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ABSTRACT
A major challenge to enhance the performance of multiuser multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) multi-carrier direct sequence code division multiple
access (MC -DS/ CDMA) system relies on the effective multiple access
interference suppression. In this work a novel distributed non cooperative power
control game with pricing (NPGP) is considered for utilizing the system resource
more efficiently. The ratio of throughput versus power is referred to as the utility
function which should be maximized by combating the multiple access
interference (MAI). Simulation results show that the propounded scheme achieves
significant performance improvement, compared with the conventional system
without NPGP.
k=1 S=1
log M f
2 k ,i k ,i ( ) all jKi. Assume there exists a P-i such that 0<P-i < Pi
G1 = max U1i( Pi ,P i ) =
Pi Ai Pi which is derived form
2f
( k ,i ) , it can guarantee
( )
0
2
(6) k ,i
2u
li
0
for all jKi.So, it can be concluded that with
Pi P j
The game G2 is given by, the strategy space Ai = P i , Pi where P-i is derived
from
2f
( k ,i ) , the game G1 is supermodular.
( )
0
{ }
min Mt ,Mr N 1 2
k ,i
log2 Mk ,i f
k=1 S=1 k ,i The following theorems, proven in [9, 10],
G2 = max U2i( Pi ,P i ) = tPi
Pi Ai Pi (7) guarantees the existence and the uniqueness of a
nash equilibrium of supermodular game, and give
the algorithm that can converge to the equilibrium.
for all i N
4.2. The set of Nash equilibrium of a supermodular
In outdoor, macro cell with the typical game is nonempty.
parameters of outdoor channel, the maximum
The best response is
singular value i ( k ) and U i ( k ) , V i ( k ) can
BR ( P i ) ={ pi Ai :ui ( pi , P i ) ui ( p 'i , P i ) ! P ' Ai (10)
successfully approximate Hi . In the NMCPGs,
that each user is assumed rational and selfish. Assume that for all i=1, 2,…N, Ai are compact,
Users always maximize their own utilities by convex, lower semi continuous in its argument, and
selecting the best transmit power strategy, which hold scalability property. Further assume that for
depends on the transmit power strategies of all the each i=1,2,…..N, BR(P-i)>0 for all Pj Aj, j " i.
other users in the system. In the games, a set of Then the Nash equilibrium is unique and general
powers can be found where the users are satisfied. updating algorithm converges monotonically to an
equilibrium whose convergence holds for any initial
4. NASH EQUILIBRIUM policy in the strategy space. It can be concluded that
each of our NMCPGs has unique Nash equilibrium
Nash equilibrium is the most widely used point and then the asynchronous power control
solution in NPG [4]. It is an action profile in which algorithm, we considered in this work, converges to
a unique Nash equilibrium point. In this algorithm
users update their transmission powers in the same for k =1 to K.
manner as in [2].Assume user i updates its
{
transmission power at time instances in the set Ti
={ti1 ti2 …..}, with tik< tik+1 and ti0 for all i € N. Let for S =1 to N-1(IFFT size)
T={t1,T2,…} where T=T1 # T2 # …… # TN with {
tk<tk+1. The NMCPG generates a sequence of power eff. function of k th subchannel of
vector following the iterative procedure as follows. user1 =(1-BER ( k,i))L/** L=frame size. }
The power vector P(0)=P is set at time t=0. For all
i N. Calculating ri ( tk ) = argmax p p ui ( pi, p t (tk t ) ) . Given end for
i
}
that pi(tk)=min(ri(tk),pmax).If p(tk) equivalent to p(tk-
1),the iterative procedure ends and Nash equilibrium end for
power vector is divided to be p(tk).If it is not the calculate throughput of user ‘i’at transmit_
case the iterative procedure is repeated the power ‘t’.
predetermined number of times until p(tk)=p(tk-1).
calculate utility of user ‘i’ without pricing at
transmit_ power ‘t’.
4.3. Proposed game theoretic power control
if utility1(t)=utility max ‘t’.
algorithm for MC- DS/CDMA
{
Assuming ‘N’ users in a single cell, the SINR power for ith user power(i)= t.
is estimated for all the ‘N’ users participating in power for ith user utility(i) = utility(t).
the game. Suppose if a particular user increases the }
power level beyond the required threshold, then
end if
access to that particular user will be denied so as to
keep the interference level well within control. }
This procedure is followed for all the users end for
whoever tend to increase the power level thereby Power_subchannel =Power(1/K) .
contributing to the MAI.This scheme is called
power_ iteration =Power(iteration-1).
pricing whereby allowing all the users. Simulation
results have shown that by employing this pricing }
scheme, the overall utility of a particular user end while.
achieves significant performance amelioration, by Results: Power without pricing (power), Utility
mitigating the MAI.
without pricing (Utility)
Iterative algorithm 1:
Iterative algorithm 2:
Initiliation ()
Initiliation ()
Distance d; Mr -Transmitting antenna;Mt-
Distance d; Mr -Transmitting antenna; Mt -
Receiving antenna; S-IFFT size;
Receiving antenna; S-IFFT size;
Generate Channel Matrix H;
Generate Channel Matrix H;
iteration
iteration
while(Power " Power iteration) /**Initially
while(Power " Power iteration) /**Initially Power
Power iteration is a random matrix.
iteration is a random matrix.
iteration =iteration+1.
iteration =iteration+1.
for k =1 to K. /**k=min (Mr Mt)
for k =1 to K. /**k=min(Mr Mt)
{
{
for txt power(t)= Min_power to Max_power
for txt power(t)= Min_power to Max_power
{
{
Power_subchannel =Power/K /**k=min (Mr Mt)
Power_subchannel =Power/K /**k=min(Mr Mt)
for k =1 to K.
for k =1 to K.
{
{
Calculate SNR of Kth subchannel of user i( k,i ).
Calculate SNR of Kth subchannel of user i( k,i ).
}
}
end for
end for scatter components and is a zero-mean unit-
variance complex Gaussian random variable [11].
for k =1 to K.
The following parameters are considered for
{ simulation.
for s=1 to N-1(IFFT size)
eff. function of k th subchannel of Table 1 Simulation Parameter
user1 =(1-BER ( k,i))L/** L=frame size.
Parameters value
}
Distance in meter 260,330,450,
end for (d) 560,660,800,
} 900, 950, 1000
end for Block size(L) 80 bits
calculate throughput of user ‘i’at transmit_ power Maximum total 2watts for each
transmit power user
‘t’.
constraint Pi
calculate utility of user ‘i’ without pricing at
Path loss exponent T 3.6
transmit_ power ‘t’. Median of the mean 0.097
if utility1(t)=utility max ‘t’. path gain c
{ AWGN power at 5 × 10-5(watts)
power for ith user power(i) = t. receiver U2
Spread gain G 100
power for ith user utility(i) = utility(t).
Users 9
} IFFT size 512
end if
}
end for
Power_subchannel =Power(1/K) .
power_ iteration =Power(iteration-1).
}
end while.
Results: Power with pricing (power), Utility with
pricing (Utility)
5. NUMERICAL RESULTS