TEORIA ALEGERII RATIONALE

TEMATICA GENERALA A DISCIPLINEI 1. Teoria Alegerii Raionale ca ramur a tiinei politice; fundamentele filozofice i logice ale TAR; 2. TAR ca teorie economic a democraiei; fundamentele economologice (microeconomics); 3. Raionalitatea i conceptul de raionalitate. 4. Raionalitatea instrumental i raionalitatea valoric; actorul raional individual; 5. Raionalitate limitat; modelele raionalitii limitate. 6. Dilema prizonierului: tiparul clasic; dezvoltri moderne ale patternului dilema prizonierului; 7. Alegerea raional: tiparele generale, premisele i principiile alegerii raionale; 8. Premisa individualismului metodologic orientarea spre scop i motivaia instrumental; 9. Raionalitate, dreptate, moralitate, ideologie; 10. Alegerea raional ca rezultant a dinamicii binomului preferine-constngeri; 11. Preferina ca funcie de utilitate; tipologia preferinelor; 12. Preferine individuale- preferine colective: individualitate i interferene/interdependene; 13. Principiile raionalitii instrumentale; 14. Raionalitate, iraionalitate, raionalitate iraional; 15. Elemente de teorie a alegerii sociale; 16. Aciunea social i aciunea colectiv; 17. Raionalitatea n aciunea politic; 18. Raionalitate i iraionalitate n aciunea militar; 19. Opiunea terorist ca opiune iraional; 20. Teoria descurajrii ca iraionalitate raional (MAD); 21. Elemente de teorie a alegerii publice: actorul raional colectiv; agregarea preferinelor; 22. Raionalitatea colectiv i construcia sistemelor politice; 23. Sistemul de vot i paradoxul votantului raional; 24. Torema blatistului raional; 25. Amendamente ideologice i psihologice la premisa alegerii raionale; 26. Actorul politic ca actor raional colectiv; 27. Maximizarea utilitii ca scop al aciunii actorului politic colectiv raional; 28. Bunuri publice, bunuri comune; 29. Aciunea colectiv, principiul eficienei i principiul echilibrului; 30. Optimul Pareto i Echilibrul Nash; 31. Raionalitatea colectiv i limitele dezvoltrii durabile; 32. Actorul raional colectiv i birocraia organizaional: modele funcionale; 33. Modelul politicii raionale i modelul procesului organizaional; 34. Procesul decizional n cadrul organismelor statale; 35. Particulariti ale procesului decizional n domeniul securitii; 36. Utilitarismul modern i funcia de bunstare social; 37. Paradoxul lui Arrow i Eficiena Pareto; 38. Comportamentul raional colectiv n situaii de criz i conflict; 39. Dilema prizonierului n teoria i practica securitii; 40.Sistemele de securitate ca expresie a alegerii raionale: cooperare-confruntare. NOTA: - Pentru susinerea examenului de disciplin, fiecare student va ntocmi un referat tematic. - Temele pentru referate sunt la alegerea fiecrui student i se formuleaz pe baza tematicii orientative.

- Referatele tematice vor avea dimensiunea de 8-10 pagini (fr bibliografie), TNR 11-12. - Referatele pot fi trimise n format electronic, sau predate n form scris la sfritul examenului. BIBLIOGRAFIE GENERALA
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Bibliografie minimal
- Dahl, R., A., A Preface to Democratic Theory, 1985, New Edition in 2006; - Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy, 1957; - Fisichella, Domenico, tiina politic: Probleme, concepte, teorii, Ed. POLLIROM, 2007; - Goodin, R.; Kingemann H. D. .a. Manual de tiin politic, Ed. Pollirom, 2005; - Heywood, Andrew, Politics, Palgrave Macmillan; 2nd edition, 2002; - Miroiu, Adrian, Fundamentele politicii, Vol. 1 i 2, Editura Pollirom, 2007; - Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Harvard University Press; Revised edition (January 1, 1971);

- Wendt, Alexander, Teoria social a politicii internaionale, Collegium, POLIROM, 2011.