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VI PERSONS LIABLE A.

THE TORTFEASOR
CIVIL CODE: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a) Art. 2081. The guarantor may set up against the creditor all the defenses which pertain to the principal debtor and are inherent in the debt; but not those that are personal to the debtor. (1853) Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n) WORCESTER v OCAMPO 22 PHIL 42 Johnson; Feb. 27, 1912 NATURE: Appeal from judgment of CFI FACTS - Plaintiff Dean Worcester, member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior of the Insular Government commenced an action against defendants Ocampo, Kalaw, Santos, Reyes, Aguilar, Liquete, Palma, Arellano, Jose, Lichauco, Barretto and Cansipit (owners, directors, writers, editors and administrators of a certain newspaper known as El Renacimiento or Muling Pagsilang) for the purpose of recovering damages resulting from an alleged libelous publication. - The editorial Birds of Prey was alleged to have incited the Filipino people into believing that plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt person, unworthy of the position which he held. The said editorial alluded to him as an eagle that surprises and devours, a vulture that gorges himself on dead and rotten meat, an owl that affects a petulant omniscience, and a vampire that sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless. - After hearing the evidence adduced during trial, the judge of the CFI rendered judgment in favor of petitioner, holding all the defendants (except for Reyes, Aguilar and Liquete who were found to be editors but in a subordinate position and found to have merely acted under the direction of their superiors) liable jointly and severally for sustained damages on account of petitioners wounded feelings, mental suffering and injuries to his standing and reputation in the sum of P35,000 as well as P25,000 as punitive damages. - This judgment prompted defendants to appeal to the SC, claiming that the CFI committed several errors in rendering said judgment among which was that the lower court committed an error in rendering a judgment jointly and severally against the defendants. ISSUE WON the defendants, regardless of their participation in the commission of the actual tort, may be held jointly and severally liable as joint tortfeasors HELD YES. Ratio Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate

in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. ***If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured, has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them separately, because tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual. Reasoning Defendants fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is a tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tortfeasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tortfeasors. The defendants might have been sued separately for the commission of the tort. They might have sued jointly and severally, as they were. It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act. **note: Ponente used examples of torts as held under common law** (In a case of assault and battery committed by various persons, under the common law, all are principals). So also is the person who counsels, aids, or assists in any way the commission of a wrong. Under the common law, he who aided, assisted or counseled, in any way the commission of a crime, was as much a principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual tort. - Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The person injured may sue all of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all, and altogether jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared with that of the others. - The courts during the trial may find that some of the alleged joint tortfeasors are liable and that others are not liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort. And this is true even though they are charged jointly and severally. However, in this case, the lower court, committed no error in rendering a joint and several judgment against the defendants. As recognized by Section 6 of Act 277 of the Philippine Commission: Every author, editor, or proprietor * * * is chargeable with the publication of any words in any part * * * or number of each newspaper, as fully as if he were the author of the same. Disposition Judgment of the lower court modified. Ocampo, Kalaw, Palma, Arellano, Jose, Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit held jointly and severally liable for the sum of P25, 000 with interest at 6%. Santos absolved from any liability. ARELLANO, C.J. and MAPA, J. [concurring] - We concur, except with reference to the liability imposed upon Lichauco. The real owner and founder, Ocampo, explicitly stated that the other so-called founders subscribed and paid sums of money to aid the paper but as to Lichauco, he offered to contribute, but did not carry out his offer and in fact paid nothing. It is incomprehensible how one could claim the right or title to share the earnings or profits of a company when he had put no capital into it, neither is it comprehensible how one could share in the losses thereof, and still less incur liability for damages on account of some act of the said company, an unrestricted liability to the extent of all his property, as though he were a regular general partner when he was not such. TORRES [dissenting in part] - I concur in regard to the defendants Ocampo and Kalaw, but dissent as regards Palma, Arellano, Jose, Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit for they had neither direct nor indirect participation in the act that gave rise to the present suit for

damages, nor were they owners or proprietors of the newspaper, its press or other equipment. They were donors who merely contributed a sum of money, as a genuine gift, for the purpose of founding, editing, and issuing the said newspaper, it is improper to deduce that the contributors formed a company of either a civil or commercial nature. - After Ocampo had accepted the various amounts proffered, the donors ceased to be the owners of and surrendered all right to the money donated and to the objects that were acquired therewith. Therefore they can not incur, jointly and severally with the director and manager. Art. 2184, CC. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable. (n) CHAPMAN V UNDERWOOD 27 Phil 374 MORELAND; March 28, 1914 NATURE Appeal from the judgment of trial court finding for the defendant FACTS - The plaintiff-appellant, Chapman, desired to board a certain "San Marcelino" car coming from Sta. Ana and bound for Manila. Being told by his friend that the car was approaching, he immediately, and somewhat hurriedly, passed into the street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car. The car was a closed one, the entrance being from the front or the rear platform. Plaintiff attempted to board the front platform but, seeing that he could not reach it without extra exertion, stopped beside the car, facing toward the rear platform, and waited for it to come abreast of him in order to board. While in this position he was struck from behind and run over by the defendant's (Underwood) automobile. - The defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle Peafrancia in his automobile driven by his chauffeur, a competent driver. A street car bound from Manila to Sta. Ana being immediately in front of him, he followed along behind it. Just before reaching the scene of the accident the street car which was following took the switch (there was a single-track street-car line running along Calle Herran, with occasional switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other)- that is, went off the main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside of the main track. Thereupon the defendant either kept straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to the right. The car which the plaintiff intended to board was on the main line and bound in an opposite direction to that in which the defendant was going. When the front of the "San Marcelino" car was almost in front of the defendant's automobile, defendant's driver suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the plaintiff. - The judgment of the trial court was for defendant. ISSUE WON Underwood is responsible for the negligence of his driver. HELD NO. Ratio An owner who sits in his automobile or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. On the

other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present herein at5 the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefore. The act complained of must be continued in the presence or the owner for such a length of time that the owner by his acquiescence, makes his drivers act his own. Reasoning Defendant's driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side. - The plaintiff needed only to watch for cars coming from his right, as they were the only ones under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the street car. - in the case of Johnson vs. David, the driver does not fall within the list of persons in Art.1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant would be responsible. Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not present at the time the alleged negligent acts were committed by the driver, the same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent act of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. - it appears with fair clearness that the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver. DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is affirmed. CAEDO V YU KHE THAI GR NO. L-20392 MAKALINTAL; December 18, 1968 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CFI of Iloilo FACTS - Bernardo is the driver of Yu Khe Thai. He was driving the latters Cadillac along highway 54. On the other side of the road, Caedo was driving his Mercury car. He was with his family. - A carretela was in front of the Cadillac. Bernardo did not see the carretela from afar. When he approached the carritela, he decided to overtake it even though he had already seen the car of the Caedos approaching from the opposite lane. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. - The Caedos were injured. They filed a suit for recovery of damages against Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai. The CFI ruled in favor of the Caedos and held Bernardo and Yu solidarily liable. ISSUES WON Yu Khe Thai should be held solidarily liable as Bernardos employer HELD No. - Bernardo had no record of any traffic violation. No negligence of having employed him maybe imputed to his master. - Negligence on the employers part, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting,, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. - No negligence can be imputed. The car was running at a reasonable speed. The road was wide and open. There was no reason for Yu to be specially alert. He had reason to rely on the

skill of his driver. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. - The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another DISPOSITIVE Decision modified. Yu Khe Thai is free from liability CAEDO v. YU KHE THAI GR No. L-20392 MAKALINTAL; December 18, 1968 FACTS - Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home in Quezon City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro. With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his Paraaque home to Wack Wack. - The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds, considering the condition of the road and the absence of traffic the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and the Cadillac at approximately 48 to 56 kilometers. Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a caretella owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista. - Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him, only eight meters away. This is the first clear indication of his negligence. The carretela was provided with two lights, one on each side, and they should have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary precautions. And even if he did not notice the lights, as he claimed later on at the trial, the carretela should anyway have been visible to him from afar if he had been careful, as it must have been in the beam of his headlights for a considerable while. - In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the left in order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his speed, judged the distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac would wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to take a gamble beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with the carretela, or else squeeze in between them in any case. It was a risky maneuver either way, and the risk should have been quite obvious. - It was already too late to apply the brakes when Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him, and so he had to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side was insufficient. Its rear bumper, as already stated, caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected

situation, tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful. The photographs taken at the scene show that the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the moment of impact. ISSUE 1. WON defendant Rafael Bernardo is liable for the accident. 2. If YES, WON his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai, is solidarily liable with him. HELD 1. YES. There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. 2. NO. If the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. - The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage. - The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. - The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed. - Rafael Bernardo had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. The car was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability, and is otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with costs against the latter.

RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA) 135 SCRA 242 ABAD SANTOS; February 28, 1985 NATURE: Petition to review a decision of CA FACTS: Roberto Luna, a businessman, was killed in a vehicular collision (between Luna, driving a gokart, and Luis dela Rosa, 13 years old, driving a Toyota car without a license) at a gokart practice area. Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages against Luis and his father, which the CFI ruled in favor of the Lunas, awarding P1,650,000 as unearned net earnings of Luna, P12,000 compensatory damages, and P50,000 for loss of his companionship (come on!!), with legal interest from date of the decision, and attorneys fees of P50,000 (no interest mentioned). (Note: father and son solidarily liable for damages.) The Dela Rosas appealed in the CA, which affirmed in toto the RTC. In a MFR filed by the Dela Rosas, the CA modified the decision, this time reducing the unearned income to P450,000. Both parties filed separate petitions for review in the SC. Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for lack of merit. The instant petition is the one filed by Lunas, contending that the CA erred in reducing the award for unearned income, and that the award for attys fees should include legal interest. Pending the decision, the SC came out with a resolution ordering the Dela Rosas, in the interest of justice (since the death took place in 1970, and 15 years after the process of litigation is still not over), to pay the Lunas P450,000 for unearned net earnings, P12,000 compensatory damages, P50,000 for loss of companionship, all with legal interest, and attys fees of P50,000, within 30 days. The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts, saying that they had no cash money. The writ of execution produced only a nominal amount. In the meantime, Luis is already of age, married, with 2 kids, and living in Spain but only causally employed (His compensation is hardly enough to support his family. He has no assets of his own as yet). ISSUES: 1. WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned income 2. WON the award for attys fees should have legal interest HELD: 1. YES Ratio: The reduction of the award of net unearned earnings had no basis, thus is void. Reasoning: the RTC based its computation of the net unearned earnings on 2 factors: life expectancy of the deceased of another 30 years, and an annual net income of P55,000 (P75,000 gross income less P20,000 personal expenses). In coming out with the life expectancy, RTC considered the age and health of the deceased. However, the CA modified this by factoring in the engagement of Luna in car racing, thus lowering the life expectancy to only 10 years. WRT to the gross income, RTC considered the various positions the deceased held at the time of his death, and the trend of his earnings over the span of his last few years, thus coming up with a potential gross income of P75,000. However, the CA increased the annual personal expenses to P30,000, due to the escalating gasoline expenses, thus lowering the net annual unearned income to P45,000. CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racing reduced the life expectancy. There is nothing on record that supports the claim that the car racing was a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy. That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then gokart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for gokarts are extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only

slightly larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled conveyances. It was error on the part of the CA to have disturbed the determination of the RTC which it had previously affirmed. Also, it was an error to increase the expenses without increasing the gross income. It stands to reason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because of the escalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing [a statement which lacks complete basis], it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase considering the manifold sources thereof 2. YES Ratio: The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and under the circumstances, interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court. (The attys fees should accrue interest from the date of filing of the compliant.) Obiter: The Dela Rosas invoke the ruling in Elcano v Hilll, where the court held that A2180 applied to Atty. Hill nothwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of his son, but since the son had attained majority, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill became merely subsidiarily to that of his son. The Dela Rosas now invoke that the father should also be held only subsidiarily. To this contention, the court is unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law because to do so will not serve the ends of justice. Luis is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine Courts. Also, he has no property in the Phils or elsewhere. Disposition: resolution of CA SET ASIDE, reinstating the earlier decision with slight modification regarding the award of attys fees.

B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
QUASI TORTS (Blacks Law Dictionary)

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 603:THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE CHAPTER IV: Liabilities of Parents Article 58. Torts. - Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the Civil Code. FAMILY CODE: Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated: (1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214; (2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and (3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified. Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed. Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a) Art. 129. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasidelicts. (n) Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. Art. 236. Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life. RPC: Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules: First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part. Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law. Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received. The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable. When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damages have been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations. Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution. Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes

committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees. Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees. Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties. Republic Act No. 9344 AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act. The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. CIVIL CODE: Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a) Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904) Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)

ISSUE Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperia caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno. RULING 1 YES. RATIO Parents shall be liable for the tortious conduct of their minor children living with them although at the time of the tort, the children were under the direct control or supervision of an academic institution. (THIS IS A LANDMARK DOCTRINE, WHICH WAS LATER MODIFIED BY J CRUZ IN AMADORA VS. COURT OF APPEALS) REASONING The provision Teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was in connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it, the accident occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institution of arts and trades as provided for by law. The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This defendants failed to prove. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P2,959.00 as damages, and the costs of action. REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting: I believe we should affirm the judgment relieving the father of liability. I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to

1. PARENTS
SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO L-10068-70 06291957 BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: FACTS Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperia and Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna. During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperia, reserved her right to bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused. After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged and, on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Dante Capuno was only fifteen (15) years old when he committed the crime. In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro Caperia. Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of Isidoro Caperia, he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the time of the accident, the former was not under the control, supervision and custody of the latter. This defense was sustained by the lower court and, as a consequence, it only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint. From this decision, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals but the case was certified to the Supreme Court on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of law. It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the Balintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31, 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperia, died as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his son at the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. He only came to know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher. Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor and was then living with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident. And so, plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in relieving the father from liability.

1 The case involves an interpretation of Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, (schools liability versus parental liability) which provides:

"ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible. The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them. xxx xxx xxx Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody."

academic ones. What substantial difference is there between them in so far as concerns the proper supervision and vigilance over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons, so long as they are in a position to exercise authority and supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of establishments". The phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian and French Civil Codes. If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would seem clear that where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no responsibility. I submit that the father should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent, and which he had every right to assume the school authorities would avoid. Having proved that he entrusted his child to the custody of school authorities that were competent to exercise vigilance over him, the father has rebutted the presumption of Art. 1903 and the burden of proof shifted to the claimant to show actual negligence on the part of the parent in order to render him liable. Padilla and Reyes, A., JJ., concur. SALEN V. BALCE G.R. No. L-14414 |

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the father can be held subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity of P2,000.00 which his son was sentenced to pay in the criminal case filed against him. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes. While the court agrees with the theory that, as a rule, the civil liability arising from a crime shall be governed by the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, it disagrees with the contention that the subsidiary liability of persons for acts of those who are under their custody should likewise be governed by the same Code even in the absence of any provision governing the case, for that would leave the transgression of certain right without any punishment or sanction in the law. Such would be the case if we would uphold the theory of appellee as sustained by the trial court. A minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code. The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent portion ofwhich provides: "The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who lived in their company." To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void that apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases. FUELLAS V. CADANO Nature: Appeal from the Decision of the Trial Court making defendant therein, now appellant Agapito Fuellas, the father of the minor who caused the injuries to Pepito Cadano, also a minor, liable under Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code for damages. Facts: Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendantappellant Agapito Fuellas, were both 13 years old, on September 16, 1954. They were classmates at St. Mary's High School, Dansalan City. They had a quarrel that lead to Pepitos injury, his right arm was broken after Rico pushed him on the ground. It is contended that in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petitioner-appellant was ordered to pay damages for the deliberate injury caused by his son; that the said court held the petitioner liable pursuant to par. 2 of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, in connection with Art. 2176 of the same Code; that according to the last article, the act of the minor must be one wherein "fault or negligence" is present; and that there being no fault or negligence on the part of petitioner-appellant's minor son, but deliberate intent, the above mentioned articles are not applicable, for the existence of deliberate intent in the commission of an act negatives the presence of fault or negligence in its commission. Appellant, therefore, submits that

April 27, 1960

FACTS y Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte to recover the sum of P2,000.00 y Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died single from wounds caused by Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of defendant. y Gumersindo Balce was also Single, a minor below 18 years of age, and was living with defendant. As a result of Carlos Salen's death, Gumersindo Balce accused and convicted of homicide and was sentenced imprisonment and to pay the heirs of the deceased an indemnity in the amount of P2,000.00. y Upon petition of plaintiff, the only heirs of the deceased, a writ of execution was issued for the payment of the indemnity but it was returned unsatisfied because Gumersindo Balce was insolvent and had no property in his name. y Thereupon, plaintiffs demanded upon defendant, father of Gumersindo, the payment of the indemnity the latter has failed to pay, but defendant refused, thus causing plaintiffs to institute the present action. y The trial court held that that the civil liability of the son of appellee arises from his criminal liability and, therefore, the subsidiary liability of appellee must be determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, and not under Article 2180 of the new Civil Code which only applies to obligations which arise from quasi-delicts

the appellate Court erred in holding him liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act of his minor son. Issue: WON the father is liable civilly for the criminal act of his son? Held: Yes. In an earlier case (Exconde vs. Capuno, et al., G.R. No. L-10132, prom. June 29, 1957), holding the defendants jointly and severally liable with his minor son Dante for damages, arising from the criminal act committed by the latter, this tribunal gave the following reasons for the rule: The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them in proportion to their means", while on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Arts. 134 and 135, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Art. 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This, defendants failed to prove. In another case, Salen and Salbanera vs. Jose Balce, the defendant Balce was the father of a minor Gumersindo Balce, below 18 years of age who was living with him. Gumersindo was found guilty of homicide for having killed Carlos Salen, minor son of plaintiffs. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case, stating that the civil liability of the minor son of defendant arising from his criminal liability must be determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and not under Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code. In reversing the decision, this tribunal held: It is true that under Art. 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, or over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acts without discernment, unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits the act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or control. But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code. The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent portion of which provides: "The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases. Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of the evidence submitted therein by both parties, independently of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the action in the

present case was instituted, is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault of negligence under the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated, any discussion as to the minor's criminal responsibility is of no moment. IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is dismissed, the decision appealed from is affirmed GUTIERREZ VS GUTIERREZ MALCOLM; September 23, 1931 Nature: an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the five defendants, to recover damages in the amount of P10,000, for physical injuries suffered as a result of an automobile accident. Facts: A passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality of Las Pias, Province of Rizal. The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and was owned by Saturnino Cortez. The automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age, and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr. and Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez. At the time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but the mother, together will several other members of the Gutierrez family, seven in all, were accommodated therein. Narcisso Gutierrez was a passenger of the bus. He had a fracture on his right leg. It was conceded that the collision was caused by negligence pure and simple. But, Narcisso Gutierrez blames both the bus and the car while the truck blames the car and the car in turn blames the truck. the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent chauffeur, that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed, and that, on approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his head and so contributed by his negligence to the accident. The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son. Based on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and not the minor or the mother, would be liable for the damages caused by the minor. Issue: 1. 2. Held: 1. WON the father of Bonifacio (car) is liable. WON the owner of the truck is liable. Yes. In the United States, it is uniformly held that the head of a house, the owner of an automobile, who maintains it for the general use of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children, whom he designates or permits to run it, where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of the owner's family than the child driving it. The theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of the owner's business, so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant. Yes. The liability of Saturnino Cortez, the owner of the truck, and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis, namely, that of contract. The reason for this conclusion reaches to the findings of the trial court concerning the position of the truck on the bridge, the speed in operating the machine, and

2.

the lack of care employed by the chauffeur. In its broader aspects, the case is one of two drivers approaching a narrow bridge from opposite directions, with neither being willing to slow up and give the right of way to the other, with the inevitable result of a collision and an accident Disposition In consonance with the foregoing rulings, the judgment appealed from will be modified, and the plaintiff will have judgment in his favor against the defendants Manuel Gutierrez, Abelardo Velasco, and Saturnino Cortez, jointly and severally, for the sum of P5,000, and the costs of both instances. RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA) 135 SCRA 242 ABAD SANTOS; February 28, 1985 NATURE: Petition to review a decision of CA FACTS: Roberto Luna, a businessman, was killed in a vehicular collision (between Luna, driving a gokart, and Luis dela Rosa, 13 years old, driving a Toyota car without a license) at a gokart practice area. Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages against Luis and his father, which the CFI ruled in favor of the Lunas, awarding P1,650,000 as unearned net earnings of Luna, P12,000 compensatory damages, and P50,000 for loss of his companionship (come on!!), with legal interest from date of the decision, and attorneys fees of P50,000 (no interest mentioned). (Note: father and son solidarily liable for damages.) The Dela Rosas appealed in the CA, which affirmed in toto the RTC. In a MFR filed by the Dela Rosas, the CA modified the decision, this time reducing the unearned income to P450,000. Both parties filed separate petitions for review in the SC. Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for lack of merit. The instant petition is the one filed by Lunas, contending that the CA erred in reducing the award for unearned income, and that the award for attys fees should include legal interest. Pending the decision, the SC came out with a resolution ordering the Dela Rosas, in the interest of justice (since the death took place in 1970, and 15 years after the process of litigation is still not over), to pay the Lunas P450,000 for unearned net earnings, P12,000 compensatory damages, P50,000 for loss of companionship, all with legal interest, and attys fees of P50,000, within 30 days. The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts, saying that they had no cash money. The writ of execution produced only a nominal amount. In the meantime, Luis is already of age, married, with 2 kids, and living in Spain but only causally employed (His compensation is hardly enough to support his family. He has no assets of his own as yet). ISSUES: 1. WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned income 2. WON the award for attys fees should have legal interest HELD: 1. YES Ratio: The reduction of the award of net unearned earnings had no basis, thus is void. Reasoning: the RTC based its computation of the net unearned earnings on 2 factors: life expectancy of the deceased of another 30 years, and an annual net income of P55,000 (P75,000 gross income less P20,000 personal expenses). In coming out with the life expectancy, RTC considered the age and health of the deceased. However, the CA modified this by factoring in the engagement of Luna in car racing, thus lowering the life expectancy to only 10 years. WRT to the gross income, RTC considered the various positions the deceased held at the time of his death, and the

trend of his earnings over the span of his last few years, thus coming up with a potential gross income of P75,000. However, the CA increased the annual personal expenses to P30,000, due to the escalating gasoline expenses, thus lowering the net annual unearned income to P45,000. CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racing reduced the life expectancy. There is nothing on record that supports the claim that the car racing was a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life expectancy. That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then gokart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for gokarts are extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only slightly larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled conveyances. It was error on the part of the CA to have disturbed the determination of the RTC which it had previously affirmed. Also, it was an error to increase the expenses without increasing the gross income. It stands to reason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because of the escalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing [a statement which lacks complete basis], it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase considering the manifold sources thereof 2. YES Ratio: The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and under the circumstances, interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court. (The attys fees should accrue interest from the date of filing of the compliant.) Obiter: The Dela Rosas invoke the ruling in Elcano v Hilll, where the court held that A2180 applied to Atty. Hill nothwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of his son, but since the son had attained majority, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill became merely subsidiarily to that of his son. The Dela Rosas now invoke that the father should also be held only subsidiarily. To this contention, the court is unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law because to do so will not serve the ends of justice. Luis is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine Courts. Also, he has no property in the Phils or elsewhere. Disposition: resolution of CA SET ASIDE, reinstating the earlier decision with slight modification regarding the award of attys fees. LIBI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (SPS GOTIONG) 214 SCRA 16 REGALADO; Sept. 18,1992 NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court. FACTS - respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from which she died on January 14,1979, was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same event on the same date. - More than 2 years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up with Wendell after she found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. - January, 1979 - Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the Julie refused, prompting him

to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso - January 14,1979 - Julie and Wendell died from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm licensed under Cresencio Libi, father of Wendell - both set of parents came up with versions of the story Gotiongs: > Wendell caused her death by shooting her and thereafter turning the gun on himself to commit suicide Libis: > an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell's death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification - CFI Cebu: Gotiongs filed civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter's vicarious liability under A2180 CC. CFI dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of the evidence. - IAC: CFI decision set aside and found Libis subsidiarily liable ISSUE WON A2180 CC is applicable in making Libis liable for vicarious liability HELD YES Ratio The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under A2180 CC. Reasoning - undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It should be emphasized, however, that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not as the body was cleaned already in the funeral parlor - Amelita Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita's key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was. - A2180': The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by A2180 CC covers obligations wising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.' - BUT Liability is not subsidiary BUT primary > if the liability of the parents for crimes and QDs of their minor children is subsidiary, they they can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damages. But if the liability id direct and primary, the diligence would constitute a valid substantial defense. HENCE, LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR QDS OF THEIR MINOR KIDS AS CONTEMPLATED IN A2180 ID PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY

> applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint tortfeasors) the parent is also solidarily liable with the child. THE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR FELONIES IS LIKEWISE PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY. A101 RPC SAYS SO > RULES: + for civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the legal authority and control or who live in the company of the parents: PRIMARY = premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex delicto by kids 9 or under or 9-15 but without discernment = premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with discernment or 1521 (now 18) + liability effected against father or mother? BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUHTORITY OVER THE MINOR = youth welfare code = FC: responsibility of parents + for civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors: same rules in A2180 and A2182 Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio, Bundoc) 209 SCRA 518 Feliciano, J; 1992 NATURE: Appeal for review of CA decision FACTS - On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then aged ten, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. He was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide but was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability ob the ground that he had acted without discernment. The adopting and natural parents of Jennifer filed a civil complaint for damages against the parents of Bundoc. - The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not the indispensable party in the action as their son adopted by the spouses Rapisura on November 18, 1982 via an adoption decree granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur. The trial Court agreed with the respondents and dismissed the complaint. - The case contained procedural questions which were raised in the appeal. The SC however decided to hear the appeal based on substantial justice. ISSUE - WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party to the tort action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. HELD- Yes. The Court held that parental authority did not retroactively transfer to and vested in the adopting parents at the time the shooting incident occurred. The adopting parents had no actual or physical custody of Adelberto at the time of the incident as they were then in the US were they live. To do so and hold them liable for the tortious act when be unfair and unconscionable. Reasoning- The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on quasidelict against him under Article 2176. However, because of his minority, the provision of Article 2180 would be applicable. Article 2180 reads the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible The father and, incase of his death or incapacity, the mother are responsible for the damages caused by the children who live in their company The responsibility treated of in this Article

shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. - The principle of parental liability is designated as vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed liability under the AngloAmerican tort law. Thus, under this doctrine, a person is not only liable for torts committed by him also torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsibility. Thus parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of the parents which include the instructing, controlling, and disciplining of the child. The presumption under law is that when a child under their care commits a tortuous act the parents were negligent in the performance of these duties and responsibilities. As stated, sufficient proof can be presented to overcome this presumption. Disposition Petition granted. Decision set aside. Cuadra v. Monfort Makalintal G.R. L-24101 | Sept. 30, 1970 | FACTS Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six. Their teacher assigned them, together with three other classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises. Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband. Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and, to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, first on July 20 and again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all of which the parents spent the sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye. In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit. ISSUES & ARGUMENTS W/N the parents are liable for the acts of their minor child when the act or omission of the child is committed in the absence of the parents. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI: NO. There is no meticulously calibrated measure applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage," it implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of such diligence the damage could have been prevented. There is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his

child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. The act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents. The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate her suffering, compulsion of good conscience.

2.

GUARDIANS

FAMILY CODE: Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated: (1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214; (2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and (3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified. Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed. (349a, 351a, 354a) Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency. (314a) Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. CIVIL CODE: Arts 2180-2181: supra