Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
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- The aforecited case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. involved virtually the same factual situation. The Court, in arriving at the conclusion hereinbefore quoted, expressly declared that the failure of the therein plaintiff to reserve his right to file a separate civil case is not fatal; that his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing a separate civil action for damages, especially considering that the accused therein was acquitted because his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; that the two cases were anchored on two different causes of action, the criminal case being on a violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code while the subsequent complaint for damages was based on a quasi-delict; and that in the judgment in the criminal case the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved. Consequently, said civil case may proceed as authorized by Article 29 of the Civil Code. - Under the present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits the accused on reasonable doubt, it could very well make a pronounce ment on the civil liability of the accused and the complainant could file a petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment of acquittal. And that the failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable. Dispositive Decision of CA affirmed, petion denied.
reconsideration thereof was denied for the same reason in a resolution of October 28, 1975. - After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of the herein private respondent and ordering herein petitioner to pay damages. Thus, petitioner appealed said decision to the CA but said respondent court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court with a few changes in the amount of the damages to be paid. ISSUE WON the private respondent, who was the complainant in the criminal action for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and who participated in the prosecution thereof without reserving the civil action arising from the act or omission complained of, can file a separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or omission where the herein petitioner was acquitted in the criminal action on reasonable doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of acquittal HELD YES - The action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages. Ratio The allegations of the complaint filed by the private respondent supports and is constitutive of a case for a quasi-delict committed by the petitioner. The Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano vs. Hill that: ... a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is also actually charged criminally, to recover damages on both scores; and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasidelict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused . . .
PEOPLE v USANA and LOPEZ 323 SCRA 754 DAVIDE; January 28, 2000
NATURE Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting the two accused together with Julian D. Escano for the violation of R.A. 6425, as amended FACTS - On the 5th of April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun ban, some law enforcers of the Makati Police were manning a checkpoint at the corner of Senator Gil Puyat Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway. They were checking the cars going to Pasay City, stopping those they found suspicious, and imposing merely a running stop on the others. At about past midnight,
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no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before it was seized. Ratio Despite the validity of the search, we cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for violation of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The following facts militate against a finding of conviction: (1) the car belonged to Escao; (2) the trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was stopped and after the accused were searched for firearms; (3) the car was driven by a policeman from the place where it was stopped until the police station; (4) the cars trunk was opened, with the permission of Escao, without the presence of Usana and Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police station and until the opening of the cars trunk, the car was in the possession and control of the police authorities. No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car. Their having been with Escao in the latters car before the "finding" of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an appreciable time and without their presence left much to be desired to implicate them to the offense of selling, distributing, or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, there was no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before it was seized. Dispositive Accused appellants are hereby acquitted.
answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. - The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs. - The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without opening the cars doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands. We see no need for checkpoints to be announced, as the accused have invoked. Not only would it be impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to violate the ban. Even so, badges of legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred from their fixed location and the regularized manner in which they are operated. 2. YES - Escano consented to the search and consented warrantless search is one of the exceptions from the warrant requirement. Ratio Jurisprudence recognizes six generally accepted exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1) search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) evidence in plain view; (4) customs searches; (5) consented warrantless search; and (6) stop-and-frisk situations. - Even though there was ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant, we cannot invalidate the search of the vehicle, for there are indications that the search done on the car of Escao was consented to by him. 3. NO - No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car and there was
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- The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana 137 was found in the house of accusedappellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged. Dispositive the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City acting as a Special Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and modified as follows: 1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00). 2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.
113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." 114 In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her. - Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." In case, there was no reasonable suspicion especially as she was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her coaccused - Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs as Doria may have left the money in her house, with or without her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria 's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. - As the arrest was illegal, the search and seizure is not incidental to the arrest 2. NO - The marijuana was not in plain view of the police officers and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution as the contents of the box where the marijuana was partially hidden was not readily apparent to PO Manlangit, one of the arresting officers. - As a general rule, objects in plain view of arresting officers may be seized without a search warrant but must follow these requisites: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. - However, if it is not plain view of the police officers, it may not be seized without a warrant except if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized.
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acquiesces in a trial resulting in his conviction and later seeks release by the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus, the burden of proof rests upon him to establish that he did not competently and intelligently waive his constitutional right to assistance of Counsel. If in a habeas corpus hearing, he does meet this burden and convinces the court by a preponderance of evidence that he neither had counsel nor properly waived his constitutional right to counsel, it is the duty of the court to grant the writ. Dispositive The cause is reversed and remanded to the District Court for determination whether petitioner did not competently and intelligently waive his right to counsel. If court finds for petitioner the decision of the district court convicting petitioner must be declared void.
proceedings has been broadened-not narrowed-since the adoption of the Sixth Amendment. In such a proceeding, 'it would be clearly erroneous to confine the inquiry to the proceedings and judgment of the trial court' and the petitioned court has 'power to inquire with regard to the jurisdiction of the inferior court, either in respect to the subject-matter or to the person, even if such inquiry involves an examination of facts outside of, but not inconsistent with, the record.' Congress has expanded the rights of a petitioner for habeas corpus and the '... effect is to substitute for the bare legal review that seems to have been the limit of judicial authority under the common-law practice, and under the act of 31 Car. II, chap. 2, a more searching investigation, in which the applicant is put upon his oath to set forth the truth of the matter respecting the causes of his detention, and the court, upon determining the actual facts, is to 'dispose of the party as law and justice require.' - 'There being no doubt of the authority of the Congress to thus liberalize the common-law procedure on habeas corpus in order to safeguard the liberty of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States against infringement through any violation of the Constitution or a law or treaty established thereunder, it results that under the sections cited a prisoner in custody pursuant to the final judgment of a state court of criminal jurisdiction may have a judicial inquiry in a court of the United States into the very truth and substance of the causes of his detention, although it may become necessary to look behind and beyond the record of his conviction to a sufficient extent to test the jurisdiction of the state court to proceed to judgment against him. ... '... it is open to the courts of the United States, upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus, to look beyond forms and inquiry into the very substance of the matter ....' - If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus. A judge of the United States-to whom a petition for habeas corpus is addressed-should be alert to examine 'the facts for himself when if true as alleged they make the trial absolutely void.' - It must be remembered, however, that a judgment cannot be lightly set aside by collateral attack, even on habeas corpus. When collaterally attacked, the judgment of a court carries with it a presumption of regularity. Where a defendant, without counsel,
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call for the complainant and the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose him to an open and public accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists. Dispositive Petition granted
petitioners it appearing that he did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead, he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed. For, otherwise, he would have found out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners. - In Soliven v. Makasiar, we said that the judge (a) shall personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or, (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on the existence of probable cause. - In People v. Inting, we emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a) The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause; and, (c) Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is a function of the prosecutor. - ALLADO DOCTRINE: If upon the filing of the information in court, the trial judge, after reviewing the information and the document attached thereto, finds that no probable cause exists, he must either
PEOPLE v MARK JIMENEZ G.R. No. 148571 PANGANIBAN; September 24, 2002
NATURE Petition for certiorari praying for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez into legal custody FACTS - The US govt through diplomatic channels sent to the Phil. govt a note requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of the Extradition Law. - Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a TRO by the RTC of Manila, which prohibited the DOJ from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The TRO was assailed byt the Sec. of Justice. Initially, the court dismissed the petition but after acting upon the motion for reconsideration, it reversed its earlier decision. It held that Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. - Finding no more legal obstacle, the US govt, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC the appropriate Petition for Extradition. The Petition alleged that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the US District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses; (2) tax evasion; (3) wire fraud (4) false statements, and (5) illegal campaign contributions. - In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069 - Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent
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April 3, 2003
NATURE Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 28, 2002 FACTS - Respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male persons identified as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. - The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases against the accused were with the express consent of the respondent as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of witnesses. The Court also held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its application are attendant. The trial court was thus directed to resolve the following: ... (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party; (3) whether the 2-year period to revive it has already lapsed; (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period; (5) whether notices to the offended parties were given before the cases of respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir; (6) whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3) other victims; (7) whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar. - The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had to be first determined whether it shall be from the date of the order of then Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, or from the dates of receipt thereof by the various offended parties, or from the date of effectivity of the new rule. According to the Court, if the cases were revived only after the two-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with the said time-bar. It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in court. However, the State is not precluded from presenting compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the two-year bar.
follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. - That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court. - Also, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors. > - The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14 of the Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition. Dispositive the Petition is GRANTED. The bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition Law.
PEOPLE v AMBROSIO 56 PHIL 801 PEOPLE v RELOVA 148 SCRA 292 PEOPLE v PANFILO LACSON G.R. No. 149453
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motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent. A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations. - In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed the Criminal Cases. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise of the Criminal Cases. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. - The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended party or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. - In the case at bar, even if the respondents motion for a determination of probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his motion for a provisional dismissal of the Criminal Cases, however, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. It must be stressed that the respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999 and set it for hearing on March 22, 1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof. Although the
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely: 1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; 2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; 4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. - The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein. Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal. - Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a
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NO - The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions, in favor of the legality and regularity of all the proceedings of the trial court, including the presumption that the accused was not denied the right to have counsel. (U. S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil., 82.) It is presumed that the procedure prescribed by law has been observed unless it is made to appear expressly to the contrary. (U. S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.) The fact that the attorney appointed by the trial court to aid the defendant in his defense expressed reluctance to accept the designation because, as the present counsel assumes, he did not sympathize with the defendant's cause, is not sufficient to overcome this presumption. The statement of the counsel in the court below did no necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to protect the interest of the accused. As a matter of fact, the present counsel "sincerely believes that the said Attorney Carin did his best, although it was not the best of a willing worker." We do not discern in the record any indication that the former counsel did not conduct the defense to the best of his ability. If Attorney Carin did his best as a sworn member of the bar, as the present attorney admits, that was enough; his sentiments did not cut any influence in the result of the case and did not imperil the rights of the appellant.
rank denial of justice. The State must be given a period of one year or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive the criminal case without requiring the State to make a valid justification for not reviving the case before the effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to justice and fairness, so is the State. Dispositive Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED
PEOPLE v PRIETO (alias EDDIE VALENCIA) 80 Phil 138 TUASON: January 29, 1948
NATURE APPEAL from a judgment of the People's Court FACTS - The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7 counts. After pleading not guilty he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea as to counts 4, 5 and 6. The special prosecutor introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6 that he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. - The attorney de officio manifested that he would like to be relieved from his assignment. The defendant was found guilty on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 and was sentenced to death and to pay a fine of P20,000. ISSUE WON the judgment must be reversed because of the trial court's failure to appoint "another attorney de oficio for the accused in spite of the manifestation of the attorney de oficio (who defended the accused at the trial) that he would like to be relieved for obvious reasons." HELD
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be cross-examined as any other witness; his neglect of refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him. Thus, unlike an ordinary witness, the accused may refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, or answer any question altogether. The accused, if he chooses to testify, may refuse to answer only questions which could incriminate him of a crime for which he isnt charged. - It appears that respondent Judge mistakenly applied the rights set forth in Sec 20 Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution. It is clear from the undisputed facts that Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, and thus his constitutional rights in relation thereto dont apply. Also, Ramos had voluntary answered the questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation and agreed that the proceedings be recorded and filed as exhibits A and K, spontaneously offering to compromise his liability. Said exhibits may not be excluded as the so-called Miranda rights had not been accorded to Ramos. Dispositive the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the Orders of respondent Judge, and he is hereby ordered to admit in evidence exhibits A and K
Sec. 17 Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution) and the rights of a person in custodial interrogation (Sec 12 Art. 3). - The first right, against self-incrimination, is NOT to be compelled to be a witness against himself and applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal or administrative. It prescribes an option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry. However, it can only be claimed when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness and cannot be claimed at any other time. The witness thus may not disregard a subpoena or refuse to testify altogether. - The provision of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the judge or any other presiding officer, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of this right, which the witness should know, as ignorance of the law excuses no one. The right against selfincrimination is not automatically operational but must be claimed. Failure to claim it is an implied waiver of said right. - The second right, or rather, group of rights, are a persons rights in custodial interrogation, which means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. These section can be broken down into 3 rights: (1) the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right (2) no force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him (3) any confession obtained in violation of this shall be inadmissible in evidence. - The accused must be informed of these rights prior to any questioning, after which the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. Statements not made under custodial interrogation are not protected. - It is important now to inquire whether the rights mentioned apply to persons under preliminary investigation or already charged in court for a crime. It is evident that a defendant under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation, and there is thus no occasion to speak of such rights under custodial interrogation; however, the accused still possesses the right against self-incrimination. - Under the Rules of Court, the accused occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness and is entitled, among others: (1) not be a witness against himself (2) to testify as a witness on his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness, he may
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given or used and all the rights and benefits provided under Section 8 hereof - Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion, the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court, is given the power to discharge a state witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. The discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function. Moreover, the Rules of Court have never been interpreted to be beyond change by legislation designed to improve the administration of our justice system. R.A. No. 6981 is one of the much sought penal reform laws to help government in its uphill fight against crime, one certain cause of which is the reticence of witnesses to testify. - The rationale for the law is well put by the Department of Justice, viz.: "Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic dislocation, usually refuse to appear and testify in the investigation/prosecution of criminal complaints/cases. Because of such refusal, criminal complaints/cases have been dismissed for insufficiency and/or lack of evidence. For a more effective administration of criminal justice, there was a necessity to pass a law protecting witnesses and granting them certain rights and benefits to ensure their appearance in investigative bodies/courts." Petitioner Webb's challenge to the validity of R.A. No. 6981 cannot therefore succeed. Dispositive Petitions dismissed
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be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him. If the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must, subject to Section 1, Rule 111, file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. We summarize our ruling herein: 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 3. Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action 4. The private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Dispositive The appeal is DISMISSED.
shown to exist yield two (2) or more inferences, one of which consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other or others may be compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused: for the evidence does not fulfill the test or moral certainty and is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction. Dispositive Reversed.