SOCRATES, THE ELENCTIC METHOD & TWO PROPOSED ANSWERS TO THE JUSTICE QUESTIONS

All human beings, by their nature, desire understanding. Aristotle, Metaphysics (Book 1) The safest general characterisation of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality

The Elenctic Method, part 1: testing Cephalus traditionalist concept of justice On the elenctic method & Socratic irony. Socratic irony is a technical term that Plato scholars use to refer to the method that Socrates uses to teach his interlocutor(s), his conversation partner(s). This method is referred to as the Socratic or elenctic method. (The term elenctic comes from the Greek word elenchus, meaning refutation.) The method works as follows. Socrates professes to be ignorant on the topic of discussion and asks his interlocutorwho takes herself to be an expert on the issueto impart knowledge to him, to share what she knows. Thus, Socrates takes the role of a student. Insofar as he is a student, he asks questions of his teacher and the claims that are being asserted. While the questions give the appearance of Socrates merely thinking through the ideas that the teacher is espousing, in actual fact, the questions are designed to reveal that the teacher does not know what she is really talking about, that it is she that is actually ignorant on the matter. (Notice that does not imply that Socrates knows the answer; it merely implies that he recognizes that the teacher does not know it. Of course, we might ask about the plausibility of such a situation.) It is for this reason that the method is referred to as irony; for it is the student who professes ignorance that ends up instructing the teacher, the one who professes expertise. Why is this method practiced by Socrates? The answer is simply this. Given that Socrates believes the wise person knows their level of ignorance and the unexamined life is not worth living, he believes that his first responsibility is to help a person become wise, by in part, taking account of their real state of understanding (or lack thereof). The best way to help a person acquire this recognition is to bring them to a state of perplexity (Gr. aporia). Once a person is in this state and recognizes that she is ignorant on some topic, Socrates takes it that she is genuinely ready to investigate the matter. On Socratic definitions & Platonic Forms. According to Plato, a central part of philosophical inquiry involves an attempt to understand the Forms. What are the Forms? That question is best answered as follows. Much of the most important research that philosophers and other scholars do involves an attempt to answer questions of the form what is x? Physicists, for instance, ask what is a black hole? Biologists ask what is an organism? Mathematicians ask what is a right triangle? Let us call the correct answer to a what-is-x question the Socratic definition of x. We can say, then, that physicists are seeking the Socratic definition of a black hole, biologists investigate the Socratic definition of an organism, and mathematicians look to determine the Socratic definition of a right triangle. What does that mean exactly? What are Socratic definitions? Socratic definitions are not dictionary definitions. That is, they are not a description of the agreed upon usage of word or phrase by a linguistic community. Rather, a Socratic definition of some thing x is a conceptual analysis of x-ness.1 When the groups of scholars noted earlier attempt to answer their respective what-is-x questions, each is investigating a very specific issue: each is investigating the nature of the x in question. Its important to note, however, that that does not simply mean that our imagined physicists, for example, are merely asking about the properties of some particular black hole. While it is certainly true that that is of interest to physicists, that is not what they are doing when they ask the question what is a black hole? No, in asking this question, they are attempting to work out a conceptual analysis of the type or kind of thing called a black hole or what we might simply call black holeness. In the same way,
1

The ancient Greeks called such an analysis a logos.

our envisaged biologists and mathematicians are attempting to work out conceptual analyses of organismness and right triangleness, respectively. In so doing, when we analyze these and other concepts, we are attempting to develop a complete theory regarding the nature of the type of thing in question. Again, we are not merely trying to determine the properties of some particular instance or token of the type; we are trying to determine what properties are had by every (possible) instance of that type. That said, we can answer the question what are the Forms? as follows: what I have been calling the type of thing x, Plato calls the Form of x-ness. Accordingly, the Forms is simply Platos preferred phrase for referring to types. Before we move on, we need to note the following. It should be clear that when a theorist proposes a Socratic definition, that does not by itself imply the proposed analysis is correct. Not at all. Sometimes we discover that a proposal is correct, e.g., that gold has seventy-nine protons. Sometimes, however, we discover that a proposal is not correct. Geometers, for example, used to think that a shape s is a right triangle only if s has the Pythagorean property (i.e., s satisfies the theorem that the square of the hypotenuse is equivalent to the sum of the squares of the other two sides). However, at least as early as the mid-nineteenth century, mathematicians discovered that there are right triangles that do not have the Pythagorean property. Accordingly, what we should say is this: when a person proposes such Socratic definition, she provides what is purportedly the correct answer to a particular what-is-x question.2 Yet, once a proposal is offered, we then seek to confirm or disconfirm the proposal. When is a proposed Socratic definition correct? A proposed analysis is correct iff the analysis corresponds to the actual nature of the type in question. When a proposed analysis a does correspond, then a is correct. If, however, a fails to correspond, then a is not correct. It is obviously not easy in alleven mostcases to determine whether or not a proposed conceptual analysis corresponds to a type of things actual nature. (This is one reason why scholarly research progresses very slowly.) To determine whether or not a proposed does so correspond, we look for evidence that helps us to a sufficient degree determine if it is correct. Once such method for doing so is to look for counterexamples. In the event that we find a counterexample to a proposed Socratic definition of x, then we have found evidence that demonstrates that that proposed analysis of x-ness is in fact false (e.g., as in the case of right triangles). Of course, it must be noted that the mere fact that scholars dont find a counterexample to proposed Socratic definition does not imply the proposal is in fact correct. No, it might turn out that they simply have yet to find one. Again, this is one part of the reason that makes this type of work is so difficult (but, also so interesting). On the concept of a counterexample. A proposed Socratic definition of x is correct only if it is not subject to a counterexample. What is a counterexample? A counterexample is an example that demonstrates that the proposed Socratic definition of x is too narrow or too broad in scope. By too narrow or too broad in scope I mean this. To say that a proposed Socratic definition of x is too narrow in scope is to say that the analysis of x does not account for or capture all xs; to say that a proposed Socratic definition of x is too broad in scope is to say that the analysis of x does not account for only xs. For instance, imagine that Jones proposes the claim that 1. All As are Bs

(which is logically equivalent to the statement if something is an A, then it must be a B) and his friend, Smith, presents a counterexample to (1), then Smith has described an A that is not a B. Accordingly, we can see that Smith has asserted that (1) is too narrow. If, as Smith has argued, its true that 2. There is at least one A that is a non-B,

then it is true that

Note well. When a person proposes a Socratic definition, that does not imply that she believes that that is the correct account. She may believe it is, but that is not necessary. She may simply be considering a view that someone else has suggested for the purposes of demonstrating its mistaken. For instance, consider the fact that Plato provides various proposals regarding the nature of justice, yet ultimately seeks to refute each of them.

3.

Some As are not Bs

(where (3) is the denial of (1)). Since (1) and (3) cannot both be true, given that (3) is true, (1) must be false. (Note: one counterexample is sufficient to reveal a theory is false.) What is the counterexample from the insane knife owner? On Cephalus externalist theory of moral psychology. Plato raises the topic of moral psychology (also known as the rationality of morality) by considering the type of view to which Cephalus is committed. He does so because he thinks that that view implies moral complacency. What is that view? Cephalus is committed to what moral philosophers refer to as practical reason externalism. To make sense of this, let us first note that theories of moral psychology can be divided into two kinds: practical reason internalism versus practical reason externalism. PR-INTERNALISM: If a person S has a practical reason to do an act A, then (i) A is the right thing to do and (ii) Ss recognition that A is the right thing to do is sufficient to motivate S to do A.

PR-EXTERNALISM: If a person S has a practical reason to do A, then (i) A is the right thing to do, but (ii) something more than Ss mere recognition that A is the right thing to do is necessary to motivate S to do A. The Elenctic Method, part 2: testing Thrasymachus conventionalist concept of justice & immoralist theory of moral psychology After both Cephalus and Polemarchus recognize and admit that their proposed answers to (JQ1) and (JQ2) have been refuted, Thrasymachus proposes what he believes are the right answers to The Justice Questions. Not only can we test his proposal to (JQ1) against the requirements of a good Socratic definition, but we can see both of his proposals can be refuted with substantive arguments. On the nature of reductio ad absurdum arguments. A reductio ad absurdum (RAA) argument is a valid argument method that begins with the assumptionfor arguments sakethat the conclusion that is to be established as true is actually false. Given that assumption, if it can be demonstrated that this initial assumption implies a contradiction, then that by itself is sufficient to demonstrate the assumption is false and that implies that the opposite of the assumption is true. Socrates refutation of Thrasymachus conventionalism: The Inept Ruler Argument Objective: Prove that the conventionalist concept of justice is false. The proof: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Assume that justice is the advantage of the stronger. [Assumption for RAA: the conventionalist concept of justice] Justice is obeying all the laws. [Premise] It is possible for rulers to establish mistaken laws. [Premise] A mistaken law is not advantageous to the ruler. [Premise] It is sometimes just to obey laws that are not advantageous to the ruler. [From 1-4] Justice is both advantageous and not advantageous to the ruler. [From 1,5] (6) is not possible [LNC] (1) is false. [From 7]

Hence, Therefore,

Therefore,

Is the inept ruler argument sound? Heres the reasoning for thinking that it is. First, notice that the argument is valid. If (1)-(7) are true, then (8) cannot be false. Accordingly, we need to determine whether or not the premises are true. Notice also that since the argument is valid, the only premises we can call into question are (1), (2), (3), (4) and (7). Should we accept (7), that it is impossible that (6) be true? Yes. Heres why. (6) is a contradiction (i.e., a statement of the form p and not-p; given the law of noncontradiction, namely, the claim that LNC: Pr(p and not-p) = 0 (where LNC reads the probability that the conjunction p and not-p is true is equal to 0), (6) cannot be true. What about (2), (3) and (4)? Notice that Thrasymachus accepts (2), (3) and (4). What is more, he must do so on pain of irrationality. As such, the only way he can avoid the contradiction in (6) is to reject (1). And in so doing, he agrees the conventionalist concept of justice is false: that justice is not the advantage of the stronger. Socrates refutation of Thrasymachus immoralism: The Jones-is-Happy-Implies-Jones-is-Just Argument i. Jones is happy iff Jones lives well. [Premise] ii. The function of the soul is living. [Premise] iii. The soul functions well in proportion to its virtue. [Premise] iv. The virtue of a soul is justice. [Premise] Therefore, v. Jones is happy in proportion as Jones is just. [From i-iv]3

2011, Richard G. Graziano. All rights reserved. This material may not be used, or duplicated in part or whole without express written permission by the author.