VI PERSONS LIABLE A. THE TORTFEASOR B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY 1. PARENTS 2. GUARDIANS 3.

TEACHERS & HEAD OF INSTITUTIONS

Art. 218, FC. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a) Art. 219, FC. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasidelicts. (n) Art. 2180, CC. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)

MERCADO v. COURT OF APPEALS AND QUISUMBING L-14342 LABRADOR; May 30, 1960 NATURE: This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS: - Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son of his coplaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L. Quisumbing, while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L. Mercado, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic School on Kanlaon, Quezon City. - A "pitogo", which figures prominently in this case, may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. On February 22, 1956, Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a "pitogo". As a result, Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor. ISSUES 1. WON the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the of the father since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during recess time) 2. WON the moral damages fixed at P2,000 are excessive. HELD 1. NO. The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made liable, is as follows: ART. 2180. . . . Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. - It would be seemed that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. - Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. 2. YES. It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty, of a quasi-delict causing physical injuries, within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 2219. Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the moral damages, yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's resentment, which motivated the assault, was occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo from Renato." It is, therefore, apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy. (Art. 2179, Civil Code.) After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which authorizes the grant of moral damages, was shown to have existed. Consequently, the grant of moral damages is not justified.

PALISOC VS. BRILLANTES 41 SCRA 548 TEEHANKEE; October 4, 1971 NATURE: An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a decision of the CFI Manila. FACTS: - Palisoc spouses as parents of their 16-year old son, Dominador Palisoc, and a student in automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute filed the action below for damages arising from the death of their son at the hands of a fellow student, defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory room of the said Institute. - the deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates, and one afternoon, they, together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. At that time the classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained consciousness; finally he died. - Defendants were: Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time when the incident occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute; Teodosio Valenton, the president thereof; Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged; and Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow student of the deceased. - At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single proprietorship, but lately, it was duly incorporated. - the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. - The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute, in this wise: In the opinion of the Court, this article(art.2180) of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar, since this contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the teachers and heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the parents...The clause "so long as they remain in their custody" contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents...There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the school. ISSUE WON the school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors with Daffon. HELD a. YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute, Valenton and Quibulue, respectively) Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child." In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and

hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. Reasoning - The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs. Court of Appeals, that "(I)t would seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence. It is true that under the law abovequoted, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody, but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution" - phrase used in the cited article "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. - At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. b. NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of directors and the school) itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant - the school had been incorporated since and therefore the school itself, as thus incorporated, should have been brought in as party defendant. DISPOSITION The judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as follows: . 1. Sentencing the Daffon, Valenton and Quibulue jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b) P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral, damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of earning power and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this action in both instances; 2. absolving defendant Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3. dismissing defendants' counterclaims. . REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring: -I would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils who are minors is not in accord with the plain text of the law. - Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority, the article expressly so provides, as in the case of the parents and of the guardians. It is natural to expect that if the law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article, it would have expressly so stated. The fact that it has not done so indicates

an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of persons under age. Further, it is not without significance that - finally, that while in the case of parents and guardians, their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age, the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter. MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting: - I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado v. Court of Appeals. I think it is highly unrealistic and conducive to unjust results, considering the size of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions, academic and non-academic, as well as the temper, attitudes and often destructive activism of the students, to hold their teachers and/or the administrative heads of the schools directly liable for torts committed by them. - It would demand responsibility without commensurate authority, rendering teachers and school heads open to damage suits for causes beyond their power to control. - one other factor constrains me to dissent. The opinion of the majority states: "Here, the parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident." Note that for parental responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in their company...it stands to reason that (1) the clause "so long as they remain in their custody" as used in reference to teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase "who live in their company" as used in reference to parents; and (2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their children who are no longer minors, so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of their students in the same age category.

dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher is physically present and in a position to prevent it. Thus, for injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him. In any event, the school may be held to answer for the acts of its teacher or the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior, but it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. Such defense they had taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180. Basis of teachers vicarious liability is, as such, they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents). However teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child. As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the school remised in the discharged of their duties, they were exonerated of liability. (Note the court view on increasing students activism likely causing violence resulting to injuries, in or out of the school premises J. Guttierez, Jr concurringly said many student x x x view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or reactionary group whose advice on behavior deportment and other non-academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected. It seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship. The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has outlived its purpose. The court cannot make law, it can only apply the law with its imperfections. However the court can suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed. PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY) 160 SCRA 785 PARAS; April 25, 1988 NATURE Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order dismissing the complaint as against the respondent school and denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal. FACTS - A group of students walking inside Araneta University were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karin Madidis alias Teng. Petitioner (Reynaldo) was subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to be hospitalized and to undergo surgery. - Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC - Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the provision only applies to vocational schools and not to academic institutions. They also claim that the civil liability in this case

AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLLETOS) 160 SCRA 315 CRUZ; April 15, 1988 Facts: It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes. Alfredo went to the school to submit his Report in Physic. While they were in the auditorium of their school, he was shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon. ISSUE: WON Art 2180 is applicable. Held: Yes. Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools, academic or nonacademic. Teachers are liable for acts of their student except where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be answerable. There is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic and non-academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student under their control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. x x x x The distinction no longer obtains at present. x x x The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not ended, or has ended or has not yet begun. The term custody signifies that the student is within the control and influence of the school authorities. The teacher in charge is the one designated by the

arose from a crime, which they did not commit. Since it was a civil case, respondent school claims that a demand should have been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to bring an action for damages against respondent school. MTD was granted by the CA. - Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of Dismissal. Motion was denied due to insufficient justification to disturb ruling. ISSUE WON the Art 2180 CC1 applies to academic institutions HELD It is unnecessary to answer the issue. What the petitioner wants to know is WON the school or the university itself is liable. The answer is no since the provision speaks of teachers or heads Dispositive WHEREFORE, this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he could get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing position. As a result thereof, Ylarde sustained injuries and died three (3) days later. Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education; (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person; and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence. ISSUE WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the Civil Code, both private respondents can be held liable for damages. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:

YLARDE vs. AQUINO GANCAYCO; 1988 July 29 NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari FACTS Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. At that time, the school was littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren, another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez stated burying them all by himself. Deciding to help his colleague, private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils, aged ten to eleven. Being their teacher-in-charge, he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. The work was left unfinished. The following day, also after classes, private respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging. These four pupils ---- Reynaldo Alonso, Fransico Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep. At this point, private respondent Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging. When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. Then, said private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away. Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope. Before leaving, private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone." A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left, three of the four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for

"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter." On the other hand, the applicable provision of Article 2180 states: "Art. 2180. . . . xxx xxx xxx

"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." HELD Only Aquino, the teacher, is liable. Ratio: As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Reasoning: This is in line with the Courts ruling in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held liable. Ratio: Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. Reasoning: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling;

1 "Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody."

(4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's safety; and (5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance. (6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent, it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity. This should not be the case. The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. Bearing this in mind, We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence. DISPOSITION: Granted.

SALVOSA v. IAC (CASTRO) 166 SCRA 274 PADILLA, J.: October 5, 1988 FACTS Jimmy Abon, a commerce student of Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro, a student of the University of Baguio on 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF. BCF is both an academic and arts and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP. Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc. as party defendants. After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision, (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc., jointly and severally, to pay private respondents, as heirs of Napoleon Castro; (2) absolving the other defendants; and (3) dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for lack of merit. ISSUE WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon. HELD NO. Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts. Ratio: Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and

teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time." Reasoning: a. The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the CA. According to the CA, while it is true that Abon was not attending any class or school function at the time of the shooting incident, which was at about 8 o'clock in the evening; but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit, he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. The time interval is safely within the "recess time" that the trial court spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case, supra. In line with the case of Palisoc, 17 a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law. b. Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v CA(Castillo/Cadiz) 194 SCRA 340 Paras, J.: Feb. 25, 1991 NATURE: Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS: -Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student at St. Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach, Quezon. His parents didnt allow him to go due to short notice but directed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight home. However, he was persuaded by his teachers to go and later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher. -his parents filed a complaint against St. Francis HS, represented by its principal, Illumin, and several teachers for damages incurred from the death of their son, contending that it occurred due to petitioners failure to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family. The TC found against the teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim. Also, the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were not even in the area as they went off drinking. The TC dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which was not school sanctioned, and as the latter had her own class to supervise then and was not actually invited. -Both parties appealed to the CA. On the issue of the liability of St. Francis HS and the Illumin, the CA held that both are liable st th th under Article 2176 taken together with the 1 , 4 , and 5 paragraphs of Article 2180. They cannot escape liability simply because it wasnt an extra-curricular activity of the HS. From the evidence, it was shown that the principal had known of the picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the holding of the event. As such, under Article 2180, both are jointly and severally liable w/ the teachers for the damages incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the owner/manager (St. Francis and the principal). Petitioners contend that the victims parents failed to prove by evidence that they didnt give their son consent to join the picnic. The Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence

of their liability. Also, 2 of the teachers who arrived after the drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers. Hence this petition. ISSUE (1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants (2) WON Art. 2180, in relation to 2176 is applicable (3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper HELD (1) NO. Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or the negligence of people under them. At the outset, it should be noted that the victims parents allowed their son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical cross examination. -Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to it. If the CAs findings are to be upheld, employers will be forever exposed to the risk and danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are committed while they are not in the performance of their duties. -No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised diligence of a good father of the family. In fact, 2 P.E. teachers were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in First Aid and swimming. Life savers were brought in the event of such an accident. The records also show that the 2 P.E. teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim. (2) NO. The CA erred in applying Art. 2180, particularly par 4. For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task. In the case at bar, the teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned activity. (3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the diligence required of them, no moral or exemplary damages under Art. 2177 may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses. PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is SET ASIDE

ISSUES (1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and 2180 HELD (1) NO. Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the parties, the rules on quasidelict do not really govern; but the court has repeatedly held that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a contract. -Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroad: the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties -Using the test in Cangco, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to PSBAs liability; hence, any finding of negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual obligation only. -When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment, a contract is established between them, resulting in a bilateral obligation. The school is obliged to provide the student with an education, along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the undertaking of imparting knowledge. In turn, the student abides by the schools academic requirements and observes its rules and regulations. However, a school cannot be an insurer for its students against all risks; one can only expect it to employ the degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place. - In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the contract was breached due to PSBAs negligence in providing proper security measures. At this stage, the proceedings have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondents complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which only the TC can determine. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners. SOLIMAN, JR. V JUDGE TUAZON 209 SCAR 47 FELICIANO, J; May 18, 1992 NATURE: Civil complaint for damages FACTS - On August 13, 1982, while the plaintiff Maximo Soliman, Jr., a student of the defendant Republic Central Colleges (RCC), was in the campus premises thereof, the defendant, Jimmy Solomon, who was then in the premises of said school performing his duties as security guard under the employment of defendant R.L. Security Agency, Inc., without any provocation, shot the plaintiff on the abdomen. The plaintiff was confined in a hospital, and as per doctor's opinion, he may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to four months. Petitioner, represented by his guardian, filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC, RL Security Agency and Solomon, - RCC filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the complaint stated no cause of action against it. It argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the reason that it was not the employer of the security guard Solomon, and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. It further argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of the Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph holds

PSBA v CA (BENITEZ/BAUTISTA) 205 SCRA 729 Padilla, J.: Feb. 4, 1992 FACTS rd -Carlitos Bautista, enrolled in the 3 year commerce course of PSBA, was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants who were from outside the schools academic community. This prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w/ Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers, alleging negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack of the victim. -PSBA sought to dismiss the case, alleging that since they were presumably sued under Art 2180, there was no cause of action since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision. -A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by the TC, yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA. Hence this petition.

teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the school. - Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCs motion to dismiss. Petitioners MFR was denied, Hence, this appeal. ISSUES 1. WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180, as well as those of Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code 2. WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis in law, for the injury sustained by petitioner HELD 1. NO - Under Art. 2180, the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for one's own act or omission, but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible. Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or omissions of another person are the following: xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helper, acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. xxx xxx xxx Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils, their students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. - The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman, Jr. RCC was not the employer of Solomon. The employer of Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while the school was the client of the latter. It is settled that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients of such agency. There being no employer-employee relationship between RCC and Solomon, petitioner cannot impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon. - Since there is no question that Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges, he being in fact an employee of the R.L. Security Agency Inc., the other abovequoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon. - The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as follows: Art. 349. The following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority: xxx xxx xxx (2) Teachers and professors; xxx xxx xxx (4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to apprentices; xxx xxx xxx Art. 350. The persons named in the preceding article shall exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. xxx xxx xxx Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and student are fixed by government regulations and those of each school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student."

- In Palisoc v. Brillantes, the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc, a student of that Institute, which resulted from fist blows delivered by Daffon, another student of the Institute. It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v. Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th paragraph of Article 2180, quoted above; but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the instant case. - Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority. In the instant case, Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner, was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges; the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon. 2. YES - In the case of PSBA v CA, the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision. At the same time, however, the court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students for enrollment, on the one hand, and the students who are enrolled, on the other hand, which contract results in obligations for both parties. It held: When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or 'built-in' obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof. It was also pointed out in said case that: "In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code. - In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the school's motion to dismiss the complaint against it, and both the CA and this Court affirmed the trial court's order. In the case at bar, the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC, upon the assumption that petitioner's cause of action was based, and could have been based, only on Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. As PSBA, however, states, acts which are tortious or

allegedly tortious in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC. Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition, to treat the comment of respondent Colleges as its answer, and to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to dismiss the case.This case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings.

ST. MARYS ACADEMY VS. CARPITANOS PARDO, February 6, 2002 NATURE: Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR FACTS (this case was already assigned in PFR) -Sherwin Carpitanos, together with James Daniel II (then 15, driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and was driving the jeep, Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle turned turtle. It was found out that the steering wheel guide was detached. Carpitanos sued the school, James Daniel II, his parents, and Vivencio Villanueva. -TC: absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II, held parents and school liable -CA: school liable under A218 and 219, FC, finding that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle without a teacher accompanying them. ISSUE (regarding liability of St. Marys Academy) WON St. Marys Academy should be held liable for death of Sherwin Carpitanos, and therefore, liable for damages HELD NO. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Ratio. For the school to be liable, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. Reasoning. The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. -Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so reliance on A219 is unfounded. -There was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva was in possession and in control of the jeep, and was in fact the one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep. -Liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering

wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident. - It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. Disposition. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial court.[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Marys Academy, Dipolog City. No costs. SO ORDERED.

4. OWNERS & MANAGERS OF ESTABLISHMENT

PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM FORWARDERS 63 SCRA 231 AQUINO; March 25, 1975 NATURE: Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision FACTS - PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, Inc., its manager BALINGIT and the driver, PINEDA. - It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight TRUCK, owned by Phil-Am, along the natl highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan, owned by Phil Rabbit. Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79 days. This deprived the company of earnings of about P8,600. - Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that Balingit was not Pineda's employer. Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him. - CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Art.2180 CC. - In the appeal, the bus company also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T. This implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality. But this was not alleged in their complaint.* ISSUE WON the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" used in Art. 2180 NCC (Art.1903 OCC) embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck (this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue!) HELD NO Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of Establishments: Art.2180 uses the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) to mean "employer.

- Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. * This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be unfair to allow them to do so now. The case has to be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses. Dispositive Lower courts order of dismissal is AFFIRMED.

-Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, and denied MFR -Hence, this appeal ISSUE WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for damages HELD Yes. -Civil Case No. 373 is an action for damages based on quasi2 3 delict under Article 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code against petitioner Manilhig and his employer, petitioner Philtranco, respectively. -We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco, for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint and several or solidary with the driver. As to solidarity, Article 2194 expressly provides: the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. -Since the employer's liability is primary, direct and solidary, its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides: Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed. (with regard to this issue) CASTILEX V. VASQUEZ Dec. 21, 1999. Davide Facts: At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmea Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St. In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay

5. EMPLOYERS
PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA) 273 SCRA 562 DAVIDE; June 17, 1997 NATURE: Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA FACTS -Civil Case No. 373 was an action against herein petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A. Acuesta -Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of gross negligence, recklessness, violation of traffic rules and regulations, abandonment of victim, and attempt to escape from a crime Private Respondents Version -In the early morning of March 24, 1990, about 6:00 oclock, the victim Ramon A. Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez Street -On the Magsaysay Blvd., defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No. 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine. -The Magsaysay Blvd. runs perpendicular to Gomez St. and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of the said Gomez Street. -As the bus was pushed, its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A. Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus. -As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly, its running motion was also enhanced by the said functioning engine, thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim Ramon A. Acuesta who, as a result thereof fell and, thereafter, was run over by the said bus. Petitioners Version -Manilhig, in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City, warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog. -While the bus was slowly and moderately cruising along Gomez Street, the victim, who was biking towards the same direction as the bus, suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road. -The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn, the victim was bumped from behind and run over by the bus. -Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees, including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired. -Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim in overtaking two tricycles, without taking precautions such as seeing first that the road was clear, which caused the death of the victim **Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents

(limited to that involved in the outline) 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter 3Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxxxxxxxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. xxxxxxxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. xxxxxxxxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage
2Art.

whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur. After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the accident, a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. So, the present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the same action, Cebu Doctor's Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez. Issue: WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle. Held: Castilez is absolved from any liability. The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD. Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should apply. Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task. A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks. The Court of Appeals cannot, therefore, be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case. Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. As to

whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact, which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative. Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even finality at times. This rule is, however, subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or conjectures. Such exception obtain in the present case to warrant review by this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioner's vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a manager. On the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned tasks, ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle, registered under the name of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner. No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment, an employee is engaged in his employer's business in the operation of a motor vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the employee's action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each state of facts. The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances. The SC does not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. It used the principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle: I. Operation of Employer's Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer. Evidence that by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled to reduce his timeoff and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the findings that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle. II. Operation of Employer's Vehicle in Going to or from Work In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employer's motor vehicle. 14 cda The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive home in the employer's vehicle as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work earlier and, presumably, spending more time at his actual duties. Where the employee's duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed place or hours of work, or to go to and from his home to various outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use in his work, the courts have frequently

applied what has been called the "special errand" or "roving commission" rule, under which it can be found that the employee continues in the service of his employer until he actually reaches home. However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or from work in his employer's vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident, the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own. III. Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip. The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer's business or within the scope of his assigned task. ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m., way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his position. FILAMER V IAC 212 SCRA 637 GUTIERREZ SR; August 17, 1992 NATURE: Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - Funtecha is a scholar of FCI. He is also employed as a janitor. The president of FCI is Agustin Masa. Agustin has a son, Allan, who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver. Allan lives with his dad. Funtecha also lives in the presidents house free of charge while a student at FCI. - It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home, then go back to the school, then go home in the school jeep. He is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the morning hes supposed to fetch the kids and bring them to school. - One night, Funtecha wanted to drive home. He has a student license. After a dangerous curb, and seeing that the road was clear, Allan let Funtecha drive. Then there was a fast moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights. Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan. Kapunan was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians). The jeep had only one functioning headlight that night.

- TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan. SC reversed, saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable. ISSUE WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be held liable HELD: YES - Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day. - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student driver's license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms. - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not, having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage. Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's business. - Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan. There were no rules and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons other than the driver. There was thus no supervision on the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the jeep. - The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees. The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.

NPC v CA (PHESCO INC.) 294 CRA 209 ROMERO; August 14, 1998 NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City. Unfortunately, enroute to its destination, one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-oncollision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers. - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC with the main duty of supplying workers and technicians for the latter's projects, but in this case it was alleged that they own the dump trucks). - The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability. PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court's judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing NPC to pay damages. ISSUE WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba, driver of the dump truck, which should be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims HELD YES - In the provisions of the "Memorandum of Understanding" entered into by PHESCO and NPC, we are convinced that PHESCO was engaged in "labor only" contracting. In a "labor only" contract, the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him. Finding that a contractor was a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the "labor-only" contractor, including the latter's workers. - Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides: "Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry." - In this regard, NPC's liability is direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver. Of course, NPC, if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it, shall have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action. DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY 397 SCRA 75 VITUG, J/February 6, 2003 NATURE: APPEAL from CAs DECISION - 14 Oct 1993, about 730pm, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). - While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. - A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. - No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks.

- At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. - Marjorie Navidad (Nicanors widow), along with their children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. - LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards. - The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. - TC: Rendered in favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following: "a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00; 2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00; 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00; b) Moral damages of P50,000.00; c) Attorneys fees of P20,000; d) Costs of suit. - TC: dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit. -Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. - CA: exonerated Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts: a) P44,830.00 as actual damages; b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages; c) P50,000.00 as moral damages; d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and e) P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees. -CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train. - CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000. ISSUES: WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR. WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NAVIDAD LRTAs CLAIMS: -Escartins assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. - NO employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA. Navidads Contention: - A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation, and that the appellate

court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier. HELD: 1. NO. The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. - PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort under the 12 provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in 13 conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. (But there wasnt any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise, however, for the employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. - Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. - A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 14 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. - In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply. 2. YES. There is no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability as Prudent is. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence. REASONING: - Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. - The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides: "Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. "Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755." "Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the formers employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.

"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees." "Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carriers employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission." -The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. - Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage - The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. - In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which LRTA and Roman, according to the CA, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved. DISPOSITION: CAS DECISION AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs. ______________
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. 13 Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. 14 Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
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MCKEE V IAC (TAYAG & MANALO) 221 SCRA 517 Davide, Jr.; July 16, 1992 NATURE: Petition to review the resolution of the CA FACTS - On January 8, 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, owned by private respondents, Jaime Tayag and Rosalina Manalo, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George McKee, Christopher McKee and Araceli McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort. - Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with 200 cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When the northbound car was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge. - Please see first Mckee digest for details on the collision. - Civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were filed as a result of a vehicular accident. ISSUE WON the owners of the cargo truck (Tayag and Manalo) are liable for the resulting damages HELD YES - The Court rules that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver, Manalo and Tayag are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Article 2180 reads as follows: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. xxx xxx xxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. - The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.

VALENZUELA v CA (LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC.) 253 SCRA 303 KAPUNAN; February 7, 1996 NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving when she realized she had a flat tire. She parked along the sidewalk of Aurora Blvd., put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a car driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. - Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. She filed a claim for damages against defendant. - Lis alibi was that he was driving at 55kph when he was suddenly confronted with a speeding car coming from the opposite direction. He instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted. Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that plaintiff was the one who was reckless or negligent. -RTC found Li and Alexander solidarily liable. CA absolved Alexander. ISSUE 1. WON Li was grossly negligent in driving the company issued car 2. WON Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence 3. WON Alexander Commercial is liable as Lis employer HELD 1. YES - The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were alert as every driver should be to those conditions. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Physiological "fight or flight" mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc. Li's failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident could therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast" speed as testified by one of the witneses; and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol. Either factor working independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela's car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply his brakes. - Li was, therefore, negligent in driving his company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer 2. NO - Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger

and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. - While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought or the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoroughful care, but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. - Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others. It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. 3. YES - Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car, the managerial employee or company sales agent. As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose of furthering the company's image, a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly. - In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident. DISPOSITION Judgment of RTC reinstated.

condition. This latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor, especially when he attempted to use his money for mathematical calculations. - Witnesses testified that plaintiffs physical and mental condition before the accident was excellent. He was one of the best contractors of wooden buildings. He could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. He had to dissolve a partnership that he had with an engineer and give up a contract for the construction of a building. - Trial court held that the collision was due solely on the negligence of the chauffeur and awarded the plaintiff the sum of P14, 741. - Act No. 2457 was enacted. It states that E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the AttorneyGeneral of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defendant said Government at the same. ISSUES WON the government is liable for the damages resulting from a tort committed by an agent or employee of the government HELD NO Ratio The State is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903. Reasoning - In the United States the rule is that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest. - As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus: By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. - Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. - The obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on

6. STATE
MERRITT v GOVERNMENT 34 Phil 311 TRENT; March 31, 1916 NATURE: Appeal from decision of the CFI FACTS - E. Merritt, riding on a motorcycle, was hit by the General Hospital ambulance, which turned suddenly and unexpectedly to Taft Avenue without sounding any whistle or horn, in contravention of an ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act. - Plaintiff was so severely injured. His leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental

the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal an that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. - The Civil Code in chap 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or negligence; and whereas in the first article thereof. No. 1902, where the general principle is laid down that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage, the following articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage, because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to proof, however, because, as held in the last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage, and among these persons, called upon to answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it acts through the agency of a special agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault or negligence, which is the original basis of this kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with the state. - Although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting in the name and representation of the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers, yet said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official, acting in the exercise of his powers, in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of the property which they hold in sublease. - The responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. - The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. - The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903

On the computation of damages The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the award awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the first. As to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court, however, limited the time to 2months and 21 days, which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think there was error, because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of 6 months. The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only 2 months and 21 days while the remainder of the 6 months was spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for the whole time. We, therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is P18,075. Dispositive Judgment appealed from reversed. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts. ROSETE v AUDITOR GENERAL 81 Phil 453 FERIA; August 31, 1948 NATURE: Appeal from the decision of the Insular Auditor FACTS - Jose Panlilio ignited his lighter near a drum into which gasoline was being drained causing fire in the warehouse of Emergency Control Administration (ECA, a government agency). - The fire destroyed the building owned by the petitioner, thereby giving rise to this claim for damages against Panlilio for his negligence and the officers of ECA for storing gasoline in said warehouse contrary to the provisions of ordinances of the City of Manila (ordinance requires a license for storing flammable substances, which ECA didnt have). - Insular Auditor dismissed the claim hence this appeal. ISSUE WON the government is liable for the damages HELD: NO - Art. 1903 of the Civil Code reads: Art. 1903. The obligation imposed in the preceding article is enforceable not only for personal acts and omission but also for those persons for whom another is responsible. xx The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom it properly pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. - In the case of Merritt v. Government, the court held the following: The state is not responsible for the damage suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office n relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the

state acts as a juridical person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. xx That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order by the commission, foreign to the exercise of duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. - There being no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to the ECA or its officers, was done by a special agent, because the officers of the ECA did not act as special agents of the government within the above defined meaning of that wod in Article 1903 of the Civil Code in storing gasoline in the warehouse of ECA, the government is not responsible for damages caused through such negligence. - Although there is an act (Act No. 327) authorizing the filing of claims against the government with the Insular Auditor, and appeal by private persons or entities from the latters decision to the Supreme Court, it does not make any and all claims against the government allowable, and the latter responsible for all claims. DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is affirmed. MENDOZA V. DE LEON G.R. L-9596 Trent Feb. 11, 1916 FACTS y Plaintiff was the grantee of an exclusive lease privilege under Act No. 1643 of the Philippine Commission. After a little over one year, plaintiff was forcibly ejected under and pursuant to a resolution adopted by the defendants-members of the municipal council of Villasis, Pangasinan. y Thus, plaintiff brought action against such individual members for damages. Act No. 1643 provides that the use of each fishery, fish-breeding ground, ferry, stable, market, and slaughterhouse belonging to any municipality or township shall be let to the highest bidder annually or for such longer period not exceeding five years as may have been previously approved by the provincial board of the province in which the municipality or township is located. ISSUE: W/N the municipality is liable for acts of its officers or agents in the performance of governmental functions. HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI y It depends. In this case, it is not liable. y When the acts of its officers come within the powers which it has as agent of the state, it is exempt from liability for its own acts and the acts of its officers; if the acts of the officer or agent of the city are for the special benefits of the corporation in its private or corporate interest, such officer is deemed the agent or servant of the city, but where the act is not in relation to a private or corporate interest of the municipality, but for the benefit of the public at large, such acts by the agents and servants are deemed to be acts by public or state officers, and for the public benefit. Governmental affairs do not lose their governmental character by being delegated to the municipal governments. The state being immune for

injuries suffered by private individuals in the administration of strictly governmental functions, like immunity is enjoyed by the municipality in the performance of the same duties, unless it is expressly made liable by statute. A municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent performance of its corporate or proprietary or business functions. In the administration of its patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private corporation or individual so far as its liability to third persons on contract or in tort is concerned. Its contracts, validly entered into, may be enforced and damages may be collected from it for the torts of its officers or agents within the scope of their employment in precisely the same manner and to the same extent as those of private corporations or individuals. As to such matters the principles of respondeat superior applies. It is for these purposes that the municipality is made liable to suits in the courts. The leasing of a municipal ferry to the highest bidder for a specified period of time is not a governmental but a corporate function. Such a lease, when validly entered into, constitutes a contract with the lessee which the municipality is bound to respect. It cannot be said that in rescinding the contract with the plaintiff, thereby making the municipality liable to an action for damages for no valid reason at all, the defendant councilors were honestly acting for the interests of the municipality. The defendants are liable jointly and severally for the damages sustained by the plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of the ferry privilege in question.

FONTANILLA V MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINSITRATION 194 SCRA 486 PARAS; Feb 27, 1991 NATURE: Resolution FACTS The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions, but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its driver Garcia, who was not its special agent. o NIA believes this bases this on:  PD 552 amended some provisions of RA 3601 (the law which created the NIA)  The case of Angat River Irrigation System v. Angat River Workers Union Angat Case: Although the majority opinion declares that the Angat System, like the NIA, exercised a governmental function because the nature of its powers and functions does not show that it was intended to bring to the Government any special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit, a strong dissenting opinion held that Angat River system is a government entity exercising proprietary functions. The Angat dissenting opinion: Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. He argued that although his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17, 1976, since his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment had lasted for five years, he had acquired the status of regular employee and could not be removed except for valid cause. -

The employment contract of 1971 was executed when the Labor Code of the Philippines had not yet been promulgated, which came into effect some 3 years after the perfection of the contract.

ISSUE WON the NIR is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, thereby opening it up to the possibility that it may be held liable for the damages caused by its driver, who was not its special agent HELD YES Reasoning the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make the NIA essentially and purely a "governmentfunction" corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands. NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, thus is governed by the Corporation Law. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3601 provides: Sec. 1. Name and Domicile A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration. . . . which shall be organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces, for the proper conduct of its business. (Emphasis for emphasis). Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides that: (b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water from all irrigation systems constructed by or under its administration, such fees or administration charges as may be necessary to cover the cost of operation, maintenance and insurance, and to recover the cost of construction within a reasonable period of time to the extent consistent with government policy; to recover funds or portions thereof expended for the construction and/or rehabilitation of communal irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a special fund for irrigation development under section 2 hereof; Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be preferred liens first, upon the land benefited, and then on the crops raised thereon, which liens shall have preference over all other liens except for taxes on the land, and such preferred liens shall not be removed until all fees or administration charges are paid or the property is levied upon and sold by the National Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. . . . The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued in court. It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors. Section 2, subsection (f): (f) . . . and to transact such business, as are directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment

of the above powers and objectives, including the power to establish and maintain subsidiaries, and in general, to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. DISPOSITION We conclude that the National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent. ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 26, 1990 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. The decision of this Court in G.R. No. 55963 and G.R. No. 61045 dated December 1, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED. DISSENTING: PADILLA: to say that NIA has opened itself to suit is one thing; to say that it is liable for damages arising from tort committed by its employees, is still another thing. The state or a government agency performing governmental functions may be held liable for tort committed by its employees only when it acts through a special agent. Art. 2189, CC. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. (n) CITY OF MANILA V TEOTICA 22 SCRA 267 CONCEPCION; January 29, 1968 NATURE: Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals. FACTS - Genaro N. Teotico, an accountant, was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, waiting for a jeep. After waiting 5 mins, he hailed a jeep that came to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeep, and took a few steps, he fell inside a manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a private practitioner. - Teotico filed with CFI Manila, a complaint which was, subsequently, amended for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. - Defense pointed out that because of the lucrative scrap iron business then prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin covers was rampant; that the Office of the City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers; that in order to prevent such thefts, the city government has changed the position and layout of catchbasins in the City by constructing them under the sidewalks with concrete cement covers and openings on the side of the gutter; and that these changes had been undertaken by the city from time to time

whenever funds were available. - CFI Manila sustained the theory of the defendants and dismissed the amended complaint, without costs. - This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila. - The first issue raised by the Manila is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of RA 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading: The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions. or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. - Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because RA 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines. ISSUES WON City of Manila should be held liable for the damages suffered by Teotica. HELD YES. Ratio RA 409,sec.4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189, CC governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon. Reasoning The assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made, for the first time, in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of Manila. Voting Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

REPUBLIC vs PALACIO 23 SCRA 899 REYES, J.B.L., J.: May 29, 1968 FACTS: Ortiz instituted action against Handong Irrigation Association to recover possession of land which HIA allegedly entered and occupied at the inducement of Irrigation Service Unit, an agency under the Dept. of Public Works and Communications. A writ of execution and order of garnishment was served against the deposits and trust funds of ISU to pay for the damages to Ortiz .CA upheld on the basis that ISU is engaged in the private business of purchase and sale of irrigationpumps. ISSUE: WON State or its fund can be made liable for damages HELD : NO RATIO: The ISU liability in inducing HIA to invade and occupy land of Ortiz arose from torts and not from contract.It is a wellentrenched rule in this jurisdiction that embodied in Art 2180 of CC that the State is only liable for tortscaused by its special agents especially commissioned to carry out the acts complained of outside of such agents regular duties.There being no proof that the making of the tortuous inducement was authorized, neither the state nor its fundscan be made liable.Other issues:Even if the liability of the state had been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to paythe judgment or not. Thus execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state.