Understanding

the Civil War Understanding

the Civil War
Understanding the Civil War presents the most dramat-
ic part of our American experience in a concise and easy to
grasp manner. By separating the Eastern Theater from the
Western Theater it makes it easier to understand why eastern
Confederate victories made headlines, while Union victories
in the West won the war. In a similar manner, by separating
the political war from the military war, the political genius
of Abraham Lincoln comes into better focus. While James
M. McPherson’s Pulitzer Prize winning history of the Civ-
il War, Battle Cry of Freedom is a brilliant book, it is 958
pages long. Read Understanding the Civil War first. It will
add greatly to your understanding of this fascinating time in
American history.
RIBBON
PRESS

Michael W. O’Brien
 Understanding
the Civil War
Michael W. O’Brien

Table of Contents
Introduction ..................................................... 2
The Road to War ............................................. 2
How They Fought . ....................................... 10
The War in the East ...................................... 13
The War in the West ..................................... 32
The Political War in the North .................... 45
The Political War in the South .................... 49
The Generals - Union . ................................. 51
The Generals - Confederate ........................ 57
Conclusion . ................................................... 64

Editors Note - Understanding the Civil War is rather unorthodox in its ap-
proach to the Civil War. First of all, it presents the military action without
including the names of the officers in charge; the officers are presented at
the end of the book. The author firmly believes that it is easier to under-
stand what happened before learning who made it happen. Secondly, most
books on the Civil War cover the events in chronological order. This book
separates the political war from the military war and further separates the
military war in the East from the military war in the West. While this ap-
proach might seem unusual to the academic, the result is a Civil War primer
that is surprisingly easy to understand.
Introduction
The Civil War has captured the imagination of the American people
like no other event in American history. 65,000 books have been written
on the subject. The biggest reason for this fascination is the size of the
catastrophe. 620,000 soldiers died in the Civil War. What could push a
nation into such a bloody calamity? Some historians argue that by 1860
the northern and southern sections of the United States had become very
different societies. Others argue that, when factors like common language
and common history are considered, the similarities outweigh the differ-
ences. Whoever is right, one fact remains. Northerners and Southerners
thought they were different, and they were willing to fight about that differ-
ence whether it was real or imagined. Southerners thought they were fight-
ing the American Revolution all over again. As they saw it, the North had
no right to tyrannize the South just as Britain had no right to tyrannize the
American Colonists. Just as the North was playing
the part of Britain, Abraham Lincoln was playing
the part of the tyrant King George III. Southerners
were fighting for the right to self government, as
were the American Colonists. The difference was
the type of government for which they were fight-
ing. The Confederate States of America not only
excluded 4 million black Americans from the citi-
zenship, they held them in slavery. During the war,
the Northern states decided that destroying this type
Abraham Lincoln of government was worth the fight.

The Road to War

Slavery has been associated with civilization since the beginning of
recorded human history. Household slavery was the most common form. In
household slavery, wealthy individuals in many societies brought slaves into
their homes to help with the domestic chores. These slaves added little to the
overall wealth of the society and were often sought after as status symbols
for the well off. Household slaves often had extensive rights. Household
slaves never represented more that 20% of any society. In 1050, 10% of the
population of England were household slaves. The other form of slavery,
productive slavery, was rather rare and much more severe. In productive
slavery, ways were found to put slaves to work producing products that made
the society wealthy. Societies organized in such a manner were made up of
at least 20-30% slaves, and they spent much of the societies’ energy getting
and keeping slaves. The first major slave society was Greece. In 400 BC,


33% of Athens were slaves. Many historians believe that it was the work
of slaves that gave the Greeks time to create the high culture that was the
beginning of western civilization. Rome was the next major slave society
(200 BC to 400 AD). Roman conquest sent soldiers who would otherwise
be home farming to distant lands. Roman armies captured enemy soldiers
and sent them home to do the farm work. The product that the Roman
slaves produced was the food that fed the empire. Rome was about 30%
slave. Slave societies were also present in the Middle East. The Baghdad
caliphate, from 600-900 AD, was about 50% slave. Slaves captured in battle
and imported from Africa grew sugar cane and made this society wealthy.
One of the best known slave societies was the Caribbean sugar colonies.
European colonial powers began to import African slaves to their Caribbean
colonies in the 1500’s to work their hugely profitable sugar cane plantations.
Plantation owners usually stayed in England, preferring to employ overseers
to manage large numbers of black slaves. In 1730, Jamaica was 90% slave.
Similar societies appeared in Central and South America. Brazilian coffee
plantations created a society that was 50% slave.
Perhaps the best known of the slave societies was the southern United
States from 1619-1865. Most of the work in the early American colonies
was done by indentured servants. These white immigrants, mostly from
England, agreed to work for a specified period of time to pay for their trip
to the New World. However, as early as 1619, English settlers in James-
town, Virginia were purchasing African slaves from Dutch traders. Early
settlers to the South used slaves as well as indentured servants to grow
tobacco, sugar cane, and cotton, taking advantage of the fertile soil and
warm climate. Towards the end of the 1600’s the colonists were prospering,
and the price of slaves was low. Consequently, the slave population grew
and the plantation system began to take shape. By 1725 there were 75,000
slaves in the South, and the population of South Carolina was 65% slave.
By 1775, one in six Americans was a black slave. When the colonies were
securing their independence from England and organizing a new nation,
slavery was a major stumbling block. The cooler climate and less fertile
soil in the North made large scale farming impractical. That part of the
county naturally graduated toward manufacturing and trade. In the South,
however, slavery had become such an integral part of Southern life that it
was difficult, if not impossible, to get rid of. The founding fathers were
embarrassed by slavery, but they did not know what to do about it. They
outlawed slavery in the country’s northwest frontiers but allowed it to ex-
pand in the southwest frontiers. After much torturous debate, slavery was
actually written into the Constitution of the United States in three important
ways. First, permission was given to slaveholders to cross state boundar-


ies to retrieve their escaped slave property. Second, southern states, who
gave their slaves virtually no rights whatsoever, could count those slaves
as three fifths of a person to increase that state’s political power in the new
federal congress. Finally, the Constitution called for the importation of
new slaves to end by 1808.
North and South were growing into very different societies but, in
1776, the advantages of common currency, national defense, and common
markets overcame sectional differences. Even then slavery cast a long
shadow, and the nation that took pride in being a beacon of liberty was
rapidly becoming the largest slave holding country in the world. Many
people understood the contradiction, but it seemed that nothing could be
done about it. Thomas Jefferson said that slavery was like holding a “wolf
by the ears,” explaining that it was a bad idea to hold on and a bad idea
to let go. There was a huge amount of racism in the United States in the
1800’s, but slavery was primarily an economic problem. Slavery was actu-
ally diminishing in the South when two things happened. First, there was a
textile revolution in Europe which greatly increased the demand for cotton.
Second, in 1794 Eli Whitney invented a machine that could remove seeds
from raw cotton. This machine allowed slaves to process cotton 1,000 times
faster than before. All of a sudden, Southerners could get rich growing
cotton. They began investing in more slaves and more land to grow more
cotton. Ambitious men soon understood that the fastest way to get rich in
the South was to become a slave-owning, cotton planter. While, in 1860,
only 25% of Southerners owned slaves, they had a disproportionate share
of the money and power. While the economy in the North was based on
manufacturing and small scale farming, the economy of the South was based
on slaves working on large plantation farms. World opinion was turning
against slavery, but the South would not give it up easily. The entire social
and economic system of the South depended on slavery. Southerners were
faced with a dramatic dilemma. They could accept the blatantly unjust
system from their forefathers or be financially ruined. Some radicals in the
South accepted the unjust system of slavery wholeheartedly. These “fire
eaters,” as they were called, attacked the system of free labor in the North,
calling it “wage slavery.” They claimed that their black slaves were better
treated than poor people in the North working long hours for low pay. They
even proposed expanding their slave empire into the Caribbean. Serious
consideration was given to annexing Cuba, with its 400,000 slaves, and
bringing it into the Union as a slave state.
The North and South had become different civilizations even though
they had language, race and religion in common. The North was a progres-
sive society moving rapidly towards the industrial age. The South resisted


change, preferring to maintain and defend its slave-based, plantation sys-
tem. These two economic systems, free labor capitalism and slave labor
agriculture, are practically opposites. It was proving very difficult, if not
impossible to operate a country where both systems existed. Southerners
saw Northern industrialists as cold hearted people who cared only about
making money. Northerners saw Southern planters as throwbacks to English
lords, cruel and exploitive. They also believed that the South was holding
the country back.
In the early 1800’s moral opposition to slavery began to grow in the
North. Small, but well organized groups were formed with the express
purpose of abolishing slavery in the South. One of
the most influential of these Northern abolitionists
was William Lloyd Garrison. In 1831 he began
publishing his anti-slavery newspaper, The Libera-
tor. Garrison hired a brilliant and articulate former
slave named Frederick Douglass to help him in his
fight against slavery. Douglass had a powerful in-
fluence on the Abolition movement and went on to
be an adviser to Abraham Lincoln. Although many
in the North came to oppose slavery, few could
Frederick Douglass imagine how the country would work with 4 million
freed slaves. Some feared their jobs would be threatened. Suggestions
were made to send freed slaves back to Africa. The United States founded
Liberia on the western coast of Africa in 1822 for this express purpose.
Liberia became an independent nation in 1847. While the Civil War was
blamed on issues such as states’ rights, failure of the political party system,
sectional differences, economic considerations, and bungling politicians,
all of these causes are rooted in slavery. Almost all historians agree that
without slavery there would have been no Civil War. In the early 1800’s a
British inspired anti-slavery movement led to emancipation in many New
World countries. Chile freed its slaves in 1823, Mexico in 1829, Trinidad
and British Guiana in 1833, Peru 1854, Puerto Rico in 1873, Cuba 1880,
and Brazil in 1888. Emancipation in these countries was accomplished, for
the most part, without bloodshed. Emancipation in the United States would
come in 1865, and it would be a calamity of monumental proportions.
A great power struggle began early in the 1800’s between the slave
holding states and the free states. The South had fewer people, so they
concentrated on control of the Senate where representation by states is
equal. In 1819 there were 11 free and 11 slave states resulting in parity in
the Senate. As states were added from the western frontier, this parity would
be challenged. In 1820 Missouri came in as a slave state and Maine as a


free state. Since Missouri extended well north of what had been considered
the traditional south, the debate was bitter. The aging Thomas Jefferson
said that the arguments over slavery in Mis-
souri sounded like “a fire bell in the night”
to the country. This led to the Compromise
of 1820 which established the southern
border of Missouri (36’ 30’’) as the division
between slave and free. This compromise
would hold for 30 years. States were admit-
ted to the Union two at a time, one free and
one slave, to keep the balance of power in
the Senate in tact.
Southerners lived in fear of slave uprisings. In 1801, slaves in the
French colony of Saint-Dominique attacked and killed their white overseers
and renamed the country Haiti. Although there were minor slave uprisings
in the South in 1800, 1822, and 1832, the phenomenon was surprisingly
rare. Racial appearances always played a role in American slavery. Whites
could escape slavery and blend in with the local white population. American
Indian slaves could escape west to Native American tribes where they would
blend in. Black slaves had nowhere to go in the sense that, if they made it
to the North, they were easily recognizable as either freed or escaped slaves.
There was no free black society where they could blend in.
Southern politicians began to understand that if they did not establish
certain Southern states’ rights, the North, with its larger population would
simply vote slavery out of existence. In 1833, South Carolina tried to
declare a recently passed federal tariff null and void in the state. John C.
Calhoun, the powerful senator from South Carolina was the architect of
this defiance. In an eerie anticipation of future events, President Andrew
Jackson sent warships into Charleston harbor and troops to the state border.
A compromise was reached and bloodshed was avoided.
In 1846 the United States responded to a border dispute between
Mexico and the territory of Texas, resulting in the Mexican War. In what
many considered a land grab for new slave states, General Winfield Scott
led an army south and captured Mexico City. Almost every significant
general who fought in the Civil War on both sides gained valuable combat
experience fighting in Mexico. The Mexican War increased the size of the
United States by 25%, bringing in the land that would become California,
New Mexico, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, Colorado, and Wyoming. This west-
ward expansion and the possibility of new states would force the North and
South to deal with their differences on the issue of slavery. Bitter arguments
over slavery in the new territory produced the Compromise of 1850. This


piece of federal legislation brought California in as a free state and, to ap-
pease the South, significantly strengthened the fugitive slave laws. Em-
boldened by these new laws, slave catchers staged audacious raids into the
North. Daring slave escapes and captures became big news. In 1851 Har-
riet Beecher Stowe published her novel, Uncle Tom’s Cabin. The book
dramatized slaveholders’ disregard for the sanctity of family life. In the
novel, slave children are separated from parents and slave masters lust
after young female slaves. It is difficult to
overestimate the effect Uncle Tom’s Cabin
had on the country. The Abolitionists seized
it, preaching its themes relentlessly. When
Lincoln was later introduced to Mrs. Stowe
he commented “so you are the little woman
that wrote the book that started this great
war.” The Compromise of 1850 also intro-
duced the idea of popular sovereignty.
Popular sovereignty was an attempt to trans-
From Uncle Tom’s Cabin fer the responsibility for slavery from the
federal government to the people in the territories. Territorial residents
would decide whether or not they wanted slavery. Popular sovereignty
turned out to be an underhanded way of reversing the Compromise of 1820.
Under this long standing compromise,
no slavery was allowed north of 36’
30.” (Missouri’s southern border).
Now, settlers north of this line (as
later in Kansas) could vote in slavery.
This would have dire consequences.
By the 1850’s the North had
a large population and legislative
majority, even in the Senate, but the
Southern minority was constantly manipulating and intimidating the North.
Out of this political frustration in the North was born the Republican Party.
Republicans believed that all people, including slaves, should have that
chance to finish life ahead of where they started. Republicans pointed to
one of their own, Abraham Lincoln, as the perfect example of a person who
had risen from lowly beginnings to a position of power. Although many
Republicans were abolitionists, Lincoln was not. He thought slavery was
wrong, but protected by the Constitution. Lincoln believed that if slav-
ery was contained in the South and not allowed to spread west, it would
slowly die away. This became a popular position among Northerners in
the 1850’s. An act of Congress in 1854 opened up the territory of Kansas


to popular sovereignty. This meant that the people in Kansas could decide
for themselves if they wanted to be a free or a slave state. Because of the
slavery issue, the normal rough and tumble politics on the frontier got out
of hand. As pro and anti slave forces poured into the state a mini civil
war erupted. Over 200 people were killed and “Bloody Kansas” became
a common headline in eastern newspapers. Eventually Kansas came into
the Union as a free state, but the violence had begun.
After blood was shed in Kansas the pace of North-South confronta-
tions began to increase. In 1856 Preston Brooks from South Carolina at-
tacked and almost killed Charles Sum-
ner from Massachusetts on the floor of
the Senate. In 1857, in the Dred Scott
case, the Supreme Court ruled that
black slaves were property and could
never be citizens of the United States.
Disappointed abolitionists realized that
the problem of slavery was not going
to be resolved in the courts. In 1858
Abraham Lincoln ran against Stephen
Douglas for a senate seat from Illinois.
The country was captivated by a series
of seven well-publicized debates be-
tween the two candidates. In a com-
pletely candid and truly remarkable
Lincoln / Douglas Debate
discussion of race relations, the candi-
dates outlined their positions. Douglas would typically claim that more
rights for black slaves would eventually lead to the mixing of the races. In
a typical response, Lincoln said “I do not understand that because I do not
want a Negro woman for a slave I must necessarily want her for a wife.”
Lincoln lost the election, but he had deeply moved the country. He would
be heard from again.
In 1859 a small group of men attacked a
federal gun factory at Harper’s Ferry, Virginia
in an attempt to steal guns to start a slave rebel-
lion. The attack was led by a radical abolition-
ist named John Brown. Brown had killed five
pro-slavery men in Kansas in 1855 but never
stood trial. After Kansas he had hatched a plan
to start a slave rebellion. Bank rolled by wealthy
Boston abolitionists, Brown gathered together a
small band of radicals. Their attack on Harper’s John Brown


Ferry was ill conceived and doomed to failure. The fighting lasted only
three minutes and Brown was wounded and taken prisoner. Ten days later,
Brown and his men were tried and sentenced to death. On his way to the
gallows John Brown was reported to have said “I, John Brown, am now
quite certain that the crimes of this guilty country will never be purged
away but with blood.” His words acted like a lightning rod. Northern
abolitionists saw Brown as a martyr and a saint and took up his cause as
sacred. Southerners thought Brown’s attack represented the beginning of a
Northern plot to end slavery by force. They blamed the Black Republicans
and began to join militias.
The presidential election of 1860 was the most important election in
American history. The Democratic Party split over the issue of slavery and
nominated two different candidates. This gave the Republicans a golden
opportunity. When the leading candidates deadlocked at the Republican
convention, Abraham Lincoln was elected as a compromise candidate.
Lincoln ran on a platform of no slavery in the territories. This was simply
unacceptable to the South and many Southern leaders called for Southern
states to leave the Union if Lincoln was elected. Northerners had heard
this talk before and many thought the South was bluffing. In November
of 1860, Abraham Lincoln was elected President of the United States. He
received virtually no votes in the South. He was not even on the ballot in
most of the slave states. Fifty years of negotiation and compromise had
come to an end.
While some Southern states were dead set on leaving the Union after
Lincoln was elected President, it was very unclear what the rest of the South
would do. The South was split into three basic regions. The Lower South
(South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and
Texas) had the largest population of slaves and was the most committed to
slavery. The Middle South (Vir-
ginia, North Carolina, Tennessee,
and Arkansas) was leaning toward
secession, but taking a “wait and
see” approach. Slavery was legal
in the Border South (Maryland,
Delaware, Kentucky, and western
Virginia) but less common. The
Border South had stronger ties to
the North than did the rest of the South.
Abraham Lincoln was elected President in November of 1860, but he
would not take office until March of 1861. A firestorm of political activity
would take place in those five months. One of the first questions to come


up after the elections was “what would happen to United States military
bases in a state were that state to secede?” There were many such bases
in the South and no one knew what would happen to them. When South
Carolina actually seceded on December 20, 1860 a small garrison of United
States troops moved from a weak fort in the Charleston harbor to the stron-
ger Fort Sumter. This modest event became a news item and newspapers
throughout the North and South wrote about it. People in the North cheered
the patriotism of the soldiers while people in the South began talking about
taking the fort by force. In January of 1861, President Buchanan sent a ship
carrying relief supplies to Fort Sumter. It never reached the fort because it
was fired on by South Carolina militia guarding the Charleston harbor. This
event was also reported in the newspapers. Fort Sumter was becoming the
center of the attention. In February, the rest of the Lower South seceded,
declaring themselves an independent nation.
Some of the United States military bases in these states were surren-
dered voluntarily, some were forced to surrender and others were left alone
for the time being. However, most Americans, North and South, continued
to concentrate on the fate of Fort Sumter. Lincoln took office in March of
1861 and was told that Fort Sumter had about six weeks of supplies left. He
had to make a decision. He could surrender the fort, reinforce the fort with
additional troops, or simply resupply the fort with more food. In a clever
political move, Lincoln decided to send non-military supplies to the fort.
If the South Carolinians fired on ships carrying food they would clearly
look like the aggressors. When the South Carolina authorities heard that
supply ships were on the way, they decided to attack the fort directly. On
April 12, 1861 rebel batteries opened fire on Fort Sumter. The outcome was
never in doubt. The garrison in the fort was outnumbered and out-gunned.
After a 36-hour artillery bombardment, Fort Sumter surrendered to the
South Carolina forces. The war had begun. The day after the surrender of
Fort Sumter, Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers to put down the rebel-
lion. In reaction to Lincoln’s call for troops, the Middle South joined the
Lower South in secession. This brought the number of Confederate states
to eleven. Practically no one at the time could imagine the devastating
destruction and loss of life that these events would set off.

How They Fought

When the Civil War began, each side had certain advantages that
increased their chances for victory. The Union had a larger population, a
stronger economy, and a professional military. The North had a population
of 22 million giving it a five to two edge over the South in manpower. 80%
of the countries bank deposits were in the North. Even though the United

10
States Army had only 16,000 men at the beginning of the war, it gave the
North an organizational core from which to build a large army. The Con-
federate advantages were initiative, “home court” advantage and geography.
If neither side did anything, the South would win its independence. To win,
the North had to attack the South. The
North would also have to venture onto
Southern soil, and people fight harder
protecting their homes. Finally, geog-
raphy favored the South. The Appala-
chian Mountains divided the potential
battle ground into an eastern theater
and a western theater. In the East the
rivers ran west to east, creating natural
barriers for the invading Northern
Fredericksburg Battlefield armies. In the West, the vastness of the
territory created a manpower problem for the North. The Civil War was
the first conflict to use railroads to move armies and supplies. The extensive
and well maintained Northern railroad system was a huge advantage for
the Union. While the North may have had the greater advantages, most
historians agree that the South had a better chance to win than their fore-
fathers did in the American Revolution.
Casualty rates in the Civil War were shockingly high. In the famous
bloodbath known as the Charge of the Light Brigade in the Crimean War,
the British suffered 37% casualties. In the Civil War 62 Union and 53 Con-
federate units recorded casualties of 50% or more in a single engagement.
Civil War battle tactics were way behind the times. Armies fought like they
did 60 years before in the Napoleonic Wars, where men marched in tight
lines and fired in unison. Attacking in small groups firing individually,
and using available cover to reload, would have been more effective. The
reason they did not do this is because battlefield communication was primi-
tive and officers could not control small group attacks. The real problem
came with the changing technology. At the beginning of the war, the range
of a musket was about 100 yards. Early in the war, rifled muskets that had
an effective range of 300 yards were introduced. Similar improvements
increased the range and accuracy of artillery. This changed everything.
Cavalry became obsolete as an attacking force. Swords became useless
relics. By the end of the war, the firepower of a Civil War army was five
times that of a Napoleonic army. To get close to an enemy, an army had
to subject itself to a murderous barrage of musket and cannon fire. This
gave a tremendous advantage to the defender. Many Civil War generals
were slow to understand the technological changes and continued to order

11
frontal attacks on fortified positions.
As technology revolutionized shipbuilding during the war, iron re-
placed wood and steam replaced sail. The Northern navy grew from 42
ships in 1861 to 641 in 1865. The Union used this advantage in Naval
power to blockade Southern ports and attack on western rivers. The block-
ade started out ineffective but, as the war progressed, its increased effi-
ciency had a significant effect on
the Southern war effort. Union
ironclads on the Mississippi, Ten-
nessee and Cumberland rivers
played a big role in Union suc-
cesses in the West. While the
South could not build ships at the
rate that the North could, they did
much with little. A small group of
ironclads and commerce raiders
Battle on the Mississippi River did a surprising job of offsetting
some of the Northern naval advantage.
Technological changes in medicine came too late for the Civil War
soldier. Doctors did not yet understand that infection could be prevented
by cleaning wounds and applying sterile dressings. As a result, Civil War
soldiers were eight times as likely to die of their wounds as their World
War I counterparts. More then twice as many men died of disease than of
battle wounds. Little was known of the causes of dysentery, typhoid and
malaria. These diseases and others took a terrible toll. In previous wars,
women who cared for men in military camps were seen as prostitutes. This
began to change during the Civil War, and nursing became one of the first
honorable professions for working women.
Early in the war, captured soldiers were treated well. An effective
prisoner exchange system meant that few soldiers spent much time in pris-
ons. However, in 1863 the exchange system broke down. Prisons on both
sides began to fill up and conditions deteriorated. The Confederate prison
camp at Andersonville, Georgia was the worst, but there were appalling
conditions in Northern prison camps as well.
Understanding what happened in the Civil War is a daunting task.
This task is made more difficult by the huge numbers of soldiers that par-
ticipated. There were more than 1,000 generals that fought in the Civil War.
Separating the events of the war from the people that made it happen makes
the subject much easier to understand. The War in the East and the War in
the West sections discuss the events of the war. The main characters of the
war are found in The Generals section.

12
The War in the East
Overview - 1861: The first engagement in the East took place just
south of Washington at Manassas Junction, Virginia. The Confederates
scored a decisive victory. 1862: After a long delay to grow and train their
army, the Federals came down the coast in boats and slowly moved up the
peninsula to within six miles of Richmond. They were stopped at the Battle
of Fair Oaks. The Rebels created a diversionary attack in the Shenandoah
Valley and defeated a larger Union force. They then pushed the Federals
away from Richmond and off the peninsula in a series of battles known
as the Seven Days Battles. The Rebels then came north and defeated a
reorganized Union army at 2nd Manassas. Continuing north, they crossed
the Potomac River and invaded Maryland, but were stopped at Antietam.
The Rebels then retreated to defensive positions in Virginia. After some
delay, the Federals followed the Rebels south. 1863: The Union suffered
two humiliating defeats, one at Fredericksburg, and one at Chancellorsville.
Seizing the opportunity created by these two decisive victories, the Con-
federates again invaded the North. They were dealt a crushing defeat at
Gettysburg. Gettysburg was followed by a nine month lull in the fighting
in the East. 1864: In the spring, the reorganized and reinforced Federals
launched the Overland Campaign against the Rebels. Continuous fighting
for 45 days drove the Rebels from the Rappahannock River to the Richmond
defenses. For the next nine months the Rebels struggled desperately to keep
from being surrounded. 1865: In April, the Confederate Army collapsed
and surrendered.
For three months after Fort Sumter, there was very little fighting. The
North began to surround the South with its naval power. The United States
and the newly formed Confederate States both worked at a fever pitch to
train the many volunteers that flowed into the military camps. Political
pressure began to grow in the North for the army to do something about
the Rebels to the south. On June 29, 1861 orders came down from Wash-
ington for the Union Army to capture Richmond before the Confederate
Congress could convene there. The Federals had two armies in the North-
ern Virginia theater. 35,000 troops were coming south from Washington
and another 18,000 were fifty miles up the Potomac River at Harper’s
Ferry. In a similar manner, the Confederates had 20,000 troops southwest
of Washington at an important railroad junction called Manassas and an
additional 12,000 at Winchester, near Harper’s Ferry. The main Union force
moved south out of Washington in an attempt to surprise the Rebels at
Manassas Junction, but the green troops were so slow that surprise was
impossible. The Union battle plan was to fake a frontal attack, then swing
west to attack the Rebels left flank. The attack began early on the morning

13
of July 21 and civilians came out from Washington to watch the battle. The
flanking movement was successful and the Federals pitched into the rebel
left flank. There was great confusion
with similar uniforms and flags making
it sometimes difficult for both sides to
tell friend from foe. While the battle
took the appearance of two armed mobs
lurching at each other, the Federals
began to push the Rebels back. Just as
the Federals were beginning to make
serious progress, Confederate rein-
forcements began arriving from Win-
chester. The rebel forces there had given the Federals the slip, marched
down to the railroad and boarded east bound trains for the Manassas battle-
field. The Federals had made a major error by not pinning the Confederates
down at Winchester.
By 4:00 in the afternoon, the Union Army had pushed the Rebels all
the way back to Henry House Hill. There the Confederates made a de-
termined stand. It was at this time that the full impact of the Confederate
reinforcements were felt. When the Rebels launched a massive counterat-
tack, the Federal Army dissolved. As the Union soldiers fled back towards
Washington they encountered frightened civilians clogging the roads. Panic
was epidemic. The demoralized Union Army was a tempting target, but
the Rebels were as disorganized in victory as the Federals were in defeat.
Had the Confederates maintained better order in the ranks, they might have
taken Washington.
The Rebels lost 2,000 while the Federals lost 2,700, making 1st Manas-
sas the largest battle to that date in United States history. Furthermore,
important lessons had been learned on both sides. While the Confederate
military leadership realized that its soldiers must be better trained to march
and fight more effectively, they were convinced that Southerners could out
fight Northerners. This sense of confidence would continue for the next
two years. The devastating loss at 1st Manassas shocked the North into the
realization that the rebellion would not be easily put down. Lincoln called
for 500,000 more volunteers. Both sides began to understand the potential
size of this escalating conflict. No general on either side had commanded
more than 1,000 troops in battle. Armies would grow to 100 times that
size. Many generals would fail because they had too little experience, the
armies were too large, and the tactics too outdated.
After the calamity of 1st Manassas, The United States settled into the
serious business of building a large and effective army. Patriotism ran high

14
and soon the army swelled to 100,000. As summer turned to autumn, con-
cern began to grow as to when this huge army would march south against
the Rebels. Winter came and still nothing
happened. By the end of winter Abraham
Lincoln had had enough. He ordered the
Union Army to move against the Confed-
erates. The Union generals were reluctant
to repeat the mistake of last summer by
moving directly south towards the rebel
army camped at Manassas. They finally
devised a plan to take the army by boat
down the Potomac River to the mouth of
the Rappahannock River. They would try
to flank the Rebels by sea. Lincoln did
not like the idea because it appeared to
leave Washington vulnerable to attack. It was decided that 35,000 troops
would be left to protect the capital and the Peninsula Campaign (as it became
known) began.
Moving the Union Army by sea was an enormous undertaking. 400
boats were contracted to transport men, horses, and vast amounts of equip-
ment and supplies down the Potomac. It was a clear demonstration of the
economic strength of the Northern states. The Confederates soon learned
what the Federals were up to and they responded by moving their army from
Manassas south to the Fredericksburg area. This move effectively denied
the Rappahannock as a beach head for the Federal invasion. At the same
time a Confederate ironclad gunboat named the Virginia was terrorizing the
sea lanes that the invasion was supposed to use. The development of the
Union ironclad, the Monitor, removed the threat from the Virginia and the
Union could now make better use of the waterways. Instead of landing at
the mouth of the Rappahannock they would go further down the Virginia
coast to Fort Monroe. Fort Monroe was on the peninsula between the York
and the James Rivers. The operation went smoothly and 100,000 Union
troops landed on the peninsula. The Peninsula Campaign had begun.
The object of the campaign was to capture Richmond, the Confeder-
ate capital. By early March, the Union Army was a mere 60 miles away,
advancing slowly up the peninsula. The first obstacle they encountered was
a small force of Rebels near the old Revolutionary battlefield of Yorktown.
17,000 Confederates held up 100,000 Federals for a month. When the Rebels
finally did retreat, they fought rear guard actions which further slowed the
Union advance. This gave the main Confederate Army at Fredericksburg
time to move south to the Richmond defenses. In the slow movement

15
towards Richmond, both armies showed a reluctance to fight. The Union
came to within six miles of Richmond. Things had been going badly for
the Confederacy in the West, and now a huge army was at the doorstep of
their capital. It was a dark time, indeed, for the South.
The rebel army had no where else to retreat to and the Confederate
president, Jefferson Davis, was angrily calling for action. The Southern
generals noticed that the Union Army was divided by the flooded Chicka-
hominy River. It would be difficult to reinforce from one side to another.
The Battle of Fair Oaks began on May 31, 1862 when the Rebels attacked
the part of the Union Army south of the river. The Confederates maneuvered
and fought ineffectively but still managed to push the Federals back. The
next day, Union reinforcements were able to cross the river and help regain
much of the ground the Federals had lost on the previous day. When the
battle ended the two armies were pretty much right where they started. Fair
Oaks was a disjointed and bloody affair costing both sides 5,000 casualties
and deciding nothing.
As this drama was playing out in front of Richmond, military opera-
tions were under way in the Shenandoah Valley 100 miles to the northeast.
The Confederates knew that the Federals wanted to send the army guarding
Washington south to help in the Peninsula Campaign. To prevent this, the
Rebels created a disturbance in the Shenandoah Valley. (This valley is a
narrow expanse of fertile land separated from tidewater Virginia by the
Blue Ridge Mountains.) While the rebel army sent to cause this disturbance
numbered only 17,000, it had a superior knowledge of the geography and
the loyalty of local scouts an spies. The Confederates were opposed by
62,000 Federal troops separated into three poorly coordinated armies. The
1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign began on March 22 and lasted 11
weeks. In that time this
small rebel band defeat-
ed all three of the larger
Union Armies. They
marched 630 miles, in-
flicted 7,000 casualties
(suffering only 3,100)
and captured huge
amounts of weapons and
supplies. The goal of
keeping Federal reinforcements from reaching the Peninsula Campaign was
accomplished in legendary fashion.
A change in command in the Confederate forces guarding Richmond
brought a new offensive strategy. Fortifications around the city were

16
strengthened so they could be held by fewer men. This would free up 60,000
Rebels for an attack on the 30,000 Federals north of the Chickahominy River.
The gamble was that the 75,000 Federals south of the river would not at-
tack and overwhelm the 27,000 Rebels guarding Richmond. The victorious
Confederate army in the Shenandoah Valley had been brought south on a
forced march to lead the attack. Confederate military leadership had better
information on enemy strength and position then did the Union. Also, at
this time in the war the rebel cavalry was better than Federal cavalry. This
fact was dramatically demonstrated when a detachment of Confederate
cavalry rode completely around the Union Army.
The Seven Days’ Battles began one month after the inconclusive
Battle of Fair Oaks. On June 26 the Rebels attacked the Union forces north
of the Chickahominy River at Mechanicsville. The attacks were unsuc-
cessful, but the Federals retreated. The next day a massive Confederate
assault broke the Union lines at Gains Mill.
Success came at a high price as the Rebels lost
9,000 men in six hours of fighting. The fa-
mous rebel army from the Shenandoah Valley
fought poorly, probably due to exhaustion. On
June 29 the Federals held off the Rebels at
Savage Station and, again retreated, this time
to Frayser’s Farm. Not only was the Union
Army retreating from battlefields where they
had done well, they were retreating south to-
wards the James River. Their supply line ran
north to the Pamunkey and York Rivers where large siege cannons waited
to be shipped down to the front for the anticipated siege of Richmond. By
retreating south to the James, the Federals were admitting defeat in the
middle of the battle.
On June 30, the Union Army held off the Confederates at Frayser’s
Farm, then retreated to a strong position at Malvern Hill. On July 1, the
Rebels launched a disjointed attack against Malvern Hill. Federal cannons
pulverized the attacking Confederates resulting in a solid Union Victory.
The Rebels had been hurt badly and there was some discussion about a
Union counterattack. However, once again the order was given to retreat,
this time to Harrison’s Landing.
The Union army had failed on the Peninsula and 100,000 federal
troops were bottled up at Harrison’s Landing southeast of Richmond. There
was, however, federal activity in northern Virginia. The three small Union
armies that had been defeated in the Shenandoah Valley Campaign were
reorganized into a unified command numbering 50,000 soldiers. This army

17
began a slow advance towards Richmond taking the same route that had
failed the summer before. It occurred to the Confederates that they needed
to deal with this army before it was reinforced with troops returning from
the Peninsula. The Rebels split their army in two. Half guarded Richmond
as the Federals left the Peninsula, and half marched north to deal with the
new threat. The Confederates encountered the federal advance guard at
Cedar Mountain on August 9 and an inconclusive battle was fought. By
this time, the Rebels at Richmond became convinced that the Federals were
leaving the Peninsula for good; and they hurried north. The two armies
began to concentrate on the same battlefield where they had fought the
summer before. The Rebels executed a flanking movement that managed
to get behind the Federals and they captured the Union supply depot at
Manassas Junction. Enraged, the Federals turned to attack the raiders. The
Battle of 2nd Manassas began on August 29 when the Union army launched
a disjointed attack against the northern part of the Confederate army. Union
communication and intelligence was poor and reinforcements from the
Peninsula were slow to arrive. When the Rebels fell back slightly in an
orderly retreat, the Federals saw it as a rout.
Meanwhile, the rest of the Confederate army
arrived on the battlefield. When the battle was
renewed the next day the Confederates coun-
terattacked and crushed the Union left flank.
In a repeat performance from the year before,
the Federals beat a hasty retreat back into the
defenses of Washington. Casualties at 2nd
Manassas were 5 times that of 1st Manassas.
In less than a month, the Confederates had
pushed the Federals from the defenses of Rich-
mond to the defenses of Washington. For the first time in the war there
were no Union forces in the state of Virginia. The Confederates were,
however, not done with their counter-offensive.
Immediately after the Battle of 2nd Manassas, the Confederates began
to plan an invasion of Maryland. This plan was arrived at by a process of
elimination. The Rebels could not advance towards Washington because
the city defenses were too strong, and they did not want to retreat after a
victory. They could not stay where they were because the land of northern
Virginia was so picked over that there was a serious shortage of food for
men and animals. Furthermore, the Confederates believed that a victory
on Northern soil might encourage Britain or France to recognize their new
country or even intervene on their side. In September of 1862, 60,000
Confederates crossed the Potomac River into Maryland.

18
 Although the morale of the Union Army was low, there were still
110,000 Federal troops to protect Washington. Unfortunately, 12,000 of
these troops had been carelessly positioned up river at Harper’s Ferry. Once
the Confederates were across the river, they split their army in two. Part
of the army was sent up river to bag the Federals at Harper’s Ferry. This
strategy would not only match superior numbers against a weaker foe, it
would open up a possible avenue of retreat through Harper’s Ferry and down
into the Shenandoah Valley. The northern part of the Confederate Army
had little trouble capturing the 12,000 Federals at Harper’s Ferry. They
would have had little trouble uniting with the southern half of the army in
a timely manner were it not for a most unusual and unfortunate event for
the Rebels. While advancing through a recently abandoned rebel campsite,
Union soldiers found the Confederate battle plans wrapped around several
cigars. When the documents made their way up to senior command, they
had a huge impact on the upcoming battle, and perhaps the entire war.
The Federals had discovered that the Rebels were dangerously spread out
and very vulnerable to attack. They had a golden opportunity to crush the
Rebels if they moved fast. Even then, it took the Union Army 18 crucial
hours to get in motion.
When the Confederates realized what was happening they sent word
to the forces at Harper’s Ferry to return immediately. They also sent a
detachment east to a gap in South Mountain to slow the Union advance.
The initial Federal delay and brave fighting by outnumbered Rebels in the
mountain pass gave the Confederate Army some time to gather together
and, perhaps, save themselves. On September 16, the Federal Army broke
through South Mountain and advanced toward a Confederate Army hastily
arranged behind Antietam Creek.
The Battle of Antietam began early in the morning of September 17
and would be the bloodiest day in American history. The Federal plan was
to attack across the entire rebel line, but poor coordination created three
separate battles. A massive federal attack on the Confederate left flank was
held off by the slimmest of margins. There was a cornfield in the middle
of the fighting that was literally carpeted with bodies. A Union attack on
the center pushed the Rebels back to a sunken road. A determined stand by
the Rebels on the road created what became known as “Bloody Lane.” At
a terrible cost, the Federals did finally take “Bloody Lane,” but they could
advance no further. On the rebel right, the Federals managed to capture a
key bridge across Antietam Creek after three costly attempts.
Throughout the day, rebel reinforcements from Harper’s Ferry kept
arriving at critical moments. On the Union side, commanders cautiously
held back reserves, failing to capitalize on Federal breakthroughs. The

19
Federals came very close to scoring a significant victory at Antietam, but
the important fact was, they did not lose. At the end of the day, 23,000
Americans lay dead or wounded on the battlefield. This casualty rate was
four times that of D-Day in World War II.
While Antietam was considered half a Union
victory, the Confederate Army was not driven
from the field. The Rebels waited a day, and
when the Federals did not renew the attack,
they began an orderly retreat across the Po-
tomac River. By not pursuing the Rebels, the
Union Army lost a chance to destroy the Con-
federate Army.
Before the Battle of Antietam, a negoti-
ated settlement of the war was a real possi-
bility. Such a settlement would probably have phased out slavery over a
period of time with compensation paid to slave holders. After Antietam,
Abraham Lincoln released a statement that the war was now about freeing
the slaves. This statement, known as the Emancipation Proclamation, was
a fascinating document for what it said and did not say. It freed the slaves
in the territory held by the Confederated States of America. It did not free
the slaves in the Border States or the parts of the CSA captured by Union
Armies. Lincoln, through the Emancipation Proclamation, was saying that
the North can not defeat the South until the slaves, which are helping the
CSA wage the war, are freed. Ideas about restoring the old Union were
gone, and the North would now attempt to destroy the South and build a
new country on the ashes.
After the Battle of Antietam, the Confederate Army retreated back into
Virginia. It began to establish a long line of winter camps all across the
northern part of the state. Lincoln urged his generals to march south and
engage the enemy, capitalizing on the Union success at Antietam. It was
decided that another campaign against Richmond would be launched, this
time going through Fredericksburg where the army could be supplied from
the Potomac River. In mid-November 30,000 Federal troops set out for
Fredericksburg. The plan was to capture the town before the Rebels could
respond. The Union Army won the race to Fredericksburg but could not
get across the river. Because of a mix up in orders, the pontoon bridges had
not arrived. By the time the bridges were delivered to the front, there were
75,000 Rebels dug in on the high ground south of town. Instead of adjusting
their plans, the Federals plowed ahead. As the Union engineers began to lay
the bridges in place, they were fired on from the town by rebel sharpshooters.
When the frustrated Union Army finally got across the river, they vented

20
their anger by looting and destroying much of Fredericksburg.
The Battle of Fredericksburg began on December 13 when the
Federals attacked along a five mile front. The Federals found a seam at
Prospect Hill and momentarily broke through the Confederate line. Rein-
forcements never arrived, and the Rebels effectively sealed the break. The
lead Federal unit in the attack suffered 40% casualties. Had the Union
break been supported properly it might have carried the day; and the calam-
ity to the North might never have happened.
When the Union attack in the south faltered,
the action shifted to the north end of the battle-
field. Here, there was 600 yards of clear and
open ground from the south edge of the town
to a stone fence. Behind the fence was a
sunken road where the rebel infantry stood
four deep. Behind the road the ground rose to
form a plateau named Marye’s Heights. Con-
federate artillery had been concentrated on this
high ground completing the near perfect de-
fensive position. While examining this terrain before the battle, one rebel
gunner said “A chicken could not live on that field when we open on it.”
The Federals launched 14 hopeless attacks against the powerful
Confederate position at Marye’s Heights. These attacks on the stone wall
at Fredericksburg were some of the bravest and most tragic in the history
of warfare. Not one Federal soldier got close to the wall, and the bodies
of the dead and wounded were stacked up like cord wood all across the
battlefield. By the end of the day the Union had lost 12,700 men while the
Rebels had lost only 5,300.
The Federals were badly beaten at Fredericksburg, but many Union
soldiers had not gotten in the fight. As the Union Army retreated and
reorganized, pressure mounted from Washington to renew the offensive.
Encouraged by the unusually dry weather in January, the Federals started
to move again. Just as the army got into motion heavy rains came, turning
the roads into rivers of mud. Many Federal units not only couldn’t move
ahead, they couldn’t get back to where they started. Lincoln was so dis-
gusted by the spectacle that he, once again, replaced senior command. In
the next three months the new Union commanders repaired army morale.
Rations, pay, and leave were improved, which lowered desertions. The
winter of ‘63 was hard on Confederate forces in Virginia. Supplies were
so low that two rebel divisions were sent to North Carolina where food
and fodder were more plentiful. In April the roads began to dry, signaling
the beginning of the campaigning season. The Federals outnumbered the

21
Confederates 130,000 to 60,000.
The Federals were intent on not making the same mistake they had
last December. There would be no frontal attacks. The Confederate Army
occupied 25 miles of carefully prepared defenses around Fredericksburg.
The Union plan was to fake an attack on Fredericksburg and then swing
around the Confederate left to attack their western flank. 40,000 Federals
menaced Fredericksburg while 70,000 went west to cross the Rappahannock
near the rebel left. Rebel commanders quickly determined that the Freder-
icksburg attack was a ploy. They seemed to understand the Federal plans
better than the Federals themselves. The Confederates split their smaller
army, leaving only 10,000 to face the 40,000 Federals at Fredericksburg.
The rest hurried west to meet the main Union offensive.
When the Union Army crossed the river, they entered into an area
known as the Wilderness. The Wilderness was a dense forest with tangled
underbrush which was not a good place for a large army to fight a smaller
army. As the Federals marched out of the Wilderness near Chancellorsville,
they began to meet rebel resistance. Instead of pushing the entire army out
into the open, the Union generals ordered a retreat back into the woods to
set up defenses. This was a mistake. By this time in the war, the Union
cavalry had improved greatly. However, most of the cavalry had been sent
on an ineffectual raid towards Richmond. Again, the Union Army was
without vital information about their enemy that their cavalry should have
been providing. The Federals retreated back into the Wilderness because
they did not know where the Rebels were and what they were up to. When
the Federals paused in their defenses, it gave the Rebels time to devise a
daring plan. Because of good cavalry work, the Confederates knew that
the Union center was strong and that the Union left was anchored to the
river. However, the Union right was not well guarded. A successful attack
could be launched from the West if the Rebels could just get there. Local
scouts convinced Confederate commanders that they could lead a strike
force down little known roads through the Wilderness. Early in the morn-
ing of May 2, the Rebels split their army for a second time sending 30,000
troops on a flanking movement to the West. This left the small force at
Fredericksburg, the small force left at Chancellorsville, and the flanking
force all very vulnerable to attack. The Federal commanders let this golden
opportunity go by as if they were paralyzed.
The Union forces on the right flank knew there was rebel activity in
their area. They should have guessed that a Confederate attack was coming
from the West, especially when rabbits and squirrels broke out of the dense
woods. The Battle of Chancellorsville began on May 2 at 5:00 PM when
the gray coats emerged from the tangled undergrowth. They crushed the

22
Federals, almost splitting the Union army in two. Only the coming of dark-
ness saved the Union right from complete annihilation. That night, the
Federals had a chance to reorganize and
counterattack the next morning, but they
were stunned. The next day the Federals
attacked back at Fredericksburg. Union
forces stormed Marye’s Heights where
so many Federals had fallen four months
before. On the third attack Marye’s
Heights fell and the defending Rebels
retreated west towards Chancellorsville.
The Federals fought so ineffectually at
Chancellorsville that the Confederates
withdrew 21,000 from that front to meet
the coming Union advance from the East.
At Salem Church, the Rebels stopped the
Union advance and the Battle of Chan-
cellorsville came to an end. The Feder-
als had been poorly led again. Large
parts of the Union Army that retreated
across the Rappahannock had never got-
ten into the battle. The Union suffered
17,000 casualties to the rebel 13,000. When Lincoln received the news of
the defeat he said “My God, My God, What will the country say? ”
After the humiliating defeats at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville
Federal morale was low, but the will to fight had not been broken. Many
people began to wonder which would give out first, Union morale or Con-
federate resources. The Rebels had been doing well in the East but poorly
in the West. Senior command considered sending forces west to help in
the defense of Vicksburg. Instead, the decision was made to invade the
North for a second time. One of the important considerations in this deci-
sion was the fact that the Maryland and Pennsylvania countryside would
provide badly needed food for the hungry Confederate Army. In addition,
the Rebels decided that the war could not be won by defensive action alone.
They came to believe that only offensive action into the North itself would
break the Union’s will to fight.
On June 9, the Union cavalry slipped across the Rappahannock on
a reconnaissance mission. They ran directly into the main body of the
Confederate cavalry setting off the Battle of Brandy Station. Civil War
cavalry was used to gather information on the enemy while keeping the
enemy from doing the same. Brandy Station was an old fashioned fight

23
on horseback on a grand scale. The Union cavalry fought well proving
that the Confederate cavalry was no longer the dominant force it had once
been. After the battle, perhaps to redeem itself, the rebel cavalry took off on
another long ride around the Union Army. The timing was bad because at
just that time, 76,000 Confederate troops pulled out of their Fredericksburg
defenses heading north. The rebel invasion would be conducted without its
cavalry screen. Confusion also reigned on the Federal side. On June 28,
Lincoln fired his army commanders. This was the fourth change in seven
months for the Union Army.
The Confederate Army marched up the Shenandoah Valley and
crossed the Potomac River into Maryland. They thought they had given
the Federal Army the slip, but without cavalry they could not be sure. By
July 1, the rebel army was spread out some fifty miles from the Potomac
River into Pennsylvania on its way to Harrisburg. Eventually, the Rebels
learned through spies that the Federals were much closer than they thought.
The order was given to draw the Confederate Army together into battle
formation. Because there was no cavalry, a rebel infantry division was
sent on a reconnaissance mission toward the town of Gettysburg. There
they discovered a Union cavalry force occupying the town. Both armies
rushed their soldiers forward, setting the stage for the greatest battle ever
fought in the western Hemisphere.
The Battle of Gettysburg began when Union cavalry occupied the
high ground northwest of the town. Armed with new rapid firing rifles they
dismounted and fought effectively. When the order was given for the Con-
federate Army to concentrate, a large body of
Rebels were just north of Gettysburg. As they
marched south, they drove the Federals off
the high ground and back into the town.
Eventually, there were 24,000 Rebels pushing
19,000 Federals slowly south. While this was
going on, Union forces were arriving and oc-
cupying the high ground south of Gettysburg.
Had the Rebels pushed the attack more vigor-
ously, they might have gotten to that high
ground before the Federals dug in. By the end
of the First Day the Rebels had won a deci-
sive victory, but the Union Army held a strong position south of town.
As the Second Day began, the Federal line was in the shape of a fish
hook. It started at Culp’s Hill curved around through Cemetery Hill,
straightened down through Cemetery Ridge and ended at the two round
topped hills in the south. This position made it easy for the Federals to

24
move reinforcements from one flank to the other. The Confederates de-
cided to attack the Union left flank first. Success here would be followed
by an attack on the right at Culp’s Hill. The
problem was that the rebel position was so
extended that the left did not know what was
happening on the right. The Union corps de-
fending the left flank had advanced into the
peach orchard near the Emmitsburg Road. Just
when the Union command realized that this
position was exposed, the Rebels attacked.
Bloody fighting in the wheat field produced six
attacks and counterattacks. As the Union corps
began to collapse, both sides noticed that Little
Round Top was not occupied. If the Rebels could capture that high ground,
they might be able to roll right up Cemetery Ridge and drive the Union
Army from the field. The race for Little Round Top was on, and the Feder-
als got there first. The 20th Maine regiment positioned themselves on the
hilltop and attempted to anchor the extreme left of the Union line. They
suffered 50% casualties in 40 minutes, but they held the hill. The Union
left was being pushed back through a rocky area known as Devil’s Den, but
Union reinforcements kept arriving at critical times. The attack on Culp’s
Hill in the north that was supposed to pin the Federals down was late in
coming and ineffective. The Rebels had come very close to crushing the
Union left on the second day, but their attacks had been disjointed. The
Federals effectively shuffled forces around all day to fill weak points. When
night came, the Union Army still occupied their strong defensive position
on the high ground. The Union commanders decided to remain where they
were to see if the Confederates would attack the next day. Two day casual-
ties totaled 35,000, the highest in the war, and there was still one more
fateful day to go.
The Confederates had come very close to breaking the Union Army
on the second day. They reasoned that the Federals had weakened the
center to support the attacks on their flanks. The Rebels decided to hit the
middle of the Union line. The Federals were not expecting an attack on
their center, but they dug in all night just in case. Early in the morning of
the Third Day the Confederates launched another half-hearted attack on
the northern hills. When that attack failed, they turned their attention to
Cemetery Ridge. At 1:00 PM, 150 Confederate cannons began a two hour
barrage of the Union center that was the biggest cannonade of the war. It
had little effect on the well-protected Federals who hunkered down in their
trenches and waited for the coming attack. The Union artillery saved their

25
ammunition for the infantry charge. At 3:00 PM, 15,000 Confederates
marched in perfect formation across the three
quarters of a mile of open ground towards
the Union fortifications. The true role of
artillery in the Civil War was as infantry kill-
ers. “Pickett’s Charge,” as the attack became
known, proved this point. Grape and canis-
ter loads tore huge holes in the rebel lines
before the muskets opened up. It was an
unwise, even reckless, decision and the whole
bloody affair was over in 30 minutes. In that
short period of time the attacking rebel
forces took 50% casualties.
Historians debate why the Confederates fell into this frontal attack
trap that they were so good at setting. Many believe that they were simply
overconfident. In three years of fighting in the East, the South had never
lost a major battle. Only at Antietam had the Union fought them to a draw,
and the Federals had the Confederate battle plans. The Rebels were so
anxious to destroy the Union Army once and for all that they made a big
mistake. The next day (July 4) the Confederate Army began its long and
torturous march home. The recently appointed Union commanders were
so stunned by their sudden victory that they did not pursue. More than
50,000 men fell at Gettysburg. The Union had lost 23,000 (25%) while
the Confederacy lost 28,000 (33%). After the battle, the retreating Rebels
learned that Vicksburg had fallen. The dream of an outright Confederate
military victory was gone. Now, the South’s only hope was to wear down
the North in a defensive struggle. The war would last another two years.
After Gettysburg, very little happened in the East for the next nine
months. Both armies had been badly hurt at Gettysburg, and they began to
rebuild their forces. The Northern military machine was in high gear and
the army came back rapidly. Things were much different on the Confeder-
ate side. It is estimated that 75,000 soldiers deserted the rebel army after
Gettysburg and Vicksburg. The Southern economy was in shambles and
the Southern railroad system was almost totally unable to deliver supplies
to the army. Desertions due to hunger thinned the ranks, but the men that
stayed were hard core veterans. Signs were pointing towards a Union vic-
tory, but Northern war weariness was still a factor.
Lincoln did not push his generals for action in the East after Gettysburg
because he had very little trust in them. In contrast, Lincoln put great trust
in his brilliant generals in the West because they were accomplishing every
military goal set for them. Lincoln did not want an eastern calamity to

26
derail Union momentum in the West. The Union and Confederate armies
in the East took up positions on opposite sides of the Rappahannock-
Rapidan River line and occupied themselves with small cavalry clashes and
occasional infantry skirmishes. When cold weather arrived, the armies
went into winter camps. Spring brought a new focus to the Union war ef-
fort. New leadership was brought to the eastern army from the West and
plans were made for the upcoming campaign season. The 1864 Federal
battle plans were three fold. 1.) The main army would march straight south
towards Richmond. 2.) A smaller army would be sent up the James River
to threaten Richmond from the south. 3.) A third Federal army would be
sent into the Shenandoah Valley to deny supplies from that area to the
Confederates. All three operations began around
the first of May. The first part of the plan to fail
was the James River expedition. On May 5,
30,000 Federals landed south of Richmond and
began to very slowly move north towards the
city. A week later they were attacked by a
rebel force at Drewry’s Bluff. The Union Army
retreated and foolishly entrenched. The Con-
federates anxiously constructed matching de-
fenses, effectively sealing the Federals on the
Bermuda Hundred Peninsula. It was as if a
bottle had been firmly corked. The second part
of the plan to fail was the Shenandoah Valley
campaign. On May 15, 6,500 Union soldiers
were attacked and defeated by a smaller rebel
force at New Market. In the battle, a spirited
attack was made by young cadets from the Virginia Military Institute. These
two failures put added pressure on the main Union Army which was begin-
ning the bloody phase of the war known as the Overland Campaign.
The main bodies of the two armies had been facing each other across
the Rappahannock-Rapadan River line for nine months. Not only had the
Union Army been reinforced to a strength of 120,000, successful Generals
from the West had been brought in to take command. The Confederate
Army had gone through a rough winter and was down to 65,000. Supply
trains could not be counted on to reach the front, so the army was scattered
to better live off the land. The Overland Campaign began on May 4, 1864
when the Union Army crossed the Rapadan River looking for the Rebels.
This campaign would be considerably different than what had come before.
There would be three major battles in the next six weeks, the Wilderness,
Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor. In addition, there would be significant

27
fighting every day between the major battles. For 45 continuous days sol-
diers would be marching, digging, and fighting. Again, the Union Army
was trying to capture Richmond, but its primary goal was now to destroy
the Confederate Army. This was all out war.
The Federals came through the same wilderness area where the Battle
of Chancellorsville had been fought one year before. In this dense forest,
artillery did little good and cavalry was useless. The Confederates saw this
as an equalizing factor in ‘64, just as they had in ‘63. The Battle of the
Wilderness began on May 5 when the Rebels attacked the Federals in the
deep woods, just like Chancellorsville. The Confederates hit both Union
flanks effectively. The Federals were barely able to hold them off. On the
second day, the Union Army launched a counterattack that almost broke
the rebel line. Only the arrival of rebel reinforcements saved the day. Gun
flashes set off brush fires and at least 200 fallen men burned to death. Both
sides periodically stopped the fighting to retrieve their wounded, or the fire
would have claimed more lives. The Confederates might have gotten the
better of the fight at the Wilderness, but the Federals refused to see it as
a setback. Orders were given for a flanking move south to Spostylvania
Courthouse. Federal morale improved when the soldiers realized that,
instead of retreating, they were going forward. This Federal pattern of
fighting and flanking to the southeast would be repeated throughout the
Overland Campaign.
After the Wilderness, both armies moved rapidly south to Spostylva-
nia. Having slightly less ground to cover, the Confederates arrived first and
blocked the roads to Richmond. By this time in the war, shovels were almost
as important to soldiers as rifles. The Battle of Spotsylvania began on
May 10, when the Federals launched massive attacks on the rebel left and
center. The Federals found a weak spot in the Confederate defenses known
as the “mule shoe.” They punched a hole
in it and drove the Rebels back. The Con-
federates were in serious trouble and they
fought desperately to plug the hole. Their
counterattack created what became known
as the “bloody angle” at the “mule shoe.”
For the next 20 hours, the two armies fought
at close quarters, sometimes hand-to-hand,
in some of the bitterest fighting of the war.
The Rebels never recaptured the “mule
shoe,” but they held on long enough to
construct another defensive line south of the break. When the Union Army
realized that they were not going to carry the defenses at Spotsylvania, they

28
disengaged and started another flanking move. Spotsylvania, like the Wil-
derness, produced large casualties on both sides with no clear-cut winner.
While all of this was going on, the Confederate cavalry was harassing the
western flank of the Union Army. By May 10 the Federals had had enough
and sent 12,000 horsemen to deal with the rebel cavalry problem. The
Federals rolled over the once invincible Confederate cavalry at Yellow
Tavern, scoring an impressive victory. In the process, the Federals de-
stroyed 1.5 million Confederate rations and freed 400 Union prisoners.
There was fighting on the North Anna River followed by a Union flank-
ing movement. There was fighting at Totopotomy Creek followed by another
Union flanking movement. Although they were defending effectively, it was
clear that the Confederate Army had never been pushed to this degree. The
Federals kept looking for a road to Richmond that was not defended by the
Rebels. Finding one would force the Rebels to come out of their defenses
and fight the Federals in the open. The Confederates would fight, then fall
back a little ways and dig new trenches. As the two giant armies wrestled
their way southward, they entered the old Seven Days battlefield from the
1862 Peninsula Campaign. They concentrated for another major battle at a
place called Cold Harbor. The three day Battle of Cold Harbor began on
June 1 when the Union attacked. By the morning of June 3, the Federals
thought they had the Rebels whipped, and they launched a massive attack
across open ground. The Confederates delivered rapid musket and can-
non fire from entrenched positions. On this day, the results were horrific.
7,000 Union soldiers fell at Cold Harbor in 30 minutes, the fastest kill rate
of the war. It was the most costly maneuver ever made by a Union Army.
The tragedy at Cold Harbor caused the Federals to change strategy.
Directly attacking Richmond was costing too many lives, so they decided
to go for the railroads and cut the city off. In
one of the most impressive maneuvers of the
war, the Federal Army marched southeast,
crossed the James River, and doubled back
towards the railroad town of Petersburg. For
several days the Confederates were fooled.
When they finally realized what was happening
they rushed reinforcements south. The Union
Army beat the Rebels to Petersburg, but they
hesitated to attack the lightly held defenses of
the city. Past experience with frontal attacks
had made the Federals reluctant to attack even defenses held with skeleton
crews. In a week, the rebel defenses were strong and the opportunity to
capture Petersburg had passed. The Overland Campaign had come to an

29
end. The Federals had taken 50,000 casualties in six weeks compared to
only 32,000 for the Confederates. However, those numbers represent 46%
of the rebel army compared to 41% of the Union Army. The Federals had
neither captured Richmond nor destroyed the Confederate Army, but they
had hurt the Rebels badly and pinned them down in a deadly trap.
Beginning in June of ‘64 the Federals began a campaign to encircle
the Rebels and cut their supply lines. When Vicksburg had been completely
cut off from outside supplies, the city had held out for only six weeks. The
Confederates knew that to be surrounded was to lose, so they fought for
every inch. Old fortifications from the Peninsula Campaign were reoccupied
and improved. Elaborate systems of trenches and breastworks connected
the forts. The Federals continually attacked both ends of the rebel defenses,
extending the trench works 20, 30, then 40 miles. In July, the Federals cut
the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad. In August, they captured the Weldon
Railroad. This left Richmond with only one railroad link to the rest of
the south. This was the Southside Railroad that ran to Danville, and the
Confederates fought desperately to hold it. As the trench line got longer
and longer, the rebel forces got thinner and thinner. The Union Army grew
with reinforcements, while the Confederate Army shrank due to desertions.
This dangerous circle game lasted for nine months.
One of the strangest events of the war happened along the Petersburg
trench line in July of 1864. The Union Army was terribly frustrated. They
wanted to end the war, but they could not get to the Rebels because of the
fortified trenches. A group of Federal soldiers had been Pennsylvania coal
miners before the war. They were given permission to dig a 500 foot trench
to the rebel line. They then stacked 8,000 pounds of black powder into the
end of the shaft. Blacks had begun enlisting in the Union Army in large
numbers after Lincoln issued his Emancipation Proclamation. A black unit
had been specially trained to charge around the hole immediately following
the explosion. At the last minute untrained white troops were substituted for
the black troops. Union commanders had become concerned about political
fallout if the black troops suffered high casualty rates. When the powder
was set off, it ripped out 175 feet of rebel entrenchments hurling men and
debris hundreds of feet into the air. The Union attack that followed was
poorly coordinated and there was mass confusion. Many of the Federals
marched into the gigantic hole created by the explosion instead of around
it. The Rebels soon recovered from their initial shock and brought rifles
and cannon to the edge of the hole. The Union soldiers were shot like fish
in a barrel. What started out as a potentially decisive breakthrough ended
up as a humiliating Union failure. The Federals took 4,000 casualties.
The Union Army was trying to encircle Richmond and starve the Reb-

30
els out. The Confederates were receiving huge amounts of food and fodder
from the Shenandoah Valley. In June of ‘64, the Federals sent an army into
the valley to stop the supplies at the source. The army was ordered to “eat
up (the Shenandoah Valley) clear and clean so that crows flying over it...will
have to carry their own provisions.” The hungry Confederates could not
survive without this vital supply source, so they sent their own army into
the Valley to retain control there. The Rebels were so successful against
the Federals that their mission was enlarged. Now, in an effort to take the
pressure off Richmond, the rebel army in the valley went north to threaten
Washington. This Confederate Army of about 15,000 marched north to
the Potomac River, crossed over into Maryland, and was at the outskirts of
Washington on July 11th. Abraham Lincoln was actually shot at when he
went to inspect the city defenses. Embarrassed and enraged, the Federals
rushed troops back to Washington to defend the city. This rebel army was
not strong enough to take the city, but the fact that it threatened to do so
was a great morale booster for the South. With reinforcements pouring into
Washington the Confederates retreated. However, the Federals were not
going to let these Rebels off easily. A powerful force of 45,000 was sent to
hunt the Rebels down. On October 19, ‘64 the Federals soundly defeated
the Rebels at the Battle of Cedar Creek, giving the Union undisputed
control of the Shenandoah Valley. The Federals went on to destroy 2,000
grain filled barns, 70 grain mills and most of the railroads. Total war had
come to the Shenandoah Valley.
As cold weather came late in 1864, the Confederate situation was be-
coming desperate. Although they fought effectively to keep the circle from
closing around them, they suffered greatly from hunger and desertions. In
February alone, the Confederates lost 8% of their army to desertion. The
question became not so much would they collapse, but when. In contrast,
the Federals had spent the winter strengthening their army, and their numbers
had grown to 110,000. The end game came in early April when the Federals
moved south and west of Petersburg to threaten the remaining railroads sup-
plying the Confederates. It was now clear to the Rebels that they needed to
pull out of their defenses, evacuate Richmond and make a run for it. They
attempted to create a diversion for their retreat by attacking Fort Stedman
on the Union line. The attack bought the Rebels some time but it cost 5,000
casualties. Fort Stedman was the first day of a six day fighting retreat for
the Confederates. Jefferson Davis and his Cabinet boarded the last train to
Danville before the line was cut. With the way to Danville now blocked
the Confederate Army marched west towards Lynchburg. The Union Army
relentlessly pursued the Rebels, and the Union Cavalry swung around to
Appomattox Courthouse to cut off their retreat. Hungry, exhausted and

31
surrounded, the Confederate Army had no choice but to surrender. Ap-
proximately 18,000 rebel troops laid down their arms at Appomattox. The
war in the East and, indeed, the Civil War had come to an end.

The War in the West

Overview - 1862: In February the Federals came down the Tennes-
see and Cumberland Rivers and punched a gaping hole in the Confederate
line of defense. They captured Nashville and continued up the Tennessee
River. The Rebels fought back with a surprise attack at Shiloh, but the
Union recovered and fought them to a draw. The Federals then attacked
up and down the Mississippi River, capturing New Orleans and Memphis,
but failing to capture Vicksburg. Union forces were overextended in the
West and the Rebels took advantage. In October, they launched an inva-
sion of Kentucky, but were stopped at Perryville. Federal forces chased
the Rebels back into Tennessee and fought the inconclusive battle at Stones
River. They then turned their attention to Vicksburg. 1863: In perhaps the
most brilliant campaign of the war, the Federals captured Vicksburg and
cut Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas off from the rest of the Confederacy.
The Rebels fought back in eastern Tennessee, scoring a stunning victory
at Chickamauga. A resilient Union army recovered and, one month later,
crushed the Rebels at Chattanooga. 1864: In May, the Federals set off
towards Atlanta, capturing and burning it in September. What was left of
the rebel army marched north and was completely destroyed at Nashville
in December. The Union army marched from Atlanta to the sea, waging
total war. 1865: The Federals turned north and marched into the Carolinas.
They were in Goldsboro, NC when the war ended.
Fighting broke out in Missouri in 1861. In September of that year,
confederate forces came up the Mississippi River and captured Columbus,
Kentucky. The state of
Kentucky was trying to
remain neutral in the war.
This act of aggression on
the part of the South
forced Kentucky to join
the Union side. Federal
forces moved quickly
across the Ohio River
from Cairo, Illinois to
Paducah, Kentucky. The
Rebels faced the daunting task of defending a 500 mile line from Columbus
to the Cumberland Gap.

32
 The Rebels had 70,000 troops spread out along this line and were op-
posed by 100,000 Federals. The Union Army had the choice of attacking
down the Mississippi or going for Nashville. The Mississippi was protected
by strong forts at Columbus, New Madrid, and Island #10. Nashville
seemed to be the better target. The Confederates held a strong position at
Bowling Green, Kentucky, which protected Nashville from attack down
the railroad from the northeast. However, the western approach to the city,
from the Cumberland River, was lightly guarded. In addition, since both
the Cumberland River and the Tennessee River were so close together near
the Mississippi, an attack could be coordinated down both rivers at the same
time. The Federals had constructed seven, shallow water gunboats in St.
Louis that were perfect for fighting on the rivers. The Confederates had no
comparable navy, giving the Union a distinct advantage on the rivers. The
Federals began their campaign for control of the Cumberland and Tennes-
see Rivers by capturing Paducah, on the Mississippi near the mouths of the
rivers. This was the first major campaign of the Civil War.
The Confederates had constructed two river forts; one on the Cumber-
land and one on the Tennessee. These two forts were near the Kentucky-
Tennessee border, only 12 miles part. The Federals had discovered that
both forts were weak, especially the Tennessee River fort. The Battle of
the River Forts began on Feb 6, 1862 when the Federals, accompanied
by the seven Union gunboats, came up the Tennessee River and attacked
the fort. A cold rain slowed the army, but actually helped the gunboats
by raising the river. The poorly constructed fort actually flooded, and the
gunboats were able to batter the fort into submission without the help of
the army. Most of the 2,600 man rebel garrison escaped 12 miles west to
the Cumberland River fort. The Federal gunboats then steamed down the
Tennessee and back up the Cumberland to attack the other fort. The army
marched the 12 miles west and surrounded the Cumberland River fort. On
February 14 the Federals seemed to have the Rebels in a trap, and the attack
began. The next day the Confederates launched a spirited counterattack in
an attempt to break free. Just as the attack began to gain momentum, it was
called off; and the Rebels returned to their defenses. Poor leadership and
bitter cold had put the Rebels in a hopeless situation, and 17,000 Confeder-
ates surrendered. The effect of the loss of the two river forts was stunning.
The Federals had punched a huge hole in the middle of the Confederate
line and the whole defensive line fell apart. The Federals steamed up the
Cumberland River and captured Nashville on February 23. Columbus,
Clarksville and Bowling Green were evacuated, and all Confederate forces
retreated south to the railroad center of Corinth, Mississippi. They had lost
Kentucky and half of Tennessee. The Union Army steamed up the Tennes-

33
see River in hot pursuit.
Two Union armies converged upon Pittsburg Landing on the Tennes-
see River, 22 miles north of Corinth. The army that had captured the river
forts came up the Tennessee and arrived on March 11. The Union Army
that had occupied Nashville came down the railroad to Columbia, Tennes-
see and marched overland towards Pittsburg Landing. The two armies,
when combined, would have 75,000 troops. The Confederates were also
concentrating their forces in the area. Reinforcements poured into Corinth
from Memphis, Columbus, Murfreesboro and Tupelo, bringing Confederate
strength to 40,000. The Rebels determined that, if they moved fast, they
could strike the Federals at Pittsburg Landing before the other army arrived.
The Confederate commanders devised a battle plan that was too complicated
for their green troops to execute and two critical days were lost.
The Battle of Shiloh began April 6, 1862 when the Rebels launched
their surprise attack. The Union Army should have known what the Con-
federates were up to, but their cavalry was not on patrol, their pickets were
too close to camp, and they were not dug in. The rebel attack succeeded
all across the line. As the Federals retreated they came across a sunken
road and field with a picket fence. As the Union
left and right continued to disintegrate, this
center began to stiffen. Here 4,500 Federals
held off 18,000 Confederates in fighting so
bitter it was given the name, the Hornet’s Nest.
After 10 hours of fighting the Rebels lined up
62 cannon and fired point blank into the Hor-
net’s Nest. The 2,200 Federals that survived
ended up surrendering. Although the Federals
lost this key center position, they gained valu-
able time to reorganize the rest of the Union
Army. They then fought a more organized retreat back towards the Ten-
nessee River. As the Federals approached Pittsburg Landing, they began
to receive artillery support from the powerful cannons mounted on the
Union gunboats on the river. Encouraged by this support, the retreating
Federals regrouped and organized a defensive perimeter. At 6:00 PM,
believing they had accomplished much, the Rebels called off the attack.
That night, unknown to the Confederates, the Union Army from Nashville
arrived at the battlefield. The next morning the Federals launched a dra-
matic counterattack, pushing the Rebels back and recapturing the Hornet’s
Nest. As the Federals advanced, they came across the dead and dying from
yesterdays fighting. For many soldiers it was an unnerving experience.
The Confederate Army was pushed back all the way to their Corinth forti-

34
fications. The Federals decided not to attack the Rebels at Corinth and the
Battle of Shiloh ended. It had been the first great battle of the Civil War,
and the 20,000 casualties (25%) it had produced
were simply overwhelming. It had been a
bloodbath without precedent, and there was
great suffering on both sides. Neither side was
prepared to bury its dead, let alone care for the
wounded. Although the Confederates had
fought bravely, they had failed to drive the
Federals out, and their hopes for winning back
Tennessee were dashed. A month after Shiloh,
typhoid struck the Confederate Army at
Corinth, and they abandoned the city. The
Federals used Corinth as a staging ground to march against Memphis, and
the city fell on June 6.
The Federals had come up the Tennessee River to engage the Rebels
at Shiloh. At the same time the Union began a systematic attack on rebel
positions up and down the Mississippi River. Their first target was Island
Number 10 (the tenth island south of Cairo, Illinois). When the Confeder-
ates abandoned Columbus, Kentucky, they moved their heavy artillery to
Island Number 10. The fort had 50 cannon protecting a double hairpin turn
in the river. If the federal gunboats could run by the fort, they could cut off
the island from supplies coming up the river from the south. The Feder-
als were reluctant to expose their whole flotilla to the fort’s guns, so they
dug a channel in the river to bypass the fort. The lighter boats were taken
down the channel while the heavier boats ran by the fort successfully. On
April 7 (the same day as the Battle of Shiloh) the Federals captured Island
Number 10, taking 7,000 prisoners. It was another significant victory for
the Union.
With a population of 150,000, New Orleans was by far the largest city
in the Confederacy. Because the Federals had been preoccupied with com-
ing down the Mississippi from the north early in the war, New Orleans had
been largely ignored. When the North learned that gunboats were being
built in the city, New Orleans became a serious target. Ship Island lay 12
miles off the coast at the mouth of the Mississippi. In September of 1861,
the Federals captured the island to use as a staging ground for an attack
against New Orleans. The threat continued to grow, but the city was stripped
of its defensive manpower to fight at Shiloh. In April, a powerful Union
flotilla started up the Mississippi supported by 15,000 troops. The two forts
protecting New Orleans from the south were bombarded for five days.
Again, the plan was to get by the forts and cut supplies coming from New

35
Orleans. On the night of April 24th, the Union flotilla started by the forts
in single file. When the 90 cannons in the forts opened fire, the Union re-
sponded with twice that number. The Confederates sent flaming barges
down the river to catch the Union boats on fire. They were, however,
largely ineffective. Many of the obstructions that the Rebels had placed in
the river were washed away by a very swift current. Though the rebel bat-
teries caused great damage to the Union fleet, almost all of the boats got
through. Cut off from the mainland, the forts surrendered. Just two weeks
after Shiloh, the Federals captured New Orleans. The city would remain
in Union hands for the rest of the war.
The Union victory at New Orleans was followed by success up and
down the Mississippi. Fort Pillow fell on
June 5. Union ram boats destroyed a make-
shift Confederate flotilla near Memphis, and
that city fell on June 6. Baton Rouge and
Natchez were captured in August. From
February to August 1862, the Federals had
captured 50,000 miles of Confederate terri-
tory, put 30,000 rebel soldiers out of action,
captured two state capitals and the largest city
in the South, and gained control of a thousand
miles of rivers. Only the Confederate fortress
at Vicksburg eluded their grasp.
As the summer of 1862 wore on, the
Union steamroller in the West ran out of gas. In many ways, the Federals
were victims of their own success. All of the territory they had won had to
be occupied, which required huge numbers of soldiers. The vastness of the
geography gave the Confederate cavalry great opportunities to raid Union
supply convoys. The Federals had an army in northern Mississippi trying
to take Vicksburg and an army in middle Tennessee trying to take Chatta-
nooga. The Rebels, who were concentrated around Corinth, Mississippi,
saw an opportunity. They left half of their army in Corinth to guard the
approaches to Vicksburg. The other half was sent on an improbable railroad
journey to Chattanooga. The Rebels considered Kentucky to be part of the
Confederacy, even though the state had never seceded. They decided to
invade Kentucky in an attempt to rally its citizens to the rebel cause. In
August, two Confederate armies began marching north, one from Chatta-
nooga, the other from Knoxville. The invasion of Kentucky happened at
the same time as the invasion of Maryland, and both took the Federals off
guard. In September, the Rebels captured Frankfort, the capital of Kentucky
and installed a pro-Confederate governor. As they saw it, this allowed them

36
to legally draft Kentuckians into their army. The Confederates had brought
15,000 muskets north with them to arm the new recruits. The recruits
never came. For the most part the Kentuckians were not interested in join-
ing the rebel cause nor even supplying the
rebel armies. What the Confederacy had
thought would be a campaign of liberation
turned out to be a raid into unfriendly territory.
Whatever it was, the Federals were in hot
pursuit. Having been resupplied and strength-
ened at Louisville, the Federals advanced to-
wards the Rebels at Frankfort. Oddly, the two
rebel armies had still not joined forces and the
Federals meant to hit them before they did.
There was a drought going on in Kentucky at
the time and the armies were looking for water
as much as they were for each other. The
Battle of Perryville began on the morning of October 8, 1862 when scouts
from both sides bumped into each other at a watering hole. At 10:00 AM
the Rebels launched a spirited attack on the federal left flank. For hours
the Federals struggled to contain the Confederate attack. Finally, at 4:00
PM the Union launched its counter attack, but lack of support and darkness
limited its success. The next morning the Federals initiated an attack all
across the line, only to find the Rebels gone. Realizing they were outnum-
bered, the Confederates had retreated during the night. They had fought
well at Perryville but, because of their retreat, the battle is seen as a Union
victory. The Rebels marched back into Tennessee having failed to bring
Kentucky into the rebellion.
The Rebels retreated south and took up positions at Murfreesboro,
Tennessee, 30 miles southeast of Nashville. It took a change in command
to get the Union army moving in pursuit. The Federals moved to Nashville
and began to plan an attack on the Rebels at
NA

CH
NA TA
SH

Murfreesboro. On December 26th the Feder-

AT
SH NO

0 1/2 mile
VI
LL

VIL OG
E

als marched out of Nashville towards the

LE A R
TU
RN

and R
PI

Confederates. Confederate cavalry went to

KE

work immediately, causing havoc with Union

Round
supply and communications. The three day
Sto

Forest
nes R.

Battle of Stones River began on December

31, 1862. Both sides had drawn up the same
battle plans to turn the enemies right flank.
The Confederates struck first pushing the Murfreesboro

Federals back three miles. The rebel artillery

37
could not be brought forward to support the Confederate breakthrough
because of the rough terrain. This gave the Federals time to regroup and
stop the rebel attack. The second day saw only skirmishing as the Union
moved to higher ground. On the third day, the Rebels attacked a position
in the Union line known as the Round Forest. They carried the position
only to be driven back by a federal counterattack. Losses on both sides
were extremely heavy. The next day, frustrated by federal refusal to give
ground and fearing reinforcements from Nashville, the Confederates re-
treated towards Chattanooga. Stones River had been sheer butchery. Of
the 72,000 soldiers that fought in the battle, 21,500 had been killed wound-
ed or captured. This casualty rate of 31% was higher than any other battle
in the Civil War. The cost of Stones River caused both sides to rethink their
tactics as they continued the war in east Tennessee.
Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas provided large amounts of food and
supplies for the Confederate war effort in the West. As long as the Rebels
held Vicksburg they could ferry those supplies across the Mississippi River
to feed their hungry armies. The Federals knew that if they could capture
Vicksburg, they could cut Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas off from the rest
of the Confederacy. In the Union campaign against Vicksburg, nature would
prove to be as big an enemy as the Rebels themselves. The Federals had
failed in their attempt to take the city via the river because of its geographic
location. Vicksburg was perched on high ground above the river where
artillery was strategically placed. This created an impregnable defense from
river attack. In November of 1862, the Federals had a 32,000 man army in
Memphis and a 42,000 man army in Jackson, Tennessee. They devised a
plan to take both armies south to join forces north of Vicksburg for a massed
attack. The Union army in Memphis started down the Mississippi River
while the other army marched overland toward Vicksburg. As the Union
army to the East moved from Tennessee into Mississippi, it ran into serious
problems. As their supply lines became longer and longer it became more
and more vulnerable to attack from Confederate cavalry. By mid-December,
the situation had become intolerable, and the army began to retreat back to
Tennessee. So thoroughly had their supply and communication lines been
cut, that no one even knew that they had turned back. The other Union
army had come down the river and landed at Chickasaw Bluffs, north of
Vicksburg. When it became apparent that the other army was not coming,
they decided to launch the attack by themselves. On December 28, the
Federals attacked the Rebels at Chickasaw Bayou. Having only one Union
army to deal with, the Confederates were able to concentrate their forces.
The Union attack was easily repelled, and the Federals took heavy losses.
The Federals had found it impossible to take Vicksburg from the river.

38
Now they were finding that it was also a difficult place to even get to by
land. The wetlands of Mississippi and Louisiana proved to be an enormous
obstacle. After the defeat at Chickasaw Bayou, the Federals spent four
months trying to get an army on the dry ground east of Vicksburg with
enough food and ammunition to fight. They tried many roundabout routes
through the swamps and bayous. They even tried digging a canal past the
fortifications like they had successfully done at Island #10. Everything
failed, and they were forced to consider radically different approaches to
the problem. The Federals could march down the Louisiana side of the
Mississippi River and cross over to dry ground south of Vicksburg. The
problem with this plan was that it was practically impossible to supply the
troops during such a march. While it appeared that the local people had
little to eat themselves, they were actually hiding large quantities of food.
They did not want to sell their food to the Rebels for worthless Confederate
money. The Federals decided to make the march and take the food they
needed from the locals.
In April 1863 the Federals started down the western bank of the Mis-
sissippi living off the land. As they moved, they built bridges over the
bayous, some over 600 feet long. They diverted the Rebels attention away
from this main thrust by creating skirmishes north of the city. They also
launched a major cavalry raid of their own east of Jackson. The Mississippi
River was a mile wide south of Vicksburg. The army would have to be
ferried back to the eastern shore by boat. Since the Union navy was north
of the city, it would be necessary to run the boats by the guns at Vicksburg.
It was a huge gamble.
On the night of April 16 seventeen union boats attempted to slip by
the Vicksburg defenses. As the cannons on the high bluffs opened up bon-
fires were lit on the shore to help the
rebel gunners. Two of the Union boats
were sunk, but the other 15 made it by
Vicksburg. On April 30 the Union Army
had successfully crossed the Mississippi
to dry ground south of the city. The
Confederates were taken off guard, hav-
ing one army in Vicksburg and another
in Jackson. The Federals headed northeast moving fast and effectively.
They split the two armies, then moved east and burned the city of Jackson.
They then turned back towards Vicksburg. The Union Army outmaneuvered
the Confederates and, on May 16, defeated them at the Battle of Champi-
on’s Hill. They repeated their success the next day at the Big Black River,
driving the Rebels back into the Vicksburg defenses. Retreating back into

39
the city defenses was an unwise strategy for the Confederates. Cut off from
all supplies they could only wait for help that would never come. Impatient
for a victory, the Federals launched two all out attacks on the heavily forti-
fied city. Both attacks were repulsed with heavy Union losses. The Feder-
als then settled in for a siege. The residents of the city dug caves into the
hillsides to escape the constant Union bombardment. As the days wore on
and the supplies disappeared, people were reduced to eating dogs and cats.
The siege lasted for six weeks. On July 4, 1863, one day after Gettysburg,
Vicksburg surrendered. 30,000 Rebels were captured; and Louisiana,
Texas and Arkansas had been severed from the Confederacy.
After the fall of Vicksburg, attention was refocused on middle Tennes-
see. The bloody battle of Murfreesboro had produced a long standoff lasting
from January to June 1863. In the spring of that year, Lincoln began to put
pressure on the Union army at Murfreesboro to move against the Rebels.
Chattanooga was the logical goal because it was an important railroad hub
and a natural staging ground for a push towards Atlanta. Lincoln also knew
that eastern Tennessee was a hotbed of pro-Union sentiment and by taking
Chattanooga, Knoxville might also fall. There was a pattern emerging in
the West of Union advances and corresponding Confederate retreats. This
pattern was extended on June 24 when the Federals began the Tullahoma
Campaign. In a mere two weeks the Federals, executing a series of skillful
flanking movements, pushed the Confederates 100 miles southeast to Chat-
tanooga. This Union army accomplished a significant military objective with
virtually no bloodshed. As the Federals approached Chattanooga, Knoxville
fell. The Federals then made a brilliant move across the Tennessee River
and threatened to trap the Rebels inside Chattanooga. The Confederates
were forced to retreat 15 miles south, where they camped beside a creek
called Chickamauga.
Meanwhile, Jefferson Davis was growing tired of Confederate armies
constantly retreating in the West. Since there was a lull in the fighting in
the East, Davis and his advisers decided to send 12,000 veteran eastern
troops to reinforce the rebel army at Chattanooga. Moving 12,000 men
from Virginia to Tennessee on the defective southern railroad system was
a remarkable accomplishment. When completed, the Rebels would have
a rare numerical advantage at Chattanooga, 70,000 to 57,000. On the morn-
ing of September 19, Union and Confederate cavalry skirmished across
Chickamauga Creek and the Battle of Chickamauga had begun. The area
of first contact acted like a magnet and soon both armies were fully engaged.
The Confederates launched effective frontal assaults all across the battle
line, but failed to break the Union ranks. The first day ended in a standoff.
That night the last of the eastern reinforcements arrived, and the Rebels

40
readied themselves for the next days fighting. The rebel attacks the next
morning were making little headway when a very odd thing happened. In
the heat of the battle the Federals got confused and tried to plug an imagi-
nary hole in their right flank, creating a real
one. At that exact moment the 12,000 man
division from the East attacked that very spot.
The effect was spectacular. The federal right
was completely crushed and driven from the
field. As the federal soldiers ran for their lives,
the rest of the Union army got caught up in the
panic. The Federals were soon in full chaotic
retreat back towards Chattanooga. Only a
desperate and determined rear guard defense
saved the Union army from total destruction.
Chickamauga was the second largest battle of the war, with almost
35,000 casualties. It was a huge victory for the South, but it had come at
a costly price (18,500 casualties). The Federals had narrowly avoided
destruction by retreating back into Chattanooga. When the Confederates
did not pursue, the Federals had time to fortify the city. The Rebels then
began to surround the city in an attempt to cut off all supply. They were
trying to do to the Federals what had been done to them at Vicksburg.
Displaying excellent leadership, the Federals launched an all out effort to
save the army in Chattanooga. In some fancy railroad work of their own,
the Federals rushed food and reinforcements to the embattled city. A sup-
ply route was established through the Confederate perimeter known as the
“cracker line.” Slowly the threat subsided, and the Union army began to
grow in size and morale. As the Union army in Chattanooga was getting
stronger, the Rebels were getting weaker. In early November the Confed-
erates dispatched 12,000 badly needed troops on a failed attempt to recap-
ture Knoxville. The remaining 45,000 Rebels were dug in on Lookout
Mountain and Missionary Ridge just south of the city.
The Battle of Chattanooga began
on November 23 when the Federals
marched south out of the city and attacked
Lookout Mountain. The mountain was an
imposing geographic feature rising 1,100
feet in the air. Because of a low lying
cloud cover, the many newspaper report-
ers on hand named the attack “the Battle
above the Clouds.” Perhaps because
of its fortress like appearance, Lookout

41
Mountain was lightly guarded by the Rebels. To everyone’s surprise the
Federals scaled the mountain and dislodged the Rebels with little trouble.
The Federals lost less then 500 men in the attack. In contrast, the federal
attacks against both ends of Missionary Ridge ran into serious trouble. The
Union decided to make a diversionary attack against the middle to draw
manpower away from the rebel flanks. The federal units involved in the fake
attack were the same soldiers that had been humiliated two months earlier at
Chickamauga. As the 25,000 federal troops marched against the Confederate
center, it reminded some veterans of Pickett’s charge at Gettysburg. The
outcome could not have been any different. Their orders were to take the
first line of rifle pits at the base of the ridge and stop. When the objective
was accomplished, they continued the attack and captured the second line.
Without orders, the Federals continued up the ridge, capturing the crest and
driving the Confederates down the back side. It simply defied all logic. A
frontal attack against a well-fortified enemy on high ground had not only
succeeded, it had driven a Confederate Army from the field for the first
time in the war. It was a crushing defeat for the South. The badly mauled
Confederate army retreated 25 miles south to Dalto, Georgia and went into
winter camps. Union forces in the West had pushed the Rebels completely
out of Tennessee and had established Chattanooga as a powerful staging
ground for a push into Georgia in the spring. A dagger was now pointed at
the heart of the Confederacy.
During the winter of 63-64 Chattanooga was turned into a giant Fed-
eral railroad depot. Soldiers, horses, and
supplies flooded into the city in preparation
for the spring campaign against Atlanta. On
May 7 the Atlanta Campaign began when
the Federals moved south out of Chatta-
nooga. At the same time the Union forces in
the East began the Overland campaign
against Richmond. 100,000 well equipped
Federals crossed over into Georgia opposed
by 53,000 ragged Confederates. Neither
army would have the taste for the slam bang
combat found in the eastern campaign. For
the next ten weeks, the two armies would
play a dangerous, but cautious chess game
over the 100 miles between Chattanooga and
Atlanta. The Rebels knew that their army
was no match for the Federals in open com-
bat, so they conducted a delaying action while the Confederate cavalry

42
struck at the ever lengthening Union supply lines. From Dalton to Resaca
to Cassville the Federals skillfully maneuvered southward. The Rebels
would block a main road or valley, dig in, and dare the Federals to launch
a frontal attack. When the Federals flanked their fortification they would
then retreat and block another road or valley. As they retreated, the Rebels
tore up the railroad tracks. The Federals repaired the tracks as fast as they
were wrecked. As the Union Army marched southward, slaves were freed,
and Southern morale shrunk. At Cassville, the Confederates launched an
unsuccessful counterattack, then fell back 12 miles to Altoona Pass. The
Federals avoided the trap at Altoona Pass and launched a full frontal attack
on the rebel defenses at Kenasaw Mountain. Temperatures reached 100
degrees and men fainted and vomited from heat exhaustion. The attack
failed and 3,000 Federals fell, but the Rebels were again forced out of a
strong position.
As the federal supply lines lengthened, more men were required to
defend them. This sapped strength from the Union offensive. Jefferson
Davis was growing frustrated by the constant retreating of his army. When
the Rebels dropped back to Peachtree Creek, 4 miles north of Atlanta,
Davis fired the commanding general. The new rebel leadership was more
aggressive and attacked the Federals at Peachtree Creek. The attack was
repelled with heavy losses, and the Rebels retreated back into the Atlanta
defenses. The Federals did not want to attack the strong city defenses so,
in a familiar tactic, they went for the railroads. Lessons from Vicksburg
were well learned and when the last railroad fell on Sept 1, the Confeder-
ates abandoned the city. While the Federals wanted very badly to capture
Atlanta, they did not want to waste troops occupying it. They decided to
force all of the citizens out of the city and burn it to the ground, to end its
usefulness to the Southern war effort. The Federals were now waging total
war in an attempt to break the Southern citizen’s will to fight. It is difficult
to overestimate what a positive effect the fall of Atlanta had on Northern
morale. There had been little good news in the East, and the fall presidential
election was fast approaching. The North was ecstatic.
While the Union army had captured Atlanta and greatly weakened the
Confederate army, it had not destroyed it. The Rebels had circled around
Atlanta hoping to complete the job of severing the Union supply line to
Chattanooga. They hoped to lure the Federals back into the mountains where
they were more vulnerable. The Federals did not want to chase this rag tag
band of Rebels all over the South, so they sent 32,000 troops to Nashville to
protect Tennessee. The rest of the Union army stayed in Atlanta. Realizing
that they could not lure the Federals back into the mountains, the Confed-
erates hatched a desperate plan. They decided to march north and attack

43
the Union army at Nashville. If they could capture Nashville, they would
continue north through Kentucky, gathering recruits, and maybe even go
east and rescue Richmond. The plan was preposterous, but 30,000 Rebels
began moving north.
At Franklin, Tennessee, 15 miles south of Nashville they ran into
heavily fortified Union positions. On the morn-
ing of November 30, the Rebels attempted a
reckless head on assault. The result was shock-
ing. The Confederates took 7,000 casualties,
more than the Federals had lost at Cold Harbor
and three times the Union losses. Six Confed-
erate generals fell at Franklin. When the Feder-
als withdrew to their Nashville fortification, the
stunned rebel army somehow followed. Con-
federate commanders were afraid that if they
called for a retreat, their whole army would
desert, so they camped and waited for the Fed-
erals to attack them. When the Battle of Nash-
ville finally began on the morning of December
15th, the result was decisive. 55,000 Federals swept the 25,000 man rebel
army from the field. Thousands of Rebels surrendered, and the last major
Confederate army in the West went out of existence.
With part of the army gone to Nashville to protect Tennessee, the main
federal army in Atlanta planned a bold move. Union armies in the West
had learned that protecting supply lines was an agonizing process. They
had also learned that local farmers throughout the South had food and
provisions for the taking. The decision
was made to march east from Atlanta to
Savannah living off the locals and destroy-
ing everything in sight. The two armies
that had been hammering at each other for
4 months were now marching in opposite
directions. The Confederates headed
north into Tennessee and, on November
15, the Federals began their “march to the
sea.” In the fall of 1864 everyone knew
that the North was winning the war. How-
ever, the Confederates would not stop
fighting. In an attempt to make the South surrender the Federals decided
to make war against the civilian population. All Southern resources that
could contribute to the war effort in any way would be targeted in an attempt

44
to break Confederate morale. The Union army set off on the 285 mile trek
from Atlanta to Savannah to “make Georgia howl” as one General put it.
The army made about 10 miles a day in a path 50 to 100 miles wide. As
the army moved, the cavalry scouted the land ahead. When the main body
of Federals arrived they took the provisions they needed from houses, barns
and fields and burned many of the large plantations. One Union soldier
described it as “the most gigantic pleasure excursion ever planned.” Of-
ficers were supposed to decide what got burned. The Union army itself
was well-disciplined but stragglers, deserters and looters often were not.
When houses were burned, there was much suffering. The campaign had
occurred right after the fall harvest so there was much food to be had. It
became apparent that rebel soldiers were not starving because there was no
food in the South. The problem was that the Southern transportation system
had collapsed, and there was no way to get the food to the front. As the
Federals marched deeper into Georgia, freed and escaped slaves flocked to
the army. The Federals approached Savannah in mid-December, and the
10,000 man rebel garrison fled the city. The army marched into Savannah
on December 22 and gave the city to Lincoln as a Christmas present.
The Federals stayed in Savannah for a month to rest and resupply. In
early February they burned Savannah and marched north into South Caro-
lina. Swampy terrain and torrential rain slowed the Federals very little.
Since South Carolina was the state that had started the rebellion, great re-
venge was taken there. Charleston was sacked and Columbia was burned
to the ground. The Federals overall plan was to march north to Virginia and
help capture Richmond. As they continued unopposed through the South,
Jefferson Davis worked desperately to organize a defense. 10,000 men
from defeated Confederate armies were gathered together in North Carolina
and waited for the Federals. In March, the Union army moved into North
Carolina and captured Fayetteville. At Bentonville they were attacked by
the rag tag rebel army and they brushed them aside. The Federals did not
pursue the retreating Confederates because they knew the end was near. The
Union stopped at Goldsboro, completing the 700 mile march. Three weeks
after Appomattox, Confederate forces in North Carolina surrendered.

The Political War in the North

Northern politics during the Civil War were skillfully dominated by
Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln was born in Kentucky in 1809. His family
moved to Springfield Illinois where Lincoln became a successful lawyer.
He served in the Illinois state legislature and one term in the United States
Congress. Lincoln came to the attention of the nation in 1858 when he ran
unsuccessfully against Stephen Douglas for the United States Senate. Two

45
years later he surprised everyone when he won the Republican nomination
for President as a compromise candidate. Lincoln won the Presidency in
a bitterly divided election.
When Lincoln arrived in Washington early in 1861, very little was
known about him. Hardly anyone believed that he could effectively run a
country that was literally falling apart. Lincoln, however, possessed unique
skills. He had the ability to work with difficult but talented people. Lincoln
put together a cabinet of brilliant and capable people. It did not matter to
him that some of his cabinet members were former political rivals. This
group of men with whom Lincoln surrounded himself would effectively
run the country, freeing Lincoln to concentrate on the war. Lincoln was
not a military man like his Southern counterpart, Jefferson Davis. He was,
however, very intelligent. He listened to his military advisers and learned
fast.
Lincoln’s first major challenge as President was to keep as many
slave states as possible from joining the Confederacy. He stood a decent
chance with Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, and the western part
of Virginia. Lincoln knew that the main cause of the war was slavery. He
also knew that if he talked about freeing slaves in the Border South, those
states might leave the Union. For the first year of the war, Lincoln insisted
that he had no intention of interfering with slavery where it existed. When
his generals freed slaves in conquered Southern territory, Lincoln would
override their orders. He did everything possible to maintain or win the
loyalty of the border states. Due to Lincoln’s clever political maneuvering,
no border slave state joined the rebellion. This denied the Confederacy the
services of 3.5 million people. Had the Border States joined the rebellion,
the Confederate fighting force would have been increased by 45% and
manufacturing capacity by 80%. There are two extra stars in the Confederate
flag that represent states (Kentucky and Missouri) that never seceded.
Lincoln’s greatest opposition came from the “Peace Democrats,” bet-
ter known as Copperheads. Copperheads were Northern-
ers who wanted to let the South go in peace. The south-
ern parts of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois had relatively
strong ties to the South, and they were a hotbed for Cop-
perhead activity. These Peace Democrats were led by a
brilliant defense attorney named Clement Vallandigham.
Vallandigham served in the United States Senate and ran
for Governor of Ohio in 1863. During the campaign,
Vallandigham openly encouraged Union soldiers to
Clement desert. He was arrested, tried by a military court, and
Vallandigham convicted of sedition. This made Vallandigham a pow-

46
erful martyr figure for the anti-war movement. Wisely grasping the politi-
cal implications, Lincoln had Vallandigham released form prison and
banished to the South. The Copperhead movement lost its momentum in
the summer of 1863 when the Union scored dramatic victories at Gettysburg
and Vicksburg. The Democratic Party had an equal number of “War
Democrats.” The “Peace” and “War” Democrats were united in their op-
position to freeing the slaves. Lincoln also had to deal with the Radical
Republicans who opposed slavery on moral grounds from the very begin-
ning. Based in New England, the Radical Republicans exercised power
that exceeded their numbers.
Early enthusiasm for the war produced plenty of volunteers to fill the
Union ranks. However, as the war dragged on and the casualty lists grew,
fewer and fewer stepped forward. This forced Lincoln to institute a draft.
The draft was never expected to bring large numbers of soldiers into the
army. Many Northern men volunteered to avoid the stigma of being drafted.
If a potential draftee volunteered, he was paid a bounty of $100, which was
almost half a year’s salary in the 1860’s. Wealthy men could avoid military
service by paying a substitute to fight for them. Prominent Americans like
J.P. Morgan, Andrew Carnegie, and Grover Cleveland avoided military
service by paying a substitute. Poor Irish and German immigrants were
lured into the army by bounties and substitute payments. Many Northern
men simply did not want to fight to free black slaves. When the draft began,
there was rioting throughout the North. The New York City draft riots in
July of 1863 were the worst in the nation’s history. The 200,000 Irish im-
migrants living in New York feared that freed slaves would take their jobs
and being forced to fight for their freedom was too much. The city erupted
in riots that killed 1,000 people and had to be put down by troops returning
from the Gettysburg battlefield.
The war was expensive to fight, and the North struggled to meet the
cost. The Lincoln administration taxed, borrowed, and printed money to
pay for the war. While there was significant inflation in the North it never
reached the chaotic level it did in the South. The war provided a dramatic
stimulus to the Northern economy. Manufacturing and farm production
expanded greatly and exports doubled. Because of the lack of manpower,
new, labor saving machines were introduced to factories and farms and
women joined the work force. Many Northern men made fortunes during
the Civil War.
While Lincoln knew that slavery was the central issue behind the war,
he downplayed its importance. He knew that the Border South, and most
of the North did not want to fight a war to free the slaves. Lincoln began
to change his mind because of happenings on the battlefields. As Northern

47
armies began to advance into the South, large numbers of escaped slaves
crossed the lines and surrendered to Union forces. These slaves had been
supporting the rebel armies, building their fortifications and growing their
food. It eventually occurred to Lincoln and his generals that it would be
easier to defeat the Confederacy if they took away their slave labor. After
the half victory at Antietam, Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclama-
tion which freed all of the slaves in the unconquered rebel territories. This
Presidential order was an attempt to win the war by denying the Rebels
their slave labor. Now it was disloyal not to want to free the slaves. This
changed everything. The war was no longer about bringing the South back
into the Union on negotiated terms. It was about bashing the South to
pieces and bringing it back into the Union however the North pleased. The
Emancipation Proclamation also changed the way Europeans thought about
the war. In many ways, the American Civil War resembled class conflict in
England. The North stood for elected government, equal rights, and free
labor. The South stood for aristocracy, privilege, and slave labor. The up-
per classes of England were for the South while the lower classes were for
the North. Slavery was outlawed in Europe and very unpopular. When the
Emancipation Proclamation made it clear to Europeans that the war was
really about slavery, even the upper classes withdrew their support for the
South. By issuing the Emancipation Proclamation Abraham Lincoln had
outmaneuvered the South and denied them European support. The procla-
mation also opened the door for black soldiers. Blacks had always wanted to
fight but racism had kept them out of the army. Resentment against former
slaves in uniform lessened as casualty lists grew. Eventually, 180,000 black
soldiers and 20,000 black sailors fought for the North. Blacks in uniform
represented 10% of the Union fighting force. Lincoln later reflected “use
of colored troops...the heaviest blow yet dealt to the rebellion.”
After the Battle of Gettysburg, thousands of bodies were buried in
shallow graves. As the rains began to expose these bodies it became ap-
parent that federal money would be needed to construct a proper cemetery.
The project was finished early in November of 1863 and Abraham Lincoln
came to speak at the dedication. There he delivered the Gettysburg Address,
perhaps the most famous speech in American history. In his brief address
he abandoned talk of a union of states, choosing instead to speak about the
hopes and dreams of a completely united nation.
As the election of 1864 neared, the war was going badly for the North.
Although it appeared they were winning, Union armies were stalled on both
the eastern and western fronts. The volume of killing with no apparent
success was hurting Lincoln’s re-election chances. The Copperheads gained
strength from the negative reaction to the Emancipation Proclamation and

48
the growing casualty lists. Lincoln was convinced that if he lost, an anti-
war Democrat president would negotiate peace with the South that might
leave slavery intact. His opponent was George B. McClellan, a brilliant
but indecisive general that Lincoln had fired for lack of initiative. His
campaign strategy was simple. Lincoln characterized the Democrats as
disloyal, and prayed for victories on the battlefield. His prayers were an-
swered when Union forces captured Atlanta. Lincoln’s election victory
margin was significant. He used the political momentum of his election to
pass the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, which outlawed slavery
everywhere in the United States. The amendment was passed January 13,
1865. As the war was coming to an end, discussion began as to how to
bring the Southern states back into the Union. Lincoln favored a liberal
plan that would be easy on the South. The Congress
wanted to inflict punishment on the South for its
experiment in rebellion. The sides were coming
towards a compromise when, on April 19th, Abra-
ham Lincoln was assassinated by an Southern
sympathizer named John Booth. Eventually, the
harsher plan was adopted, and the South was di-
vided into military districts governed by Union
military officers. The process of uniting the South-
ern states with the rest of the country was bitter,
and the task was not completed until 1877. John Booth

The Political War in the South

The central figure in the political war in the South was the President
of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis. Davis was born in a Kentucky log
cabin, like Lincoln, but his family moved to Mississippi when he was young.
His father became wealthy as a slave owning
cotton planter. Davis was educated at West
Point. When South Carolina seceded Davis was
a senator from Mississippi. Although he did
not campaign for the post, he was unanimously
elected President of the Confederate States.
While Davis was a man of great intelligence,
courage and energy, his enemies saw him as
inflexible, thin skinned and humorless. He did
not have Abraham Lincoln’s unique ability to
work with difficult people. All in all, given the
Jefferson Davis very difficult position he was put into, Jefferson
Davis performed quite admirably.

49
 To fight an effective war, the South needed to form a strong union
among the Southern states. This was, however, exactly what they were
fighting against. States rights were written into the Confederate constitu-
tion, making it difficult for a central authority to prosecute a war. Southern
governors would often oppose the war effort. Governor Zebulon Vance,
of North Carolina, hoarded 100,000 Confederate uniforms while southern
armies shivered in rags. Governor Joseph Brown of Georgia made 10,000
Georgians second lieutenants in the state militia to keep them out of the
Confederate Army. When anything went wrong, the states blamed Davis’s
government in Richmond. Much of the bitterness in Confederate politics
was caused by the fact that there were no political parties in the South dur-
ing the war. As nasty as party politics can become, it gives a platform for
politicians to fight fairly. Without political parties, disagreements became
personal vendettas. The Confederate Congress in Richmond was ineffec-
tive, bureaucratic and susceptible to drunken brawling. It was incapable of
levying taxes and shaping economic policy in the young, struggling nation.
The Confederacy never did bring political power under control of a single
authority. Some of the blame goes to Jefferson Davis and the Congress, but
the independent nature of the southern people was also to blame.
As the war began, the economic challenges facing the Confederacy
were immense. Having few resources with which to work, Southerners set
up gun factories, gun powder mills and foundries for casting cannon. By
1863 the Confederacy was self-sufficient in
the production of guns and munitions. They
were less successful with supplying their
armies with uniforms and shoes. Early in the
war Southern farmers switched from cotton
to food production. Food became plentiful,
but getting it to where it was needed was a
Tredegar Iron Works serious problem. The Southern railroad sys-
tem fell apart and almost all of the wagons and draft animals were in the
army. Armies in Virginia often went hungry, and there were bread riots in
Richmond. With most of the men away in the army, Southern women
struggled to keep family farms going. Thousands of pitiful letters were
written begging husbands to come home. As the war dragged on, the
blockade of Southern ports made everything more difficult. Jefferson Da-
vis and the Confederate Congress did a poor job of administrating the
Southern economy. In the beginning, they paid for the war through taxes
and borrowing. When these two methods failed, they began to print more
money. This led to run away inflation. Goods cost ten times as much at
the end of the war as they did at the beginning.

50
 Slavery itself changed during the war. With most of the men away
in the army, slaves were less vigorously overseen, and they did less work.
More slaves worked off the plantations in war production or army work.
These factors weakened the underpinnings of the slavery system while the
war was going on. As Union armies penetrated deeper into the South, they
became magnets for runaway slaves. These armies literally carried freedom
with them and eventually one out of seven slaves crossed Union lines.
The Confederacy had its share of problems getting men for its armies.
After the dramatic losses in the West in the spring of 1862, the South began
to draft men into military service. Wealthy Southerners could pay substitutes
to fight for them. Planters who owned 20
slaves or more were exempted from the
army. This led many Southern soldiers to
say that it was a “rich man’s war, poor
mans fight.” Jefferson Davis’s enemies
used this unpopular draft as a weapon
against him. They accused the Confeder-
ate government of trampling on individ-
Antietam Battlefield ual rights. This inability of Southern
politicians to work together for independence, and worry about liberty
later, was one of the main reasons they lost the war. While politicians
squabbled, most ordinary soldiers made tremendous sacrifices for the South.
Despite all of the distractions to the Southern war effort, the Confederacy
put an incredibly high percentage (80%) of its eligible men in uniform

The Generals - Union

Ulysses S. Grant (1822-85) – Ulysses S. Grant
was born into a working class family in Point
Pleasant, Ohio. His given name was Hiram
Ulysses Grant, but a clerical error at West Point
made him Ulysses S. Grant. The error proved hard
to change and he eventually accepted the name.
His friends called him Sam. After fighting in the
Mexican War, Grant languished in remote western
posts, separated from his family, where he some-
times drank excessively. Throughout his life, Grant
depended on his wife Julia to provide the stability he needed to function
effectively. He resigned from the army in 1854, in part, to be with his fam-
ily. Grant then spent six frustrating years knocking around from job to job.
When the war broke out, Grant enlisted in the army and began to rise through
the ranks. Early in 1862, Grant commanded a small but strategically im-

51
portant army in the West. He managed to punch a gaping hole in the
southern defenses at the Battle of the River Forts. It was the first major
victory for the North, and the newspapers began calling Grant “Uncondi-
tional Surrender” (as in US Grant) because of the terms he demanded. Grant
became famous overnight. When the Rebels retreated up the Tennessee
River, Grant followed them. Surprised by a rebel attack on the first day of
the Battle of Shiloh, Grant was saved by the arrival of the army from
Nashville, led by Don Carlos Buell. On the second day of the battle, he
rallied his troops and scored a victory. When criticism of Grant for unpre-
paredness at Shiloh reached Lincoln, he said “I can not spare this man. He
fights!” From Shiloh, Grant went on to Vicksburg where he mastermind-
ed one of the great battles of history. At Vicksburg, Grant captured a huge
rebel army and split the Confederacy in two. He then went on to Chat-
tanooga where he broke a seemingly hopeless siege and scored another
stunning victory. Promoted to general-in-chief of the army, Grant was sent
east to fight Robert E. Lee in Virginia. Grant’s Overland Campaign against
Lee was very costly, but effective. Grant drove Lee back into Richmond
and strangled his army into surrender. Grant became the preeminent North-
ern war hero. After the war, Grant capitalized on his popularity by winning
the presidential election of 1868. As president, Grant was out of his ele-
ment. His administration was marred by scandal and corruption.

William Tecumseh Sherman (1820-91) – William

Tecumseh Sherman was born and raised in Ohio
where his father-in-law and brother were both U.
S. Senators. Sherman was educated at West Point
and was superintendent of the Louisiana Military
Academy when the Civil War broke out. He re-
signed his position and joined the Union Army.
Sherman fought bravely at the Union loss at 1st
Manassas and was promoted to a higher command
in the West. In Kentucky he had what many mod-
ern historians refer to as a brief nervous breakdown. When he recovered,
Sherman was assigned to duty under Ulysses S. Grant, beginning the chief
military partnership of the Civil War. Grant and Sherman dominated Con-
federate forces in the West, highlighted by victories a Shiloh, Vicksburg
and Chattanooga. When Grant went east to take control of Union forces
in Virginia, Sherman took over as commander in the West. Sherman drove
Confederate forces from Chattanooga to Atlanta and, when he captured the
city in the Battle of Atlanta on September of 1864, he saved the fall elec-
tion for Abraham Lincoln. In his famous March to the Sea, Sherman

52
destroyed all civilian property and supplies that could be used to support
Confederate armies. He then marched north and was in North Carolina
when the war came to an end. After the war, Sherman became Com-
mander-in-Chief of the army, managing operations against American Indi-
ans in the West. Sherman has been called the first modern general because
he understood that armies survived because of the support of civilian
populations. Modern warfare would target civilian populations as well as
enemy armies. Justifying his belief in tough and intensive war on all fronts,
Sherman said “War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it.”

George H. Thomas (1816-70) – George H.

Thomas was from Virginia, but he fought for the
Union in the Civil War. Early in the war he was
sent to Kentucky to command an independent
force. He fought under Don Carlos Buell at Shiloh
and Perryville and under William Rosecrans at
Stones River and the Tallahoma Campaign. At
the Battle of Chickamauga, Thomas saved the
Union army from possible annihilation by organiz-
ing a stiff, rear guard defense. For this heroism he
was given the nickname “The Rock of Chickamauga.” Fighting under
Sherman in the Atlanta Campaign, Thomas again distinguished himself
with his leadership at the Battle of Peachtree Creek. When John Bell
Hood circled around the Union army in Atlanta and headed back to Ten-
nessee, Thomas was sent to deal with him. The two armies met at the
Battle of Nashville, which was the most one-sided engagement of the war.
Thomas defeated Hood so completely that Hood’s army would never again
take the field. The Battle of Nashville ended major hostilities in the West,
and the war would soon end. After the war, Thomas stayed in the army,
becoming the Military Commander in the Pacific.

Phillip H. Sheridan (1831-88) - In 1861 Phillip

Sheridan was an obscure desk lieutenant in the U.S.
Army. He did not get his first combat assignment
until May of 1862. Fighting in the West under Don
Carlos Buell, Sheridan distinguished himself at Per-
ryville and Stones River. He rose from captain to
major-general in six months. Under the command
of Grant at the Battle of Chattanooga, Sheridan led
the incredible charge up Missionary Ridge. When
Grant went east, he took Sheridan with him, placing him in charge of Union

53
cavalry in Virginia. Sheridan fought in the Wilderness Campaign and led
the cavalry raid on Richmond that killed J.E.B. Stuart. When the Confed-
erates again invaded the Shenandoah Valley in 1864, Grant sent Sheridan
to root them out. At the Battle of Cedar Creek, Sheridan rallied his
routed troops and turned defeat into victory by the force of his personality.
He then destroyed everything of military value in the valley. He explained
that, even a crow flying over the place would have to carry his own provi-
sions. At the end, Sheridan led the attack that cut Robert E. Lee off at
Appomattox. After the war, Sheridan served as military governor of Texas
and Louisiana, before being transferred west to fight Indians. When Wil-
liam T. Sherman retired as general-in-chief of the army, Sheridan assumed
the position. He was head of the army until shortly before his death in 1888.

William S. Rosecrans (1819-98) – William S.

Rosecrans first fought under George B. McClellan
in Western Virginia in 1862. Rosecrans did much
of the planning for the successful campaign, but
McClellan got the credit. When McClellan was
promoted, Rosecrans refused to follow him to
Washington, taking a command in Mississippi
instead. Rosecrans won battles at Iuka and Corinth,
Mississippi before being promoted to a command
in Kentucky. He stopped Braxton Bragg’s invasion
of Kentucky at Perryville. Promoted to command the Army of the Cum-
berland in the ensuing Tallahoma Campaign, Rosecrans pushed Bragg’s
rebel army all of the way south to Chattanooga. Bragg was reinforced and
attacked Rosecrans at Chickamauga, crushing his army. Rosecrans was
relieved of his command and ended up in charge of military operations in
Missouri for the rest of the war. After the war, Rosecrans held numerous
public positions including U.S. Congressman and Minister to Mexico.

George B. McClellan (1826-85) – A native of

Philadelphia, George B. McClellan was president
of a railroad company when the war broke out.
His early success in western Virginia made him
the first Northern war hero. After the defeat at
1st Manassas McClellan became commander of
the Army of the Potomac. McClellan excelled in
training soldiers to fight, but was reluctant to com-
mit them to battle. His insubordination was a con-
stant source of frustration for Abraham Lincoln.

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Lincoln finally pressured McClellan into beginning the Peninsula Campaign
against the Rebels. Moving slowly and cautiously up the Peninsula, Mc-
Clellan failed to capture the rebel capital. He was eventually driven off by
Robert E. Lee. Demoted but not fired, McClellan played a small part in the
Battle of 2nd Manassas. Facing a desperate situation when Lee invaded
Maryland, Lincoln reinstated McClellan. Armed with superior numbers
and the rebel battle plans at Antietam, McClellan could manage no better
than a draw. When he failed to pursue the retreating Lee, Lincoln fired him
for good. McClellan never received another military command. He ran
as a War Democrat against Lincoln in the 1864 presidential campaign and
was soundly defeated. After the war, he served as governor of New Jersey.
While McClellan was a brilliant organizer of men, he was a poor field com-
mander. Had he been more effective leading men in battle, the war might
have ended much sooner and many lives might have been saved.

George Gordon Meade (1815-72) – George

Gordon Meade was born in Spain, son of a U.S.
Naval agent. When the war broke out, Meade was
assigned to the East where he stayed throughout
the conflict. He fought under George H. Mc-
Clellan in the Peninsula Campaign and was
severely wounded at the Seven Days’ Battles. He
recovered from his wounds in time to fight in the
Battle of 2nd Manassas. Meade distinguished
himself with his leadership at Antietam and
scored the only Union breakthrough at Fredericksburg. Meade fought at
Chancellorsville and took over command of the army three days before
Gettysburg, when Joseph Hooker suddenly resigned. Although Meade
designed the sound defensive strategy that won at Gettysburg, his victory
is often attributed to poor decisions on the part of the Rebels. Meade was
praised for the badly needed Union victory, but soundly criticized for not
pursuing Robert E. Lee after the battle. When U.S. Grant came east, Meade
became his subordinate. Both men adapted to the difficult situation and
Meade performed his duties effectively during the Wilderness Campaign
and the end game at Richmond. After the war, Meade stayed in the army,
serving as a Military District Commander in the South and Commander of
the Division of the Atlantic.

Ambrose E. Burnside (1824-81) – Ambrose E. Burnside was better

known for his whiskers (sideburns) than for his military career. He fought
at 1st Manassas and directed attacks against the North Carolina coast.

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His success in North Carolina first brought him to the attention of Abra-
ham Lincoln. Fighting under McClellan at Antietam, Burnside was slow
to capture a critical bridge (Burnside’s bridge). He twice declined a
promotion to command in the East, accepting only after McClellan left
for good. Pressured into bold action, Burnside
was responsible for the costly and humiliating
defeat at Fredericksburg. When his next cam-
paign bogged down in the mud a month later,
Lincoln fired him. Reassigned to the West, Burn-
side served as the commander of the Department
of Ohio, where he ordered the arrest and oversaw
the banishment of Clement Vallandigham. He
later successfully defended Knoxville against a
rebel army led by James Longstreet. When Burn-
side returned to the East, he fought under George Meade in the Wilderness
Campaign. At Petersburg, he was relieved of his command for his role
in the Battle of the Creator fiasco. After the war, Burnside was active
in Rhode Island politics, serving as governor and U.S. Senator. Burnside
was a man who knew his limitations and accepted senior command grudg-
ingly. After bitter disappointments, he willingly accepted lesser roles in
a loyal and positive manner.

Joseph Hooker (1814-79) – Joseph Hooker served

as a subordinate officer in the East, fighting in most
of the major battles. His nickname “fighting Joe”
came from a misprint in a newspaper article.
Hooker never liked it. He played a major role in
the Union half victory at Antietam. After the
Union disaster at Fredericksburg, Hooker pub-
licly criticized his commanding officer, Ambrose
E. Burnside. Abraham Lincoln took a chance and
promoted Hooker to replace Burnside. A good
administrator, Hooker rapidly improved army morale and discipline. Ad-
vancing his army south, he met Lee at Chancellorsville. Lee completely
“out generaled” Hooker and dealt him a costly and humiliating defeat. Two
months later he was removed from command after quarreling with Lincoln
and senior commanders. Transferred to the West, Hooker fought effec-
tively at Chattanooga, capturing Lookout Mountain in the “battle above
the clouds.” He served under Sherman in the campaign against Atlanta,
but resigned when he was passed over for promotion. The legend that
prostitutes got their name “hookers” from the general is untrue. While

56
Hooker was a hard drinking, ladies man, they were called that before
Hooker’s time.

Benjamin Franklin Butler (1818-93) – Benja-

min Butler was the best known of the Northern
political generals. Although he was a Democrat,
the was a strong Unionist. Butler had no military
experience at all, but he rose to high command
because of his public following and his friends in
high places. He organized his own contingent of
Massachusetts militia, which were the first Union
soldiers to arrive in Washington after Fort Sumter.
Assigned command of Fort Monroe in Virginia, Butler was one of the first
to realize how important slave labor was to the Confederate war effort. He
was a failure as a military commander, so he was sent to New Orleans to
administer the newly captured city. He outraged the city’s inhabitants when,
among other things, he threatened to treat the women of New Orleans as
prostitutes. Butler was removed from his position when the South began to
use his outrageous behavior as effective war propaganda against the North.
In the spring of 1864, Butler used his connections to become head of the
Army of the James. He was defeated by P.T.G. Beauregard at Bermuda
Hundred, south of Richmond. U.S. Grant had little use for Butler’s military
skills, and he fired him when Butler’s expedition against Fort Fisher in North
Carolina failed. After the war, Butler was a powerful political force in the
radical Republican Congress and he spearheaded much of the reconstruc-
tion legislation. He was Governor of Massachusetts from 1883-84, and he
ran unsuccessfully for President in 1884.

The Generals - Confederate

Robert E. Lee (1807-70) – Robert E. Lee was the
most successful Confederate general and one of
history’s greatest military leaders. Without Lee’s
brilliant leadership, the Civil War might have been
much shorter. Lee was commanding troops in
Texas when the war broke out. He was offered
command of the Union army, but chose to stay
loyal to his home state of Virginia. Early in the
war, Lee served as military adviser to Jefferson
Davis in Richmond. When Joseph Johnston was
wounded at Fair Oaks, Lee took the field. Taking heavy casualties at the
Seven Days’ Battles, Lee managed to push the Federals off the Peninsula

57
and save Richmond. Marching north, Lee vanquished John Pope’s army
at 2nd Manassas and invaded Maryland. When Lee’s battle plans fell into
Union hands, he could only fight the Union army to a draw at Antietam.
Retreating south, Lee went on the defensive. At Fredericksburg, Lee
demonstrated his defensive brilliance in a lopsided Confederate victory.
Fredericksburg was followed by Chancellorsville, Lee’s masterpiece.
Displaying an uncanny ability to read the mind of his opponent, Lee com-
pletely out maneuvered and out fought the Federals. When Lee invaded
the North for a second time, his offensive came do a dramatic halt at Get-
tysburg, the largest battle in the Civil War. Some blame Lee’s stunning
defeat at Gettysburg on his own overconfidence, while others blame the
poor performance of his subordinates. Both were factors. Another cause
considered less often was how well the Federals fought. After Gettysburg,
Lee’s armies did not have the strength to win offensive victories. Fighting
U.S. Grant in the Wilderness Campaign, Lee inflicted heavy casualties,
but lost many men himself. During the winter of 64-5, Lee fought hunger
and desertion in his army. In the spring, Lee was forced to abandon his
trenches around Petersburg and run for it. Finding himself trapped at Ap-
pomattox, Lee was forced to surrender what was left of his army. Lee was
gracious in defeat, refusing to approve guerrilla type fighting after the sur-
render. After the war, Lee served as president of Washington College
(later renamed Washington and Lee) until his death. Admirers of Robert
E. Lee often see him as the epitome of the noble and strong Southern
gentlemen. The fact that Lee was a slave holder is often left out of the
legend. What is not in dispute is the fact that Robert E. Lee came to rep-
resent a way of Southern life that was overtaken by the modern world.

James Longstreet (1821-1904) – James Longstreet

was a highly regarded officer in the regular army
when the war began. Born in South Carolina, he
cast his lot with the Confederacy. He fought well
at 1st Manassas and commanded half of Lee’s
army during the Peninsula Campaign. An excel-
lent combat officer whom Lee often referred to as
”my war horse,” Longstreet played pivotal roles
in the rebel victories at 2nd Manassas, Antietam,
Fredericksburg, Chickamauga and The Wilder-
ness. Longstreet proved ineffective as an independent commander when
he failed to capture the city of Knoxville. He was with Lee at the surrender
at Appomattox. Longstreet’s most controversial role during the war was
commanding the Confederate right flank at Gettysburg. He openly ques-

58
tioned Lee’s offensive strategy during the battle. In retrospect, Longstreet’s
plan to flank the Federals and force them to attack was a better idea. The
disagreement became a full blown controversy after the war when Long-
street joined the Republican Party and supported U.S. Grant for President.
Southern Lost Cause writers (like Jubal Early) revisited Longstreet’s conduct
at Gettysburg and blamed him for the defeat. Longstreet benefited greatly
from his affiliation with the Republicans and served in many important
public positions in his long, post-war career.

Thomas Stonewall Jackson (1824-63) – Stone-

wall Jackson is often considered one of the most
brilliant battlefield commanders in American his-
tory. His military genius, odd personality quirks,
and religious fanaticism make him one of the most
compelling characters of the Civil War. After a five
year military career, Jackson accepted a teaching
position at the Virginia Military Institute. When
the war broke out, he resigned and joined the Con-
federate army. Jackson fought at 1st Manassas
where he and his brigade earned the nickname “Stonewall.” In May and
June of 1862, Jackson commanded 17,000 troops in the Shenandoah Valley
of Virginia. With high motivation and clever military strategy, Jackson’s
small army defeated 60,000 Federals. After the victory, Jackson hurried
south to join Robert E. Lee in the Peninsula Campaign. He performed
poorly on the Peninsula, probably due to exhaustion. At 2nd Manassas,
Jackson played a major role in the destruction of John Pope’s Union army.
When Lee decided to invade Maryland, Jackson was sent to capture Harper’s
Ferry. Jackson’s march from Harper’s Ferry to reinforce Lee at Antietam
probably saved the Confederate army. His troops played a major role at
Fredericksburg, holding off a ferocious Union assault. At Chancellors-
ville, Jackson made a daring, flanking attack that crushed the Union right.
After the battle, Jackson was personally scouting the Union lines for a
possible night attack when he was accidentally shot by his own sentries.
He died seven days later. Robert E. Lee was shocked and disheartened by
Jackson’s death, and the entire South mourned. Some attribute Lee’s defeat
at Gettysburg to Jackson’s absence from command.

J.E.B. Stuart (1833-64) – A native Virginian, James Ewell Brown Stuart

was only 27 years old when the war started. As a cavalry officer, he had
fought Indians on the frontier and maintained order in “Bloody” Kansas.
Stuart fought in every major battle in the eastern theater. During the war,

59
cavalry was used to screen the army and scout the enemy; and Stuart was
brilliant at this. Twice, he rode completely around George B. McClellan’s
army on reconnaissance missions, making dramatic headlines. At Chancel-
lorsville, Stuart played a pivotal role in Stonewall Jackson’s amazing
flanking attack. When Jackson was killed, Stuart temporarily took over his
command. Two low points in his career occurred
during the Gettysburg Campaign. Stuart was
surprised by Union cavalry at Brandy Station and
could only fight to a draw. As Robert E. Lee moved
his army north towards Pennsylvania, he wanted
Stuart to screen his army from Union detection.
Stuart misinterpreted Lee’s orders and rode around
the Union army. Lee was without critical informa-
tion on the enemy for seven days. It is doubtful if
Lee would have attacked so forcefully at Gettys-
burg had he known the true strength of the Federals. Jeb Stuart was killed
during the Wilderness Campaign when Phillip Sheridan’s cavalry attacked
him at Yellow Tavern. Stuart was confident, flashy, and flamboyant. He
understood the influence that positive newspaper reporting could have on
Confederate morale, and he made the most of it. Stuart was a favorite of
Robert E. Lee and his death (at the age of 31) was a bitter blow to Lee and
the entire Confederacy.

John Bell Hood (1831-79) – John Bell Hood was

a career military officer who fought under Robert
E. Lee in Texas before the war. He commanded
the Texas Iron Brigade, which first distinguished
itself during the Peninsula Campaign. Hood was
then promoted to command a division under James
Longstreet. After the victory at 2nd Manassas,
Hood got into an argument with a fellow officer;
and Longstreet had him arrested. As the Battle of
Antietam began, Hood’s Texas Brigade demanded
their commander’s return. Robert E. Lee intervened and returned Hood to
active duty. Hood fought brilliantly at Antietam. At Gettysburg, Hood
directed the attack against the Union position at Little Round Top. He was
severely wounded in the attack, loosing the use of his left arm. The loss of
Hood during the battle probably effected the outcome. When Hood recov-
ered, he was sent west with Longstreet to fight at Chickamauga. Hood’s
division broke the Union lines, but he was again severely wounded, this
time loosing his leg. Returning to duty in the spring of 1864, Hood fought

60
under Joseph Johnston against Sherman in the Atlanta Campaign. When
Jefferson Davis fired Johnston for constantly retreating, Hood took over
the command. In his typical, aggressive style, Hood launched four major
attacks against Sherman. All four assaults failed, and Hood had to abandon
Atlanta to save his army. Hood then circled around the Union position
cutting supply lines in an attempt to get Sherman to pursue him. When
Sherman failed to take the bait, Hood marched his army towards Nashville.
In December of 1864 at Nashville, George H, Thomas destroyed Hood’s
army. John Bell Hood’s military career was over, and he resigned soon
after the battle. His bravery and aggressiveness were legendary, but in top
command, he was reckless. Robert E. Lee referred to Hood as “all lion, no
fox.” After the war, Hood moved to New Orleans where he married and
fathered 11 children.

Nathan Bedford Forrest (1821-77) – Nathan

Bedford Forrest grew up poor in middle Tennessee
where he received no formal education. He became
wealthy as a planter and slave trader; and when
the war broke out, he was one of the richest men
in the South. Having no military training, Forrest
quickly became a top cavalry officer and was the
only bright spot at the rebel loss at the River Forts.
He fought at Shiloh, again distinguishing himself
with a spirited rear guard defense that covered the
Confederate retreat. At the first Battle of Murfreesboro, Forrest defeated a
Union army twice his size and captured nearly the entire force. Forrest’s
cavalry caused U.S. Grant to significantly revise and delay his Vicksburg
Campaign. At Chickamauga, he led the pursuit of the retreating Union
army and captured hundreds of prisoners. After the battle Forrest threatened
to kill his commanding officer Braxton Bragg for discontinuing the pursuit.
When senior Confederate command realized Forrest was serious, they hast-
ily re-assigned him to Mississippi. Raiding all over northern Mississippi,
western Tennessee, and Kentucky, Forrest attacked Fort Pillow in April of
1864. The massacre of black troops at Fort Pillow became a major inci-
dent of the war. Forrest continued his successful cavalry raiding through
the summer and fall of 1864. He then joined John Bell Hood’s disastrous
Nashville Campaign. At Nashville, he fought bravely and effectively in the
losing effort. In four years of war, Forrest had been wounded seven times,
had 29 horses shot out from under him and had personally killed 31 men.
Forrest never lost a battle until the end of the war, when he was hopelessly
outnumbered. Many believe that had his military genius been discovered

61
sooner, things might have gone far better for the Confederacy in the West.
After the war, Forrest rebuilt his lost fortune through railroading and plant-
ing. He became the first Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan in 1867, but
resigned when he saw things getting out of hand.

Jubal Anderson Early (1816-94) – After a brief

military career Jubal Early began to practice law
in Virginia. He opposed secession but accepted a
commission in the Confederate army when war
broke out. Early fought in most of the battles in
the eastern theater. He was promoted for his ca-
pable leadership at Antietam. Early saved the day
at Fredericksburg when he plugged the hole that
George G. Meade had punched in the south part of
the rebel line. At Chancellorsville, he fought an
effective delaying action at Marye’s Heights, giving Lee and Jackson enough
time to destroy Joe Hooker’s army. Early played a significant part in the
Gettysburg drama. He replaced Richard S. Ewell at corps command dur-
ing the Wilderness Campaign. Early’s most important military contribu-
tion took place in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864. Lee sent Early into the
valley to take the pressure off Petersburg and Richmond. The campaign
went so well, that Early marched to within three miles of Washington,
threatening the Northern Capital. Grant was furious and sent Phillip
Sheridan to deal with Early. With a superior force, Sheridan defeated
Early and drove the Confederates out of the Shenandoah Valley for good.
When the war ended, Early fled the country, settling in Toronto, Canada.
He returned to Virginia in 1869 to continue his practice of law. Early was
an excellent writer and led the bitter Lost Cause movement which blamed
the Confederate defeat on James Longstreet’s actions at Gettysburg.

Braxton Bragg (1817-76) – Braxton Bragg had

retired from the army and owned a sugar planta-
tion in Louisiana when the war started. His first
assignment was commanding the Confederate gulf
coast defenses. Bragg fought at Shiloh and moved
up in the command structure when Albert Sidney
Johnston was killed. Soon after, P.G.T. Beaure-
gard became ill, and Bragg took over command
of the Army of Tennessee. In August of 1862,
Bragg invaded Kentucky and won a tactical vic-
tory at Perryville. His invasion ultimately failed when he retreated back

62
into Tennessee. At Stones River, Bragg fought William S. Rosecrans to a
draw, but retreated again to a position south of Chattanooga. Reinforced at
Chickamauga, Bragg routed Rosecran’s army and laid siege to Chattanooga.
U.S. Grant then broke the siege and defeated Bragg at Chattanooga. A close
personal friend of Jefferson Davis, Bragg was transferred to Richmond were
he became military adviser to the President. Proving ineffective in that posi-
tion, Bragg returned to minor field command late in the war. Braxton Bragg
was a quarrelsome man who was difficult to get along with. His friendship
with Davis is probably the reason he served in such high command. After
the war, Brag moved to Texas and became a railroad inspector.

P.G.T. Beauregard (1818-93) – Pierre Gustave

Toutant de Beauregard was a creole (a descendant
of early French settlers) from Louisiana. He was
superintendent of West Point when the war broke
out. Beauregard commanded the rebel forces. In
Charleston harbor that forced the surrender of Fort
Sumter. Beauregard and Joseph Johnston headed
the victorious Confederate armies at 1st Manassas.
Transferred west, he assumed command during the
Battle of Shiloh when Albert Sidney Johnston was
killed. No friend of Jefferson Davis’s, Beauregard was removed from com-
mand after Shiloh when he became ill. From 1862-64 Beauregard compe-
tently defended Charleston against Union attack. During the Wilderness
Campaign, Robert E. Lee called upon Beauregard to help in the defense of
Richmond. He defeated Benjamin Butler in the Bermuda Campaign south
of Richmond, delaying the inevitable. Towards the end of the war, he served
under Joseph Johnston in the Carolinas. After the war ended, Beauregard
returned to Louisiana and managed railroads and ran the Louisiana lottery.

Joseph E. Johnston – Joseph Johnston was a general

in the U.S. Army and the highest ranking officer to
resign to join the Confederacy. He commanded half
of the rebel army at 1st Manassas and he shared
the credit for the victory. Johnston hated President
Jefferson Davis, and their feud complicated military
strategy for the South throughout the war. Johnston
led the Army of Northern Virginia in the Peninsula
Campaign against George B. McClellan. He was
badly wounded at Fair Oaks in July 62 and replaced
by Robert E. Lee. After a four month recovery, Johnston returned to duty as

63
commander of the Confederate forces in the West. He was, at least, partially
responsible for the loss of Vicksburg. Johnston replaced Braxton Bragg
after the rebel defeat at Chattanooga. He retreated in front of William T.
Sherman all the way to Atlanta, where he was replaced by John Bell Hood.
Joseph Johnston was a competent, sometimes overly cautious, commander.
In February of 1865, Johnston commanded what was left of the rebel forces in
North Carolina. He surrendered to William T. Sherman soon after Appomat-
tox. After the war, Joe Johnston served as a United States congressman and
railroad commissioner. He died at the age of 84 when he caught pneumonia
at William T. Sherman’s funeral.

Conclusion
The American Civil War took an incredible toll in terms of human
life. 620,000 soldiers died. Of all the men in uniform during the war, one
in three were dead by 1865. The Northern economy, which boomed during
the conflict, continued to expand after the war. The Southern economy was
devastated. Regional industries were destroyed, 40% of Southern livestock
were dead, Southern railroads lay in ruins, and thousands of acres of farm-
land were overgrown in weeds. In 1860, the average Southerner was 70%
as wealthy as the average Northerner. By 1865 that had shrunk to 40%.
Many Confederate veterans were homeless and jobless. Four million freed
slaves faced an uncertain future. Little thought had been given to how best to
handle this gigantic social upheaval. The power and influence of the federal
government had been greatly increased by the Civil War.
After the war, Northern Republicans painted the Democrats as disloyal
during the conflict to gain political power. Gradually, Northerners lost inter-
est in the war, secure in their belief that their cause had been just. The South
had a much more difficult time moving on from the conflict. The humilia-
tion of their defeat and the enormity of their sacrifice required deeper soul
searching. Many Southerners came to embrace the “Myth of the Lost Cause”
to make sense of the war. In this myth, Robert E. Lee is idealized as the
perfect product of the antebellum South, slavery is downplayed as a cause of
the war, and the defeat is blamed on disloyal Southern generals (like James
Longstreet). It is surprising how common belief in the “Lost Cause” is even
today. Twenty five years after the conflict, veterans from both sides started
coming together for Civil War reunions. In these gatherings, emancipation
and black participation in the war were virtually eliminated. Some people
believe that the prevalence of these attitudes explain why it was 100 years
after the Civil War before black people came to receive equal protection
under the law.

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