Sartres Phenomenological Ontology Existence Precedes Essence Jean Paul Sartres existentialism is greatly known as existential atheism, for

his point of departure is Atheism or the denial of the existence of God. In explaining this, Sartre went further by making a stand point of his notion of existence precedes essence. there are two kinds of existentialists. There are, on the one hand, the Christians, amongst whom I shall name Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel, both professed Catholics; and on the other the existential atheists, amongst whom we must place Heidegger as well as the French existentialists and myself (Sartre, 1946, n. p?) These two kinds of existentialist are different from each other for they are in position of different angles. But, their common denominator is that they believe the existence comes before essence or existence precedes essence. With this, Sartre stated that his existentialism is of greater consistency with this notion. It was for this reason that he regarded that Atheistic existentialism as the only as valid existentialism. In this regard, what does it mean to say existence precedes essence? Sartre described it that first of all man exists, turns up, appears on the scene and only afterwards defines himself. (Sartre, 1946, n. p?) In explaining this more, he made used of the analogy of God as the supernal artisan to the manufacture of a certain article. According to him, God can be likened to the producer of a paper knife. When they create they already had the blueprint and formula and they already know the purpose of their article. Hence, it is in the same way that they already know its essence. They already have the preconception of its nature. But according to Sartre, this is not the case for God does not exist. Man simply is. It was the very first principle of existentialism. As it implication therefore, he denied that there is no existence of human nature but rather its human condition. Another thing would be creation would be a deniable question for human beings for it is not right for him to ask this question for he simply exists. In de Beavoire Ethics of Ambiguity (1948), she said that the first implication of Phenomenological Ontology, which is the philosophy of Sartre, is that the genuine man will not agree to recognize any foreign absolute (1948, n. p ?). Existentialist conversion would be compared to the phenomenological reduction. That is bracketing or putting mans will into parenthesis and thereby bring him to the consciousness of his true condition. It is in the same way as phenomenological reduction prevents the errors of dogmatism by suspending all affirmation concerning the mode of reality of the external world. With this all it clearly offers that atheism is the very first principle of existentialism. Being for itself and Being in itself In Being and Nothingness, Sartre calls into attention that there two modes of being, which he calls being-for-itself and being-in-itself. With this, one would notice the Hegels influence for he regarded being-for-itself as the thesis whereas the being-in-itself as its antithesis. But for him, its synthesis cannot be realized for it such an impossibility. This is where he distinct himself from Hegel. (Stumpf, 1999)

In applying this to the materialist world, one could say that man is the being for itself (consciousness) whereas others realities besides him is the being in itself. Being for itself There three ways in order to understand being-for-itself, that is taking into consideration being-for-itself as: (1) consciousness, (2) nothingness, and (3) freedom. Let us take into account first being-for-itself as consciousness. As a consciousness subject, being-for-itself therefore, presupposes an object for without this, consciousness would be an impossibility. Thus, object is an absolute necessity for the consciousness subject for consciousness presupposes an object. Sartre further explained this that consciousness can be likened to a mirror, without any reflected object on it mirror will be no content. Thus, one would notice that there is a distinction or separation of consciousness and object. Second is being-for-itself as nothingness. Sartre says that being-for-itself is nothingness by way of its nihilating activity. It is nothingness in greater sense for it is a mere existence. As we have seen being-for-itself does not have any content or essence of its own. As a result it just borrows an essence from its object. Human reality is a kind of nothingness of the present situated between the past of accomplishment performed and the future of the projects embarked upon. He is in constant struggle in creating his own essence by way of his project. Thus, he described man as a being who is not what he is and a being who is what he is not. Mans present condition, therefore, is a kind of nothingness of pure existence in relation to the past and a midway to his future projects which he will to undermined. The present becomes meaningful only in its relationship to that it has been accomplished and the future that he has to achieve.(Lescoe, 1985, 282) Lastly, being for itself as freedom, this third consideration will be discussed further in the latter part of this paper. Being-in-itself Sartre described being in-itself in a simple formula: being is what it is. As mentioned above, being in-itself is diametrically opposed to being for-itself for it is its anti-thesis. It is a world of objects that simply are what they are. Sartre denies any dualism in it, for according to him it is in its fullness of being because its density is infinite. Being-in-itself are objects whom are exactly what they are and no more. They are things which, lacks consciousness. This totality of non-conscious beings can be best described as a massive inertia, hence there is no absolute reason for its existence for things preliterate themselves with an overwhelming obscenity. Thus, it is a world of things which denies the existence of God for any reasons. Everything merely is and it exists without any purpose. (Lescoe, 1985, 291) Being-for-itself-in-itself as God Being for itself and being in-itself are always in constant contradiction with each other for the world of being-in-itself enjoys the permanence and stability even though it is completely meaningless whereas being-for-itself or consciousness seeks to transcend itself because of its contingency and radical stability. Sartre states that being-for-itself has its own fundamental drive toward self transcendence, for it envies the rock like stability of being-in-itself and it is in continuous engagement in its attempt in overcoming its lack of being.

Sartre described man as a useless passion for he is engaged in an absolute impossible task of unification of being-for-itself and being-in-itself. This impossible task which man sets for himself namely setting himself of the instability which consciousness inevitably demands is clearly a most frustrating undertaking. It is a foregone conclusion that man cannot be both beingfor-itself and being-in-itself. (de Beaviore, 1948) After having established this futile of the being-for-itself and bein-in-itself project, Sartre went further on asserting that this transcendent being-for-itself-in-itself is none other than what religion calls God. It was for this reason that Sartre explained that mans desire is the desire to be God. The best way to conceive of the fundamental project of mans reality is to say that man is the being whose project is to be God. To be man means to reach toward being God, or it you prefer man fundamentally is the desire of God. (Lescoe, 1985, 295) Being-for-others As de la Cruz (2007) would note that being-for-itself should not be seen only with his relationship with being-in-itself but also being-for-itself should be seen in his relationship with being for others. With this regard, in digging more Sartre phenomenological ontology is an incomplete impetus, if one would not dealt on this other angle of being for itself. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre devoted himself about this with almost 200 pages. Thus, it is also of central importance to Sartre. In doing so, Sartre argues man as being-for-itself that cannot or can never be isolated, the regards or the existence of others as being for itself tends to fix ones possibilities. With this, Sartre cited two examples of the way being for itself can become being for others. These examples are (1) the glance or the look and (2) the phenomenon of fear or shame. A. The Glance or the Look From the word itself, one would think that Sartre first example is about being-oritself experience of being look at. Sartre described this experience as an example of the being-for-itself in the park. In explaining his first example, Sartre made a good analogy by situating the being-for-itself or consciousness in the park. Sartre describes being alone in a park, at this time, all relations in the park (e.g. the bench is between two trees) are available, accessible and occurring-for him. With this, he says that: no relation would appear through him between those things in my universe, grouped and synthesize from any point of view into instrumental complexes, they would from his, disintegrate into multiplicities of indifferent relationships. (Sartre, 1956, 344) But let us suppose that you are not alone in the park. You then realized that there is a man-reading-a-book who has been there for a long time. This man then started to wonder, his eyes then looks at the benches, then into any other objects in the park and finally, he started to look at the man. Such action therefore became a threat to his existence and security. He then realized that objects are no longer his objects, distances are no longer his distances. With this, he therefore realized that the world is not only for him; that there is also the existence of the other.

For Sartre stated the other is a threat to ones existence for the other is stealing his world, and at the same time the glance of the other pierces through his. Sartre added that this inevitable reaction to such threat which others glance begets is one of fear. Fear as he describes, is the discovery of the discovery of my being as object on the occasion of the appearance of another object in my perceptive field. It refers to the origin of fear, which is the fearful discovery of my pure and simple object state insofar as it is surpassed and transcended by possibles which are not my possibles. (Sartre, 1956; Lescoe, 1985, 300) B. The Keyhole Sartres another example of being for other is the keyhole. With this he says that out of curiousity, jealously or vice, being-for-itself is prompted to peep into a keyhole. With this, man is alone and on the level of a non-theitic self consciousness. Thus, there is no self to inherit his consciousness, He is on the level of unreflective consciousness. But this change, when he hears footsteps approaching him, then he realizes that someone is staring at his. The sensation of being looked at makes man suddenly conscious of himself. Thus, it just means that man is aware of being looked at by the other. As Sartre indicates that I am ashamed of myself before the other. Sartre writes Shame is by nature recognition. It is the recognition of the other. Shame is shame of oneself before the other. Shame is the recognition of the fact that I am indeed that object which the other is looking at and judging. I can be ashamed only as my freedom escapes me in order to become a given object. (Sartre, 1956; LEscoe, But Sartres description does not only stop there, he maintained that shame is much wider than a merely the feeling that one has, when he was discovered doing awkward things. He argues that it is not a feeling of being this or that guilty object but rather, he is being guilty of being an object. With this he asserted that: Shame is the feeling of an original fall, not because of the fact that I may have committed this or that particular fault but simply that I have fallen into the world in the midst of things and that I have need the mediation of other in order to be what I am. (Sartrem 1956; Lescoe, 1985, 301) These two examples only portray that the existence of the other can beget either shame or fear in man as being-for-itself; that the existence of the other is a threat to the existence of being-for-itself. The existence of the other is the negation of the being for itself for being-for-itself become an object of consciousness rather than a subject. It is because every being-for-itself is a subject which is a potential threat to every being for itself; that every being for itself is a natural and apriori enemy of the of the Other. It was for this reason that he argues that conflict is the basis of being-or-others. He contends that all human encounters must be viewed as a form of conflict.

Conflict is the original meaning of being for others. Everything which may be said of me in relation with the Other applies to him as well. While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while the Other seek to enslave me. We are by no means dealing with the unilateral relations with an object-in-itself but with reciprocal and moving relations. (Sartre, 1956; Lescoe, 1955, 303) With this, Sartre states that human love is the clearest and most striking example of mutual conflict between human beings. In his view, he regards that all human love is therefore an endless engagement in mutual frustration. As a project, love cannot be realized. Love there is doomed to fail. In love, both being-for-itself are place on both opposite sides. Each of them were like law of opposites who were tying to steal and limit the freedom and the possibilities of the Other. Man, therefore is in endless passion and are faced with infinite regress and total frustration. From another point of view, love is considered as an attack upon the object of the love and the subject of love. Since human love is an impossibility, Sartre asserted that there are two extreme attitudes in achieving love: It is either (1) masochism or (2) sadism. The former, according to Sartre, is making of myself a kind of pleasure of the other. The masochist wants to surrender his freedom and become totally an object of the Other. The later is through violence and pain the Other is considered as an instrument of his subjectivity for his own pleasure. (Lescoe, 1985) Man as Freedom Man as freedom or being-for-itself as freedom is one of the implications of Sartres notion of existence precedes essence. Since, there is no being prior to his existence, man is simply is. Man therefore does not have any freedom. He is not an agent who possesses a nature of freedom but rather he is freedom. This is what he meant by Sartres absolute freedom. With this, in his Existentialism is Humanism (1945), he argues that man is condemned to be free. He is condemned to be free. He is condemned because he is. Therefore, he is responsible for himself. He is responsible for creating his essence and he is responsible for everything that he will do. His existence therefore is of greater responsibility for the burden of the world is his shoulders. His action would not be reference to human nature for there is no human nature, and there is no God. Man, therefore, is a Godless world in search of creating, inventing and finding values that should spring from his freedom. Man, in his absolute freedom and condemnation, must invent values for there are no rules of conduct and morality that would serve as his guide for his actions. He is therefore in subjectivity. But subjectivity, according to Sartre should not be understood as relativism but rather it should be understood that in fashioning and choosing himself, man is also fashioning and choosing humanity. Man is therefore the supreme maker and inventor of values. He must assume complete responsible not only for himself but also for humanity. In his actions

and choices that he will be making, he does not just need to choose himself but also chose humanity. This is ultimate realm of responsibility according to Sartre. A. Anguish Sartre defined anguish as the reflective apprehension of the self as freedom, that a nothingness slips in between my Self and my past and future so that nothing relieves me from the necessity of continually choosing myself and nothing guarantees the validity of values which I choose. (Sartre, 1956, 628) Thus, from this we could say anguish is the reflection and apprehension that being-for-itself is a freedom. But it is not only that Sartre added that anguish is more on the apprehension of being-foritself as freedom but it also includes the recognition that he is also its legislator. Being for itself is in anguish because in fashioning himself, he will be also fashioning also humanity. B. Bad faith While Sartre argues that anguish is a category that accompanies human freedom, he hasten to point out in most cases, it is conspicuous by its absence. (Lescoe, 1985, 321) According to Sartre, it is a lie to oneself within the unity of consciousness; it is the refusal that man to become anguish and to flee from the burden of the responsibility. Fleeing here means that man as being for itself denies that he is a for itself but rather makes an excuse that he is a being in itself. Critical Analysis Sartre pointed out that the point of departure of his Phenomenological Ontology is atheism. It is, for him, the first principle of existentialism. It was for this reason that he firmly believed that the only valid existentialism is atheism for it is of greater consistency with the existentialists notion of existence precedes essence. As its implication, he denies any existence of human nature for according to him there is no God to have a conception of it. Man simply is. Man is the one responsible in creating his own essence by the existential choices that he is about to undermined. In Existentialism is Humanism, Sartre asserted that this is what distinguish man from any other realities of being. That man is a being for itself whereas all other realities besides him, whom lacks of consciousness is called being in itself. Being of itself can be understood in three ways that is, being for itself as consciousness, nothingness and freedom. Being for itself as consciousness and nothingness mean that he is a conscious subject that has no essence or content, he just in a way borrows essence from being in itself which is said to be the fullness of being. Another would is that being for itself as freedom. This entails that man does not have any freedom; that having freedom for him is not a characteristic of man. Man, therefore, is freedom. He is condemned to be free he is. Man is the one responsible for his freedom. As a freedom, he is in useless passion in two ways. First is by way of his relationship toward being in itself and second is by way of his relationship towards being for others. Man is in useless passion in his relationship towards being for itself for he is in constant struggle to attain the unifying

content or the synthesis of Being-for-itself-it-self which he called God. And lastly, Man is in useless passion towards his relationship to being for others for his relationship arises with conflicts; conflict therefore is the basis of human relationship. Conflict for each individual man is a being for itself that needs to sacrifice his freedom (Masochist) or through pain makes Others as an instrument of his freedom (Sadist). It was for reason that later on declares that love is doomed to fail. (Lescoe, 1985) With all of this, how do we view Sartrean Ethics then? In Existentialism is Humanism, Sartre gives a glimpse that his ethics is like that of Kants Categorical Imperative. What makes its different is that Kants is a positivity for it postulates the existence of God but his is of negativity for it postulates the non-existence of God. In the light of these Sartres Phenomenological Ontology, we raise the following points: First is raised against his concept of existence precedes essence. According to Marcel, Sartre is guilty of ambivalence in explaining his notion of existence precedes essence. That there are two ways of understanding existence: metaphysical and moral. The former refers to the nature or the quiddity of an object. He even added that there is a simultaneous co-existence of the real individual essence and existence. The latter, on the other hand, refers to the free development of moral character of the person that he will undermine by way of his existential choices. With this, one would ask what do we mean by essence by Sartre? Thus, from this he is therefore guilty of ambivalence. Even a novice of a student of philosophy is not a thing but an abstract notion which becomes actualized the moment that he began to exist. ( Lescoe, 1985) Sartre failed to recognize mans ontological subjectivity when he strongly emphasized individual subjectivity. (Aguas, 2007) Another would be raised is that Sartre failed, in declaring that the only valid existentialism is atheism, the entire history of existentialism. That existentialism was first formulated by Kierkegaard, a devout Christian. It also fails to recognize such great work of Marcel, Jasper and other theistic existentialist. Second, man is in useless passion in two ways in his relationship with Being in itself and being for others. With the former, his concept about God as a synthesis or the unifying content of being for itself and being in itself is unclear. What do we mean by God here? His idea of God in this way does not agree with the idea of the perfect being as of for the believers of God, according to them is a fullness of being. God is a separate entity from man and not man of becoming God. Thus, in this case Sartre has rejected is not the God of the believers, but his own idea of God. (Aguas, 2007, 99) With the latter, all such relationships to others are all doomed to fail. In this case, how can be viewed Ethics then? According to him, it should be seen as Kantian Imperatives as negativity. But this sounds questionable for it is quite incompatible with his philosophy in his Being and Nothingness, he did not mention any of those. It was only in his Existentialism is Humanism. How did he explain this? We do not know. In any case, he may be just wanted to quote mans responsibility. Third, Sartre said that man is condemned to be free. He as being for itself does not have any rights to ask about creation or how things came to be? With this, we could say that it is

questionable. Eversince in time and memoriam, man is confronted to ask how things came to be? It is even the starting point of philosophy. Philosophy started from wonder of things on how things came into being. From this perspective, Sartre therefore is again guilty of denying history of philosophy. And also it is an escapable fact to ask such question. Every human individual has it natural curiosity to ask about his beginnings.