = , N
<
N and , p,

Q, P

, D, o, . . . N, and h : N
satises P

N Rang(h). Furthermore, suppose that



F = F

: o) is
a (D, o)semi diamond and q = q

: o) is an (N, h, P

,

F)candidate.
We may assume that for each o
() if h F

() : < ) is not a
P

increasing sequence of members


of P

N,
then h F

() = for all < .


(
6
5
5
)


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10 ANDRZEJ ROS LANOWSKI AND SAHARON SHELAH
[Just suitably modify F

whenever the assumption of () holds note that


the modication does not change the notion of a candidate, the game from
1.1(3), etc.]
Before we dene a generic condition r P

for q over

F, let us introduce
notation used later and give two important facts.
Let i N (

+ 1) and let G
P
i
P
i
be generic over V. We dene:
h
i
[G
P
i
] : N[G
P
i
] is such that
if h() is a function, i Dom(h()) and (h())(i) is a P
i
name, then
(h
i
[G
P
i
])() = (h())(i)[G
P
i
], otherwise it is ;
h
[i]
: N is dened by
h
[i]
() = (h()) i provided h() is a function, and otherwise;
o
i
[G
P
i
] = o : if is limit, then q

i G
P
i
;
q
i
[G
P
i
] is q

(i)[G
P
i
] : o
i
[G
P
i
]);
q
[i]
= q

i : o);


F
i
[G
P
i
] is F

: o
i
[G
P
i
]).
Observe that h
[i]
: N is such that P
i
N Rang(h
[i]
) and h
i
[G
P
i
] is
such that N[G
P
i
] Q

i
[G
P
i
] Rang(h
i
[G
P
i
]).
Plainly, by (),
Claim 2.7.1. Assume i N (

+1). Then

F is a (D, o)semi diamond
sequence for (N, h
[i]
, P
i
) and q
[i]
is an (N, h
[i]
, P
i
,

F)candidate.
Claim 2.7.2. Assume that i N(

+1) and r P
i
is (N, h
[i]
, P
i
)generic
for q
[i]
over

F. Let G
P
i
P
i
be a generic lter over V, r G
P
i
. Then in
V[G
P
i
]:
(1) o
i
[G
P
i
] D
+
,
(2)

F
i
[G
P
i
] is a (D, o
i
[G
P
i
])semi diamond for
(N[G
P
i
], h
i
[G
P
i
], Q

i
[G
P
i
]), and
(3) q
i
[G
P
i
] is an (N[G
P
i
], h
i
[G
P
i
], Q

i
[G
P
i
],

F
i
[G
P
i
])candidate.
Proof of the Claim. (1) Will follow from (2).
(2) Assume that this fails. Then we can nd a condition r

P
i
, a P
i

name q

= q

: < ) N for an increasing sequence of conditions from


Q

i
, and P
i
names A


for members of D V such that r
P
i
r

G
P
i
and
r

P
i
( o
i

<
A


)(h
i
F

() : < ) , = q

) .
Consider a play r

j
, r
j
, C
j
: i < ) P
i
of the game (r, N, h
[i]
, P
i
,

F, q
[i]
)
in which the generic player uses its winning strategy and the anti-generic
player plays as follows. In addition to keeping the rules of the game, it
makes sure that at stage j o

:
r
j
r

(so r
0
r

; remember the anti-generic player plays at 0),


r
j
decides the values of all A


for < j.
(
6
5
5
)


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ITERATION OF -COMPLETE FORCING NOTIONS 11
Let A

D V be such that r
j
A


= A

for suciently large j o

.
Note that the sequence r

j
) : j < ) is
P
i+1
increasing. So, as
D is normal and A

, C
j
D and

F is a semi diamond for (N, h
[i+1]
, P
i+1
)
(by 2.7.1), we may nd a limit ordinal o
<
A


j<
C
j
such that
h
[i+1]
F

(j) : j < ) = r

j
) : j < ). Then also h
[i]
F

(j) : j < ) =
r

j
: j < ), and since the play is won by the generic player, we conclude
q

i r

. But then taking suciently large j o

we have
r
j
o
i

<
A


& h
i
F

() : < ) = q

,
a contradiction.
(3) Should be clear.
Fix a bijection :

. Also let (

i
,
i
) : i < ) list all
pairs (

, ) N such that

, cf() and

is a P

name for an
ordinal.
Next, by induction, we choose a sequence (p
i
, w
i
) : i < ) P
RS

N
such that
(i) (p, 0,

(p
i
, w
i
)

(p
j
, w
j
) for i < j < ,
(ii) if i < j < and () i, then Dom(p
i
) and p
i
() = p
j
(),
(iii) if i < is a limit ordinal, then w
i
is the closure of

j<i
w
j
, and
if, additionally, Dom(q
i
) is such that () i (and i o, of
course), then Dom(p
i
) and p
i
() is such that
() for every generic G
P

over V such that (p


i
, w
i
)

G
P

,
and two successive members

of the set w
i
such that

<

we have:
if p
j
()[G
P

][G
P

] : j < i q
i
()[G
P

] has
an upper bound in Q

[G
P

],
then p
i
()[G
P

][G
P

] is such an upper bound,


(iv) for each i < , for some N
i
and a P

name

N we have:
sup

<
i
: () i (w
i

i
)

< , w
i+1
= w
i
, p
i+1
=
p
i
and
if G
P

is generic over V and (p


i+1
, w
i+1
)

G
P

,
then

i
[G
P

i
] =

[G
P

]
(It should be clear that there are no problems in the induction and it is
possible to pick (p
i
, w
i
) as above.) From now on we will treat each p
i
() as
a P

name for a member of Q

.
Now we are going to dene an (N, h, P

)generic condition r P for q


over

F in the most natural way. Its domain is Dom(r) =

N and for
each i

N
r i r(i) p
(i)
(i) is (N[G

P
i
], h
i
, Q

i
)generic for q
i
over

F
i
.
(
6
5
5
)


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12 ANDRZEJ ROS LANOWSKI AND SAHARON SHELAH
Main Claim 2.7.3. For every (

+ 1) N, the generic player has a


winning strategy in the game (r , N, h
[]
, P

,

F, q
[]
).
Proof of the Claim. We will prove the claim by induction on (

+1)N.
For

N this implies that r() is well-dened (remember 2.7.2). Of


course for =

we nish the proof of the theorem.


Suppose that (

+ 1) N and we know that r

is (N, h
[

]
, P

)
generic for q
[

]
over

F for all

N. We are going to describe a winning


strategy for the generic player in the game (r , N, h
[]
, P

,

F, q
[]
). The
inductive hypothesis is not used in the full strength in the denition of
the strategy, but we need it in several places, e.g., to know that r is well
dened as well as that we have the st

i
s below. Also note that it implies
that (p

i
, w

i
)

(r , 0, ) for all i < , where p

i
= p
i
and w

i
=
(w
i
). Moreover, during the play, both players will always have legal
moves. Why? By the inductive hypothesis we know that r

is (N, P

)
generic for all

N. Therefore, if is a successor or a limit ordinal


of conality , then we immediately get that r is (N, P

)generic
(remember clause (iv) of the choice of the p
i
s!), and thus 1.2(4) applies. If
is a limit ordinal of conality cf() < , then we may use 2.3.
Let st

i
be a P
i
name for the winning strategy of the generic player in
(r(i), N[G

P
i
], h
i
, Q

i
,

F
i
, q
i
), and let
E
0
def
= < : is a limit of points from o

.
Plainly, E
0
is a club of .
Let the generic player play as follows. Aside it will construct sequences
r

(), r

() : j

< , N) and C

() : j

, < , N) so that
r

() is a P

name for a member of Q

N[G

P
], r

() is a P

name
for a member of Q

, C

() is a P

name for a member of D V,


and
if j o, j

j, and () j, then after the j


th
move (which is a
move of the generic player) the terms C

() : < ), r

(), and
r

() are dened.
So suppose that j

o and r

j
, r
j
, C
j
: j < j

) is the result of the play


so far. To clearly describe the answer of the generic player we will consider
two (only slightly dierent) cases in the order in which they appear in the
game. (Remember (r
0
, C
0
) is chosen by the anti-generic player and that all
successor moves are done by the generic player.)
Case 1: j
0
< j

< min(o

(j
0
+ 1)) = j
1
, j
0
o

.
First the generic player picks conditions s

, s P

, s

N such that
r

j
0
s

s, r
j
0
s and for each N we have
s

(i < j
0
)(p
i
() s

()) .
(
6
5
5
)


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ITERATION OF -COMPLETE FORCING NOTIONS 13
[Why possible? By 2.6(3).]
Now the generic player looks at

< such that (

) = < j
1
. It picks
P

names r

), r

), C

) so that s

forces that
r

), r

),
<
C

) : j

< j
1
)
is a play according to st


in which the moves of the anti-generic player are
determined as follows. First, it keeps the convention that if j

o o

,
then (r

), r

),
<
C

)) is (a name for) the <

rst legal answer


to the play so far. Now, if < j
0
, then we have already the play up to j
0
(it
easily follows from the inductive construction that s

indeed forces that


it is a legal play). The j
th
0
move of the anti-generic player is stipulated as
r

j
0
(

) = s

), r

j
0
(

) = s(

), C

j
0
(

) =

jj
0
C
j
, and next we continue
up to j
1
keeping our convention. If j
0
< j
1
, then the generic player lets
r

0
(

) = s

), r

0
(

) = s(

), C

0
(

) =

jj
0
C
j
and then it plays the
game according to st


up to j
1
keeping our convention for all j

/ o

.
Next, the generic player picks a condition r

and P

names

j
(

)
N (for < j
1
,

< , j
0
< j

< j
1
) such that
r

s, and for every , j

< j
1
, and
r


P
r

) r

) & r

) =

j
(

) ,
for every j, < j
1
and < j
1
with

< , the condition r

decides the value of C

), and
r

) ( + 1) = C

) ,
where C

) D V.
Then it lets r

N P

(for j

(j
0
, j
1
)) be conditions such that
Dom(r

) = Dom(s

: < j
1
&

< ,
and for Dom(r

)
r

if () < j
1
and

j
() : j
0
< j < j
1
) is an increasing
sequence of conditions stronger than s

(),
then r

() =

j
(), otherwise r

() = s

() .
Finally, for j

(j
0
, j
1
) it plays r

, r

) : j

, , < j
1
,

< .
Case 2: supi o

: i < j

= j
0
j

< min(o

j
0
) = j
1
, j
0
o.
The generic player proceeds as above, the dierence is that now j
0
belongs
to the generic player, and that it is a limit of moves of the anti-generic
player. Again, we look at

< such that (

) = < j
1
.
(
6
5
5
)


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14 ANDRZEJ ROS LANOWSKI AND SAHARON SHELAH
If < j
0
, then every condition in P

stronger than all r


j

(for j < j
0
)
forces that
r

), r

),
<
C

) : j

< j
0
)
is a legal play in which the generic player uses st


. The generic player
determines r

), r

), and C

) for j

[j
0
, j
1
) playing the game
as earlier (with the same convention that if j

o o

, then the j

th
move of the anti-generic player is stipulated as the <

rst legal move).


If j
0
< j
1
, then (any condition stronger than all r
j

for j < j
0
forces that) r

j
() : j < j
0
), r
j
() : j < j
0
) are increasing, and r

j
(

)
r
j
(

) and r(

) is (N[G

P
], Q

)generic. So, by 1.2(4), the generic player


may let (r

0
(

), r

0
(

)) be the <

rst such that for all j < j


0
we have
r

j
() r

0
(

) N[G

P
], r
j
(

) r

0
(

). It also lets C

0
(

) =

j<j
0
C
j
.
Then the generic player chooses r

), r

), and C

) for 0 < j

< j
1
playing the game with the strategy st


(and keeping the old convention
for j

/ o

).
Next the generic player picks a condition r

(stronger than all r


j
for
j < j
0
), P

names

j
(

) N and sets C

) D V (for j

, , < j
1
)
as in the previous case. Then it chooses conditions s

NP

and r
+
P

such that r

r
+
and (j < j
0
)(r

j
s

r
+
). [Why possible? If is limit
of conality cf() < , use 2.3; otherwise we know that r is (N, P

)generic.]
Next it denes conditions r

N P

(for j
0
j

< j
1
) so that
Dom(r

) = Dom(s

: < j
1
&

< ,
and for Dom(r

)
r

if () < j
1
and

j
() : j
0
j < j
1
) is an increasing
sequence of conditions above all r

j
() for j < j
0
,
then r

() =

j
(), otherwise r

() = s

() .
Finally, for j
0
j

< j
1
it plays r

, r
+
,

) : j

, , < j
1
,

< .
Why does the strategy described above work? Suppose that r
j
, C
j
: j <
) is a play of the game (r , N, h
[]
, P

,

F, q
[]
) in which the generic player
used this strategy and let r

() : j

< , N) and C

() : j

, <
, N) be the sequences it constructed aside. (As we said earlier,
the game surely lasted steps and thus the sequences described above have
length .)
Let us argue that condition 1.1(3)() holds.
Assume that a limit ordinal o

j<
C
j
(so in particular E
0
) is
such that
()

h
[]
F

() : < ) = r

: < ).
(
6
5
5
)


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ITERATION OF -COMPLETE FORCING NOTIONS 15
We are going to show that q

and for this we prove by induction on


( +1) N that q

. For = this is the desired conclusion.


For = 0 this is trivial, and for a limit it follows from the denition of
the order (and the inductive hypothesis).
So assume that we have proved q

, < , and let us consider


the restrictions to + 1. If () then by the choice of conditions s, s

in Case 1, we know that


r

(i < )(j

< )(p
i
() r

()) .
Now look at the clause (iii) of the choice of the p

at the beginning: what


we have just stated (and ()

) implies that
r

() is an upper bound to q

() p
i
() : i < .
thus, r

() p

() r

() , so we are done. Suppose now that


() < and let j
1
= min(o

). Look at what the generic player has


written aside: r

forces that r

(), r

(),
<
C

j
() : j < j
1
) is a play
according to st


and

j,<
C

j
() o

, so we are clearly done in this case


too (remember the choice of r

).

Remark 2.8. Note that if the iterands Q

are (forced to be) lubclosed,


then the proof of 2.7 substantially simplies.
3. Examples
Our rst example of a proper over forcing notion is a relative of the
forcing introduced by Baumgartner for adding a club to
1
. Its variants
were also studied in Abraham and Shelah [AbSh 146]; see also [Sh:f, Ch.III].
The forcing notion P

is dened as follows:
a condition in P

is a function p such that


(a) Dom(p)
+
, Rang(p)
+
, [Dom(p)[ < , and
(b) if
1
<
2
are both from Dom(p), then p(
1
) <
2
;
the order of P

is the inclusion .
Clearly,
Proposition 3.1. P

is lubcomplete and [P

[ =
+
.
But also,
Proposition 3.2. P

is proper over .
Proof. Assume N (H(), , <

) is as in 1.1, and p P

N.
Put j

= N
+
and r = p j

, j

).
Claim 3.2.1. (1) If r

P, r r

, then r

NP

and r

.
(
6
5
5
)


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16 ANDRZEJ ROS LANOWSKI AND SAHARON SHELAH
(2) If r

P, r r

, and r

N P

, then r

is
stronger than both r

and r

.
(3) If p = p

: <

) P

is increasing and

< , then p has


a least upper bound q P

, and q j

is a least upper bound of


p

: <

).
Proof of the Claim. (1) By the denition of P

,
Dom(r

) j

() < j

() N.
(2), (3) Should be clear.
Claim 3.2.2. r is Ngeneric for semidiamonds (see 1.7).
Proof of the Claim. Suppose that D is a normal lter on , o D
+
. Let
h : N be such that N P

Rang(h),

F = F

: o) be a (D, o)
semi diamond, and let q = q

: o) be an (N, h, P

,

F)candidate.
We have to show that the condition r is (N, h, P

)generic for q over



F,
and for this we have to show that the generic player has a winning strategy
in the game (r, N, h, P

,

F, q). Note that the set
E
0
def
= < : is a limit of members of o
is a club of (so E
0
D). Now, the strategy that works for the generic
player is the following one:
At stage o of the play, when a sequence r

i
, r
i
, C
i
: i < ) has been
already constructed, the generic player lets C

= E
0
( + 1) and it asks:
() Is there a common upper bound to r
i
: i < q

?
If the answer to () is yes, then the generic player puts Y = r
i
: i <
q

; otherwise it lets Y = r
i
: i < . Now it chooses r

to be the
<

rst element of P

stronger than all members of Y and r

= r

N.
Why the strategy described above is the winning one? Let r

i
, r
i
, C
i
:
i < ) be a play according to this strategy. Suppose that o
i<
C
i
is a
limit ordinal such that h F

() : < ) = r

: < ). So, q

is stronger
than all r

(for < ), and for conally many < we have r

= r

.
Therefore, q

and (by 3.2.1) r

: < q

has an upper
bound. Now look at the choice of r

.
The proposition follows immediately from 3.2.2.
Proposition 3.3. (1) P

is proper over if and only if < .


(2) If D is a normal lter on , o D
+
, and

F is a (D, o)diamond,
0 < <
+
, then P

K
,s
D
[

F] if and only if < .
Proof. (1) Follows from (2).
(2) Assume < .
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ITERATION OF -COMPLETE FORCING NOTIONS 17
Let

N = N

: < ), h

: N

and q

be as in 1.8(1b), p P

N
0
.
Let j

= N


+
(for < ) and put r = p (j

, j

) : < . Clearly
r P

and r j

for each < (remember



N N

). By the
proof of 3.2, the condition r j

+1
is (N

, h

, P

)generic for q

over

F
To show that P

/ K
,s
D
[

F] for , it is enough to do this for = .
So, pick any

N = N

: < ), h

: N

and q

as in 1.8(1b), and let


N

<
N

.
Let

be a P

name for the generic partial function from


+
to
+
, that
is,
P

P
. We claim that
()
P
( < )(i Dom(

) N

)(

(i) / N

) .
Why? Let p P

. Take
0
< such that Dom(p) N

0
(remember
[p[ < ). If for some i Dom(p) N

0
we have p(i) / N

0
, then
p (i Dom(

) N

0
)(

(i) / N

0
) .
Otherwise, we let

= N

0

+
and

= N

0
+1

+
, and we put q =
p (

). Then clearly q P

is a condition stronger than p and


q (i Dom(

) N

0
+1
)(

(i) / N

0
+1
).
It should be clear that () implies that there is no condition r P

which
is (N

, h

, P

)generic for q

for all < (remember 1.6(2)).


For the second example we assume the following.
Context 3.4. (a) , D, o, o

are as in 0.7,
(b) o

def
= <
+
: cf() = ,
(c) A

, h

: o

) is such that for each o

:
(d) A

, otp(A

) = and A

is a club of , and
(e) h

: A

.
The forcing notion Q

is dened as follows:
a condition in Q

is a tuple p = (u
p
, v
p
, e
p
, h
p
) such that
(a) u
p
[
+
]
<
, v
p
[o

]
<
,
(b) e
p
= e
p

: v
p
), where each e
p

is a closed bounded subset of A

,
and e
p

u
p
, and
(c) if
1
<
2
are from v
p
, then
sup(e

2
) >
1
and sup(e

1
) > sup(A

2

1
),
(d) h
p
: u
p
is such that for each v
p
we have
h
p
e

: otp( e

) o

;
the order of Q

is such that p q if and only if u


p
u
q
, h
p
h
q
,
v
p
v
q
, and for each v
p
the set e
q

is an end-extension of e
p

.
A tuple p = (u
p
, v
p
, e
p
, h
p
) satisfying clauses (a), (b) and (d) above will
be called a pre-condition. Note that every pre-condition can be extended to
a condition in Q

.
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18 ANDRZEJ ROS LANOWSKI AND SAHARON SHELAH
Plainly:
Proposition 3.5. The forcing notion Q

is lubcomplete. Also Q

sat-
ises the
+
chain condition.
Proposition 3.6. Q

is proper over .
Proof. Assume N (H(), , <

) is as in 1.1, A

, h

: o

) N and
p Q

N. We are going to show that the condition p is Ngeneric for


semi-diamonds.
So suppose that h, q and

F are as in 1.1. For r Q

, let r N be such
that u
rN
= u N, v
rN
= v N, e
rN
= e
r
N, h
rN
= h
r
N. Note that
r N N. Let us describe the winning strategy of the generic player in the
game (p, N, h, P

,

F, q). For this we rst x a list j
i
: i < of N o

,
and we let E
0
= < : is a limit of members of o .
Suppose that we arrive to a stage o and r

i
, r
i
, C
i
: i < ) is the
sequence played so far. The generic player rst picks a condition r

stronger
than all r
i
s played so far and, if possible, stronger than q

. Then it plays a
condition r

above r

such that
if v
r

, then otp(e
r

) > , and
j
i
: i < v
r

,
and r

= r

N. The set C

played a this stage is [, )E


0
, where is the
rst ordinal such that v
r

N j
i
: i < and otp(A

(max(e
r

)+1)) <
for all v
r

.
Why is this a winning strategy? Let r

i
, r
i
, C
i
: i < ) be a play according
to this strategy, and suppose that o
i<
C
i
is a limit ordinal such that
h F

() : < ) = r

: < ).
Note that then
(i) if

i<
v
r
i
then

i<
e
r
i

is an unbounded subset of A

: otp(
A

) < , and
(ii)

i<
v
r
i
N = j
i
: i < .
We want to show that there there is a common upper bound to r
i
: i <
q

(which, by the denition of our strategy, will nish the proof).


First we choose a pre-condition r = (u
r
, v
r
, e
r
, h
r
) such that:
v
r
= v
q


i<
v
r
i
,
if v
q

, then we let e
r

= e
q

, if

i<
v
r
i
v
q

, then
e
r

e
r
i

: i < , v
r
i
the
th
member of A

,
u
r
= u
q


i<
u
r
i
the
th
member of A

: v
r
v
q

,
h
r
h
q


i<
h
r
i
.
(
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)


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ITERATION OF -COMPLETE FORCING NOTIONS 19
Why is the choice possible? As / o

! Now we may extend r to a condition


in Q

picking for each v


r
large enough

and adding

to e
r

(and extending u
r
, h
r
suitably).
Our last example is a natural generalization of the forcing notion D

from
Newelski and Roslanowski [NeRo93]. Let us work in the context of 0.7.
Denition 3.7. (1) A set T
<
is a complete tree if
(a) ( T)( T)( ), and T has the smallest element
called root(T),
(b) (,
<
)(root(T) T T),
(c) if
i
: i < ) T is a increasing chain, < , then there is
T such that
i
for all i < .
Let T
<
be a complete tree.
(2) For T we let succ
T
() = < :

) T.
(3) We let split(T) = T : [succ
T
()[ > 1.
(4) A sequence

is a branch through T if
( < )(lh(root(T)) T).
The set of all branches through T is called lim

(T).
(5) A subset F of the tree T is a front in T if no two distinct members
of F are comparable and
( lim

(T))( < )( F).


(6) For T we let (T)
[]
= T : .
Now we dene a forcing notion D

:
A condition in D

is a complete tree T such that


(a) root(T) split(T) and ( split(T))(succ
T
() = ),
(b) ( T)( T)( split(T)),
(c) if < is limit and a sequence
i
: i < ) split(T) is increasing,
then =

i<

i
split(T).
The order of D

is the reverse inclusion.


Proposition 3.8. D

is proper over .
Proof. First let us argue that D

is lubcomplete. So suppose that T

are such that ( < < )(T

), < . We claim that T


def
=

<
T

is a condition in D

. Clearly T is a tree, and root(T) =

<
root(T

). By
clause (c) (for T

s) we see that succ


T
(root(T)) = , and in a similar way
we justify that T satises other demands as well.
Now suppose that D, o, N, h,

F and q are as in 1.1, T D

N. Choose
inductively complete trees T

N and fronts F

(of T

) such
that
(i) root(T

) = root(T),
(
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20 ANDRZEJ ROS LANOWSKI AND SAHARON SHELAH
(ii) if < , then T

T and F

split(T

), and
(iii) if F

then otp(i < lh() : i split(T

)) = ,
(iv) if is limit, then T

<
T

,
(v) if o is limit and h F

() : < ) is an increasing sequence of


conditions from D

N and

<
hF

() T

, and =

<
root(h
F

()) F

, then for some T

we have
F
+1
and q

(T
+1
)
[]
.
Now we let r =

<
T

. It should be clear that r D

.
Claim 3.8.1. r is (N, h, D

)generic for q over



F.
Proof of the Claim. We have to describe a winning strategy of the generic
player in the game (r, N, h, D

,

F, q). Let E
0
be the club of limits of mem-
bers of o

. Let the generic player play as follows.


Assume we have arrived to stage i o of the play when r

j
, r
j
, C
j
: j < i)
has been already constructed. If i / E
0
then the generic player chooses
r

i
, r
i
D

such that
(A) r
i

j<i
r
j
, r

j<i
r

j<i
T
j
, and r

i
N, r

i
r
i
,
(B) root(r

i
) = root(r
i
) F
(i)
for some (i) > i,
and lets C
i
= E
0
((i) + 1). If i E
0
then the generic player picks r
i
, r

i
satisfying (A) + (B) and such that
(C) if possible, then q

i
and it takes C
i
as earlier.
Why is this a winning strategy? First, as D

is lubcomplete, the play


really lasts moves. Suppose that o

i<
C
i
is such that
h F

() : < ) = r

: < ).
Let =

<
root(r

). Note that (as E


0
and by (B)) we have F

and (by (A))

<
r

is included in T

. Therefore, by clause (v) of the choice


of the T

, for some T

we have F
+1
and q

(T
+1
)
[]
. But
this immediately implies that it was possible to choose r

i
stronger than q

in (C) (remember r =

<
T

).

4. Discussion
4.1. The Axiom. We can derive Forcing Axiom as usual, see [Sh:f, Ch.
VII, VIII]. E.g., if is a supercompact cardinal larger than , then we can
nd a cc complete, proper over Dsemi diamonds forcing notion P of
cardinality such that
(
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ITERATION OF -COMPLETE FORCING NOTIONS 21

P
2

=
P collapses every (
+
, ), no other cardinal is collapsed,
in V
P
:
if Q is a forcing notion proper over Dsemi diamonds, 1

are open
dense subsets of Q for <
+
,
then there is a directed set G Q intersecting every 1

(for <
+
).
If we restrict ourselves to [Q[ = , it is enough that is indiscrebable enough.
In ZFC, we have to be more careful concerning Q.
4.2. Future applications. Real applications of the technology developed
here will be given in a forthcoming paper Roslanowski and Shelah [RoSh 777],
where we will present more examples of proper for forcing notions (concen-
trating on the case of inaccessible ). We start there developing a theory par-
allel to that of Roslanowski and Shelah [RoSh 470], [RoSh 628], [RoSh 672]
aiming at generalizing many of the cardinal characteristics of the continuum
to larger cardinals.
4.3. Why our denitions? The main reason why our denitions are (per-
haps) somewhat complicated is that, in addition to ZFC limitations, we
wanted to cover some examples with large creatures (to be presented in
[RoSh 777]). We also wanted to have a real preservation theorem: the (limit
of the) iteration is of the same type as the iterands (though for many appli-
cations the existence of (N, P

)generic conditions could be enough).


Why do we have the sets C
i
in the game, and not just say that the set of
good s is in D? It is caused by the fact that already if we want to deal with
the composition of two forcing notions (the successor step), the respective
set from D would have appeared only after the play, and there would be
simply too many possible sets to consider. With the current denition the
generic player discovers during the play which o are active.
Why semidiamonds (and not just diamonds)? As we want that q
i
,

F
i
are as claimed in 2.7.2 (for the respective parameters).
4.4. Strategic completeness. We may replace complete by (a variant
of) strategically complete. This requires some changes in our denitions
(and proofs) and it will be treated in [Sh:F509].
4.5. Relation to [Sh 587]. There is a drawback in the approach presented
in this paper: we do not include the one from [Sh 587], say when o o

is stationary and o

o is also stationary.
One of possible modication of the present denitions for the case of
inaccessible , can be sketched as follows. We have

: o),

= (

)
||
;
q = q

: o) is replaced by q = q
,t
: o, t Par

,
) (where

= N
+
), and

Par = Par

,
: o) V is constant for the iteration
(like D).
In the forcing P: for p = p
j
: j < ), o, t Par

,
, there is an upper
bound q[ p, t] of p (this is a part of P).
(
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22 ANDRZEJ ROS LANOWSKI AND SAHARON SHELAH
For each , each Par

,N

iN

Par

,
has cardinality

= (

)
||
(N

is
of cardinality [[; is the length of the iteration). Having p
j
: j < ) N

we can nd q

t
: t Par
,N

) as in [Sh 587].
Several (more complex) variants of properness over semidiamonds will
be presented in [Sh:F509] and Roslanowski and Shelah [RoSh 777].
References
[AbSh 146] Uri Abraham and Saharon Shelah. Forcing closed unbounded sets. The Jour-
nal of Symbolic Logic, 48:643657, 1983.
[J] Thomas Jech. Set theory. Springer Monographs in Mathematics. Springer-
Verlag, Berlin, 2003. The third millennium edition, revised and expanded.
[NeRo93] Ludomir Newelski and Andrzej Ros lanowski. The ideal determined by the un-
symmetric game. Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, 117:823
831, 1993.
[RoSh 628] Andrzej Ros lanowski and Saharon Shelah. Norms on possibilities II: More ccc
ideals on 2

. Journal of Applied Analysis, 3:103127, 1997. math.LO/9703222.


[RoSh 470] Andrzej Ros lanowski and Saharon Shelah. Norms on possibilities I: forcing
with trees and creatures. Memoirs of the American Mathematical Society,
141(671):xii + 167, 1999. math.LO/9807172.
[RoSh 672] Andrzej Ros lanowski and Saharon Shelah. Sweet & Sour and other avours
of ccc forcing notions. Archive for Mathematical Logic, 43:583663, 2004.
math.LO/9909115.
[RoSh 777] Andrzej Ros lanowski and Saharon Shelah. Sheva-Sheva-Sheva: Large Crea-
tures. Israel Journal of Mathematics, 159:109174, 2007. math.LO/0210205.
[Sh:F509] Saharon Shelah. More on properness over semidiamonds.
[Sh 64] Saharon Shelah. Whitehead groups may be not free, even assuming CH. I.
Israel Journal of Mathematics, 28:193204, 1977.
[Sh 100] Saharon Shelah. Independence results. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 45:563
573, 1980.
[Sh:98] Saharon Shelah. Whitehead groups may not be free, even assuming CH. II.
Israel Journal of Mathematics, 35:257285, 1980.
[Sh:b] Saharon Shelah. Proper forcing, volume 940 of Lecture Notes in Mathematics.
Springer-Verlag, Berlin-New York, xxix+496 pp, 1982.
[Sh:f] Saharon Shelah. Proper and improper forcing. Perspectives in Mathematical
Logic. Springer, 1998.
[Sh 587] Saharon Shelah. Not collapsing cardinals in (< )support iterations.
Israel Journal of Mathematics, 136:29115, 2003. math.LO/9707225.
[Sh 667] Saharon Shelah. Successor of singulars: combinatorics and not collapsing
cardinals in (< )-support iterations. Israel Journal of Mathematics,
134:127155, 2003. math.LO/9808140.
Department of Mathematics, University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE
68182-0243, USA
E-mail address: roslanowski@unomaha.edu
URL: http://www.unomaha.edu/aroslano
Institute of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem
91904, Israel, and Department of Mathematics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick,
NJ 08854, USA
E-mail address: shelah@math.huji.ac.il
URL: http://www.math.rutgers.edu/shelah

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