1st Marines Division Okinawa

COPY NO.
c^Q
PECIAL ACTIO
REPORT
A U CA N LS
.-)
tt tt O
NSEI-SHOTO
UNr.lASSIFIED
FIPST MARINE DIVISION

30UCE0 BT MAPPING REPRO ON SECTION FIRST ENGINCER ,ON FIRST MARINE DIVISION
1945
01718 1990-5-80 485/390
OE
F i r s t Marine D i v i s i o n ,
F l e e t Marine Force,
c/o F l e e t Post O f f i c e , San Francisco, CONFIDENTIAL From: To : Via :
California.
10 July, 1945. The Commanding General* Commandant of the Marine Corps* (1) The Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps.
(2) The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force,
Pacific.
(3) CINCPAC - CINCPOA. Aotion Report, NAN3EI SHOTO Operation, 1 Aroril 30 June, 1945, submission of. P a c i f i c F l e e t Confidential Letter 1CL-45. (A) Subject Report.
Subject; Reference: Enclosure:
In accordance with the r e f e r e n c e , enclosure (A) 1. i s submitted herewith. 2. Each has been forwarded r e p o r t i n order to c o p i e s through the organization shown on d i s t r i b u t i o n l i s t the required number of copies o f subject preclude tne n e c e s s i t y of forwarding a l l chain of command.
P. A. d e l VALLE
DISTRIBUTION: CinC
Commander i n Chief, U, S. F l e e t .
Commandant of the Marine Corps.
CINCPAC - CINCPQA (3)
CG, FMF, PAC.
CG, 10th Army (2)
Commander in Chief, Soutnwest Pacific Areas.
CG, V Amphibious Corps
-.? '"'* |",,.i:
< *- J * >.\ ' ~ - 1 1 .
11 I
DECLASSIFIED
Subject: Action Report, NANSEI S O O Operation, 1 April HT 30 June, 1945, submission of. (Con^d). CO, 2d Marine D i v i s i o n . CO, 3rd Marine Division. CO, 4th Marine Division. CG, 5th Marine Division. CG, 6th Marine Division. Commander Third Amphibious Force. ANSCOL. Naval War College.
Command and General Staff School.
Marine Corps Schools (3)
Commander Amphibious Training Command Pacific.
Commander Amphibious Training Command Atlantic.
Commanding General Troop Training Unit Pacific.
Commanding General, Training Center, Fleet Marine Force,
Camp Lejeune.
Commanding General, Training Center, Fleet Marine Force,
Camp Pendleton.
Commander Third Fleet.
Commander Fifth Fleet.
CO, 8th Marines.
CG, XXIV Corps.
CG, 7th Infantry Division.
JttUSSIFB
TABLE of CONTENTS
Special Action Report
Nansei Shoto
Chapter Chapter I - Introduction
II - Task Organization
Chapter III - Preliminary Planning

Personnel Annex
Intelligence Annex
Operations Annex
Supply Annex
Medical Annex
Chapter Chapter Chapter IV - Training and Rehearsals
V - Loading and Embarkation
VI - Movement to and Arrival at Objective Area
Chapter VII - Assault Phase

Narrative
Division Field Orders
Tank Support Annex
Artillery Annex
Naval Gunfire Annex
Air Support Annex
Signal Annex
Engineer Annex
Logistics Annex
Shore Party Annex
Medical Annex
Personnel Annex
Chapter v m - Intelligence
Chapter Chapter IX - Operational Results
X - Comments and Recommendations
DECLteSfflED
CHAPTER I ; INTRODUCTION
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT -NANSEI SHOTO
INTRODUCTION Special Action Report Nansel Shoto Operations of the First Marine Division (Reinforced) against
the former Japanese island of O I A A are divided into three
KN W Phases for purposes of this report:
Phase I included training, planning and rehearsals conducted in the RUSSELL ISLANDS, G A A C N L Area. The movement UDLAA of t h i s Division to the target area concluded Phase I . Phase II began with the assault ship-to-shore movement on 1 April. 1945. Ground action in Central and Northern O I A A was included in t h i s phase which terminated on 22 April, 1945. KN W Phase I I I consisted of the battle for Southern OKINAWA the final destruction of organized resistance on the island, and the mopping up of enemy remnants. Phase III was o f f i c i a l l y terminated on 30 June, 1945. Phases I and II of First Marine Division operations on O I A A KN W provide few lessons for future study that may be included in an action report. The primary reason for this i s that the negligible enemy resistance i n this Division's zone of action provided few opportunities to discover the strengths and weaknesses of a combat organization. Weapons and equipment were not tested under conditions which would warrant qualified opinions on their e f f e c t i v e n e s s ; the only t a c t i c s employed were previously time-tested; and the lessons from Japanese t a c t i c s were almost completely non-existent* I t was during Phase III that the efficiency of this Division was tested and proved. In the protracted, fiercely-contested b a t t l e for Southern OKINAWA, valuable lessons were learned. I t i s the purpose of t h i s report to oroject these lessons against a background of the action as i t developed. While basic doctrine i n a l l cases was again oroved sound, i t i s necessary to point out the application of t h i s doctrine i n s p e c i f i c situations. Pertinent narratives, comments, and recommendations are grouped in the following chapters. Before the detailed operations of the First Marine Division can be analyzed, i t i s well to putline the over-all role played in the invasion of the NANSEI SHOTO. The task of the newlycreated U.S. Tenth Army and supporting units of the Unites jttffes
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UNCLASSIFIED
Fleet was to continue the growing assault on the inner defense
lines of the Japanese Empire and to secure naval and air bases
for further blows against the enemy* Capture of principal
islands in the NANSEI SHOTO would provide these bases and secure
a r a sage to the China Seas, the coast of China, and the
approaches to the Japanese mainland*
As a part of this army, it was the mission of the First
Marine Division, functioning under the control of the III
Amphibious Corps, to defeat the enemy in its zone of action and
be prepared to carry out any further assigned operations. The
Division's initial assignment consisted of landing on the west
coast of OKINAWA and driving to the opposite coast on a proposed
timetable of fifteen days* As the action unfolded, initial
successes came with surprising ease. Central and Northern OKINAWA
fell quickly to Tenth Army forces* Major Japanese defenses were
located in Southern OKINAWA: in that area the decisive battles
of the island were fought*
The following chapters record the part played by the First
Marine Division in seourlng vital OKINAWA. The results of this
experience are incorporatea for the future benefit of those who
participated in the campaign and for those who may be faced with
comparable situations in the future*
3 Ji -
(HUISSYW**
...CHAPTER IE... ..TASK ORGANIZATION... SPECIAL ACTION QE1POQT ...NANSE1I SWOTO...
Btcussro
UECmSIFltD
TASK ORGANIZATION
Nansei Shoto
CT - 1
lBt Marines
Co A let Engr Bn
Co A 1st Plon Bn
Co A 1st Med Bn
Co A 1st MT Bn
Det Ord Co 1st Serv Bn
Atchd: 2d Plat, 1st Bomb Disposal Co
(less 2d and 3d Sqds)
Det S&S Co 1st Serv Bn
1st Plat 1st MP Co
Det 4th JASCO
Det 454th Amph Trk Co (Army) (3 DUKW)
CT - 5
'!><?
*^
Col Kenneth B. CHAPPELL, USMC
Col John H. &RIEBEL, USI'C
5th Marines
Co B 1st Engr Bn
Co B 1st Plon Bn
Co B 1st Med Bn
Co B 1st MT Bn
1st Amph Trac Bn (less Dets)
Atchd: 3d Sod, 2d Plat, 1st Bomb Disposal Co
Det S&S Co 1st Serv Bn
2d Plat 1st MP Co
CT - 7 Col Edward W. SNEDEKER, USMC
7th Marines
Co C 1st Engr Bn
Co C 1st Plon Bn
Co C let Med Bn
Co C 1st MT Bn
8th Amph Trac Bn (less Dets)
Atchd: 2d Sqd, 2d Plat, 1st Bonb Disposal Co
Det S&SJfct life, Serv Bn
3rd PlaC iST*Wl

Det 4th JASCO
Arty gp
Col Wilburt S. BROWN, USMC
11th Marines 3rd Amph Truck Co Det 454th Amph Truck Co (Army) (22 DUKW) VMO-3 Det 1st Amph Trao Bn (12 LVT)
Det 8th Amph Trac Bn (8 LVT)
Armd Amph Trac GP
3rd Armd Amph Bn (Prov)
LtCol A. J. STUART, USMC
Tk Gp
1st Tk Bn
Det 1st Amph Trac Bn (3 LVT)
Det 8th Amph Trac Bn (4 LVT)
Tk Malnt Plat, Ord Co, 1st Serv Bn
Col Francis I. FENTON, USMC
Engr gp
1st Engr Bn (less Cos A, B, C)
145th NCB (less Det)
Shore Party *Gp
1st Plon Bn (less Cos A, B, C) i 11th Special NCB Det 145th NCB Det 4th JASCO Replacement gp Serv Op
1st Serv Bn (less Dets)
1st MT Bn (less Cos A, B, C)
2d Plat 1st Laundry Co
MP gp
LtCol Austin C. SHOFNER, USMC
Col John KALUF, USMC
LtCol Robert g. BALLANCE, USMC
Ma J John I. WILLIAMSON, USMC
Army MP Co
1st MP Co (less 1st, 2d, 3rd Plats)
OKLASSIIW
Div Trs
Lt Col James S. MONAHAN, USMC
Div Hq Bn (less 1st MP Co) 1st Med Bn ( less Cos As Bp C) 4th JA8C0 (less Dets) 454th Amph Truck Co (Army) (less Dets) (9 DUKW) Dets A-1& B-l AMG l?th & 18th G-10 Dispensary Units Assault Air Warning Teams 4th Prov Rkt Det 4th War Dog Plat
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CHAPTER
HE
PRELIMINARY PLANNING
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
NANSEI SMOTO-
Annexes: Personnel lntelli aence Operations Supply j Logistics Medical
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#* 0~ " * tw" ***"
PERSONNEL ANNEX
Nansei Shoto
Composition of the First Marine Division (Reinforced), for
the OKINAWA Operation was as follows:
First Marine Division:
Commanding General Major General Pedro A. del Valle Assistant Division Commander - Brigadier-General Louis R 0 Jones Chief of Staff Colonel Robert 0. Bare G - 1 LtCol Harold 0. Deakln
G - 2 G - 3 G - 4
LtCol. John W. Scott, Jr. LtCol. Russell E. Honsowetz LtCol Harvey C. Tschlrgi
Elements composing the Division for this operation were;

1st Marines 5th Marines 7th Marines 11th Marines let Tank Bn 1st Engineer Bn let Pioneer Bn 1st Motor Transport Bn 1st Service Bn 1st Medical Bn Division Headquarters Bn Colo Kenneth B. Chap-oell, USMC
Colo John Ho Griebel* USMC
Col. Edward W Snedeker, USMC
Col, Wilbert S. Brown, USMC
LtCol Arthur J0 Stuart, USMC
Majo Theodore E Drummond, USMCR
LtColo Robert Go Ballance, USMC
LtCol. Marion A. Fawcett, USMCR
LtColc Calvin C. Gaines, USMC
LtCoradr. Francis Guiffrida, USNR
LtColo James Sc Monahan, USMC
Attached to the Division for operational control for this

operation were:
1st Amphibian Tractor Bn 145th NCB
8th Amphibian Tractor Bn 2d Plat 1st Bomb Disposal Co
3rd Armored Amphibian Bn(Prov)2d Plat 1st Laundry Co
3rd Amphibian Truck Co. Dets A-l & B-l AMG
4th JASCO 17th & 18th G-10 Dispensary Units
4th War Dog Platoon Assault Air Warning Teams
11th Special NCB Co B, 1st MP Bn (USA)
454th Amphibian Truck, Co (USA) 4th Pro-v Rocket Det
The strength of the First Marine Division embarked for the
OKINAWA Operation was 943 officers and 16,979 enlisted men.
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The First Marine Division rear echelon, with a strength of 80

officers and 1,229 enlisted remained at PAVUVU, RUSSELL ISLANDS
awaiting transportation to the HAWAIIAN Area. The strength of
the rear echelon of the attached units was 11 officers and 207
enlisted. Only personnel essential for the operation and forward
movement of the rear echelon remained a PAVUVU* Two Battle
Replacement/Drafts, the 29th and 32nd, consisting of approximately
110 officers and 2,400 men combined, were also embarked in
assault shipping and comprised the bulk of the labor troops.
Their initial employment as shore party was planned to include
ship and boat platoons.
The total strength of the First Marine Division (Reinforced)
was 25,166, Including Marines, Navy and Army. Of this number
1,289 were officers and 23,877 were enlisted men. The breakdown
of the First Marine Division (Reinforced) was as follows?
a. First Marine Division, Forward Echelon;
USMC 830-15,956 b. USN 113-1,023 TOTAL
17,922
Attached Units (including Battle Replacements);
USMC 257-4,720
USN USA TOTAL
75-1,898
USN 188-2,921
14-280
USA 14-280
7,244
c.
Total First Marine Division (Reinforced):

USMC 1,087-20,676 TOTAL
25,166
At the time of embarkation the First Marine Division was b% over the authorized Table of Organization strength. The total sick in hospital was 240. After returning from the PALAU Operation, there remained attached to the Division 246 officers and 5,600 Marine enlisted who had served overseas nearly 30 months, and had participated in the GUADALCANAL, NEW BRITAIN, and PALAU Operations. It appeared that only half of these officers and about 3,000 men could"be rehabilitated in the United States after their lengthy tour in the combat zone. However, after a conference between G~l and the Chief of Staff, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, at Pearl Harbor, a partial solution to this problem was found, in that all the enlisted men could be rotated by diverting two additional Battle Replacement Drafts, the 23rd and 25th, to the First Marine Division. An extensive leave program for officers was also worked out, and53 officers elected to take thirty j3.ays_leaye_In the United States/ in view of the m\ rotated. ^Xn'addltio4, six went tof^fTfzii^j|r%*<ê|lfe MW|15ALAND
2o
Some fifty key enlisted men also elected to take leave in

AUSTRALIA in order that they could continue to serve in the
First Marine Division,*
Replacements received and absorbed into the Division after
the PALAU Operation weres
October, 1944 - 45 Officers - 4400 men
November, 1944 - 45 Officers - 1900 men
January, 1945 - 125'Officers - 2500 men
These5 plus individuals transferred into the Division, brought the
officer strength to the authorized figure, and the enlisted
strength 10$ in excess At the end of January, orders were
received to transfer 900 enlisted men to the 6th Marine Division
and Third Amphibious Corps Troops* However, in view of an intensive
training period at GUADALCANAL during which this over-strength
had been fitted into the divisional organization, authority
was requested and subsequently received to transfer the 900
enlisted from the 29th Replacement Draft, then billeted at
nearby BANIKA (Fourth Base Depot) The divisional over-strength
was then ear-marked for shore party employment, and later
re-assignment to the organization with which trained.
The absor'btion of some 8,000 replacements in the last
quarter of 1944 was accomplished with a minimum of difficulty
despite a serious shortage of experienced noncomralsioned officers,,
However, the replacements received were inadequate in specialist
personnel, and acute shortages existed in Communication, Engineer,,
and Quartermaster branches0
Authority to temporarily promote enlisted personnel was
limited to Line, Commisary, and Field Music branches, which
aggregated only 2,800 Men who had proved themselves in battle
received these promotions, which had a decided morale factor,
somewhat offset by the lack of promotionof the specialist
branches mentioned above. The noncommissioned officer shortage
in the Engineer granch was particularly acute aggregating about
500, or 67$ of authorized, and in Signal Communications totaling
about 300, or 25^. There were instances of Privates First Class
acting in the capacity of Staff Sergeants. The overall picture
therefore was that there was sufficient manpower available, of
which two-thirds of the officers and one-half of the enlisted
personnel had combat experience.
However, many enlisted personnel were performing the
of a higher rank, since there was no authority to jpr
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Many of these men, were deserving of promotion for creditable

performance in combat0
After OKINAWA^ there-will once again exist the problem of necessary officer and enlisted rotation* Present survey indicates there may remain 205 officers of various ranks having twentyfour or more months overseas as of 30 June, 1945 Over half of these will have over thirty months9 There will be approximately 3,200 enlisted with two years or more in the field, of which nearly 800 will have thirty months. As the fall of 1945 approaches the situation will become more acute from the morale viewpointp,inasmuch the personnel entering the two-year category will have spent their entire tour in cocoanut grove or Jungle with not a single opportunity for leave or liberty,,
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INTELLIGENCE
- NAN8EI SHOTO
Prior to landing on OKINAWA 3HIMA this Division oonduoted
a vigorous and comprehensive training and planning program.
The part played by the Division Intelligence Section consis
ted of conducting a school to train and Instruct Intelligence
personnel in their duties* Instruction was given in the
functions of combat intelligence, beach reconnaissance, and
Japanese language; regimental and division field exercises
were carried out.
Schoolst
An intelligence sohool for the enlisted personnel of
the various intelligence sections within the division was con
ducted by the D-2 section from 12 Deo ember to 5 January* It's
main aim was to present a baslo understanding of the organ
ization and function of intelligence agencies and the indiv
idual duties required of all such personnel* The training
was particularly adapted and well timed* since a large number
of new men had entered the D-2 section and were in need of
such instruction*
Among the variety of courses offered; certain ones of
basic importance were stressed* They were as follows: Map reading and orientation. Use of the compass and azimuth hikes*
Panoramic and planemetrlc sketching*
Construction and purpose of observation posts*
Form for and use of Periodic Report, Work Sheet,
Journal, Intelligence Plan and Annex*
(6) CP procedure*
Practical work in the field included CP procedure and the
function and organization of its various component parte.
One night was devoted to a compass march without benefit
of light, to test the ability to work under handicap and to
further facilitate the use of the compass*
At the conclusion of the school, a Division CPX was held allowing each enlisted man to perform the duties ft*"^3^1! R-2 and- D-2, ,of ,the .division. fl L F 1 -* i ^ ' \1)
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During each CPX, time was allowed for instruction and

operation of radio sets, A radio school of one week's dur
ation starting 12 January, 1945 was conducted by the Signal
Company for all Division Intelligence personnel, in which
the complete operation and function of the SCR-300 and 610
radio were explained in detail. The purpose of the D-2
net was given special consideration,
A Beach Reconnaissance School was held from 7 January,
1945 to the 26th by the D-2 section. Representatives of the
2-sections throughout the Division were required to attend*
Instruction in hydrographic reconnaissance, API, photography,
rubber boating and range estimation was featured* This type
of training was undertaken in view of the probable necessity
of euch reoonnale sanee on the Impending operation. The work
of the Navy UDT was fully explained so as to coordinate the
two functions later on. Practical exercises in water borne
reconnaissance from the reefs edge, was practiced on nearby
islands and complete photographic coverage of the landing
beaches obtained. The results of the above training has
now become self evident.
Eleven lectures ranging from one to two hours on combat
phrases, pronunciations, simple vocabulary, numbers, geo
graphical terms, and dates were given by officers of the
language section to the Reconnaissance Company; enlisted
intelligence personnel of Division Headquarters and separate
battalions; enlisted personnel of 5th and 7th Marines R-2
sections; "E*, "P-, and "a" Companies, 2nd Battalion, 5th
Marines; 1st Tank Battalion; and General Duty and Band
personnel of Headquarters. A syllabus was given to each
of these groups to supplement the lectures. These lectures
were given between 28 November, 1944 and 15 February, 1945
Three courses of a similar but more detailed nature
were also given by personnel of the language section be
tween 8 December, 1944 and 16 February, 1945, as follows:
(1) Five weeks oourse to the MP Company l hours
a day, five (5) days a week with speolal
emphasis on vocabulary for handling of PWs
around the stockade and on working parties*
A twelve (12) page syllabus was supplied
with the course.
Five weeks course to the Red Cross Service Center
(2)
w o n ^ { l ) , 4 h o ^ r Ud^SC^>two (2) days ja, jffifik^

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with special emphasis on combat phrases. The

syllabus used in the eleven lectures and some add
itional pages were supplied with this course.
(3) Three (3) weeks course to the Medical Battalion one (l) hour a day, four (4) days a week with special emphasis on medical vocabulary. The MP
syllabus and some additional pages on medical
terms were used as a basis.
During December and January a training film on combat
phrases was shown at the various movie areas, and a combat
phrase was published each day for about a month in the
Pavuvu Press after the middle of January.
On 23 February, 1945 fifteen (15) sets of combat phraser
cartoons such as were used prior to the PELELIU Operation,
and 10,000 cards containing thirty-six (36) phrases were
distributed to the various front line units of the Division,
Indoctrination material concerning the handling of PWs
end captured materiel was presented in all the lectures and
courses mentioned above. In addition, one to two hour lec
tures on these subjects alone were presented to the enlisted
intelligence personnel of the let Marines; the R-2 personnel
of the 7th Marines; and the enlisted intelligence personnel
of Division Headquarters Bn and the separate battalions.
These were given between 8 December, 1944 and 2 January, 1945
A training film on the handling of PWs was shown to the last
group above on 29 Deoember, 1944. Plans to give similar
lectures and films to the intelligence officers of the Div
ision during January were cancelled because of the absenoe
of various regiments on training programs.
Special training of language personnel. After the
PELELIU campaign it was decided to send the members of the
language section to JICPOA for further training in trans
lation and interrogation in order that the officers and men
should not stagnate between operations. It was planned to
leave two officers and one enlisted man behind for admin
istrative and training purposes and to rotate them with two
others at a later date. The time element prevented the
carrying out of the second part of this plan, but eleven (11)
offioers and ten enlisted men (including one each from the
MP Company.the 1st Marines, and the 5th Marines) left for

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MfiWSSIFIE
Liaison:
PEARL H R O on 17 November, 1944, while one o f f i c e r en route ABR baok from eeoorting a group of PWe from PELELIU to the Main land arrived at FMF, Pao. on 16 November, 1946*and vafi a s s i g n ed to the same type of duty as the others assumed upon t h e i r arrival* All personnel returned to the Division between 17 January and 15 February, 1946 Suoh training was found to be invaluable to both o f f i c e r s and men, and a greater effort to have a l l personnel participate in t h i s training between future operations i s recommended*
Because liaison teams from the Division Intelligence Sec

tion proved to be of so much value during the previous oper
ation, it was decided to employ them again. Great profit was
derived from the lessons learned on that operation and a
period of intensive training was undergone by the officers
and men chosen to form the teams. A uniform procedure for
reporting to Division, adjacent, and lower echelons was care
fully worked out; printed forms for the making of written
reports were printed and distributed to the officer in charge
of each team; instruction was given in telephone and radio
procedure; and each team was carefully briefed and instructed
in its primary function, which was to make detailed periodic
reports to Division and to keep a constant stream of infor
mation flowing to Division and adjacent units.
After a period of training had been successfully brought
to a close, the Division Intelligence Section immediately
set to performing its functions in preparation and planning
for the coming operation. It concerned itself with the
procurement, study, and distribution of aerial photographs,
and maps, including relief maps. An Intelligence Estimate
and an Enemy Order of Battle were prepared. Personnel were
briefed, and the Division Intelligence Section was carefully
organized to perform its duties during the operation in the
most efficient fashion.
Photographs:
Photographs of the target area were furnished entirely
by JICPOA, distributed chiefly through the III Amphibious
Corps. The following sets of photographs were regej^
* *<
jy -.-:.. * r f r-
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Date Rec'd 27 Dec 44 27 Deo 44 28 Deo 44 9 9 9 5 8 Jan 45 Jan 45 Jan 45 Feb 45 Feb 45
Type Obi. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Higi A l t . Obi. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert. Vert-. Vert. Vert. Vert.
Scale
1:12,300 1:15,500 1:5,000 1:5,000 1:10,000 1:11,000 1:6,000 1:6,000
13 Feb 45 13 Feb 45
22 Jan 45 22 Jan 45 22 Jan 45 22 Jan 45 22 Jan 45 22 Jan 45 3 Jan 45 3 3 Jan 45 Jan 45
14 Feb 45 16 Feb 45 17 Feb 45 17 Feb 45 17 Feb 45 20 Feb 45 25 Mar 45 25 Mar 45 5 Mar 45
1:5,000 1:6,000 1:10,000 ~ 1:10,000 1:3,000 1:8,000 1:8,000 1:10,000 1:15,000
Photo coverage varied from poor to excellent but cover age capable of Interpretation was limited to approximately 5,00 yards inland, from the landing beaches and a narrow s t r i p along the opposite (East) ooast which included the en r. t i r e uifjagtf HANTO. ^
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Beach coverage was especially good. A written report on

beaches and an annotated mosaic were included in the intell
igence annex to the operation order end a detailed pictorial
study of beach and reef conditions was prepared for each beach.
These studies included a mosaic of entire Division landing
area showing beach boundaries and defenses. A profile of the
reef, beach, and terrain immediately inland showing extent
and character of reef, obstacles, and water depths, a stereo-
pair, an oblique, and a panoramic sketch. This information
on each beach was reproduced on a single sheet and distributed
as far down the chain of command as platoon leaders* The
studies proved to be quite correct* Water depths did not
vary over 1 or 2 feet from the estimated depths and the char
acter of the reef was as stated. The oblique of the beach
was very poor but was the only one available at the time*
One excellent oblique was received on the morning of LOVB-Day
and would have proved very valuable had it been received in
time. No submarine photos were available and it was necess
ary to substitute the panoramic sketch which proved to be
Just as useful or perhaps even better as submarine photographs
are rarely clear in detail* They would be of very great
value in the preparation of the sketch, however.
If in future operations photographs of landing beaches,
particularly those fringed by a coral reef, were taken at
different states of tide and, what is especially important,
one sortie were made as near low tide as feasible, this
would make possible the location and determination of the
maximum amount of underwater obstacles, and, if the reef
should be drying or near drying, would be of the utmost val
ue in estimating water depths* The photographic scale should
not be smaller than 1:5,000.
The terrain report Included in the intelligence annex was
prepared largely from photographic information*
Enemy defenses and other military installations were
taken solely from photographs and the final interpretation was
presented as the Enemy Situation section of the intelligence
annex to the operation order* All installations were looated
by target area coordinates* An annotated mosaic was also pre
pared and distributed to all company oommanders and staff
personnel. Preliminary interpretation reports were prepared
and distributed as additional photography was received*
The interpretation of military installations suffered
from the lack of comparative sorties. Suitable photographs^ *
jt were taken on only three different dajtej,, 1<^ Q ^ j
28
22 January, 1945, and 1 March, 1945# Also the scales of com

parative sorties of the same area varies so greatly that an
accurate comparison was very difficult. An illustration
of this is the difference in the photographs reoeived of
IE SHIMA whose successive large scale sorties each covering
almost all of the island soon made it apparent that the
enemy were abandoning or had abandoned that island.
It is recommended that in future operations that every
effort be made to obtain as many comparative sorties of as
near the same scale as possible. This scale, for best re
sults, should not be smaller than 1:5,000. Photographic
coverage of this theater of operation was received taken by
high altitude bombers using only a six inch focal length
camera and consequently were of no use for interpretation
because of their small scale. Had a 40 inch camera been used,
the photography would have been most helpful.
Throughout the planning phase copies of the best photo
graphy received on the area were reproduced and distributed
to regimental and battalion intelligence sections as soon
as possible after receipt.
A report on island facilities within the Division Z of
A was prepared for the Engineer Battalion.
Maps:
Maps used in the OKINAWA operation were furnished by d i r e c t shipment from TENTH Army to 1 s t Marine D i v i s i o n and Included t h e f o l l o w i n g : Scale 1:10,000 Designation Line Map "A" of Key Terrain i n D i v i s i o n Z of A. (Note: A 1:10,000 Photomap (mosaic) covering the i d e n t i c a l area as Line Map "A", p r i n t e d on the r e v e r s e s i d e of Line Map "A".) Line Map HBM of IE SHIMA. T a c t i c a l maps Red, Blue, Green, Brown, Black and Purple, each c o l o r d e s i g n a t i n g various s e c t i o n s of Target Area. (For color chart of a r e a s , see Annex Baker to Opn Plan 1 - 4 5 ) . 64th Road Map. Road and Planning MapÔKINAWA. Planning and Orient a t t a i n J 0*!tfM?> | J" - 7
1:10,000 1:25,000
1:50,000 1:100,000 l:25Q,000
*?
In addition, a special map, HAGUSHI B A H area, scale EC 1:5,000, was prepared by the Division Mapping and Repro duction Section of beaches in the Division Z of A and inland approximately 6,000 yards, information being taken from the 1:25,000 Tactical Map, plus additional information from the most recent aerial photographs. This special 1:5,000 "Beach Area" map was f i r s t introduced in the planning and opera tional phase of the PALAD campaign and distributed to com pany commanders and platoon leaders. More than 600 copies were printed and the maps furnished to battalions in large quantities. One (1) copy only of a complete set of hydrographic charts pertaining to the area between F R O A and JAPAN OMS were furnished the D*-2 Section by CinCPAC-CinCPOA. These charts were received several days prior to embarkation. The f i r s t shipment of t a c t i c a l maps was received by the 1st Marine Division on 6 February, 1945, and there after at irregular intervals u n t i l 27 February, 1945, the l a s t s i x (6) boxes arriving one day after embarkation. Final distribution of maps was made to units afloat following the return to BANIKA and PAVUVU after rehearsal maneuvers at GUADALCANAL. On 5 January, 1945, the Division Relief Mapping Unit com pleted work on a r e l i e f map of the l e t Marine Division beaches on OKINAWA. A plastelena map mounted on plywood, scale app roximately 1:7,000, was prepared from an aerial sortie of 10 October, 1944. Special attention was given not only to the beaches and area of the a i r f i e l d s within l i m i t s of the map, but also to the road network and v i l l a g e s then e x i s t i n g . Oil color was applied to the model for greater definition of d e t a i l of airports, v i l l a g e s and road networks. The Division also received r e l i e f maps of i t s Z of A from CinCPAC-CinCPOA, FMF, Pac, III Phib Corps and A.T.B # , Camp Bradford, Va. These maps, cast in both p l a s t e r and rubber, were of two s c a l e s , 1:5,000 and 1:10,000. Each regimental headquarters and assault battalion was furnished with a r e l i e f map of i t s Z of A. Other units r e c e i v ing r e l i e f maps were 1st Engineer Bn, 1st Tank Bn, 1st Amph Trac Bn, the l a t t e r unit Jointly sharing i t s map with the 8th Armd Amph Trac Bn.
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50
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Final distribution of relief maps was made to all above-

named units 28 February, 1945, two days after embarkation.
This late distribution was due to the failure of relief maps
reaching PAVUVU in time for dissemination ashore.
It is recommended that in the planning phase of future
operations a standard scale relief map be distributed to assault
divisions in such quantity as will provide at least one complete
map for each divisional unit, plus attached units. It is fur
ther recommended that distribution of relief maps be made to
divisions in ample time for dissemination and study prior to
embarkation. Final distribution of relief maps in the OKINAWA
operation to units afloat between SUNLIGHT CHANNEL, BANIKA,
and PAVUVU posed a difficult problem.
Another difficulty encountered with regard to relief maps
resulted from lack of advance information from higher head-
Quarters as to the number of maps to be allotted the Division.
Accordingly, no plan could be made for ample distribution and
possible readjustment of numbers of maps issued to each organ
ization.
Enemy Order of Battle:
Aerial photographs provided the only estimates of enemy
strength in our Z of A. They showed positions for one batt
alion of infantry in the high ground inland from the YONTAN KATENA road; for elements of one battalion of infantry direct
ly behind the beaches in our left sector, and for elements of
another behind the beaches in our right sector. On the east
coast, positions for three battalions of infantry were shown
at the base of KATCHIN Peninsula. CD, AAA, small boat, and
supply installations also were Indicated.
Aboard ship, aerial photographs were received which showed
more than enough artillery positions to accommodate an artill
ery regiment. Concurrently, III Amphibious Corps estimated
one regiment of artillery in the Corps Z of A. Therefore, a
regiment of artillery was added to the estimate for the 1st
Marine Division Z of A.
Experience, freshly confirmed at IWO Island, indicated
probable support of the infantry with mortars, rockets, artill
ery, and tanks. A mortar battalion, a rocket detachment, a
battalion of divisional artillery, and a company of tanks
therefore were added to the estimate though no photographs
actually showed these weapons.
nrri s ^ i n r
s
- "Estimates of Order of Battle in the TENTH Army Z of A

used by the let Marine Division were those issued by higher
echelons, with the exoeption of the D-2's final estimate on
tyOVE minus nine. At that time late reports of shipping sight ed in OKINAWA waters appeared to demand a further Increase In
the enemy1s estimated strength*
Preparation and Distribution of D-2 Estimate and Study:
The D-2 Estimate of the Biemy Situation was completed
by 10 January, 1945 and formed part of the Intelligence
Annex to the Operation Plan for the OKINAWA Operation, On
5 February, 1945, a current Estimate was issued on the basis
of the latest information, and oh 23 March, 1945, Supple
ment No* 1 to the D-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation was
published at sea*
In accordance with orders from CG, TENTH Army, the
Division Intelligence Section organized the briefing of
troops aboard ship.
12.
OPERATIONS ANNEX
Nansei Shoto
Initial planning within the First Marine Division for
this operation was based od the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Intelligence study of the NANSEI SHOTO, OKINAWA GUNTO in
particular. The large scale plan was laid down in ComPhibsPac
Operation Plan Al-45. First detailed planning was taken from
this order and the tentative operation plan of the Tenth Army,
received 8 December.
The first basic conceptwhich was to undergo some changes
during the campaignwas as follows:
Phase I - capture of KERAMO RETTO, KEISE JIMA and
OKINAWA JIMA south of ISHIKAWA ISTHMUS.
Phase II - capture of IE JIMA, and the remainder of

OKINAWA as considered necessary.
Phase III - succesive seizure of OKINO DAITO JIMA and
MIYAKO JIMA.
Original concept for this Division was an assault on the
west coast of OKINAWA as a part of the III Amphibious Corps,
in turn an element of Expeditionary T roops, Task Force 56
XXIV Army Corps on the right and the Sixth Marine Division on
the left and push across tb the East coast of the island. It
was anticipated (after verbal discussions) that the Second
Marine Division would come out of Army reserve, pass through
and take the peninsula to our Southeast.
The original plan for this Division was slightly changed
with the receipt of the Corps Operation Plan on 3 February.
That order took away some land on the North of this Division's
Zone of Action, and the Southern boundary previously in doubt,
was verified as the BISHA GAWA. The scheme of maneuver placed
CT-5 on the right, CT-7 on the left and CT-1 in reserve. A
further revisionlater grantedwas requested in BLUE Beaches
One and Two, making them virtually the same width, thus
enabling one landing team to go ashore in entirety on one beach.
The Division established its own 0-a line short of I>3, to aid in control, and confirmed its plan to assist the Sixth Marine Division in the capture of YONTAN k%vtV^d ;t v rto* IJhdj ' *jufrt North of ouavZoine b%fAgtoiafy*.*; *\\ 1 ' *
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Tentative S'irsi, Marine Division Operational Plan 1-45 was

complexed on 2 February, but It had to be held up for slight
revisions on receipt of tne Corps oraer. The plan was issued on
5 February and on that day operations officers from all units
were briefed by G-3, Earlier, regimental and some separate
battalion commanders had been briefed as information became
available. About this time dissemination of information to
lower units began to enable them to initiate detail planning
This Division, embarked on TransRon 18 with the CP aboard
the US3 BURLEIGH, continued planningwith only minor changes
throughout rehersals and the approach to the target area.
SUPPLY ANNEX
NANSEI 3H0TC
The Division returned from the PALAU Operation in three
echelons, the last of which arrived at the rehabilitation area
in mid-November < Reequipping did not commence as soon as had
, been desiredo
Reequipping proceeded at a satisfactory rate0 However,
as in the past, the Division wan still receiving equipment and
supplies after transport and LSTs had been loaded. This was
particularly true in the erase of signal supplies0 Prior to
embarkation, orders were received to embark ninety days signal
supplies replenishments instead of the customary thirty days
replenishments,, This necessitated shipping bf air to the
serving depot many signal supply items In order to meet the
n
required deadline Steps were initiated early in the reequipping phase to
obtain fifty-five gallon water drumsc Previously, used
petroleum drums had been cleaned and sterilized and then used
as water containers This method was entirely unsatisfactory and
the problem of embarking five days water was solved by the
use of the new type galvanized water drum0
During the reequipping phase, full cooperation in all
supply matters was received from the Fourth Base Depot This contributed immeasurably to the high state of equipment
readiness of this Division for the OKINAWA Operation0

Logistical planning was based on two premises? first, that
landing beaches would be strongly defended, and secondly, that
the enemy would contest our advance determinedly from his
positions in the advantageous terrain.
For this reason, it was decided to land only dpeclfied
amounts of high priority orargo during the first dayQ High
priority cargo Included one unit of fire for all weapons, one
days' rations, one days0 water, sufficient fuel for tanks, DUKW's
and LVT's, necessary medical and signal supplies, fortification
materials and demolitions0 Priority cargo LCVP, LOK and LCT loads
were drawn up and presented to the Navy for final approval.
This plan, known as the, "hot cargo" plan, was then embodied in
CTF 53o2 Attack order0
I B ^ I I ittmri'ilffliy^'"^
The OKINAWA Operation was similar to the PALAU Operation

in that a fringing reef off the landing beaches would be
encountered and that a reef-transfer line would have to be
established, utilizing swing cranes on pontoon barges for
transferring cargo from shlpns craft to LVTs and DUKWso
Therein, all similarity between the two operations end.ed0
In the planning phase it was apparent that after beachheads
had been secured the problems of tactical and logistical
motor transport imposed by operations on a large land mass .
over a poor road net would be encountered,. It was decided that
all available shipping space should be utilized to transport
Division organic motor vehicles to the Target Area0
Logistical planning for the OKINAWA Operation was
simplified due to the fact that all units would be mounted
from either PAVUVU or BANIKA in the RUSSELL ISLANDS,, No complex
movement of ships to various mounting out areas was encountered
which greatly facilitated embarkation and loading
~* f
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3G
MEDICAL ANNEX
Nansei 3hoto
MATERIAL
Upon return to PAVUVU from the PALAU Islands It was
necessary to reequip the medical department with many units
which had been lost in action0 Approximately one-half of
all medical units were lost in the PELELIU operation.
The Medical Supply Facilities at GUADALCANAL and
ESPIRITU SANTOS gradually supplied most of the necessary equipment and supplies to bring all medical activities up
to standard strength,, In many cases, due to shortages at
nearby medical supply facilities it was necessary to request
supplies from PEARL HARBORo The fault seems to lie in lack
of coordination between the various supply facilities.
Empty First Aid Jungle Kits for most all combat troops
were available, but there were no supplies with which to
equip them, e 0 g 0 , no vials for salt and Atabrlne tablets
and no bottles for fungicide solution. Such a situation is
regrettable because theê kits were used both at CAPE GLOU
CESTER and PELELIU and were found to be far superior to the
standard first aid packet. Approximately 7000 were equipped
by utilizing such containers as could be procured by devious
mean So
Efforts were made to obtain adequate supplies of medi
cinal Brandy0 In combat, brandy has been found to be very
valuable in the treatment of combat fatigue, shock and ex
posure cases. However, due to disapproval of requisitions
by higher medical echelons, an adequate supply could not be
obtainedo
Plans were made to make extensive use of serum-albumin
in accordance with numerous directives from the Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery,,
All supplies and equipment not carried by combat units
were dispersed for transportation to the five medical com
panies.
^1
- 1
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V** **
SANITATION
Three sanitary squads were trained to operate with
each combat team to spray DDT on all bodies and assist in
mosquito and fly control. On previous operations these
squads had proven invaluable Their work was to be later
supplemented by the Malaria Control Unit. Prefabricated
seats were prepared and issued to all units for use on emp
ty 50 gallon drums as latrines. Each drum was to be buried
to about 3/4 of Its height and the seats close fitting to
avoid entrance and egress of flies. It was believed that
these fixtures would keep all the usual gastro-intestinal
diseases at a minimum. These drums also were to have 5 gal
lons of DDT in oil added to them before use.
All units were fully instructed in the value of sani
tation while in oombat.
PERSONNEL
Each combat team was assigned litter bearers for each
rifle company to evacuate casualties from the front lines
to aid stations. These litter bearers were trained in first
aid and the evacuation of casualties*
Each infantry battalion had 40 hospital corpsmen assign
ed, permitting t he use of two corpsmen to each platoonB
All medical personnel were brought up to authorized
strength.
CLASSIfliO
3d
-CHAPTER BE TRAINING # REHEARSALS SPECIAL ACTION REPORT -IMANSEI SHOTO
TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

Nansei Shoto
TRAINING
<
Training for the NANSEI SHOTO Campaign cannot be said to

have started with the First Marine Division's return to its
base camp in the RUSSELLS during late October and early
November of 1944 after a hard-fought selge in the Southern
PALAUS. Training of the Division had bnen continuous since
it struck the first offensive blow of the war against the
Japanese on GUADALCANAL in August of 1942 It had continued
throughout the campaigns in N T / BRITAIN and the PALAUS, and
E/ the four months prior to OKINAWA were merely added to the
sum total.
True, the organization that landed for rehearsals on
GUADALCANAL in March of 1945 was almost a totally different
organization than landed on the same island in 1942, for its
rotation and training of personnel had been a continuous process*
When the Division embarked for OKINAWA, approximately
one-third of its men had been in two actions against the enemy,
one-third had faced him once, and the remainder had seen no action
Most of these replacements were awaiting the Division at PAVUVU
upon its return from PALAU and received the full benefit of
four months rigourous training in addition to their earlier
indoctrination in the United States*
Training was hampered somewhat in the RUSSELLS because of
the lack of suitable areas and the necessity of reaching these
areas by limited water transportation. This was overcome
for the most part by sending the artillery and regimental
combat teams to GUADALCANAL for large scale field maneuvers.
This was accomplished in rotation with one Division problem
being held in late January. Basic training, small unit problems,
and Division specialized schools were held near the base camp
at PAVUVU. Special emphasis was placed on preparing the
Division for the possibility of a type warfare it had not
faced in previous campaigns. For the first time it was landing
as an integral part of a much larger landing force. It was
invading a large land mass which contained extensive road nets,
large inhabited areas, cities and villages, large numbers
of enemy civilians, and types of terrain differing in many
respects from the jungles of GUADALCANAL and NEW BRITAIN,
-1
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In addition to training for these new types of warfare,

experienced hands in the Division were schooled in the use
of new weapons and the replacement personnel was thoroughly
Indoctrinated in the roles they were to play as a part of the
Division team. Included among the weapons not previously
used by this Division were truck-mounted rocket la;, richer s .and
certain secret weapons still in the experimental stage.
Defense against chemical attack was stressed in training
with the growing possibility of the enemy's use of chemical
agents as we pressed ever closer to the Japanese homeland,,
Also encouraged by this factor was the training in defense
against paratroops and indoctrination in the proper attitude
to be adopted toward hostile civiliansa problem not -pre
viously faced by this organization.
REHEARSALS
The first days of March found the First Marine Division
undertaking the initial steps in its fourth operation aîlnst
Japanese Imperial Forces. Some four months after its return
from the Southern PALAUS, the Division was embarked for
rehearsals and transport to the target area. Functioning as
a part of the IIIAmphibious Corps and the Tenth Army and
embarked in naval Transport Squadron 18, units of this
. Division sailed from the RUSSELL Islands on 1 March, v vjund
for the training area off TA33AFAR0NG-A, GUADALCANAL for
rehearsalso
Preliminary maneuvers wepe initiated the following day
with emphasis on disembarking practice and shlp-to-shor^
drill. Only scattered communications personnel were actaally
put ashore. On 3 March, larger scale landings, with the
assault units going ashore and including simulated naval
gunfire and air support, were staged. There was little man
euver ashore since the Division already had held extensive
land warfare problems; however, communications received a
thorough testing. CT-1, Division reserve, was disembarked
and maneuvered away from the transport area but did not land.
After a critique for unit commanders and various staffs
aboard the Corps command ship on 4 March the activities of
3 March were repeated on the 5th, emphasis still being
placed on ship-to-shore movement.
A full scale dress rehearsal was staged on 6 March, All
ftnifts* .with the,,exception of the Division Reserve, were landed
J; lite*-Division- t P was. established asljpijpjâ/jiggmmunicatlons
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again received a thorough test in an extensive command post

exerciseo Some supplies were taken ashore for limited beach
party activity and the exercise included real and simulated
naval gunfire and air support. In the late afternoon of the
6th all units, less CT-1, returned to the RUSSELLS for
refueling of ships and replenishment of supplies. *
On 7 March, CT-1 conducted brief landing exercises, then
returned to the RUSSELLS. The Division, except for those units
embarked on the Northern Tractor Flotilla which departed for
ULITHI on 12 March remained in the RUSSELLS until the 15th.
Most elements spent some time ashore at PAVUVU and BANIKA for
final conditioning of equipment for combat, recreation, and
conditioning hikes.
The complete convoy rendezvoused at BANIKA on 12 March.
With receipt of ComTaskFor 53 Attack Order A405-45 final phases
of the planning were completed.
*"* i
- CHAPTER Yl LOADING t EMBARKATION SPECIAL ACTION QEPOQT NANSEI SHOTO
5! " " PIT"

HP ^ ^
^5
LOADING AND EMBARKATION

Nansei Shoto
Embarkation of the First Marine Division on Transport
Squadron 18 and Northern Tractor Group began 17 February
1945. All supplies and ammunition were loaded by 4th Base
Depot at BANIKA, Troops and combat equipment were loaded
by this Division at PAVUVU.
Planning for Transron 18 was done under difficult con
ditions. Ship's characteristics, as furnished,.were not
correct, and no characteristics were available for two ships0 Ship's TQMs were slow in reporting to this Headquarters, and
for this reason loading was delayed on the Jefferson and
Betelgeuse. The Andromeda had taken both tween decks of num
ber three hatch for ship's space,, This was a serious loss
as number three hatch is serviced by a thirty ton boom.
The forms required by FMF, Pac, are much too detailed

and difficult for the average line officer to complete. When there is not sufficient time for trained TQM personnel to do
this work, the Troop TQMs become confused and make many er
rors. The Cargo and Loading Analysis shows no information
not covered by the Stowage Plan or Profile Plan; the Con
solidated Vehicle Table only repeats information shown on
the Consolidated UP&T Table and the Vehicle Debarkation
Priority Table. It is recommended that more emphasis be
placed on the Stowage Plan and Profile Plan and that re
petitious forms be eliminated.

Loading progressed as planned. Unloading priorities
were followed. The 12th Special NCB, under Commander Naval
Base, RUSSELL ISLANDS, furnished necessary stevedores for
the loading of supplies at BANIKA. The loading,of ships at
BANIKA was continually in advance of schedule, due to the
full cooperation of the 4th Base Depot and 12th Special NCB.
Since the harbor and other port facilities at PAVUVU were
limited, some difficulties were encountered. However, the
schedule was met and loading completed by 26 February 1945.
All ships were slightly overloaded. It is believed
that thirty-two days rations and thirty days fuel are in
excess of that which should be embarked in assault ship
ping.
LST planning was based on information from higher h(
quarters which stated that six (6) LSTWiwuWfcaflrjr*!* '
n
.***. I l l * " * ^
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-l
After plans were made on that basis, the Division was.^ % assigned eleven (11) LSTs carrying LCTso This lovered * the available space by fifteen thousand (15000) square feeto Furthermore, all LSTs carrying an LOT had 12" 12" timber shoring on the tank deck to support the main deck which greatly hindered loading and movement of LVTso The tactical plan of employing LSTs was changed just
prior to loading* No representative of the LST Flotilla
was available during planning0 Arrival dates were unknown
and substitutions were made daily0 Proper planning was
consequently impossible
Many LST Captains firmly believed that their ships should not carry fuel or ammunition. Navy ammunition on top side was not stowed according to plan, and in many cases had to be restowed in order to load vehicles top side* Captains received confusing orders* For example, one LST left BANIKA for PAVUVU and was next heard of in TULAGI. Information concerning personnel and cargo which would be aboard LSTs upon their arrival at PAVUVU was Inaccurateo LST 949 arrived carrying 162 Navy passengers This worked an undue hardship on assault troops0 No loading schedule for LSTs could be followedo
Troops were alerted and broke camp but LSTs did not arrive
Other LSTs arrived unannounced, but with resultant delay
in loadingo
In spite of difficulties encountered, the embarkation
schedule was met and loading accomplishedo It is believed
that if recommendations made herein are followed, future
movements will be simplified,,
48
CHAPTER, m .MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE SPECIAL ACTION REPORT -NANSEI SWOTO...
OtC'X'W
*?
r.ccM.'tn *:.f L * * * ~ h*
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-WW*
MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE
Nansei Shoto
Command post afloat for the First Marine Division was
established aboard the U3S APA BURLEIGH, flagship of TransRon
18, at 1600 on 28 February, lying in MAQUITTI BAY, RU3SELL
ISLANDS* The rear echelon of this organization remained
temporarily at the Division base camp at PAVUVU.
Portions of TransRon 18, with the reinforced division
embarked, sailed from the RUSSELLS at approximately 0600
1 March, 1945, bound for TASSAFARONGA, GUADALCANAL and seven
days of amphibious rehearsals before sailing for the target
On 6 March, following rehearsals,, ships returned to the
RUSSELLS for replenishment of supplies and refueling The
entire division convoy had rendevouzed in SUNLIGHT CHANNEL off
BANIKA ISLAND by 12 March, and on that same date the Northern
Tractor Flotilla, carrying assault elements of the Division, depar
ted for the target. At 0600 on 15 March Transport Group Baker
(TransRon 18), under command of Commodore Moyer, weighed anchor
in SUNLIGHT CHANNEL and departed the RUSSELLS for ULITHI in
the WESTERN CAROLINES, From that time to 21 March, this
Division was at sea enroute to ULITHI along a route generally
parallel to the Northern coast of NEW GUINEA
The convoy dropped anchor at approximately 1400 21 March
at ULITHI and remained there until 1530 on 27 March at which
time it departed for the NANSEI SHOTO, While in the CAROLINES
troops were sent ashore for conditioning and recreation and
final planning conferences were held aboard the various
flagships. After departure, all troops were thoroughly briefed
on the coming operation, making extensive use of materials
provided by various Intelligence sections and the Tenth Army.
All hands received literature relative to the target area,
officers held daily lectures and conferences, and detailed
maps and relief maps were placed in the enlisted men's mess halls.
In the morning of 31 March UDT reconnaissance teams were
taken on board from APDs, bringing late information on reefs,
beaches, tide conditions, and enemy shore defenses* All
reports were favorable, and as the convoy moved toward the
transport area it received word that preliminary air and naval
preparat3^m^4E|[j^Bafiiê^Lln6 o n schedule with excellei
ncf *
News was also received, as L day neared, of the successful

preliminary landings in the KERAMA RETTO, Troops listened
daily to the Radio Tokyo version of Allied intentions in the
RYUKYUS
Following heavy seas for two days out of ULITHI the approach
weather was ideal. For almost the entire period there was
overcast with somewhat limited visibility, and the sea running
moderate swells.
There was no attempted enemy interception and the convoy
reached the transport area on schedule completely without
incident and with no losses to enemy action.
DECLASSIFIED
^ ^ ^ Y - v v ^ r - rffc.
* ^ w i* n ^- ^ n 11,. 1
CMAPTEQ 3ZH
ASSAULT PMASE
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

NANSEI SHOTO
Narrative Division Field Orders Tank Support Annex Artillery Annex Naval Gunfire Annex A i r Support Annex
3inal Annex Engineer Annex Logistics Annex Shore Party Annex Medical Annex Personnel Annex
-lU'-.USSUM
ASSAULT NARRATIVE
Nansei Shoto
When assault waves, of the First Marine Division surged onto
the western slopes of OKINAWA JIMA on Easter morning of 1945
they cane expecting to wage one of the costliest battles yet
fought in the war against Japan and three days later on the
eastern beaches they were still looking for that battle. The
Division had raced across its nine-mile-wide zone of action
virtually "standing upH against light,scattered resistance
To the South, Array units of the XXIV Corps,' also operating
against negligible opposition, reached the east coast with
similar speed and swung South for a drive on the center of enemy
resistance above NAHA, principle city and capital of the island.
The American advance continued without pause till it reached the
Japanese defensive network running across the island generally
North of the NAHA-SHURI Line. There it was nalted by the enemy for
the first time, and our forces paused for an extended period to
bring reinforcements ashore and allow for extensive air, artillery
and naval gunfire preparation before renewing the attack.
The Sixth Marine Division, in assault on the left of this
organization, sped through its lightly held area and by 16 April
had elements patrolling the northern tip of the island. The only
heavy opposition found in its sector was on MOTOBU Peninsula, a
large area Jutting into the CHINA SEA north of ISHIKAWA ISTHMUS.
Initial action in the NANSEI SHOTO was something of a departure
from earlier campaigns of this Division, not only in the
surprising lack of resistance but in the type of warfare. Here
was the blitz-style war of speed and movement, combined with its lat
stages with the same type aggressive patrolling and mopping up
that this Division had seen earlier on GUADALCANAL and CAPE
GLOUCESTER.
The rolling checkerboard terrain of this Division's zone of
aetlon on OKINAWA was Ideally suited for defensive tactics* Most
of the First Marine Division sector was excellent defensive
country, gently rolling, but covered with a multitude of finger
ridges and interlocking valleys. A vast part of the area was
covered with emplacements in varying states of readiness^plainly
indicating earlier Jap Intentions to defend this area. The usual
caves, many of them civilian shelters, honeycombed the entire zone.
The hills and terraced fields were interlaced by, as one observer
put it, "an excellent network of very poor roads." Most of the
streams were spanned by narrow bridges which the enemy had made
littii^ntiMPt to destroy. The principle bridge over the BISHA
YONTAN Airfield had excellent command of all landing beaches

and observation to the other coast and far to the north and south.
The only thing lacking In the defensive setup was the most
Important: personnel to defend the ground.
Defense of this Division1s zone of action was left almost
entirely in the hands of scattered home defense units after the
major Imperial forces withdrew to the south. Bnemy action was of
a purely harassing nature carried on by small groups for the most
part and aimed only at slowing our progress. Principle Jap
efforts were placed on night infiltration, a maneuver with which
this Division was thoroughly familiar from past experience.
But the Jap's scattered and half-hearted effort* here were a far
cry from his usual destructive strikes.
Such was not the type campaign expected by Marines of the
First Division while standing off the west coast of OKINAWA at
dawn of 1 April and watching the naval bombardment that climaxed
seven days of heavy preparation. The pre-landing pounding
started at 0530, some 20 minutes prior to dawn. Transport squadron
18 reached the transport area at approximately 0510 and began
immediate preparations to launch the assault troops. The early
morning weather was ideal; cool, with a moderate breeze, calm seas
and a slight overcast. Visibility cleared rapidly and by 0700 was
unlimited though the target was still partially obscured from
seaward by low-lying horizon clouds and haze.
Our air support approximately 0650. convoy, but most of aircraft or knocked arrived over the target in force at
There were scattered enemy air attacks on the
the raiders were Intercepted by our carrier
down by 8hips anti-aircraft.
This Division went ashore according to plan over Beaches Blue 1

and 2 and Yellow 1 and 2 a total of approximately 2400 yards in
width. The off-shore reef extended seaward on an average of
600-700 yards, and, though not mined or artificially obstructed,
offered the familiar problems to amphibian vehicles. Particular
difficulty was experienced with the circular reef guarding the
approaches to our left flank beaches.
Assault waves, spearheaded by armored amphibians, encountered
difficulty in crossing the reef and were delayed in reaching the
shore despite lack of heavy enemy fire. Fighter strikes were on
schedule with the lifting of naval bombardment Just before How-
Hour at 0830. First waves were on all beaches at 0839, with air
observation reporting no damage to landing craft in the initial
waves,
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J?I
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Flra$ reports from assault elements of the Division reported

very light resistance with all units moving rapidly inlando Air
spot reported our troops pouring ashore and racing inland standing
up 0 All assault BLTs were ashore by 0920 with beaches clearing
rapidly unimpeded by wreckage0 CT-7 on the left had advanced
through the village of 30BEP first priority objective, by 0940*
Our attack" continued to progress against very light opposition

throughout the morning0 Because.of rapid movement there was little
information from front-line units. Other units of the Division
continued to pour ashore, and by noon first elements of our
artillery (4-11) had been landed,, The assault wave of the First
Tank Battalion landed at approximately 11500
Delay in embarking the tanks caused many of thera to come in
at low tide late in the afternoon and three machines were lost
on the reefu Five others were damaged but remained operational*
Two companies were ashore by 16300
The Commanding General and the Division CP0 arrived ashore
at 1630 and set up on the outskirts of S0BE Front line units were
immediately ordered to halt their advance^ establish a defensive
line for the night and carry out extensive patrolling to their
fronto Artillery was ashore and emplaced before nightfall ready
to furnish necessary fires* Our advance on Love-Day was halted
on a line running generally from IRAMMIYA on the north to the
Division boundary below MAKIBARUo The Sixth Marine Division on
the left was abreast of this unit, having crossed YONTAN Aifield
against light opposition, and to the south the Army had advanced
beyond the L/3 line*
A summary of the day's activity showed an almost complete
lack of contact with the enemy and negligible casualties within
this Division,, No mines were encountered on thebeaches, roads,
or routes of'egress from the beaches0
There was no intelligence report on estimated enemy casualties
for the first day, but few were possible because of lack of
contacto Our forces had captured 76 Okinawans, all civilians of
no military value* These civilians reported that the last Jap
forces had.been moved from the First Marine Division sector two
days prior to the American landings. In the Array sector two POWs
said the bulk of the enemy troops -had been withdrawn to the south,
a fact which was later proved to be true0
By nightfall all beaches including Yellow 3 which had not
been used for landing, were open to traffic and unloading of
priori^yûpp*W.es continued throughout the night
-3
<T?
Weather continued clear after dark, but there was no enemy

ground activity in the Divislon~zone, Enemy planes were over
the convoy, at dusk but were driven off by intensive ack-ack from
the ships. Two more Red alerts were sounded at 0410 and 0540 but
no enemy aircraft were sighted.
On the second day of the invasion CT-7 and CT-5 jumped off
at 0715 and 0725 respectively in accordance with plans drafted
the previous evening at a conference between the Commanding
General and hnit commanders. The attack was continued in perfect
weather. It was cool in the early morning with a bright sun
and unlimited visibility. No artillery preparation was laid
down before the advance, but all' guns were available on call for
support fires.
The attack, spearheaded by extensive advance patrols, continued
to progress satisfactorily against light resistance throughout
the^ day. Our aircraft were in complete control of the air at all
times. Our rate of advance was slowed somewhat later in the day
by difficulty of supply created by the"*'speed with which our units
were moving and by lack of good roads into the increasingly
rough terrain.
In the late afternoon two battalion's of CT-1 were moved into
position along the Division's right boundary with one battalion
up and one back to assist the advance of CT-5 through its rapidly
widening zone of action. The Third Battalion, First Marines
passed into Division Reserve. Our forces were still unable to
locate the center of enemy resistance and at 1600 our position
was stabilized for the night at a line running generally along
the L/5 line in the north and slightly short of that phase line In
the south. Our casualties up to this time were 3 KIA and 18 WIA.
Twenty Japs had been reported killed and 330 civilians had been
interned.
Field Order 1-45 was issued at 1630, calling for the attack
to be resumed the following day at 0730 with the combat teams to
continue the advance to the L/10 line. In addition, the First
Reconnaissance Co was ordered to reconnoiter the area along our
right boundary to the east coast. By this time the Army,
operating over easier terrain, was well in advance of our forces
and this patrol was ordered out in an attempt to establish contact
laith Army units on our right.
First enemy infiltration was reported on the night of 2-3
April. The Seventh Marines lost seven men killed and seven
wounded in destroying a Jap force of 25, but the First and Fifth
regiments reported no night activity. Two Red alerts were
sounded at 0130 and 0330, but again no enemy aircraft were over
the Division zone.
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**
In continued clear weather the attack Jumped off on 3 April

In column formation with extensive patrolling to the front0 Our
ever widening zone of action prohibited the "hand-in-hand" advance
of some amall Island operations and our units were able to
maintain contact and clear their areas only by patrolling to
the flanks and to the fronto Opposition was virtually non existant on the right and light on the left as all three combat
teams pushed forwardo By 1600 advance elements of the First
Marines had reached the east coastj the main bodies of CT-1 and
CT-5 had reached L/10 and were continuing to push the attackc
CT-7 encountered one enemy strong point just short of L/10 line
and was forced to halt for the night In that area0 All troops
were ordered to halt on the most advantageous ground at 17000
The First Reconnaissance Co under the command of First
Lieutenant Robert J0 Powell, on 3 April began a series of patrols
which were to cover virtually the entire Division zone of action0
During the morning motorized units of this company had reached
the vicinity of IKEBARU-NUPUNJA, and continued along the right
boundary to MIYAZA against no opposition It was then ordered
by radio to continue Its patrols throughout the KATCHIN Peninsula
and up the east coast road network to the village of HIZA0NNAo
Only enemy military activity observed was a lightly-held tank trap
at TA 8591 So The patrol returned to headquarters before darko
After nightfall there were scattered infiltration attemts In
areas of CT-5 and CT-7P but other ground activity was negligible0
There were three Red alerts during the night but no enemy aircraft
reported over the First Marine Division areac
Darkness of the Division"s fourth day ashore saw our initial
zone of action virtually secured some 11 days ahead of the
proposed schedule The attack on 4 April jumped off without
artillery preparation at 07300 The First and Fifth Marines moved rapidly against very little resistance and reached the east coast (L?15) during the afternoon In addition OT-1 occupied the
KATOHIN Peninsula and both regiments consolidated and prepared
defensive positions,, CT~7 on the left continued to meet moderate resistance, particularly in the vicinity of INUBI. Its advance
continued^, however, and by nightfall the front-line battalions
had reached the coast and were in contact with the Fourth Marines of the Sixth Division,,

The Division C P o was displaced forward during the day to

8991 To Intensive patrolling was initiated Immediately in all
sectors, the Reconnaissance Company covering the area forward
of the Division Command Post and in the vicinity of INUBI where
the enemy was still offering sporadic resistance; and all regiments
patrolled back to L/10. Third Battalion^, First Marines, Division
Reserve, patrolled rear areas in an effort :o mop up any by-passed enemy positions0
With the entire zone of action, excluding a few enemy pockets

in our hands, the true situation of Japanese defense still was
cloudedo At this time the Army still was pushing southward
against light resistance and the Sixth Marine Division continued
to push to the north against only scattered enemy groups Some
79 Japs had been killed by this Divislonin its push across the
ieland two POWs were in our hands, and 500=600 civilians had
been internedo
In the early evening of 4 Aprilp 3-1, with one platoon of
tanks attached, was ordered to relieve CT-29 (6th Mar Dlv) in
defense of YONTAN? Airfield as a part of III Corps Reserve0
Temporary plans also were formulated for releasing CT-7 to Corps
reserve to assist the Sixth Marine Division in its drive to the
northo
No air activity marked the night of 4 April, but there was a
slight increase in ground infiltrationso It was difficult to
determine if this was the activity of Imperial forces^. Home Guard
outfits, or armed civilians<, Approximately 45 Japs were killed
in the CT-7 zone with light losses among our troops0 The Nips
were reported using rifles, grenades, bayonets and "idiot sticks?
The fifth day of April in actuality was the start of Phase II in the NANSEI; ^ 3H0T0 Operation,, On that date this Division began to devote Itself primarily to defensive activity5 though extensive mopping up remainedo All units started heavy patrol activity back to the L/10 line, blowing some 50 caves and killing approximately 70 Japso Units of OT-1 patrolled the island of YABUCHI off the east coast against no resistance, and finding no military installations,, The enemy actually was showing increased activity^ but in small scattered groups behind our lines;; there was no organized resistance0 Our casualties up to this time showed 12 KIA and 34 WIA.
During the morning of 5 Aprils friendly F6Fs operating from
carrier support forces, strafed and bombed units of the First
Marines on KATCHIN Peninsula0 One man was killed and 14 wounded
during the at tack,
Civilians, now convinced that they would not receive the
expected harsh treatment from the American forces^ were pouring in
i i ever-increasing numbers^, heavily burdening Military Government
i and Military Police facilities Concentration areas were
established at central point^ and the internees were shuttled into
these sectors as quickly as possible to avoid their interference
with military activity0
The Division reserve was sent to Y02JTAN Airfield for defense
of that sector on Corps order and Field Order 2=45 was issued,
calling for two battalions of CT-7 Jo page ^nder^Cpfrps^contrpJ.0
The order also outlined the zones (^^spBlsi^ffyL^c^rdefenSl of
m,^
7 .m**
|J , ir L ft %# * ' " * l"
ASSIFIED
the Division Z of A*
--* *
' * ' W * . '': ... * .> .'
* ;-4
,
With the Array scoring good progress in Its drive to the

south for the high ground overlooking the city of NAHA, and
the Sixth Marine Division reorganizing to continue its northward
pushp unloading was proceeding rapidly over all beaches, and
routes of supply to inland areas were being constantly improved
by engineer units By 5 April this reinforced Division was
estimated at 85 per cent unlosded0
Light rains in scattered areas began in the early evening
but they proved no hinderance to military operation0 Some air
^tivity was reported over shipping units lying offshore, but. no
Hiid alerts were sounded in the Division areae Scattered ground
infiltration continued with some Japs being killed in the CT-7
area and in the vicinity of the Division CoPo
The First Marine Division wasln a more or less static
defensive position on 6 April0 Units took over the defensive
sectors assigned them in Field Order 2=45 and continued extensive
patrol activity, blasting caves and rounding up civilians Few
snemy soldiers still were operating in our sector0 CT-7, less
:he Third Battalion, was moved to the vicinity of ISHIKAWA from
which it would operate as Corps Reserve0 Also on this date
III Phib Corps Operation Order'2-45 took most of the attached units
from this Division and placed them under Corps control as service
troopSo
The sixth of the month brought the first signs of a major
Japanese attempt to salvage something from the OKINAWA debacle0
The enemy made large-scale air attempts to reach our shipping
off the island, but most of his aircraft were intercepted by our
fighters with excellent results.before they reached 0KINAWAo
Those that did succeed in breaking through encountered intense AA
fire which was highly effective0 Some damage was done to naval
units offshore, but no attacks were made on troop areaso
A new estimate of our casualties placed the figures at 53
killed, 99 wounded, with 104 listed as non-battle casualties0
Japanese dead were estimated at 335 with 11 POWs In our hands.
Hundreds of civilians, most of them frightened and confused but
cooperative^ continued to pour In daily0
Unloading was almost completed and though most engineer units still were operating with line outfits they were maintaining muchused bridges, Improving supply roads, and installing water distillation unltSo Water provided something of a problem; all streams and wells had been condemned by the Division Surgeon and water no in tfr-~- at ill too few in numbeHj^î$) |he#o^yr$<|upc!e$*c l
supplTf^f* , *
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The air battle raging off OKINAWA continued into the night
of 6~? April with the results going increasingly in American
favor though some Navy surface units were reported hit. There
was intermittent AA fire throughout the night, but no, bombs or
Red alerts in the Division ares,, Ground activity was nil.
Our patrols were operating in cooler weather and light rains
on 7 April Japs were still present in this sector and carrying
on harassing activity, but groups of four or five now were the
largest encountered by this organization0
By this date, morning and dusk patrols of Marine fighter units
were operating from YONTAN Airfield In support of our ground forces
and carrier-based aircraft0
The picture of the Japanese defensive plan on OKINAWA had been
greatly clarified by 8 April. The situation still was static in
the Marine's sector, but the XXIV Corps were now running into stiff
resistance in the south0 The enemy held strategic high ground
and was well dug in throughout the rugged terrain north of NAHA
and was reported using massed artillery in that area almost
the first instance in Pacific warfare0 It was now evident that
the Japanese commander Intended to make his stand in the south of
the island and had moved the majority of his troops and equipment
to that area. Intelligence estimated some 53,000 Japs in that
zone, including the 62nd Division, the 24th Division, and the
44th Independent Mixed Brigade. In the late evening of the
8th three battalions of the Eleventh Marines were ordered to stand
by to move to the support of the Army0
Patrolling remained the primary activity in the First Division
sector0 First Tank Bn carried out reconnaissance of all road
nets and drafted plans to furnish support in case of enemy counter
measures such as a paratroop landing or amphibious counter-
invasion,, All units reconnoitered beaches in a search for suicide
boats, motor torpedo boats, or midget submarines with no results.
Engineers were making steady progress on roads and bridges and had now put in sufficient water points to alleviate the previous shortage0 Light rains continued into the night and there was limited air
activity. Some fire was received in the sector of the First
Marines but it was traced to friendly units in the south.
Infiltration continued despite the fact that Division Intelligence
had ordered all able-bodied men to be treated as prisoners of war.
During the day two young men posing as women had been captured
and all indications pointed to their beijig- soldiers.
JI I ( * I /;p
* is J^r|
70
, #
^ *
-*
Our casualties to dates 41 KIA, 163 WIAQ Enemy dead was

placed at 371 and we had 13 Japanese prisoners of war0
Enemy activity in the central part of the island was almost
at a standstill on 9 April0 This Division issued Field Order 3-45
reassigning defensive sectors after the departure of three
artillery battalions that morning to the XXIV Corps and redrafting
the task organization for units still assigned to the Division,,
Third Battalion, First Marines was returned to this organization
by III dorps at 0800o The only Red alert of the night was sounded
at 1905 but again there were no planes over the Division zone0
In the pre-dawn hours of 10 April the earlier light rains
became a downpour that continued throughout the day Roads were
whipped Into a mire by heavy traffic, and by evening transportation
was severely hampered. There were no reports of any enemy~actlvlty0
Small-scale enemy action flared slightly on 11 April0 Several
patrols of CT-1 were involved in fire fights and there was increased
sniper activity,, Tanks were called in to knock down one small
town housing a sniper oest 0O One of the Japs involved In the
fighting carried an A C - pass All civilians were now being headed
M3 into the southern peninsula to aid in their control0 The heavy
rains ceased in the early morning, but the weather continued cloudy
and the cold was almost intense to troops just up from extended
duty in the tropics
Ground activity continued light through the night and into
the 12th of April, but with improving weather air action again
became intense,. There were repeated night raids in the vicinity
of YONTAN Airfield despite heavy anti-aircraft fire Air action
continued into the 12th with several large-scale battles being
fought some miles off the island,, Our interceptors continued to
hold most enemy planes out of range
In the afternoon the weather cleared, bringing bright sunshine
and warm temperatures* Roads and bivouac area dried quickly,
greatly aiding construction work and supply,, All Division units
continued patrol workmotorized wherever possible.
One platoon of the Second Battalion, Seventh Marines, then under Corps control, was ambushed on a patrol along the ISHIKAWA Isthmus with three men killed and twenty-four wounded The ambush was well-planned and carried out by an estimated fxifty well-organized JapSo In the afternoon the First Battalion, Eleventh Marines was sent to join the mass of artillery forming in the south to support the Army drive on the center of Jap >a\ oAA&oft a ^ncr thfl NAHA-SHURI Line,,
4*'
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^SifiED
The situation saw.no change on the 13th of April, There was little activity in the First Marine Division sector, but four tanks of "CM Co, First Tank. Battalion fired 300 roundstheir first of the campaignwhile conducting a harassing indirect fire mission for the -Second Battalion, 3evetith Marines A house, believed to conceal an enemy C0Po, was knocked out with nine rounds,, On 15 April, Third Battalion, First Marines was moved to the
north, of the island and placed under the control of the Sixth
Marine Division to assist that Organization in covering its
extensive areac By this date the Sixth Division *|&$- encountering
stiff 'organized resistance on the MOTOBU Penin'sula0 All units of
CT-7 w e r e ^turned at the same time to this Division and our zone
of responsibility was extended to the road net marking the northern
boundary of the ISHIKAWA Isthmus0 All units continued patrol
!
activity but there was no contact with the enemy0 Air activity again held the spotlight on the night of the 15th0 There was repeated harassing action by Nip planes that managed to
sneak through our fighter screen Ack-ack downed two enemy
aircraft in the area of CT-70 Two bombs were dropped in that
sector bu' caused no damage, and one low-flying enemy craft was
over the Division C 0 P 0 but attempted no strafing or bombingo On
the ground, the Seventh Marines reported scattered activity and
four Japs killed, but all other sectors were quiet0
Sixteen April marked the invasion of IE SHIMA, three miles

off the west coast of OKINAWA by the 77th Infantry Division. On
the same day the First Marine Division issued Field Order 4=45,
reassigning defensive sectors to cover its expanded area*
Patrolling continued with the only enemy activity still in the zone
of GT~7c One unit of that regiment surprised a group of 12 Japs
eating near a cluster of straw huts in a concealed valley and wiped
out the entire group in a brief skirmish,. Night activity was
negligible; Service Battalion killed one Jap carrying a hand
grenade near the Division dumpo
The next two days saw continued quiet in the Division sector,,
On the 17th the Third Armored Amphibian Battalion^ less companies
B C" and M D", reverted back to Division control The following day
plans were made to send the Reconnaissance Company and some of
these tractors on a patrol of the four islands lying off KATCHIN
Peninsula*, CT-5 was assigned to garrison these islands, which had
previously been reconnoitered by Array and FMF troops, following
the initial patrols0
On both the 17th and 18th there were the usual early evening
Red alerts, but no activity over this sectore m
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Assault Narrative
Phase III
During the Spring days of late April the First Marine
Division continued its small-scale "guerilla war" in the
rolling country of central OKINAWA against scattered remnants
of a Japanese delaying force and waited for the Tenth Army's
decision on its future employment. On 27 April the decision
came: to be attached to the XXIV Army Corps. Division and
regimental staffs began immediate reconnaissance of southern
sectors and drafted tentative plans for executing a passage
of lines through the Army's 27th Infantry Division.
On 30 April the First Marine Division and attached units
initiated motor movement southward. Two assault regiments,
First Marines on the right, Fifth Marines on the left, had
passed through the three assault regiments of the 27th Infantry
Division by raid-afternoon of the first day of May, and MaJ. (Jen.
Pedro A. del Valle, by mutual agreement between the two
Division Commanders, assumed command from the 27th Infantry
Division, at 1400 that date. May brought with it cloudy, cool
weather, scattered rains and the opposition this Division
had not found when it landed one month earlier.v Field Order
No. 7-45 was issued, calling for the units first push to the
south, supported by tanks, air, naval gunfire, and artillery.
The objective was placed as the north bank of the ASA KAWA.
In its first day of action in the south the First Marine
Division was greeted by the determined, well-planned resistance
that it was to encounter throughout its hard-fought drive to
the southern tip of OKINAWA. Operating in continued light rains,
the Division Jumped off at 0930 on 2 May but was held to 200-300
yard advances. Right flank units attempted to move down the
west coast to the ASA KAWA Estuary line but were halted by
heavy flanking fire from the steep ridges Jutting northwestward
from the city of SHURI. Our forces were faced all along the
line by heavy artillery, mortar, and small arms fire.
This stiff enemy resistance Increased on the following day,
but the Fifth Marines in the center of our zone of action made
gains of 400 to 600 yards. The First Marines on the right,
however, were engaged in a heavy fire fight for the village of
NAKANISKI and were held to limited gains. Our forces, supported
by tractors of the Third Armored Amphibian Battalion, lying off
ASA KAWA Estuary, were able to move well ahead of our lines, but
then were hit with murderous flanking machine gun and mortar
fire from northwest of SHURI which exacted heavy casualties.
Four tanks were damaged by enemy fire and one temporarily
aced with this fire which Drohlblted the advance along

the flat, narrow coastal plain, plane were formulated to pivot
the attack to the southeast against the commanding ground.
The First Battalion of the Seventh Marines, which had moved
south in Division reserve, was attached to the Fifth Marines
to assist in their advance. The remaining two battalions of
the Seventh Marines were moved into position to protect the
Division right flank as the attack pivoted to the southeast.
Coupled with minor air action which included bombs in the
vicinity of the First Marines command post and strafing in other
areas, the Japanese attempted counter-landings during the night
of 3 May all along the coastline on our right flank. An esti
mated one company to one battalion was landed in small groups
north to the ASA KAWA Estuary,, but was pinned down in the tiny
village of KUMAN. Other isolated elements landed on the coast
in the vicinity , f the Division command post. The Third
o Battalion of the Seventh Marines was sent to assist the First
Marines in destroying enemy elements that succeeded in getting
ashore despite heavy fire from guns of the fleet units offshore
and supporting armored tractors.
Our attack Jumped off at 1000 on 4 May, following a ten
minute artillery preparation. The infantry, supported closely
by tanks, continued to advance in the face of dogged resistance
with the right flank taking heavy casualties from enemy fire
from south of the river. Gains of 350 yards were marked up
during the day. One tank was damaged by artillery fire south
of MACHINATO Airfield, but was later retrieved. Advance on the
left was slow because of necessity of maintaining contact with
the 77th Infantry Division, ^llch was operating over
extremely difficult terrain.
The enemy shifted his counter-attacks to the land on the
nigjit of 4-5 May. A counter-assault, preceded by two hours of
150mra shelling, was launched against Third Battalion, Fifth
Marines during the t>re-dawn hours but was repulsed.
During the morning the Division continued Its yard-by-yard
advance and succeeded in reaching the ASA KAWA Estuary line.
Encouraging progress also was registered on the left flank where
the Fifth Marines scored 600 yard gains in some sectors and
reached the nose extending westward from Hill 187. The Seventh
Marines were following close behind the First Marines in order
to fill the gap resulting from the Division's eastward swing
along the right flank.
On 6 May preliminary plans were drafted for the movement
of elements of the Sixth Marine Division into the lines on this
Division's rigit flank, with this organization sideslipping to
the left. There was very little advance on the ground, with
the Second Battalion, Seventh Marines standing fast along the
eatuary line and other elemen t strati 11s fa clngp^
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defense. The south of the island was under a constant air,

naval gunfire and artillery bombardment and enemy artillery
action showed a noticeable decrease under our accurate counter-
battery fire. Particular attention was being paid to the
extensive ridge network to the front of this Division. Two of
our tanks in attempting to blast enemy cave positions before
the Fifth Marines at close range were knocked out during the
day by enemy anti-tank fire. The First Marines, now under
the command of Col. A. T. Mason, were unable to advance.
At 0600 on 7 May this Division reverted to control of the
Third Amphibious Corns as plans were formulated for a Tenth
Army attack to the south, with Corps abreast, on the tenth.
It was now apparent that the Japanese commander, when he had
pulled his entire defense to the south of the island, had
established the core of his line at the fortress city of SHURI,
the island's second largest, and anchored it at the coast
cities of NAHA and YONABARU. The SHURI bastion was protected
on three sides by formidable, cave-infested ridges that covered
every approach and overlooked the ground over which the
American troops were forced to advance. The Japanese commander
used his terrain advantages well. Every small emplacement was
mutually supported by others and the campaign, like others
against the Japanese, became a death struggle in which every
enemy soldier had to dug out of the ground.
A heavy air strike was delivered against the village of
DAKESHI, strongpoint on the approaches to SHURI, during the
early morning of 7 May. Both assault regiments made limited
gains. The First Marines seized the high ground at 7775 W and
the Fifth Marines advanced about 200 yards in the center of
their zone of action. Patrols ranged even farther to the front
but they were driven back by heavy mortar and artillery fire.
In the early morning of 8 May the Japs threw a counter
attack in force against First Battalion, Fifth Marines. The
assault was turned; back with an estimated 100 enemy dead left
in front of our lines.
Heavy rains immobilized our tanks and M-7s later in the
morning and the attack was unable to get under way in the mud,
but numerous caves and pillboxes were destroyed in a general
mopt>ing up. One battery of 75mm pack howitzers was attached
to each the First Marines and Fifth Marines to nrovide direct
fire support against the well dug-in enemy positions. By 1600
the Twenty-Second Marines of the Sixth Marine Division had
relieved the Seventh Marines on the west coast and the latter
regiment moved into an assembly area as Division reserve.
Rain continued through the night and early morning keeping
ground and air action at a standstill. However, the south of
the island was still rocking under a steady rein of shells

from American artillery and naval gunfire including, at
noon, one round from all artillery pieces and supporting
ships in celebration of the Allied victory in Europe.
The eleventh of May brought gains all along the line,
putting American forces in position to threaten seriously
breakthrough to the enemy's final defenses in the SHURI
sector Behind a constant bombardment from sea, air and land,
the First Marines continued to drive the Japs back along the
southbound railroad near the Division right boundary and reached
positions west of the high ground protecting SHURI, Advances
in the center and left of the line were slower in the face of
determined resistance, but the Second Battalion, Seventh Marines
smashed into the western outskirts of the long-troublesome
village of DAKESHI and gained control of the ridge line running
through that village. DAKESHI was made further untenable for
the Japanese by forces of the Third Battalion, Seventh Marines
which swung toward the town from the northeast, placing it in a
rapidly closing pincers. Flame-thrower tanks and engineers
were being used extensively in routing the Japs from emplace
ments and caves that they were determined to defend to the death.
By mid-afternoon of the twelfth this Division had secured
DAKESHI and elements of the First Marines on the right were
threatening the SHURI bastion from the west. Our troops were
held to limited gains on the ground by a network of pillboxes
and emplacements to the east of DAKESHI, but already the Japs
outer defenses were crumbling under the steady pounding of our
heavy guns and the close-range fires of tanks and infantry.
Just prior to nightfall the Japanese charged positions of
the First Battalion, Seventh Marines behind a heavy barrage of
mortar fire. A company was forced to give some ground but
succeeded in turning back the attack after suffering heavy
casualties. Our forces were called upon again before dawn of
thirteen May to turn back enemy counter-assaults. In the
sector of the First Marines, the Japs launched two counter
attacks both of platoon to company strength. The first attack,
against the Third Battalion, First Marines,, faltered and gave
way in the face of heavy mortar fire and point-blank machine
gun and bazooka fire which took a heavy toll of enemy troops.
The same battalion smashed a later smaller scale attack with
heevy small arms fire.
With the enemy standing firm in the face of determined
onslaughts all along the line this Division halted in its
salient on the right until the commanding ground on the left
could be overrun by the Seventh Marines. Elements of the First
Marines, however, operated successfully against enemy positions
to the front with 37mm guns and mortars. Slight gains were
registered on the left where Seventh Marines units pushed some
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200 yards south of DAKESHI through a maze of caves and pillboxes.

With the Japanese outpost line at DAKESHI smashed, the
battleground for this Division shifted to the formidable WANA
approaches to the SHURI hill mass. It was now evident that the
main enemy defenses of Southern OKINAWA radiated from SHURI
like the spokes of a wheel and the hub of that wheel was
protected by some of the most rugged terrain encountered in the
drive southward. The main assault on this line fell to the
First Marine Divison and the Army!e 77th Infantry Division,
with the Sixth Marine Division and the 96th Infantry Division
attempting to break through on the flanks.
This Division's operations against the WANA ridge and WANA
valley brought tank-infantry operations to their maximum uee.
Tank-infantry teams worked constantly against the well guarded
draw formed by WANA ridge on the north and the slopes of the
BHURI hills on the south, moving in under devastating fire to
blast caves and emplacements which prohibited infantry assault.
During the morning of 15 May, the Fifth Marines passed
through the First Marines on the right flank and advanced 600
yards down the NAHA railroad. Under protective covering fire
tank-infantry teams of these units succeeded in stabbing deep
into the WANA valley and knocked out several enemy caves and
anti-tank guns in that vicinity.
Under the continued pounding of one of the most concentrated
assaults in Pacific warfare the enemy's fortress was showing
signs of cracking by 17 May. On that date, advance elements of
the Fifth and Seventh Marines drove to the crest of the vital
WANA ridge and were moving one spearhead along the ridge into the
village for which the ridge was named. The Division also in
creased its threat to SHURI from the west when the Fifth Marines
pushed their thin right flank line along the NAHA railroad to a
position at 7773 VW. This Inverted U, resulting from the two
arms of the pincers driving on SHURI from the north and west,
continued to provide a theater for extensive tank-infantry
operations. Our Infantry and armored units maintained a constant
assault on the WANA ridge through the mouth of the valley to the
south as well as with frontal advances from the north.
On the 18th, the north-south corridor along the NAHA rail
road was expanded to the eastward, with one platoon of the Fifth
Marines gaining a foothold on the hill at 7773 R. This unit,
however, was pinned down on the reverse slope by heavy enemy
fire and was unable to expand its position. Elsewhere along the
line, gains were measured by yards won, lost, then won again.
The battle closed to bayonet range on 20 May. Fresh troops
of the First Marines moved into the lines, relieving the Seventh
Marines, and in recurrent hand-to-hand combat smashed the enemy
bpck to the northern outskirts of S l W ^ f ^ ^ ^ f ^ V ^ V ^ J l ' ^ " n
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advance of 600 yards. On the right of the First Marines the

Third Battalion continued its drive southeast along the WANA
ridge in the face of heavy fire. These advances placed our
troops on dominating ground overlooking SHURI and in position
to launch a renewed assault against the weakened enemy defense.
On 21 May our forces still were forced to fight against
fanatical resistance for every yard, but maintained their un
relenting pressure against SHURI, threatening the heart of the
enemy's defense from two directions. By nightfall the Second
Battalion, First Marines, moving abreast of the 77th Infantry
Division on its left, had completely occupied the small village
marking the northern boundary of SHURI itself. With the outer
wall of his fortress breached by this spearhead, the Jap continued
to hold fast in his death struggle along the crest of the WANA
ridge During the afternoon the Third Battalion, First Marines,
closely following tank-infantry teams, attempted to move two
companies across the troublesome WANA draw and up on the high
ground to the south, but they were pinned down by withering
mortar and machine gun fire and forced to mill back under cover
of smoke to their original positions. This Division, however,
did register further gains in its drive on SHURI from the west.
Elements of the Fifth Marines stabbed closer to the city's
flank in pushing their lines to 7773 X.
During this period Division tanks, in addition to their
fire support, were providing valuable services in the evacuation
of wounded under fire and in supplying units on the line.
Late in the afternoon of 22 May, intermittent rains that
had been promised by overcast skies for several days began to
fall and continued fojr nine days. That period brought every
thing from liît, scattered showers to driving rain storms that
turned the entire southern front Into a morass. Within two days
our attack, deprived by the mud of its vital armored support,
was at a virtual standstill*
With vehicles mired, the Division resorted to aggressive
patrolling to maintain its constant pressure on the enemy - already on the verge of cracking before SHURI. Our forces also
took advantage of the lull in the attack to relieve elements of
the Sixth Marine Division in occupying a widened zone of action,
putting all three of the Division's infantry regiments in the line.
Despite the pouring rains the Japanese received no respite
from the guns of the Eleventh Marines. Our artillery pounded the
enemy defenses night and day in conjunction with Corps and Army
artillery units all along the line.
On 26 May the enemy hoping to succeed under the cover of limited observation resulting from the pouring rains which had brought our ground and air operations to a virtual halt, began a withdrawal southward from his SHURI fortress positions. An estimated three to four thousand J a T W f ^ V | r e h 1 & $ P $ |M
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open under a devastating barrage from the main batteries of our

ships offshore, artillery, and the machine guns and bombs of our
planes. More than 50 Marine aircraft took off despite limited
ceiling and difficult operating conditions to strafe and bomb
the moving groups. Some 13 minutes after front-line units of
this Division reported indications of troop withdrawals the
first salvo from the guns of the US3 NEW YORK began to fall on
Be retreating Japs. Approximately 15 minutes later, support
aircraft had taken to the air and were strafing foot and motor
ized columns traoped on the muddy roads. With air soot confirm
ing the magnitude of the troop movements, additional support
ships from the 77th Infantry Division and Sixth Marine Division
were brought to bear and by nightfall the villages of ZAHANA,
GISUSHI, and DAKITON, all sheltering troops, had been pounded
into a shambles; t i o truck convoys had been smashed; six light
xr tanks and two mobile field pieces had been destroyed. Filter
pilots reported the roads littered with enemy dead and smashed
eauipment.
The next four days confirmed the belief that the Japs had
taken advantage of our lack of observation, the poor flying
weather, and our inability to follow up the retreat closely, to
withdraw from his crumbling defenses. Under constant pressure
from the front and now threatened with a sweeping flajik drive
from the east coast by the fresh troops of the Army's 7th Infantry
Division the Japs had pulled back to their final defense line
in the south.
The beginning of the end for SHURI came on 28 May. With
enemy resistance apparently confined to determined rear guard
action in the high ground north of the city, elements of the
First Battalion, Fifth Marines on the right advanced almost 1000
vards to a point south of the town of ASATO. Other elements
also captured formidable BEEHIVE Hill at 7772 M. On the Division
left, however, the enemy continued to defend bitterly hie
positions before SHURI. Twice the First Marines assaulted the
hotly-contested KNOB Hill at 7873 N and twice they were thrown
back by machine gun fire from three directions and satchel
charges mounted on sticks and flung from close range. Troops
hauled 37mm guns forward through deep mud for ooint-blank close
support, but heavier support weapons were mired and unable to
move. Continued rains and mud also were severely hampering
our supply and evacuation of wounded.
Ancient SHURI Castle, onetime seat of OKINAWA rulers and
modern symbol of Japanese defense on the island, fell to infantry
forces of this Division at 1015 on 29 May after a rapid thrust
across the still muddy approaches to the southern part of the
fortress city. The First Battalion, Fifth Marines Jumped off
at 0730 and, moving across muddy terrain against scattered
opposition, quickly occupied the ridge line at 7772 RST. From
that position forward elements pushed op, lotp^ ^HUI>an^ oqeupe<t^
rm
the moaced castle. Apparently this drive completely surprised

the Japs who believed us incapable of any major advance over
the muddy terrain.
With this sudden breakthrough on the western slopes of
the SHURI hill mass, the Division plan was quickly revised to
bring the Third Battalion, First Marines driving into the city
from the southward through the Fifth Marines zone to form a
pocket around the Japs still fighting doggedly for KNOB Hill
and the high ground north of the city. By mid-afternoon, the
Third Battalion, First Marines had relieved the elements of
the Fifth Marines slong SHURI ridge and those units continued
to push southward.
The Japanese moved wisely in their withdrawal to the south. Supply and evacuation problems, complicated by extension of our
lines and continued bad weather, prevented complete exploitation of this Division's breakthrough into SHURI. By 30 May ground
supply, with heavy rains still falling, was virtually impossible beeause of mud and lack of approach routes. Repeated efforts to sunply from the air were bnly partially successful because of
freauent storms and a constant limited ceiling. Despite adverse ground and supply conditions our forces maintained relentless
pressure against the enemy with extensive patrolling to the
front. Unite of the First Battalion, First Marines pushed north
ward through the city of SHURI before halting at the steep, well-
defended draw at 7872 ABC. During the night enemy counter offensive efforts stiowed a noticeable decrease with even the
usual mortar and artillery fire decreasing.

By 31 May this Division had completed the occupation of the

Jap's SHURI fortress and was pushing southward. The last day of
the Divisions second month on OKINAWA finally brought a break
in the weather with solid overcast and rains changing to sun
shine and high, scattered clouds. With the clearing weather,
units of the First Marines closed their pincers on SHURI from
the north and south, and in a coordinated sweep with the 77th
Infantry Division, cleared the area of strongly-held enemy
pockets. The First Battalion moved northward through the
devastated city and Joined with other elements of the regiment
that had driven southward after clearing the long troublesome
WANA valley and KNOB Hill. The hill was finally taken after
repeated assaults at grenade and bayonet range in some of the
bitterest fighting of the Southern OKINAWA Campaign.
The Fifth Marines, still hampered by supply and evacuation
over muddy terrain, continued their advance to the southeast
toward the hi#i ground overlooking the NAHA-YONABARU highway,
key trans-island motor route. By nightfall the regiment's
right flank had reached the sloping ground north of the village
of SHICHINA and other units had sent patrols ranging 500 yards
further southward against scattered opposition.
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The first day of the month that was to see the end of the
battle for Southern OKINAWA brought our infantry forces to the
crest of the ridge overlooking the highway and the river valley
through which it runs. Rolling ahead against light opposition
on a one regimental front, this Division had occupied the ridge
by mid-afternoon, after overrunning enemy positions in the
vicinity of SHICHINA.
On 2 June, for the first time in eight days, tanks were
able to operate in support of our infantry but had been
Immobilized again by nightfall because of renewed heavy rain
squalls which turned to steady rains by evening. During the
day our forces breached the NAHA-YONABARU highway line and
crossed in several places, the river that flows parallel to the
road. The Fifth Marines pushed across the stream during the
early morning and seized the ridge guarding the approaches to
the village of TSUKASAN. In attempting to advance beyond this
ridge, however, troops were pinned down by intense rifle and
machine gun fire from the front and flanks. Throughout the
remainder of the day our advance was bitterly contested by
Japs strongly emplaced in the vicinity of Hill 69 and we
were limited to only local gains south of the river. The
bridge at 7869 G was destroyed by the enemy, but our troops
poured across the still intact railroad span to establish a
bridgehead on the south bank. On the Division right, the
Seventh Marines relieved the Twenty-Second and Twenty-Ninth
Marines of the Sixth Marine Division in their positions along
the KOKUBA GAWA. Patrols Immediately crossed the river and
gained the heights north of TOMIGUSUKU MURA, but were forced
to pull back in the face of heavy Jap mortar and machine gun
fire. A heavy artillery barrage was called down on the enemy
guns and two additional companies Joined the original forces
south of the estuary. By nightfall the entire Second Battalion
had regained the higi ground and dug in.
Just prior to midnight of the same day, the enemy launched
his first determined counter-attack since his withdrawal from
SHURI. The assault was turned bock by G Company of the Seventh
Marines with approximately 20 Japs killed.
A major breakthrough was scored by this Division on 3 ûne. Fast moving advance infantry elements advanced more than 2500 yards in outflanking Jap defenses north of GISUSHI and occupied Hill 57 west of that town. With two battalions of the Fifth Marines pinned down south of the NAHA-YONABARU highway by heavy rifle and machine gun fire, the Second Battalion, Fifth Marines moved through the Army zone of action on its left to the village of TERA, then struck westward against the enemy's flank. Remain ing elements of the Fifth immediately followed up.this sweeping "end run" by overrunning Jap positions in TSUKASAN and surrounding hills. , ^T j , w
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On the Division right the Seventh Marines also continued

to smash the enemy southward, advancing some 800 yards and
establishing complete control of virtually all the hill mass
to the south of the KOKUBA GAWA. Division Reconnaissance
Company for the second day had patroli in advance of the
Seventh Marines. The company, attempting to reach Hill 68 at
7668 T, ran into an enemy platoon and in the stiff fire figrt
that ensued killed 15 Japs with no Marine casualties.
By 4 June supply difficulties were becoming acute. The
Division is not equipped for a rapid advance over a large land
mass and driving rains whipped the already-muddy roads into
impassable mires, requiring hand carry for supplies to forward
units. Evacuation of wounded also was at a critical stage, and
forward displacement of infantry command posts WSB virtually
impossible because of inability to haul vehicles out of the mud,
even with tractors. All tanks were ordered off the roads in
an effort to facilitate movement of supplies.
Despite the obstacles of bad weather and lack of supplies
this Division rolled up gains of 1800 yards in Its drive south
from the NAHA-YONABARU valley. During the day of 4 June our
forces reached positions Just north of the plateau stretching
toward the HANJA-IWA line and were prepared to launch an
attack along the approaches to DAKITON and HANJA. In the after
noon, the Fifth Marines were pinched out by elements of the
First Marines which had enveloped the hostile right flank by
moving through the Army zone on the left. The First Battalion,
First Marines attempted to continue the drive southward, but
when two platoons of C Company attempted to cross the swollen,
unfordeble stream on a foot bridge at 7866 UV they were hit by
heavy rifle, machine gun and mortar fire and wer< forced to
pull back.
Rain on the 5th of June continued to make evacuation
extremely difficult for all front line unite, eight men being
reauired to carry out a single casualty. Forward elements
were forced to operate on limited rations despite the more
than 40,000 pounds of supplies that were parachuted to our
troops from aircraft operating between rain squalls.
Ground action on that date was centered in the rl#it of
the Division zone of action. The Seventh Marines in that zone
scored gains of up to 1000 yards in driving to positions Just
north of the village of HANJA which anchored the Division
objective on the right. The regiment was held up during the
morning by heavy machine gun and mortar fire from a hill mass
to the right of the Division boundary in the Sixth Marine
Division zone of action, but our forces were able to advance
again after laying a heavy artillery barrage on the high ground.
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REPRODUCTION III PHIB CORPS
9/

1st Marines Division Okinawa

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COPY NO.

FIPST MARINE DIVISION

01718 1990-5-80 485/390

Subject; Reference: Enclosure:

-.? '"'* |",,.i:

< *- J * >.\ ' ~ - 1 1 .

Chapter III - Preliminary Planning

Chapter VII - Assault Phase

r~g%rt k' 9W-, IJ.,

...CHAPTER IE... ..TASK ORGANIZATION... SPECIAL ACTION QE1POQT ...NANSE1I SWOTO...

Col Kenneth B. CHAPPELL, USMC

Col John H. &RIEBEL, USI'C

3rd PlaC iST*Wl

Det 454th Amph Trk Co (Army) (8 DUKW)

Col Wilburt S. BROWN, USMC

Lt Col James S. MONAHAN, USMC

Annexes: Personnel lntelli aence Operations Supply j Logistics Medical

#* 0~ " * tw" ***"

Elements composing the Division for this operation were;

Attached to the Division for operational control for this

The First Marine Division rear echelon, with a strength of 80

Attached Units (including Battle Replacements);

Total First Marine Division (Reinforced):

Some fifty key enlisted men also elected to take leave in

___ , r?-. .-</* ?>** 0 * afk -^ ,_, .

Many of these men, were deserving of promotion for creditable

During each CPX, time was allowed for instruction and

w o n ^ { l ) , 4 h o ^ r Ud^SC^>two (2) days ja, jffifik^

*h*? **.$& %**

with special emphasis on combat phrases. The

5 ' # ' f f '&*r-$2'' '

Because liaison teams from the Division Intelligence Sec

1:12,300 1:15,500 1:5,000 1:5,000 1:10,000 1:11,000 1:6,000 1:6,000

22 Jan 45 22 Jan 45 22 Jan 45 22 Jan 45 22 Jan 45 22 Jan 45 3 Jan 45 3 3 Jan 45 Jan 45

14 Feb 45 16 Feb 45 17 Feb 45 17 Feb 45 17 Feb 45 20 Feb 45 25 Mar 45 25 Mar 45 5 Mar 45

1:5,000 1:6,000 1:10,000 ~ 1:10,000 1:3,000 1:8,000 1:8,000 1:10,000 1:15,000

Beach coverage was especially good. A written report on

22 January, 1945, and 1 March, 1945# Also the scales of com

1:50,000 1:100,000 l:25Q,000

Final distribution of relief maps was made to all above-

- "Estimates of Order of Battle in the TENTH Army Z of A

Phase II - capture of IE JIMA, and the remainder of

Tentative S'irsi, Marine Division Operational Plan 1-45 was

The OKINAWA Operation was similar to the PALAU Operation

-CHAPTER BE TRAINING # REHEARSALS SPECIAL ACTION REPORT -IMANSEI SHOTO

TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

Training for the NANSEI SHOTO Campaign cannot be said to

In addition to training for these new types of warfare,

again received a thorough test in an extensive command post

- CHAPTER Yl LOADING t EMBARKATION SPECIAL ACTION QEPOQT NANSEI SHOTO

5! " " PIT"

LOADING AND EMBARKATION

The forms required by FMF, Pac, are much too detailed

CHAPTER, m .MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE SPECIAL ACTION REPORT -NANSEI SWOTO...

News was also received, as L day neared, of the successful

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

YONTAN Airfield had excellent command of all landing beaches

This Division went ashore according to plan over Beaches Blue 1

unbpr I HO-JIM A OKAHA-IWA ^ usuku, 1 '*

Flra$ reports from assault elements of the Division reported

Our attack" continued to progress against very light opposition

Weather continued clear after dark, but there was no enemy

3 '* 5 /v " J CLK miya f^Z'jjk

\ W ^ * ' ; - / < v i -^:>^<'

< - J >.\ ' ~ - 1 1 .

h? .$& %

"Kishabo, Atsu+0< > lariya/' Unjo 'V5- . ' 1 \

< > j f ^ i ' ^>