Introduction: In order to begin to understand the factors and causes of World War II, one must first understand

the factors and causes that gave it rise, and in order for such factors to be clearly comprehended and understood, one must grasp the environment that gave birth to it. While this research does not intend to elaborate on WWII as such, it does seek to identify the factors and causes that provided the drive for a Second World War, so soon after the first had been devastatingly seared into mass public consciousness. Indeed, on all fronts, the end of World War I saw the generation of a massive anti-war sentiment; which stemmed directly from the massive loss of life and severe social trauma. Of the 60 million European soldiers who were mobilized, 8 million were killed, 7 million were permanently disabled, and 15 million were seriously injured. On its own, Germany saw a grand total of 15% of its male population decimated.1 The shortage of manpower in subsequent years to come was so severe, that Adolf Hitlers government was reduced to incentivizing marriage through the gifts of money upon marriage, and for each newly-born, German child. The question then, is how did such a traumatic event see itself repeated? Events History dates the end of World War I on November 11th, 1918, in Western Europe, and in the Eastern Europe by 1920, through the signing of the Treaty of Versailles. While the end of the War did re-shape the World in political, social and cultural spheres; some changes, more than others, were rather conducive to the re-initiation of potential future conflict. Other factors, while more innocent; did their equal share of priming the keg, however inadvertently. It should be noted however, that the end of the First World War was characterized by the domination of Idealist thought. Examples of such are found in Wilsonian thought and the formation
11

Martin Kitchen, Europe Between the Wars (New York: Longman, 2000), 22.

of the League of Nations. One may assume that following the end of the war, thoughts of future conflict were not highly relevant or pressing. Indeed, in retrospect, while examining the severe terms and humiliation caused by the Treaty of Versailles to Germany, the victorious Allies do not seem to have pre-empted any sort of future response from Germany at all; or perhaps did, but believed their restrictions and limitations enough to keep Germany in check; another example of Idealistic trends of thought trends. Speculation aside, the first of the key features which defined the Interbellum, or Interwar period (1918-1939) was the blockade of Germany from the time of the signed Armistice and end of the war on November 11th 1918 until June 28th 1919; a total of 8 months in which a nation dependent on imports was forced to do without them. German National Archives set the casualties that occurred due to starvation as close to 525,000 deaths. As far as the German people were concerned, this move portrayed nothing of the goodwill that the German people had come to expect of the gracious victors and only gave rise to national sentiment, bitter feelings and feelings of isolation, which made a definitive come-back later on in the guise of ultra-nationalism and fascism. A Decisive factor in the priming of Germanys potential for intent of war can found in absolute blaming of the war on Germany, and the loss of Poland, which stung bitterly in national sentiment. Some may posit however, that the treaty did little to effectively cripple German ambition and potential. While the Treaty of Versailles was in reality probably justified, some segments of it bordered on the extreme. Charging Wilhem II with supreme offense against international morality, much of the territorial division, and finally the taxing weight of the reparation payments all proved to be heavily burdensome on Germany as a whole. Ironically enough, in one of the largest strategic blunders the Allies ever made, the Treaty of Versailles demanded a total of $31.4 billion dollars from Germany, or in the present day, a grand total of $385 dollars. One would posit that the reparation

payments were made in a peevish sort of revenge on the Germans for their imposition of reparation payments on France following the Franco-Prussian war. However, while France was able to pay the reparations within three years, had Germany continued to pay reparations, it would have done so until the year of 1988.2 Future German propaganda would utilize the view that the treaty was unfair, which a large number of Germans never truly accepted; which resulted in the people willingly giving their ear to a charismatic politician, who with all fairness, can be said to have been the first German leader to vocalize this dissent and take action against the injustices of the treaty; this man was Adolf Hitler. Expansionism In analyzing the causes leading up to World War II, expansionism must be given its due as one of the most direct causes leading up to the Second World War. During WWI, a large number of European nations held vast amounts of land and territory under their control; which was a soughtafter achievement; considering the benefits it held for them in the way of economy and resources. Two nations that were unsuccessful in gaining such land were Germany and Italy. For Italy, the drive for expansionism can be attributed to resentment following its aid to the allies and minimal returns received towards the end of World War I. While promised significant portions of land, it did not receive most of them. Beyond this, the inefficacy of the League of Nations response following Italys invasion of Albania and Ethiopia only served to embolden it and other nations who were also harboring expansionist feelings. With regards to Germany, its impetus for expansionism can be attributed to poor economic standing and the desire for reclamation of lands rightfully theirs. One should bear in mind that the 1930s

Hans-Joachim Braun, The German Economy in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 1990), 46.

saw the world in the grips of an economic depression the likes of which had never been seen before. The worst afflicted by this depression, following the United States closely on its heels was Germany. Retrospectively speaking, it seems almost inevitable that War would have broken out, as expansionism would have bettered a nations economy, as would have War, both of which are two sides to the same coin; a paradox of sorts that Germany was quick to realize, and America slower to grasp as witnessed by its policy of Isolationism, which like the failure of the League of Nations, and the Policy of Appeasement, only served to increase the desire of these downtrodden countries to achieve their rightful place and stature in the world. Furthermore, the loss of the Rhineland and other valuable economic regions in France resulted in the relocation of population, and effectively, severe bitterness among the Germans. As a result, under the Nazi regime, the pre-World War I boundaries of Germany were actively sought out, leading to the almost inevitable war with Poland. The very daring of Germany was probably due to Nazi leaderships estimation that the invasion of Poland and even Russia would not result in a large war, or at most, would result in weak, pathetic Allied response after the fact. Equally important was the concept of Greater Germany, which was an idea that had been growing unopposed in Germany for a long period of time. The policy of Lebensraum sought to unite all Germanic peoples underneath the banner of one nation, irrespective of the fact that they were minorities in the said territories. Japan was another nation that possessed a major drive for economic expansionism, which was caused partially by the miniscule rewards it received following the First World War. The discontent was generally caused by Japans being forced to give up all lands it took control of during the WWI, which included a German settlement in China, portions of land in Siberia, a Russian port, and a number of islands in the Pacific. One would also do well to note that geographically speaking,

Japans ambitions did not reconcile with the amount of natural resources available to it. While strategically located in the Pacific, Japan lacked coal, rubber, petroleum and even wood with which to mechanize and build towards its later conceived idea of a superior empire. As such, one may assert that as with most other nations possessing expansionist tendencies, it was only a matter of time until these sentiments rose to the forefront and affected their policy. Realistically speaking, Japan would have hit a lull in its mechanization and industrialization sooner or later due to the lack or low amounts of vitally needed resources. As such, the variety of options available to it must have seemed tantalizing indeed; and as such it must come as no surprise to later historians that Japan chose to take the path of conquest and seek world domination. On a more general level, it must also be said that with regards to expansionism, much of the impetus was caused by inadvertent, impulsive Allied decisions. With regards to most of the expansionseeking nations, the drive for expansionism would have been largely suppressed had the Allies not stripped them of their land trophies following the World War. One might argue however, that not stripping them of their lands would have sent a message of softness to the defeated nations. While this may very well be the case, it must still be pointed out that some of the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles were quite simply petty. While the limiting of Germanys army size was rational, the imposition of extreme reparations was however not. Furthermore, the laying of the blame on Germany was also quite short-sighted, seeing as most of Germanys people had nothing to do with the war. Irrespective of decisions, it may be concluded that for a large number of these nations, their World War II inducing expansionism was brought about as a result of national slights, whether intended or otherwise, ambitions for a large empire and finally: a wish for the re-unification of previously owned territories.

Failure of League of Nations and Improper International Response: While the desire for expansionism was one of the main underlying reasons behind the Second World War, it should be noted that the desire for expansionism alone may be harmless; but that the combination of circumstances at that time created of these constrained nations a volatile mix of nationalism, fascism, militarism, and resentment. A direct cause of this was the Treaty of Versailles, what aggravated it further; was the flawed and weak international handling of the situation. Even the treaty of Versailles was also a factor however. What definitively allowed the world situation to progress beyond the point of no return however, was the failure of the League of Nations to carry out its mandate, and prevent the reoccurrence of a World War.
The League of Nations most obvious deficiency lay in the fact that it did not have a military force of its own. As such, most of its actions took the form of sanctions and condemnations, and even then by means of its more powerful members who were often ambivalent or unwilling to place pressure on others.

Equally crippling was the League of Nations policy of unanimity in voting, which gave effectively gave each member the power of Veto. As a result, this caused the League to appear indecisive, unsure and often weak. Additionally, it suffered with the general perception of its being a league of victors, which was impressed upon Germany and Japan countless times in the Leagues initial refusal to allow them to join. The league also contradicted itself with its notion of collective security, which to a large extent was the bedrock of its policy. The policy required nations to be ready to invade a nation that they may have considered friendly, simply to aid a nation with which they held a normal relationship. As such, a nation might be required to go against its own interests; which caused them to be even more reticent in their decisions and actions; and to ultimately adopt a passive, pacifyingly approach of appeasement.

The concept of collective security was eventually rejected by members of the League, and soon after the world witnessed Britain and France appeasing Germanys rapidly increasing militarism. To further add problems to the basket, the United States had not opted to be part of the League of Nations although it was one of the driving forces behind its creation. At the time, the United States had adopted a policy of Isolationism, which along with appeasement from other European states, only served to embolden Germany and Japan. Conclusion: With the failure of the League of Nations, and with the ineffectual policy of appeasement, the Interbellum received rapidly acting catalysts that did much to ensure that the Second World War was inevitable. One must note however, that a large number of the factors that brought about the Second World War had potential to be avoided, and were not evaded due to a general lack of foresight and the wonder and naivet that only comes as a result of facing things for the first time; as in the case of nationalism, and the limits to which a nation would go to in order to make come to terms with the target of its resentment.

Reference:
Braun, Hans-Joachim The German Economy in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 1990). Burbank, Jane Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010) Flower, Desmond The War: 1939-1945 (London: Cassel, 1960)

Kitchen, Martin Europe Between the Wars: A Political History (New York: Pearson Longman, 2000) Miller, Donald L. The Story of World War II: Revised, expanded and updated from the original text by Henry Steele Commager (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002) Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960) Shirer, William L. The Collapse of the Third Republic: An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969) Tucker, Spencer World War II: A Student Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara: 2005) Toland, John Willard The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-45 (New York: Modern Library, 2003) Roberts, J.M. The History of Europe (New York: Penguin Non-Classics, 1997) Keegan, John The Second World War (New York: Penguin Non-Classics, 1990) Gilbert, Felix & Large, David C. The End of the European Era: 1890 to the Present (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2002) Merriman, John A History of Modern Europe, Second Edition: From the Renaissance to the Present (New York: University of New York Press, 1993) McKay, John P. A History of Western Society (Stanford: Cengage Publishing) Palmer, R.R. & Colton, A History of the Modern World (New York: McGraw Hill, 2002) Paxton, R. Europe in the Twentieth Century (New York: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 2005) Spielvogel, J. Western Civilization (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2005)